FORGING CONSENSUS: HOW FRANJO TUĐMAN BECAME AN AUTHORITARIAN NATIONALIST

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If there is a consensus in the literature on the Yugoslav wars of succession, it is that Franjo Tudman was not merely a nationalist, but an authoritarian nationalist. Few today would doubt that judgment, but prior to 1993, Tudman’s reputation was more moderate. Tudman was not simply a nationalist. He had fought with the Partisans; he had written a prizewinning book on partisan warfare and another praising Tito; he had served on the board of Yugoslavia’s Military Encyclopedia; and he had been the first Director of the Institute for the Workers’ Movement in Croatia, handpicked for the job by the Party hierarchy. Jailed in 1972 for his efforts to liberalize Yugoslavia’s Communist system and again in 1981 for speaking to foreign journalists and besmirching the image of Yugoslavia, Tudman became a reluctant dissident during the 1970s. However, prior to 1989, most scholars did not consider him a dangerous nationalist or a racist or authoritarian, so it seems reasonable to ask how and when he came to be portrayed as an “authoritarian nationalist” who has been regularly paired with the Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević.

If there is a consensus in the literature on the Yugoslav wars of succession, it is that Franjo Tudman was not merely a nationalist, but an authoritarian nationalist. Few today would doubt that judgment, but prior to 1993, Tudman’s reputation was more moderate. Almost a decade before he was elected President of Croatia, Gale Stokes portrayed him as a dissident whose nationalism was essentially benign and whose focus on the “national question” was “salutary,”¹ and in 1991 Ivo Banac wrote that Tudman was “decidedly not an Ustaša.”² Both observations seemed obvious; Tudman had fought with the

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² Ivo Banac, ed., Eastern Europe in Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 180,
Partisans and he had written one of the few accounts in English of the NDH, the Independent State of Croatia created by the Ustaša—a Marxist analysis that roundly condemned the Croatian nationalist movement and its wartime state as fascist. So he was not an Ustaša. But he was certainly a nationalist; his own writings left no doubt on that score. He was also a Communist and an influential historian, whom Wayne Vucinich considered one of two prominent proponents of a Croatian interpretation of Yugoslav historiography.

Tudman was therefore not simply a nationalist. He had fought with the Partisans; he had written a prizewinning book on partisan warfare and another praising Tito; he had served on the board of Yugoslavia’s Military Encyclopedia; and he had been the first Director of the Institute for the Workers’ Movement in Croatia, handpicked for the job by the Party hierarchy. During the 1960s, he had joined the board of Matica Hrvatska’s reformist publication, Tjednik; he had helped to refurbish Stepan Radić’s image; and he had worked closely with Večeslav Holjevac on the staff of the immigrant organization, Matica iseljenika. He was one of the leaders of the reformist movement known variously as maspok (mass movement), the “Croatian national movement,” and the “Croatian Spring,” and his name appeared on a list of fifty key “counter revolutionaries” along with those of the leaders of Croatia’s League of Communists, Miko Tripalo and Savka Dabčević-Kučar; the Director of Croatia’s largest publishing house (Vjesnik), Božidar Novak; and two prominent student leaders, Dražen Budiša, and Ivan Zvonimir Ćičak. Jailed in 1972 for his efforts to liberalize Yugoslavia, he believed that Croatia was the object of “a vicious campaign designed to portray its leaders as latter-day Ustaša,” even though Franjo Tupman was “decidedly not an Ustaša.”


gosлавia’s Communist system and again in 1981 for speaking to foreign journalists and besmirching the image of Yugoslavia, Tuđman became a reluctant dissident during the 1970s. However, prior to 1989, scholars like Gale Stokes and Wayne Vucinich did not consider him a dangerous nationalist or a racist or authoritarian, so it seems reasonable to ask how and when he came to be portrayed as an “authoritarian nationalist” who has been regularly paired with the Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević.

The answer to that question is partly historical and partly historiographical. The historical part of the answer lies both in the Communist regime’s crackdown on reformists during the 1970s and its use of the sobriquets “nationalist” and “Ustaša” to discredit Croatian reformers and in the dearth of easily available informed and nonpartisan opinion regarding events in Yugoslavia after 1989. Only a handful of “Western” scholars were familiar with the country and its history, and the majority of them tended to support the regime, which they viewed as a leader of the nonaligned movement and a novel experiment offering an alternative to the dominant ideological systems. As a result, journalists, politicians, pundits, and scholars unfamiliar with the country gleaned what little information was easily available and integrated it into hurried analyses and ad hoc policy prescriptions. The historiographical part lies in the scholarly and popular literature about the former Yugoslavia, whose pro-Yugoslav and pro-Partisan bias necessarily carried a negative image of Croatia and Croatian nationalism, both of which were associated with separatism and the Axis.
This essay deals primarily with the second part of the question, although on occasion it discusses the history of the past two decades to set in context the historiography which influenced perceptions of Tuđman.

Was Tuđman a racist?

There had long been a tendency, particularly by those on the Left, to view Croatian nationalism as both conservative (because Croats had supported the Austrian monarchy in 1848 and fought with the Central Powers between 1914 and 1918), and tainted (because members of the Ustaša regime had committed heinous war crimes). There were two corollaries to this point of view—one, that Yugoslavia, as John Fine wrote, was “a beautiful society,” the other, that Serbian nationalism was essentially democratic. Beginning in the inter-war and postwar regimes), e.g., Stephen Clissold, *Croat Separatism: Nationalism, Dissidence, and Terrorism* (London Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1979); David Martin, *Allied Betrayed. The Uncensored Story of Tito and Mihailovich* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1946); J. B. Hoptner, *Yugoslavia in Crisis, 1934-1941* (New York: Columbia UP, 1962); Ladislaus Hory and Martin Broszat, *Der Kroatische Ustascha-Staat, 1941-1945* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlaganstalt, 1964); Paul N. Hahn, *The German Struggle against Yugoslav Guerrillas in World War II. German Counter-Insurgency in Yugoslavia, 1941-1943* (New York: East European Quarterly, 1979); Michael Lees, *The Rape of Serbia. The British Role in Tito’s Grab for Power 1943-1944* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1990). For further discussion, see Ante Ćuvalo, “Croatian Nationalism and the Croatian National Movement (1966-1972) in Anglo-American Publications. A Critical Assessment,” *Journal of Croatian Studies* (1989).

12 Karl Marx, *Revolution and Counter-Revolution or Germany in 1848* (Ed., Eleanor Marx Aveling) (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1952/1891), pp. 64-8, 78-9, 83-5, 99-101, saw Bohemia and Croatia as unable to “exist as a nation” on their own and fated to be absorbed “into a more energetic stock,” a fate they sought to avoid through the “ludicrous” doctrine of “Panslavism.” For Marx, Croatian and Bohemian Panslavists had served Russia in 1848-1849 and “betrayed the revolutionary cause for the shadow of a nationality.” He was particularly critical of Jelačić, “the leader of South Slavonian reaction,” whose “brigand hordes” had helped to defeat the revolutions in Vienna and Budapest and committed “un-heard of cruelties and infamies” in the Austrian capital. Not “capable of an independent national life” Croats and other “petty” nations sought to avoid the “inevitable fate of these dying nations…to allow this process of dissolution and absorption by their stronger neighbours to complete itself” by supporting “the side of despotism and reaction.” But this only made them “traitors to the popular cause” and placed them “in the position of outlaws in the eyes of all revolutionary nations.”


