Asymmetries of Dual Enlargement: from the Baltics to the Balkans

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1. Introduction

In the post-Cold war era the EU and NATO and other multilateral institutions have found it very difficult to articulate in an agreed way their roles and compatibility, even in areas where they cooperate effectively. The transatlantic differences and tensions that have steadily arisen through the 1990s in the Balkans, evidenced by a major cleavage in transatlantic unity over conflict management in Kosovo, culminated in the 'transatlantic trauma' associated with the Iraq war in 2003. Although both US and European states share many common threat assessments, they disagree over how best to manage these threats, and in particular how, when and why to deploy coercive force. This strategic-conceptual gap is exacerbated by military-technological capability asymmetries amongst states within the region. At its extreme, this has been presented as a dichotomy between European unilateral passivism and US unilateral activism. As a result, policy-makers and analysts alike have suggested that we face one of three possible futures: an amiable separation (Daalder, 'End of Atlanticism'); strategic divorce (Kagan, 'Power and Weakness'); or, strategic realignment and renewal (Asmus and Pollack, 'New Transatlantic Project').

As these strategic disputes, tensions and ambiguities have arisen the transatlantic security community is set to enlarge. The political will within NATO and the EU, expressed at the 21-22 November 2002 Prague NATO Summit and 12-13 December 2002 EU Copenhagen Summit respectively, to integrate new members in May 2004 will have an impact on institutions, security policies in the Euro-Atlantic region. However, NATO at 26 and the EU at 25 will be profoundly different entities than NATO at 19 and the EU at 15 (particularly as 19 out of the 25 EU states will also be NATO allies). The EU will increase its collective population by 20% and the GDP from between 5-9% and small member EU states will increase from 10 to 19 of the 25 members (Batt et al, 2003: 17).

Although it could be argued that the 'variable geometry' between NATO and the EU will be reduced, it should also be noted that as there will be less diversity outside the EU and NATO so there will be greater diversity within it. Relations of newly integrated states with neighbours that are not yet integrated will be changed as these institutions further enlarge: the EU-Balkans Thessaloniki Summit in
June 2003 endorsed the belief and aspiration that the entire region be integrated into the EU over the next decade, whilst both Serbia-Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina look to integrate into PiP by 2004. Dual enlargement has the potential to generate a number of asymmetric impacts within the Euro-Atlantic security region: between existing EU and NATO member states; between old and first echelon members; between security policies within these organizations that stress competitive or cooperative functional division of labour (that is, in terms of roles, missions and duties) between these organizations; between EU and NATO member states and those that will integrate by May 2004; and, between those that have the ability to integrate and those states that either do not or in which NATO and EU their current elites and publics perceive integration as a distant long-term generational strategic objective. Let us examine some of the issues that arise in relation to the asymmetric impact of dual enlargement in greater detail.

2. Euro-Atlantic Strategic Divorce or Strategic Renewal?

The 1999 Kosovo campaign highlighted the dangers in the eyes of some NATO members of conducting a war by committee. The U.S. administration saw NATO’s cumbersome decision-making structures as detrimental to the achievement of closure or victory in the campaign, whilst the U.K. argued that the U.S. lack of political will to rule in the possible use of ground troops at the beginning of the air campaign undermined the deterrent effect of NATO. The Kosovo campaign also served to reopen the discussion of the capabilities, technology, and power projection disparities between the U.S. and other NATO member states. (Clark, 2001: 427.) The low defence expenditures of the European NATO member states and the largely static nature of their force structures were exposed, raising again ongoing debates over optimal burden sharing and division of labour within NATO. Moreover, some old NATO member states, as well as new first echelon members, were perceived to have performed poorly, with political elites not spending political capital to persuade their publics about the necessity and virtue of NATO intervention.

The shocking impact of 9/11 determined that the Bush administration ‘would seek to dominate the international system to such an extent that no strategic challenge would ever again be posed.’ (Lyndley-French, 2002: 802) The ‘lessons learned’ from Kosovo impacted heavily on the transatlantic response to 9/11. The diplomatic failure of the US to engage European NATO Allies post 9/11 – even as they offered ‘unlimited solidarity’ - undermined NATO’s relevance. Although NATO’s support proved politically useful, the US rejected European NATO offers for the alliance to engage as NATO in war fighting in Afghanistan: ‘The Bush administration viewed NATO’s historic decision to aid the United States under Article 5 less as a boon than a booby trap.’ (Kagan, 2003: 102) In the words of the US Secretary of State for Defence: ‘the mission defined the coalition, not the coalition the mission’. The implications of GWOT and US-led and inspired ‘coalitions of the willing’ – a la carte multilateralism - for NATO were apparent.

