OVERCOMING OR SUPPRESSING ECOFEMINISM?

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Since problems of ecofeminism are orientated not only towards contemporary times, but also towards future, this paper will examine the role of technique in an attempt of their resolving. Post-modern, lets call it fluid, understanding of the Being as plurality is given as an alternative to often criticized horizon of classical metaphysic (reduced on monistic or factual understanding of Being in a sense of something that is given, firm and/or unchangeable). Precisely that post-modern understanding is often appreciated as a solution of ecological and feminist issues. Does a unity of a man and the machine, the same unity which bare attempt has produced ecological and other problems that we are affronting, truly offer their solution or do the old conditions of domination over women and domination over nature transfer in the idea of transhuman beings? Is the world of information as the essence of a cultural (human) world a solution of a ‘problem’ of natural or is it a path to a new, repetitive, slavery? As an effort of answering this and other questions, reasoning of the idea of transhumanism (Bostrom – Sloterdijk) in a feminist discourse (Haraway) will be related to epistemological understanding of technique (Heidegger, Gehlen). This appreciation will be comprehended as the finalization of a dominant ‘stiff’ metaphysical understanding of nature (as something that can be realized).

Key words: Donna Haraway, ontology, cyborg, transhumanism, technology.

INTRODUCTION. HARAWAY AND ECOFEMINISM

At the beginning of this paper it should probably be noticed that Donna Haraway’s A Cyborg Manifesto, which will later be critically acclaimed, thematically does not fall under the area of ecofeminism in the strict sense. If we accept the thesis that by feminism we actually consider certain
“-isms”, it is important to emphasise that this work is, as the author herself states, a contribution to socialist-feminist culture and theory in a postmodernist non-naturalistic way. Nevertheless, having in mind that ecology itself is a theoretical product of ambivalent unity of human and machine, the questioning of the role of technology, especially its realisation through modern technological advances precisely appears essential in considering ecofeminist issues. Hence, this Haraway’s work, in which she analyses human-machine unification from a feminist perspective, can serve as a solid ground for a future-oriented consideration of the woman–technology–nature relationship, i.e. for a possible outline of ecofeminism of tomorrow.

Although her work does not fall under ecofeminism, as we have already stated, in her panegyric to cyborghood Haraway does not miss to define and ‘place’ ecofeminism, which will also be addressed in this introduction.

One of the premises of her work is that the majority of American socialists and feminists see the connection between mind–body, animal–machine or idealism–materialism dualisms in social practices, symbolic formulations and physical artefacts, and high-tech and scientific culture [1: 154]. They have been insisting, according to Haraway, on the domination of technology and inviting us in an imaginary organic body that should integrate our resistance. Furthermore, Haraway argues that the American radical feminists, such as Susan Griffin, Audre Lord and Adrienne Rich, have deeply influenced our political imaginations – and perhaps excessively restricted our notion of friendly body and political language. They insist on the organic by putting it in opposition to the technological. But their symbolic systems, together with similar positions of ecofeminism and feminist paganism also permeated with organicism, can be regarded only as Sandoval’s oppositional ideologies that become the late 20th century, as Haraway thinks. They will simply confuse those who are not preoccupied with machines and consciousness of the late capitalism [1: 174]. However, Haraway believes that feminists could gain significantly by explicitly using the possibilities inherent to the break of organism–machine and similar distinctions which constitute the Western selfhood. Hence her cyborg metaphors express two key assertions in the mentioned essay: 1) universal, totalizing theories are wrong and fail to give an account of the reality; 2) to take responsibility for social, scientific and technological relations means to reject antiscientific metaphysics and demonisation of technology, thus taking the professional task of reconstructing the boundaries of everyday life, in partial connection with others, in communication with all its parts [1: 181]. In accordance to this, Haraway regards biology as a convenient ‘scientific’ method and calls it “the queen of cryptography” [1: 164].