14 John Fine, “Heretical Thoughts about the Postcommunist Transition,” in Norman M. Naimak and Holly Case, eds., *Yugoslavia and Its Historians. Understanding the Balkan Wars of the 1990s* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003), pp. 190-2, and Slavoj Žižek, *Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism? Five Interventions in the (Mis)use of a Notion* (London: Verso, 2002), p. 231, notes a “plethora of standard Leftist prejudices and dogmas” that blinded “their perception of the Yugoslav crisis,” especially “the secret belief in the viability of Yugoslav self-management Socialism, and the notion that small nations like Slovenia (or Croatia) cannot actually function like modern democracies but, left to their own devices, necessarily regress to a proto-Fascist
1980s, there was also a concerted effort to “frame” events in Yugoslavia by referring to crimes committed in the NDH during World War II and to tar Tuđman, Croatia, and Croats as “Ustaša,” particularly by those individuals and organizations comprising what Brad Blitz has termed ASerbia’s war lobby. As heirs of the Ustaša, Croats as a people supposedly had an inclination to anti-Semitism and genocide, as the American anthropologist Robert Hayden suggested in East European Societies and Politics. While “the Croats were not uniquely genocidal,” Hayden wrote, Franjo Tuđman had sought to “minimize the number of those killed, not just at Jasenovac, but during the Holocaust.” Hayden saw Tuđman’s “reference to Jasenovac as a ‘myth’” and his use of the phrase “final solution” as reflecting “a stunning disregard for the sentiments of Serbs,” which was not “only insulting to them but also ominous.” According to Hayden, Tuđman’s anti-Semitism and Croatia’s genocidal past explained why Croatia’s Serbs had no “reason to wish to remain in a nationalistic Croat state.”

Hayden’s comments about Tuđman and Croats in general were made in his response to an article published in East European Politics and Society by Ljubo Boban, one of Croatia’s leading Communist historians. Boban had sought to deflate myths that were damaging to Croatia and in their stead to offer careful historical analysis. He had concluded that those who “manipulated” history to stoke hatred of Croatia were comparable to the Ustaša, Chetniks, and other racists who had pursued “genocidal policies” in the past, and he had called upon everyone to take Jasenovac as an example of why it was crucial to avoid stirring up ethnic hatred and to make every effort to avoid genocide in the future. These appear to be laudable sentiments, particularly in hindsight, but Boban had also indirectly exonerated Tuđman of the charge that he was a Jasenovac (and, by extension, Holocaust) revisionist—as Hayden would argue in his response—by discussing a 1964 census by Yugoslavia’s Institute of Statistics. Tuđman had based his discussions on the same census, which had estimated that 346,740 Serbs had perished during World War II, a lower number than the estimates by Bogoljub Kočović and Vladimir Žerjavić, whose later studies had, respectively, estimated that between 487,000 and 530,000 Serbs had died during the war. However, all these estimates were well below claims that 700,000 to a million Serbs had died at the Ustaša concentration camp of

Jasenovac alone, a number Tudman had repeatedly questioned. Boban seemed to support the Croatian dissident by referring to the 1964 report and by noting that the best estimate was that no more than 70,000 people had perished at Jasenovac. He also noted, as had Tudman, that while the majority of victims had been Serbs, others had also died at the camp, including Jews, Gypsies, and Croats. Finally, Boban raised the question of whether Jasenovac had been a “death camp,” given that the regime’s political opponents, including the President of the Croatian Peasant Party, Vladimir Maček, had been interned there, and that thousands had survived internment.17

Vladimir Žerjavić was more explicit than Boban, noting that the figures published by Tudman were actually “fairly close to the actual ones,” given that the 1964 Yugoslav census had listed 61,383 victims at Jasenovac and its two satellite camps (Stara Gradiška and Gradina), as well as in Gospić-Jadovno.18 The implication that Tudman’s figures were essentially accurate, given the information available to him, appears to be what troubled Hayden, who did not contest Boban’s numbers, but rather the “meaning” that Boban had assigned to them.19 Like Boban, Tudman had also sought to be meticulous in his discussion of the actual numbers of war victims. At his trial in 1981, he had argued that Yugoslavia’s demographic loss had been 2.18 million, of whom some 800,000 had actually perished. He had estimated that 450,000 of the demographic losses had been due to a depressed birth rate, 250,000 to emigration, and 700,000 to political persecution after 1945.20 His estimate that some 60,000 had died at Jasenovac was somewhat lower than the figures arrived at later by Boban, Kočović, and Žerjavić,21 but that was because in 1981 Tudman was working from the 1964 census, which listed 50,002 dead at Jasenovac and 9,587 at Stara Gradiška, a total of 59,589.22 These are the figures that Tudman most often cited, usually with the observation that even if “only” 60,000 had

17 Ljubo Boban, “Note and Comments: Jasenovac and the Manipulation of History,” East European Politics and Society 4 (1990), pp. 580-92, and Boban’s rebuttal to Hayden’s response, “Still More Balance on Jasenovac and the Manipulation of History,” East European Politics and Society 6 (1992), pp. 213-217. The question is a vexed one, but the core of the question regards numbers, as Boban noted, if 60,000 to 70,000 perished at Jasenovac, that was horrible, but if 700,000 to a million had done so, the Croats as a people were inculpated in the deaths.

18 Vladimir Žerjavić, Opsesije i megalomanije oko Jasenovca i Bleiburga (Zagreb: Globus, 1992), p. 34.


21 In 1985, Kočović estimated that 70,000 had perished at the Jasenovac complex, and in the early 1990s Žerjavić estimated that a maximum of 83,000 had perished in Ustaša camps, including some 45,000 to 52,000 Serbs, 12,000 Croats and Muslims, 13,000 Jews, and 10,000 Roma. Bogoljub Kočović, Žrtve Drugog svetskog rata u Jugoslaviji (London: Naše delo, 1985), passim, and Žerjavić, Opsesije, op. cit.

22 Jasenovac Foundation, online at http://www.jusp-jasenovac.hr/logor.html.
died at Jasenovac, that was a terrible tragedy and did not lessen the guilt of those responsible.  

So it seems that Tudman was neither a racist nor a Holocaust denier, but rather a historian using the most accurate figures available at the time he was writing. But few people read Serbian or Croatian, and Boban’s article was rarely cited. Nor did most of those writing on the wars of succession bother reading the literature on World War II. Journalists and scholars consulted the internet, which offered excerpts from Tudman’s work selected to demonstrate his racism; they read the literature in English, which included sensational accounts of Ustaša war crimes; and they listened to the head of Serbia’s Museum of the Victims of Genocide in Belgrade, Milan Bulajić, who continued to cite the higher figures and to claim that the Jasenovac complex had covered 210 square kilometers, not the 1.4 to 4.0 square kilometers the camps actually occupied. So it is not surprising that journalists and scholars, even the most conscientious and best intentioned, continued to view Tudman as a racist, nor that in 1995 Christopher Bennett could still write that Tudman had acted as “an apologist for the NDH,” because he had “revised” the figures for war victims downward.

**The necessary nationalist**

But if Tudman was not a racist, an apologist for the NDH, or a Holocaust revisionist, he was a nationalist, and therefore anathema both to those who viewed nationalism per se as an anachronism that threatened individual human rights and to those who saw Croatian nationalism as a recrudescence of an extreme variant of nationalism that was both anti-Semitic and anti-Serb. He was also unacceptable to Leftists who viewed nationalism as a reactionary

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ideological construct and to those who saw the loose confederation proposed in 1990 by Tuđman and Slovenia's president, Milan Kučan, as subverting Yugoslavia. In many ways, Tuđman was the indispensable politician needed to explain Yugoslavia's demise as a function of vicious nationalists seeking to create ethnically pure states—a simple, elegant, parsimonious explanation congruent with the political culture of the 1990s, which rejected nationalism in favor of globalism and collective rights in favor of individual rights. But it is worth remembering that elegant theories are not descriptions of real phenomena; they are ideal types constructed from data that is neither comparable nor necessarily accurate.28

