

The Partnership for Peace is the anteroom to NATO membership. As the document issued by the heads of state and government of NATO's member nations in 1994 put it: "Active participation in the Partnership for Peace will play an important role in the evolutionary process of the expansion of NATO." Four years later, three countries are on the threshold of moving from PFP to full NATO membership. This is a path the United States hopes other countries will follow – including Croatia.

But NATO membership is not automatic for PFP members. NATO, after all, in a community of like-minded nations. All share a commitment to the same fundamental democratic principles. As the North Atlantic Treaty, which established NATO on April 3, 1949, says: "The parties ... are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law." Although I have been here only four months, it has been long enough to know that the people of Croatia share this heritage and this commitment to the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. This is, in fact, what makes Croatia a prime candidate for inclusion in the western community of democratic nations.

We also recognize that, unlike some of those countries now entering NATO, Croatia has had to make

the transition from decades of authoritarian rule to market capitalism under the most trying circumstances, while simultaneously fighting for its survival and freedom as an independent state. We know this was not easy. We can sympathize. Our country, too, was born in war, and 222 years later we are still struggling to reach the goal enunciated in the first sentence of our constitution – "to form a more perfect union."

This is, in fact, why we have presented the Government of Croatia with this roadmap. Our roadmap is not long or complicated. Its terms are clear and simple. When they are met, Croatia will have our full support for entry into Partnership for Peace. If they are met, Croatia will also strengthen both its international reputation and its own democratic system.

To briefly sum up: the United States Government firmly believes that it is in our best interest and your best interest that Croatia base its future security policy on PFP and NATO. We want to assist you in joining PFP as quickly as possible and have presented a roadmap to your government to help it to do so. We hope you can complete all the benchmarks by the end of 1998. The timetable, however, is up to you. Nothing would give me more pleasure, however, than seeing Croatia achieve this historic step forward in time for the Christmas/New Year holidays. We will help you in any way we can. ■

Challenges to the New World Order

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When the socialist system in Europe collapsed, the bipolar model in international relations vanished, and a new phase was started, of a search for structures and models of international relationships. But just as one-time attempts to introduce the concepts of trilateralism or pentagonalism did not change the bipolar relations of the two super powers, so today's discussions that endeavour to create an image of a model of the new world order on the so-called formula of "one super power and four great powers" or "one super power and several great powers" are still far from the reality. Thus the claim that the world order has been established and that a new model can

be discussed within the framework of the existent structure of the distribution of power has come more and more to dominate, especially in America. Its view is that it is easy to see that there is only one super power and that the world order is subordinated to it, this structure of relationships not being likely to change in a generation. This implies that multipolarity, seen in this way, means primarily that there is a central and large pole, the United States, while the other parts, the four great powers, China, Russia, the EU and Japan, or the several great powers, are unable to fulfil the tasks of leadership, of the central pole that is.

The character of American power, concentrated round economic development, military force, science and foreign policy engagement, shows that only America is in a state to pose and realise global strategic aims. However, even all those American authors who accept such a definition of American power and the role of American global strategy nevertheless agree that the US cannot act everywhere and deal with every problem, and that to a great extent it has to take into account the interests and views of the four other great powers.

If one were to analyse further this kind of model of the world order that, with all its endeavours to talk about multipolarity, nevertheless has a tendency towards unilateralism, a division within the four great powers can be made. It is clear, for example, that Europe, or, German policy in Europe, as it is sometimes referred to, has the same economic and political foundations as the USA. Then there are the numerous political, economic and security threads that bind Europe and the US, and Europe, that important player, is in practical terms a part of the joint Atlantic strategic projection. This goes even more for Japan, which in spite of its enormous economic strength, follows the American line completely in security and political affairs. If to the total power of America we add on the EU and Japan, it follows that the new world order does have powerful leaders, irrespective of how the internal relations between the USA and the other two figures are arranged. In a strategic sense, the interests of the central pole of the world order and its two biggest allies are identical, and a firm leadership can be built upon them.

China as future global colossus

Two of the four world powers with which the centre of the world order should be built have in fact a somewhat different view of it. Mainland China and Russia, although in completely different conditions, look upon the new world order as a set of values and relations that do not satisfy their interests completely and, irrespective of their being ranked among the four great powers, they are not sure that they are going to get any very prominent position at the top of this order.

