“Quid pro quo, Clarice”:
Wittgenstein’s Multiaspectual Notion of Clarity

Abstract
In this paper, the author elucidates J. R. Searle’s famous plea for clarity and L. Wittgenstein’s multiaspectual notion of it. The concept of clarity is introduced via Searle’s plea for clarity and the problem of it is introduced via Wittgenstein’s morphological method. An ambiguity in the concept of clarity is presented, namely the difference between clarity as a transparency and clarity as an understanding. L. Wittgenstein’s unambiguous notion of perspicuity as seeing and understanding is presented as a solution to the previous difference as the major source of ambiguity of the concept of clarity. Some exceptions from clarity are presented; particularly the paradox of complete understanding without clarity. Finally, Wittgenstein’s river image from On Certainty and explication of the image in terms of a worldview and three kinds of remarks (sentences), namely empirical, grammatical/hinge, and axes remarks which make a presentation completely understood for practical purposes.

Key words
axes sentences, clarity, empirical sentences, grammatical sentences, John R. Searle, Ludwig Wittgenstein, perception, perspicuity, practice, river image, transparency, understanding, worldview

1. I can see clearly now…

It is no grand wisdom to understand that clarity is something one achieves or conquers when one progresses from the darkness of ignorance to the light of knowledge, or when one crosses the horrifying abyss of doubt by the use of certain methods of clarification and achieves clear and distinct certainties.

1 I am indebted to two anonymous reviewers for pointing out many mistakes that I corrected, and misleading and obscure places that I tried to make clearer as consistently as possible given the topic of the paper.

2 For the title of the paper I used famous line of Hannibal Lector (played by Anthony Hopkins) in dialog with agent Clarice Sterling in the blockbuster movie The Silence of the Lambs. Ouid pro quo here means that what one gains in terms of clarity, one loses in terms of precision, style, elegance, etc.

regarding the matter in question. The idea is still there in the contemporary philosophy, namely, J. R. Searle is famous for his following saying “If you can’t say it clearly, you don’t understand it yourself.” On one hand, it is obvious that one can say something clearly without understanding it at all (obvious candidates are repeating or lucky guess). However, this is not the point, rather the issue that saying anything clearly is a matter of specific training and technique, while understanding it is a matter of insight and art. Besides that, clarity as a process is a matter of degree. These points are important for understanding Wittgenstein’s notion of clarity which will be explicated later on as a solution to some problems in Searle’s concept of it, since he obviously struggles to meet the standard of clarity but that of style as well.

Now, concerning Searle’s saying, what one can be suspicious of is that it is not so simple, namely if Searle is saying – if you cannot say it plainly, you are stupid, then it is not as clear as he tends to present it. It is not just about a plea for clarity or about the hazard of being unable to understand, the first being justified in itself, and the second being a real menace, but about certain lack of context of practice of clarification, and of reflexivity concerning the very concept of clarity. In order to fill up this scarcity and to supply some context one needs at least to explicate clearly the very concept of clarity. It is naïve to suppose that the word ‘clear’ by being that word is ipso facto clearer than other words, say ‘duck’, ‘rabbit’, ‘bicycle’, or ‘bull’. Now, this seems to beg the question since any concept used in explication of the concept of clarity should be clearer then the concept of clarity itself.

The concept of clarity is the topic of this paper, particularly two somewhat indistinct, somewhat unclear and unsuccessful concepts of clarity; one connected with the concept and activity of seeing, and the other related to the concept and activity of understanding and this point raises another type of objection. The second one seems to be a metaphor since only what one sees can be seen clearly or not stricto sensu, while what one says or understands is clear or not only metaphorically, but not literally. “Seeing clearly” means for instance “seeing sharp enough for some further goal”, like identifying a thing, differing it from its blunt surroundings, etc. Understanding is a metaphor of seeing in terms of one understanding clearly with one’s mind’s eye as one is seeing clearly with one’s physical eyes. The motive for an investigation of these two concepts of clarity comes naturally from the fact that the concept of clarity itself is not clear or at least not sufficiently unambiguous, and this vagueness arises mainly from the mentioned dichotomy. Nevertheless, being so divergent, the concept of clarity still serves as an undisputed champion of philosophical inquiries and methods (no matter if clarity is not enough). The first part of the motive can be explicated a la Lakatos, that is to say four words in the expression “completely clear and distinct concepts” are neither clear nor distinct. The second part of the motive can be explicated a la Feyerabend that is to say if there are many methods and if they are incommensurable on all grounds, then there is no method at all.
Excise 1: On morphological “practices” and grammatical “outcomes”