Even setting the vagaries of theory aside, there seems to have been a consensus regarding Tuđman that extended well beyond the academic community. Among those who considered the Croatian leader a dangerous nationalist were such influential journalists as David Binder, John Burns, Alexander Cockburn, Duško Doder, Misha Glenny, Chris Hedges, Christopher Hitchens, Robert Kaplan, Noel Malcolm, William Pfaff, Silvia Poggioli, David Rieff, A. M. Rosenthal, Chuck Sudetic, and Ed Vulliamy. Their reports were aired on the BBC, NPR, PBS, and CNN, and their articles and op. ed. pieces and editorials appeared in *Foreign Affairs*, *The Guardian*, *Harper’s*, *The New Republic, The New York Review of Books, The New York Times, The New Yorker and The Washington Post.*29 Both journalists and academics framed the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, determined the news pegs on which information was hung, and shaped opinion in the West. Because they tended to reflect the existing literature and the views of their contacts, few of whom were sympathetic to the HDZ or to Croatia, the image of Tuđman they offered was that of an authoritarian nationalist who suppressed his opponents at home and supported subversives in Bosnia and Herzegovina.30

It was therefore not surprising that members of NGOs, political leaders, the informed public and those diplomats, journalists, and academics not familiar

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30 Sadkovich, “Patriots, Villains, and Franjo Tuđman,” *passim*, and discussion below. Particularly influential was the anti-Croatian and pro-Serbian travelogue by Rebecca West, *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon. A Journey through Yugoslavia* (New York: Viking, 1941/53). Most books dealt with Yugoslavia and tended to present Croats in a negative light, e.g., Duško Doder, *The Yugoslavs* (New York: Vintage Books, 1978), 21, wrote that Croats nursed “an animosity toward the Serbs that seems to date back to their tribal period,” but their “elite” had been “politically emasculated” and took refuge in “a realm of intellectual opposition,” giving “Croatian nationalism” its “exclusivist tone” and disposing Croats to “covertly fear and overtly despite” Serbs. The cover blurb cited *The New Yorker*, which had praised Doder’s works as “An enthralling, an honest, and an illuminating book.”
with Yugoslavia's history tended to view Tudman and the HDZ in a negative light. Their information came from news reports, from diplomat contacts, and from locals, most of who appear to have been sympathetic to Yugoslavia, to have viewed Serbs as a tragic but noble people, and to have dismissed Tudman and his party as “separatists.” This predisposition to view events through a distorted historical lens was exacerbated by a tendency to deal with local leaders in an evenhanded manner. For example, during 1990 and 1991, Helsinki Watch listed minor human rights violations in Croatia with major ones in Serbia, thereby conflating workplace discrimination with physical abuse, and pairing Tudman with Milošević as an authoritarian leader. Diplomats and statesmen, including the acting American Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagleburger, and the German Foreign Minister, Hans Dietrich Genscher, repeatedly voiced their support for Yugoslavia through mid 1991, thereby casting Tudman as a bothersome, and unwelcome, separatist. As Slaven Letica and Anto Knežević have demonstrated, there was also a concerted campaign to depict Tudman as an anti-Semite and a Holocaust revisionist, even though he publicly condemned the NDH, removed passages that some found offensive from the American version of his *magnus opus*, and expressed his solidarity with the Jewish community and his support for Israel. Indeed, Croatia tended to be more open and more tolerant than other Yugoslav republics, including Slovenia, and not only did Freedom House never list Croatia as authoritarian,


34 Anto Knežević, *An Analysis of Serbian Propaganda* (Zagreb: Domovina TT, 1992), *passim*; and Slaven Letica, *Političko pleme* (Zagreb: Naklada Jesenski i Turk, 1998), pp. 271-82, for a brief, but detailed, rebuttal of charges that Tudman was an anti-Semite. Letica notes that a 1993 public opinion survey found that only five to seven percent of Croats displayed anti-Semitic attitudes, a much lower percentage of the population than in Western Europe or the United States. He also cites Tudman’s January 1992 letter to the Congress of the United States in which the Croatian President condemned “in the strongest manner possible” Nazi Germany and the NDH for committing “genocide” against “Jews, Gypsies, Croats, Serbs, and other groups,” and Tudman’s letter to the President of B’nai B’rith noting that he had revised *Bespuća* to remove any passages that might be offensive to Jews.
it earned ratings close to those of Bulgaria and Romania, who have been admitted to the European Union.\textsuperscript{35}

Nonetheless, for many in the West, Tuđman’s leadership of the avowedly nationalist Croatian Democratic Union (\textit{HDZ, Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica}) and his party’s electoral victory in May 1990 reinforced their negative image of both Tuđman and Croatia. It was therefore not surprising that in the summer of 1991, as JNA units attacked Slovenia and Croatia, Dennison Rusinow, author of one of the standard works on Titoist Yugoslavia and professor emeritus at the University of Pittsburgh, cautioned the readers of the influential policy journal \textit{Foreign Affairs} that Tuđman and his party posed a threat. Rusinow reported that the HDZ leader had been “a wartime partisan general” [sic’he was a major] and “a former political prisoner,” but he also noted that Tuđman had been jailed “for his alleged ‘nationalist-separatist’ role [sic’Tuđman advocated liberalizing the Yugoslav regime, not independence for Croatia] in the Croatian Spring” and was now placating “the most nationalist wing” of his party, “whose utterances about Serbs” were essentially “racist.” Even though Tuđman’s rhetoric was moderate and conciliatory, particularly when compared to the intransigent and hostile rhetoric of Serbian leaders and the Serbian media, and even though he promised Croatia’s Serbs full cultural autonomy and some local political control,\textsuperscript{36} Rusinow seemed to imply that he was a dangerous nationalist and that Croatia’s Serbs were merely reacting to the threat posed by the HDZ, which controlled Croatia’s government. The American academic therefore urged the United States and Europe to give “unconditional support” to a unified Yugoslavia in order to avert a tragedy.\textsuperscript{37}


\textsuperscript{36} For example, Tuđman’s interviews with the foreign media, in which he condemned the NDH, expressed his desire to collaborate with Croatia’s Serbs, to resolve Croatia’s differences with Serbia, and to find a peaceful resolution to the crisis threatening Yugoslavia in 1990-1991 and subsequently to the conflicts of 1991-1995; see Franjo Tuđman, \textit{Hrvatska riječ svijetu: Razgovori sa stranim predstavnicima} (Zagreb: Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada/Hrvatski institut za povijest, 1999), passim; for Serbian rhetoric and viciously anti-Croatian cartoons, see Ivo Banac, \textit{Protiv straha. Članci, izjave i javni nastupi}, 1987-1992. (Zagreb: Slon, 1992), passim, and Nikica Barić, \textit{Srpska pobuna u Hrvatskoj 1990.-1995.} (Zagreb: Golden marketing-Tehnička knjiga, 2005), passim.

\textsuperscript{37} Dennison Rusinow, “Yugoslavia: Balkan Breakup?” \textit{Foreign Affairs} 83 (Summer 1991), pp. 43-59. Rusinow’s \textit{The Yugoslav Experiment 1948-1974} (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1977), pp. xiii, 2, 6-14, passim, was sympathetic to the creation of the Yugoslav state in 1918 (“the nearly complete fulfillment” of a south Slav “dream”), the Partisan movement (which combined “hierarchical links with flexibility and generous room for autonomous local initiative”), the concepts of \textit{bratstvo i jedinstvo} (brotherhood and unity), and Yugoslavia’s
Creating a new image, 1991-1993

During his visit to Yugoslavia in June 1991, James Baker appeared to do just that. But by supporting a unitary Yugoslavia, Baker also tacitly supported plans to use force to suppress nationalists in Slovenia and Croatia, and shortly after his visit the Yugoslav army attacked Slovenia. Although Croatia remained neutral, Serb forces, supported by the Army, stepped up their attacks on Croatian villages over the summer. That autumn, as fighting intensified in Croatia and Serb militia drove tens of thousands of Croats from their homes, Slavic Review, the official organ of the AAASS (American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies), published a short essay by Alex Dragnich, professor emeritus at Vanderbilt, who argued that Serbs had never exercised “hegemony” over other nationalities in Yugoslavia, but had actually sacrificed their national interests to create a multinational state. In the spring, fall, and early winter, The New Republic, then an influential political journal, published essays by the American journalist Robert Kaplan, who portrayed Croatia as a breeding ground for racists and described Tuđman as an anti-Semite committed to the destruction of its Serbian citizens. The British historian Eric Hobsbawm also warned that nationalism per se was dangerous and suggested that some states were simply too small to be viable in the pages of The Nation, a left-wing publication whose columnists regularly savaged Tuđman and Croatia.

