(Re)Entering Europe: 
The Post-communist Transition of Croatian Political Culture

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Summary
In the past two decades, Croatian political institutions have been through a whirlwind of change, from wartime politics, to international isolation, to gradual democratization and, most recently, to pending European Union membership. This paper examines the trends in the development of political culture over this twenty-year period, drawing an important distinction between democratic institution building and liberalization. At the core of the paper are the following questions: to what extent can changing political culture explain institutional change (and vice versa)? Is political culture determined by, and perhaps held prisoner to, history or is it easily mutable? Drawing from the Croatian experience, in which history alone is no forecast, the paper will conclude by attempting to draw lessons for other countries seeking to democratize their political culture.

Keywords: political culture, Croatia, Southeastern Europe, Yugoslavia, democratization, political transition, post-communist politics, self-expression values

I mixed with people who lived by their pen who described history without interfering with politics, as well as with politicians who were engaged solely in creating events without any intention of describing them. It always struck me that the former would see general causes in everything while the latter, living in an entanglement of day to day facts, tended to imagine that everything was caused by minor incidents, and that the world moves thanks to small wheels similar to those that their hands are pushing. I believe that both of them are mistaken.

Alexis De Tocqueville, 
Recollections: The French Revolution of 1848

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In the 1970s and 1980s, when authoritarian governments gave way to cautious democracies in South America and Southern Europe, academics spoke of ‘movement away from authoritarianism’. Amongst them were Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, the title of whose book is representative of the hesitant tone of contemporary scholarship: *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*. While the starting point of these transitional countries was clear, the direction of their transition was marked by a sense of ambiguity.

With the collapse of communism and the Berlin Wall, politicians and academics alike were imbued with a sense of optimism about where the world was headed as it stood on the brink of the 21st century. With communism discredited and the United States the only superpower left standing, democracy seemed the only remaining credible system of government. As Fukuyama famously says, “the triumph of the West, of the Western idea, is evident first of all in the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism” (Fukuyama, 1989). Academics proclaimed the new transitional countries to be in the process of ‘democratization’, and enthusiastically debated the merits of different methods of privatization and liberalization. Grants from the West poured into the former Eastern bloc to fund civil society initiatives, advisors from top banks arrived to oversee the process of privatization, foreign aid and foreign investment surged.¹

Yet despite initial external and internal enthusiasm regarding the so-called 4th wave of democracy, many countries stalled or reversed in their supposed democratization process as authorities regained the control they had lost in the first half of the 1990s, as in Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Belarus, Turkmenistan (Way, 2005). While the European Union has extended membership to ten former Eastern bloc countries,² Romania and Bulgaria’s ongoing struggles with corruption and organized crime were cause for many to judge the membership as premature. The Color Revolutions at the turn of the 21st century gave some new enthusiasm to the democratization hopefuls, but even there significant work remains.³

¹ For more see Youngs, 2004.
² The Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia entered the EU in 2004. Cyprus and Malta also joined at the same time. Romania and Bulgaria followed 3 years later in 2007.
³ Georgia’s Rose Revolution in 2003, Ukraine’s Orange Revolution in 2004, and Kyrgyzstan’s Tulip Revolution. Some might argue to include the cases of Romania in 1996, Slovakia in 1998, and Serbia in 2000. Yet with the electoral model that characterized the Color Revolutions, the focus was foremost on defending the integrity of electoral results and did not necessarily imply a commitment to democracy in a broader sense. Although the opposition parties of Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan banded together to provide an alternative to the incumbent in each case, these alliances often proved ineffective and unsustainable when it came to policy and reforms.
experiences of these 23 post-communist nations in the past two decades have forced academics to re-confront some basic questions regarding the nature of democracy: can democratic values take root anywhere or are some cultural legacies adverse to democratic values? By what criteria does one measure democracy? The answer to this question had and has serious implications for the standards transitional nations are held to as they try to join the democracy club of NATO and the EU.

Democracy being a difficult thing to quantify, the US government chose to focus its attention on one of the few elements of democracy that can be objectively measured: the conduction of free and fair elections. Yet, while important, this disproportionate focus on elections as the defining element of democracy had something of a negative effect on the transition processes of post-communist Eastern and Southeastern Europe. Once a set of national elections had been completed, the democratic transition was assessed to be complete and international attention and funding moved elsewhere. Rather than treating democracy as a continuum within which it is possible to have varying levels of democracy, free and fair elections, as certified by such organizations as Freedom House and the Organization For Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), were seen as crossing the symbolic finish line towards democracy.

What the Western democracy advisors failed to devote adequate attention to – perhaps because of its intangible, difficult to quantify nature – was “the importance for democratic consolidation of a civic culture – Tocqueville summed it up as the ‘habits of the heart’ – without which the legitimacy and stability of democratic institutions will always remain doubtful” (Rubnik, 2007: 19). An increasing number of values-based surveys in post-communist countries and the resulting data has enabled political scientists to more effectively measure and distinguish between electoral democracy which “hinges on suffrage and considers any regime that holds competitive, free, fair, and regular elections to be a democracy” (Welzel and Inglehart, 2008: 126) and liberal democracy which is “based on mass voice in self-governance [and] therefore depends on social preconditions such as the wide distribution of participatory resources and a trusting, tolerant public that prizes free choice” (ibid.). This trend towards a more well-rounded view of democracy is based on the conception of democracy founded, not on public balloting, but on public reasoning (Sen, 2003).

In staying with this more expansive view of democracy, the aim of this paper is to examine the evolution of political culture during democratization. Based on data gathered by the World Value Surveys, Christian Welzel and Ronald Inglehart assess the following so-called self-expression values to be essential social preconditions for liberal democracy: tolerance, high levels of interpersonal trust, and participatory habits (Welzel and Inglehart, 2008: 129). These values, they conclude, are a much
better indicator of societal commitment to democracy than is the percentage of the
population who verbally endorse democracy, as they shed light on the priority given
to "freedom and autonomy as goods in and of themselves" (ibid.: 132). Therefore,
measurements of political culture presented here will focus on these three values.

It is worth noting that the three self-expression habits examined here are by no
means an all-inclusive list. Political scientists have generated a virtually limitless
list of habits of the heart thought to cultivate democratic proficiency in a citizen-
ry, ranging from ability for critical thinking, patriotism, social consciousness and
global awareness to public spiritedness. Yet in the effort to sift through the unend-
ing lists of proposed qualities characterizing a democratically component citizenry,
Robert Weissberg stresses that “the emphasis [should be] on essential traits, not
everything conceivably augmenting democracy” (Weissberg, 2001: 261), on those
consistent across time and place. Looking at data spanning 30 years, over 80 coun-
tries and nearly 90 percent of the world’s population, Welzel and Inglehart are in a
prime position to identify these essential traits. It is for this reason that I have cho-
sen to focus on the three values discussed above, while acknowledging that other
values outside the scope of this paper can positively impact the democratic compe-
tence of a citizenry.

The central questions that this paper hopes to address are as follows: 1) Get-
ting at the compatibility of non-Western cultures with democratic values, to what
extent is current political culture a product of historical political culture? More sim-
ply, how much does history matter in shaping political culture? 2) What, if any, is
the correlation between the democratization of institutions and the liberalization of
political culture? Or in other words, does electoral democracy lead to liberal demo-
cracy or do the underlying preconditions of each develop independently?

In order to make these questions more concrete, I will examine them through
the lens of developments in Croatia’s political culture from 1991 to 2011. Croatia
is an appropriate case study because it underwent an enormous amount of institu-
tional change in this 20-year time period – from ethnic war, to international isola-
tion under a nationalist leader, to standing on the brink of becoming the EU’s 28th
member – allowing us to test the correlation between the democratization of institu-
tions and the liberalization of political culture. Furthermore, like most transitional
nations, Croatia entered its independence with a political culture shaped by its past;
the endurance of the Yugoslav legacy on Croatian political culture will shed light
on the potential of countries lacking a democratic history to develop a political cul-
ture necessary to sustaining democracy, either by shedding or adapting their unique
legacies.