China, with its accelerating economic growth and relatively stable internal situation is in a position to make use of all its advantages as a great country. Enormous investments in the economy from the West, and modern equipment, are beginning to give results, and according to numerous analyses, in twenty years China should be a very powerful country. This, of course, poses the Chinese leadership with the question of China at the summit of interna-

tional relations. Current Chinese positions can be presented most easily as a part of the activity of a regional Asian power, which can achieve its regional aims with its existing means.

Placing the stress on the need to build up a multipolarity in the world order, Chinese politics looks for assistance to the OECD May 1997 analysis that says that in 2020 five states, Brazil, China, India, Russia and Indonesia, will account for one third of total world production, while the developing countries will also raise the value of their production up to one third. Developed countries would reduce their share of world production to one third.

Taking it as a fact that in this total new distribution the relative power of the US will fall, Chinese theorists claim that even today, American politics is having problems with some countries of ASEAN or Latin America, and this is the beginning of the changes.

All this together is supposed to confirm the idea that the world of the future will not have many similarities with the past phases of development of international relations when there was quite clearly the domination of just a few great powers. In the new complex of total global development, particularly of the developing countries, in China it is said that it is possible to expect the origin and action of a series of new global and regional powers, as of groups of large countries, which will have a significant role in international relations and in the new world order.

The approach that stresses the current great backwardness of the developing countries, their lack of unity and their lack of decisiveness in the establishment of any joint interests is considered by Chinese theorists to be related to a passing phenomenon. Thus the whole construction of the current world order, set up at the level of a central pole and four great powers, is taken as a transitory solution that will not manage to remain for very long and not as a model that will manage to last out even the generation.

In the current situation China particularly resents American political hegemonism and politics from the positions of a force that is particularly evident in the neighbourhood of China. The USA has 100,000 troops located in Asia and the Pacific, assisting the overall augmentation of military force with their thesis that the Asian-Pacific region is turbulent and unstable. Japan, with its military budget of \$55.4 billion is the number two state in terms of military expenditure. Then there are the special relationship between Japan and America and the development of American-Australian military co-operation. Chinese analysts condemn American interpretations of Chinese accelerated growth and alleged strengthening

of military power, which are supposed to show that China will become the number one world power. In Beijing they look at this as the search for a new adversary, the presentation of China as a future threat serving American domestic needs.

In order to parry the current situation, Chinese politics is active at several levels:

- globally, it rejects the idea of a world order based on hegemony,
- it is attempting to develop relations with certain Asian countries that share this way of thinking,
- it is hard at work developing co-operation with Russia which is also an important economic partner, likely to be more so in the future,
- it is endeavouring to promote its ideas about a multipolar world among the numerous countries of the third world, said to be an important player in future international relations.

Occupied with its own internal problems of development, China is able with this kind of policy to be involved at the international level and at the same time to appear as a champion of new relations and a new order. It thus defines its standpoint about current international relations and about those that will appear in the future, when China will certainly be stronger.

However, it is clear that when China does become stronger, there will be new relations with the world, in which China will project its own view of the world and the world order. With the need to solve the Macao problem, which will come very soon, there is also the problem of Taiwan, which is still a challenge to the image of China as great power. Then there are also the questions of the delicate relations with India, with Vietnam and in particular with Japan, all of which weigh heavy on its image as a great country. At the same time the very complex Chinese relations with the US, an important business partner and at the same time a country that is firmly linked with Japan, as well as a country from which come criticisms of Chinese human rights policies, are also a burden on Chinese policy.

Bearing all this in mind, in recent years China has been hard at work developing relations with Russia, relations currently characterised as a strategic partnership. Solutions to border problems, an agreement about the redeployment of nuclear weapons, the development of considerable trading links and military co-operation have certainly created model relations between these two great powers, which have, at the same time, similar views about questions of the new world order. Although in total economic power China has now outstripped Russia, it sees in the great country to the west an important and useful ally it is linked to by a number of inter-

ests, bilateral and of a wider international nature. In this current, very likely optimum phase of bilateral relations, China is interested in having Russia as ally in Asian matters and on the wider global level. In a pluralist world, which for Chinese analysts is a synonym for the current situation in which there is unilateral American leadership, it is impossible to win a place for yourself independently, and the alliance with Russia is highly necessary. Although in China there are various schools of thought about Russia (some of them thinking it a weak and played-out country, while others stress that in twenty or thirty years Russia will once again become a great power thanks to its qualified personnel and great natural resources), Chinese policy does not miss any chance to build up relations that suit both sides.