A third dynamic occurred with the November 2002 NATO Prague Summit and the debates that preceded it were shaped by lessons learned from Kosovo, but also the imperatives that flowed from 9/11. As a result, NATO focused attention on three new issues. Firstly, ‘new capabilities’ - the capabilities of NATO allies had to be improved and the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) tackled this issue. In the context of GWOT, new NATO members were strongly encouraged to reform their internal security structures – the civil-military focus of the MAP process was extended to include more explicitly civil-security sector reform in which security/intelligence services, Ministries of Interior, border guards etc. could all perform a role within the GWOT paradigm. NATO’s Response Force (NRF) was to be the catalyst and most visible and useful objective of PCC. The NRF was to be a 21,000 strong force, technologically advanced, deployable, interoperable and sustainable by 2006, with 2000 troops to be sustainable for operating in the field for 14-30 days by October 2003. It was understood to be a means of improving the NATO capabilities of European states at no additional spending it would help to keep NATO interoperable through intense periods of training and missions and would be deployed to Afghanistan under German-Dutch leadership.

Secondly, ‘new members’ - a decision to integrate seven new members in second echelon enlargement was taken – and this included the three Baltic States. However, second echelon enlargement was shaped by the first echelon post-integration performance. A number of ‘lessons learned’ have been identified, which suggest security policy implications for second echelon integration states. Following the experience of Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, it is likely that what ever the force structure of current prospective NATO member states is now, that
structure will change in the future after accession. All new members will face budgetary constraints as they attempt to restructure their military and constitutional and legal system inadequacies will persist and have to be addressed, along with changes to national security doctrines, military concepts and doctrines. Incompatibilities between national and NATO defence planning will appear and will have to be addressed and it appears questionable whether the publics and elites will continue to support NATO membership to the same extent post-accession as in the pre-accession period. The lack of support for the Kosovo campaign in the public and elites of the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland, the poor rate of defence reform and force restructuring these states had undertaken since integration and low rates of defence expenditure was compounded by the fact that it was 'more difficult to gain compromise once the new allies were members.' (Simon, 2003) 'One bitten twice shy' was the watchword – and with it the realization that NATO could only exert reform pressure on new members through exclusion; once integrated leverage was lost.

Thirdly, 'new relationships' – the NATO-Russian relations were placed on a firmer footing by the creation of NATO-Russia Council. (Kay, 2003) Russia-NATO relations were becoming routinised under the Russia-NATO Council, as a practical content of activities were developed, and an administrative capacity and a shared institutionalized culture gained root. Russia continued to promote security co-operation with the US in GWOT and despite Putin’s objections to the Iraq war – the issue was not discussed within the Russia-NATO Council forum – but rather through bilateral discussions between Washington D.C. and Moscow. The framework of Russian-US strategic partnership rather than the institution of NATO was favoured and this trend further underscores NATO’s increasingly limited relevance to transatlantic relations.

However, the latent tensions exposed by Kosovo had transformed into simmering disagreement and discontent not so much by the US declaration of a GWOT and intervention into Afghanistan, but by the way in which the ‘coalition of the willing’ intervened and the implications that held for US security policy in the Bush administration. Open cleavages within the transatlantic security community continued to surface, particularly in France preoccupied with the exercise of US ‘hyper-power’ and Germany, as the Chancellor was caught in a close political election and politicized his party’s (SPD) opposition to US ‘adventurism’ to capture critical floating voters and bolster his Green Party coalition allies. The ‘Bush Doctrine’ of pre-emption (US National Security Strategy of September 2002) against states that currently threaten the US or that might conceivably threaten US primacy was understood by some alliance members in terms of neo-imperial ‘adventures’, to be opposed or counter-balanced through a greater emphasis on NATO or other multilateral institutions such as the UN. (Stelzenmueller, 2002: 9)