The paper is organized as follows. The first two sections focus on the role of
historical legacy in shaping political culture. Part 1 provides a broad overview of
the various historical legacies at work by placing Croatia in a geographical and historical context with regards to its relation to Europe and to the Balkans. Part 2 narrows in on the historical legacy of the Yugoslav era on political culture in order to achieve a better understanding of the political culture with which Croatia entered its independence in 1991. Part 3 utilizes existing values-based surveys to identify developments within Croatian political culture from 1991 to 2011. Section 4 focuses on the correlation between institutional democratization and the liberalization of political culture, contrasting levels of institutional democracy with the democratic (and nondemocratic) elements of political culture in order to assess the degree of convergence. It also examines other possible driving forces behind changes in political culture. Part 5 places the observations regarding the development of Croatian political culture during democratic transition into a broader regional and global context. Part 6 provides a conclusion.

Part 1: Placing Croatia in a Geographical and Historical Context

Both geographically and historically, Croatia has one foot in Europe and one in the Balkans. It is neither wholly a part of Western Europe, as is the case with core EU members such as France and Germany, nor is it wholly a Balkans country, such as Serbia.

Croatia’s self identification as part of the West can be traced to its membership in the Austrian empire (1527-1918). As the meeting ground for the Ottoman and Austrian Empires, Croats were supremely aware of the contrast between themselves and the great other, the Turks. Thus, it came to be that Croatia has a very different conception of itself, as well as a different set of underlying historical legacies, than its southern neighbors it would come to be united with in the 20th century. Yet despite its historical grouping with the West, the role of democracy and liberalism in Croatia, the very ideas that define the modern day conception of the West, differed notably in timing from its Western neighbors.

In 1848, while most of Europe was revolting against monarchs, empires and divine right, opting instead for democracy and liberty, Croatia actually reasserted its loyalty to the Austrian crown. The 1848 Sabor professed this loyalty (along with its hopes for a greater status for Croatia within the Empire that would go unfulfilled) saying, “let Hungary separate from the Habsburg Monarchy and consequently from these kingdoms, if it has the inclination and the strength; but Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia are independent countries, and as such they not only do not wish to loosen the existing bond with Austria, but rather declare openly and unreservedly that they desire to enter into a still closer connection with the now constitutional Empire of Austria, on the basis of complete equality of all nations” (Memories of a Ban exhibit, 2010).
The consequences of this were far reaching for Croatia, albeit in a very different manner than for the rest of Europe. For most of Europe, the year of failed revolutions was their first (albeit short-lived) experience with a modern, liberal government. Despite the resurrection of monarchy, liberals would point to 1848 as the golden period, using it as a historical precedent to call for the resurrection of the 1848 constitution and laws in their respective countries. Croatia had no such legal historical legacy to call upon. Lacking this precedent, Croatia’s political goals for the remainder of the 19th century focused on the gradual establishment of a modern government, aims of increased Croatian autonomy, territorial integrity (unification with Dalmatia and the Military Border), and promotion of Croatian culture and language. Operating under the perception that its status within Western Europe depended on its successful replication of Western institutions, Croatia largely succeeded in modernizing its legal and judicial systems during the second half of the 19th century. However, despite movements towards liberalization, the state did not democratize. To the contrary, reformers actively resisted movement towards democratization, rejecting a proposal in 1875 to extend the franchise to lower social classes and curtailing the use of jury courts (Čepulo, 2006). As a whole, experimentation with democratic principles such as individual rights and freedoms remained severely limited, perhaps out of practicality (all Croatian laws required the approval of the emperor) or perhaps out of the perception that achievement of national autonomy took priority over individual autonomy. Regardless of the cause, Croatia entered the 20th century lacking any significant historical experimentation with democracy.

The interlinkages between the processes of industrialization, urbanization and democratization are many. Rising urbanization rates are, of course, indicative of industrialization. Industrialization produces a middle class that historically play a key role in demands for democracy as their new wealth gives them a vested interest in increased representation for those outside of the traditionally privileged classes. Yet at the turn of the 20th century, the effects of the industrial revolution had not yet fully reached Croatia: in 1931, a full 76.4 percent of the population still worked in agriculture (Flere, 1991: 185). In contrast, in 1901 the urban population of England and Wales was 72%, of Germany and the Netherlands roughly 50%, and of France, Switzerland and Belgium roughly 40% (Gannet, 1901: 266). Croatia’s delayed urbanization (population growth in the capital city of Zagreb was slow until the 20th century), had additional political implications, as geographical proximity traditionally facilitates political organization.

4 Given that Croatia was still split between several administrative districts of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, figures for this period are scant.

5 The population growth of Zagreb was as follows: 1801 – 6586 people, 1850 – estimated 15,000 people, 1900 – estimated 61,000 people, 1921 – 108,674 people, 1931 – estimated 185,000
Although Western Europe only grew to be synonymous with the doctrines of democracy and liberalism in the 20th century, the grounds for that distinction were laid well before that, in the 19th and even the 18th centuries. It was then that Croatia’s divergence from the European path began, and it is for these reasons that, historically speaking, Croatia cannot be accurately classified entirely as part of Western Europe.

The year 1918 marks the date when Croatian history broke from its previous association with Europe and became linked with the Balkans, a linkage that formally continued up through its succession from Yugoslavia in 1991. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, formed in the aftermath of the First World War, included the previously independent territories of Serbia and Montenegro, as well as the formerly Austrian-Hungarian controlled territories of Dalmatia, Croatia-Slavonia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (annexed by Austria-Hungary in 1908), and Vojvodina (Milojević, 1925: 70). An estimated 40.1% of the population were Serb, while 23.3% were Croat, and 8.5% Slovene (Jovic, 2003). Surrounded by the territorial ambitions of Italy, Hungary and Bulgaria, Croats idealistically assumed their future lay in union with their fellow Southern Slavs. However, despite the enthusiastic rhetoric about a brotherhood of the Southern Slavs, no state had ever before joined these peoples under a single government.

Little thought was given to the compatibility of imperial legacies or cultures. From the 15th-18th centuries, Serbia had been a part of the Ottoman Empire before becoming an autonomous principality in 1817 and receiving formal independence in 1878. In contrast to the Austrian tradition of local government, the Serbian state was based on the “orthodox, unitary and centralistic constitutional institutions of the French administrative system” (Newman, 1970: 172). From the very beginning of their union, it was the clash of these two imperial legacies that impeded the establishment of a Southern Slav state, with Croats resenting the heavy centralization in Belgrade and the lack of Croatian autonomy. The separateness felt between the three component ethnicities was evident in the name of the state, emphasizing the three main component groups individually rather than their unity. The central challenge of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later inherited by the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) lay in reconciling the “cultural dualism” of Serbia and Croatia, with their foundations in the East and West respectively.

The historical differences predating the 20th century between Croatia and the rest of the Balkans are not confined to political institutions. Throughout Yugoslav history, the divergence of cultural traditions (in which religion plays a defining part)
proved stronger than the shared ethnic heritage. In the 1920s, the political institutions of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were largely dominated by Serbs, which, “for a Roman Catholic people on the periphery of civilized Europe, ... signified submission to an inferior, Oriental culture” (Doder, 1993: 10). In a scenario reminiscent of an immigrant who identifies more strongly with his homeland when he is outside of it, Croats actually came to identify more strongly with their European history upon entering into the Yugoslav phase of their history. Even when cultural similarities existed, as with language, the component ethnicities actively sought to distinguish their identity: in 1967, Croatian academics and cultural organizations issued the ‘Declaration Concerning the Name and Position of Croatian Standard Language’, objecting to the classification of their language as Serbo-Croatian or Croato-Serbian, and calling for the recognition of Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian and Macedonian as separate and equal languages (Goldstein, 1999: 176).

Additionally, while Croatia had been amongst the least industrialized countries of Europe, its position within the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was quite different. Despite being a primarily peasant nation, Croatia was still economically and industrially ahead of its Southern neighbors. Zagreb was “the last point of capitalistic exploitation in Europe; everything further to the east [was] Balkan, in other words, Orient” (Fisher, 1963: 277). The North/South economic divide, with Croatia and Slovenia being the wealthiest Yugoslav republics, would persist throughout the 20th century and cause much tension.

