On European Identity

Abstract
European identity can be considered in its objective dimension, as being the top-down project and also the bottom-up process of building the genuine form of the trans-national political community, as well as in its subjective dimension related to the identification of the individuals and groups – the Europeans – with this new political community and in addition to their already established identification with a certain nation-state. The third dimension, related to the relevant interpretative models – ethno-cultural/Euroscepticism approach, European constitutional patriotism, pluralist/multiculturalism approach – has also been important factor of European identity-building.

New type of political community opens new questions – whether it is a Europe as the family of nations, a Europe of citizens, a Europe which is going to be built through common practices, a Christian Europe or a Europe of mutual matching and crossing civilizations, a secular Europe or Europe of religious Christian heredity and/or different religions.

Founding Treaties define European identity politically, starting from the motto “Unity in Diversity”. However, this motto is differently interpreted by communitarians/Euro nationalists, ethno-nationalists/Euro skeptics, liberals and republicans/European constitutional patriots.

Controversial character of political identity has to be kept in mind always again. The politics of identity, the misuse of an ethnically conceived concept of identity with its war-like consequences, has represented one of the most destructive potentials of a contemporary politics, including the region of Europe (Western Balkans). On the other hand, political communities cannot survive without homogenizing force of a common identity, and it is especially valid for proposed democratic communities, including European Union.

When European identity is regarded, it is most important to define its meaning in a sense which will empower a democratic capacity of the European Union, which will contribute to overcoming its democratic deficit, and will also contribute to escaping particularist, xenophobic, Euro skeptic tendencies and sentiments.

Key words
European Union, European identity, European constitutional patriotism, European citizenship, European social model

Introduction
Talk on European identity is related to political identity. The question is what political identity generally means and what kind of political identity does matter in a case of the European identity. The concept of political identity has been originally linked to the nation-state, as a primary form of the modern political community. In the case of European identity the question is about a new form of identity related to the political community which certainly is not equal to the nation-state.

Political identity has had three dimensions: objective framework of institutional-legal and social order, subjective context of a collective and individual
attachment of social actors to the political community, and the dimension related to relevant interpretations of the given political community. All these three dimensions play certain role and mutually contribute to the identity building. Interpretations of objective and subjective dimensions of the political identity have been of a constitutive power for the process of its building. So far, political identity has always been a kind of construct.

The main focus will be on an objective and subjective meaning and interpretation of the European identity, which enables, supports, empowers democratic character and sustainability of European Union as **sui generis** political community. Historical and pre-political background of building European identity and political elements and manifestations of the European identity will be taken into consideration. European identity will be considered as an ideal-typical concept, with outlining its empirical manifestations and its normative content as conceived from the point of democratic legitimacy of this specific and still not fully formed political community. While comparative perspective is necessary, the political identity of a nation-state will be a starting point of consideration.

1. Political identity of the nation-state

Each political identity consists of objective – institutional-political-legal-economic-cultural-social dimensions of a certain nation-state, but also of subjective/intersubjective links of citizens with their state, feeling of belonging, membership, loyalty, identification with that political community. However, there is a third important dimension of building a political identity, related to its interpretations, or interpretative models. Most relevant interpretations/constructs of the modern nation-state are: firstly, civic interpretation, secondly, nationalistic/ethno-cultural one, and there is also a rising importance of an additional – multiculturalist interpretation.

Identity building of a modern nation-state had happened initially through the fusion of nationalism and republicanism, and later on a liberal-democratic institutional legal/political order fully achieved its civic content and articulation. Modern political identity in its paradigmatic form and its objective dimension has meant primarily liberal-democratic institutional legal-political system of the nation-state, followed by and accompanied with certain economic, social, cultural system and structures.

Identity of each nation-state comes out, descriptively and analytically speaking, from pre-political elements such as a common language, culture, territory, historical memories, tradition, political-historical continuity between the past, the present and the future, but primarily comes out from a profiled political and institutional system, and its legality and legitimacy.

Historically, the mobilizing force of the nation-state was twofold, firstly, it meant a fight for overcoming a medieval transcendent founding of the state in the God’s will or reason, and secondly, it meant destruction of the feudal state and its authoritarian social strata structures. Initial nationalism, as Jürgen Habermas states, had been related to forming modern nation-states and had a positive, libertarian spirit and democratic connotation, but later on started being more linked to authoritarian and anti-democratic tendencies and social forces (being more existent among upper classes and attached to rightist, conservative ideological orientations). On the other hand, further democratic
development of the nation-state became more and more distant from nationalism, and the civic principle replaced the ethnic one.

