The Global Society and Its Enemies: “9/11” and the Future of the Atlantic Civilization

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Whatever the measures in the fight against terrorism are they cannot transcend the most important consequence of “9/11”, which is the privatisation of warfare. “9/11” is not only an attack against the symbols of power that the most powerful country in the world stands for. It introduces an unparalleled asymmetry into global relations, namely the asymmetry between state-channelled means of protection and society-based means of terror. The core of the issue is not whether NATO could any longer remain confined to “in area” reactions or whether it will be bound to increasingly act “out of area” in order to fight threats to the alliance partners. The set of new threats requires a new assessment of the notion of security and new dimensions of security strategies on local, national, and international levels. “9/11” has begun a period of soul-searching and of hard choices in the Western world. Its consequences will go way beyond the war on terrorism: “9/11” has become the rather unpleasant “opportunity” for the Atlantic civilisation to redefine its cause in contributing to world order in the 21st century.

Key words: terrorism, Atlantic civilisation, anti-terrorist measures

1. Introduction

The terrible terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have the potential of transforming the world order in a way no other event or process was able to do since the end of the Cold War. In retrospect, the period of 1989/91 until 2001 might be seen as a “late summer” before the return of rough waters in world politics. At the core of the matter, the post-“9/11” transformation of world power is not only about power equations between states. It is about the character of power as such. If “9/11” stands symbolically for anything deep and fundamental it symbolizes the failure of state-centered definitions of deterrence. It symbolizes the end of the state monopoly on the legitimate use of force (Gewaltmonopol des Staates), one of the key elements of state sovereignty in the modern world.

Whatever the military or policing measures in the fight against terrorism are, and no matter how necessary they are; they cannot transcend the most important consequence of “9/11”, which is the privatisation of warfare. “9/11” is not only an attack against the symbols of power that the most powerful country in the world stands for. It introduces an unparalleled asymmetry into global relations, namely the asymmetry between state-channelled means of protection and society-based means of terror. The intuitive reaction of citizens all around the world to
the terror attacks of “9/11” was towards their nation-state in search of protection with means of policing and military. It was understandable and yet it was insufficient as far as the new dimensions of global threat are concerned.

Regarding the transatlantic reaction to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the core of the issue is not whether NATO could any longer remain confined to “in area” reactions or whether it will be bound to increasingly act “out of area” in order to fight threats to the alliance partners. The assumption that the new dimension of threat means the privatization of warfare, the deliberate use of civilians as targets of violence, and the deliberate use of “surprise” as a means to launch attacks, challenges the fundamental patterns of proven state reactions and international relations. Unpredictability has become an element of unique intensity in the evolution of world politics. The new dimensions of threats after “9/11” do imply “in state” or “in government” components as much as “out of state” or “out of government” components. Worst of all, the threat is very much inside the Atlantic world itself as the existence of “terrorist sleeper cells” suggest, whether or not they are linked to strategic operations of Al Qaeda or another terrorist networks or even to potential terrorist activities of aggressive governments in “rogue states”. It might be debatable whether there can be “private terrorism” without some sort of organized and comprehensive state sponsorship. In light of the multifarious dimensions of possible modern terrorism, this is a rather academic question. The use of terrorist means to attack another country or society clearly introduces asymmetric notions of warfare into the traditional strategic and military interpretation of conflicts. Asymmetric warfare, whether state-driven or based on “privatized” terrorism, might unfold in many ways:
- Terrorists and states can manufacture and use lethal biological weapons and other weapons of mass destruction;
- Increases in information technology and the integration of world trading and financial systems are steadily increasing the danger of cyber warfare and terrorism;
- Global transportation systems are increasingly exposed to dangers of a terrorist nature.

2. Threat perception

The set of new threats requires a new assessment of the notion of security and new dimensions of security strategies on local, national, and international levels. The transatlantic community has been challenged by “9/11” to rethink its specific strategic reaction. Globalisation, whatever the term implies, is defined by a unique combination of technological means and practical expressions of unprecedented interdependence around the globe. Technology does not know borders any longer. Technology does not know limits, laws and equivalent modes of responding to its effects either. Technology is neither good nor bad, and it would mean to miss the point if the recognition of the transforming character of technology would simply be used for anti-technological responses. It requires however penetrating analysis to understand the nature of the threat symbolized in “9/11”. It is a threat, which does not know borders anymore; it is a threat that does not know taboos anymore; it is a threat that does not meet equivalent and complementary measures of a monopoly of state power anymore. “9/11” means the end to the state monopoly on the legitimate use of force.