Croatia’s 20th century history is closely tied to that of its Balkans neighbors, yet its Western foundations as part of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire simultaneously mark it as unique in the Balkans. The description of Southeastern Europe as the place where “the tectonic places of imperial, religious and racial interest have ground together” (Doder, 1993: 5) is an apt one. Though Croatia today has attempted to look past its Yugoslav history and rebrand itself as a Western country, when viewed through a historical lens, Croatia is a love child of the East and West with a corresponding complexity of historical legacies.

**Part 2: Yugoslav Legacy on Political Culture**

To get a complete picture of Croatia’s political culture entering 1991, we would ideally assess the unique impact of each phase of its history. Still, since the line must be drawn somewhere, we will confine our focus to the legacy of Croatia’s Yugoslav period on its political culture, specifically on the self-expression values that form the center of our study: participatory habits, tolerance and interpersonal trust. In order to do so, we must first establish a firmer understanding of the conditions in which these values develop and to what extent Yugoslavia provided germane conditions for their development.
Welzel and Inglehart identify a strong linkage between self-expression values and economic development. Their reasoning is as follows: as one’s economic security increases, one’s priorities move away from ‘survival values’ to put greater importance on personal freedoms. Thus, they stress that self-expression values can develop under any regime with a certain level of economic development, while admitting that “economic development alone does not bring democracy. It does so only in combination with certain cultural factors. But these factors are not necessarily unique to certain European countries and the lands that they colonized” (Welzel and Inglehart, 2008: 137).

According to their thesis, we would expect that, as Croatia’s economy develops, so too would the frequency and strength of self-expression values regardless of the regime type. Thus, given the more advanced state of the Croatian (and Slovenian) economy in the 20th century as compared to the other Yugoslav republics, we would expect to see a stronger showing of self-expression values in Croatia. While the economic element will be addressed in greater detail in Part 5, the remainder of this section will be devoted to analyzing the cultural factors that Welzel and Inglehart mention. In examining these cultural factors, we are somewhat hindered by the fact that statistics for the Yugoslav era often consider the country as a whole without breaking down data by individual republic. Out of necessity, the majority of our observations about the political culture of the Yugoslav era will apply to Yugoslavia as a whole, though we will supplement this with specific references to Croatia whenever possible.

It is an oft-heard refrain that by denying citizens of political choice, communism stifled participatory habits, producing politically apathetic populations. According to the subscribers of this theory, the popular uprisings of 1989 and 1990 were a blip in the radar, after which the populations fell back into a state of political apathy. Although this may have been the case under Soviet regimes (and even there, strong arguments and examples to the contrary exist), the Yugoslav system of communism certainly defies this generalization.

Following their break from the USSR in 1948, Yugoslav socialists sought a way to distinguish their form of socialism from that of Moscow. What emerged was the concept of economic self-management, described by one author as a system of ‘economic alchemy’ (Doder, 1978: 90). Although the practical application of the system never lived up to the theory, self-management aimed to produce a highly decentralized economy, in contrast to the central planning Soviet Gosplan, that placed decision-making powers directly in the hands of the workers. In the absence of traditional Western participatory outlets, citizens could be elected to workers’ councils, local community councils, apartment/house councils, and municipal councils. Far from condemning the Yugoslav system for denying citizens of participatory
venues, Western academics Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie and Jae-On Kim praised Yugoslavia for being “in the forefront in the innovation of new modes of political activity” (Verba, Nie and Kim, 1978: 219) in their study comparing participatory behavior of seven nations, six of which were capitalist.

In theory, economic self-management “introduced elements of civil and economic responsibility” (Doder, 1978: 89) into the system, giving ordinary citizens a voice in their workplaces and local communities. Of Verba, Nie and Kim’s 2,995 survey participants, 20% had served in workers’ councils, 7% in local community councils, 6% in apartment/house councils, and 4% in municipal councils (Verba, Nie and Kim, 1978: 60). Membership to these councils implied an ongoing commitment, as opposed to the one-time job of showing up to the polls. It would also seem likely that the cooperative nature of the councils would engender interpersonal trust. Writing in 1965, after the issuance of a new federal constitution furthering economic self-management, Serbian political economist Ivan Maksimović optimistically predicted a “democratization of economic life followed by democratization of political life” (Maksimović, 1965: 16).

Yet despite Yugoslavia’s socialist rhetoric, the effects of self-management on participatory habits do not appear to have been spread equally across all sectors of society. Verba, Nie and Kim’s data, gathered 1970-1971, revealed a stark socio-economic divide in predicting participatory behavior, higher even than in the Western cases of the study. Rating participants on a socio-economic resource level (SERL) scale of low, medium and high that incorporates the level of income and education, Verba, Nie and Kim found a “strong positive relationship between SERL and party affiliation”, where only 3% in the ‘low’ SERL group were members to the League of Communists, compared to 30% of the ‘high’ SERL group (Verba, Nie and Kim, 1978: 220). The composition of the League reflects this imbalance: though the League had emerged from WWII as a grass-roots organization with a full 50% of its membership originating in the peasantry, by 1968 peasants made up only 7% of its membership (ibid.: 223). Restrictive criteria for membership to the League of Communists further limited political participation of the common Yugoslav. Although the government in Belgrade did not enforce atheism on the population as a whole, it remained a requirement for League membership. In a system where “affiliation is both a necessary and sufficient condition for high levels of regular political activity” (ibid.: 87), the correlation between socio-economic status and party affiliation is highly significant when considering the distribution of participatory habits in society (ibid.). In the categories of regular political activity, voting, functional self-management, and psychological involvement, members of the Socialist Alliance and League of Communists were consistently shown to participate at greater rates than those in the unaffiliated group. Furthermore, in nearly all cases, levels of participa-
tion within an affiliations group are correlated to SERL: of the unaffiliated, participation levels are lowest in the ‘low’ SERL group and highest in the ‘high’ SERL group. The same holds true for those belonging to the Socialist Alliance and League of Communists (ibid.). Thus, while the unique self-management structure of the Yugoslav system provided outlets for political participation, and in so doing cultivated participatory habits often considered exclusive to multiparty systems, these were conferred disproportionately upon those of higher socio-economic status.

What then of those in the low SERL group not represented in the councils? Did they develop habits outside of the government-provided outlets? The largest incident of public protest under Tito was the so-called Croatian Spring of 1971, in which economic grievances were expressed through nationalistic rhetoric. The message resonated with the public: 30,000 Croatian university students expressed their support through a strike. Though it would be easy to read Croatian Spring as evidence of latent participatory habits in the population, the events of 1971 appear to be more of an exception than a trend for the period. The fledging opposition was effectively muted for the better part of the next two decades following Belgrade’s heavy-handed response: the Croatian communist party was purged of those with nationalist tendencies, student leaders were imprisoned, and the cultural organization Matica Hrvatska was abolished (Batović, 2009: 18). Though the event shows a one-time willingness to rally behind a large popular movement, it would be an exaggeration to call a one-time event a habit.

As a whole, the impact of the Yugoslav system on participatory habits was something of a mixed legacy. The system featured a variety of unique participatory mechanisms, many of which were characterized by ongoing, habitual participation as opposed to the one-time act of voting. Yet criteria for membership to the League of Communists, as well as an inherent bias of the system towards individuals of higher economic status, cultivated participatory habits disproportionally in the wealthier, higher educated, and less culturally traditional part of society. Modernization may have produced a desire for participation amongst the lower classes, as we will discuss further in Part 4, but actual participatory opportunities and thus habits were largely confined to those of higher socio-economic status.