Although many pre-emptive wars have occurred in history, the US-led invasion of Iraq – ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’ - on 20 March 2003 represented the first pre-emptive war in accordance with the US September 2002 Strategic Doctrine. ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’ can be understood as the fourth dynamic as it ushered in an era in which the US has thrown off the constraints and balances of the multilateral system and exercised its enormous political and military supremacy on its own terms. (Baker et al, 2003: 17) UN Security Council Resolution 1441 brought fully into the open cleavages between 18 European states and France, Germany, Russia, Belgium and Luxembourg, and between the US and Turkey (where the US strategic partnership with Turkey was deemed to be ‘in tatters’). Current European NATO members signed ‘Letter of Eight’ in support of the US position on Iraq, and days later a further 10 European states – the ‘Vilnius 10’ – added to this majority. The so-called ‘Chocolate Summit’ held in Brussels by the ‘Gang of Four’ (Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg) was grist to the mill of those that pointed to ‘strategic divorce’. These splits now appeared fundamental in nature and constituted a crisis for NATO, only comparable in NATO history to the Suez Crisis of 1956, when the US opposed a French-UK led ‘coalition of willing’ occupation of the Suez canal, to the point of forcing a humiliating retreat on its erstwhile allies.

These dynamics both generated and illustrated tensions and cleavages that were cumulative in nature, but driven over the immediate short-term by French, German and Russian opposition to US intervention in Iraq without a second UN resolution. This opposition, whilst reflecting the overwhelming popular sentiment – also served to highlight European inability to either stop through political diplomatic means, or indeed emulated through military power the US-led intervention. It merely underscored the realization that Europe lacked sufficient military power coupled with a political determination to become a global strategic power through the exercise of military force (‘hard power’).
The Iraq crisis also demonstrated that the US was prepared to deal with like-minded EU states individually, rather than attempt to deal with the EU as a unified whole. The widely reported statement attributed to Condoleezza Rice underscored this perception, to the effect that US post-Iraq policy towards Europe was to ‘Punish the French, ignore the Germans, forgive the Russians’ and presumably reward the Spanish and the British? Such disaggregating or ‘cherry-picking’ isolates opponents on any given issue and undermines the European project, and this may further undermine the rose-tinted vision of transatlantic re-coupling. It also undermines any attempts to generate ‘credibility, cohesion, convergence, commitment and candour’, the prerequisites for transatlantic re-coupling. (Lindley-French, 2003: 76)

Solana, for example, has argued that: ‘such an approach would not only contradict generations of American wisdom, it would also be profoundly misguided. Different voices must be heard and respected, not ostracized or punished.‘

3. Security and Defence Policy Implications

This ambiguous and unsettled strategic environment, coupled with the process of dual enlargement will have an number of asymmetric impacts on the defence and security policies of states in the Euro-Atlantic region, particularly the new entrants to NATO and the EU. Firstly, it brings with it the need to effectively fulfil the duties and responsibilities of membership. The US in particular asks two key questions of the new allies. Will the candidates’ commitment democracy strengthen the alliance’s ability to protect and promote its security, value and interests? Can NATO be confident that a candidates’ commitment to democracy and the alliances values be enduring? In military terms these questions translate more practically into the challenge of EU and NATO membership in balancing a need to both develop high intensity niche capabilities/specialized roles in NATO’s Response Force (NRF) and promote peacekeepers to support the middle and lower end Petersberg tasks, which the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) is likely to undertake. Can the Baltic and SE European states advance on two fronts at once or do they have to choose one due to finance, personnel and administrative and institutional capacity shortfalls and limitations? Both tasks have the potential to unbalance their militaries and create tensions in defence planning, contingencies and tasking arenas.

On the one hand role specialization for the NRF increases ‘strategic partnership’ with the US and opens up the possibility of integration into ‘coalitions of the willing’. But such participation would be symbolic at best – their contribution is not needed militarily - and could be potentially unpopular at home depending on war fighting casualties and the gap between perceived necessity of the pre-emption against the perceived imminence of the threat. On the other hand Peace Support Operation preparation with the ERRF would be more popular domestically, but it is far from clear of the ERRF has the decision-making capacity, finance and political will to operate in a meaningful manner and the doubts can only increase as the EU moves to 25. Thus, whilst it might have been argued - half in jest - that the best interests of the SE European and Baltic States within a transatlantic security alliance would be to ‘join any emerging consensus’ in order to maximize their influence, the dynamic events of the last few years argue that such a policy is now untenable. The US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld has noted: ‘The distinction between old and new Europe today is not really of a matter of age or size or even geography. It is a matter of attitude, of the vision that countries bring to the trans-Atlantic relationship.’ (Rumsfeld 2003) French President Jacques Chirac also exacerbated splits through his undiplomatic comments in February 2003 in response to the V10 letter of support for the US: ‘If they had wanted to diminish the chances of joining Europe, they could not have found a better way.’ Bluntly put: which is more important for Baltic and SE European States – European or American priorities?