So while Slovenia was allowed to go its own way, ostensibly because it had a robust civil society but in reality because it had no sizeable Serb minority, Croatia was portrayed as a small, barely viable state led by a vicious nationalist. Hobsbawm returned to the attack in 1992 in the pages of Anthropology Today, warning the journal’s readers that “ethnic politics” inevitably ‘mutate’ into “national separatism” and “national xenophobia,” adducing Croatia as an example. In 1992, the British journalist Misha Glenny equated Milošević, experiments with self-management (the “Yugoslav experiment with an independent and novel ‘road to socialism’”). Rusinow also distinguished Croatian from Serbian collaboration, referring to the Croat leader Ante Pavelić as a “super-Quisling” but to the Serb collaborator Milan Nedić as “a man who did the enemy’s bidding in the tragic hope of saving [his] peoples from a still worse fate.”

42 E. J. Hobsbawm and David J. Kertzer, “Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe Today,”
Tudman, and their respective nationalisms as the primary causes of Yugoslavia’s problems in the pages of The New York Review of Books, required reading for many of America’s intellectual elite, while Robert Hayden and his wife, Milica Bakić-Hayden, deployed postmodern arguments to cast Croats as chauvinists in Slavic Review, which also published another article by Hayden, who seemed to imply that Tudman approved of genocide. Not only was Tudman presented as a dangerous nationalist, he was also portrayed as a racist who was predisposed to genocide. During 1992, major publishing houses also issued works by a congeries of authors who, despite their political and ideological differences, all cast Tudman and Croatia in a negative light—Misha Glenny’s The Fall of Yugoslavia (Penguin); Mark Thompson’s A Paper House (Vintage); Alex Dragnich’s Serbs and Croats (Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich), and John Zametica’s The Yugoslav Conflict (Brassey and the International Institute of Strategic Studies).

In 1993, Oxford University Press issued a survey of post-1989 Eastern Europe by Gale Stokes, a professor at Rice University, who distinguished Serbia’s democratic nationalism from Croatia’s chauvinistic nationalism and who seemed to imply that Croats bore a burden of genocidal guilt when he criticized Tudman’s government for failing to “apologize” and “atone” for Ustaša actions during World War II. Apparently, Tudman’s expression of regret that the Jewish community in Croatia had been the victim of genocide by the...
Ustaša state was not enough to satisfy the American academic. Three other books also appeared in 1993 that were hostile to Croatia—Robert Kaplan’s popular Balkan Ghosts (St. Martin’s), which depicted Croats as religious fanatics; Lenard Cohen’s widely read Broken Bonds (Westview), which presented Tudman’s government as authoritarian and the Serb rebellion in Croatia as justified; and Slavenka Drakulić’s postmodern, middle-class lament, The Balkan Express (HarperPerennial).

Drakulić’s work echoed Glenny, Cohen, and Kaplan in suggesting that both Croats and Serbs—and the weight of history and symbols and a centuries-long build-up of misunderstanding and hatred—were responsible for the war in Croatia. In the spring of 1993, Harper’s published Drakulić’s letter to her daughter in which she blamed both sides for the fighting and singled out nationalism (the tallying up of war victims, justification of war criminals, the resuscitating of old national myths, the revival of religion on both the Catholic and the Orthodox sides”) as the main cause of the country’s problems. By blaming nationalism and ignoring what Serbian and Croatian leaders had actually said and done, Drakulić privileged an abstraction over reality and implied that both Serbs and Croats, rather than particular individuals and institutions, had caused the conflicts that accompanied Yugoslavia’s dissolution, thereby transforming what Croats saw as a fight to defend their homeland into something both more complex and more sinister. If less than rigorous, she was typical of a postmodern tendency to ignore facts in favor of impressions which made it more difficult to discern reality in Croatia and all but impossible to establish the “truth” regarding Tudman’s attitudes and actions. A lukewarm Communist who believed most Croats had joined Yugoslavia’s League of Communists to further their careers, Drakulić left for Ljubljana in September 1991 when the war in Croatia became serious. Returning to Zagreb in November, she greeted the truce in January 1992 with ambivalence, wondering whether she could “love” her “new country” whose “independence stinks of death,” an odd piece of introspection, given the bloody history of her “old” country. Although Ivo Banac dismissed her as displaying “a studied ignorance of history” and Beverly Allen criticized her for engaging “in the worst kind of blaming the victim,” Drakulić undoubtedly influenced opinion on the Left; a major American publishing house issued her work, and she placed articles in Harper’s and The Nation, which praised her Balkan Express as “firsthand war reasons.


reporting” that revealed “the true complexity of the crisis and the enormity of the task of reconciliation.”

In August 1993, Bette Denich, like Hayden an anthropologist, argued in *Anthropology of East Europe Review* that nationalists were “unmaking” “multi-ethnicity” in Yugoslavia. A year later, in *American Ethnologist*, she accused Tuđman of having imposed an Ustaša vocabulary on Croatians. “Trouble,” Denich wrote, “started when the new government in Zagreb acted to install the symbols of its domination throughout Croatia,” whose lack of a “democratic system” left “Serbian nationalists” no choice but to defend themselves against “extreme Croatian nationalists.” That autumn, Hayden used the pages of *Anthropology of East Europe* and Edward Said’s concept of “orientalism” to accuse Stjepan Meštrović, a sociologist at Texas A&M University, of writing an “Orientalist discourse” and to argue that the “chauvinistic” “orientations” of Yugoslav politicians and intellectuals had “fed” the “civil war” of 1991-1992. “Absurdities,” Hayden argued, lead to “atrocities,” and since all “successful political movements” in Yugoslavia, including the HDZ, had “been based on absurdities,” atrocities naturally followed their assumption of power, albeit through the mechanism of democratic elections.

Such abstract arguments muddied analysis by submerging actual events beneath a slurry of heuristic language and ignoring the actions of individuals and institutions in favor of insinuating that all nationalisms were equally vicious and all nationalists equally culpable. In effect, Drakulić, Hayden, and Denich diffused responsibility for the descent into war and mass murder in Yugoslavia by attributing the federation’s problems to nationalism and nationalists, in particular Tuđman and the HDZ. In the summer of 1993, as Croats and Muslims squared off in Central Bosnia, Duško Doder, a journalist with *The Washington Post*, rehearsed the specific charges against Tuđman and Croatia in the pages of *Foreign Affairs*. He labeled Ante Starčević, who had formulated many of the basic tenets of Croatian nationalism, a “racist”; insisted that Tuđman had conspired with Milošević to carve up Bosnia and Herzegovina;


and accused “both sides” of engaging in “ethnic cleansing.” He also argued that if Slovenes and Croats had “the right to secede,” then Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina “had an equally justifiable right to remain in Yugoslavia”; he blamed Croats and “their European allies” for having “inflamed” the war in Croatia; and he criticized Tudman for having “refused to disown the fascist Croatia” [sic] and “instead revived its symbols.” According to Doder, Tudman’s government had “replaced” the Cyrillic script with a Latin one and denied Serbs “any kind of political autonomy,” while “his supporters conjured up images of a fascist spirit stalking” Croatia.53