Therefore, the first part of the investigation of mentioned divergence should include descriptions of language-games which include many uses of the word clarity or its synonyms, antonyms, and various phrases; while the second part obviously should contain descriptions of various forms of life and their practices that have characteristics of the procedure of clarification. Given that humans are symbolic animals or cultured humans in terms of cultural anthropology, investigating human languages (LGs) in the context of human actions and practices as parts of their forms of life (FOLs) sounds like a right method. Observing richness of vocabulary, its use, and numerous more or less similar examples from daily life provides understanding of culture (FOL) and the place of an investigated phenomenon within it (as shown in Table 1). On the other hand, it prevents one in attempts of simple reduction or unification of a phenomenon or some of its aspects (say language aspect, action aspect, etc.) and clarity is no exception.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SYNONYMS</th>
<th>ANTONYMS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>directness (of a character)</td>
<td>ambiguity (of a meaning)</td>
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<tr>
<td>clearness (of an argument)</td>
<td>vagueness (of a source)</td>
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<tr>
<td>transparency (of a plan)</td>
<td>openness (of a drawing)</td>
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<tr>
<td>comprehensibility (of a summary)</td>
<td>inexactness (of a better)</td>
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<tr>
<td>distinctness (of a photograph)</td>
<td>obscurity (of a shape)</td>
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<tr>
<td>sharpness (of a knife)</td>
<td>blurriness (of an edge)</td>
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<td>(other synonyms: obvious, apparent, visible, plain, evident, manifest, bright, lucid, vivid)</td>
<td>(other antonyms: murky, thick, turbid, faint, dubious, entangled, confused)</td>
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Table 1. Clarity: synonyms and antonyms

2. Two types of clarity

In terms of mentioned divergence within the concept of clarity it can be said that the most common factual use of the word ‘clarity’ one can find is in visual jargon and closely connected with the concept of seeing; it surely has to do with exactness, strictness, sharpness, precision, or accuracy of borders for instance. However, there is another common notion of clarity too for which a kind of comprehensiveness is pivotal, a notion which is in philosophy present in Wittgenstein’s ideas of clusters concerning names, and family resemblances and use regarding meaning. Say that one is presented with two pictures of the same sailing boat viewed from two distances, (a), and (b) as shown in Figure 1).

Indeed, the word *method* comes from Greek *meta-hodos* which in fact means to cross over (perhaps the river Styx). Additionally, and quite later in R. Descartes’ philosophy *clear* and *distinct ideas / perceptions* are paradigms of knowledge with their motive in algebra and geometry that is to say completely different from the clarity in Greek sense, and in philosophies of say F. Bacon, M. de Montaigne, F. Suarez, or B. Pascal and which by itself raises interesting historical issues. See for instance the beginning of the Third Meditation, in: Descartes R. (1997) *Key Philosophical Writings*, Ware: Wordsworth, pp. 147–162; see also Cottingham J. (2005) *The Cambridge Companion to Descartes*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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If the same sailing boat is observed from the greater distance (a) its edges can appear quite blur and precisely because of that it is not easy to point to the place where it stops and its surroundings starts, while if it is observed from the lesser distance (b) its edges can appear quite sharp and it is therefore quite easy to differentiate it from its surroundings. On the other hand, looking at a phenomenon from too small distance results with seeing smudgy things and seeing only details/parts of phenomena (one can of course achieve sharpness say by using magnifier), while looking at a phenomenon from greater distance results with seeing sharp edges and the whole thing observed. In fact, if an observed phenomenon is not sharp (sharpness as acuity), it could be blurred because it is observed from too close so one sees only blurred details, but also because it is observed from too far so one sees only blurred shapes (in terms of known ocular and optical fact). This concept of clarity is dichotomous; one cannot have clarity and indistinctness, details and the whole in the same time and by being such concept it is quite close to these of transparency and perspicuity.

The opposite case is interesting as well. Namely, one can clearly see the whole thing, but its details (its functioning for instance) can be unclear. Say that one is looking through the periscope but that it is unclear to one how it works (as shown in Figure 2, a).

However, if it is explicated how a periscope works, namely by using mirrors, then one understands and it is clear how it works (as show in Figure 2, b). Otherwise, say that one is looking at the part of some phenomenon and does not understand what it is. Then, one needs to move away from it or to move
closer to it in order to see it clearly. This concept of clarity is closely related to concepts of understanding and comprehending. These two concepts of clarity are metaphorically opposite; namely, in order to achieve clarity as seeing clearly (sharply) in most cases one needs to move closer to the investigated phenomenon, while in order to achieve clarity as understanding clearly one needs to move away from it.