The Russians support China and its endeavours to solve the Taiwan question, while on the other hand Chinese policy has supported Russian critiques of NATO expansion, while China and Russia both oppose America getting into Central Asia and its insistence on the strengthening of pluralism as the main base from which to prevent a resurgence of the USSR.

But if it can be said of China that it is a power with the ability to act regionally, on an upward development path, nevertheless it would be hard to imagine China being a central pole of the new world order. Even in the phase in which China becomes the world's strongest state, it will still have enormous problems. In the first place, this is a very populous country where, irrespective of the tempo of growth over the next twenty years, a great part of the population will live at a low level. This will create difficulties in social divisions, between different structures in society, and among the individual parts of China. From a technological point of view, Chinese development is largely dependent on Western expertise and loans, which means that in every situation it will be possible to control the direction of Chinese movement. Finally, the current social and political stability is still based on a firm socialist political model and an economic mixture of capitalist and socialist principles. Looked at over the long haul, it is a question how long this monocentric political model will be able to resist pluralist pressures that will come from a more developed economic tempo of dynamic growth and from connections with the rest of the world. Then there is the question of human rights and democracy, which if they have not yet developed to any great extent are at least knocking on the door. All this together can limit China in its endeavours to take a leading place in world relationships or to become the central pole of the world order.

Russian accommodation to realities

In the early Yeltsin foreign policy phase, when it was believed it would be possible to build a strategic partnership between the US and Russia, the weight of Russian policy was placed in that direction, with the obvious hope that it would be possible to create a condominium of Russian and American interests. This quite simply would have resulted in a solution to the problem of the world order and Russia's leading place in it. However, very soon, hopes in some strategic partnership began to weaken, Russian foreign policy sobering up when it had to face real problems. The USA with its practical approaches clearly showed that it considered Russia a great power, but that it was now weak in every point of view and that of the characteristics of a great power only nuclear weapons were left to it. There was no chance of any kind of Russo-American condominium or the creation of a special relationship in which the Russians would have some kind of vote identical to that of the Americans. All those in Russia who had expected such a development had to search for different political conceptions.

In the framework of its understanding of the new relations, American policy:

- proposed the thesis that geo-strategic polycentrism in the area of the former USSR was useful and desirable,
- said that it was necessary to develop relations with the Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, so as to enable the penetration of American interests into the Ukraine and former Soviet Central Asia,
- affirmed that Russia could have nothing to say about the expansion of NATO,
- took the view that world crises could be (Bosnia) but did not have to be (Iraq) solved on the basis of common viewpoints between Russia and America,
- held that Russia was too weak and for this reason could not be treated as an equal partner.

Russian policy, realising the new realities, in which the group of the so-called Westerners was defeated, sought new space for action. Instead of arguing for partnership or mature partnership with the US, for which Russia quite obviously does not have the means either today or in the near future, Russian policy was redirected towards:

- closer foreign countries,
- China,
- the countries of Western Europe.

In its approach to closer foreign countries, Russian foreign policy also made a great about-turn. Convinced at the beginning that almost all the former Soviet republics, in spite of their independence, would soon be looking to Moscow as the centre of

economic, industrial and social and cultural development, Russian policy was primarily directed towards the development of Russo-American ties. Only when it was seen that these relationships were not producing the desired results and that at the same time the states of the CIS were getting further and further away from the Commonwealth and increasingly stressing their independence did Russian foreign policy make a U-turn and start treating this area as of primary interest.

In the document *Strategic Principles of Russia* (1995) about relations with the countries of the CIS, economic integration was stressed as the aim. This was to be achieved via the creation of customs and payments unions, a joint space for scientific and technological collaboration, the transfer of capital and so on. The stress placed upon the idea that the co-operation proposed would be the voluntary activity of sovereign and equal states was aimed at bringing all the countries of the CIS into the tie-strengthening process. However, it was clear that inside the Commonwealth a split had already occurred. Russia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan were for such co-operation; the Caucasus countries showed less interest, and the Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan almost none at all. All these three countries were bombarded with American, Turkish and Iranian offers of co-operation. Petroleum reserves in Central Asia exceed those of the North Sea, Kuwait and Mexico put together, and the great oil companies are increasingly active. The first pipeline from Azerbaijan that does not cross over Russian territory is being built, in an endeavour to avoid both dependence on Russian space and Russian pressures. In the Asian republics the first railway lines that link Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan with Iran have been built, which has also reduced their dependence on Moscow.

