The Role of Arms Control and Defence Restructuring in the New South-Eastern Europe

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The present status of arms control in Europe is somewhat paradoxical. On the one hand, arms control has experienced astounding successes over the last ten years: the INF Treaty, START 1 and 2, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the CFE 1 and 1a Treaties, as well as a wide range of confidence-building measures. On the other hand, the impression has become redundant in the European context. The presumed reason is that the Cold War has evaporated which had provided the setting for arms control efforts ever since the 1940s, leaving arms control as 'a solution in search of a problem'. In the present paper, however, a case shall be made for the continuing relevance of arms control for the 'new Europe', albeit with an emphasis that differs significantly from that of the Cold War.

The Concept of Arms Control

Arms control was originally conceived as a more realistic alternative to disarmament, in particular to the futile, perhaps even counter-productive and harmful, quest for general and complete disarmament. In the most sophisticated conceptions, arms control was a means of achieving stability, i.e. war prevention. As this had also become the foremost goal of military planning (because of the suicidal nature of nuclear war) arms control was regarded as an integral component of, rather than the opposite of, defence policy. Because the main goal of arms control was stability, it was furthermore acknowledged that it might sometimes require more rather than fewer arms, even though it was, of course, desirable to accomplish stability at the lowest possible level of armaments. Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin thus used the term to denote

... all the forms of military cooperation between potential enemies in the interest of reducing the likelihood of war, its scope and violence if it occurs, and the political and economic costs of preparing for it. ... an effort, by some kind of reciprocity or cooperation with our potential enemies, to minimize, to offset, to compensate or to deflate some of these characteristics of modern weapons and military expectations.

Behind this notion was a theory of crisis stability and instability, according to which there was a significant risk of wars starting inadvertently, e.g. via dynamics that International Relations theory associates with the 'security dilemma': One state might erroneously come to believe that its opponent is about to initiate (or even that it has already launched) an attack, in which case the best chance of not losing will be to 'beat him to it', i.e. to pre-empt the attack. Conceivably, between two sides 'reciprocal fears of surprise attack' might even result in a sequence of pre-emption incentives which might produce a war desired by neither side, and from which both sides would stand to lose 'in a big way', regardless of who would ultimately prevail.

Initially, arms control thinking was almost entirely concerned with nuclear weapons and the relationship between the two superpowers. However, the awareness gradually grew that the conventional realm had to be taken into account. If this remained unstable, in the sense that states (in particular the Soviet Union) might possess war-winning options, there were limits to how stable the nuclear realm could be made. War had to be deterred by means of manipulated risks that fighting might escalate out of control, which required some instability at the higher ranks of the escalation ladder. To thus pose a 'threat that leaves something to chance' was what NATO's flexible response' strategy was all about. By implication, in order to truly render nuclear war inconceivable, the conventional realm had to be stabilized, i.e. conventional war-winning options had to be eliminated.

This was the purpose of the arms control-related ideas of non-offensive defence that flourished in Europe, especially in Germany, in the 1980s. The seminal proposals for a 'defensive defence', those of Horst Afheldt and associates, were directly based on the findings of nuclear arms control, i.e. the theory of stable deterrence, from which the central criteria of force design were (*mutatis mutandis*, of course) transposed to conventional forces:

* To pose of threats to the respective other side's defensive ('second strike') capabilities was counter-productive, as it would merely produce incentives for pre-emptive attack whence a war might ensue.

* To remove even the impression of posing such 'threats required not merely amendments of political intentions, military strategy and operational concepts but also of capabilities, i.e. a force restructuring to a defensive or non-offensive defence (NOD).

* That a dispersion of forces would make them less susceptible to disarming attack ('first strike'), hence would allow a state fearing an attack to wait until it actually occurs before defending himself ('retaliating') rather than doing so in an 'anticipatory mode', i.e. by pre-emption.

Arms Control and Defence

We have thus seen that, after a bumpy start, the arms control endeavour thus eventually accomplished some noteworthy successes in the concluding phase of the Cold War. Even though it may not have been a decisive factor in bringing this bipolar confrontation to an end it certainly codified its gradual disappearance. This raises the question whether arms control has had its day, i.e. whether it has been rendered obsolete for the post-Cold War period. It would not be at all surprising if this were so, as arms control was clearly conceived as a solution to, or a means of managing, a conflict that was no longer relevant. It would, indeed, be a mere coincidence if the same (set of) instruments(s) would be relevant for a radically different setting.