3. Wittgenstein's concept of clarity as half-seeing and half-understanding

It seems that this particular ambivalence of the concept of clarity and of the activity of clarification was noticed and of some interest for Wittgenstein. Namely, in CV 9 he claims that “for me clarity, transparency is an end in itself”. In PI 71 Wittgenstein asks the following series of motivating questions: “Is an indistinct photograph a picture of a person at all? Is it even always an advantage to replace an indistinct picture by a sharp one? Isn’t the indistinct one often exactly what we need?” The questions Wittgenstein (or an interlocutor) asks seem to be beside the point since surely the obvious answer to the first question is – yes, to the second is – no, and to the third is – it depends. Regarding the vocabulary it could be said that Wittgenstein uses two concepts of perspicuity, namely perspicuity as transparency, mono/multi-aspectuality (seeing), and perspicuity as conceptual (grammatical) clarity (understanding). So far Wittgenstein stays within the limits of our preliminary differentiation of the concept of clarity. However, one can claim, and not without textual evidence, that there is only one basic concept of clarity in Wittgenstein’s philosophy, specifically the concept of half-seeing/half-interpreting two-aspectual phenomena (like double cross, Muller-Lyer arrows, or duck-rabbit head). Such concept of clarity encompasses perception and understanding both, that is to say, observation and conceptualisation (there is no conception without perception, and there is no perception without conception). In addition such concept has its extreme logical possibilities in terms of pure perception of mono-aspectual phenomena, and an interpretation of multi-aspectual phenomena (in radical cases besides interpretation imagination is included too, as shown in Table 2).

Table 2. Unified multiaspectual concept of clarity

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4. Understanding without clarity

Leaving these issues aside for the moment, the last of previously mentioned three answers (the third one) is quite attractive since it captures the mentioned ambivalence of the concept of clarity by the use of the word indistinctness. The concepts of distinctness and indistinctness with their synonyms and antonyms capture the duality and unity between seeing and understanding since they could be applied equally satisfactory to both spheres of clarity. However, it seems that there is a paradox here, since there are situations in which one needs indistinctness in order to achieve distinctness at least in cases of visual phenomena and vice versa in cases of understanding, since humans sometime need to squint, narrow their eyes, in order to see more precisely. These are the following: sometimes it is needed to squint in order to find some detail on a phenomenon, in other words, to look away from the whole of a phenomenon (as for example on two almost the same drawings with say ten differences which should be detected, as it is the case with drawings which could be found in crossword puzzle magazines), and sometimes it is needed to squint in order to see a global pattern of a phenomenon, or in another words, to look away from overcrowdedness by details in order to see a pattern of phenomenon (say that one is looking at a painting by Arcimboldo, and one needs to look away from particular pieces of fruit in order to see a face pattern).

It is similar with understanding. To be precise, what is squinting in perception is applying morphological method in understanding. Sometimes one needs to compare various parts of a phenomenon in order to see some particular differences and similarities, analogies and disanalogies; sometimes one needs to look away from particular differences and similarities, to look away from particular analogies and disanalogies in order to see the global pattern of a phenomenon (linguistic or otherwise). Finally, there is the mentioned paradox: one needs to squint in order to see clearly (a detail or a global pattern); one needs to look away from particular knots in the web of many similarities and dissimilarities in order to understand a pattern. In short, sometimes more blurred means more clear and more sharp means more unclear (understanding), and vice versa (seeing). Now, precisely in this sense an indistinct photograph is sometimes exactly what humans need. Nevertheless, Wittgenstein states that it is often exactly what humans need. If this is so, then what can be clearly said on this matter is only that humans have and use certain completely unclear concept of clarity and very rarely humans need to make it clear, or in other words, in most cases to make it more clear is something that they do not need and by making it more clear they are making it more unclear in fact, at least for various practical purposes. In another words, what is supposed to be “fairly unclear” in absolute terms is for many practical matters almost “completely clear” and precisely this concept of clarity is implicit in our daily actions and routines and by being implicit in them it is also non-reflexive, sometimes even inexplicable, but intuitively completely understood by full-grown healthy humans. Now, to be honest, there are situations in lives of humans in which there is an extreme need for clear explication of a practice due to some further reasons such as upbringing younlings, change in a standard practice, a clash of cultures, and similar. In such situations a reflexive concept of clarity is needed, but is it possible?

Now let us comment on quotations from the beginning of the paper in the light of what was just said regarding clarity. Concerning Searle’s saying that “If you can’t say it clearly, you don’t understand it yourself.” some things should be mentioned.\(^8\) What it really says is that if anything is said unclear,
then whoever said it does not understand it. This saying seems to be correct no matter if it is somewhat unclear plea for clarity. Much more clear version of it one can find as fourth category of P. Grice’s Cooperative Principle, namely that of Manner which includes the supermaxim – “Be perspicuous”, and various maxims such as: avoid obscurity, and ambiguity, etc.9 However, Searle’s version obviously tends to operate with absolute and completely clear concepts of clarity and understanding and if it is so, then it simply begs the question. That is to say, if Searle’s dictum is not clear, then we do not understand it, and it is not clear, however, we understand it completely. Do we understand the following sentence “If a lion could talk, we could not understand him” (PI 223)? Yes we do? However, it is said in somewhat unclear fashion. This shows only that clarity is a relative concept; for one thing it seems to be relative to the very process of clarification. This is somewhat complicated, since it goes along with what Searle claims, namely, if one takes examples from field archaeology (a description of an artefact parts really becoming clearer and clearer before our eyes), field geography (a description of a shape of a newly discovered land becomes more and more clear as we cruise around it and chart it), or from history (a description of some historical event and persons included makes sense more and more as one sees the whole picture of it by putting pieces together), then it is obviously the case that one is in the process of trying to say clearly what needs to be said and what is already completely understood. It is a fact that during a process of discovery clarity sometimes goes along with understanding, but sometimes something can be clear without complete understanding (due to various reasons), and of course sometimes something can be unclear with complete understanding.