Habermas also states\(^2\) that there is no conceptual inter-connection of civility and national identity, republicanism and nationalism (between civic, republican character of a modern state and nationalism). He says that, however, nationalism and republicanism had been factually inter-connected during the process of the nation-state establishing, they have not been essentionally interconnected. Namely, a democratic nation-state had built only in a short period a narrow link between \(ethnos\) and \(demos\). Nationalism and republicanism, as accompanied, had produced in people a readiness to fight and, if necessary, to give their lives for their country. According to him, it explains the relation of mutual empowering and charging which at the beginning existed between nationalism and republicanism.

In an attempt to give arguments in favour of an idea that republicanism and nationalism have not been essentially interrelated, he points to the difference between ‘freedom’ conceived as a fight for national independence and collective self-determination and ‘freedom’ in a sense of political liberties which an individual possesses inside his/her state. He says that these two concepts have had so much different meaning that the republican freedom could cut its “umbilical cord” with a national consciousness from which it had been born. Habermas concludes that a republican, civic concept of national sovereignty has had nothing to do with a collective will inherited in a homogeneous heredity or way of life. Namely, consensus achieved in regard of association of free and equal citizens comes out in a last instance from identically applied procedures which have been recognized by everyone.\(^3\)

Although modern states were formed as nation-states and early constitutions have established political community on the premise of the identity of national majority – in the long historical period of the fight for universal human rights – they further evolved towards the universal category of a citizen and liberal-democratic polity.\(^4\)

Habermas speaks about historical social-integrative and democratic potentials of the nation-state, in a sense that nation-state was the one which opened itself firstly to forms of democratic legitimacy and later on also developed as a social state. According to Habermas, only in a frame of the nation-state a state could evolve into democratic, legal and social state.\(^5\) However, as already mentioned, Habermas also points to the destruction of an initial conscience between nationalism, democracy and libertarianism, by stating that the nation-state and democracy had been born in the French Revolution as the twins, but, however, shortly afterwards it happened that nationalism became counter-posed to democracy and an internal relationship of \(ethnos\) and \(demos\) was broken.\(^6\) Nenad Dimitrijević states about this:

\(^2\) \textit{Ibid.}
\(^3\) \textit{Ibid.}
It is true that many contemporary liberal democracies are founded as nation-states. Historically, the political neutrality of the liberal nation-state has been based on the premise of identity of national majority which was later transformed into a liberal non-problematic republican identity. That was typically done through ‘privatization’ of special group identities (even though history offers much evidence of repression and the annulment of national minority identities). Classical liberalism recognizes equal individual rights to all citizens, concurrently referring to civil society as a sphere of legitimate care for particular identities.

Objective dimension of political identity depends also on an issue whether political community has had authoritarian or democratic character. Srđan Vrcan points to the fact that political identity of the nation-state can be both authoritarian and democratic, that appealing to national sovereignty can have both democratic and nationalistic implications, that nationalism can be linked to different political ideologies (democratic, fascist and communist). Different implications come out from constitutional and interpretative founding of the modern nation-state in the ‘nation’ conceived either as ‘people’ (multitude, internal differentiation and complexity, affirmation of a free choice of individuals), on the one hand, or in the ‘nation’ conceived as ‘Volk’ (homogeneity, “community of blood and soil”, “community of those dead, alive and not yet born”); namely, the first concept of the nation-state has been democratic by its nature and the second one has been inherently authoritarian. As already mentioned, the modern nation-state has become predominantly based on the civic principle, i.e. principle of constitutionalism and the rule of law.

Identity of political community, however, cannot be based only on its objective dimension and objectively homogenizing factors. Political identity needs also a subjective/intersubjective dimension of the people’s identification with a certain political unit, feeling of belonging, devotion, sense of membership. Again, this subjective dimension depends on whether sense of belonging to the political community comes out from a common historical-cultural heredity combined with fear from authoritarian state authority or from democratically legitimized state authority based on an ethnicity principle, on the one hand, or, on the other, from constitutional patriotism, i.e. sense of belonging based on democratically legitimized state authority.

Paradigmatic model of the sense of belonging in a modern political community has been connected with the democratic institutional framework of limited and divided government and people’s institutionally guaranteed political participation in decision-making. Sense of belonging to the modern nation-state has been linked to the constitutional patriotism, but, however, in a pluralist political and social context of the modern liberal-democratic state it is also sometimes and to a certain extent linked to nationalist, ethno-cultural sentiments. Different political-ideological orientations have been playing their roles in creating/founding sentiments of belonging to the given polity.

