Immigrants in Slovenia: Integration Aspects

SUMMARY

On the basis of the latest statistics, the author estimates the present share of first- and second-generation immigrants in Slovenia’s population. After examining the quantity and intensity of those public efforts in Slovenia that have been focused on unresolved problems of the immigrants’ social and cultural integration, she continues to question the equality of immigrant minorities in Slovenia, and the sufficiency of the existing programs aimed at facilitating their integration with Slovenian society at large. She explains her doubts about the general assumption that a very clear distinction should be made between the rights of the autochthonous minorities and those of the immigrant ones as far as their special protection is concerned. In the third section of this article, the author discusses the social-ethnic stratification of Slovenian society and tries to look into the psychological background of the nationality/ethnicity statistics. She presents some aspects of the immigrants’ daily experience in Slovenian social, cultural, educational and working milieu, and points to the authorities’ attitude toward them. She comments on the burning issue of the “deleted residents”, and illustrates it with the experience of one of the persons involved. The fourth section, in which the most regular symptoms of Slovenian xenophobia are presented, consists of first-hand observations and focuses on the daily human attitude of the national majority towards the immigrant minorities. Finally the author compares the nature of the specific needs of Slovenians as a “European national minority” with the needs of the immigrant minorities in Slovenia.

KEY WORDS: migration, Slovenia, former Yugoslavia, cultural integration, living conditions, xenophobia, intercultural relations

Introduction

The central subject of this essay – to put it briefly – is the obstacles of successful (cultural) integration of immigrants in Slovenia. As my basic discipline is history of literature, one of my future plans is to examine the quantity, the contents, creative motivations, artistic value and intercultural impact of literary production of immigrants living in Slovenia, whereby I wish to apply some of my past research experience with Slovenian emigrant literature in my attempt to evaluate the “reverse” literary output as well as its integration in Slovenian national literature and culture. But in order to be
able to place those findings in a broader context, I first tried to investigate the specific conditions in which those literary works are being created.

Not many intercultural studies have been made to discuss the role of the immigrant literatures or broader, immigrant cultures in Slovenian “pluriculture”, or to examine the cultural policy background that conditions the possibilities of maintaining those cultures. At a more advanced stage of my research I hope to find out whether besides those few prominent names of immigrant writers that most Slovenians have heard of (and who constitute the immigrant literary elite), there are a substantial number of others. If so, why do we know so little about them? And if there are almost none, why so? In this essay though I will not even touch upon those questions. My concern at this initial stage of research is to discover whether for the immigrant communities in Slovenia at large – meaning for everyone except those members of the communities who can afford to be actively engaged in their societies and in their cultural activities – the chances of maintaining their original cultures in their new homeland are one of the major issues at all. If so, what would be a relevant estimation of their chances compared to the chances of the autochthonous minorities or of the national majority in this country? And if not, what are the main reasons? My hypothesis is that during these past several decades of their struggle for survival, many immigrants have not been able to afford the time or money either to be actively involved in the maintenance and consolidation of their original cultures, or to have a single sip of the mainstream Slovenian Culture (at least the one occasionally spelled with a capital C). Furthermore I suspect that a good deal of the immigrant population in Slovenia know neither the literary Slovenian language properly, nor the literary language of their native land, and that there is a pretty good reason for that.

Following an opening presentation of demographic figures pertinent to this topic, I am going to question the equality of immigrant minorities in Slovenia, and the degree of their integration into Slovenian society at large. The preparatory work for this article included the following methods: my estimation of the current percentage of first and second generation immigrants in Slovenia’s population represents my own calculation based on 2002 census statistics as well as on recently published research on second-generation immigrants in Ljubljana. In the second section, the proportions of state subsidies for cultural activities of ethnic minorities presented in Table 1 illustrates my own calculation based on data combined from a series of quoted sources. In my commentary on the table figures, related published studies are also considered. The third section is mainly the result of a qualitative approach. In order to support my appeal for more advanced research into the problems of the immigrants’ social and legal status, a summary of three personal stories is included. Having been closely connected with the informants for many years, I have not only witnessed but also participated in most of the events reported in their stories. The fourth section is a picture of Slovenian xenophobia as seen from my personal perspective. As a member of the Slovenian national

1 In 2001 for example, the Slovenian Ministry of Culture participated in the treatment of 40 applications for extraordinary naturalization, which can be conferred by the Government on the basis of article 13 of the Citizenship Law (Gazvoda, 2002: 89). Some of these people constitute the so-called “immigrant cultural elite”.
majority, I can hardly apply published research results on Slovenian xenophobia without presenting my personal views and experiences as well. The last section is a postscript, adding a further argument to my appeal for more uniform standards of defining equal status.

As Marina Lukšič Hacin points out, an encounter of two cultures is always the beginning of a mutual process that brings changes to both cultures (Lukšič-Hacin, 1999: 237 ff.). Nevertheless, the blending or integration of immigrant cultures in Slovenia have not occurred as the subject of any comprehensive studies as yet, whereas research into questions such as the impact of Slovenian culture on (and general attitude of the authorities and of the national majority towards) first and second generation immigrants from the former Yugoslav republics to Slovenia, is still in an initial state. It is true though that some research has been focused on more specific topics, for example on the need of a special protection of immigrants’ rights (Komac, 2003), on the treatment of refugees, and on some particular aspects of immigrants’ lives in Slovenia. And yet I seriously doubt that a scholar, say Silva Mežnarić, who published one of the earliest studies on the subject (Mežnarić, 1986) and who is pretty well acquainted with the general orientation of research interests in Slovenia, would be much surprised to see how little has actually been done in this burning field of research during these past two decades. It is almost amazing that in the midst of the rich European tradition of multiculturalist and intercultural studies, Slovenia is still reluctant to admit that the share of its immigrants has been substantial enough to start treating its own population at large as a multicultural society whose aim should be to become a highly interconnected and flexible co-cultural society. “The perception of the Slovene nation as a multi-ethnic entity has not yet gained ground within the group of ethnic Slovenes” (Komac, 2003: 33). The majority of people in Slovenia still apprehend the word nation as a unisense word, and regard their society as a monocultural one – as if either the autochthonous or the immigrant minorities had never existed in this country, had never contributed to its culture, and had never been part of the nation which has constituted this sovereign state.

