The role of Croatia in the Expansion of the European Union and NATO

Janko Vranyczany-Dobrinović

Although parts of the Croatian public opinion and inadequately informed media take the view that the relations between Croatia and the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are only just beginning, with Croatia standing before the closed doors of institutionalized relationship without clearly defined intentions and visions, it is important to stress at the outset that this view is wrong. On the contrary, the relations are well-developed, the diplomatic exchanges from both sides highly intensive, and the relationships very intricate, one might almost say atypical and falling outside the usual norms of diplomatic conduct.

It is important to note also that the diplomatic circuit in Zagreb, consisting of representatives of different countries as well as international governmental and non-governmental organizations, including the E.U. and NATO, generates assessments that occasionally lead to misunderstandings. The Croatian diplomacy makes systematic and determined efforts to correct the assessments that are occasionally one-sided and insufficiently deep. It makes moves, often successful and on occasion less so, to provide a more balanced picture and shed additional light on the situation, blunting the sharp edges and relativizing and reconciling opposing views. It certainly tries to avoid crude labelling, unsupported by arguments, which can only exacerbate problems. This is a difficult and exhausting task in view of the large number of opinion and decision makers and the multiplicity of interests. In an age of electronic communication, our manoeuvring space is fairly limited.

I must add also that we suffer from a shortage of professional people with international experience in foreign-policy marketing and lobbying. Equally, the funds needed for such activities are in short supply. For these reasons, this segment of our activity is not as effective as we would like it to be.

It goes without saying that diplomatic representatives have the task to prepare clear, unbiased, unemotional and confidential messages for their governments, giving their assessment of the situation and their views and comments on the intentions and forthcoming moves of the individual governments or, as in our case, large agglomerations of governments. Diplomatic representatives must formulate their messages without regard for how well or how badly they will be received by those for whom they are intended.

Since Croatia’s relations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are clearer and simpler, more attention will be devoted in what follows to our relations with the European Union, which are more complex, more intricate, and – to use the expression favoured by our Foreign Minister – indeed “multilayered.”

NATO wishes to have relations with stable and well-organized states within clear and stable borders. At the same time the E.U. is undergoing a continuous, complex and long-term process of socio-political harmonization, involving the standardization of legislation, establishment of common external borders and introduction of a common monetary system. Croatia undoubtedly belongs to the Christian, Central-European and Mediterranean civilizational circle. In the period of the intention of international community to extend the ancient border of the European civilization to the Black Sea by europeanizing of the unstable Balkans Croatia has a very important geographic position. The international community believes that real stabilization of that region could be achieved only by economic development, and broader economic cooperation.

Key words: Croatia, EU, NATO
Although 12 of the 16 NATO members are also members of the fifteen-strong European Union and thus seemingly guided by the same political instructions of their governments and the common view that membership in the two organizations is open exclusively to totally open democratic societies, their thinking begins to differ when specific cases are brought up.

NATO is a combination of a political-ideological (formerly strongly anticomunist) and defence-security (formerly anti-Warsaw Pact) grouping, with highly complex and sophisticated tasks, standard organization and weapons purchase. The leading voice in the organization is that of the United States, without whose approval no major decision can be passed. From the global security aspect, NATO wishes to have relations with stable and well-organized states within clear and stable borders.

The European Union, for its part, is a predominantly economic grouping undergoing a continuous, complex and long-term process of socio-political harmonization, involving the standardization of legislation, establishment of common external borders and introduction of a common monetary system. It has the common European Parliament, which will gradually be given increasing powers. The common world view and social component, democracy, similar social systems and common philosophy are gaining in importance alongside the economic component. They are firmly and explicitly based on reconciliation, humanism, mutual respect and partnership, and reduced nationalism.

This is the system that will continue to develop, and in the process the Republic of Croatia will undoubtedly join it over time.