Political identity has always been a certain interpretation, an ideological construct. We cannot speak about one and only content of a certain political identity of a modern polity, because it always matters a certain interpretation(s) of the past, present times and future, with an aim to legitimize either an existing or an intended polity. Eriksen says that an interpretation of the past matters a contemporary construct of the past. He also states that each conception of ethnic/national identity has represented the construct, which can be based on heroic or tragic interpretation of the past and which can have different implications for the political identity. He also concludes that political identity in general represents a certain construct, in a sense that different political ideologies – including the nationalistic ideology – can serve for affirming a certain power structure of the given nation-state.
The above mentioned initial fusion of nationalism and republicanism has been kept on through certain political ideologies. Different interpretations of the modern nation-state have been expressed as liberal-democratic, neo-liberal, conservative, socialist, extreme-right, and extreme-left political ideologies. The multi-party system and civil society activism have been based on different political ideologies, which have been dominantly coloured in this or that way by the civic principle (cosmopolitism, constitutional patriotism), but also happens to be designated by nationalistic approach and ethnicity principle (ethno-nationalism, ethno-cultural orientation).

From the point of an interpretative dimension as constitutive one for political identity, few additional remarks are necessary. Political identity has been created primarily by elites (political, cultural, religious, intellectual, media elites), and depends significantly on their ideological-political affiliations. For the sake of its own profiling, political identity always needs the “relevant others”, either treated as enemies or different entities. In the case of liberal-democratic polity, the “relevant others” have been authoritarian and anti-democratic regimes in general, and that especially used to be the Soviet Block before the fall of the Berlin Wall. Political identity can also be differentiated in relation with the contested/problematic past of its own (example of the post-World-War II Germany).

Main interpretations of the modern nation-state are civic and ethno-cultural (ethno-nationalist) interpretation. However, with a processes of massive economic and political immigrations from the mid-20th century and further on into developed Western countries, a talk on multiculturalism and an interpretation of a modern political identity from the point of multiculturalism came at agenda.

Ethno-cultural interpretation of a political identity links political identity of a certain nation-state to the past, ethnus, homogenous culture, memories, tradition, and collectivity. Collective identity in this case is uncontested and imposed to the individuals, who are expected to accept, interiorize and follow it. In this interpretation the past dominates and determines the present and future, and nation-state has been institutionalized on the ethnic principle. Patriotism is linked to a more or less apologetic relation towards the given collective identity and dominant ethnus. Patriotism is close to ethno-nationalism, although the collectivist nature of patriotism as such can be less rigid and heteronymous than in the case of ethno-nationalism.

Civic interpretation of the same political identity starts from the institutional-legal framework of a democratic state and its legality and legitimacy; the past, present and future of the given polity and political identity have been open to reconsideration from the value/civilization standards. Individuals put into question legitimacy whenever the polity violates democratic mechanisms, protection of human rights; they do not accept unquestionably the construct of a (collective) political identity as uncontested part of their personal identity.

10 Eriksen, Th. H., op. cit.
Patriotism has been linked here to the notion of “constitutional patriotism”, i.e. it becomes much more individualist and autonomous sentiment.

Ideal-typically speaking, the issue of identity in a modern political community finds a rational answer from the perspective and criteria of constitutional democracy. Constitutional democracies institute the rule of law and equally tenable freedom of all individuals, preventing the rule of people (as *ethnos*), which always turns into the rule of the dominant nation (thus violating the principles of constitutional democracy).

However, the controversial character of political identity has to be kept in mind always again. History of Europe of the 20th century bears tragic legacies of ethnic and national identity conceived as organic collective belonging. Issues of political identity entail ambivalent practical-political potentials, both destructive and productive ones; for example, wars came out even in a near past, just in a geographical frame of Europe – in the Balkans, because of the search for new political identities. The politics of identity, the misuse of an ethnically conceived concept of identity with its war-like consequences, has represented one of the most destructive potentials of a contemporary politics. On the other hand, political communities cannot survive without homogenizing force of a common identity, and it is especially valid for proposed democratic communities, including European Union.11

2. Background processes of building the European identity

Historical preconditions of the European identity and the genesis of its establishing consist of the following elements and factors of impact:

- the heritage of ancient Greek rationality, democratic *polis*, concept of legality and mixed government; then, the heritage of Roman legal system building, especially in the field of private law, and its embedding in the modern 19th century legal systems of Western countries; the medieval ideal of equality of all people before God, ideal of unity all over the Christian world (conducted through establishing churches as the common institutional framework, unified religious rituals, same religious and feudal titles, church’s unique nomenclature and common Latin language, unique dress codes, habits, everyday life of religious officials; in addition, establishing of universities in the 13th century with common centers of studying law or medicine, common textbooks); the Modern age and the revival of rationalism, empiricism and scientific world view (mediated by the Renaissance movement);

- the heritage of industrial and political revolutions of the 18th and the 19th century, and a gradual build-up of liberal and liberal democratic states and societies;