What is then the share of the immigrant population in Slovenia? According to the 1953 Slovenian census, the share of the persons who did not state Slovenian natio-

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2 In 2002, four monograph studies were published on these subjects: two on the problems of the refugees in Slovenia (Pajnik, Lesjak-Tušek, Gregorcčič, 2002; Lipovec Čeborn, 2002; cf. Dupona Horvat, Verschueren, Žagar, 2001); one on the aged immigrant population (Kobolt, 2002); and one on second generation migrants living in the capital (Dekleva and Razpotnik, 2002). The research for the latter was done on the initiative of the Institute of Criminology, Hannover, Germany, and was part of an international research project.

3 The notion of co-cultures and the idea of “co-cultural models” that I propose for further consideration are explained in my following articles that have been recently submitted for publication: “Slovene emigrant writers in Canada and Europe – the question of bilingualism”, accepted for publication in: Fritz Peter Kirsch (ed.), The Protection of Cultural and Linguistic Diversity in Canada and in Europe: Chances and Obstacles of Multiculturalism, Vienna, Centre for Canadian Studies, expected in 2004; “Globalization and the prospects of multicultural coexistence and world peace”, accepted for publication in: Journal of National Development (Meerut, India), vol 16, 2003; “Multiculturalism and globalization: a comment”, accepted for publication in: Dve domovini / Two Homelands: Migration Studies, no. 19, Spring 2004. My idea of “co-cultural models” is – in some aspects – close to the concept of interculturalism, summarized for example in Katunarić (1993).
nality, was 3.5%. In the 1991 census their share was 12.2%, and a considerable number of the rest refrained from declaring their nationality. In 2002 their share was 17%. 2.5% of the population skipped the question about their nationality, another 6.4% are those whose nationality is “unknown”, and 2% are foreign citizens or people with unknown citizenship. The largest autochthonous minorities, i.e. the Italians and the Hungarians, constitute – together with the Italian and the Hungarian immigrants – approximately 0.5% of the population (0.6% by their mother tongue, and only 0.4% by their declared nationality). Mostly due to the recent increase in their immigration rate, the share of the Romany population has risen from 0.01% in 1961 to the present 0.17%. A deduction from these figures shows that at least 14.5% of the current population in Slovenia are those immigrants who state their nationality other than Slovenian; whereas the share of either those immigrants or their descendents who state Slovenian nationality (most of the latter are children of nationally mixed couples), is unknown.

The number of the present first generation immigrants who settled in Slovenia before 2002, is 169,605 (or slightly over 8.6% of the entire population). Of these 169,605 first generation immigrants, 150,763 came from the former Yugoslav republics. The National Report on Cultural Policy in Slovenia (Čopič and Tomc, 1996: 187) refers to them as economic migrants. The joint number of the first generation immigrants and their descendents born in Slovenia, is not directly evident from the published statistics. In the quoted National Report the share of the “economic migrants” was estimated at 11% of the country’s population; judging from the 2002 census results though, the current estimation would actually exceed 14%. According to their stated nationality, the largest groups are the Serbs, the Croats, the Bošnjaki, the Muslims and the Bosnians.

The distribution of immigrants in Slovenia is mainly concentrated in urban areas, and the share of immigrants in some cities is much larger than in others. In Ljubljana for example, only in 63.4% of teenagers (at the age of 15), both parents state Slovenian nationality, which reflects their choice rather than their ethnicity; in 12.5% one of the parents declares a nationality other than Slovenian, and in 22% both of their parents identify themselves in terms of one of the Non-Slovenian options. Of those fifteen-year-old youngsters in Ljubljana who – according to their parents’ self-classification – are children of nationally mixed couples (one of the parents declares Slovenian nationality),

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4 In this context, nationality means narodnost, i.e. ethnicity, not citizenship.
6 For a historical survey of migrations within, to and from Slovenia or broader, the territory of former Yugoslavia, see for example Malačič (1989) for Slovenia from 1950; Klemenčič (2000) for the territory of former Yugoslavia 1910–2000; and Beve & Prevolnik-Rupel (2000) for Slovenia in the 1990s.
7 See as in footnote6. The opt ion of the Bošnjaki nationality was introduced in the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1994. In the 2002 Slovenian census, Muslim pertains to one’s ethnic (and not religious) affiliation. Those who identified their nationality in previous Slovenian censuses as Bosnians, were placed in the column “regionally identified”. What I like about the 2002 Slovenian census is that the choice of the registered nationalities is much sooner democratic than ethnically transparent. This makes a precise analysis of the actual ethnic structure impossible. But as I believe other aspects of intercultural relations in Slovenia are much more significant than the exact nationality statistics, this may not constitute a serious problem.
73.4% identify themselves as Slovenians, whereas the share of the self-declared Slovenians among the children of Non-Slovenian couples is 16.7% (Dekleva and Razpotnik, 2002: 99–100). This shows, to some extent, the degree of national assimilation among the second-generation immigrants living in the capital. 

As I mentioned before, the share of those (first and second generation) immigrants who declare Slovenian nationality, has not been undisputedly established – but it seems to be relatively large. Some immigrants have “adopted” Slovenian nationality on the basis of two facts: 1) after several decades of their lives spent in this country they now actually identify themselves with Slovenian nation; and 2) the 2002 census, like previous censuses, offered a free nationality choice. Many immigrants, on the other hand, state Slovenian nationality for other reasons, the most frequent of which is fear. (I will return to this in section “Social reality and legal abuse”.

**Lively Visions, Ossified Realities: Slovenian State Participation in Ethnic Cultures**

In spite of this high immigration rate, conceptualization of a more complex integration policy in Slovenia is still at its earliest stages. Global transmittance of various multiculturalist or integration concepts has had its impact on this country as well. The number of government bodies and non-government organizations which (within a wider scope of their activities) are also dealing with immigration, has risen during the past few years. The former have been mostly focused on the questions concerning the legal status of immigrants, the latter on the defense of immigrants’ equality in all spheres of public and private life. The Ministry of Education, Science and Sport has co-financed a handful of research and school projects pertaining to immigrant issues, and the Ministry of Culture has co-financed some of the immigrants’ cultural programs and projects.

Before Slovenian independence (1991), cultural activities of ethnic communities from other Yugoslav republics were co-financed from the cultural budget item designed for amateurish activities. In the seventies, the national minorities’ rights and the liabilities of the state pertaining to their implementation were defined. The Yugoslav Constitution declared the equality of nations and nationalities, which was supposed to be manifested in the use of their languages, education in their mother tongue (also for migrants from other parts of Yugoslavia), founding of their ethnic organizations, use of their national symbols, and their participation in making decisions on all aspects of public life. In the eighties, a special program for cultural contacts with Slovenians abroad was framed by a Slovenian administrative body (Kulturna skupnost Slovenije), whereas the aforementioned rights of the migrants from other parts of Yugoslavia were exercised in various ways: in the neighborhoods where their concentration was large enough, special Serbo-Croatian

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8 Of course it would be a superficial oversimplification to say that if immigrants in Slovenia declare Slovenian nationality, it means they have been assimilated. For a detailed theoretical discourse on the processes of adaptive acculturation, behavioral assimilation and marginalization of second-generation immigrants see Klinar (1989).