The centrifugal forces that are at work in the Commonwealth are the result of bad experience from the past and fears of Russian domination. Since the doors are increasingly wide open for co-operation with the US, Iran, Saudi, Turkey and Pakistan, Russian desires to step up collaboration within the CIS are meeting with less and less interest. In spite of this, it is obvious that Russian policy will, because of past relationships, because of the great number of Russians in these countries, go on with connections that exist and with attempts to parry foreign activity through championing and strengthening collaboration in the CIS. If this were successful, Russian policy would be stronger internally, and would have an important card to play in its relations with the US.

Relations with China are developing in line with the Russian intention of creating good and friendly relations with its neighbours. As the Russian side says

today, the two countries can be good neighbours, good friends, and good partners. Because of this intention, border problems have been solved, and both sides attempt to resist any statements that present the other country as a danger or a threat. Although in Russia there is still a viewpoint that says in the future China could be the greatest threat to Russian interests, nevertheless the prevailing view is that co-operation with China is in the interests of Russia, and that in this positions can be created for some new place for Russia at the centre of the world order.

Economic complementarity, and the rapid growth in Chinese productivity, have created opportunities for the development of trade which is particularly significant in the border areas of both countries. At the same time, Siberia and the Russian Far East have rich resources that are necessary for Chinese industry. Via APEC and bilateral relations, China helps in the development of these parts of Russia, thus expanding overall economic and trade relations.

Instead of the one-time relations based on the same Marxist-Leninist ideology, today's Sino-Russian relations are developing on the pragmatic interests and needs of the two countries. They understand the value of these relations, both because of internal reasons and for the sake of their international positions. In both cases, it is considered that co-operation can help in the furthering of their international roles.

Russian policy says that it wants to build joint relations with China on the base of equality and respect for sovereign interests, and that in their actions both countries can stand up for a more just and democratic world. Multipolarity is for both countries the foundation of the new post-cold war relations. Faced with events in Eastern Europe, where NATO is on the point of taking in new countries, and with activities in Central Asia, Russian policy claims that it cannot allow, in the new circumstances, the cold war line to be replaced by some new line of division among countries. In the new conditions there should not be any leading countries, or states that are led, and that all tendencies leading to a unipolar world are impermissible. To this, China adds the need to construct relations in the new world order on five principles, of peace-loving coexistence, and the demand for hegemony and the politics of force to be replaced by respect for the sovereign rights of all states, irrespective of their size, strength or position.

Community of interests is best expressed in views about the solution of regional conflicts and crises. In the whole run of political, economic, territorial, national and ethnic conflicts and local wars, both sides see a danger to security. This is particularly strongly marked in Russia, which is faced with numerous crises in the ex-USSR some of which can

easily spill over onto its territory (Chechnia). At the international level Russian and Chinese politics of crisis from the Near East, in ex-Yugoslavia, Africa, South East Asia always look for the use of peaceful solutions, the initiation of dialogue, negotiations and consultations. They are against the use of the mechanisms of regional organisations and in the event of the action of the UN seek full control of the operations, resisting the use of military force.

The Russians support China over Taiwan and are equally against the use of human rights questions as a means to apply pressure. Russian policy has rejected such attempts, stating that this is meddling in internal affairs. China in turn backs Russia over the expansion of NATO and with respect to Chechnia sees this as an internal problem. Such joint views are co-ordinated by foreign policies, which help each side to show how it can in fact act, certainly more powerfully if not alone. It can easily be hypothesised that Russian politics, which does not have a great choice of partners, will continue carrying out this policy, seeing in China a strategic partner likely to be content with it.

In relations with west European countries, some circles in the Russian political elite still count on differences, divisions and national interests that are not the same in the West and can lead to differences of viewpoints. This particularly relates to the views of the Europeans as against those of the US. Carrying out a policy that did have its place in the previous phase of international relations, Russia is attempting to find common points of contact, especially in relations with Germany and France, so as to create fissures in the Atlantic alliance and make possible the softening of certain views relating to Russia and Russian politics.