- the heritage of illiberal modernism (rooted in the Versailles Treaty basis of building nation-states – with a combination of illiberal dimension of romantic collective belonging and liberal right to self-determination – which expressed its most destructive features in the Nazism and Holocaust);12 the heritage of the long history of colonialism, imperialism, and wars between European countries;

- post-World War II attempts to distance from war-like and traumatic European past, to build new European relationships based on peace, stability, and security (Schumann, Konrad Adenauer, and Jean Monnet); here also
belongs the whole institutional history of gradual building of, firstly, European Economic Community and further on the common European institutional legal and political system (starting from the Treaty of Rome in 1957 to the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009);

– building of the trans-national community of European nation-states which was accompanied and made more complicated (more complex) by massive immigration of guest workers, firstly, in the ‘70s of the 20th century from the former colonies and the south parts of Europe (Italy, Greece, Serbia/Former Yugoslavia) and Turkey, and then by a new wave in the ‘80s and the ‘90s under the impact of globalization and with a flow of immigrants from all over the Third World; in addition, the intra-European immigrations which happened (from the East to West) after the EU enlargement in 2004 and 2007;

– developing of the human rights culture as the top value standard of the EU legal and political system, with consequential affirmation and politicization of different collective identities, based on sex, gender, religion, ethnic culture, etc.

3. Empirical manifestations and characteristics of the European identity

European identity can be considered in its objective dimension as being the top-down project and also the bottom-up process of building the political community, as well as in its subjective dimension related to the identification of the individuals and groups with that political community. The third dimension, related to the relevant interpretative models, has also been important factor of European identity building.

3.1. Objective framework

Institutional economic, political and legal system – being founded on the constitutional democracy and the rule of law – have been in a process of completion. European elites designed and completed single market, common European currency, European Central Bank, the Schengen passport free zone, European elections, European symbols – flag, anthem, motto (“united in diversity”, or “unity in diversity”), concept and practice of European citizenship. European elites recently also built a very successful policy of enlargement.

Constitutive for European identity are four basic freedoms, all-encompassing system of values and human rights, but also the practices of networking the Europeans at different micro-levels, like business, finances and economy in general, education, cultural entertainments, transnational civic initiatives, European public, I-networking, etc. EU identity is also defined in contrast to the afore mentioned traumatic past of Europe (colonialism, imperialism, Nazism, fascism, Stalinism, anti-Semitism), and as a peaceful project oriented towards tolerance and deliberation and compromise. EU identity is defined in relation with “relevant others”, which after the fall of the Berlin Wall and


with rising economical changes in a globalized world have become, besides the USA, also China and India. European identity is also defined in relation to multiculturalism, pluralism, and, as already mentioned, processes of globalization. Post-colonial and guest workers, and all waves of immigrations, turned homogenous national societies into multicultural ones. Uncontrollable character of these immigrations, especially in the ‘80s and the ‘90s, caused the formation of the Schengen zone in the 2000s thus making Europe the “fortress” towards the outside world.

European identity is especially related to the fall of the Berlin Wall: it was a push for the EU enlargement, which deeply changed the sense and content of European identity; “new” democracies brought new forms of diversity, conservatism, ethno-nationalism, as well as the importance of the religious factor into European identity and polity. European secularism has been contested by the revival of importance of Christianity (Polish Catholicism, Romanian Orthodox religion entered the EU) by the EU25 enlargement, but also by a great presence of Muslim religion inside the EU countries. Another shift and push for the European identity building is related to the introduction of European citizenship with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992.

Internal migrations of the “Euro stars” represent the most attractive side of the European individual integration, where well educated and well established individuals/professionals use all the advantages of the free access to job, residence and political rights in whichever European country they choose to live; they live and work in “Euro cities” and identify themselves much more with being Europeans than members of certain nationalities.

Europeans’ travel and tourist habits, taking part in European cultural happenings, in European business and professional engagements, as well as in European civil society, taking advantages of European citizenship wherever they live throughout Europe, contributes to the gradual processes of social and cultural European identity building of individuals.

Depoliticized European identity – through economic, cultural, social, I-networking has been causing the rising politicization in a mode of new particularism, xenophobia, ethno-nationalisms, Euroscepticism (and it happens in both the “new” and “old” Member States, though with somewhat different background causes).

To sum up, European identity, in its objective dimension, has been related to a multiple, plural, multi-leveled political community, which has also been building a unique and united institutional-legal, economic and political structure, called the European Union. The European identity has been built across the top-down but also bottom-up storylines as well as through different macro- and micro-levels of the community practices (in all spheres of economic, political, social and everyday life).