9 At the present moment the central administrative body competent in this sphere is an independent office which is not operating within the Ministry of the Interior. It is called the Office for Immigration and Refugees.
classes were organized in primary schools, and the immigrants’ cultural societies and clubs continued to be co-financed from the “amateurish activities” budget (Čopič and Tomc, 1996: 186–187). With Slovenian independence and the new Constitution, numerous rights of the autochthonous Italian and Hungarian minorities were guaranteed. Most of these rights had been included in the former Yugoslav legislation as well. The law also protects equal rights of the Romany population in Slovenia, and defines Slovenia’s obligations regarding its concern for Slovenian autochthonous minorities in the neighbor countries as well as for Slovenian emigrants living in other countries.

On the strength of the Citizenship Law (1991), all immigrants from other parts of the former Yugoslavia who had obtained permanent residence in Slovenia were free to apply for Slovenian citizenship. Almost 170,000 people (9% of the country’s population) submitted their applications and most of them were granted. The media though did not report on the bureaucratic difficulties these people met with. On the other hand, the National Report on Cultural Policy underlines the following fact: “The share of the economic immigrants [in relation to the entire population] is approximately 11%, but the legislation does not provide for any special protection of their rights” (Čopič and Tomc, 1996: 187).

The authors of the quoted Report claim that the cultural activities of immigrant minorities were included in public financing after 1992, and those of the Romany communities after 1993. The annual financial reports of the Ministry of Culture reveal the actual situation as regards their cultural “equality” (Table 1).

Table 1: State subsidies for cultural activities of autochthonous and immigrant ethnic minorities in Slovenia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minority</th>
<th>Share in the country's population (2002)</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Approved Projects</th>
<th>Rejected Projects (or put on a “spare list”)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italians</td>
<td>0.15%</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>44,722,125 SIT</td>
<td>40,653,677 SIT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>56,783,839 SIT</td>
<td>44,719,044 SIT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>60,094,420 SIT</td>
<td>47,934,870 SIT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarians</td>
<td>0.35%</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>41,782,240 SIT</td>
<td>NONE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>45,961,350 SIT</td>
<td>NONE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>59,181,755 SIT</td>
<td>48,672,000 SIT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romany</td>
<td>0.17%</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>10,374,354 SIT</td>
<td>9,281,650 SIT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>10,969,640 SIT</td>
<td>9,281,650 SIT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>11,952,806 SIT</td>
<td>9,745,000 SIT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants from the former Yugoslav republics</td>
<td>~14%</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>22,570,536 SIT</td>
<td>8,783,000 SIT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>11,729,800 SIT</td>
<td>5,976,000 SIT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>14,066,265 SIT</td>
<td>9,847,000 SIT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The calculations were made on the basis of annual financial reports of the Slovenian Ministry of Culture: Pregled (so)financiranja kulturnih programov in projektov v letu 1998; ... v letu 1999; ... v letu 2000 (An Overview of the (Co-)Financing of the Cultural Programs and Projects in the Year 1998; ... in the Year 1999; ... in the Year 2000), combined with the 2002 census statistics.

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10 As I wrote in the Introduction, the current estimation – judging from the 2002 census results – would actually exceed 14%.
It is evident from the Ministry of Culture annual report for 2001 (Gazvoda, 2002: 201–202) that the amount of the state subsidies granted to the immigrant societies in 2001 is identical to the financial support that those societies received in 2000. The names of the societies and the amounts of money that individual societies received in 2001 are included in the Ministry’s financial report, whereas their programs and projects, either those that passed or the rejected ones, are not mentioned. This is the reason why I did not include the incomplete figures for 2001 in Table 1. The table also lacks the data for 2002 and 2003 as no reports have been published for those years.

The Slovenian cultural budget for 2001 was 25,461,375,000 SIT (Gazvoda, 2002: 235). The sum total earmarked for cultural activities of national minorities and immigrants is 137,670,000 SIT (or 0.54 %). Although almost all of this money was assigned to the autochthonous minorities, this percentage may or may not be interpreted as adequate “special” cultural protection of these minorities, which altogether (including the Romany community) constitute 0.67% of the country’s population. On the other hand, the immigrants (~14% of the population) were granted only 8,727,000 SIT, or 0.03% of the cultural budget.

Using the figures from the annual financial reports of the Ministry of Culture for 1998–2000, combined with the census results (Table 1), a simple calculation will show the following proportions. The joint group of the immigrant minorities from the former Yugoslav republics is almost a hundred times as large as the Italian minority, forty times as large as the Hungarian one, and more than eighty times as large as the Romany minority in Slovenia. The sum total of state subsidies for cultural activities received by the Italians between 1998 and 2000 is 133,308,000 SIT, and it is 5.5 times as large as the joint sum of money received by the so-called “Yugoslav” minorities; the sum endorsed for the Hungarians is 5.7 times as large as theirs (135,942,000 SIT), and even the Romany communities were granted more money (28,309,000 SIT) than all other immigrants from former Yugoslavia together (24,606,000 SIT). This means, for example, that the amount of money per person received by the Italians in Slovenia for their cultural activities is more than 500 times as large as the amount of money per person granted to the immigrants from former Yugoslavia. The report stresses that during the last decade the Ministry has been trying to fulfil the basic conditions for a development of cultural activities within those ethnic communities that have been formed only recently (meaning probably the immigrant ones), although no extra funds have been endorsed to the cultural budget for this purpose (Gazvoda, 2002: 81).