Given the venue, Doder’s views were certainly read by America’s top policy-makers and leading intellectuals, and given the prestige attached to articles in Foreign Affairs, it is safe to assume, particularly given Rusinow’s earlier piece, that many accepted Doder’s claims. If they wanted confirmation, they could read Bogdan Denitch, a sociologist and a socialist, who condemned not only nationalism, but also Tudman and the HDZ, in a book published by the University of Minnesota Press.54 Or they could consult the reports of the Croatian Helsinki Committee (CHC) and the indictments of the ICTY, both established in 1993, two years after Denitch created his own NGO, Transition to Democracy.55

The ICTY’s policy of indicting members of all belligerent groups reinforced claims that Tudman and Milošević, like their respective nationalisms, were similar. When the Prosecution at the ICTY later named Tudman as the leader of a “joint criminal enterprise,” this seemed proof positive that he was guilty of aggression and genocide,56 even though the concept of joint criminal enterprise demands a much lower standard of evidence than is the norm for proving complicity in war crimes and was not used at Nuremberg but formu-

53 Duško Doder, “Yugoslavia: New Wars, Old Hatreds,” Foreign Affairs 91 (Summer 1993), pp. 3-23. Also Doder, The Yugoslavs, pp. 18-22, 35, 41, 219-23, for his views on Croatia and the Catholic Church, and his belief that during the 1960s Croats displayed a “fundamental weakness,” their “inability to check the revival of tribal hatred” among themselves, which so frightened the country’s “800,000 Serbs” [sic: 560,000] that they began to arm in self-defense. From 1948 to 1991, the number of Serbs in Croatia increased by 7 percent (from 543,795 to 581,663), while the number of Croats in Serbia declined by 55 percent (from 169,864 to 109,214); see Ivan Crkvenčić, “Croatian Ethnic Territory and the Multiethnic Composition of Croatia as a Result of Population Migrations,” Časopis za opća društvena pitanja 33-34 (1-2) (Zagreb), pp. 117-23, and Dražen Živić, “Stvaranje hrvatske države i Domovinski rat” (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 2006), pp. 437-455.


lated by the Prosecution at the ICTY to overturn an acquittal. Led by Ivan Zvonimir Ćičak, a student leader in the 1960s, the Croatian Helsinki Committee (CHC) also launched a series of attacks against Tuđman, the HDZ, and the Croatian government. The Croatian NGO defined its primary task as protecting Croatia’s Serbs from their government, and it reinforced Serb charges that they were threatened, e.g., accusations that the government had begun the “ethnic cleansing” of Serbs from “all public services” in 1991 and that “the basis of the politics of the ruling party” was the “banishment [from Croatia] of members of the Serb minority and the prevention of their return.”

Consolidating the image, 1993-1999

The Croat-Muslim war of 1993-1994, the third war of the Yugoslav succession, convinced most observers that Tuđman had conspired with Milošević to dismember Bosnia and Herzegovina and fixed his image as an aggressive nationalist. Reports that Bosnian Croats supported by Zagreb had “cleansed” and murdered Muslims in Central Bosnia made earlier Serb claims that they had been threatened in Croatia more credible and prepared the ground for later Serb accusations that the Croatian army engaged in mass murder and ethnic cleansing during military offensives in 1995. By the time that the Dayton Peace Accords were concluded later that year, Tuđman’s image was firmly established as a nationalist who tolerated racism and nursed a benign attitude toward genocide.

60 William Pfaff, “Invitation to War,” Foreign Affairs (Summer 1993); Robert Hislope, “Intra-Ethnic Conflict in Croatia and Serbia: Flanking and the Consequences for Democracy,” East
By then, nationalism had been identified as the primary cause of the wars in Yugoslavia, and it had become fashionable to speak of nations as “imaginary” communities, to decry as intolerant all those who viewed others as different than themselves, and to deploy the loose postulates and disparate methodologies of postmodernism to discredit nationalism in general and Tuđman in particular. Eugene Hammel saw “Balkan society” as “a frightening mirror of our own” society, caught fast in “Neolithic thinking” and bereft of “a culture of civil rights and citizenship,” while Robert Hayden argued that proponents of “extreme nationalism” had resorted to ethnic cleansing in an effort to recreate “imagined communities” by “unmixing” “existing heterogeneous ones.” According to Hayden, the logic of “national self-determination” legitimated the “process” of “homogenization” and triggered wars that followed “this logic of establishing the nation-state by eliminating minorities,” and Tuđman and other “extreme” nationalists were negating “social reality in order to reconstruct it.” “Ethnic cleansing” then was less a concrete event than a theoretical encounter, “a manifestation of the incompatibility of the objectified or reified cultures at the base of the several nationalist enterprises with the living cultures of the areas that have been the sites of the worst violence . . . .”

For the uninitiated, such abstractions might seem to have little to do with reality, but Thomas Cushman, who was himself critical of Tuđman and nationalism, was concerned that “the ethical and moral implications” of such arguments “reproduce[d] some basic tenets of Serbian nationalist accounts of the breakup of Yugoslavia” and “equalize[d] victims and perpetrators in assigning responsibility” for the wars that accompanied Yugoslavia’s disintegration. In other words, the right heuristic language and the right postmodern analysis could effectively diffuse the guilt for what had occurred between 1991 and 1995—and presenting Tuđman as an authoritarian nationalist effectively rationalized, excused, or mitigated actions by the JNA and by Serb and Muslim nationalists. Or as Cushman put it during a very frank exchange in Anthropological Theory in 2005, in the accounts by Denich and Hayden he “saw

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not only the elision and denial of the experiences of Croatian and Bosnian victims of Serbian aggression, but also—and most importantly—a degree of moral equivalence which described the victims of atrocities as the cause of not only the dissolution of Yugoslavia, but the war itself.” Denich defended herself in part by arguing that Cushman had damaged her reputation and misrepresented her work as pro-Serbian, in part by arguing that her “interpretation precisely focuses on the mutually reinforcing interaction between Serbian and Croatian nationalists, not on the exclusive culpability (or innocence) of either”—a position that did indeed seem to diffuse responsibility. Denich’s claim that Tuđman’s “nationalist government” had revived “Ustasha symbols and policies” also seemed to confirm Cushman’s impression that her account, like Hayden’s, implied that Croatia was at fault for the Serbian attack on it. Like many postmodern accounts, it assigned priority to abstractions, such as symbols, in favor of ignoring concrete events, such as the JNA’s support of Serbian separatists in Croatia.

Context, policy proposals, and a priori assumptions

Many of these books and articles appeared during the early stages of what James Gow calls the “Serbian project,” the effort by some Serbian leaders to create a Greater Serbia on the ruins of Yugoslavia by using the Yugoslav army and Serb paramilitary groups to seize and occupy lands in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and then “cleanse” them of their Croat and Muslim inhabitants. Others appeared during the wars of the Yugoslav succession and some

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65 Denich claimed Cushman had damaged her reputation, and Hayden accused the journal’s editor, Richard Ashby Wilson, of having allowed Cushman to make ad hominem attacks on him, his wife, and Denich. Cushman responded by noting that an “ad hominem attack involves using arguments about a person’s qualities or characteristics to discredit his or her argument,” but that he had avoided doing so. However, Cushman implied that Hayden had done so. “In our intellectual battles,” he wrote, “Hayden has never centrally addressed my arguments, but instead has resorted to tautological legalistic arguments, threats of legal action, professions of outrage, and now, it seems, assaults on my character and ethics.” The journal’s former editor, Richard Ashby Wilson, was both bemused and alarmed. “My aim,” he explained, “was to generate more scholarly debate about the analyses of scholars” on Yugoslavia’s dissolution, and he found it “genuinely perplexing” that Hayden and Denich had responded so strongly, “given the frequently heated nature of scholarly and political disagreement over responsibility for the Balkan conflict.” Wilson also thought it unreasonable of Hayden and Denich to claim the “right” “to scrutinize and possibly censor articles before publication,” a position at odds with the freedom of scholars “to challenge one another’s position in a free and open debate.” The exchange in Anthropological Theory 5 (2005), pp. 545-77, was over “Anthropology and Genocide in the Balkans: An Analysis of Conceptual Practices of Power,” Anthropological Theory 4 (2004), 5-28, a reprint of Critical Theory and the War in Croatia and Bosnia (Seattle: The Donald M. Treadgold Papers in Russian, East European, and Central Asian Studies), 1997).