New and Rekindled Conflicts

What is new about the post-Cold War Europe is, first of all, that there is no longer any 'systemic divide', neatly dividing the continent into opposing (approximate) halves. Whether a new fault-line may develop (or is already developing) is disputed, just as is the question what might be the divisive issues: civilization, geopolitics, economics, or something else; and the question how such a division might be avoided. Much will depend on how NATO (and perhaps the EU) handles the enlargement that seems to be 'in the cards', and how Russia responds to this.

In any case, what has been called the bipolar 'overlay' has been lifted, hence conflicts are no longer (exogenously) predetermined by the opposing sides belonging to different 'camps', but the overwhelming majority are endogenous. As a result, various conflicts that lay dormant during the Cold War have been rekindled, and (what appear to be) new types of conflicts have erupted.

An example of a 'rekindled conflict' is that between Greece and Turkey that was previously suppressed by their joint membership of NATO (*vide infra*). Examples of 'new conflicts' are those on the territory of the former Yugoslavia and of the former Soviet Union-all of which would formerly have been categorized as 'intra-state wars', even though some have been transformed into international wars by the international community's recognition of the secessionist entities as states.

While there have been no 'hot' international wars in Europe since the end of the Cold War, some are at least conceivable, to which I shall return shortly. However, there is little doubt that Europe will experience the same development as has the rest of the world, namely the rise to prominence of intra-state wars-probably even more so than elsewhere, because Europe has already experienced a period of 'long peace' (John Lewis Gaddis). This has been attributed to a wide range of factors, for instance to the war preventing effects of nuclear weapons, to bipolarity, and to the pacifying role of institutions such as NATO and the EU.

A few authors have thus predicted a return to the 19th century patterns of shifting alignments and occasional wars as a result of the disappearance, or at least the receding saliency, of some of these factors. Others, however, have pointed to the persistence of other war-inhibiting factors such as democracy and market economy as well as to a general war-weariness. Even without bipolarity and almost without nuclear weapons it appears highly unlikely that, say, France and Germany should end up a war with each other once again; and even more inconceivable that other 'old' and stable European states should go to war against each other.

The 'old Europe' is thus firmly within what has aptly been called 'the zone of peace', which might be taken as implying that neither arms control nor defensive restructuring of the armed forces will have much of a role to play. In the following, I shall nevertheless venture some suggestions as to where they might still be relevant as well as to what kind of measures might be needed.

International Conflicts

Most of Europe is undoubtedly a zone of peace, i.e. a security community among the members of which war has ceased to be regarded as an option. The 'zone of turmoil', however, commences at the very fringes of the continent (or within the peripheral parts of the continent, depending on where one locates its outer limit), whence it may well spill over into Europe.

Even though this is primarily a question of civil war (*vide infra*), there are also a residual risk of international conflicts. The following is a list of conflicts that might conceivably lead to war. In none of these cases is war the most likely outcome, but neither is it quite unlikely enough to render planning and preparations for such an eventuality obviously superfluous. Moreover, it is entirely conceivable that the very planning might trigger chain reactions that might present 'path to war'.

First of all, we have various conflicts related to the break-up of the USSR, some of which are about territorial issues, and most of which are located in Russia's 'near abroad':
* between Russia and Ukraine, e.g. over the Crimea or some other issue;
* between Russia and other states in its 'near abroad', e.g. the Baltic states, perhaps triggered by secessionist attempts on the part of the Russian minorities;
* between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh;
* between Russia and (an enlarged) NATO;
* between Russia and Turkey over 'spheres of influence' in Central Asia and the Caucasus

Secondly, there are various potential wars related to the break-up of Yugoslavia:
* between Croatia and Serbia (the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), most likely triggered by a breakdown of the 'Dayton Regime' (*vide infra*), leading either the Bosnian Croats or Serbs, or both, to seek the support from their respective 'mother state';
* between Serbia and the (Croat-Muslim) Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, most likely via an internationalisation of a struggle between the Republica Srpska and the federation;
* between FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) and Greece.

Thirdly, we have to reckon with the possibility of a war between Greece and Turkey, either via intervention by either state (or both) in a rekindled armed conflict in Cyprus, via a maritime dispute in the Aegean Sea; or, finally, via the intervention by either or both in one of the several conflicts in the former Yugoslavia.