Having read this though, the reader may get a false picture of an extreme partiality practiced by the Slovenian cultural policy. Several other circumstances that underlie the aforementioned figures at least to some extent, must be pointed out. Some of the immigrant societies have actually been founded only recently. Before Slovenian independence in 1991, the migrants from other parts of Yugoslavia did not regard themselves as “immigrants” but much sooner as people who settled in another part of their homeland, and thus felt more or less at home there as well. They hardly found it necessary to establish their own organizations and societies as their languages were in most respects equal with the Slovenian (or even dominant – the official language used e.g. in
the Yugoslav National Army was Serbo-Croatian); a great deal of their children had a chance to attend Serbo-Croatian classes, the students of the Ljubljana University were entitled to answer at their exams or to write their theses in any of the Yugoslav national languages, etc. Suddenly – without having moved to another place – they found themselves in a “foreign” country, even if in the plebiscite they voted for Slovenia’s independence and thus helped constitute this state. The status of their languages and cultures changed essentially, and this change occurred overnight. Maybe these last twelve years have not been quite enough for them to organize themselves properly according to their new status. Meanwhile, some of their (new) societies did apply for cultural funds to cover the expenses dedicated to their programs and infrastructure but a good deal of their applications were rejected. The Ministry of Culture annual reports briefly comment on this, indicating that the contents of those applications did not meet the standards specified in the Ministry’s call for applications – yet without any further details that would explain the irrelevance of those requests.

It is generally believed that we should make a very clear distinction between the rights of the autochthonous minorities in Slovenia and those of the immigrants. The present status of the Italian and the Hungarian minorities in Slovenia is a result of many decades of interstate negotiations as well as of negotiations between representatives of these minorities and the Slovenian government. The liabilities of the Slovenian state in terms of the protection of the Italian minority depended on the negotiated liabilities of Italy regarding the Slovenian minority in that country. Although most of the current liabilities of the Slovenian state, outlined in the Slovenian Constitution, were already defined in the former Yugoslav Constitution in the period of self-management and self-government (1975–1990), basic minority rights were mentioned in the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Slovenia as early as 1947, and further defined in the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia in 1963 and 1974, and as such represent the result of long-standing interstate negotiations. The reasoning based on the history of these negotiations claims that the status of the immigrant communities in Slovenia should also depend on the negotiated status of the Slovenian communities in other parts of former Yugoslavia, and that it should also result from interstate negotiations. Of course I agree that detailed and clearly specified interstate agreements on optimum reciprocal support to “each other’s” immigrants would be a most pragmatic approach to handling this problem. Furthermore, as I understand from the statements of the Slovenian National Party representatives, Slovenia has allegedly already been far more generous to the immigrants in this country than the other new states in the territory of former Yugoslavia have been to the Slovenians living there. Yet the social (and cultural) reality of a good many immigrants in Slovenia shows that the standards of measuring our generosity may be somewhat misleading.

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12 In this context I prefer to call them minorities.
13 Slovenian negotiators prefer to call them minorities.
At the AEMI Conference 2003, Christine Inglis from the University of Sydney summarized her paper titled *Australian Perspectives on Migrant Descendants*. She presented problems of school integration as regards second-generation immigrants in Australia. She used tables (most of them previously published by other authors) to give a detailed comparative analysis of schooling profiles, the degree of finished education, marks in individual subjects, drop-outs, language obstacles and specific learning difficulties related to migrant situations, by each of those ethnic groups in Australia which – in terms of school integration – stand out most from the rest. She explained to me that most of the tables were made exclusively on the basis of the 1996 Australian census. She is currently planning a research into labor market mobility and a subsequent study on transnationalism among the Chinese, the Turkish, the Philippine and the Vietnamese migrants in Australia, both primarily based on the 2001 Australian census results. I was interested in her methodology because a few months earlier, when the 2002 Slovenian census results appeared on websites, I tried to check out if a similarly detailed comparison between individual ethnic groups and the national majority in Slovenia could be made as regards their achieved qualification, participation in the current process of education, socio-economic background and the multiple effects of unemployment (including the percentage of immigrants among those who have been dismissed from employment as technological surplus during this past decade). Yet the statistics from the census databases (e.g. the demographic figures showing the nationality structure) could not be linked up with, e.g., the more detailed education-related statistics from another database that does not include the nationality aspect. The census databases turned out to be incompatible with other databases. And worse, most of the different databases from the census website could not be used to create a cross-database table either. Obviously it will take a carefully conceptualized and comprehensive sociological team research to establish the aforementioned proportions and to find explanations for them.

What about the Slovenian government’s interest in academic research into immigration and integration aspects? Social and human sciences in Slovenia are financed from the state funds managed by several different Ministries, mostly by the Ministry of Education, Science and Sport. The first inter-institutional project proposals, oriented towards questions of immigrant communities, intercultural relations and integration policy in Slovenia, were submitted towards the turn of the millennium. The fact that some of these research proposals were rejected reflects the government’s considerable indifference to these matters until 2002, when one of the major integration research projects finally passed.

Today the Institute for Slovenian Emigration Studies is conducting or participating in several research projects dealing with integration. Among other institutions

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15 Among others in The Perception of Slovenian Integration Policy (from October 2002, in co-operation with the Institute for Ethnic Studies), Migration and Intercultural Relations: Challenge for European Schools Today (Comenius project, from October 2002), Justice in Educational Systems – A Contrastive Aspect (from January 2003, in co-operation with the Faculty of Education), and Literary and Cultural Image of Immigrants in Slovenia (from July 2004). Besides, study into various aspects of integration problems is a constituent part of the Institute’s medium-term research program submitted for 2004–2008.
engaged in immigration or integration research are the University of Ljubljana or, more precisely, the Faculty of Education, Faculty of Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Faculty of Law, and Faculty of Security, along with the Institute for Ethnic Studies, the Peace Institute, and the Institute for Public Administration. The scope of the disciplines currently interested in advanced integration strategies seems to be fairly wide, and their visions for the future are very much alive; nevertheless, most of the problems concerning immigrants – from the notorious case of the “deleted residents” to more general questions of immigrants’ equality, either in view of Slovenian legislation or in view of their daily experience – have remained unresolved. This helps maintain an atmosphere of tension, irritability and fear on the part of the immigrants as well as on the part of the national majority.

Social Reality and Legal Abuse

Among the problems which have been repeatedly pointed out within the integration debate at large is the question, how to reduce the obstacles of the immigrants’ social mobility. Possible strategies of securing equal chances for migrants in terms of their education, professional development, creativeness and social as well as cultural output are being continually discussed in international academic circles dealing with migration and intercultural relations. As systematic as some of the proposed solutions may sound, they seem to give rather short-term answers. For those immigrant communities which constitute the lowest social classes in their country, this kind of solutions cannot change the fact that the immigrants’ starting points in most spheres of life essentially differ from the starting points of other social strata, and that this may have crucial consequences for them regardless of any subsequent facilities they may be granted. The integration and interculturalist discussions are relatively seldom focused on the fundamental question of the socio-economic order in individual countries and in the world, the question which seems to underlie all subsequent equality problems of immigrants as well as of the underprivileged strata of native populations – the question which also underlies most of other controversies straining the global climate of our times. The “new economy”, which in terms of the living standard has divided the countries of the world to a higher degree than any previous economic processes, needs international economic migrations as well as underdeveloped countries because it needs inexpensive labor to sustain itself (Haralambos and Holborn, 2001: 726). If the countries of the world were more equal in economic respect, they would be more equal in social and cultural respects, there would be far less economic and financial imperialism and far less international economic migrations, migrants would not constitute extreme social strata, and their nationality would not be such a controversial issue as it is now.