There is another type of cases, namely of inventions. An inventor sometimes completely understands the problem and the invented solution; however it is often the case that it cannot be said clearly. Clarity in such cases comes actually with the patent document which is (de facto) a summary or a perspicuous presentation (visual and textual, PI 122)10 of an invention. Finally, there are cases which include creativity and technique like in arts and crafts and in such cases understanding can be complete but an artist or a craftsman often cannot say it clearly, or in other words, one cannot say it clearly but it is completely understood (such things happen in say poetry and painting). Cleverness, argumentation, and debating powers are simply not enough for doing philosophy in this way. An interesting issue to tackle is the following: is it really impossible that there are things that can be said in somewhat unclear fashion only, and still be completely understood?

The last point raises another issue altogether. Is the sentence “He is strong three times as an average man.” more clear than the sentence “He is strong as a lion.”? One can be inclined to say – well, it depends. The concept of the strength of an average man is quite clear concept. However, it is clear only if one knows something relevant concerning human physical strength. On the other hand the first sentence can be completely unclear to a child, while

8 In some of his books J. Searle achieved high level of clarity regarding quite complex problems. Concerning clarity compare his Minds, Brains & Science with T. Nagel’s What Does It All Mean? and B. Russell’s The Problems of Philosophy as perhaps one the most clear introduction to the problem.


the second can be clearer then the first. And clarity is measured by actions in which its understanding is implicit and manifested. Paradoxically enough, in such cases to be unclear is the only way to be clear. Then again, in the previous sentence words *unclear* and *clear* are not opposites; they belong to two different languages, perhaps forms of life as well. Further point to emphasise is the following (especially in the light of Searle’s analysis of metaphor) – is it possible that there are things that can be said clearly only figuratively (say metaphorically) but not literally? The problem here is if this is so, then many textual figures could be completely understood and yet completely unclear to one unfamiliar with such finesse and in general with a form of life they belong to. How this is possible will be explained in the following section.

5. Wittgenstein’s metaphor of a river: multiaspectual understanding as clarity

Here we will use Wittgenstein’s concept of certainty as presented in OC and by explicating it in brief we will illustrate how it is possible that there are completely understood things (descriptions, actions, practices etc.) and which should not be clearer then they in fact are for given practical purposes. In OC he doesn’t use clarity but as we shall see “certainty” is for epistemological issues just an application of “clarity” in philosophical method in general. This point connects the previous (sections 1. to 4.) to the following (5.1. to 5.5.).

5.1. Is certainty epistemological clarity?

Is there a central idea of Wittgenstein’s work *On Certainty*? On one hand, this question has an aspect of a broader question, namely, is there a critical and unified scheme of epistemology (modern and contemporary) and what is the position of OC in this scheme, and on the other hand, it has an aspect of specific issue of Wittgenstein’s treatment of certainty in his whole philosophy. Let me start from the second aspect. The title of OC as set of notes with some content integrity seems to be somewhat misguided since certainty is not treated as an epistemological concept, rather as a pragmatic concept, i.e. certainty which is simply manifested by human actions and practices, linguistic and non-linguistic; in another words, it is closely connected to concepts of LGs and FOLs already established in PI and related works, and to concepts like practice, action, and even pragmatism. Certainty is not regarded as epistemological category as for instance in some criterion of it, say S knows P iff P is true, S is sure that P, and S has a right to be sure (like in Ayer, Chisholm or Gettier); as some result of applying strict method, or as explication of common-sense usage of the word knowledge which implies certainty (like in Moore). For one thing it seems that he departs from these and similar traditions very early in the course of investigation in OC (perhaps in the whole course of his philosophy) since if knowledge is of any interest to him at all, then surely it is not attractive in terms of know-that or propositional knowledge, rather in terms of know-how or practical knowledge. More to that, since certainty is for him a practical phenomenon it has many important differences compared to non-propositional knowledge.

Let me now turn to the first aspect. Surely, a thoroughbred 20th century academic epistemologist would unmistakably identify some connections between Wittgenstein’s approach and the epistemology of analytic tradition in terms of an explicit or implicit discussion with some important philosophers, with some characters representing whole schools of modern epistemology such as
an idealist, realist, rationalist, sceptic, etc., and sometimes examining central epistemological concepts and relations, but this would tell us more about academic discipline of epistemology itself then about Wittgenstein’s treatment of the subject. Surely, a part of understanding OC consists in understanding its background and context, but to read Moore and Russell perhaps means to read works that Wittgenstein uses as adversaries, while to read James and maybe Ryle (especially in the light of the difference between know-that and know-how) means to read some of works that influenced his vital ideas and that were influenced by them. However, this understanding, if reached at all, could easily mislead a reader in the way that one places Wittgenstein’s treatment of certainty in various traditions of 20th century epistemology and thinks that that’s it. Personally, I do not have any kind of sound argument that the mentioned procedure is wrong, but some sections of OC, in fact a lot of them, are surely dissonant with such presentation of the work.