Secondly, it places a stress on relations with both traditional regional partners and near neighbours. The attitudes of Baltic elites, for example, and the choices they make will place a pressure on the ability of their foreign and defence establishments to maintain cohesion in foreign and security policy formation and implementation once accession to NATO and the EU has been achieved. It is highly likely that – just as after the Benelux bloc or Iberian Peninsula integration – the constituent parts followed their own on occasion divergent interests, and accession will lead to a greater fragmentation of the Baltic States in foreign and security matters. This, in turn will reduce the collective geopolitical weight of the Baltic bloc as a whole, but increase the bargaining power and influence of individual states in new informal alliances and partnerships within the EU and NATO. This has implications for civil-military relations in the region. Intra-Baltic foreign policy co-operation within the military-security sector - widely perceived as the jewel in the crown of intra-Baltic co-operation - the most active,
largetment and the motor of possible third echelon integration. Slovenia, though, has suggested that it can shoulder responsibilities Greece and Italy currently undertake as strategic partners offering 'sovereignty support' and promoting democratic security building in the Western Balkans – particularly the former Yugoslavia. Slovenia has peacekeepers in BiH, Macedonia and Kosovo, active economic investments in the region and has stressed the importance of EU integration of thes states. The EU-Balkan Summit of June 2003 has reaffirmed the EU's desire to eventually integrate all Balkan states into the Union. As Slovene Prime Minister Anton Rop stated: 'The EU has shown that the integration of the Balkan states is one of the priority tasks.' (STA news agency, Ljubljana, 21 June 2003) The necessity of integration was underlined by Lord Robertson, who has argued that border controls need to be strengthened in order to fight organised crime – a key threat to regional stability: 'either region takes control of its borders or the criminals will take control of the region.' (Agence France Press, May 22, 2003)

However, there are a number of challenges to stability and security that must be overcome before integration into EU and NATO can be realised. Some are relatively straightforward. Although in Albania 90% of the population support NATO membership, it has low democratic standards – but this can be enhanced by continued EU integration and the support of near neighbours. It is not entirely clear whether the Bulgarian and Romanian experience is relevant for and could be transferred to the South Caucasus or the Balkan region. BiH represents another challenge, which poses far harder policy questions for the EU and neighbouring states. Firstly, the state has little internal cohesion, with 13 Prime ministers, 180 Ministers and 760 legislators within three entities lead by nationalist leaders with a zero sum mentality. BiH can only be supervised through the international supervisory administration and central to its success will be the policies of neighbouring states and the unity of the international community forcing reforms – including the non-tolerance of anti-Dayton factions – in a comprehensive and unified manner.

In addition, near neighbours do not have comprehensive policies towards BiH. Two-thirds of BiH's borders are shared with Croatia: 'It is the primary transit country for international forces and supplies to this totally landlocked country, and Croatia's many ports and roads along the Adriatic are BiH's lifelines to the world.' (Raguz, 2003) While the
new Croatian government has withdrawn outright support for Croats in BiH to be integrated into Croatia, it is not yet apparent what will replace the 'BiH-breakup' policy. The State Union of Serbia and Montenegro has a huge reform process to implement after the assassination of Prime Minister Djinjic in February 2003, and difficulties are compounded by the possible independence of Montenegro in 2-3 years, following the election in early 2003 of a pro-independence president. The status of Kosovo also has yet to be decided and this has the potential to impact on relations with the West, although it is being at least discussed within the context of KFOR-Belgrade dialogue and with the EU’s Stability and Association Tracking Mechanism (the SAP equivalent for Kosovo). The current Belgrade government has stopped military ties between Belgrade and Banja Luka in Republika Srpska, but have continued economic ties – though leading generals in the Vojvo- 
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These principles entail a switch from building large, heavily staffed garrisons, towards a more modern basing paradigm. General Jones has spoken of the creation of ‘bare bones bases’ or ‘lilly pads’, noting that a Pentagon study in 2002 as noted that 20% of the 499 bases in Germany are no longer ‘terribly usable.’ (Graham, 2003) Instead, he supports smaller, lighter more scattered bases in which prepo-
sition equipment and skeleton 6-month rotating staff (without dependencies) can respond with greater speed and flexibility to deployments out of area. It is thought that while some ‘enduring value’ bases will be maintained, such as the airbase at Ramstein in Germany or Aviano in Italy, and the overall number of US troops in Europe will continue (approx 112,000 with 84% in Germany), the location of these troops will change. For example, the two US divisions (each division has 15,000 troops) in Germany, the 1st Armoured Division (15,000 soldiers) attached the Vth Corps near Heidelberg and the 1st Infantry Division, currently in Iraq, will only have a brigade (between 3-5000 troops) redeployed to Germany after the Iraq operation. The balance will be sent back to the US or deployed to the ‘lilly pads’.