Various arms control measures might have a benign impact on any of these conflicts, as might a defensive restructuring of the armed forces. Such measures would, needles to say, not resolve the underlying conflicts, but they might make a resort to military means less likely and certainly less destructive, if armed struggle should break out, for the simple reason that if neither of the opposing sides is capable of large-scale aggression, none will occur.

Intra-State Conflicts

The distinction between intra-state and international conflicts is neither clear-cut nor 'natural'. First of all, there may be a causal link between the two in the sense that intra-state conflicts may become internationalized as the opposing sides draw external powers in for assistance. Secondly, as was the case for most of the conflicts listed above, a conflict may start out as a civil war only to be 'transsubstantiated' into international one by a (sometimes rather arbitrary) decision on the part of the world community to recognize the secessionist party as a sovereign state. The same may happen to some of those on the following, far from exhaustive, list of what remain, at the time of writing, actual or potential armed intra-state conflicts.
* civil war between Moldova and the secessionist 'Trans-Dniester Moldovan Republic';
* civil war between Georgia and the secessionist regions Abkhazia and South Ossetia;
* civil war between Azerabijan and Nagorno-Karabakh;
* civil war in Chechnya between the Russian Federation and the secessionists;
* civil war between the Federation and the Republica Srpska within the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which would *de facto* be an international war, yet *de jure* remain a civil, intra-state war;
* civil war in Albania;
* civil war between Turkey and the Kurds.

All such civil wars are extremely complex, and the experience with conflict management and resolution has not really been properly digested. Furthermore, neither traditional arms control theory nor NOD theory has much to say about the issue. Rather than generalising, I shall therefore confine myself to a few suggestions pertaining to concrete conflicts, some of which may be applicable to similar conflicts, while others may not.

Arms Control and Defence Restructuring for the Balkans

In the following I shall suggest some relevant arms control and restructuring measures for three of the conflicts in the Balkan area mentioned above: a rather traditional international conflict (Greece versus Turkey), an entirely internal one (Albania) and one exhibiting features from both, namely that in Bosnia Herzegovina.

Greece versus Turkey

The conflict between Greece and Turkey is in one sense a classical, old-fashioned conflict over ter-

ritorial and other issues, which presently takes the form of an arms race and occasional small armed clashes. Whether it will ever flare up into a full-fledged 'hot' war is an open question, the answer to which hinges, among other things, on NATO's continuing ability to function as an embryonic collective security organization, besides its traditional role of collective defence. If the conflict does erupt into war, however, it could well get nasty, as both sides have been rearming very heavily over the last few years, *inter alia* because of the availability of plentiful and cheap supplies of equipment from other NATO countries that has been 'cascaded' to the flanks of the alliance in order to escape destruction under CFE rules.

Imports of major conventional weapons

(SIPRI Yearbook 1996, table 11.2)	TURKEY Constant	GREECE (1990) USD
1991	954	559
1992	1,640	2,632
1993	2,288	891
1994	2,089	1,185
1995	1,135	489
1991-95	8,096	5,756

Various arms control and restructuring measures would be relevant for preventing a war and/or, if that fails, for containing it both 'horizontally', i.e. for preventing it from escalating and from spreading.

A relevant guide-line would be to ensure each side's ability to defend itself against an attack from the respective other. This situation of 'mutual defensive superiority' is captured in the following (pseudo-mathematical) formula, where D and O stand for defensive and offensive strength, G and T for Turkey, and where > signifies superiority.

Formula 1: $DG > OT \ \& \ DT > OG$

The situation is, however, complicated by the fact that the situation is profoundly multipolar and open-ended, as Turkey would also need the ability to defend itself against (or even attack) other neighbours, many of which are not obviously peaceful: Iraq, Iran, and Syria as well as the unstable Central Asian states. It is further complicated by the fact that (as a result of the archipelagic nature) Greek and Turkish borders in the Aegean Sea intersect (which is one of the least unlikely causes of a war), hence that it will be very difficult to device force configurations and deployments that provide neither side with border-crossing capabilities. What might nevertheless help would be the following measures:
* A freeze on arms transfers to both states, with the exception of such equipment as cannot be used for cross-border attack. As far as Turkey is concerned,

this would also improve the security of Russia and Iraq.
* A regional (bilateral or, even better, multilateral) Prevention of Incidents at Sea agreement.
* Various maritime CBMs applying to the Aegean Sea.
* Limitations on amphibious vessels and other means of seaward attack against land targets.
* Limitations on aircraft, especially for ground attack.