The Yugoslav state was unique in the communist world for its degree of intellectual freedom and global openness, providing the average Yugoslav citizen with a great deal of interaction with the non-communist world. Yugoslavs had the freedom to travel, a freedom which many took advantage of to obtain jobs in the West and send money back home, so that in 1980, $4,050 million poured into Yugoslavia in the form of remittances (Migrant Workers’ Remittances, 1984: 536). Foreign tourists – peaking at 67,665,000 tourist nights per year in 1985 (Goldstein, 1999: 191) – cycled through Croatia’s Dalmatian coast, providing locals with direct expo-
sure to the Western world. In 1964, Yugoslavia became the only communist country to sign the Fulbright agreement with the United States. Every year thereafter, 30-some Yugoslav students, professors and researchers would spend a year in the United States, while an equal number of Americans conducted academic research and taught in Yugoslavia (Peck, 1987: 10). While the media operated under some political censorship, Yugoslavia imported American books, magazines and records under the US Informational Media Guarantee Program and translated a number of foreign titles into local languages (1,666 in 1967), which indicates that “the right to read, and hence the right to know, [was] a concept accepted by Yugoslavs” (Booher, 1975: 129). All Yugoslav students studied a mandatory 4 years of foreign language (English, French, German, Italian or Russian) during grades 5-8, and most university departments required students to complete 2 years of a foreign language (the above-mentioned with the additions of Latin and Greek) (Bancroft, 1974: 104). Although value-based survey data does not exist for this era, it seems reasonable to expect that these various venues of contact with the non-Yugoslav world would have broadened the Yugoslavs’ worldview and produced a relatively tolerant society.

Indeed, the very design of the Yugoslav state was intended to supersede ethnic rivalries and to cultivate ethnic tolerance. Though the multilingual, multiethnic, multi-faith nature of Yugoslavia ultimately proved the fault lines upon which it would crack, did the increased interaction lead to an increase in tolerance and interpersonal trust? Where interaction did occur, researchers Randy Hodson, Dusko Sekulic and Garth Massey found a consequent increase in tolerance. Using data collected 1989-1990, immediately before the outbreak of war, Hodson, Sekulic and Massey found a direct correlation between levels of diversity and levels of tolerance on a republic basis. Survey participants were asked the extent to which they agreed or disagreed, on a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 questions regarding different nationalities. Bosnia – the most diverse of the republics – had the highest average tolerance score of 3.88, while the province of Kosovo – the least diverse part of Yugoslavia – had the lowest score of 1.71. The greatest limitation of this data, of course, is that it cannot be compared to levels of tolerance outside of Yugoslavia. What we can assess from this data, however, is that Croatia was one of the more tolerant republics in Yugoslavia, coming in just behind Bosnia and Vojvodina with a score of 3.63. Hodson, Sekulic and Massey further found that the majority group within a republic was less tolerant than a minority group in the republic. In other words, Croats in Croatia were less tolerant (3.60) than Serbs in Croatia (3.93) (Hodson, Sekulic and Massey, 1994).

Still, the fact remains that the interaction credited with producing tolerance was limited throughout much of Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav republics, with the exception of Bosnia, were predominately populated by the ethnic group for which
they were named. A study of internal migration based off of data from the 1961 census found that, though migration was common, migration between republics was relatively rare. In the 1961 census, 32.7% of the population within Croatia had migrated to their current location from elsewhere in Croatia. Only 5.9% of the population had migrated to their current location from outside of Croatia (Hawrylyshyn, 1977: 101). Although the author acknowledges that other factors, such as distance and cost, could discourage inter-republic migration, the data certainly calls into question the extent to which interaction produced interethnic tolerance.

The data on interethnic marriage also fails to convincingly support the thesis of increasing interethnic tolerance. Contrary to League claims that high levels of interethnic marriage were indicative of social integration, Nikolai Botev found that, from 1962 to 1989, rates of intermarriage in Yugoslavia remained between 12 and 13 percent (Botev, 1994: 469). Botev notes that not only is this figure unchanging, but also relatively low for an ethnically mixed society; in 1980, over 20% of marriages in the US were ethnically mixed, while in the late 1970s, that figure stood at over 30% in Canada (Botev, 1994: 468).

This brings us to the manner in which Yugoslavia broke apart: through violent, nationalist war characterized by incidents of ethnic cleansing. At a cursory glance, this may appear the most compelling proof for a legacy of intolerance. Around the same time that Hodson, Sekulic and Massey were measuring tolerance levels within Yugoslavia, a survey of secondary school children found that “Croatian children described their own group as proud, democratic, and peace-loving, but perceived Serbs as domineering, antagonistic toward others, aggressive, and perfidious. Serbian students saw themselves as proud, hospitable, brave and lively, but viewed Croats as perfidious, antagonistic toward others, conceited, chauvinistic, and envious” (Cohen, 1993: 258). If one evaluates Croatia’s Yugoslav history only on the basis of how it ended, intolerance seems to be, uncontestedly, the most powerful force. But even acknowledging that interaction and thus tolerance had been limited in Yugoslavia, how do we explain the outbreak of war in two of what Hodson, Sekulic and Massey found to be the most tolerant republics, Croatia and Bosnia? The three authors attempt to explain this contradiction by saying that the conditions facilitating tolerance simultaneously “create the potential for heightened intergroup competition and conflict over scarce economic and political resources (...) Bosnia enjoyed the highest level of tolerance of any Yugoslav

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6 According to the 1981 census, Croatia was 75.1% Croat, Macedonia was 67.0% Macedonian, Montenegro was 68.5% Montenegrin, Slovenia was 90.5% Slovene, and Serbia was 66.4% Serb. Bosnia was the exception with 18.4% Croat, 32.0% Serb, and 39.5% Muslim.

7 Admittedly, the percentage of intermarriages in Croatia, between 15 and 17 percent, was consistently higher than the Yugoslav average.
republic, but this increased tolerance proved insufficient to outweigh the political forces emanating from its extremely diverse social fabric” (Hodson, Sekulic and Massey, 1994: 1555). According to this explanation, intolerance was not the cause of the conflict, but rather a result. In this portrayal, tolerance is something of a fair weather value, an assessment supported by the assertion that preexisting tolerance can be undermined by a perceived threat. “In the absence of a strong threat, belief in abstract norms will constrain responses to specific instances in which citizens’ tolerance is tested. If the threat is strong enough, however, it will override these abstract beliefs” (Shamir and Sullivan, 1983: 916).

To briefly address the final self-expression value, that of interpersonal trust, we ask the question: is an intolerant society necessarily a distrusting one? In the case of Yugoslavia, many narratives exist of Croats proclaiming distrust of Serbs (as in the survey of school children recounted above), but harboring no such sentiments toward their next door neighbor who happened to be a Serb (and of Serbs speaking of Croats). This seeming paradox can be partly explained by drawing a distinction between interpersonal trust and trust of a group. The distrust of an entire ethnic group is, of course, potentially dangerous in that it can be easily manipulated and mobilized by war-mongering, nationalist politicians which existed in no small quantity at the time of Yugoslavia’s dissolution. But this type of distrust, while certainly not a desirable trait, does not hamper the development of a democratic citizenry in the same way that an absence of interpersonal trust would. While the two are certainly interrelated, it is this quality we are most interested in.

Croatia certainly did not enter its post-Yugoslav period with the robust political culture featuring widespread participatory habits and high levels of tolerance and interpersonal trust that underlie a liberal democracy. And yet, Yugoslavia had not actively obstructed the development of these values, and in some cases had actively worked to promote them. True, the distribution of participatory habits was unevenly skewed in favor of those of higher socio-economic status. But the socialist message of self-management and the limited experience of the populace with participatory outlets had at least left a legacy of active citizenship. Tolerance in Bosnia, Vojvodina and Croatia was higher than in other parts of the federation, but the outbreak of war in Croatia and Bosnia is evidence of the vulnerability of tolerance. It is upon this legacy that Croatia entered its independence in 1991.

Part 3: Developments in Croatian Political Culture 1991-2010

Were this legacy to prove difficult to overcome, we would expect to see little change in the political culture of post-Yugoslav Croatia. This would obstruct the development of liberal democracy in Croatia, restraining it to, at best, electoral democracy. On the other hand, if political culture can be easily relearned, we would expect to
see Croatia gradually exchange its Yugoslav political culture for one featuring the self-expression values that are conducive to liberal democracy. To assess the development of the self-expression values of transitional Croatia we will make use of the World Values (WVS) and European Values Surveys (EVS). Croatia was included in the 1995 wave of WVS (N=1196) and the 1999 (N=1003) and 2008 (N=1525) waves of EVS. When possible, we will supplement these with findings from surveys conducted by local organizations.