The above mentioned multicultural and pluralist impacts have been imposing great challenges and tasks to the concept and practice of the European identity. In addition, real processes of economic, cultural, political, social, Internet networking of different parts and levels of the European community also contribute to the build-up of multiple identities in the EU. According to Holmes, EU regulations on different micro-levels (for example, in agriculture) and EU networking on different micro-levels (I-networking, European civic initiatives, European art festivals), become the means by which varied groups of people negotiate over time the common sentiments and expectations that constitute a very broadly based European identity.
It is better to speak about European identities, about multiple *demoi*; a single European identity is not possible. European identities are open to multiple interpretations; they are not defined primordially from within and cannot be simply imposed politically from outside. They emerge from the confluence and blending of a variety of projects and processes.

“Europe’s identities exist in the plural. There is no one European identity, just as there is no one Europe. These identities can be conceived as both social process and political project. Understood as process, identities flow through multiple networks and create new patterns of identification. Viewed as project, the construction of identities is the task of elites and entrepreneurs, operating in Brussels or various national settings… Bureaucrats crafting a Europe centered on Brussels, xenophobic nationalists, cosmopolitan Europeanists, anti-globalization Euro-skeptics, and a European public that for decades has been permissive of the evolution of a European polity – they are all politically involved in the construction of an evolving European identity.”

3.2. Interpretations of the European identity building

There are three main concepts of a European-identity building: ethno-cultural (ethno-nationalistic, Eurosceptical), civic (constitutional patriotism) and pluralist (multicultural).

3.2.1. Ethno-cultural concept

Anthony Smith, a famous scholar of nationalism, locates European identity between simultaneous trends of ethno-national revival and global cultural aspirations, and expresses essentially Eurosceptic ideas through the proposal that “the only way in which a truly united Europe could emerge is through the slow formation of common European memories, tradition, values, myths and symbols, in the image of ethnos and the nation”.

Ethno-cultural interpretation of the European political identity has been essentially linked with afore mentioned ethno-nationalistic trends in the “new” Member States. In addition, ethno-cultural interpretation of the European identity building helps us to understand the revival of xenophobia and ethno-

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13 Anthony Giddens speaks that according to the economic expansion of China and India, the Third World percentage in the world industrial product will rise from 10% in the 1980s to 50% in the 2020s, while the European industrial product is falling down from 26% in 1980 to 22% in 2002, and with a tendency to fall to 17% of the world industrial production in 2015. See: Giddens, A. *Evropa u globalnom dobu (Europe in the Global Age)*, Belgrade: Clio, 2009.


nationalism also in the “old” Member States, which come out as a reaction to massive immigrations, globalization, and Europeanization. Identification with her/his own nation-state as such, nation-state patriotism as opposed to the European identity, is linked to the rising trend of particularism and Euroscepticism.

3.2.2 Civic concept

“Constitutional patriotism” – it was not included into theoretical discourse only and firstly by Habermas, but his writings made it popular and well understood. Habermas introduced this concept in respect of the post-War divided Germany, in an attempt to make a sharp interpretative distance towards the Nazi past and Holocaust nightmare heredity, and affirming the civic identity or a moral/rational collective identity based on universal principles and framed by a post-War establishment of a liberal-democratic constitutional state in West Germany (combination of feelings of shame and proud). According to Habermas, the civic conception of “the nation” as opposed to an ethnic one “reflects both the actual historical trajectory of the European nation-states and the fact that democratic citizenship is established as abstract, legally mediated solidarity between strangers”.

Constitutional patriotism unexpectedly achieved a new popularity in the late ‘90s, it became an attractive model (also for other countries) of a civic loyalty and sense of belonging to the political community, and also started being used as a normative model for understanding of the European identity building (as the civic basis of identification with a supranational political community). Another vision of civic concept is the one offered by Weiler’s model of supranational citizenship. In an attempt to amortize deep dilemmas in constructing the ends and means of transnational integration within the framework of the European Union, he affirms the proposed interpretation of European citizenship inside Amsterdam Treaty, as a combination of national and European citizenship. These two citizenships have to stay distinct and complemented; national identity encompasses the realm of ethno-cultural identification and belonging, whereas European citizenship encompasses the realm of law and Enlightenment (civic ideal). Weiler argues for a multiple identity and multiple demoi (organic demos and non-organic, civic demos); where individuals simultaneously express both organic-cultural identification with their nation and membership to European supranational values that transcend ethno-cultural differences.