At some point throughout his philosophy Wittgenstein established the concept of perspicuous presentation (or clear summarising description) as the goal of his philosophy, and the morphological method as well. The method was applied mostly to LGs no matter if it was clearly established that LGs are only a part of FOLs (PI 23). While investigating various LGs sometimes he gets in touch with FOLs an investigated LG belong to, and quite rarely he investigated parts of FOLs as completely disconnected from their LGs. It could be said that some parts of his later work are such applications of the method (in terms of investigating various psychological phenomena in RPP I, II, LW, colours in ROC, and certainty in OC). In other words the question is: is OC an attempt of morphological investigation and grammatical presentation of practical certainty by reference to certain LGs and FOLs?

5.2. A river metaphor: how many remarks?

Now, supposing that OC is an attempt to produce a clear summarising description of certainty, or at least a starting point of morphological investigation of the subject, one would naturally like to know what the results are, or is there such description among the notes of OC? In spite of the fact that the activity of philosophising is far more important than its results, one could find some hints of such description in OC. The basic phenomenon that Wittgenstein investigates in OC is that (we) humans are simply certain of many things (this much he agrees with Moore) and he tries to perspicuously present this phenomenon. These certainties should not be observed individually but in a way that they constitute a system of certainties (system of relations). Therefore, what one should observe is the whole phenomenon, all of its parts (sometimes LGs, sometimes FOLs) and their relations, and finally the whole pattern which reveals itself, and then the investigation is over. He uses many metaphors for the system of these certainties, but the most beautiful one, and the most discussed too is that of the river (OC 94-9). The metaphor (as shown in Figure 3) deserves few notes.


Sec: PI 474, pp. 184, 204, 206, and perhaps in TLP 6.5–6.51 as well, but in another way. Besides obvious dissimilarities between TLP and PI, there are striking similarities as well, namely in structure of expositions (not in style of course) and in some claims too. Compare for instance the order and the treatment of some topics, namely, world/facts with forms of life, facts/propositions with LGs and grammar, etc.
The system of certainties is called ‘world picture’ (WP, *Weltbild*, OC 94-5), and it is compared with a river (as shown in Figure 3). The image has three elements, namely the bank consisting of hard rock, the bank consisting of sand (washed away or deposited, OC 99), or eroded and sediment), and waters. There is no sharp difference between these elements since there are two movements: the movement of the waters in the river basin (erosion), and the movement of the river basin itself (sedimentation, OC 97). All of these elements represent different kinds of remarks, that is to say, something like rule-sentences (OC 94-6), experience/practice-sentences, and sentences in between represented by sand and small rocks, which is essential since it has two aspects. One aspects is sand as a *residual part* during *erosion* (river movement), and the other aspect is send as a *constitutive part* during *sedimentation* (a bank movement, and a whole river movement). To translate the image, some sentences are hard and they hardly ever change (these are grammatical sentences or remarks from PI and other related works, and hinge sentences from OC 341-3, 655 (explicit), 87-8, 415 (implicit)); waters are empirical, experiential, or practice sentences; and two-aspectual send represents axis sentences (OC 152). Therefore any WP consists of three kinds of sentences, namely: (a) empirical, experiential, or practice sentences (which are changing compared to b), (b) rule, grammatical, or hinge sentences (which mostly do not change compared a), and (c) axis sentences, which are two-aspectual meaning that they are pivotal for change between a and b since (c1) they can become a or b (a change within the river between waters, hard rocks, and send), or *changes within a WP*, (c2) but they can contribute to *the change of the whole WP* (a change of the whole river basin). This *aspect change* regarding axis sentences is quite important (as well as in the case of duck-rabbit head in PI), it is not the fundament of a house; it is a roof which connects all the elements of the house. Understanding aspect change of axis sentences is the core of understanding a WP as a whole, seeing its pattern, and understanding clearly certainties of OC.

5.3. Axes remarks: Do squirrels grow on trees?

Now, in order to see a pattern one needs to see how and in which situations such sentences are formed, uttered, or remarks about various practices made. Wittgenstein writes the following in OC 287: “The squirrel does not infer by induction that it is going to need stores next winter as well. And no more do we need a law of induction to justify our actions or our predictions.” Given
that a squirrel does not use deduction or abduction, or even intuition, and all known differences between squirrels and humans, the question is how a squirrel can be sure that stores are needed this year too? There is not a shred of doubt in her actions. Consequently, how humans are so sure in their actions? In order to explicate this issue let us take an example.