A credible commitment on the part of NATO to assist the victim of aggression, regardless of who this might be, against the attacker (even though this would be a NATO ally) would further help, as it would modify the above formula into the following, where N stands for NATO:

Formula 2: $DG + DN > OT \ \& \ DT + DN > OG$

Bosnia-Herzegovina

The Bosnian situation is, in a certain sense, at least equally complicated, *inter alia* because of the 'unorthodox' nature of the confederation and its constituent entities, both territorially and otherwise; and, of course, because of the all too vivid memories of the recent war. In another sense, however, the situation is simpler:

The Dayton Agreement of 14 December 1995 stipulated not only the borders and political arrangements of the 'new' state, but also the military arrangements pertaining to it; and it provided for international supervision of the agreement in the form of IFOR and its successor SFOR, both operating under UN authority, even though the operational command is subdelegated to NATO. In Appendix 1B on 'Agreement on Regional Stabilization', it was thus stipulated that

The parties agree that establishment of progressive measures for regional stability and arms control is essential to creating a stable peace in the region. To this end, they agree on the importance of devising new forms of cooperation in the field of security aimed at building transparency and confidence and achieving balanced and stable defense force levels at the lowest numbers consistent with the Parties' respective security and the need to avoid an arms race in the region. (Art. I)

It was further stipulated that such measures would include

(a) restrictions on military deployments and exercises in certain geographical areas; (b) restraints on the re-introduction of foreign forces (...) (c) restrictions on locations of heavy weapons; (d) withdrawal of forces and heavy weapons to cantonment/

barracks areas or other designated locations (...) (f) notification of certain planned military activities, including international military assistance and training programs; (g) identification of and monitoring of weapons manufacturing capabilities; (h) immediate exchange of data on the holdings of the five Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (hereinafter "CFE") weapons categories as defined in the CFE Treaty (Art. II)

These stipulations certainly seem to indicate a continued relevance of arms control; indeed, they even seem to partly vindicate some of the central tenets of NOD theory. A relevant guide-line might thus be the formula of stability via mutual defensive superiority mentioned above, albeit in a slightly more complex version. Formula 3 describes a stable 'balance of power' in Bosnia, with F standing for the Federation, RS for the Republica Srpska, BH for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Formula 3: $DF > ORS \ \& \ DRS > OF$

One may describe the preconditions for stability in the former Yugoslavia as a whole in similar terms. The following formulae, however, presuppose that the defensive strength of Bosnia-Herzegovina is at least equal to the combined defensive strength of its constituent entities-which is far from certain.

Formula 4: $DF + DRS \cdot DBH$

Formula 5 describes stability among the three main states in the former Yugoslavia, with C standing for Croatia and S for Serbia, and taking into account that either two of them might 'gang up' against the third, as in other multipolar systems:

Formula 5a: $DBH > OS + OC$
Formula 5b: $DS > OBH + OC$
Formula 5c: $DC > OBH + OS$

The above formulae describe demanding, yet not necessarily prohibitive, requirements for defensive restructuring by means of arms control or unilateral steps. Moreover, the addition of the factor of external assistance (E), e.g. in the shape of SFOR, would only make the achievement of stability easier, as this force would (it seems safe to assume) always strengthen the defender against the aggressor, whoever may be cast in which role.

Applied to the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the above formula 3 would be amended as in formula 6:

Formula 6a: $DF + E > ORS \ \& \ DRS + E > OF$

Formula 7a-c described the stabilizing effects of an external 'balancer' to the multipolar conflict between Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina that was captured above in formulae 5a-c:

Formula 7a: $DBH + E > OS + OC$
Formula 7b: $DS + E > OBH + OC$
Formula 7c: $DC + E > OBH + OS$

There are various proposals for how to further stabilize the situation in concrete terms, including a set of detailed proposals by Hans Dieter Lemke of the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Ebenhausen, Germany; a concrete arms control proposal to accompany the Dayton Agreement written by US ambassador (ret.) Jonathan Dean; and an elaborate proposal for defensive restructuring produced jointly by the Project Defense Alternative and the Study Group Alternative Security Policy. It is, however, beyond the scope of the present paper to go into any detail. Suffice it to touch upon one controversial issue with regard to the application of NOD to the former Yugoslavia: that of militias.