To operationalize tolerance, we will use the data collected from the series of questions regarding neighbor preferences. WVS and EVS survey participants were given a list of groups and asked which “would you not like to have as neighbors?” Admittedly, some of the provided groups (people with a criminal record, left or right wing extremists) may not reflect intolerance so much as concerns for the safety of one’s family. Here we present only the groups that would speak to degree of tolerance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>WVS 1995</th>
<th>EVS 1999</th>
<th>EVS 2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Different race</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>23.7%</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants/foreign workers</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homosexuals</td>
<td>45.5%</td>
<td>46.4%</td>
<td>48.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gypsies</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>32.6%</td>
<td>22.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As seen here, the period between 1999 and 2008 reflects a significant increase in tolerance for all listed groups with the exception of homosexuals.\(^8\) Interestingly, the data shows a decrease in tolerance between 1995 and 1999 for two of the three groups for which we have data: people of a different race and immigrants/foreign workers. Although the latter could be explained by changing economic circumstances, especially if immigrants are perceived as taking jobs from Croatian workers, it is likely that the nationalist policies and rhetoric of the Tuđman era and the

\(^8\) With 87.8% of the population declaring themselves as Catholic in the 2001 census, Croatia retains a strongly Catholic identity and the corresponding set of values on matters such as homosexuality and abortion. Homophobia remains a problem today, with 45.5% of high school students surveyed in April/May 2010 by GONG agreeing with the statement: “Homosexuality is some kind of disease.”
Homeland War actually increased intolerance in Croatian society. If that is the case, anti-liberalization changes of the 1990s to political culture have proved more enduring than the tolerance of the Yugoslav era: in 2008, Croatia had still not returned to the levels of tolerance it exhibited in 1995. It is more difficult, it would appear, to break down intolerance than to induce it.

How have tolerance levels with regard to Serbs changed in the aftermath of the Homeland War? Demographically, Croatia is more homogeneous today (89.6% Croat, 4.5% Serb according to the 2001 census) than it was during Yugoslav times, limiting the amount of tolerance-producing interaction. Data collected by Gallup Balkans Monitor provides us with some insight on the matter through its section on relations with neighbors, in which participants were asked whether Serbia was friendly, neutral or hostile to Croatia. Though the question refers to relations with the state of Serbia rather than tolerance of Serbs, tolerance is obstructed when a group is perceived as a threat. So long as a sizable portion of the Croatian population perceives Serbia as a threat, intolerance of Serbs will remain high. In 2006, over half (53.3%) of respondents categorized Serbia as hostile. That number jumped to 62.2% in 2008, but fell in 2010 to 45.4%. Although the number shows signs of decline in the most recent survey, it appears that, a full 15 years after the cessation of military hostilities, intolerance of Serbs endures. This is further supported by national reactions to the Hague’s sentencing of Croatian General Ante Gotovina in April 2011. Though public protests were nonviolent and limited in number, the media and government alike reacted in shock, interpreting Gotovina’s guilty verdict as condemnation of Operation Storm and Croatian statehood. Croatian expat and Washington Times columnist Jeffrey Kuhner wrote that the verdict was equivalent to the assertion that “all sides were guilty of atrocities; no party – or nation – was more responsible than the other. This is what Serbia has been demanding for years. It has sought to cover its genocidal culpability and national shame with moral equivalence” (Kuhner, 2011). Though Kuhner’s extremist views should hardly be attributed to the Croatian people as a whole, his words here unfortunately reflect the opinions of too many normally moderate Croats. The reaction to Gotovina’s verdict is evidence that intolerance towards Serbs resulting from the Homeland War has not yet been overcome. The relative tolerance of the Yugoslav era proved, unfortunately, insufficiently resilient, while the intolerance generated by the events of the 1990s is more slowly swept aside.

Next we will turn out attention to levels of interpersonal trust. While liberal democracy does not require trust in government (on the contrary, a certain amount of distrust is probably healthy), it does require trust in one’s fellow citizens, a sense that “we are all in this together” rather than “every man for himself”. Data speaking to levels of interpersonal trust presents a mixed picture. According to the Gallup
Balkans Monitor poll, 66.4% of respondents in 2006 stated that they trusted people in general “a lot” or “some.” This number climbed to 73.3% in 2008, and held steady at 74% in 2010. Trust for people of different ethnicities remains lower, but is also showing a general upward trend (46% in 2006, 57.7% in 2008, 53% in 2010).

Data collected by WVS and EVS, however, presents a different story. In 1995, only 22.2% agreed with the statement “Most people can be trusted”. That number held steady in 1999 at 19.8%, and in 2008 at 19%. This data certainly falls on the low end of the countries surveyed by WVS, putting Croatia in the company of fellow post-Yugoslav nations Slovenia (15.3%) and Serbia (18.1%), as well as France (18.8%). The Scandinavian countries displayed some of the highest levels of interpersonal trust (Norway, with 74.2%, was the highest), while most Western democracies had scores around 50% (US 39.3%, Germany 36.8%, Switzerland 53.9%, New Zealand 51.2%). What can be said of this data is that we are wrong to assume that self-expression values are at healthy levels within historical democracies. Though Croatia appears, comparatively, to exhibit low levels of interpersonal trust, the stark divergence between Gallup’s data and that of WVS/EVS makes it impossible to draw conclusions about the development of interpersonal trust in transitional Croatia.

Lastly, we consider changes to participatory habits in the post-Yugoslav era. Participatory habits can be divided into those that are distinctly political (such as participation in protests, etc.) and those of a less political nature, described by Putnam in his oft-cited book *Bowling Alone*, that build habits of association crucial for democracy (book clubs, church groups, sporting leagues, etcetera). As discussed in the previous section, the Yugoslav system cultivated participatory habits along socio-economic lines. Thus, the primary question for the post-Yugoslav era will be whether participatory habits – of either the political or non-political type – have spread to other sectors of society.

EVS is structured to ask participants whether they belong to a number of organizations ranging from religious organizations, professional associations, environmental groups and sports/recreation groups, amongst others. For both the 1999 and 2008 surveys, numbers for specific genres of groups remain low, without any discernible trends either upward or downward. Rather than looking at membership for specific genres of groups, however, the number of greatest interest to us is the percentage of those who explicitly state that they belong to no group. After being asked about their membership to a variety of types of groups, participants were asked whether they belong to ‘another group’, that is, one that had not been included in any of the previously mentioned categories. The surveyors did not specifically ask whether they did not belong to any groups; the information was provided voluntarily by participants. Therefore, it is likely that this number is understated, as
some may have simply stated that they did not belong to any other group without further elaboration. In 1999, 56.9% stated that they belonged to no group. In 2008, that number dropped to 34.7%. Even accounting for the fact that the numbers are likely understated, the drop of 22.2% is indicative of an upswing in non-political participatory habits between 1999 and 2008.

It must be acknowledged that a survey by the Zagreb-based NGO GONG presents something of a conflicting picture. Surveying high school aged students (the majority of survey respondents were born in 1991 and 1992, and thus educated in transitional Croatia) in April/May 2010, the survey asked, “Are you personally a member of an association of citizens, such as youth organizations, humanitarian organizations, human rights organizations, amateur sports, or singing clubs and the like?” 61.9% answered in the negative.

This data presents a somewhat bleak picture of the future of Croatian civil society, with the majority of its youth – those most likely to possess self-expression values on the basis that they were educated under an institutionally democratic system – lacking the personal stake in society that comes from participation in such organizations. Encouragingly, GONG has attempted to remedy this deficiency on a small scale by organizing short term projects for high school students that require participants to generate project proposals in teams, discuss, select and implement the best proposal. As GONG explains it, “the aim is to influence a change of the negative attitude that young people generally express towards politics, and give them an opportunity to take on responsibility for implementing and financing a certain set of measures on the local level” (GONG, 2010: 19).