Example 1. Say that we have a boy Willard living in a nice natural environment in Akron, Ohio observing for first time a squirrel on a tree in the backyard and continue to do so for few days. Therefore, he learns many things about squirrels, say that they live on trees, that they have flamboyant tails, that they are very skilled with their “hands” while collecting hazelnuts and storing them, etc. There are some other squirrels around and Willard names his squirrel Donald and he is capable to tell Donald from other squirrels. Now, Willard is not sure is Donald different from other squirrels since he had never seen Donald on the ground, so he thinks that Donald is a special kind of a squirrel which grows on tree as well as hazels he collects, especially because Donald seems to be a bit unhandy with his “hands” compared to other squirrels. He asks his father do some squirrels grow on trees while others do not. Father explains to him that squirrels do not grow on trees, that squirrels are animals, not plants, etc., and that Donald will eventually come down from the tree if he observes him for some time.

In this example of learning about squirrels we have all of the previously mentioned sentences, all the remarks are made. There are experiential (or observational) remarks made by Willard (previously a), such as “Look father, Donald is very unhandy.” There are also grammatical remarks made by Willard’s father (previously b) such as “Squirrels are animals, not plants.”, “Squirrels have quite flashy tails like no other beings.”, “Squirrels collect various nuts and store them.” Now, there is another type of a remark made by Willard’s father (previously c), namely “Squirrels do not grow on trees like nuts do.” And this kind of a remark is obviously not an empirical or a grammatical one. First kind of a remark (a) looks like a rule of a kind, namely that squirrels are animals, not plants; the second one looks like an empirical one (b), as a result of an observation, say that Donald is quite unhandy; the third one is a special kind of remark since it is neither a rule nor it is a result of observation.

What is quite important here is to note that the remark “Squirrels do not grow on trees.” should be observed with its opposite remarks that is “Squirrels grow on trees.” and how it and the opposite one relate to others. Obviously, the remark “Squirrels do not grow on trees.” fits in nicely with other remarks, almost as they taken together constitute a harmonious system, a system which manifests itself via our actions. On the other hand, it has no obvious connection with remarks which are rule-like or observational. Say that Willard is sceptical child asking why all the time, so he asks father – how do you know that some squirrels do not grow on trees? Father can be quite surprised not so much by the question as to with his own inability to provide instant and obvious answer, so he says – “Because they do not, and I am 100% certain”. Now, this WP in which these remarks (a–c) are harmonious is in very delicate balance, namely, the whole WP could completely change if there are some rare squirrels which grow on trees. It would be the case like in Wittgenstein’s river metaphor that this simple fact would change not just the whole internal balance and structure of WP / sand, rocks, and waters, but the position of the whole WP / river as well; it would be a completely different WP (concerning physics one can imagine Willard saying “Some things can move faster than

the speed of light” and how would educated father answer to his question before the new discovery and afterwards).\textsuperscript{14}

Further issue which can easily misguide one in thinking about remarks of OC is concerning certainty. The certainty of the whole system of remarks, our whole WP, rests on fine balance between elements of WP. But the system is rarely explicated/clarified; however, it is completely understood. The previous example is one of special situations in which a part of the system should be explicated, namely in the course of upbringing (other exceptions are changes in a WP, a clash of two WPs, and similar revolutionary and not paradigm situations in a life of a WP of particular community or culture). Certainties belonging to a WP in all other normal situations are implicit in actions and practices of members of a community or culture, and in the same time they are manifested by their actions and practices. Humans by their actions simply manifest that they are certain as much as they can be that say “Squirrels do not grow on trees.”\textsuperscript{15} And there are many more remarks of this kind which are implicit in human actions and practices and by living their lives in certain way humans manifest that they are certain not in these individually taken, rather in the whole WP. Now, all previously said is surely not enough to soundly conclude that OC is an attempt of a morphological investigation and a grammatical perspicuous presentation (a clear summarising description) of practical certainty, but it points to that direction, namely to the path at which end are human practices and their practical certainty, and their practical understanding without clarification or clarity.

5.4. Experiential remarks

If the river-image from OC (94-9) is to be interpreted as a world-view (WV) composed of three types of remarks, namely experiential, grammatical, and axes remarks (as shown in Figure 4 as ER, GR, and AR), than some further issues can be raised concerning their relations. Figure 4 presents relations between kinds of remarks concerning their “similarity”, not concerning their “functioning” as it is presented in Figure 4 concerning “the river metaphor”.

![Figure 4](image-url)  
**Figure 4.** Three types of remarks and their relations within a world-view as a system

Overlap between remarks in Figure 4 are labelled as \(a, b, c,\) and \(d\). Obviously \(d\) stands for the most similarities between all remarks, while \(a, b,\) and \(c\) stand for similarities between all pairs, namely \(a\) for similarities between ARs and
ERs, b for similarities between ARs and GRs, and c for similarities between ERs and GRs. Consequently, regions which do not overlap are regions of dissimilarities.