This oversimplification of ecofeminist critical appraisal of utilisation of technology, which Haraway superficially characterises as the one comprised solely of organic, religious, or at least metaphysical arguments, and which reduces ecofeminism to essentialism and spiritualism, is partial, to say the least, and therefore incorrect. The truth is much more devastating. This paper will try to show that we actually do not need any ‘organic’ or ‘saintly’ arguments in order to criticise the cyborg’s promise of a brighter future. The contradiction of its very promoters, together with not especially deep reflection of the current state of social relations, careful consideration of ontological background and presenting the mentioned are by itself sufficient for at least a concern for the future of the Other. The concern indeed hides in the possibility of its total submission which could happen if
ecofeminism does not undertake serious critique of technology, but yields itself to the idea of scientific-technological progress, under the false pretence of final liberation from all forms of domination, which we will try to elaborate in the continuation of this paper.

**CYBORG AS A TRANSHUMAN (POSTMODERN) BEING (HARAWAY – BOSTROM – SLOTERDIJK). THE THEORETICAL CONTEXT**

There are several possibilities for accomplishing the idea of overstepping the man in the biological sense. The most controversial and the prevailing ones are including the implementation of technology. It is considered that precisely with the use of technology it will be possible to overcome human biological limitations. As one of the most prominent supporters of this idea we can emphasise so called transhumanists.

“Transhumanism is a way of thinking about the future that is based on the premise that the human species in its current form does not represent the end of our development but rather a comparatively early phase. We formally define it as follows:

1) The intellectual and cultural movement that affirms the possibility and desirability of fundamentally improving the human condition through applied reason, especially by developing and making widely available technologies to eliminate aging and to greatly enhance human intellectual, physical, and psychological capacities.

2) The study of the ramifications, promises, and potential dangers of technologies that will enable us to overcome fundamental human limitations, and the related study of the ethical matters involved in developing and using such technologies.” [2: 4]

This brief introduction to the ideas of transhumanist movement was necessary in order for us to find the philosophical and/or ideological matrix under which Haraway’s idea of cyborg falls. In this sense, cyborg could be represented as a posthuman being, while Donna Haraway could be characterised as a feminist transhumanist thinker. She understands the notion of cyborg as a machine–organism hybrid, a creation of social reality and fiction. Haraway praises cyborg as a fiction which outlines our social and bodily reality and as a means of imagination which suggests some very fruitful conjunctions. According to her, cyborgs are not only our future – by the end of the 20th century we are all hybrids of machines and organism, we are all cyborgs, cyborg is our ontology, it creates politics.

Through the idea of cyborg Haraway advocates satisfaction with the confusion of boundaries, and responsibility in their creation, while imagining a world without gender, a world which perhaps lacks a beginning, but also an end [1: 150]. Cyborg thus represents a creature in the post-gender world, a supreme selfhood finally emancipated of all its dependencies, moreover, it skips the phase of original unity, of identification with nature in the Western sense – from which, as Hillary Klein argues, differences must be created and included in the drama of escalating domination over woman as well as nature.

Three ruptures in the boundary are crucial for this political-fictional analysis to be possible:
- the boundary between human and animal is broken – the strongholds of separation are turned into amusement parks, e.g. language;
- the distinction between human/animal organism and machine, natural and artificial, mind and body, self-developing and externally designed is blurred;
- the distinction between physical and non-physical is imprecise.
The cyborg is decisively loyal to partiality, irony, intimacy and perversion, nature and culture are re-conceived, they cannot mutually incorporate or adopt each other any longer. In fact, as Haraway continues, postmodern strategies such as the cyborg myth corrupt a multitude of organic wholes – the certainty of what is considered as nature; transcendent authorisation of interpretation is lost together with ontological foundations of Western epistemology [1: 151–153]. Similarly, Peter Sloterdijk considers the anti-technological hysteria, which has affected large parts of the Western world, a product of the decay of metaphysics, because it adheres to wrong divisions of being in order to counter the processes by which these same divisions have been overcome. It is the case of bivalence which refers to a poorly understood polyvalence [3: 929–941].