While NATO and the United States have a much broader geographic perspective and much larger interest and security concerns, as well as more specific responsibilities and relations with, for instance, Russia and the countries of the former Soviet Union, the Caucasus, the Middle East, North Africa, the Persian Gulf, South and East Asia, etc., the European Union limits its attempts at economic, ideological and political unification to a more specifically defined and more narrow geographical area – that of its present members and candidates. This process goes deeper and is socially more far-reaching than the mere membership in the North Atlantic Alliance.

**The Position of the Republic of Croatia**

What is the position of the Republic of Croatia in relation to these two organizations and their differences?

**Both organizations followed, joined (each in its way) and influenced the process of disintegration of Yugoslavia.** We shall not go into the details of their involvement and their failure to act in the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina or into the reasons for the American change of policy at a later stage of the conflict in the region.

The courageous and effective Croatian defence in the Patriotic Defence War against a still existing powerful communist army earned Croatia general sympathy and admiration of all the members of these organizations (with two notable exceptions), especially of NATO, in which the spirit of anticommunism and anti-Warsaw Pact was still alive. The two members who did not show such sympathy regretted the loss of influence in the region that they had enjoyed as a result of the Treaty of Versailles and the AVNOJ arrangements for Yugoslavia. The early sympathy for Croatia gradually evaporated, especially among our German friends, giving way to disappointment and growing criticism. The reason was a feeling among some people that Croatia was establishing an authoritarian single-party regime which was at odds with its Euro-Atlantic aspirations. Another reason was the evolution of Croatian policies in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the worsening conflict with the Bosnian Muslims. The Croats, initially seen as victims of aggression, were now accused of banding together with the aggressor to attack an internationally recognized victim. In this context, our critics did not wish to consider the possibility that the Muslims, too, might have contributed to the outbreak of the conflict. Much of the international community and its public opinion expected the Croats, as a nation belonging to the civilized “European circle”, to show qualities of chivalry in defending the new and even more brutally attacked victim and thus vitally contribute to the resolution of the Bosnian crisis.

The ever-present anti-Croatian propaganda succeeded in strengthening the international perception of Croatia as the negotiating partner of the aggressor in an attempt to carve up the internationally recognized state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This perception was strengthened following Croatian military actions and detentions of Muslims in Mostar and the surrounding region, the demolition of the Old Bridge, and the cruelties in the Lašva Valley and some other parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Such an international perception was damaging for Croatia, and it had numerous negative consequences. It improved a little, though still not sufficiently, following Croatia’s military successes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which broke the stalemate and
made possible the Dayton Accords. Even today Croatia continues to be judged cautiously and with reservations, often without well-founded reasons. Some people fear that it might have a hidden and unclear agenda regarding the constitutional provisions for Bosnia-Herzegovina and the implementation of the Dayton Accords – this despite the lifting of the blockade of Bihać, the decisive contributions to the realization of the Dayton agreements, the positive developments in the process of transition, the cooperation with the Hague tribunal, the efforts to develop special relations with the Federation and the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the successful peaceful integration of the Croatian Danube Region.

To return to our relations with NATO, they have always been exceptionally open, cordial, uncomplicated, friendly and partner-like. This was true and remained to be true when Croatia was internationally recognized, and has remained true until the present day. Without a partnership agreement, we continue to have a series of talks, visits, personal communications, exchange of messages and confidential information. This has made it possible at many decisive moments during these years to transmit to the President and Supreme Commander and to the Minister of Defence the views, concerns, warnings, sometimes neutral attitudes, of the NATO Council regarding the developments such as the conflict in the Neretva Valley, the Bosnians’ abortive attempt to build the port of Neum, the conflicts in the Lašva Valley, the Bihać area and south-western Bosnia, the beginning of the U.S. involvement, Croatian military moves in the UNPAs, etc. Many of these moves were accompanied by public expressions of disapproval, sometimes by turning a blind eye, often by fixing maximum lines and deadlines, all of which helped to confirm and supplement Ambassador Galbraith’s direct messages on these issues.

Let us now try to take a sober look at the common stand that NATO and the E.U. have in relation to this region.