With regard to distinctly political participatory actions, WVS and EVS ask respondents whether they have, might, or would never engage in the following political activities: sign a petition, join a boycott, attend lawful demonstrations, participate in an unlawful strike, and occupy a building. As we might expect, the percentage of people who reportedly participated in these actions increased in each subsequent survey, although participation levels generally remain below those of historical Western democracies.

Interestingly, approval for these actions in Croatia (measured by those expressing willingness to participate in said actions) does not seem to increase with the amount of time spent living under a democratic regime. Between 1995 and 1999, an increasing number of people reported that they might sign a petition, join a boycott or attend a lawful demonstration, as seen in Table B below. Between 1999 and 2008, however, that number dropped, re-approaching the 1995 levels. These shifts in public approval for political participatory actions likely reflect the contemporary political situation and perceived need for reform. In the late 1990s, when Croatia was suffering from international isolation, affronts to freedom of the press and speech,
and little prospect of change under President Tuđman, the public granted increased approval to whatever means necessary to bring about change. By 2008, Croatia’s internal political situation and international reputation had improved, and the average Croat felt less compelled to intervene directly in political life. Accordingly, concern shifted away from preserving the fundamental democratic rights of the citizen, which had seemed at risk during the Tuđman era, to bread and butter issues. When asked what should be Croatia’s top aims, the percentage of votes for freedom of speech as the first or second aim (of four options provided) fell by 9.8% between 1999 and 2008. In contrast, the percentage of votes placing fighting the rise of prices amongst the top two aims increased by 13.2%.

Changes in approval for the more extreme actions mentioned, an unofficial strike and the occupation of a building, are slight in the timeframe surveyed.

Table B.

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sign petition</td>
<td>40.2%</td>
<td>56.1%</td>
<td>+15.9%</td>
<td>43.2%</td>
<td>–12.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Join boycott</td>
<td>51.1%</td>
<td>56.7%</td>
<td>+5.6%</td>
<td>47.8%</td>
<td>–8.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attend lawful demonstration</td>
<td>53.7%</td>
<td>64.9%</td>
<td>+11.2%</td>
<td>54.8%</td>
<td>–10.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participate in unofficial strike</td>
<td>38.9%</td>
<td>38.5%</td>
<td>–0.4%</td>
<td>40.7%</td>
<td>+2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupy building</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
<td>+.4%</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
<td>–2.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table C.

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sign petition</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>–10.3%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>+4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Join boycott</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
<td>28.8%</td>
<td>–8.7%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>+4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attend lawful demonstration</td>
<td>34.4%</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
<td>–11.5%</td>
<td>28.5%</td>
<td>+5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participate in unofficial strike</td>
<td>49.2%</td>
<td>48.1%</td>
<td>–1.1%</td>
<td>44.3%</td>
<td>–3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupy building</td>
<td>74.2%</td>
<td>71.3%</td>
<td>–2.9%</td>
<td>71.5%</td>
<td>+0.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This data suggests that while Croats became more involved in the participatory social groups that Putnam deems as so crucial to democracy, their willingness to engage in political actions actually dropped in the first decade of the 21st century. In other words, they are engaging increasingly with society, but not with the political sphere. This could well reflect a sense of alienation from politics, supported by the divergence between the government and their constituency on the issue of EU membership, possibly the foremost issue in Croatian politics at the time of writing. Despite 37% of the population reporting in November 2009 that EU membership would be a bad thing for Croatia, and 35% replying it would be neither good nor bad (Eurobarometer, 2010), the Croatian Times reported in November 2010 that not a single member of the Croatian Parliament was anti-EU, producing a citizenry understandably skeptical that their opinions matter to their governing bodies.9

There is no doubt that the three social features we have examined – tolerance, interpersonal trust and participatory habits – are highly interconnected. Tolerance and interpersonal trust are generated from interacting with other members of one’s community, often in the context of civil society organizations. As our data showed, participation in such organizations is on the rise, but remains limited compared to Western standards. Political participation, on the other hand, experienced a temporary surge in approval at the end of the 1990s, but has since declined. Tolerance has also fluctuated in the course of Croatia’s 20 years of independence. Data about interpersonal trust is conflicting, although levels appear to be lower in Croatia than in most historical Western democracies. In short, the development of self-expression values in post-Yugoslav Croatia has been anything but linear.

Part 4: Driving Forces Behind Political Culture

What explains this non-linear development of self-expression values in transitional Croatia? Welzel and Inglehart point to economic development, specifically industrialization, as the main explanatory factor in self-expression values. To what extent do the levels of economic development explain fluctuations in self-expression values in Croatia?

As previously mentioned, Croatia underwent industrialization (and subsequent urbanization) on a later time table than Western Europe. Therefore, we would expect self-expression values to surface in Croatia later than they did in European countries that underwent industrialization at an earlier date. But can we expect the degree of industrialization to predict differences in the preponderance of self-expression values? In other words, given that Croatia and Slovenia experienced a

greater degree of industrialization than the rest of Yugoslavia, would we expect these republics to display more tolerance, interpersonal trust and participatory habits? This has already been disproven, as Slovenia was shown to be one of Yugoslavia’s more intolerant republics. Similarly, if self-expression values develop simultaneously with economic growth, will they diminish in times of economic decline? In some cases, perhaps: Hodson, Sekulic and Massey suggest that unemployment can foster intolerance, as people must compete for limited jobs. But it is unrealistic to expect that participatory habits, tolerance and interpersonal trust will increase and decrease with fluctuations of the economy. If that were the case, the world’s wealthiest nations would display the highest levels of self-expression values, a link we do not see evidence of. For the most part, a certain level of economic development is necessary to enable a society to move away from survival values and towards self-expression values. Once that tipping point has been passed, however, varying levels of economic development cannot be used to explain differences in self-expression values across time and place.

Yugoslavia certainly brought its constituent republics beyond that tipping point. Between 1948 and 1960, the Yugoslav economy enjoyed an average annual growth of GDP of 7.3%, with 10.2% in industry and 4.7% in agriculture (Maksimović, 1965: 166). The percentage of the population employed in agriculture across the country dropped from 74.9% in 1938 to 50% in 1960 (Frease, 1975: 42). Although a significant socio-economic gap between Northern and Southern Yugoslavia persisted, all republics enjoyed an increase in their standard of living (as measured by GDP per capita).

Though the Croatian economy experienced regression during the Homeland War and during the recent financial crisis (in 2009, the World Bank reported that GDP contracted by 5.8%), economic development did not regress to pre-industrial levels. If economic development cannot explain fluctuations in self-expression values, it seems that other factors are at work. Though self-expression values can develop under any regime, it is possible that a democratic regime is more conducive to their development. Here we turn out attention to the democratization of Croatian institutions, while acknowledging that the drafting of a constitution featuring model democratic institutions does not necessary indicate that the country functions as a democracy. In other words, institutions alone do not make a democracy.

Though Croatia has operated under the same constitution since 1991 (with limited amendments), the actual degree of institutional democracy present in Croatia has varied a great deal. It is not by chance that the year 2000, the turning point for Croatian democracy, institutionally speaking, coincides roughly with the death of nationalistic President Tudman. Former US ambassador to Yugoslavia Warren Zimmermann described “Tudjman [as being] obsessed by nationalism. His devotion to
Croatia is of the most narrow-minded sort, and he has never shown much understanding of or interest in democratic values” (Zimmerman, 1995: 7).