3.2.3. Pluralist concept

It is built with an attempt to emphasize a pluralist nature of the European polity. According to Baubock, identities in modern democratic polities (including the European Union) are shaped by multiple overlapping and changing affiliations of different kinds of social groups and associations, among which the most important are gender, sexual, political, and ideological orientation, religious conviction, as well as class, language, ethnic culture. “In such polities, democratic representation and citizenship have to combine the traditional liberal precept of equal rights for equal citizens with sensitivity for those collective identities.” It implies measures for “symbolic recognition” of minority or immigrant community’s culture and allocation of resources for enabling these communities to develop without being subjected either to coercive assimilation or enforced segregation.
Baubock thinks that European identity cannot be based only on constitutional rights of Union citizens, and the task would be to expand/extend pluralism in the EU beyond mere recognition of national identities of the Member States and to acknowledge the collective identities of sub-national and transnational minorities. Institutional measures would be related to direct EU measures that go beyond non-discrimination policy and directly allocate group-differentiated rights, material resources and political powers to specifically disadvantaged groups.

The same idea of more inclusive European polity and concept of a constructive, responsible EU citizenship has been offered by the Greek author Ko-stakopoulou. According to her, European citizenship has to be placed in a common concern for the future of a pluralist political community, shared by different groups and their engagement in collective shaping of that common future. Formal inclusion of the third-country nationals who live and work in the EU should be regulated by a Community law concept, and without requiring them to possess nationality of an individual Member State. In addition, political democracy has to become more participatory and inclusive, and social policy has to be more just in respect of disadvantaged social groups. She calls responsible citizens to fight against tougher immigration and asylum measures which are coming into life in many Member States. She calls for “ethos of responsibility and respect”, and for “virtuous citizenship based on an ethic of the Other”.

It should be said that besides the above mentioned multicultural, pluralist approaches to the European identity issue, which are designated by openness, tolerance, principle of inclusiveness), multicultural solutions of the issue of political identity can also split towards ethno-nationalist collectivist solutions.

To sum up, these different interpretative models have been playing an extraordinary important role in building European identity, especially because of its incomplete objective institutional completion as well as its deficit in democratic legitimacy and general lack of sentiments of belonging, commitment, devotion of the Europeans to this new establishing polity.

3.3. Subjective dimension – what makes the European Union the political community of European citizens?

Objective preconditions and characteristics of European identity are far from covering the definition and content of the concept. Without subjective/inter-subjective feelings of the citizens of Europe that the European political community matters to them, that they feel it as their own, that they owe loyalty to it, we cannot speak about European identity in its full meaning.

Main lines of forming intersubjective loyalty of Europeans towards European political community could be related to the European constitutional patriotism (redefined in the new trans-national context), European social model (redefined in contrast to the paternalistic welfare state), European citizenship (in

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20 See: Jovanović, M., op. cit., p. 57.
21 Ibid., p. 61.
22 Ibid., p. 63.
23 Ibid., p. 65.
its legal, political, social, cultural manifestation), and European civil society (as a democratic participatory stimulus for the afore mentioned phenomena).

3.3.1. European constitutional patriotism

This idea is accepted in an attempt to articulate the civic identification at the trans-national European level, to explain sense of belonging, devotion, care of Europeans for the European polity, in other words, to explain an attractiveness of the European Union for European peoples.

The question is what the European constitutionalism means and why it is attractive for European peoples and insofar produces “European constitutional patriotism”. According to Miller, constitutional architecture of the European Union keeps the diversity of nation-states, represents the peaceful continuity with their liberal-democratic character and simultaneous overcoming of their particularisms. Constitution making of the European polity is based on deliberation and political struggles without in advance proposed unique purpose; normative constitutional culture has been in this case a continuous project in contrast to the well defined nation-state constitutional orders. Normative and economic attractiveness of European polity comes out from the fact that its constitutional power is capable for an enlargement and also is capable for the “transnational overflowing” towards the countries which are out of the EU. Namely, political culture and legal and political systems of the accession countries have been remodeled under influences of the EU. Attractiveness of the EU comes out also from an openness of its constitutional power; there is no one demos, and European demoi will have always again to negotiate and decide upon what they want and what they do not want to share. European people are attracted by the Union and tend towards it in a measure of its stimulating diversity and not imposing homogeneity and unity.24

Miller accepts the statement of Joseph Weiler that Union requires a high level of “constitutional tolerance”, and that Union demands all the peoples to learn from each other on the background of the persistent multitude. The attractiveness of the European polity also comes out from the multi-level governance, lack of one power center above the nation-states; namely, there are multiple channels of check-in and numerous procedural resources for dealing with what European citizens/peoples want to do together and what they want to do separately. Europeans would seemingly accept to take part in creating a constitutional tolerance instead of constitutional uniformity; they would not mind seeing themselves as keeping being together, but also as being divided in the crucial things. Europeans do not mind having been created and constructed, but the recognition of them as individuals and keeping of diversity among them have been however the highest values for them.25 Europeans do not feel the call for obedience; they are attracted by advantages of the European polity but have not been passionately identified with it. Ideal of mutual recognition of different demoi and celebrating diversity is very attractive, but it, however, bears the risks of converting the European transnational multiculturalism into the plural monoculturalism. Attractiveness of European polity produces loyalty and conviction which has always been open for criticism and contestation.