While respecting the civilizational and economic specificities and differences of the countries in the wider region, recognizing that Croatia belongs for the most part to the more narrow Christian and Central European and Mediterranean civilizational circle, the international community intends to extend the ancient border of the European civilization on the River Una, valid until the Berlin Congress, by some 950 km to the east, all the way to the Black Sea, taking in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Macedonia, Albania, Romania, and Bulgaria.

The disintegration of Yugoslavia, helped along by the unrealistically exaggerated aspirations of the Serbian politician Milošević and the more realistic achievements of the Croatian President Tudman, provided the historic opportunity to arrange, by international consensus, the relations in the traditionally unstable and sensitive south-east of the European continent with a population of some 70 million. Ever since the Vienna and the Berlin Congress, through the Balkan Wars, the assassination in Sarajevo, the treaties of Versailles, Trianon and St. Germain, the Yalta meeting, and the break-up of the Warsaw Pact, this region has been chronically unstable and unbalanced, with numerous, multi-layered and not easily fulfilled claims and counterclaims. A short hul – short from a historical perspective – occurred in the region during Tito’s rule, but this interim arrangement did not have the makings of a permanent solution.

**International Community and the Balkans**

The international community does not have a clear definition of the Balkans, and the boundaries vary depending on whether one relies on geography, history, religion, schisms, Ottoman conquests, etc. The term is generally applied to a state of political instability in a part of Europe, ethnic and religious mixture and intolerance, mentality of revenge, myths, archaic social backwardness, arrogance and pride, spitefulness, blatant lies, cowardice at one moment and courage at another.

Milošević with his imperialist and aggressive manner and Tudman and Kučan in a realistic and non-aggressive manner (the latter succeeding in leaving the Balkan scene altogether) helped to create a situation in which the Balkans can be gradually and finally “debalkanized” and a solution can be found for the very complex issue deriving from the collapse and disintegration of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires (which has remained unsolved until the present day despite the various Balkan wars and different versions of Yugoslavia).

It is paradoxical that this opportunity should arise out of an unforeseen international constellation triggered off by tragic conflicts provoked by the weakening Yugoslav People’s Army and paramilitary units (the same forces that are now fighting perhaps their last battles in Kosovo).

The international constellation was created by the fall of the Berlin Wall, the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union and Tito’s Yugoslavia, and the emergence of new, more naturally balanced states and the simultaneous expansion and
strengthening of the European Union. The two major powers, the E.U. and the U.S. (the latter working through NATO) are today assuming the role of arbiters in the Balkans that Austria-Hungary played in its time (politically inadequate though its efforts might have been in the face of Russia’s opposition and Greater Serbian aspirations, which highjacked the Yugoslav ideas of other South Slav ethnic groups for their own ends).

Today there is emptiness in what were the lines of confrontation of the superpowers in the former Yugoslavia, and there is little likelihood of the Russian presence making itself felt. The whole region needs to be reconciled, democratized, and economically, communicational and energy-wise firmly integrated in accordance with the visions of NATO and the European Union. Russia should be included in the process, but without any decisive influence and status.

This would mean debalkanizing and europeanizing the whole geographic space between the Adriatic and the River Una and the Aegean Sea (with Greece already a member of the Euro-Atlantic organizations), possibly before the start of negotiations on Turkey’s admission to the European Union.

This may be seen also as the “Scandinavization” of the region as envisaged by President Tudman, provided that the Croatian President convinces the international community that he is ready to accept Bosnia-Herzegovina as a separate state, to renounce any territorial claims on the parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina with the Croatian majority, and to find acceptable ways of stopping the interference in the financial, customs and payments competencies of an internationally recognized sovereign state, which the international community finds highly irritating.

This concept of gradual reconciliation and expansion of the E.U. and NATO all the way to Varna and beyond does not reckon with the still present ideas of dividing the region along schismatic, civilizational, Yalta-drawn imaginary boundaries and intellectual speculations of people like Huntington, Kissinger and Claes. Still less does it reckon with the revival of a new, unstable Yugoslavia. Rather, it envisages the creation of new constellations at the time of shortening distances and relativized narrowly national aspirations in the context of global electronic and satellite communication.