Discussions are ongoing as to where these ‘lillypads’ might be located and those assets, which have been used for operations over the Balkans or in Iraq, are the most likely contenders. In Poland the Krzesinsky air base near Poznan has been mentioned, in Hungary the Taszar airbase. In Romania the Mihail Kogalniceanu air base near Constanta, the Babadag training ground and Mangalia port are all under consideration. In Bulgaria, the airfields of Dobritch in the NE and Kroumovo in the South and Graf Ignatievo near Plovdiv are all discussed, as are the ports of Burgas and Varna and training grounds of Koren and Novo Selo.

The experience of the Iraq war has impacted on the necessity of reconfiguration. The lack of political support amongst some allies – a lack that contrasted sharply with Vilnius 10 support - had operational consequences for US military effectiveness. It took several days delay before the Pentagon could get permission to deploy US Army 173rd Airborne Brigade to parachute into Northern Iraq. Austria did not make its rail network available for US forces and German, French and Turkish opposition to the war provides a reason to decrease future dependence. Public support for US military presence, aims and objectives within Bulgaria, Romania, Poland and Hungary is greater than within ‘Old Europe’ and this lessens threats to deny access to such infrastructure located on their territory. Moreover, the economic benefits of the location of such bases – even the lower cost ‘lilly pads’ – will likely maintain or increase public support. EUCOM HQ at Stuggart puts $150-$175 m into the local economy and after 3 months of US use of Constanza port in Romania, $30 m was inserted into the local economy. (Fuller, 3003)

The military benefits are clear: as well as greater geo-strategic flexibility that location closer to conflict brings (for example, less mid-air refueling for tactical range F-16s), the less restrictive environmental legislation as this allows more live fire exercises, training manoeuvres in heavily tracked vehicles, helicopter night flights and this will contribute to an ability to maintain a higher level of military readiness and joint exercises with host nation militaries will help increase the interoperability of new NATO member states. At the same time as consolidating political ties with these states, basing the US military in both Bulgaria and Turkey will shift the basing burden from Turkey and provide diplomatic cover to Turkish politicians when actions become regional initiatives rather than solely US-Turkish efforts.

The US and Europe face the same threats of WMD proliferation and terrorism and NATO is the anchor of US security relations with Europe. (Brezinski, 2003) However, the eastwards and southwards tread of the lighter US footprint does raise security policy implications that may emerge and will have to be managed, though as yet are not apparent. Will Germany feel diplomatically snubbed and resent the economic (and cultural) impact of the move? Certainly, the majority of US bases are in three Lander and so radical basing changes would have economic and political consequences in Rheinland Plaz, Hessen and Bavaria. Will appropriate political contact between the US and Germany suffer; will a ‘strategic seam’ be broken and might this not then be exploited?

Alternatively, will ‘New Europe’ generate unrealistic expectations of the military, economic and political benefits that will accrue from opening up of new bases or restoration and extension of existing Soviet-era bases on their territory? After all, this very scenario is identified as a threat in Russia’s National Security Concept of 2000, which is still in operation. Will the Russia-NATO Council allow the issue of new bases on former Soviet borders and even the extension of US bases from Central Asia to the South Caucasus (e.g. Georgia and Azerbaijan) to be managed, or might Russia begin to object to this increased US presence? Armenia, with US bases already in Turkey, is unlikely to argue that it is concerned with the proximity of new NATO bases, but it would be concerned if the arrival of these bases negatively impacted on Russia-NATO relations. It might also be argued that the nature of the ‘lilly pads’ – jump off points for pre-positioned equipment rather than Okinawa-style mini-American garrisons – helps immunise them from negative perceptions of overwhelming US presence.
However, it may well be that two latent processes might be realised that undermine this positive interpretation. Firstly, bureaucratic and institutional and political considerations might see the ‘lilly-pads’ grow in size, thereby negating the benefits of the lighter footprint and increasing antagonisms from Russia. Secondly, a realization of the hidden costs of such a move might also undermine the US DoD’s determination to carry it through. The morale, retention and re-enlistment problem is expected to grow, as rotation without families increases in a period of high operational tempo. Two sets of equipment are needed – one forward and one rear to carry out training year round and transportation costs and additional capital costs to renovate new bases must be considered. Moreover, it can be noted that there is an air of unreality attached to the notion of forward basing troops and especially equipment in ‘New’ rather than ‘Old’ Europe. The time difference of deployment from Romania to the Middle East as opposed to Germany is a day saved. Presumably, if heavy forces transit time is critical then they could be deployed a day earlier from Germany - light forces two hours earlier.