This does not mean that reactions according to the traditional logic of the state monopoly on the legitimate use of force have become completely wrong or useless. The state remains the guarantor of the security of its citizens to the best of its ability. The debate whether policing measures taken after “9/11” might infringe upon people’s rights was therefore both artificial and overdone. It showed that the state monopoly on the legitimate use of force, so long contested in the name of civil liberties, has become an instrument to guarantee civil liberties at least in Western democracies. The unwavering confidence into this perception of the modern state has been deeply shaken by “9/11” and its implications. Wherever dictatorship prevails, the state also remains the potentially biggest agent of aggression against other states and other societies. This is why the question of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is extremely crucial in the context of countries working on such weapons. The borders between a state-led use of aggression, state-sponsored aggression or privatized aggression, which either holds a state hostage or operates independently from any state, have become permeable.

If violence, even in its maximal form without any taboo or limit, becomes an act of private decision, the state monopoly in countering violence through a monopoly of military and policing measures becomes clumsy, permeable and questionable. This notion of state-centered decisionism was heavily shattered on “9/11”.

The realization that terrorist groups can even hijack states as in the case of Afghanistan makes the
new challenge even more uncomfortable. Suicide bombers in the Middle East add to the new challenge of asymmetric warfare. It has become questionable whether or not the Western sovereign state, still firmly holding to the notion of the state monopoly on the legitimate use of force as the central guarantor of civil liberties, can truly act coherently and with sustainable success in the face of the new dimension of privatized warfare. While “9/11” is felt as a threat to everybody, it was a particular blow to the legitimacy of the modern state. This situation can both be seen as a hopeless tragedy or as an opportunity. Whether either the United States or Europe will be capable of living up to the intellectual challenge “9/11” has generated in terms of the threat perception for the 21st century, remains to be seen. So far, the reactions on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean were rather intuitive and hence limited. Confronted with an exceptional threat, America is inclined to act unidimensional, thus hoping to counterbalance the power of evil it is confronted with. Confronted with an exceptional threat, Europe is inclined to invoke multidimensional categories of assessment of the situation and solutions to reach both its root causes and all possible ramifications. Neither approach might suffice to come to terms with the secular implication of “9/11”.

Without any doubt, state power remains necessary in fighting terrorism. The more aggressive and wicked terrorists act, the more likely it is that they do not do so on their own. They need an infrastructure that has to be traced down. They might use shelter and cover up, financial and logistical support that has to be targeted and destroyed. They use means of communication and conspiracy, which cannot remain hidden if properly investigated. Hard state power remains inevitable to fight the war against terrorism. It will always become somewhat contradictory when the enemy is wrapped in a multi-layered combination of state authority (such as Iraq, Taliban Afghanistan), state sponsored actions (such as Hamas, Hezbollah, Al Qaeda) and extremely privatized targeting through personalized tools (such as suicide terrorism against innocent civilians). It might also mean that hard power infrastructure like military institutions become more of a target than remaining an instrument in a successful fight against terrorism.

The notion of a state monopoly on the legitimate use of force as a necessary means in protecting citizens against terror attacks has become shattered, not on grounds of theoretical opposition, but on grounds of practical state capacities to do so. Terrorists, as “9/11” has proven, are no longer “out there”, but they are among us, they can be everywhere and in fact they have proven to be everywhere. “9/11” is equivalent to the “Middle Easternisation of the West”, to terrorism which on purpose looks for civilian targets and victims. Whatever else to fear in the future, since many “sleeper cells” linked to the Al Qaeda network do exist already in Western societies, and in fact also in non-Western societies, one must recognize how difficult it will be to bring terrorism to its places of origin in the Middle East and the Arab world. Terrorism is already among us and the past experiences with terrorism in Europe (like IRA, ETA, Red Brigades or Baader-Meinhof) are incomparable with the new global dimension the world is confronted with.

After “9/11”, many Americans were wondering if Europe and the US would share the same notion of the threat perception the Western world is facing. There seemed to be consensus that terrorism was posing a threat to Western civilization, Western type liberties and to a peaceful living together of people with different ethnic or religious backgrounds. There seemed to be consensus that terrorism requires global countermeasures. As much as no country should or could react on its own, America should not be left alone and Europe needs to strongly support America. The degree of consultation on strategy, tactics and actions as well as the degree on consensual cooperation versus a unilateral urge in the US was as much focus of the debate as it could possibly be in the transatlantic relations. The open question was whether the degree of diverging perceptions and conflicting opinions was higher than usual.