As a way to explicate places in this messianic deliverance from the dark slavery of human kind towards the promised land of cyborgs that lack soundness, we will compare Haraway’s eulogy to the cyborg with the populist rhetoric of transhumanist movement members. For the illustration, we will use two quotes from the works of Nick Bostrom, Director of Future of Humanity Institute at the Oxford University.

“Why I Want to be a Posthuman When I Grow Up”:
“Let us suppose that you were to develop into a being that has posthuman healthspan and posthuman cognitive and emotional capacities. At the early steps of this process, you enjoy your enhanced capacities. You cherish your improved health: you feel stronger, more energetic, and more balanced. Your skin looks younger and is more elastic... You also discover a greater clarity of mind. You can concentrate on difficult material more easily and it begins making sense to you... When you listen to music you perceive layers of structure and a kind of musical logic to which you were previously oblivious; this gives you great joy. You continue to find the gossip magazines you used to read amusing, albeit in a different way than before; but you discover that you can get more out of reading Proust and Nature. You begin to treasure almost every moment of life... You have just celebrated your 170th birthday and you feel stronger than ever. Each day is a joy.” [4: 5]

“Letter from Utopia” (it is an imaginary letter of a posthuman to human):
“Dear Human, Greetings, and may this letter find you at peace and in prosperity! Forgive my writing to you out of the blue. Though you and I have never met, we are not strangers. We are, in a certain sense, the closest of kin. I am one of your possible futures.

I hope you will become me... and further he continues:
What is Suffering in Utopia? Suffering is the salt trace left on the cheeks of those who were around before.
What is Tragedy in Utopia? There is tragedy in Snowman’s melting. Mass murders are not required.
What is Guilt in Utopia? Guilt is our knowledge that we could have created Utopia sooner.

We love life here every instant. Every second is so good that it would blow our minds had their amperage not been previously increased. My contemporaries and I bear witness, and we request your aid. Please, help us come into existence! Please, join us! Whether this tremendous possibility becomes reality depends on your actions. If your empathy can perceive at least the outlines of the vision I am describing, then your ingenuity will find a way to make it real.

Human life, at its best, is fantastic. I’m asking you to create something even greater. Life that is truly humane.
Yours sincerely,
Your Possible Future Self” [5: 1–7]
Although this perhaps already sounds as science fiction or utopia, thus being easier to reject as frivolous or to criticise its foundations from a scientific aspect, Haraway’s rhetoric is essentially the same, only and insofar it is much more dangerous, different’, where it hurts us most, while we rush, blinded by the excruciating pain, towards her salutary technological deus ex machina solution.


What does Haraway really offer us? She speaks about blurring the differences as a possibility of a more humane, ‘inclusive’ society. For instance, human babies with baboon hearts are confusing the nation, points out Haraway as an illustration in favour of her thesis. Sounds promising. Naturally, following this logic we are prone to think, if these as well as corresponding intersexual, interspecies and other combinations will exist, that any kind of exclusive society on any level will not be possible, which is exactly what feminism is fighting for in its broadest and most positive sense. Nevertheless, it is illusory to think that something like this will happen. That is, if it happens, then it will exist only as an intermediary stage, insufficient for itself to affirm the use of technology as the means to change/enhance humans. A reflective stopping at this ‘interstage’ is analogous to drawing conclusions on e.g. height of 15-year-olds in their developing phase of highest growth rate. What can be considered as a momentary union, the hybrid of everything which is the subject of Haraway’s imagination, tells us nothing on what could we expect as the final product. Of course, what the final product will be we cannot know for certain, but we can try to anticipate it in two ways: by observing the present ‘us’ and trying to answer the question of what we think technology is, so we can be aware of the outcomes of its (mis)use.

THE SECOND WEAK POINT OF HARAWAY’S IDEA OF CYBORG. WHAT KIND OF FUTURE CAN WE CREATE HAVING IN MIND OUR PRESENT STATE? WHAT DO OUR DESIRES FOR BIOLOGICAL ENHANCEMENT SAY ABOUT OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE BIOLOGICALLY ‘IMPERFECT’?