Given the executive centric government that characterized Croatia for the course of the 1990s with this man at the helm, it is little surprise that its institutions regularly fell short of democratic norms. The privatization process was far from transparent, with many factories landing in the hands of Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) supporters. The freedom of the press was restricted, as opposition newspapers and radio stations were forced to endure harassment and supervision by the state under the pretense of overseeing privatization. Judicial independence was threatened by the strong hand of the executive in appointing and removing judicial personnel (Cohen, 1997: 87). The rights of ethnic minorities, particularly the right of Serbs to return, was regularly called into question, as critics voiced concerns about post-war attempts to create an ethnically homogenous state. Writing on the eve of the 2000 parliamentary elections, Human Rights Watch assessed that:

Croatia faces an ongoing democracy deficit. Despite a vibrant civil society with very active nongovernmental organizations, improvements in security, and the re-integration of Eastern Slavonia, many problems remain (...) Universal suffrage is weakened by the denial of citizenship and hence the right to vote to tens of thousands of Croatian Serb refugees. Freedom of expression is curtailed, especially in the area of broadcast media, which remains under the tight control of the government. The right to assemble is at the discretion of local authorities, despite rulings by the Constitutional Court that it is a fundamental freedom. Most disturbing, however, has been the politicization of new appointments to the Constitutional Court, with appointments made on the basis of political affiliation rather than merit. (Human Rights Watch, 1999: 2)

Despite the democratic deficit that characterized the regime, Tuđman’s achievements are not insignificant; writing in 1996, Lenard Cohen identified Croatia’s achievements as the elimination of a one-party regime, the beginning of economic reform, international recognition of Croatian statehood, and the conduct of competitive elections (Cohen, 1997: 69). The World Bank’s Global Governance Indicators find that the second half of the decade was characterized by a notable increase in law and order and government efficiency, and a decrease in corruption. Consequently, the legacy of Tuđman as the ‘father of Croatia’ persists domestically, despite speculation from parts of the international community that, had he not died when he did, Tuđman would likely have shared quarters with notorious Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević at the Hague. As the US-based Slate magazine wrote on the eve of Tuđman’s death, “history will remember him more accurately: ‘Franjo Tudjman: Not Quite as Bad as Milosevic’” (Plotz, 1999).
The death of Tuđman in December 1999, combined with general dissatisfaction and economic concerns in particular, prompted the Croatian voters to elect a center-left coalition headed by the Social Democratic Party (SDP), marking the first transition of power in the short history of independent Croatia. Though confronted with the “monumental task of dealing with the legacy of ethno-nationalist mobilization, violent conflict, authoritarian governance and the penetration of state institutions by organized crime” (Jović, 2010: 1616), the coalition government managed to set Croatia decisively on a new path. In the realm of foreign policy, the coalition ended the international isolation that had characterized the second half of the 1990s by declaring intent to orient itself away from the Balkans and towards European integration. Reforms followed, including increased (if not total) cooperation with the ICTY, a shift from supra-presidential to parliamentary system, and decentralization. Civil society and independent media grew under the environment of freedom, but anti-Serb policies continued in many cases due to the refusal of local governments to comply with the central government’s policy. The reforms were met with approval by the international community: Croatia was rewarded with WTO membership in November 2000, and candidate status to the EU in 2003.

Again voting on bread and butter issues, the populace voted a reformed HDZ back into power in 2004. Democratic progress continued steadily under the new presidential administration and Croatia received NATO membership in 2009. Since receiving candidate status in 2003, Croatia has made steady progress towards completing the chapters required for EU membership, and is expected to achieve full membership on July 1, 2013. Under Prime Minister Jadranka Kosor (2009-2011), Croatia has made a highly public effort to crack down on the high level corruption that the EU has identified as an enduring problem, most notably with the arrest of former Prime Minister Ivo Sanader.

The maturation of Croatian institutional, or electoral, democracy over the past two decades is clearly reflected by various indexes that measure democracy on the state level. We will briefly look at two of these in order to assess the strength of democratic institutions as an explanatory factor of self-expression values: Freedom House’s Freedom in the World Survey and The World Bank’s Good Governance Indicators.

Freedom House’s well-known Freedom in the World Survey features a more limited degree of gradation, as countries are categorized as free, partially free or not free, based on the degree of political rights and civil liberties enjoyed by individuals within a country. From 1991 to 2000, Croatia was categorized as “partially free”. 2001 marked the first year that Croatia was categorized as a “free” state, a categorization it has retained every year since (through 2011). Its scores for political rights and civil liberties (in which 1 represents the most free and 7 represents the least
free) dropped accordingly at the turn of the 21st century. Although Freedom House explicitly states that it does not assess government performance (since factors such as non-state actors and armed conflict can impact the degree of freedom experience by individuals), it seems reasonable to assume that the timing of Croatia’s transition from partially free to free is indicative of an increasing commitment to political rights and civil liberties on the part of the coalition government. Had Croatia’s transition from partially free to free country occurred in 1995, when the violence associated with the Homeland War subsided, it would have been logical to attribute the shift in classification to the cessation of war rather than to institutional reforms. That the timing coincides with Croatia’s electoral ousting of HDZ from power, however, indicates that government institutions underwent the democratic reforms that had been delayed for a decade by the Tuđman regime.

The World Bank’s Good Governance Indicators provide us with detailed assessments of Croatia’s governmental institutions. Data is presented by ranking the country amongst all the countries in the world in such a way that 0 is the lowest possible ranking, and 100 is the highest. As with the data gathered by Transparency International and Freedom House, we see that the year 2000 marks a turning point for Croatia in the category of Voice and Accountability, defined as “perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and free media” (Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2010: 4). A significant upswing occurred between 1998 and 2000 (from 40.1% to 61.1%). This reinforces the findings of Freedom House that change Croatia’s categorization from partially free to free in the same period. Rankings for Voice and Accountability between 2000 and 2009 have remained consistently in the low-mid 60 percentile range.

Based on the preceding summary of developments in Croatia’s institutional democracy, we can safely speculate that this upswing is attributable to the democratizing reforms of the SDP-led coalition. To review the trends in levels of institutional democracy and self-expression values: in the second half of the 1990s, civil liberties, including freedom of speech, assembly and the press, and minority rights were restricted. In the category of self-expression values, tolerance decreased, while approval for political participatory behavior, in the form of petitions, boycotts and demonstrations, increased. In the


11 The year 2004 represents something of an anomaly at 71.6%. In the subsequent year, the ranking dropped back down to 63.9%.
post-Tudman period, the government increasingly shifted its focus from state-building to democracy building, and political rights and civil liberties increased. In the category of self-expression values, tolerance increased, but approval for political participatory behavior decreased during this period. Levels of interpersonal trust have remained low as compared to the global democratic average. From this we can conclude that the correlation between the democratization of institutions and the liberalization of political culture is minimal. In Croatia, participatory habits surged in a nationalist regime lacking democratic institutions, yet declined under more democratic institutions. Institutions alone, it appears, cannot prevent nor sustain participatory habits. Even in the case of tolerance, where a rough correlation exists, other factors, such as level of diversity and perceptions of threat, might better explain fluctuations.

The implication, then, is that it is very much possible to have an electoral democracy without a liberal democracy, though the sustainability of this arrangement is dubious. The building of democratic institutions is not a guarantee that self-expression values with follow. If they do, it will be the result of other factors, such as diversity and civil engagement. Identifying and harnessing these factors is, therefore, of the utmost importance for transitional nations.

Part 5: Implications Beyond the Region

The varying transitional paths taken by Croatia, the other countries of the former Yugoslavia and the USSR have been a learning experience not only for the countries themselves, but also for the democracy builders of the world, both government-
tal and NGO. Democracy is about the habits of the heart as much (if not more so) as it is about elections and institutions. Encouragingly, the US has recently been making an effort to broaden its definition of democracy. With the post-Mubarak Egypt only days old and protests raging in Libya and Bahrain, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said in February 2011, “we recognize there are many paths to democracy, and we recognize that true and sustainable democracy is about far more than elections” (Clinton, 2011).

Elusive though a succinct definition for political culture remains, there are few who question its value in the establishment of a liberal democracy. This paper has attempted to shed light on the development of three self-expression values that, based on the cross-country comparisons of the World Values Survey, have a direct correlation to levels of liberal democracy. In so doing, it has found that the development of these values does not necessarily correspond chronologically to the building of democratic institutions; in the case of Croatia, approval for political participation surged in the decade predating institutional reforms. Its recent decline at a time when Croatia’s degree of institutional democracy has been on the rise suggests that democratic institutions alone cannot necessarily sustain levels of political participation. Thus, while institutional reform and the conduct of free and fair elections are of fundamental importance in establishing electoral democracy, measures to bolster the public’s participatory habits, interpersonal trust and tolerance – requisite for ensuring a liberal democracy – must come separately.