Surely, the sensitivities were higher than ever before. Hardly anybody raised the question whether or not any military and policing reaction could be up to the new challenge at all.

The US was torn, not for the first time, between superpower-instincts and an inclination to build a fortress America, much in line with the call for isolationism of her first President, George Washington, that “there can be no greater error than to expect or calculate, upon real favours from Nation to Nation”. Europe was torn, also not surprisingly, between commitment to transatlantic solidarity based either on values and shared interests or the assumption that only if Europe would stand shoulder to shoulder with the US it could prevent the US from conducting exaggerated and unproportional measures. Solidarity of values and solidarity of mistrust converged while other Europeans questioned whether the US would either understand the root causes of
“9/11”, be willing to reflect the reason for “anti-Americanism” in many parts of the world or whether the “war on terrorism” would really be fought for the same purpose and with the same objectives.2

Diverging perceptions of the threat and its nature remain the crux of the matter in transatlantic relations. While Americans emphasized the need for military options in the war against terrorism, no matter which new fronts might have to be opened, Europeans were divided on the question whether a wartime situation actually exists. “Mutual recriminations” as Jackson Janes and Jeffrey Anderson put it about six months after “9/11”, were “becoming more frequent and openly public”.3 Most of this debate was confined to the traditional patterns, reflexes and impulses of transatlantic relations. As asymmetric as the new series of threats in the world may be, the transatlantic reactions would remain asymmetric as long as the US and the EU would not see eye-to-eye as equal partners in the management of a “post-state monopoly on legitimate use of force-world”. Even such a chaotic new world will require political leadership and a wise application of multilateralism. The US might be attracted by unilateralism, which is the flip-side of isolationism, and Europe might remain torn between problems of governance and providing appropriate capabilities to both impress the US, be accepted as a partner in leadership, and tie the US to multilateral approaches of the extent Europe would like to see.

In light of the changing nature of power, the new array of terrorist threats from biological warfare and suicide bombs to spectacular attacks on symbols of Western civilization, and the limited role of the traditional state monopoly on the legitimate use of force to cope with the new dimensions of threats to peace and stability in the world, the EU and the US are forced to narrow their perception of the nature of the threats both transatlantic partners are facing. This includes not only political consultations that exist as intensive as ever. It also requires more than an increase of the networks of the civil societies (academia, media), which were so successful and vivid during the decades of the Cold War.

First and foremost, it requires consensus about a new global agenda which the Atlantic civilization is confronted with and will have to deal in consent, or at least on the basis of complementary division of labour if it succeeds as it did during the second half of the 20th century. In order to achieve this, a new “grand strategy” is needed which can truly replace the one, which served as the underlying foundation for the transatlantic alliance during the decades of the Cold War. “9/11” has made evident the need for a new “grand strategy” which can provide for a mental construct to conceptually and practically cope with the new dimensions of threat to the Atlantic civilization.

3. Unfinished globalisation and its contradictions

The Atlantic civilization cannot overlook the enormous breadth and depth of new challenges it is facing. In the wake of “9/11”, it was unclear whether the diverging tendencies between the US and Europe were

- a consequence of ideological divisions with increasing links between the policy debates on both sides of the Atlantic which would have to take into account different policy preferences between a Republican administration in Washington and a majority of left of centre governments in the member states of the European Union;
- a more general problem of transatlantic governance dealing with increasingly disparate views on policy relations stemming from diverging notions of the role of power, the role of state sovereignty, the notion of multilateralism and the importance of international cooperation while American unilateralism and “Euro-Gaullism” were evolving simultaneously;
- a consequence of unfinished globalisation along with the problem of framing the various debates and developments of the world in the early 21st century through the prism of a focused understanding of its inherent nature, its dangers and its opportunities.

Depending on which starting point one would take, the implications for a strategic assessment of the new paradigm the world order started to generate would be different:

- a return to ideological politics within the Western world, not the least between Americans and Europeans;
- a forward looking understanding of power politics and its meaning in the new century;
- a multidimensional approach which would be able to strengthen the Atlantic civilization rather than defining it by its ability to limit agreement between its key partners.