Of course all this is in the domain of politics, and thus I believe the researchers in social and human sciences should attain more influence in policy-making. Democratically elected politicians often support the solutions dictated by the most powerful factor in their countries (which usually is the capital) instead of representing the multiple interests of the entire country’s population. To be able to do this, they need to become much more familiar not only with various public interests but also with the social,
economic, cultural and psychological background of those interests. And this is where the social and human sciences can be of vital help.

One of the questions that tend to be generally neglected in politics is the psychology of nationality statistics. At the end of the Introduction I wrote that many immigrants in Slovenia state Slovenian nationality for fear. A great deal of immigrants who, before Slovenian independence, had lived and worked in this country for decades, met with trying obstacles and went through a regular bureaucratic agony before they could become naturalized; and the case of some 18,000 people who were simply deleted from “active” national registers, has not been ultimately resolved as yet.16 Immigrants wonder what comes next, and they would like to protect themselves from further legal maltreatment. Many uneducated people felt jeopardized when they were filling out the census forms. They were reluctant to reveal information that perhaps could be used against them, and their general fear of bureaucratic forms is certainly not completely far-fetched although the census procedure may be safe from the abuse of personal data. Throughout the nineties, the tension between the “native” Slovenians and the immigrants has reached several climaxes. In order to avoid physical attacks, some of the immigrants removed their names from their doors and mailboxes. Only if one new their inner experience of either legal or any other kind of maltreatment, one could understand their fear.

Let me therefore at least describe one example. A second-generation immigrant – I shall name him T. junior – was born in one of the largest Slovenian cities in the beginning of the 1970s. His parents were barely of age in 1969, when they moved there from Bosnia. At that time Slovenia needed manual workers, so they both managed to obtain regular jobs and permanent residence in that city right away, and they have lived there ever since. After twenty-four years of minimum wage for her working with dangerous chemicals, shift work, shock working and substituting for others, Ms T. was disabled and retired as a 100% invalid. She was never reimbursed for her health damage (she could not afford lawyers), and her invalid pension amounts to 270 euros per month. When she looks back, she wonders what happened with her life. She feels as if someone had stolen it from her and lived it instead of her. She had hardly ever seen her children, and now they are grown up, fighting for a life of their own, entirely engaged in the very same fight that she lost.

Mr T.’s experience was worse. Fifteen years after he had settled in Slovenia, he looked in the mirror and saw a young man looking old, a desperado, an alcoholic with no money to pay for the bills, living in a rented one-roomed flat together with his worn-out wife and two children with no future. As he felt he was underprivileged at work and disdained by his neighbors, he became violent at home. Eventually, seeing his sickly daughter, his delinquent son and the consequences of his rage and despair, he sobered up and tried to compensate to his family for all the damage. Surely bad timing for the next blow: now, after thirty years of minimum wage, hard work, voluntary work and an impressive history of his inventive suggestions that contributed to the efficiency of the working procedure in the metal works where he had been employed ever since he came to this country, he was dismissed as technological surplus. Yugoslav socialism

16 I am finishing this article in February 2004.
had been no picnic for him and his wife, but the Slovenian capitalism was their condemnation.

When all this was over, Mr and Ms T. were deprived of any acknowledgment they might have deserved. Furthermore, they both had to fight a long set of bureaucratic battles (it took almost two years) in order to be finally naturalized. During these past thirty-four years of their struggle for survival, they have not managed to learn properly the official language of their second homeland, they could never afford to go to the theatre, to visit museums, to attend art exhibitions, to find the time for reading and learning, to get acquainted with the cultural offer of this country. Yet when they were filling out their census forms and were asked to reveal their nationality, they both wrote “Slovenian”.

What about T. junior? As unusual as his story may sound, it is still based on everything that is usual in Slovenia. To begin with, the boy had no childhood. As his mother worked in shifts and, besides, had to take up an extra job, the responsibility of babysitting in the family was shifted on him, a scared little child himself, the day his baby sister was three months old. When he was fifteen, his father was imprisoned for just another act of violence upon his family. Father’s brutality and their bleeding faces and broken ribs were their daily routine, but this time social workers finally made a move: they took young T. away and put him in a boarding-school situated in another Slovenian city. When he finished a reduced training program, he declined a scholarship for further education in Zagreb. He was a gifted young man, but much too hurt to be able to make any use of his gifts.

His naturalization procedure though was far less turbulent than that of his parents. T. junior was turning twenty when he was sent an invitation to the plebiscite. He got his Slovenian identity card, a passport and a citizenship certificate, he received personal invitations to local and national elections, and was consigned a Slovenian military uniform. Yet the emotional bruises of his painful early boyhood were still there. He got occasional jobs, drank heavily and consumed drugs whenever there was a chance, got the sack every now and then, lost his temper more than once and made a lot of trouble. Pretty soon there was a police record bearing his name. He had been called all kinds of names ever since he remembered but the funny thing was he simply could not get used to it. He moved a lot from one dwelling to another. One day he looked for his documents and could not find them. All he had was the first Slovenian identity card that was no longer valid; he should have had it replaced a while ago.

A few weeks later he moved to another Slovenian city. There he fell in love, sobered up and decided to stay for good. He left his past behind and tried to start an entirely different kind of life. He got a temporary private job, rented a small studio and answered ads for regular employment. Finally he was invited for an interview. He had nothing to offer but his honest self and his fragmentary, though variegated work experience. No wires to pull, no recommendations, and yet he was chosen among a hundred odd candidates. It was quite obvious that these employers recognized his determination to bear his full responsibility this time, and were actually ready to give him a chance. Suddenly the world seemed a better place. He was asked to bring his documents and take up his post in two weeks.
He went to the municipal office in his native town to ask for new documents. They took his old Slovenian I.D. card, looked in the computer and told him that his document must have been falsified and that he had never existed. T. junior broke out into a laugh and grew pale. He asked what he was supposed to do now. There is nothing anyone can do about it, they said. They will have to keep his personal document in order to invalidate and destroy it. To make his position more absurd, they arrogantly advised him to apply for Bosnian citizenship (in fact, he did visit his uncle in Bosnia once or twice when he was a little boy). T. thought it was a bad joke and demanded that they should give him back his document at once, but nothing could soften them. Suddenly his I.D. card, his citizenship certificate and the legitimate Slovenian passport that he had lost, as well as his national military uniform neatly packed up under his bed, were just pitiful products of his imagination. All this was too much for one day. T. left the office, but he came back several times and got the same answer. Finally the officials refused to speak to him again.