In the present, historically unprecedented situation, there is no longer a structured “other side”, either as a partner or as an opponent in an attempt to divide the region. This makes possible a unidirectional spread of global Euro-Atlantic security, economic and market interests.

Bosnia-Herzegovina is at present undergoing the process of creation of a temporary Euro-American protectorate-type condominium, while in Albania, despite the chaotic and undemocratic situation, a permanent NATO base is being built to support the more important base at Vicenza in Italy. The base at Kaposvar in Hungary will be situated near the main Trans-European transport corridor: Copenhagen-Berlin-Prague-Bratislava-Budapest-Salonica. There will be also NATO facilities in Croatia.

It is the interest and expressed wish of the international community to achieve a clear and lasting stability in the countries of the former Yugoslavia and in the entire region extending from the River Sutla to the Black Sea. For this, there is a general consensus.

Whether we like it or not, Croatia is seen as belonging to this region – not in civilizational terms, but in terms of its importance for the existence of Bosnia-Herzegovina, its long semicircular border with the Balkan Bosnia-Herzegovina, the particular function of its port of Ploče, its common borders with Serbia and Montenegro, and finally its role as a signatory and guarantor of the Dayton Accords.

Austria, which took over the presidency of the European Union on 1 July 1998, stresses its support for the interests of the present-day national states emerging from the earlier multinational grouping of peoples in Central Europe. It also recognizes its role as a bridge between the West and the East and Southeast, which was noted also by Pope John Paul II during his last visit to Austria.

In this large geographic space between the River Sutla and the Black Sea, plagued by emotive national spasms and revindications, Croatia is perhaps the greatest civilizational heir to the legacy of the former Central European monarchy – not its negative traits such as the predominant position of the Austrians and Hungarians over the other nations, but its positive traits and traditions, which prompted Churchill to say that it had been “the best structure in Europe before the creation of a community of European nations”. This common past within a multicultural community is the source of tolerance and multiethnic coexistence. With its rich Central European and Mediterranean cultural and historical heritage, with Illyrian-Roman, Old Croatian, Carolingian, Romanic, Gothic, Renaissance, Baroque, Biedermeier, Szession, and modern components, and natural beauty of the sub-Alpine, Pannonian, Dinaric, Karst, and Mediterranean environment, Croatia is in itself a small European microcosm (somewhat balkanized since 1918) possessing the charm of a civilizational border in which
things function in accordance with the human measure. This truly rich legacy enables it to take a lead in building a specifically Croatian multiethnic society with Euro-humanistic components and to assume the role of a link, cultural and economic source of radiation, and participant in positive communication in all areas and all directions.

Opportunity for Croatia

The international community believes that the long-awaited stabilization in the region can be achieved only in parallel with the process of reconciliation and economic development, beginning with broader regional economic cooperation to prepare and determine the future European architecture of the entire region. This is the strategic essence of the so-called regional approach and the accompanying conditions as drafted by the Italian diplomat Amadeo de Franchis and adopted on 24 February 1997. Europe and NATO are thus extending the European space by several hundred kilometres, all the way to the Black Sea, which somewhat relativizes the position of Croatia and its civilizational and geographic specificities in a region with many unresolved disputes, but at the same time presents it with an opportunity to play a particular role in the process. This is the opportunity that we should not miss. We should note that the European Union and the international community, every organization and each key member of such an organization, intend – without a real rush – to turn this region into a big Euro-Atlantic building site for many tens of years to come. This will also be a major market for Croatian goods and stimulate foreign investments that aim to reach larger markets.