Wittgenstein scholars traditionally examine mostly GRs as being something like a rule-like phenomenon especially in the contrast with a kind of relativism which Wittgenstein seems to accept on various levels. ARs were by the same group identified as “hinge metaphor” at least until J. Schulte showed that ARs are in fact identified as “axes metaphor” while “hinges” are the metaphor for GRs. Now, ERs were never a prime or central subject matter of inquiry among majority of mainstream Wittgenstein scholars. However, ERs are quite important since in the river-image they cloud the idea that WV is a kind of change, movement, process and waters of a river are pivotal for understanding this aspect of the metaphor. On the other hand, what contributes the most to the attribution of relativism to Wittgenstein’s notes comes from the nature of ERs. ERs according to the Figure 4 have dual relation to other remarks, namely, ERs have similarities and dissimilarities with ARs and GRs alone, and similarities and dissimilarities with both ARs and GRs (regions a, c, and d in Figure 4). The flowing of a river represents so to say steady form of life (FOL) and steadiness of daily experiences (and daily certainties). Now, what is the main characteristic of ERs? Discussion on this matter one can find in PI 466-90 which can be called a discussion on justification of empirical beliefs. In PI 472 Wittgenstein emphasizes uniformity of proceedings and says “that it can perhaps be seen most clearly” in the fear from what is expected. “Sun rises in the east” is what we are certain of, and this certainty is manifested by our actions, say, by our turning to the east if we want to see the sun in the morning (apart from some standard exceptions). Wittgenstein’s example is more dramatic. Namely, if one was burnt in the past there is no way that one will put hand into a flame (again apart from some standard exceptions). Wittgenstein’s example is more dramatic. Namely, if one was burnt in the past there is no way that one will put hand into a flame (again apart from some standard exceptions). Wittgenstein’s example is more dramatic. Namely, if one was burnt in the past there is no way that one will put hand into a flame (again apart from some standard exceptions). Wittgenstein’s example is more dramatic. Namely, if one was burnt in the past there is no way that one will put hand into a flame (again apart from some standard exceptions). Wittgenstein’s example is more dramatic. Namely, if one was burnt in the past there is no way that one will put hand into a flame (again apart from some standard exceptions). Wittgenstein’s example is more dramatic. Namely, if one was burnt in the past there is no way that one will put hand into a flame (again apart from some standard exceptions). Wittgenstein’s example is more dramatic.

5.5. Grammatical remarks: three examples

Grammatical remarks are the most obvious candidates for clarity. Yet, their porous borders, deep overlap, and interdependence with experiential and axes remarks suggests that Wittgenstein advanced previously described two-aspectual concept of clarity. This point will be illustrated by three examples.

5.5.1. “The rain in Spain falls mainly in the plain”

Let us visualize workers renovating a house. After they fixed the roof, doors, and front walls they come to the foundations, and they start to repair...
the drainage system to protect the house from underwater and soil humidity. In order to do so first they dig a ditch all around the house a little bit below the level of the foundations and they repair the foundation’s dump proof. Then they start to repair a drainage system. While doing so they communicate in the following way. Worker α: “Big ones!” β: “Coming.” γ: “Dump them here.” α: “Wait until I arrange them properly.” (After a while.) α: “Pipes.” β: “Coming.” γ: “Watch for the pipe slope!” α: “O.K.” (After a while.) α: “Small pebbles and dump proof.” β: “Coming.” (After a while.) α: “Steel reinforcement and concrete.” β: “Preparing.” α: “Watch for the proportion and the density.” β: “I am.”, etc. This shortened dialogue is obviously a dialogue between three experienced construction workers, α, β and γ. If one knows a little bit about the protection of a house from underwater by a drainage system, and a little bit of physics, then one will understand this dialogue perfectly. More to that one will understand that workers are doing their job correctly and properly. For instance, one understands that “Big ones” means big boulders which must be set up first at the bottom of the ditch and scattered in order for an underwater to have a free passage beside and under the foundations and not thru them. By looking at workers doing their job, namely what they do and how they communicate, one can see that they are doing proper job. Now, by doing their job properly workers are manifesting the very grammar of the expression “a drainage system”. They manifest what “a drainage system” means, namely “to construct so to say a system which will protect house foundations from underwater and soil humidity”. They manifest that they know-how to assemble the system, namely by making a dump proof of the foundations, by putting the big rocks first and how to scatter them, by putting the small pebbles latter, etc. (as shown in Figure 5).

By showing what is grammatical concerning a drainage system, say by a remark such as “Big rocks first and small pebbles later” α, β and γ are showing the nonsensical combination of signs concerning a drainage system construction too. For instance, a remark “Small pebbles first and bigger pebbles later” is obviously a nonsensical combination of signs concerning the drainage system construction, by being nonsensical it is non-grammatical as well.