The third choice would clearly be most promising, although not necessarily the easiest one. It would require to contextualise “9/11” and put it into
the perspective of its larger relevance for the future evolution of world politics. This would be equivalent to the re-making of the world at the end of World War II. Before a grand strategy was designed at that time, which shaped the course of the Cold War and all ups and downs of the transatlantic relations during its decades, a proper analysis of the situation took place. This was the work of a few “wise men” on the side of the United States, and it was the work of enlightened statesmen in post-war Europe. While the war against terrorism prevailed, it was difficult to conceptualise it as the starting point for a new global paradigm. But nothing less was needed if “9/11” was to be transformed from a “defining moment” in history into the formative experience of a new era and as the “hour zero” for the shaping of a new global paradigm.

This would require analysts to broaden the perspective from “9/11” as an act of war to an assessment of the root causes underlying this brutal act. The key notion of the Cold War was encapsulated in the title of Karl Popper’s magnificent study “The Open Society and Its Enemies”. More than any other intellectual contribution this book grasped the scientific root causes of the era which was defined by the division between democracy and dictatorship, by the components of political totalitarianism and its seductive messages, by the combination of ideological, political, military and cultural struggles. The enemies of the open society were representatives of the same cultural background. The battle over the “open society” was a battle within the Western world, among thinkers, agitators and actors in the world between Vancouver and Vladivostok. The enemies of the open society were by and large part of the same intellectual tradition and cultural background. Only after the Cold War had completely unfolded, a dividing line between “the West” and “the East” was drawn. This recognized the geographical splits, which had taken place right through Central Europe after 1945. It facilitated political, military and ideological categorizations and became something of an abbreviation for the description of a larger and more complex conflict. It came as no surprise that with the end of the Cold War, most Central European countries claimed their “return to the West”, while Russia embarked on a Western oriented strategy even if it would remain a case sui generis, no longer adversarial to the West, but also distinct from Western and Central European societies.

The formative mental construction of the new post “9/11” world might be labelled “The global society and its enemies”. The attack on the World Trade Center was a symbolic attack on economic and cultural globalisation. It brought about a form of terrorism, which gave expression to the darkest possible side of globalisation. Its effects were felt globally and its context was truly global. If the paradigm of the 21st century was to be “globalisation”, its enemies are definitely manifold and they are so for different reasons:

- inside and outside the Atlantic civilization, some argue against the dominance of cultural globalisation which they see as an attack on heterogeneous identities;
- inside and outside the Atlantic civilization, some argue against the economic power of globalisation which they see as leading to exclusion of many members of the human family;
- inside and outside the Atlantic civilization, some criticize globalisation as becoming equivalent with “Americanisation”;
- inside and outside the Atlantic civilization, some criticize technological globalisation as a contribution to dehumanising human life and human relations;
- inside and outside the Atlantic civilization, some understand globalisation as intrinsically driven by human self idolization, thus undermining the values and norms of any religion, humility among them.

The amount of grievances in the world is not less strong or stronger in the early 21st century than it was at other times. Notions of recognition of justice were as strong and complex as ever. While the “global society” had become neither complete nor perfect or morally superior, its critics were as broad in their outlooks, priorities and orientations as could be. But what was binding them together was critique and rejection of the emerging global society. The expressions of this opposition were as diverse as human behavior can be. Endless shortcomings and limits of globalisation were supporting one aspect of the critique or another. But all in all, no opposition to the emerging global society was as forceful and violent as terrorism symbolized in its most gruesome brutality by the events of “9/11”. Terrorism has become the darkest side of globalisation.

Its aggression is of a totalitarian fanaticism comparable only to the great and wicked totalitarian movements of the 20th century. As much as proponents of Nazi or communist totalitarianism in the 20th century, historian Jeffrey Herf wrote, “today’s Islamic fundamentalist fanatics are convinced that they possess absolute truth which is immune from refutation or criticism; they despise Western modernity yet borrow its technological accomplishments in an effort to destroy it. They believe that force and terror
are necessary to establish a utopia in place of the current decadent and corrupt world; and they explain history on the basis of conspiratorial construct in which the United States, more than "international Jewry" or global capitalism, plays the central role."

And: “Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda emerge in a global political culture in which elements of leftist anti-globalisation discourse and reruns of fascist and Nazi visions of Jewish conspiracies merge with religious passion.” Herf, whose analysis of Nazi ideology as "reactionary modernism" gained attention twenty years ago, concluded that "9/11" was "a terribly clear act of reactionary modernist rage ... Islamic fundamentalism borrows the West’s technology in order to destroy it.”