just after their conclusion, during a period in which advocates of “transitional justice” sought to discredit those who had led Croatia and Serbia from 1990 to 1995, but largely ignored former members of the communist regime that had preceded them. Most advocated some sort of policy—the preservation of a Yugoslav state, increased intervention by NGOs, intervention to protect a putatively “multi-cultural” Bosnia and Herzegovina, neutrality by the major powers, and so on. After 1995, memoirs and analyses of the wars included policy recommendations, now unfortunately a requirement by organizations like IREX, even though it is a practice that confounds detached analysis with political diagnosis, advocacy, and prescription.

For example, Steven Burg and Paul Shoup concluded their study of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina by blaming the “authoritarian regimes” in Serbia and Croatia—the post-1989 regimes led by Milošević and Tuđman, not the Communist regimes directed by Stambolić and Račan—for having employed “force to achieve their ends in Bosnia.” To prevent similar events, they offered their own model of conflict prevention. Warren Zimmermann, America’s “last” ambassador to Yugoslavia was so distressed by the victories of “nationalist” parties in democratic elections and the lack of “curbs” on their “potentially non-democratic behavior” that he questioned the usefulness of free elections and suggested that self-determination be allowed only when it “won’t adversely affect the interests of other states or peoples.” The American diplomat appears to have had a weak grasp of the concepts of sovereignty and national self-determination. Even so, his suggestions were in line with the thinking and policy recommendations of academics like Burg, Shoup, and David Campbell, who echoed Zimmermann when he suggested that, “Discriminatory funding in favour of multicultural political forces, and withholding it from others, would have been one concrete manifestation of the ethos of democracy.” Like Mr. Zimmermann, Dr. Campbell appears to have had a weak grasp of the concept of national sovereignty, and his suggestion appears to give the “ethos” of democracy, a problematic abstraction, priority over the actual practice of democracy, something which can be measured, however imperfectly.

The influence of journalists, government-sponsored organizations, NGOs, and Tuđman’s domestic critics is clear in Campbell’s work. He cited, inter alia, The New York Times, OMRI (Open Media Research Institute), Daily Digest

(Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty), BosNet (a resource for “friends of Bosnia and Herzegovina”), and selected works by Slavenka Drakulić, Bogdan Denitch, Ivo Goldstein, and Ivo Banac. Drakulić, Denitch, and Goldstein were all vociferous opponents of Tuđman and the HDZ, and Banac became a consistent critic of Tuđman during the Croat-Muslim war and helped contribute to the image of the HDZ leader as a Croatian version of Milošević. However, unlike many commentators, Banac scrupulously distinguished Croatian from Serbian nationalism; stressed the “Jacobin” nature of Starčević’s ideas; and underscored Tuđman’s concessions to Croatia’s Serbs, his efforts to limit the conflict in Croatia, and the problems he faced in overseeing a transition from a one-party communist regime to a multiparty society, including the need to create a new, post-communist Croatian elite and defend his country against aggression by Serbian forces and the Yugoslav military.71 His criticism of Tuđman reinforced the negative image of the Croatian leader and his government proffered by Hayden, Denich, Zimmermann, and others, but Banac offered a scholarly analysis, not a policy proposal nor a polemic, giving his criticisms nuance and making them qualitatively different from those of the Croatian leader’s more hostile critics.

While more self-consciously analytical than polemical, policy proposals are nonetheless not detached analysis. Nor were calls for a multicultural solution in Bosnia and Herzegovina detached analysis; they were partisan variations of earlier efforts to hold Yugoslavia together, whether King Alexander’s efforts to create a Yugoslav state by imposing a royal dictatorship with fascist trappings or Tito’s attempts to resolve the national question by imposing “brotherhood and unity” on Yugoslavia’s disparate nationalities. Nonetheless, demands for multiculturalism, claims that civil society was both the litmus test for a viable society and the panacea for all social ills, and the need to guarantee the substance, not merely the forms, of democracy came to dominate the “discourse” on the Yugoslav wars of succession.72 Particularly surprising was the ubiquitous multicultural reading of the region’s history, given that the multinational polities in the region had been segmented societies, with nationalities living in the same locales but leading separate lives.73

71 Ivo Banac, Raspad Jugoslavije. Eseji o nacionalizmu i nacionalnim sukobima. (Zagreb: Durieux, 2001), pp. 33-32, 133-4, 144-7, considered the HDZ to be an integral nationalist party and criticized Tuđman for tolerating anti-Serb policies and corruption, for his harassment of the media, and for his efforts to bring all Croats into a Croat state via “humane” transfers of population and exchanges of territory, policies similar to those pursued by Milošević.

72 For example, Robert J. Donia and John V. A. Fine, Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed (New York: Columbia UP, 1994), passim.

73 Prior to Donia and Fine’s work, histories of the region tended to view it as segmented and fragmented, e.g., Jozo Tomašević Peasants, Politics and Economic Change in Yugoslavia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955), Sabrina P. Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962-1991 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), or Atif Purivatra, Jugoslavenska muslimanska organizacija u političkom životu Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca (Sarajevo:
cally accurate, a multicultural reading of history was nonetheless a necessary fiction favored by those promoting multicultural models because the “special conditions needed to resolve the problems created by multinational societies appear to be “rare” and all solutions unsatisfactory, so much so that a truly “democratic” solution—as opposed to those proposed by Zimmermann and Campbell—would have included “separation” as a viable option.74

Of course, separation and the fragmentation of existing political units were not acceptable to those who favored a multi-cultural position. Advocates of multiculturalism initially supported the preservation of the existing Yugoslav state, and when this proved impossible, a centralized Bosnian state. These were neither logically consistent nor practical positions, given the fragility of multinational polities, the national politics of the former communist regime, and the nationalist programs of all dominant parties. That the international community urged the preservation of democratic multinational societies, which then elected national parties to office, resulted in the dilemma that so vexed Zimmermann and Campbell, and ultimately led to a series of wars that palliatives, improvisation, and politically correct solutions (containing the conflicts, mediation, and delivery of humanitarian aid) could not resolve. It therefore became essential to identify both the source of the conflicts, which many believed was Serbian and Croatian (but not Muslim) nationalism, and the reason they had spread, which many located in the recognition of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

For example, in 1994, the former Finnish diplomat Maritti Koskenniemi argued in the pages of The International and Comparative Law Quarterly that recognition had been both premature and a violation of the human rights of its Serb inhabitants, because the “internal legitimacy” of both states had been questionable and because recognition had transformed legitimate Serb efforts to realize self-determination into unlawful aggression.75 Susan Woodward agreed and concluded that in addition to impersonal forces and competing nationalisms, German unification and Austria’s “century-old enmity toward Serbia” had triggered hostilities in Croatia. She argued that beginning in “the mid-1980s” Austria and the Vatican “had pursued a strategy to increase their sphere of economic and spiritual influence in central and eastern Europe,” and that by March 1991 “Germany had already joined the ranks of Austria, Hungary, and Denmark in at least covert support and encouragement of Slovene and

Similarly Damir Mirković, a professor at Canada’s Brandon University and an associate of the Australian Institute for Holocaust and Genocide Studies, claimed that Austria, Germany, Hungary, the USSR, and the Vatican had conspired to kindle conflict in Yugoslavia. He also accused Tudman’s government of associating itself with the 1941-45 Ustaša state and practicing “cultural genocide” by requiring paramilitary groups to surrender their firearms.