Irrespective of the traditions of relationships, and similarities of views in certain questions, it is nevertheless difficult to imagine that Russian politics could lead to any serious divisions in the Atlantic community. The bases of the association are so firm and so enduring that Russia could not obtain any serious successes through any sort of manipulation. Apart from this, the Russian side is so weakened that it could offer nothing big even if any of the western countries should wish to play on the Russian card. And if it is a matter of views about relations in the world order, the Europeans, however much they might be satisfied or dissatisfied with the present situation, still know that the US, the central pole, is their long-term ally and that, on the other hand, through Atlantic forms of collaboration, they are participating at the summit of the world order. This is certainly much more practical and attractive than anything that Russian might be able to offer.

Challengers from outside the circle of great powers

If one were looking for countries that are not over-satisfied with the existing world order and think that it ought to be different one might start from several kinds of criticism:

- some countries think that the current order is too concentrated around the central pole and leaves too little space for the actions of other players,
- there is also criticism that with the top of the world order organised in this way, too little attention is paid to crucial questions of world survival and development (hunger, the less developed, ecology in less developed countries and so on),
- relations structured in this way are not a guarantee for the rapid surmounting of the gap between developed and undeveloped, and that this great group of countries is actually left to one side by the main political, economic and social currents of contemporary development,
- most world questions continue to be solved in a narrow, narrower even than in the time of the cold war, circle, with a tendency to ignore, marginalise even, the UN.

All these criticisms, to which many others could doubtlessly be added, clearly show that the world order, even today, after the cold war, is incapable of creating a unified system of relationships taking account of all states. The emphasis on the central pole and the four parts of the top of the system cannot satisfy numerous other states or help in the solution of the problems of complex contemporary development. At the same time, in these criticisms there are the roots of the views of certain countries, formed in their strategic political conceptions and afterwards projected within relationships at a regional or global level.

Where relatively large and powerful countries are concerned, these criticisms are more important because they do not only show the level of dissatisfaction, but also the possible line of development for further action, which can sometimes have serious consequences in a security framework.

The current world order is still based on the line of division that exists between developed and undeveloped countries, or, as it is sometimes defined, between the zone of peace and the zone of instability. And since in the peace zone there is only 15% of the population of the planet, it is easy to conclude that in the great area of instability there are no conditions for relatively rapid transition to the zone of peace and prosperity.

As well as this great divide, which splits two worlds or zones, those of the rich and the poor, since the fall of European socialism and the collapse of the Soviet Union, there have been more and more phases in circulation about Islam as a danger and the greatest challenge to the current order. The very phrase new

world order was used during preparations for the attack on Iraq, which in a sense was a strike against a certain kind of radical Islam.

In a wider sense, the Islamic threat is seen as a group of dangers connected with nuclear weapons, terrorism, and the great wave of migrants from Islamic countries. With these definitions, it is clear that radical Islam, or the Islamic threat can show up in various places and that it might be possible to talk of some kind of global challenge.

In one interpretation, there is a great Islamic arc from Mauritania to the Korean borders while in the other variant some countries only are taken as dangers, such as Libya, Iraq, Pakistan or perhaps Iran. Apart from this, among Islamic countries, it is possible to find a few that are exposed to sanctions and embargoes, and it is logical that they should not accept the world order as something that can ensure them an equal place in international life.

Looked at within the idea of the conflict of civilisations and the new creation of a world order, Islam is taken, by Huntington for example, as a constant challenger, and as a power which is in conflict with the west. This conflict is intensifying, and of the large number of Islamic countries, only a few of them have come at all close to constructing state communities in western forms. Opposing the thesis that for the West the main danger is Islamic fundamentalism, Huntington says that it is not a question only of radical Islam but of Islam as a civilisation the members of which consider their values to be higher and thus act hostilely to western civilisation. Adding to this a still wider formulation about a conflict running along the line of the "rest against the West" Huntington actually locates the whole of the world order in the developed West, expecting challenges and conflicts from the rest of the world which will apparently work for the overthrow of this world order.

In the Islamic countries, especially in Iran, they resolutely reject such analyses about the conflict of civilisation and the place of Islam. It is said that the whole conception about Islam as a danger was launched in 1990 when the collapse of the Soviet Union and the socialist system began, and when it was necessary to find another enemy. In this framework, Islam, irrespective of its real qualities, the differences among the variants of the Islamic religion and particularly the differences among Islamic states has been pronounced a single danger so that attention should be directed in that attention. The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait was an excellent excuse, and the creation of new Asiatic states in the ex-USSR gave credence to the thesis of the threat from the south.