In the opinion of some present and former distinguished statesmen and high officials of the European Union (Chirac, Mock, Cossiga, Kinkel, Schüssel, Burghardt, and others), the Croatian President – whose unrelenting energy and pragmatic caution enabled Croatia to become internationally recognized as a sovereign state – should continue and complete his historic mission by supplementing his more narrow nationalism with additional statesman-like visions of reconciliation, forgiveness, and coexistence of recently rebellious and mutually hostile ethnic groups. He should continue to build a tolerant, democratic and law-based state and to bring such a state as a small but regionally important member into the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, providing a regional model of an attractive, democratic economic and political partner.

This would make the Croatian President a pillar, support and adviser to Euro-Atlantic statesmen in the inevitable process sketched above.

The map of the main economic, investment and development zones shows that the main such zone extends from southern England, through central Germany to northern Italy. A rather broad peripheral zone of development covers northern and central Croatia, the regions of Maribor, Vienna, Prague, Berlin, southern Sweden and the Baltic states, extending to Moscow and taking in parts of Hungary and Poland. A large part of Croatia lies on the edges of the Vienna-Prague-Berlin zone.

Croatia is not expected at this moment – and this needs to be properly understood – to participate in the design of the region up to and including the Black Sea by providing complementary assistance to its former partners in the Central European empire of Austria-Hungary, such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Slovenia. However, it is expected to provide significant assistance to its former partners in the former Yugoslavia and the neighbouring countries. This is a somewhat enlarged region with which Croatia does not have any traditional, civilizational or religious links. The unfortunate links that it has are marked by recent experience and present-day realities, the geographic position and communication lines. For the Brussels-based organizations, this is a region that requires stability, reconciliation, reconstruction, development, and opening of communication lines. This, in fact, is the essence, in the European view, of the notorious “regional approach” supported also by the United States (SECI). An important geopolitical role in this process will be played – apart from Croatia – by Hungary, Serbia (present-day Yugoslavia), Bulgaria, and the strategically important Albania.

From Croatian perspective, the objection to the regional approach is that the sovereign state, member of the United Nations and the Council of Europe, though young and newly emerged on the international scene, is not allowed to choose its own “preferred partners”, groupings and clubs. Instead, these choices are imposed upon it in a paternalistic manner, supposedly well-intended, and yet meant to squeeze it into a club of politically, economically and psychologically “non-preferred” partners that it has only recently and with great effort managed to get rid of. The international community is not likely to give up this concept, but this is not to say that it cannot be gradually relativized and more flexibly and selectively applied in different countries. Croatia has a special role to play in this concept, with special future opportunities, but equally with special yardsticks to measure every step that it takes.
Croatia is seen in this concept as an important link between Central Europe and the wider Balkans, which gives it double importance but also makes it a double possible beneficiary to play the role of a driving engine.

This is the role that would be very much to the liking of Drašković, Gaj, Jelačić, Šokčević, Mažuranić, Kukuljević, Vranyczany, Archduke Ferdinand, Supilo, Radić and Maček, and chimes well with the idea of Scandinavization and broader visions of Franjo Tudman.

For this supposedly privileged role – for which Croatia should be grateful – there is for the time being only one fundamental obstacle in the view of most members and agents of the international community.

The free elections inaugurated a Croatian model of democracy and system of government, which removed the Communist system and subsequently changed political and economic structures in line with the more successful countries of the former Warsaw Pact and present-day E.U. and NATO candidates. This system is satisfactory and acceptable to an important part of the Croatian electorate, while for the majority in the international community it still does not possess enough attributes of a totally open democracy. Additionally, it carries the burden of long-term obligations with respect to the Dayton Accords.

The Relevance of the European Standards

The international community considers that in the wake of the breakdown of Yugoslavia and preparations for self-defence there appeared an excessively single-party system, inadequate legislative protection and media freedoms, legally camouflaged persecution of the media, and a widely criticized electoral law. In spite of its very good constitution, positive macro-economic indicators, undeniable military and other successes, Croatia is perceived as insufficiently European and excessively nationalist.

Speaking of nationalism, not every form of nationalism should be a priori and uncritically dismissed. It can prove an ally in the building of democracy and free civil society when it is an expression of a desire to correct obvious historical injustice, tyranny, suppression of identity, and economic exploitation.