In sum, Yugoslavia’s breakup was purportedly the consequence of the rise of nationalist forces in Croatia whose politics were separatist, whose leaders were authoritarian, and whose support, albeit covert, came from a group of mostly Catholic states. Serbian leaders may have thought this to be true—Milošević apparently worried that Germany, Hungary, Austria, and the CSCE (Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, later OSCE) were trying to recreate the “Berlin-Tokyo axis”—but it is surprising that anyone else accepted such arguments. Yet they persisted, in part because they could be neither proved nor disproved, in part because rebuttals appeared late, and in part because their authors had a wide audience—Brookings Institute published Woodward’s analysis; Foreign Affairs published the essays by Rusinow and Doder; Mirković’s arguments appeared in the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences; Hayden’s pieces were published in Slavic Review, East European Politics and Societies, and anthropology journals, which also published Bette Denich and Eugene Hammel, and in the United

79 In “Jasenovac and the Manipulation of History,” 590, Boban noted that, “Destroyed and vanished—as opposed to real—evidence is always fertile ground for mystification.” It seems that this is true of a lack of reliable information, as was the case during the 1990s. Also Sabrina P. Ramet and Letty Coffin, “German Foreign Policy Toward the Yugoslav Successor States, 1991-1999,” Problems of Post-Communism (January/February 2001), pp. 48-50.
80 Mirković argued that Hayden had helped people to remember the “forgotten” genocide of Serbs by Croats during World War II in The Genocide Forum, Year 5, No. 4, online at http://www.chgs.umn.edu/Educational_Resources/Newsletter/The_Genocide_Forum/Yr_5/Year_5_No_4/year_5_no_4.html. Also see the exchange between Hayden and Cushman in Anthropological Theory 5 (2005), pp. 545-54, 559-64, for Hayden’s argument that his ideas, like those of Woodward, were correct because they were so widely read and cited, a logic Cushman found fallacious and certainly one that confuses popularity with coherent argument.
States and Great Britain left-wing publications repeatedly criticized Tuđman, his party, and his government.\(^{81}\)

Although the emphasis shifted to implementing the Dayton Accords after 1995, criticism of Tuđman and his government continued because Zagreb was seen as impeding progress in Bosnia and Herzegovina; domestic clashes between the HDZ and the opposition took center stage in Croatia; and the United States began to put pressure on Croatia to amnesty accused Serb war criminals and facilitate the return of Serbs who had left the country during the war.\(^{82}\) In 1996, Ian Kearns, then a lecturer in politics at the University of Sheffield, informed the readers of *Political Quarterly* that Croatia was “a new edifice of authoritarian power,”\(^{83}\) and the following year, Gordana Uzelac, a sociologist, argued that Tuđman was “authoritarian.”\(^{84}\) In 1998, Bruno Dallago, a professor at the University of Trento, and Milica Uvalic, then a professor at Perugia and later Yugoslavia’s Vice-Minister for Foreign Economic Relations, argued in *Europe-Asia Studies* that privatization was a form of expropriation and that nationalism caused economic misery. Dallago and Uvalic laid the blame for Croatia’s misfortunes during the early 1990s squarely on the shoulders of Tuđman’s government, arguing that amendments to the Croatian constitution in 1990 had “deprived” the country’s Serbs of their “status as a nation” and their “rights” as individuals, and that Tuđman’s brand of “nationalism” had led to the rapid increase in income gaps in Croatia, which surged from 10:1 in 1989 to 67:1 by 1993,\(^{85}\) still well behind the income gaps that characterize the United States, where CEOs make 500 times what workers do, but large enough to condemn Tuđman and his party as corrupt, authoritarian nationalists.

**Consensus**

By the late 1990s, nationalism, and Serbian and Croatian nationalism in particular, had become the sufficient cause of Yugoslavia’s demise. Slovenian nationalists, who had squared off against their Serbian counterparts in the late 1980s, had also engaged in a “Balkanist” discourse and had worked with the

\(^{81}\) Sadkovich, “Patriots, Villains, and Franjo Tuđman,” *passim*.

\(^{82}\) See Albert Bing, “Hrvatska u međunarodnoj zajednici,” in Radelić, et al., *Stvaranje hrvatske države i Domovinski rat*.


Croatian government through mid 1991, but they were not considered culpable because they had a well developed “civil society,” which included the rock band *Laibach*, whose members sported regalia reminiscent of the Nazis.\(^{86}\) But Tuđman was portrayed as a borderline racist who ruled in an authoritarian manner, and Croatia was depicted as a state which regularly violated human rights, especially those of its Serbs. By 1999, this had become conventional wisdom, and a reviewer in the *Royal Institute of International Affairs* noted that many scholars believed that Croatia had “more in common” with Serbia than with Hungary or Poland, owing to its “poor human rights record and authoritarian-nationalist political character.”\(^{87}\)

This view of Tuđman as both “authoritarian” and “nationalist,” and of Croatia as a state with an authoritarian government persisted into the following decade and has become embedded in the literature. How pervasive this image is can be gauged from an article by John Mueller, the Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies at Ohio State University’s Mershon Center. Based on his reading of the literature in English, he concluded that there were no significant differences between the wars in Yugoslavia and Rwanda; that all belligerents in both conflicts shared a “common criminality”; and that “a large, impressively armed, and well-disciplined policing force could have been effective in policing the thug-dominated conflicts in Yugoslavia and Rwanda.”\(^{88}\) Darya Pushkina, like Mueller, does not read Serbian, Croatian, or Bosnian, and so she depended heavily on Lenard Cohen’s *Broken Bonds*, a handful of UN documents, and two articles in *The Guardian* and *The Washington Post*. Not surprisingly, she came to similar conclusions and even accused Tuđman of having “developed” the practice of “ethnic cleansing” to rid Croatia of its Serbs.\(^{89}\) For Pushkina, it was axiomatic that he was a war criminal, just as for Mueller it was clear that he was not merely a nationalist, but someone who associated with thugs, a term also used by the British journalist Ed Vulliamy to describe Bosnian Croats in his award-winning book on the war in Bosnia.\(^{90}\) The following year, 2001, Praeger published an analysis of the Croatian media by Stjepan Malović and Gary W. Selnow, who described Tuđman as “antidem-

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\(^{87}\) Adrian Hyde-Price, Review, *Royal Institute of International Affairs* 75 (4) (October 1999), pp. 860-861.


ocratic, powerful, authoritarian and . . . fascist,” and Harper’s published excerpts from two transcripts of a meeting between Tuđman and members of his government in September 1993 which had been “obtained” by the American journalist Chris Hedges and supposedly showed that Tuđman had “planned ethnic cleansing and other war crimes,” including “Croatia’s final solution” of its Serbian problem.