In Iran it is said that the whole stability of the West depends on the creation of some illusory enemy, and that Islam, or rather the thesis about the inevitable conflict of civilisations, has been used in this light. Mechanically taking the fifty or so Islamic states and

the numerousness of their populations, it was relatively easy to launch an image of adversaries with religious and cultural, ideological and military contours.

In Iran in the last few years they have insistently stated that there is no inevitable conflict of civilisations and that this is a distorted thesis that simplifies historical experience and does not take account of the present, and still less of the future. The contemporary world is polycentric and there is enough room in it for the collaboration of civilisations, for their promotion and complementation, and not for struggle and possible elimination.

The idea about a new world order is looked at as a typical example of neo-colonialism in which one super power has announced its desire to work actively and independently world-wide. Using the example of American-Iranian relations, that is of embargoes, sanctions and pressures on other countries not to have relations with Iran, Iranian politics wants to show that the new world order is there to serve American interests and the Americans' conviction that they are the masters of the world.

In some wider strategic visions of the future as well as Islam, as a danger to the world order, the possibility has been seen of the creation of alliances of dissatisfied countries, which in a different light might be powerful challengers. The triangle, so called, of Iran, Russia and China, constituted by countries that for various reasons are not satisfied with the current arrangements, which consider that they do not have an appropriate place at the top, or which would like radical changes, might combine out of sheer dissatisfaction. That would be the common denominator that would help to bring together all the economic, military and political forces, and get these countries to work together. But in reality however much this triangle might seem attractive to some, it should not be forgotten that there are after all enormous differences in the traditions, values and interests of these countries. Each of them is occupied with its own problems which will certainly outweigh any possible desire for co-operation and it is a question whether such triangular co-operation, antagonising other players, might not bring more losses than gains.

In spite of all changes that are coming, or that will come, in ten or twenty years, the most modern technology nevertheless comes from America and the West, and it is difficult to anticipate the creation of any modern developed leagues from countries that are highly dependent on the West. Apart from this, the power of all three countries, in spite of their population and great resources, is not at the level for them to be able to close themselves off in this triangle and develop relations that they would later be able to impose on others. Only in international co-operation does Russia have a chance of solving its enormous problems; China can keep up the rapid tempo of its development and move slowly towards improving living

conditions only by strengthening its relations with the world, while Iran, in spite of its isolation and imposed enclosedness, will be able to see prosperity only the day it starts to develop wider forms of international co-operation.

Co-operation is the imperative of contemporary international relations, and international relations have never in their history been so open to the development of the most diverse forms of relationships among states. It is in this strengthening of co-operation, the interweaving of ties and relations, the mingling of civilisations, values and national interests that the possibility of creating a new world order lies, one that will suit, if not all, at least most members of the world community.

An analysis of the current stage of the world order in contemporary conditions would show that:

- it is still dominated by one super power and its attempts to remain a super power as long as possible,
- the international conditions have not yet been created for a group of states to be formed around the central pole, representing a kind of caucus of the biggest and most powerful states,
- the international organisation of the UN is fairly far away from being able to become the real centre of the world order,
- there is an obvious dissatisfaction on the part of some states that for various reasons consider a world order of this kind does not suit them, most international relationships, in spite of attempts to introduce the term multipolarity, taking place unilaterally,
- the new world order is not capable of solving the central problems of the survival and development of the world, and is not capable of eliminating all conflicts,
- challengers of the new world order for the moment can be against various solutions, they can use their vote in the UN but because of their weakness they are not able to make a serious threat to the substance and direction of contemporary international relations.

The relatively short period since the end of the cold war has not been enough, of course, to build one model of the world order to suit everyone. The world is multipolar in terms of forms and players, and yet in terms of some central decisions unilateral. It is in this conflict of multipolarity and unilateralness that the greatest challenge to the world order actually lies. Only the creation of a greater number of poles that will be powerful, organised and determined to run an active foreign policy will be able to create the foundations of the multipolar order which will pay more attention to all members of the international community. It should also be said that the creation of alliances would not be useful, and might lead to some new kind of confrontation.

If the world overcame the phase of cold war confrontation, in spite of all its imperfections and incompleteness, then the new world order can be taken as the first step towards a multipolar and democratic system of the future. ■