While the defence structure of Yugoslavia was presented by certain NOD advocates as a close real-life approximation to the NOD ideals, it has been argued by others that the debacle resulting from the breakup of the Yugoslav federation has compromised the concept of NOD as such. First of all, however, the notion of militias is not intrinsic to NOD as such, but merely one way of fielding armed forces that would be strictly defensive. There are other personnel structures which may be more appropriate for certain countries, and which may be equally defensive. Secondly, the experience with militias in ex-Yugoslavia was neither a complete failure nor a recipe for highly destructive war. In fact, the Slovene militia-like forces performed quite well against the regular forces of rest-Yugoslavia. Be that as it may, to suggest a militia-based defence, e.g. along the Swiss example where guns are kept at home, would obviously be very ill-advised in countries such as those in the former Yugoslavia; but this is no argument at all against designing forces to be as defensive and incapable of attacking neighbouring states or 'entities' as possible.

Albania

The almost surreal turmoil in Albania in the Spring of 1997, spurred by the collapse of the infamous 'pyramid schemes', may not even deserve the label 'civil war', which suggest something orderly. On the other hand, it bears a certain resemblance to the situation in Liberia, Somalia and Afghanistan and other cases of 'failed states'. Some have, moreover, argued that this is the most likely future type of conflict under 'the coming anarchy': a rest to a Hobbesian *'bellum omnium contra omens'*.

In such cases, there is probably not much that arms control in the traditional sense can accomplish. It is not so much a question of regulating arms as of disarming as many civilians as possible as quickly as possible. The rationale for this is to preventing

(or perhaps rather reversing) a 'privatization of security', where the state has ceased to provide domestic security and the citizens hence have taken 'the law' in their own hands, most often in the form of hand-guns.

Conclusion

We have thus seen that while some Cold War arms control schemes have been rendered obviously irrelevant by the end of the Cold War, there is still a role to play for arms control and defence restructuring in the new Europe. The purpose would be the traditional one of arms control, namely to prevent wars, both international and intra-state, and to limit their destructiveness, should they nevertheless occur. As Mark Twain might have put it, 'the rumours of the irrelevance of arms control and NOD are much exaggerated'.

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The Italian Ost-Politik

Viktor Tadić

Since about the beginning of the year the phrase "eastern policy" or Ost-Politik has been appearing with more and more frequency in the Italian media. It relatively quickly entered the political vocabulary of Farnesina (Italian foreign affairs ministry), while those in the know observe that it was invented by the current under-secretary in the same ministry, Piero Fassino. The phrase both conceptually and verbally depicts the Italian political initiative, the new political course that, as a Mediterranean regional power, it is projecting towards the countries in ex-Yugoslavia, to Slovenia and Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Yugoslavia and Macedonia, as well as Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria and from there to the countries of the ex-USSR.

The rise of the Italian "eastern policy"

"An Italian eastern policy really does exist". This was expressly confirmed by Fassino himself in the middle of January this year. At a time when Belgrade was alight with demonstrations against Milošević, Fassino stated that the winds that were blowing through the Balkans, thinking mainly of Serbia, showed to what extent central and south east Europe was crucial for the future of the whole of the continent. The creation of a new security architecture in the Balkan region had its own focus, for by the end of the century the EU and NATO would spread towards that region. In this context, in Fassino's opinion, key topics in this part of Europe, like for example immigration and the fight against international crime, would also lead to the necessity for Italy to have closer ties with the countries of central and eastern Europe. Fassino also mentioned the interdependence of Italy and the countries of central and eastern Europe, the long-standing cultural links and the very considerable political relations, particularly in recent times, between Italy and some of the countries of this region, all of which suggests the need for closer collaboration in both economics and culture. It gets stressed that in the countries of the central and eastern region, Italy is the second most important trading partner, and that it is the number one partner for Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria, Macedonia and Albania. In this context the Foreign Report of the respected London weekly *The Economist* had a headline at the beginning of November last year that ran "The surprising Italians", referring to the initiatives of Italian foreign politics with respect to central and eastern Europe.