4. Conclusions

Current dynamics do not allow for a complete breakdown in transatlantic relations, but they are disruptive enough not to promote a reconciliation and then renewal. Instead we are faced with strategic disequilibrium or strategic dissonance in transatlantic relations, an environment with three key features. Firstly, the constancies of US ‘hard’ military power and EU ‘soft’ economic and political power increase over the next years. Secondly, the US although maintaining a broadly unilateral proactive and pre-emptive foreign policy, does work harder at securing allies as the costs – military, political, economic – of sustaining GWOT at its current operational tempo become apparent to the Bush administration. Thirdly, and paradoxically, the stronger the EU becomes as a ‘soft’ power (the greater its ability to integrate first and then second echelon members) the larger the membership, the harder it becomes to generate strategic consensus within the EU for common foreign policy and possible military intervention in all but the lowest common denominator (i.e. ‘sub-Zimbabwe’) actions: the accumulation of EU ‘soft’ power precludes its ability to generate ‘hard’ power. As a result of disagreement over threat perception, attempts to formulate a coherent, symmetric Euro-Atlantic response to manage these asymmetric threats is at present lacking. The Euro-Atlantic security community may attempt to manage the threats by strengthening global institutions; increasing Euro-Atlantic institutional co-operation; or adopting a compartmentalized and differentiated approach over a range of issues that combines institutional co-operation, competition, and ad hoc coalitions. Time will tell.

‘New Europe’ band wagoning as a security strategy may well prove to be the most effective in the context of current transatlantic relations. This will allow the new entrants to maximise gains – particularly strategic partnership with the US that will be underpinned by greater US military assistance. However, the role of ‘balancer’ might well recommend itself to the larger of the CEE states. Poland, an existing NATO state, has a geopolitical weight that can shape the strategic balance (it represents that oft quoted ‘tipping point’) between NATO European member states and the US – as evidenced by formation of the Polish Division in Iraq. Romania amongst the new entrants might well wish to lead a sub-regional political and economic system, but as it seeks EU membership by 2007 it is likely that Romanian priorities will not – at least publicly - stray too far from the EU consensus, at least until membership is secured.

However, the dual enlargement in 2004 will render ‘New’ Europe less amenable to supporting US foreign and security policy when it is at variance with elites and publics in Europe and the necessity of securing EU integration. This tendency to downgrade transatlantic ties against the desire to focus on economic security issues associated with the EU may well be balanced by GWOT and the necessity of counter-terrorist cooperation. Whilst it is true that the US over-militarizes foreign and security policy and the EU over civilianizes it, the realization that transnational terrorists can be best countered through a combination of 90% non-military (political, diplomatic, economic and financial strategies) and only 10% military efforts will bring the focus back to combining and consolidating the ‘soft’-‘hard’ power nexus and financing each element accordingly. An acceptance of this calculation by political elites – particularly the US, French and British governments – may help realign and rebalance US with European power and this dynamic will manage the role of the new entrants to the EU and NATO.

Baltic and SE European/Balkan civil-military relations have their part to play in consolidating transatlantic security relations in the 21st century. Will these regions represent ‘Atlantic Europe’ alongside the UK and the Netherlands, or ‘Core Europe’ along-
side France and Germany? Or is it possible that their actual contribution to international security will be primarily non-military in nature and that they will become de facto part of ‘Non-aligned Europe’, and be useful as a bridge to ‘Periphery Europe’? That these questions can still be asked indicates the extent to which dual enlargement has the potential to both undermine and underpin existing trends in transatlantic relations. The answers to these questions are in the hands of the elites in the Vilnius 10 capitals as much as Brussels and Washington DC.

NOTES

1 The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, the United States Department of Defense, the German Ministry of Defence, or the United States and German Governments.

2 The eight NATO members were Britain, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Denmark, Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary.

3 US Secretary of State Powell certified its compliance on June 15th. Serbia and Montenegro did however lose $278K of IMET funds because it has not yet signed a waiver on the ICC (along with many other states).

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