The battle between the so-called transhumanists and the so-called bioconservatives takes place at several levels. Who the transhumanists are we have already explained, and for the bioconservatives, we can briefly say that they, as the name itself states, oppose the idea of human enhancement through technology. This debate most often boils down to the issues of human dignity idea (the debate between Fukuyama and Bostrom) and the possibility of individual moral choice (Habermas’ critique). Bostrom promotes the idea of human dignity, arguing that it should expand the range of relevance by including post-human beings as well [6: 202–214]. What is disturbing for the bioconservatives is the possibility that the existence of perfect beings can contribute to the loss of certain groups’ moral status, e.g. children with special needs. These fears can actually find justification in the very fact of underlining the need for human biological enhancement/change, which not only recognises, but also emphasises biological imperfections, such as disabled people.
Following these arguments, if an average, healthy human should be enhanced, then what must someone with ‘natural’ disadvantages do? What does this tell us about our sincere understanding of the ‘different’?

Let us make our point even stronger. Having in mind that the contemporary human creates this kind of future society with the final purpose of ‘biological perfection’ (Haraway is focused only on this intermediate stage), why should we think that anyone in this ‘ideal’ world, where everyone have the possibility to be flawless, would want (by that time it will really be a matter of will, maybe not our own, but the will of our parent creators) to be an imperfect experiment (such as those which are subjected to exploitation in the current society): homosexual, woman, or even ‘worse’ – non-Caucasian woman, which is, in Haraway’s terms, already a cyborg of the real life? If we accept Fukuyama’s thesis in which he quotes Aristotle’s understanding of human as a cultural being which learns from experience and transfers its heritage in a non-biological fashion, for it is precisely the humanity’s constant efforts on its own cultural change what drives the history of mankind and causes growth and progress in complexity and refinement of human institutions over time, why should we believe that we will make progress in the issue of social exclusion through biological progress [7: 24]. Bearing in mind the need for biological improvement and, in this sense, obviously hypocritical equalisation of special needs individuals’ rights, we will probably only underline it.

THE THIRD WEAK POINT OF HARAWAY’S IDEA OF CYBORG. WHY DOES TECHNOLOGICAL IMPROVEMENT HIDE COMPLETION IN ITSELF? THE CRITIQUE OF EPISTEMOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDING OF TECHNOLOGY.

In her work Haraway only briefly reflects on the notion of technology, although if we want to talk about its possibilities and mechanical objectifications, it is perhaps necessary to provide at least a preliminary answer to this issue. Nevertheless, we could say that Haraway understands technology through its epistemological value. Thus, for example, she states that communication sciences and modern biologies are constructed in the same manner – by transforming the world into an encoding problem, with the search for a common language that vanquishes all resistance to instrumentalised control and enables dispersion, re-collection, supplying and exchange of all heterogeneity. In modern biologies the transformation of the world into an encoding problem can be illustrated by molecular genetics, ecology, sociobiological theory of evolution and immunobiology [1:164]. What does ‘epistemological’ mean? Haraway here speaks on the transformation of the world. In epistemological terms, we can say that Haraway understands technology as a means by which human translates nature to a comprehensible language. In this sense, technology has a cognitive value. For Haraway, this cognitive value is anthropological, in terms of knowledge of humans, and knowledge (of nature) for humans. The machine is not something that should be animated, worshiped, by which we should dominate, says Haraway – we are the machine, our processes, the aspect of our embodiment [1: 180].

The understanding of technology through its cognitive value can be considered in two ways: ontological (the knowledge of being) and epistemological (self-knowledge). The first path is the knowledge of being, where truth is revealed by technology. An example of this is
Heidegger’s ontological reflection of technology. Namely, Heidegger considers the instrumental and anthropological designation of technology (it is a means to an end and a human achievement) insufficient. It is correct, but it does not reveal the essence – it is not true. Through Aristotle’s teachings on the four causes, Heidegger arrives to the notion of releasement (Gelassenheit):

“Every occasion for whatever passes beyond the nonpresent and goes forward into presencing is poiesis, bringing-forth (Her-vor-bringen).”