The idea of building democracy where self-expression values are not preexisting admittedly removes what Welzel and Inglehart see as the impetus for democracy. The notion of developing the two simultaneously thus presents a challenge. For countries – such as Afghanistan – that have not yet reached the level of economic development that enables them to abandon survival values, the first step will come in economic development that filters down to all levels of the population. Many of the Middle Eastern nations recently swept up in the Arab Spring suffer from a resource curse and a resulting wealth gap of huge proportions: reforms should center on sharing out the nation’s oil wealth or developing job-providing industries separate of the oil industry. Countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq, although they have reached the precipice of democratization not by popular revolt but by the involvement of foreign powers, are in this sense no different.

For the countries that have passed the survival values economic threshold, the relearning of political culture will fall largely to NGO (and perhaps government) programs aimed at building the citizens’ democratic competency. Croatia’s experience shows us that relearning is possible: though the role of historical political culture cannot be dismissed in shaping modern political culture, participatory habits, tolerance and interpersonal trust are subject to various contemporary forces as evi-
dent by their fluctuation. Through educational workshops and materials, contests, international exchanges, research and publications, NGO and government programs can promote self-expression values within the transitional society and collect valuable data upon which to assess progress and shape future programs. A prime example of such an organization is GONG, the previously mentioned Zagreb-based civil society organization. Along with ensuring government transparency and accountability through election monitoring, GONG promotes civic activism through an annual award for Citizens’ Activism and Democracy Development that highlights positive examples in Croatian society. They also organize educational workshops, covering such topics as the electoral and democratic process. Since 2006, GONG has run a ‘European Class’, designed to encourage “young people to make objective conclusions on the European Union and reduce prejudices they might have as a result of having insufficient partial information on the Croatian membership in the European Union” (GONG, 2010: 18). Through 4 years of workshops for students and seminars for teachers, nearly 40,000 high school students have participated in this program.

The appropriate role for the international community in the relearning of political culture is somewhat debatable. On the one hand, the involvement of such organizations as the Open Society Institute and the National Democratic Institute are necessary for the development of NGOs in transitional societies, providing knowledge transfer, financial backing, and personnel training. Increasingly, NGOs are not the only ones assuming this role: in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US State Department, US military, and the United Nations have assumed this position in various capacities. In the long run, both international NGOs and governments tend to fall into the same trap: prematurely declaring mission accomplished and pulling funding when significant work remains, potentially to the detriment of local organizations that have developed a dependence on their foreign partners. While international organizations are instrumental in the inaugural phase, emphasis should be placed early on making NGOs as independent (both in terms of personnel and finances) as possible, gradually transitioning the foreign partner to an advisory role.

A related key take away is the importance of establishing a thorough understanding of a nation’s historical and current political culture before undertaking its liberalization. As the world contemplates what democracy in the Middle East might look like, foreign governments and those employed in international development would do well to remember that the starting point of political culture in Egypt is as different from that of Libya as political culture in post-Yugoslav Croatia was from that of post-Soviet Russia. Just as the legacy of political culture in Croatia was shaped by the unique self-management structure of Yugoslavia and the ethnic antagonism aggregated by the Homeland War, so too does each Middle Eastern
country have a set of historical legacies that have combined to produce a unique political culture. It is this political culture that must be reformed to sustain a liberal democracy, not a generic one mistakenly applied to the region as a whole. Tempting though it is to bring in regional or subject experts to devise programs that systematically reform civil society, what is truly needed are country experts – likely from within the transitional country itself – with a deep understanding of national history, particularly as it pertains to the self-expression values examined here: participatory habits, interpersonal trust and tolerance.

When we speak of political culture, we sometimes make the mistake of confining our remarks to democracies. But democracies are not the only countries to have political culture; the presence of intolerance, political apathy and interpersonal distrust shape a nation’s political culture as much as their opposites. What should give us hope though, as we contemplate the future of distinctly non-liberal political cultures, is that they can and do change, as seen in Croatia. The pace of change may be slow, uneven and even relapse at times, but as Head of the Delegation of the European Commission said at the time of Croatia’s accession, “the Croatian example shows that geography is a fact but not destiny” (Koschmieder, 2001: 149). Further research into the driving forces behind change in the self-expression values is necessary so that NGOs and policymakers, both domestic and foreign, can effectively harness these forces to deliberately cultivate participatory habits, interpersonal trust and tolerance, ultimately leading towards the emergence of a democratically component citizenry. Conveniently, recent history provides us with an abundance of historical examples to study, and values-based surveys provide us with the tools to do so.

Part 6: Conclusion

Interestingly, democracy promotion, as seen through the Western response to the Arab Spring, has come full circle. In contrast to their enthusiastic embrace of the Eastern European revolutions and optimistic predictions of coming democracy, the West, in particular the US, has shown itself as reluctant to commit resources to support the new regimes in Egypt or Tunisia, or to give more than verbal support to the revolutionaries in Bahrain, Syria and Yemen. The sense of ambiguity about where these new regimes are headed is reminiscent of the tone that characterized the response to the overthrow of authoritarianism in South America and Southern Europe. After the euphoria of the first few weeks wore off, concerns that the Arab Spring revolutions would give rise to Islamist governments have been cause for the West to proceed with caution. The influx of Western capital, businessmen and aid that characterized the first years after the fall of communism in Eastern Europe is noticeably absent.
Part of this is attributable, no doubt, to the fact that the economic situation of the world’s democracy club today is not what it was 20 years ago. Another factor is the lessons learned: although some success stories did come out of Eastern and Southeastern Europe, there have been serious disappointments as well: Russia, Georgia and Belarus, to name a few. The triumph of the Western idea that had seemed so certain in 1989 seems less of a sure thing in a world where a small group of individuals can wreak havoc on the West and people burn American flags in public squares.

Perhaps what we are witnessing is the beginning of the US retreat from an active role in democracy building. If so, that is an unfortunate turn of events for the world. The US does not seem to doubt that more democracies in the world is in its national interest; what it seems less certain of, in light of the many pseudo-democracies that emerged in Eastern Europe and pockets of anti-American sentiment around the world, is whether the activities known as democracy building can yield any fruit in this setting.

Democracy building is undoubtedly complex, and it frustratingly resists a formula. But it is not in vain. Our study of the Croatian example shows that political culture is adaptable. Though the specific factors that explain its fluctuations require further research, what is clear is that future political culture need not be predetermined by historical political culture. An intolerant, distrustful society lacking participatory habits is not condemned to remain that way. At the same time, we must not expect a political culture to spring from newly built democratic institutions. Nor should we neglect political culture, focusing exclusively on elections and institutions. Standing up new institutions and a capitalist system is only the first step; reforming the political culture is necessary to advance from an electoral to liberal democracy.

Even should the West refrain from taking an active role in democracy building in the nations affected by the Arab Spring, democracy in the region is not necessarily doomed. Those with the greatest stake in a nation’s future are, after all, the citizens of that nation. Should self-expression values – the impulse behind democracy – be present in these nations, the prospects for democracy are bright with or without the involvement of the West. Should self-expression values not be present at the time of revolution, they might yet emerge, whether by deliberate programs or by a change in national diversity, increased interaction with fellow citizens in a new atmosphere of freedom or a perceived sense of national possibility.

Upon Croatia’s entrance in the Partnership for Peace program, the Secretary General of NATO stated that “Croatia is proof that a country does not have to remain a victim of history” (Jović, 2006: 15). There was a time when the world could not have imagined a peaceful Germany that would be the economic backbone of Europe.
There was a time when the world could not have imagined a Warsaw Pact country holding the EU presidency. Now is a time when the world seriously doubts the possibility of a democratic Middle East or a democratic Afghanistan. And the world may be right. As the track record in Eastern and Southeastern Europe shows, not every effort in history is a success story. But the prospect alone is reason enough to try.

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