Terrorism has always been linked to totalitarian movements in the past. It should be no surprise that the enemies of the global society have begun to organize and to express themselves in a similar manner as their Nazi or communist predecessors. The age of ideological seduction has found a new expression in Islamic terrorism. “To the fanatic,” Elie Wiesel wrote, “everything is black or white, curse or blessing, friend or foe - and nothing in between. He is immune to doubt and hesitation. He perceives tolerance as weakness.” The terror attacks of "9/11" are the most evident expression of this fanaticism. However, the terrorism of "9/11" is nothing but the bloody peak of a much deeper set of problems. These problems are linked, inter alia, to the character and evolution of Islamic societies confronted with modernization and Western democracy. They are likewise linked with the growing formation of dislike against the promise of globalisation and its inevitable weaknesses inside and outside the Western world. "9/11" shed a flash light on the many threads of contempt for the emerging civilization of globalisation, but the shades of the problems which they are representing are not only lit in the sharp light of "9/11". Many of the root causes of "9/11" are rather grey and not just black and white. Thus, both the analysis and the consequences stemming from it must be multidimensional and recognize the interlocking nature of the underlying root causes of the new terrorism threat to civilization.

It will require lasting intellectual efforts to link the proper analysis of the forces which represent enmity to the global society with the search for a comprehensive grand strategy of the Atlantic civilization in order to fight them appropriately and successfully. Nothing less is the consequence which the United States and Europe have to draw from "9/11" as the "hour zero" of a new epoch:

4 Elements of a new grand strategy for the Atlantic civilization: Containment and inclusion

1. The vulnerability of complex modern societies. There will never be absolute security as long as freedom prevails. Consolation can only be found in religious notions of the value and ultimate purpose of life and afterlife and in the recognition of the relative and limited success of all human endeavour. The more we appreciate human life and human dignity, the more we have to accept its limits. If necessary, this must be learned anew the more perfectionist our societies seem to become.

2. The benefit of containment. Strategies of containment are necessary in order to prevent the consequences of vulnerability to spread in uncontrolled ways and to escalate beyond acceptable means. Containing the violent enemies of global society demands strong military and policing measures, multilateral political coalitions and a resolve of applying all options necessary in order to deter forces which willingly spread destruction, fear and hate.

3. The hope of inclusion and recognition. So far, a global society is emerging only in rudimentary forms with limited scope both in terms of coherent “content” and universal territorial outreach. Whatever possible has to be done to increase the sustainable inclusion of individuals, societies, cultures and states into the emerging global society. Incentives must be provided to make it worthwhile to recognize the benefits of the global society by being recognized in one’s own individuality and identity by the global society itself.

4. The advantage of honesty. To engage each and every line of thinking into some sort of dialogue has become an incarnate expression of Western tolerance. Instead of a dialogue among cultures, often a culture of dialogue has developed. To transform it into a viable contribution to a sincere dialogue of cultures, honesty and clarity about one’s own position and goals are necessary. As paradoxical as it might sound: To overcome relativism of standpoint is necessary if fanaticism of action is to be prevented.

5. The need for universal recognition of human dignity. No killing is justified in the name of any God or human ideology. Only recognition of the inherent dignity of all other members of the human family can make the vulnerable global society a human experience for any individual. Fundamental human rights must be universally recognized to allow any moral dialogue among cultures and people and to strengthen the legitimacy of any political sys-
tem throughout the world.

From these basic assumptions follows a simple and yet fundamental consequence. Any viable and farsighted political strategy accepting the premises described above, will have to resort to two complex tasks: containment and inclusion. Neither of these tasks will be simple and unidimensional. Both require inherently multilateral approaches. If “containment and inclusion” shall serve as the summarizing and forming notions of the new paradigm necessary to focus the Atlantic civilization in its strife for the future world-order, their implications have to be spelled out in breadth and in depth. They will require a global view on both sides of the Atlantic. Neither American unilateralisn nor European insularism will be helpful for either partner to cope with the world ahead. Global coalitions will be needed, in many cases reaching beyond the Atlantic world. There will be and their must be room for the pursuit of specific interests of either the US or the EU, for complementarity of both partners wherever possible and for a joint outreach towards solutions as often as feasible. Nothing of this is easy nor does it come natural. While the 21st century is unfolding, the stakes are as high as the controversies are looming ahead of both the US and the EU.