But T. was tougher then most of the other “phantom immigrants” who were silently removed from reality and slipped into some kind of x-files. This time he did not go to a pub and drink away his problems. Instead, he went to see the most aggressive lawyer in town and asked for help, possibly free of charge. The notorious lady lawyer seemed to be familiar with the cause of his problem. As soon as she entered the town-hall, the officials called the capital and T. miraculously reappeared in the register. Obviously the central administration wanted to avoid law -suits, and it must have had a very good reason for that. T. was provided with his documents within a few days. That was the end of his nightmare that started the day he was born. He took up his new job, continued his education as his new employers decided to sponsor it, finished it with success, made new friends and found purpose in life. He was no longer a burden to society but became a source of support for those who needed it.17

T. junior’s story is a unique example of the far-reaching consequences of social and ethnic discrimination on the one hand, and of the miraculous effect of some few cases of decent human attitude on the other. Considering scarce Slovenian research results in the earlier mentioned field (cf. Kobolt, 2002: 29), it is impossible for me to estimate the percentage of immigrants in Slovenia of whom the living conditions described in T. junior’s story might be representative. As I stressed before, I hope thorough studies into the socio-economic and educational structure of individual ethnic groups in relation to Slovenian society at large will soon give some of the answers essential for further conclusions. When Alenka Kobolt brought out the results of an international research project on the immigrants’ prospects for their old age (Kobolt, 2002), I was a bit surprised to see that the common criteria for selecting the few migrants who participated in the half-structured interviews (in Slovenia nine persons were selected) included the following: age (over 50), native country (Bosnia), representation of all ethnic groups from Bosnia, both sexes (seven women and two men), whereas a representative socio-economic structure of the interviewed group was not mentioned among the criteria. The researchers simply interviewed the immigrants they happened to know

17 I wish to express gratitude to T. junior, who authorized the publication of his story.
personally or came across more or less by chance. Nevertheless, the social structure of
the interviewed persons seems to be rather representative of the immigrants in Slovenia,
but there is no way to support this statistically – at least not on the basis of any pre-
viously published studies. Qualitative analysis of half-structured interviews (in this case
focused on the immigrants’ biographies and expectations for their old age) could be
much better applied in further researches if the authors were able to specify what part
of the population those results were representative of. As some of the data singled out
from the Slovenian interviews in that monograph are used in the last chapter, in which
comparative results of the international research project are presented, they could be
misinterpreted as generalized conclusions regarding the immigrants in Slovenia.

On the other hand, if I go back to T. junior once again, the happy turnover in his
story caused by the special opportunity he was given by his new employers – partly on
account of his poor chances in the past that generated from discrimination and xen-
ophobia as well as from his father’s and his own turbulent reactions to both, naturally raises
a further question: what about those other one hundred odd applicants for that post,
who may have been just as unfortunate as he had been until then? Again, a fundamental
question of the existing socio-economic order in this country comes to the forefront.

Of course T. junior was far luckier than most other victims of ethnic cleansing
who were erased from the state computers the same way, but whose present and retro-
spective rights – at the time I am writing this – are still a matter of legal argument.
These people were divested of their legal status (mostly of their permanent residence
permission) on 26 February 1992 without any official notice or explanation. This of
course also ruined their achieved socio-economic status and impeded their further
chances in life. Those who appeared in municipal offices after that date, were seized
their personal documents. To make up for this serious legal offence, two bills have
been proposed in this matter. The legal representative of the deleted residents is unsa-
tisfied with both as they conceal the fact that these 18,000 people were deprived of
their status in an illegitimate way and against the Constitution, which has been con-
firmed by the Constitutional Court, and that this was a brutal violation of human rights.
Their future will now probably be decided (or at least consulted upon) by way of a
referendum. As the issue came to the front in a pre-election time, it has been adeptly
abused to divide the voters.

Opinion polls of course show the wide-spread Slovenian xenophobia. Only few
Slovenians see this arrogant act as an irrational self-inflicted wound in the body of our
society. The majority believe the government committed no legal offence and there
should be no reimbursements. I agree that a referendum is the most democratic form of
decision making, but it becomes questionable when a nation-dividing rhetoric gener-
ates a logic of the lynch law (cf. Dupona Horvat, Verschuuren, Žagar, 2001). Nearly two
thirds of immigrants came to Slovenia before 1980, which means that they have lived in

\[18\] Or more precisely, on the problems of the immigrants’ integration/segregation in their working, social
and cultural environments, and on their needs or expectations of specific care and security in their old age.

\[19\] For example: “In the beginning, migrants in Slovenia (the same holds true for Germany) also live in shan-
ties” (Kobolt, 2002: 179).
this country for decades. And since most of them had spent their first passive life period in their native lands and have started their active period as they came to Slovenia, it also means that they have worked here and paid their taxes for a longer period of time than almost half of the Slovenian-born population. When Slovenia was part of Yugoslavia, its economy was more productive than that of other Yugoslav republics, which was one of the reasons for its decision to proclaim independence. Meanwhile, thousands of immigrants had been helping to build up this country’s economy all of their active lifetime only to be told in the end that they had never existed.

Before and after its independence, Slovenia has had a model minority legislation for decades. But these laws pertain to our autochthonous minorities. These minorities have their representatives in the Parliament, they have their ethnic schools and press; and the financial support for their cultural activities which is annually endorsed from the state budget is more or less in proportion to the share of Slovenia’s population that these minorities represent. On the other hand, the immigrant ethnic communities in this country are much larger but none of them has got the legal status of a minority. As this is the case in most countries, it seems reasonable. On second thought I believe arguments for such stand should be reconsidered. One of the parties participating in the so-called “immigration debate” believes that immigrants are in a disadvantaged position and that they do need special legal protection parallel to that of the autochthonous minorities. Another party claims that the Constitution guarantees the equality of all citizens, and that this should suffice. The main argument against this stand is that in real life two people can hardly have the same opportunities when their living conditions have been anything but equal from the very beginning. When the guarantee is only on paper, it does not suffice.