According to Muller, constitutional patriotism as the crucial part of the critical citizenship is far from unconditional loyalty and obedience, which many nation-states inside EU and outside it demand from its citizens; constitutional patriotism is an existent example of reflexive, self-critical belonging, without
weakening the community, but also without any strong identification with that community. Constitutional patriotism promises a combination of a critical reflection and a complex emotional adherence/attachment to the political community. Representatives of the European constitutional patriotism believe that this combination contributes to the strengthening of European political community.\textsuperscript{26}

To sum up: in contrast to the notion of constitutional patriotism related to the nation-state, which bears full respect for clearly defined constitutional principles and well established constitutions of the given nation-states, European constitutional patriotism reflects the motto “Unity in diversity” and meaning of a self-critical belonging, as well as the genuine character of the EU as the never-ending-building of a genuine democratic trans-national polity.

3.3.2. European social model

Anthony Giddens considers that the European constitutional patriotism has not been sufficient basis for the attractiveness of the European political community. According to him, it has to be accompanied by an implementation of the new European social model, which will bring new qualities in comparison with the paternalistic and brought-down welfare state social model. New European social model should be based on investments in human resources, in new technologies, in an improvement of family life, gender equality and protection of the rights of children. It should not intervene in a redistributive manner into the market; it would not be based on an interventionist state social policy but on stimulating market economy and reducing the role of the state only to the above mentioned investments and regulations. European social model will not be the model of welfare state but the model of the society based on an active social support.

According to Giddens, if the European polity wants to be a real community and not only the sum of constitutional principles and treaties, European social model has to be built as the real basis of an attractiveness of the European political community.\textsuperscript{27}

3.3.3. European citizenship

European citizenship has its legal and political dimensions, especially articulated by introducing formally into founding European documents the notion of the European citizenship (Maastricht Treaty), which is complementary to the nation-state citizenship. Legal and political notion of European citizenship encompasses the right to vote at local elections wherever the citizen lives inside European union, as well as the right to vote for European Parliament; in addition, it presupposes the right to free movement for the sake of job and residence, then, the right to the consular and diplomatic protection of the citizen by any European state diplomatic representatives abroad, as well as the right to petition to European Parliament, the right to access to the Ombudsperson, and the right to use any official European language.

European citizenship has also its cultural, social, social-psychological dimensions. European citizenship is related to the issues of participation in demo-

\textsuperscript{24} See: Miller, J.-W., op. cit., pp. 138–146.

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., p. 149.

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., pp. 167–168.

\textsuperscript{27} See Giddens, A., op. cit., pp. 127, 133, 269, 271, 284.
ocratic politics, i.e. to a so-called democratic deficit of the EU. European citizenship is essentially related to the civil society activism, through which the fight for bigger inclusiveness and recognition, for European social model and for improvement of European constitutionalism has been at agenda. European citizenship has been modeled and re-modeled by the processes of multiple identities building.

John Keane says that the post-national citizenship is based on multiple, potentially mutually conflicting, and changing identities; it is embedded in the civil society activism and in the struggle for diversity. It bears guarantees for citizens that they can be different; it is not based on homogenous beliefs and fixed membership. It is not any more republican in a traditional sense, and on the state politics centered concept of citizenship. European citizenship is far from traditional understanding in which citizenship represents the common identity in the given political-legal nation-state framework.28

Instead of the conclusion

The text started with the notion of European identity and ended with the notion of European identities. Europe’s multiple identities have resulted from the top-down project of institutional legal-political framing and constitution making, on the one hand, and bottom-up processes of social and cultural integration, on the other. They are results of building the supra-national political community which leaves an open space for nation-states and national identities of their people; and, they are also results of different macro- and micro dimensions of the community’s practices (political, economic, cultural, social and civic practices), which are based on different levels of governance, on different forms of networking, and on manifold struggles both for protection of individual human rights and for recognition of different minority rights (based on sex, gender, ethnos, national culture, class stratification, etc).

The response to the question about what attracts – actually as well as ideal-typically speaking – Europeans (with their multiple identities) to the European polity is related to the aforementioned concepts of European constitutional patriotism, European social model, European citizenship and European civil society.