Bringing-forth brings out something from the concealed into the unconcealed. The unconcealed is acquired through revealing, for which the Greek term is aletheia. We understand it as truth. Therefore, technology is not only a means, it is a way of revealing. Technology resides in the area of truth [8: 226].

The second – epistemological – belongs to the philosophy of Arnold Gehlen. “If by technology we refer to abilities and means by which human places nature under his service through comprehending its properties and laws, utilises them and uses against each other, then technology, in the most general sense, belongs to the human essence.” [9: 8]

“The fascination with automatism makes the pre-rational and supra-practical drive in technology, which has in the course of many millennia acted, first of all, in magic, the technology of the supra-sensory, and only in most recent times it has found its outright completion in clocks, motors and rotating machines.” [9: 18]

Gehlen calls this the phenomenon of resonance. In fact, since he is burdened with the mystery of its own existence, the human is referred to the compensation of its self-understanding with the help of a non-I, something different-than-human.

Gehlen argues that the human being in central parts of its nature is an automatism (e.g. heartbeat or breathing), hence the motivation for objectification of work originates from our nature. This motivation comes from the unconscious, unintentionally. Therefore, the nature, according to Gehlen, is the means by which the human comes out of himself and re-establishes his self-understanding from it [9: 17–18].

Therefore, in the first, Heidegger’s interpretation, the human participates with the help of technology in revealing the truth, i.e. unconiueling being, while in the second, Gehlen’s reflection, we know/translate ourselves, and the epistemological value lies in the self-revealing (or revealing of our own nature).

Now, when we have at least tried to outline the answer to the question of what technology is, it is necessary to answer where the danger of this approach to technology hides, and in what way it relates to our ecofeminist story.

Whether we deal with the human or nature, the epistemological approach, such as Haraway’s, starts from an obvious presumption. For something to be known, it must be penetrable. For it to be penetrable, it must be knowable. Knowable in the subject-object relation is always the one that is subjected, i.e. that is dominated. For something to be knowable, it must be given, i.e. fixed. What does this mean? It means that the domination of science and scientific (i.e. natural-scientific) methods lies on the assumption of knowable. Ontologically speaking, we start from the idea of a firm factual being. However, in the contemporary scientific-technological era, in which ‘the human lags behind his works’, technology also carries an inherent danger. Why? Because today technology represents the attempt to objectify possibilities, to reify freedom, without taking responsibility, but, as Heidegger states, with the challenging which regards nature as a source of energy delivery, where the man himself walks on
the edge of a cliff, where he finally has to be regarded as a standing-reserve (by standing-reserve \((\text{Bestand})\) Heidegger understands that which stands in a certain place only to be ready for deploying to another outpost \([8: 231]\)), that is, nature, and eventually the human, do not have purpose in themselves, but are educed to mere means as a part of purposes for something else. Unaware of her own objectification of nature, Haraway believes she does exactly the opposite, that she abolishes the current facticised, objectified being with the postmodern fluid concept of selfhood embodied in the idea of cyborg. However, have we thus really lost the ontology of foundations of Western epistemology, or it, on the contrary, reaches its peak?

Throughout history, perhaps precisely because of the attempt of human factisation by defining what s/he is, it always came to the exclusion of the Others, which did not belong in that moment under this privileged definition. The most obvious examples are the rights of women, non-Caucasian, generally colonised, and extended to other living beings. This is ontologically explicated as an attempt of a monist unifying understanding, as the domination of the firm factual being, the Western \textit{logos}, which is opposed by the postmodern concept of dispersed fluid identity open to interpretation.