Five priorities arise in order to translate, the, notion of “containment and inclusion” from abstract strategy to concrete policies supporting the emergence of a global society managed by the US and the EU:

1. The US and the EU must recognize their common role in forging a new world order. This includes the need to respect and enhance global governance through the promotion of multilateral institutions, multilateral regulatory mechanisms and the effects of international law. Diverging positions on these matters might be the single most dangerous gulf in the current evolution of political understanding between both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. Contradictions between the pride claim of representing the values of law and justice and disrespect for the binding nature of multilateral mechanisms of governance and regulation will increasingly undermine credibility of the US in world affairs while the EU must overcome its capability gap in terms of military and policy operations “out of area”.

2. The need to contain state-based, state-sponsored or privatised forms of aggression against the integrity and innocence of individual human life and of the emerging global remains crucial in order to uphold a peaceful and prosperous development of the global society. The US and the EU must provide all necessary military policing, political, economic and cultural means and the underlying budgets, but they also must organize the decision making processes in a way compatible with respect for the Atlantic partnership as an end in itself and with recognition of the stakes involved in it. All necessary measures to cope with the evil of terrorism must be applied in the name of maintaining security and safety as an important individual and social right.

3. The goal to include as many individuals, societies, states and cultures into the emerging global society requires multidimensional, multi-layered and multilateral approaches with particular emphasize on recognizing “development as freedom”; focus on good governance, rule of law and political accountability; empowerment of people through education and civil society participation; recognition of human rights and basic criteria of the democratic process, particularly in the Arab world. Development, policies and the promotion of good governance will be refocused in light of the post-“9/11” experiences. They must contribute to inclusion both on the cultural as well as on the political and economic level. They must target people as their goal and wherever necessary they must not shy away from tainting regimes as their obstacle.

4. If necessary, most daunting international conflicts, such as the Middle East conflict, have to be resolved by joint means of imposing peace on failed states, accepting Western responsibility for enduring nation and state building, and by supporting means of rehabilitation, which can empower states and societies to achieve sustainable development and rule of law. This requires the Atlantic partners to provide necessary “venture capital” and necessary structural reforms such as liberalizing trade and limiting subsidies to uncompetitive sectors of their economy. It will also have implications for mechanisms and institutions of peacekeeping and nation-building. A division of labour will not work according to which the US is defining a grand strategy and the EU will be invited to pay for the follow-up costs.

5. Global migration has to be organized in a way which balances the interests of Western societies for human labour with integration measures capable of maintaining respect for the dignity of migrants; forces migrants to recognize the political and legal rules of their host country while preventing xenophobic movements derailing moderate political processes in Western societies; encourages increasing knowledge and understanding of Islam as a religion within the Western world while fighting against Islamic fundamentalism inside and outside the Western world. Both the US and the EU have to embark
on multidimensional approaches in order to come to terms with integration challenges arising from Muslim migrants while the countries of origin of Muslim migrants to the West have to be encouraged, if not forced, to better deal with internal root causes of frustration and grievance due to a lack of openness and recognition of demands of participation enshrined in universal notions of human rights.

None of these priorities will easily translate into common policies of the EU and the US. It will require leadership and persistence hardly comparable with anything seen since the formative years of the Atlantic alliance between 1945 and the early 1950s. The strategy and its goals have to be designed in ways unprecedented in transatlantic governance. They have to be communicated to the people on both sides of the Atlantic ocean in truly memorable speeches by political leaders comparable to Winston Churchill’s speech in 1946 in Fulton, Missouri, in which he outlined that an “iron curtain” had gone down in Europe forcing the Western world to stand together; comparable also to George C. Marshall’s Commencement Speech at Harvard University in 1947 in which he designed America’s commitment to the recovery of Europe and to a democratic and united Europe based on America’s enlightened self interest.

“9/11” has begun a period of soul-searching and of hard choices in the Western world. Its consequences will go way beyond the war on terrorism: “9/11” has become the rather unpleasant “opportunity” for the Atlantic civilisation to redefine its cause in contributing to world order in the 21st century. This is no easy task and it will engage more than the current generation of acting politicians on both sides of the Atlantic. The foundation stones of this new grand strategy for the management of the evolving global society have to be laid out, rather sooner than later. It is a daunting yet noble challenge for the societies living on both shores of the Atlantic Ocean. “9/11” has called on the Atlantic civilization for nothing less than working together in enlightened self interest for world order in the 21st century. Thus “9/11” defines much more than the need to win the war against terrorism as important as this aspect of world order building is.

Notes


4 Karl Popper: The Open Society and Its Enemies


6 Ibid p. 20