Dragica Vujadinović

O europskom identitetu

Sažetak

Europski identitet se može razmatrati u svojoj objektivnoj dimenziji kao projekt odozgor i proces izgradnje izvornog oblika transnacionalne političke zajednice odozdol, a u svojoj subjektivnoj dimenziji vezanoj uz identifikaciju pojedinaca i grupa – Europljana – s ovom novom političkom zajednicom zajedno s već uspostavljenoj identifikacijom s pojedinom nacijom-državom. Treća dimenzija, vezana uz relevantne interpretativne modele – etno-kulturni/euroskeptični pristup, europski ustavni patriotizam, pluralistički/multikulturalni pristup – također je bila važan čimbenik izgradnje europskog identiteta.

Novi tip političke zajednice otvara nova pitanja – je li ta Europa obitelj nacija, Europa građana, Europa koja će biti izgrađena na zajedničkim djelatnostima, kršćanska Europa, ili Europa uzajamno odgovarajućih i preklapajućih civilizacija, sekularna Europa ili Europa kršćanskog religijskog nasljeđa i/ili različitih religija.

Kada se raspravlja o europskom identitetu, najvažnije je definirati njegovo značenje u smislu u kojem će osnažiti demokratske kapacitete Europske unije, u kojem će doprinijeti prevladavanju demokratskog deficita i izbjegavanju praktikularističkih, xenofobičnih, euroskeptičnih težnji i naklonosti.

Ključne riječi
Europska unija, europski identitet, europski ustavni patriotizam, europsko građanstvo, europski socijalni model

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Über die europäische Identität

Zusammenfassung


Der umstrittene Charakter der politischen Identität muss immer erneut im Gedächtnis bewahrt werden. Die Politik der Identität, der Missbrauch des ethnisch vorgestellten Identitätsbegriffs mit seinen kriegerischen Auswirkungen, repräsentierten eines der destruktiven Potenziale der zeitgenössischen Politik, einschließlich einer Region Europas (Westbalkan). Zum andern können politische Gemeinschaften ohne eine homogenisierende Tatkraft der Gemeinwohlidentität kaum überleben, namentlich ein vorgeschlagener Zusammenschluss der Demokratien, die Europäische Union inbegriffen.

Ob die europäische Identität erörtert wird, ist es von größter Tragweite, ihre Bedeutung in dem Sinne festzulegen, in welchem die demokratischen Kapazitäten der Europäischen Union gekräftigt werden, in welchem zur Deckung ihres demokratischen Defizits beigesteuert wird als auch zur Vermeidung praktikularistischer, xenophober, euroskeptischer Tendenzen und Zuneigungen.

Schlüsselwörter
Europäische Union, europäische Identität, europäischer Verfassungspatriotismus, europäisches Staatstbürgertum, europäisches Sozialmodell

28
De l’identité européenne

Résumé

L’identité européenne peut être examinée dans sa dimension objective, comme projet descendant tout comme processus ascendant de construction d’une forme authentique de communauté transpolitique, et dans sa dimension subjective, liée à l’identification des individus et des groupes – les Européens –, avec cette nouvelle communauté politique en plus de l’identification déjà établie avec tel ou tel État-nation. La troisième dimension, liée aux modèles interprétatifs pertinents – approche ethno-culturelle/eurosceptique, patriotisme constitutionnel européen, approche pluraliste/multiculturelle – fut également un facteur important dans la construction de l’identité européenne.

Un nouveau type de communauté politique amène de nouvelles questions : cette Europe est-ce une nation, une Europe de citoyens, une Europe à construire sur des pratiques communes, une Europe chrétienne, ou une Europe des civilisations qui se correspondent et se croisent, une Europe laïque ou une Europe d’héritage religieux chrétien et/ou de religions diverses.

Les traités fondateurs définissent l’identité européenne politiquement, à commencer par le slogan « Unité dans la diversité ». Cependant, ce slogan est interprété différemment par les communautaristes/euro-nationalistes, ethno-nationalistes/eurosceptiques, libéraux et républicains/patriotes constitutionnels européens.

Le caractère controversé de l’identité politique doit toujours être gardé à l’esprit. La politique d’identité, l’abus du concept d’identité pensé ethnoculturelment avec ses conséquences guerrières, a représenté l’un des potentiels les plus destructeurs de la politique contemporaine, incluant une région d’Europe (Balkans occidentaux). D’un autre côté, les communautés politiques ne peuvent survivre sans force homogénéisante d’une identité commune, ce qui est particulièrement valable pour les communautés démocratiques proposées telles que l’Union européenne.

Lorsque il est question de l’identité européenne, le plus important est de définir sa signification dans un sens qui renforcera les capacités démocratiques de l’Union européenne et qui contribuera à surmonter le déficit démocratique ainsi qu’à échapper aux tendances et aux penchant particularistes, xénophones, eurosceptiques.

Mots-clés

Union européenne, identité européenne, patriotisme constitutionnel européen, citoyenneté européenne, modèle social européen