If we consider that the justification of the postmodern interpretation, alternative to the modern exclusivity, lies precisely in the firmness and exclusivity of the historical logocentricity which has triumphed in the modern dualistic understanding, we will realise certain circularity. Namely, if something unique to all people does not exist, let us use Fukuyama’s term \textit{Factor X} \([7: 188–190]\) which he explains with the elusive term of human dignity, if there does not exist something which makes us all equal, and from which the postmodern understanding defends itself vigorously, we would not be able to regard exclusion as unacceptable at all. That is, we could not fight against it. This means that the postmodern partiality its implicit justification and/or argumentation draws from the modern idea of the unity of human nature. Haraway fails to notice this when she argues that theoretical (postmodernism) and practical (technological) fight against the unity-by-domination and unity-by-incorporation not only attacks patriarchy, colonialism, humanism, positivism, essentialism, scientism and other ‘-isms’, but ironically also all other organic or natural standpoints. \([1: 157]\)

**FINAL REMARK. THE DESTRUCTIVE BACKGROUND OF THE POSTMODERN IDEA OF NON-GENDER**

After this attempt to consider technology, we can conclude that the idea of cyborg is not a real manifestation of the postmodern fluid being, but it is the case of finalisation of the old paradigm that regards nature as knowable, where finally through the cyborg (which will tomorrow be, as are women and nature of today, the one who is dominated) we arrive to ‘god’ (i.e. the embodiment of a perfect human, or if we have an entire population in mind, the attempt to embody sameness, and not equality). Therefore we cannot help but wonder whether the existence of postmodern non-subject, i.e. dispersed selfhoods is even possible \([10: 771–780]\), or it seems to be the case of the same monist being which is only being broken into pieces through this understanding – not to confirm plurality as the field of new possibilities, but only so it can simply be completely comprehended. In the same vein, we can notice that postmodern partial subjects are perfectly
adapted for the comprehension by modern monoperspectivist specialised natural sciences. Is the implementation of comprehensibility precisely what led to partialisation of our identities, theoretically embodied in the postmodern understanding of being, by which this, as Haraway terms it, ‘non-naturalistic’ way is in fact self-subjugation of science, and not the thing which will lead after the deconstruction of monist understanding, as her discourse is trying to justify, to a more pluralist inclusive society? What this paper tries to present as an ontological concern, expressed in all these questions, can be briefly summed up into one question: is, in fact, the only surprise, that the idea of non-gender hides, the destruction of any possible genus, i.e. overall existence?
Because, what is actually a cyborg:
“People are nowhere near so fluid, being both material and opaque. Cyborgs are ether, quintessence.” [1: 153]

Although Haraway falls into contradiction – because further on in her text she denies faith in the essential unity since there is nothing in being a woman, there is nothing that unites women, so gender, class or race cannot be the grounds of belief in the essential unity – although she speaks of the destruction of ontology, the only thing she gives in return is a cyborg ontology. In fact, as we have already said, it is the case of a most ordinary ontological determinism which implies that nature, whether human or non-human, is something comprehensible, fixed and given.

Finally, we will once again open the questions outlined in the summary: does the human–machine unification, the same unification the attempt of which caused ecological and similar issues that we now have to face, really offer a solution to these issues, or, on the other hand, are the old relations of domination over women or nature simply transferred in the idea of transhuman beings? Is the world of information as the essence of cultural (human) world a solution to nature’s ‘issues’, or a path towards a new, perpetuated slavery?

To these questions we could add another, in the light of the ‘new ontological concern’, which is often neglected due to its obviousness. If ecology is taking care of the consequences of domination over nature, and recently is trying to anticipate them, feminism likewise reveals the domination over woman, who does take care of the protection from self-subjugation of human nature? Who is responsible for the consequences of human domination over its own nature? Can ecofeminism in this sense serve as a barrier against the execution of this option? Instead of the answer, an even more important question imposes itself: what happens when the privileged positioned

Other, i.e. the dominated in the dualistic understanding (we say ‘privileged’ because only out of the sensitivity of these position could have arisen a true ecofeminist critique), takes over the dominating rhetoric, as well as the logic of the former, and thus falls under it. Donna Haraway gave this subtitle to her work: An Ironic Dream of a Common Language for Women in the Integrated Circuit. Accordingly, the question could be reversed. Is the feminist glorification of cyborgs – as we have tried to show, not the third way, but a sideway where the dominated obediently takes over and implements the dominator’s ideas, thus completely subjugating himself – actually a true irony?
REFERENCES