The intensity of those public efforts that tend to remedy this situation has certainly increased lately, yet the actual reality at the present moment arouses but little optimism. The immigrants who came to Slovenia in the seventies or later, still predominantly live in lower-standard neighborhoods, they manage to obtain only lower qualification, and (due to the increasing unemployment) are lucky if they can get underpaid jobs. They mostly live second-rate lives, slightly better than those of most people in their native lands, from which they fled.

**General Attitude: Defence against Defence**

Symptoms of xenophobia, open or concealed, have been functioning as a constituent part of a vicious circle: they can be seen at the same time as a cause and a consequence of various (most frequently social and cultural) discriminations. “The actual denial of intolerance and racism is one of the basic characteristics of hate speech today – it involves the self-legitimization which denies that an action (aimed against others or those different) is intolerant, xenophobic or racist, and presents it as acting out of self-defensive necessity” (Jalušič, 2002: 70). This section, in which the most regular symptoms of Slovenian xenophobia are presented, consists mainly of my first-hand observations, which I believe contain a substantial degree of self-criticism, and focuses on the daily human attitude of the majority Slovenian nation towards the immigrant minorities.
In Slovenia, unofficially, there are still immigrant jobs, mixed jobs and the non-immigrant ones. When immigrants apply for the latter, they are often met with reserve and distrust – as if “we” wanted “them” to “stay where they belong”. The worst thing that can happen to a Slovenian in this respect is to face an immigrant colleague’s promotion sooner than his or her own – or, to see a young man from a close-by immigrant neighborhood, a boy fresh from high school, driving a new BMW – something which most people in Slovenia cannot afford. Of course the immigrants feel the same way about the “native” Slovenians, and neither the former nor the latter realize that isolated cases of rapid individual progress most often have nothing to do with one’s nationality.

As social conflicts often do, this one also continually feeds on the self-construc- ted counterposition between “us” and “them”. “They” are seen by most of “us” as hostile intruders who plan to conquer “our” country and culture. Komac points out: “But it would be utterly irresponsible if Slovenian society should treat these populations as ‘undesired newcomers’, as persons who want to steal from Slovenians (Slovenian nation) a part of their national wealth. There must be something wrong with the ‘mental health’ of the nation that possesses all the levers of authority and the entire repressive machinery and still fosters a belief that it is being menaced by some 10% of its own citizens who, after all, are in an inferior position. Is that perhaps nothing but a psychosis of those opinion-makers who are using this means in their attempt to keep their positions and privileges?” (Komac, 2003: 33).

Even for most of their defenders, the division is equally present. “We” have “our” mountains, “our” sea, “our” culture and tradition, and “our” immigrants. The latter are often treated by their defenders as inadequate beings who need to be protected from outside instead of being felt simply as we, which would make them adequate to speak for themselves. “We” have “our” immigrants. We “have” our immigrants, and we can make decisions on their behalf. They do not “have” us, as they cannot make decisions on our behalf. If we and they should both realize that “they” are just a construction de- signed to disguise the fact that it is only we who live in this country, it would become clear that what we all have in common, is our sick society and what we all need to do together, is to diagnose and heal it. But how could we even think of the possibility of doing away with this division when we are so unfamiliar with those of us that we call “they”, when we know so little about them that they scare us.

The reason why we know so little about them is the fact that we do not want to know them. If we got to know them, they might actually turn out to be nothing else but our own kind of “we”, and our power over them would be gone. Therefore we prefer not to ask about their problems, not to attend their public meetings, not to read their poems, and certainly not to live in their neighborhoods. We choose not to particularly like their clothing or hairstyle and we want to look as different from them as we can. We choose not to appreciate their habits of life. Therefore we feel uneasy when we enter a public place where their languages prevail, and we tend to be a bit more cautious when their children make friends with our children.

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20 An exception would be the concerts and stage performances presented by some highly popular guests from other parts of former Yugoslavia.
In certain countries or cities, e.g. Germany (Graf, 2001) and the traditionally multiethnic Vienna, these kinds of emotional obstructions are being eagerly dealt with – in some places to considerable effect. “In western Europe and with the Counsel of Europe we have been developing the intercultural since the 1970s in a context in which the cultural plurality essentially generated from migrations, and it was from the sphere of education that this concept has been diffused” (Rey-von Allmen, 2002: 87). The influence of daily policy on social and human sciences has turned the other way round in such cases, which has brought visible results even in some countries with lower immigration rates than Slovenia’s, whereas this country – in spite of its several experimental school programs to that effect – seems to have got stuck after a few initial steps. The immigrants are our fellow-citizens, people living in our town, working in our company, Their culture is part of our country’s heterogeneous culture – and this frightens us.21

When we are buying an apartment, we check the names on the mailboxes to see how many immigrants live in the building. When we are choosing the “right” school for our child, we check the names of other pupils to see how many immigrant children attend that school.22 We still avoid socializing with them, their children are still called names. They do not only grow up in social insecurity, but also in fear, guilt, in a considerable lack of self-confidence. They respond with delinquency and crime, and when not, they are the most convenient scapegoats. It is generally believed that most criminal acts and delinquencies in Slovenia are committed by immigrants. The results of the aforementioned international research project (Dekleva and Razpotnik, 2002) show the contrary: between 1980 and 1994, approximately one third of all criminal acts and delinquencies in Ljubljana were committed by immigrants, which exactly corresponds with the proportion of immigrants in the population of the capital.23

From 1945 to 1970 immigration rates in Slovenia were low, and the immigrants – intellectuals and officers in the Yugoslav National Army with their families represented a considerable share – constituted more or less the same social class as the majority of Slovenes. Their children, some of them my former schoolmates (in the 1960s I happened to live in a neighborhood largely populated by officers’ families), are now well-integrated members of Slovenian society and they have no reason to declare Slovenian nationality for fear. Many of them have become leading experts, successful managers, prominent medical specialists, etc. Besides (or perhaps because of) their equal social background there was another factor that added to their successful integration: before the seventies there were hardly any signs of xenophobia to be observed in the country compared to the present atmosphere. Most people nowadays may not come out in the open with their negative feelings but the immigrants can still sense the effects of the national majority’s concealed aversion any time anywhere. They feel that

22 A worst case of national segregation at school is described in: Dekleva and Razpotnik (2002: 10).
23 As I stressed before, less than two thirds of the representative sample (2,000 persons) of 15-agers from Ljubljana who participated in that research, stated that both of their parents were Slovenians (Dekleva and Razpotnik, 2002: 260).
they are welcome to do their jobs properly, but not to speak about their underprivileged position. They know that if they did speak up, they would be fired even sooner than any other laborer in a crude capitalist system.