However, once these injustices have been corrected, nationalism should not be allowed to develop into a permanent state and offered as a pat answer to any problems and challenges. If this should happen, it becomes a hindrance or an excuse for the exclusion of others.

Croatia tends to advertise itself as a regional military power, which could be understood by some people as a form of threat and as such incompatible with the European views, especially not for the social-democrat, left-liberal and green parliamentarians, who occupy dominant positions in the European Parliament and many national parliaments.

An added problem cited by the international community at the present time, more as lip service than a genuine humanistic attitude, is the problem of return of Croatian citizens with the internationally recognized right of citizenship, the return of their property and housing, and their equal participation in the civil society of their country. It must be said that there are some objective grounds for such apprehensions.

As events evolve and concrete problems appear, the international community modifies, removes or imposes its conditions in accordance with the momentary needs and interests and in keeping with its priorities. This leaves the impression of a set of instruments that can be arbitrarily used.

As for Croatia, the government, the parliamentary majority, much of the media and a large proportion of the Croatian public opinion have their own assessments of the views of the international community. Their assessments are based on living realities, our moral and material capabilities, but just as in any other country – regardless of the desire for consensual cooperation – there are technical, financial, security and domestic policy limits. Nobody can deny that the main interest of a country is the integrity of its borders and security within the state.

The Croatian citizens should realize – which is neither easy nor, over a short term, with events still fresh in the people’s minds, actually possible – that it is necessary, in the interest of a nation with European and humanistic traditions, to balance and relativize the cardinal syndrome that blurs our vision, namely, the attitude towards the Serbs. A similar syndrome exists among many Serbs and Montenegrins and prevents rational thinking, debate and constructive action. Reconciliation, settlement of disputes and accounts is inevitable. Similar considerations apply to relations with the Muslims.

There is a basic misunderstanding between the interested parties. Many people in Croatia and in the world see that the international community’s stand towards Croatia is one-sided, more severe, almost less just than towards many other countries which are now closer to being integrated into Europe. Such misunderstandings should be overcome through consensus and constant effort on both sides.
The situation just described needs to be noted, but should not be given too much weight. Such misunderstandings should not be the reason for an isolationist reflex in Croatia, but an incentive for more resolute steps to open small country, with only 4,784,000 inhabitants, to the rest of the world. This can be done in the first place relying on a clear and decisive economic development programme, designed to develop weakened, inefficient economy, suffering from chronic shortages of finance. In addition, there is a need for foreign investments and technological and marketing know-how. This is required to stimulate the growth of production and exports, development of more profitable tourism, rational agriculture, stronger small businesses, intensified scientific research, all of this in the interest of creating more jobs. Such a bold economic programme should be accompanied by a harmonization of our legislative, free market, financial, health, scientific and other systems with the European standards in these areas.

Simultaneously with the improvement of democratic system, Croatia's significant economic results would enable it, following the inclusion in the PHARE programme and the signing of the first agreement with the European Union, to speed up the process of preparing an agreement on association and possibly catch up with the second-circle candidates for future membership in the E.U.

In the words of Croatian President, Croatia now finds itself at the point at which it should spare no effort to become part of the E.U. and NATO. Croatian population know very well that this is their national interest.

The entry into the European Union and NATO is a crucial step for Croatia and for future generations and therefore requiring a consensus of all citizens to secure interests and the hard won and defended identity. Such decisions are not a task for one group or party in any country. The decision depends on the democratically elected bodies, parliaments, and on the consensus of the citizens.

It is well known that in most E.U. countries with a highly praised democratic models of value and tolerance there are social injustices, corruption, unemployment, frequent protests and strikes, decline in social values, drug abuse, organized crime and criminal enrichment, interference of economic interests in the media, illegal financing of political parties, and many other deficiencies of the kind that Croatia is reproached with. But in this array of negative traits there is room also for Euro-