In 2003, Victor Peskin, a graduate student at Berkeley, and Mieczysław Boduszyński, a political scientist from San Diego State, portrayed the Croatian leader as an authoritarian ruler who had been (properly) indicted as the leader of a joint criminal enterprise, and Cambridge University Press published a study by the British sociologist Michael Mann, who argued that Tuđman and his government belonged on the “dark side” of democracy. In a talk at the Wilson Center in 2004, Boduszyński coupled the Croatian HDZ with Vojislav Šešelj’s Serbian Radical Party and separated both from truly “democratic” parties and “former communist parties in Eastern Europe” which had “genuinely transformed themselves into democratic organizations.” Boduszyński argued that their “record” during the 1990s “entirely justified” “concern” over the electoral victories of the HDZ and SRS in 2003, because their “legitimacy has been largely based on the illiberal nationalist projects of the 1990s, and not on progress in building democracy, reforming the economy and promoting international integration.” He acknowledged that the Serbian party was more recalcitrant than the Croatian, but he claimed that the “moderate” Ivo Sanader could only keep HDZ members in line by imposing a “hierarchical and undemocratic party organization” which “ensure[s] that any illiberal tendencies are kept in check,” apparently confusing party discipline, one of the most

92 (Chris Hedges), “Planning Croatia’s Final Solution,” *Harper’s* (December 2001). The article can be found in various websites, including that of The Centre for Peace in the Balkans, a Serbian organization based in Toronto which, *inter alia*, opposed NATO’s attack on Serbia in 1999; see http://www.balkanpeace.org/index.php?index/article&articleid=13920.
93 Victor Peskin and Mieczysław P. Boduszyński, “International Justice and Domestic Politics: Post-Tudjman Croatia and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,” *Europe-Asia Studies* 55 (7) (2003), pp. 1117-42. Peskin’s research has been supported by the United States Institute of Peace, the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at UC San Diego, the Berkeley Center for African Studies, and the Human Rights Center at UC Berkeley. His articles have appeared in *Europe-Asia Studies, Legal Affairs, International Peacekeeping, the Journal of Human Rights*, and the *Journal of International Criminal Justice*.
basic requirements for a viable party system, with totalitarian and authoritarian governance.

In 2004, Maple John Razsa, an anthropologist, and Nicole Lindstrom, a political scientist, published their critical analysis of Tuđman’s ABalkanist discourse”96; Darya Pushkina published an essay that implied Tuđman was to blame for the UN’s failure to carry out its mandate in Croatia97; and the ICTY reinforced the image of the former Croatian President as a bad actor by indicting six Bosnian Croats for war crimes and naming Franjo Tuđman as the leader of a “joint criminal enterprise,” along with Gojko Šušak, his former Minister of Defense, and Janko Bobetko, who had led Croatia’s armed forces from 1991 to 1995. The tribunal has also indicted Ante Gotovina, the commander of Operation Storm, which had reclaimed Croatian territory occupied in 1991, for participating in a joint criminal enterprise that sought to expel Croatia’s Serbs.98

So it seemed that during the 1990s the Croatian government was a criminal organization, and it is not surprising that in a recent collection of articles on Croatia published by a Zagreb publishing house, Sabrina Ramet notes that Tuđman’s “regime” “promoted a traditionalist and exclusive vision of Croatia” (promicao je tradicionalističku i ekskluzivističku viziju Hrvatske) as a Croat state in which Serbs were “unwelcome” (nisu dobrodošli). Although Ramet’s claim can be “contested,” the younger generation of scholars has learned this lesson well. Peskin and Boduszyński assume that Tuđman was an authoritarian nationalist; Darya Pushkina thinks that he was a war criminal; Knut Vesterdal believes that Tuđman and the HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union) “flirted with ideas that until then had been associated with the Ustaša movement” (očijukala [je] s idejama koje su se prije povezivale s ustaškim pokretom); and Marius Søberg sees Tuđman’s heritage as “xenophobia and nationalism” (kse

96 Maple J. Razsa and Nicole Lindstrom, “Balkan is Beautiful: Balkanism in the Political Discourse of Tuđman’s Croatia,” *East European Politics and Societies* 18 (4) (2004), pp. 628-650. Razsa has made a number of documentary films and has worked with anarchists in Croatia. His dissertation is “Bastards of Utopia: An Ethnography of Radical Politics after Yugoslav Socialism.” A graduate of Syracuse University, Lindstrom teaches at Central European University in Budapest and was a visiting professor at The New School in New York. Her dissertation was “Rethinking Sovereignty: The Politics of Europeanization in Europe’s Southeastern Periphery.”


Whether Tuđman was actually an authoritarian leader and the HDZ a xenophobic party is another question, and one beyond the scope of this essay. But it seems worth noting that the relative lack of information, exacerbated by the bias of those who knew something of Yugoslavia and the tendency to focus on particular questions and to view them through ideological lenses (e.g., analyzing the rights of Croatia’s Serbs or the plight of Bosnia’s Muslims based on multiculturalist assumptions) created a situation in which inaccurate information and propaganda transformed a dissident communist reformer into a rabid Croatian nationalist. Tuđman’s transformation suggests that much of what we know about “small peoples” and the less studied areas of the world is suspect because the sources on which we depend are both few and partisan. This observation is hardly unique and in many ways echoes the ideas of Edward Said and Maria Todorova. What is ironic is that those who embraced the theories of Said and Todorova also tended to be the most vociferous critics of Tuđman because their focus was on the rights of Serbs and the plight of Muslims to the exclusion of the rights, and the plight, of Croats. Consequently, the informational vacuum regarding Yugoslavia was filled with propaganda by Serbian nationalists, well-meaning arguments to preserve Yugoslavia and protect Muslims and Serbs, partisan scholarship, and sensational but often poorly informed reporting on Yugoslavia and the wars which attended its dissolution.

While the consensus regarding Franjo Tuđman has been widely accepted as true, it consists largely of assertion based on assumptions which may or may not be tenable, not on empirical historical studies, and it is also worth noting that the consensus does not obtain everywhere. There are other young scholars who discern a more complex history in the events of the 1990s and some older ones who would agree that casting Tuđman as an authoritarian leader is not only a simplistic, but also an untenable, way to explain events during the 1990s. It also seems worth noting that the stereotypes of Tuđman as an authoritarian nationalist and Croats in general as prejudiced are not benign; they have shaped perceptions abroad and even led some scholars to suggest that the most effective way to deal with Croatia’s “national government” is to recruit locals to subvert it, using “civil-society representatives” as “agents of domestic change,” thereby recasting civil society as a subversive force and themselves as either outside agitators or idealistic revolutionaries, depending on one’s view regarding the importance of respecting a state’s sovereignty. Finally, it
is worth noting that the historiographic problem is not one of “rival” or “contested” or “competing” narratives, but rather of a lack of historical distance, a paucity of archival studies, and a tendency to copy and repeat what has been said and written, rather than question and re-evaluate earlier assumptions and claims.

We are just beginning to write the history of the 1990s, a process that will be neither easy nor short, and during which much of the models and theories that are now currently fashionable will fall away, because, as Fernand Braudel noted, when you float such devices down the stream of history, they inevitably sink.103 Whether fifty years from now, after archives have been opened and their contents explored, historians will still conclude that Tuđman was both a nationalist and an authoritarian leader is impossible to predict, but it is unlikely that the current consensus will endure, given that even a superficial comparison of his nine years in power suggests significant differences with Yugoslavia’s truly authoritarian rulers, from King Alexander to Josip Broz Tito. But that, of course, is not only the subject of a different essay, it is question that future historians will be better able to evaluate than we are able to do at present.

Vereinbarter Konsensus: Wie wurde Franjo Tuđman ein autoritärer Nationalist

Zusammenfassung

Wenn es überhaupt einen Konsensus in der Literatur über den Krieg für Jugoslawiens Sukzession gibt, ist es ganz gewiss der Konsensus darüber, dass Franjo Tuđman nicht nur ein Nationalist, sondern der autoritäre Nationalist war. Heute gibt es nur Wenige, die diese Einschätzung bezweifeln, aber vor 1993 war Tuđmans Reputation ziemlich gemäßigt. Er war nicht nur Nationalist. Er kämpfte mit Partisanen in Jugoslawien während des Zweiten Weltkrieges; er verfasste das preisgekrönte Buch über Partisanen-Kriegsführung und noch ein Buch, in dem er Tito verherrlichte; Tuđman war Mitglied der

to undermine the “national government.” Merlingen teaches at Central European University; Mujic is with the OSCE mission in Kosovo.

103 Fernand Braudel, “History and the Social Sciences,” in On History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), pp. 35-7, 45, also notes that social scientists evade historical explanation by focusing on the present.