The questions of xenophobia, the resulting discriminations and the undesired or even aggressive reactions to these seem to be closely related to the question of the socioeconomic order and stratification of a society. When an immigrant or a native minority represents a specific social stratum, the extreme lower or the extreme upper one, the majority is publicly encouraged to put the blame for their disappointments with their own social system on the nationality or religion of those social strata which stand out most from the average, which is very convenient for those who wish to avoid major changes within the country’s social and economic system (cf. Haralambos and Holborn, 2001: 726). To the readers of this article, most of this is old news. My point is that we should make it known to the public at large as well.

Every Majority is a Minority

At the international symposium organized by the Institute for Slovenian Emigration Studies that took place in Murska Sobota in 2002, Mr Jožek Horvat – Muc, a spokesman for equal rights of the Romany minority in Slovenia, concluded his discussion, half in jest, with these words: “Anyway, the moment you guys join the European Union, you will become our minority.” A general laugh followed. The fact is though that there are two million Slovenians in Europe, and that we are largely outnumbered by the Romany population. Regardless of the speaker’s jesting tone, his remark animated a vivid discussion later on at dinner. The central subject of the informal debate was the following question: Are we going to fight this kind of battles for our rights in the EU as well?

This kind of battles, of course, have been fought within the Slovenian-EU negotiations for several years now. They have occurred on a different level, but the final aim of each joining country in these negotiations is not much different from what the minorities in these very same countries are trying to achieve, and that is actual equality. It is almost embarrassing to contemplate the double standards that are mirrored in the Slovenian negotiating philosophy when this country speaks for its interests as an equal partner within the EU, pointing out the particular circumstances in Slovenia and the resulting special needs and expectations on the one hand, or when it is supposed to consider the particular circumstances and the resulting special needs of immigrant minorities in this country on the other hand. Can these standards ever become more uniform? Can a country’s negotiating experience when it appears as a “minority” generate more readiness and flexibility in its disposition toward the legal protection of the minorities living in its own territory, and toward its daily implementation?

Evidently it is quite a long way from realizing to meeting the need of adequate legal protection of ethnic equality, and even a longer way from the immigrants’ protection on paper to their equal opportunities in real life. But as thousands of personal tragedies are involved, I believe we (and not just “we”, the national majority, but we all) must do what we can to find the available shortcuts for defining and implementing adequate solutions for those of us who are underprivileged. Not the question how to do
that but the question how to do that as quickly and efficiently as possible must become our priority. Our self-absorbed academic circles must open up and start acting together with the wounded and exhausted subject of our studies. And then, as soon as the wounds have been taken care of, in order to prevent our further self-inflicted injuries, we must radically redefine our society.

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Janja Žitnik

IMIGRANTI U SLOVENIJI: ASPEKTI INTEGRACIJE

SAŽETAK

Na temelju posljednjih statističkih podataka autorica procjenjuje sadašnji udio prvog i drugog naraštaja imigranata u populaciji Slovenije. Nakon ispitivanja količine i intenziteta javnih napora u rješavanju otvorenih pitanja društvene i kulturne prilagodbe imigranata u Sloveniji, nastavlja s ispitivanjem jednakosti imigrantskih manjina u toj državi i dostatnosti postojećih programa za njihovu uspješniju integraciju u slovensko društvo. Autorica objašnjava svoje dvojbe s obzirom na opću pretpostavku da mora postojati jasna razlika između prava autohtohnih manjina i imigrantskih skupina u pogledu njihove posebne zaštite. U trećem dijelu rada autorica raspravlja o socijalno-etničkoj stratifikaciji slovenskoga društva te nastoji osvijetlititi psihološku pozadini statističkih podataka o narodnosnoj strukturi. Nakon prezentacije nekih aspekata svakodnevnog iskustva imigranata u slovenskome društvenom, kulturnom, obrazovnom i radnom okruženju te odnosa vlasti prema njima, komentira aktualnu polemiku o »izbrisanima« i njihov doživljaj oduzimanja pravnog statusa, što ilustrira iskustvom jedne od osoba na koje se to izravno odnosi. Četvrti dio, u kojem su prikazani najčešći simptomi slovenske ksenofobije, sadrži neposredna opažanja koja se odnose na svakodnevni odnos nacionalne većine prema imigrantskoj manjini. Na kraju autorica uspoređuje specifične potrebe Slovenaca kao »europejske nacionalne manjine« s potrebama imigrantske manjine u Sloveniji.

KLJUČNE RIJEČI: migracija, Slovenija, bivša Jugoslavija, kulturna integracija, uvjeti života, ksenofobija, interkulturni odnosi

Janja Žitnik

PRISELJENCI V SLOVENIJI: VIDIKI INTEGRACIJE

POVZETEK

Na osnovi zadnjih statističnih podatkov avtorica ocenjuje sedanji delež prve in druge generacije priseljencev v prebivalstvu Slovenije. Po pregledu količine in intenzitete javnih prizadevanj za reševanje odprtih vprašanj socialne in kulturne integracije priseljencev v Sloveniji izpostavi problem neenakopravnosti priseljenških manjšin v tej deželi in nezadovoljnosti obstoječih programov za njihovo uspešnejšo integracijo v slovensko družbo. Ob tem pojasnjuje svoje dvome glede splošnega prepričanja, da je treba jasno razločevati med pravicami avtohtohnih manjšin in priseljenških skupnosti, zlasti kar zadeva njihovo posebno zaščito. V tretjem razdelku obravnava socialno-etnično razslojenost slovenske družbe in poskuša osvetliteti psihološko ozadje statistik o njeni narodnostni strukturi. Ob predstavitvi nekaterih vidikov vsakodnevne izkušnje priseljencev v slovenskem socialnem, kulturnem,
izobraževalnem in delovnem okolju ter izpostavitvi odnosa oblasti do priseljencev avtorica komentira tudi aktualno polemiko o »izbrisanih«, njihovo doživetje ob odzvemu pravnega statusa pa ilustrira z zgodbo ene od prizadetih oseb. Četrti razdelek, v katerem so predstavljeni najsprošnejši znaki slovenske ksenofobije, obsega predvsem neposredna opažanja v zvezi z vsakodnevnim odnosom slovenske narodne večine do priseljenih manjšin. V zaključku avtorica išče vzporednice med specifičnimi potrebami Slovencev v smislu »evropske narodne manjšine« in specifičnimi potrebami priseljenih manjšin v Sloveniji.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: migracije, Slovenija, bivša Jugoslavija, kulturna integracija, življenjski pogoji, ksenofobija, medkulturni odnosi