5.5.2. “Number 23”

Philosophical grammar (further shortened as “grammar”) describes language-games. It consists of remarks ordered in various chapters, remarks which manifest familiar, intimate, and usual arrangements of signs. It says which order of words or a combination of signs is meaningful and which is meaningless. A grammar simply describes the correct use of signs with-
out explaining it. (PI 496) However, not all remarks belong to the grammar. Think of possibility that to any question to which the correct answer is 2, like for instance “How much is 1 + 1?”, “How tall is this man?”, “How deep can you dive?”, one, instead of answering “2”, should always answer in terms of complex operation the correct solution of which is 2, for instance: (a) – “How tall is this man?” – “He is 2x6 – 50/5 meters tall.” (PI 513, 552) Compare this dialogue with the following: (b) – “How tall is this man?” – “This man is 1971 – 1969 meters tall.” And then with the following: (c) – “How tall is this man?” – “This man is 2 meters tall.” What do you find except that you are unfamil­ iar with the first (a) and the second (b) answer, while you are familiar with the third one (c)? Now, combinations of signs in all of the answers presented previously are meaningful, however, only the third one (c) is the description of our grammar, the one with which we are familiar. Compare the whole situation with the following one: – “What is the temperature outside?” – “It is x degrees of Celsius.” – “What is the temperature outside?” – “It is x degrees of Fahrenheit.” (PI 508) Here the another finess is of importance, namely, not so much the issue of being familiar or not with telling the temperature in terms of Fahrenheit or Celsius since we indeed are “familiar” with it (PG 3), meaning that we know-how to re calculate degrees of Fahrenheit into degrees of Celsius vice versa, but are we, so to say, more intimate with telling the temperature in degrees of Fahrenheit or in degrees of Celsius.

Surely, this doesn’t show much, but it shows that our grammar is sensitive, or that it is composed of say layers. Some forms are grammatical and famil­ iar for most humans like “1 + 1 = 2”, some are grammatical and intimate for some groups like telling the temperature in degrees of Fahrenheit, and some are grammatical and intimate for some subgroups like ways of greeting. This point can be connected with kinds of remarks which our WP consists of, namely: meta-historical such as “1 + 1 = 2”, or “Cats don’t grow on trees”, historical such as “Water boils at 100 degrees of Celsius”, those which stand for each and every human “My name is NN” (which is true since “Every hu­ man has a name”), and those which are completely individual such as “Most of my life I spent in Madagascar at this home address”. Generally speaking, it seems that there are at least three kinds of remarks in our WP represented by famous river-image (OC 94-9). Now, the possibility of these types of remarks isn’t something postulated, but manifested by the way in which we live and talk. More to that, these types aren’t sharply differed, they can merge one into another since our form of life changes internally (regarding the balance of its aspects) and externally (regarding its relative position to other forms of life, no matter if real or merely probable or just possible).

5.5.3. “Chicken run”

Wittgenstein writes that “The cock calls hens by crowing.” (PI 493) and the hens come. The mother calls her daughter by saying “Come here Jill.” and Jill comes. Analogy is obvious. However, Wittgenstein asks – “Isn’t the aspect quite altered if we imagine the crowing to set hens in motion by some kind of physical causation?” (ibid) The notion of an aspect-change is important here. Namely, obviously there are some grammatical (or hinge) remarks here such as “Cocks crow” and “Hens cluck”. In the river-image they are represented by hard rocks forming river bottom and banks. There are some possible empirical (or experiential) remarks as well, say, “Hens are quite nervous today” or “Cock Johnny is really quiet this morning” These are represented by waters of a river. Finally, there is the remark “The cock doesn’t call the hens by
barking but by crowing”. Such remarks are represented by send and tiny pebbles which can become hard rock if they create a sandal and finally become a part of the bank (sedimentation), or which can become a part of waters end change the course of the whole river (erosion). Really, these axes remarks (OC 152) indeed are the centre of rotation of the whole WP and they have two aspects, that is to say, they can remain as they are (one aspect), and they can change (another aspect) into grammatical or hinge remarks or into empirical remarks.

The whole chicken phenomenon consists of remarks which taken as a whole like a slice of a cake is mirroring the structure of the whole cake, our whole WP, and all other phenomena are doing the same thing. Now, where is the aspect-change in this example? Is the remark “By crowing cock calls…” or the remark “Cock’s crowing causes…” the right axis remark? Well, one could say, this issue can really change not just the balance in our WP but it can shift the whole WP too. This issue isn’t about metaphors (does the cock really “calls”?), or about communication in animal world (how certain sounds made by cocks cause certain moves by hens?), rather about our notion of language, and Wittgenstein writes that our ordinary language is what we call a language and then other things by analogy with this (PI 494), and by being more similar then dissimilar with our language-games and with our forms of life we call cock’s crowing in fact “calling”, not “causing”. In the same manner we say that plants are “reacting” to the sunlight except for sunflowers for which we say that they “turn” towards the sunlight similarly as Jill “turns” to her mother when she calls her. A form of life (cultures) consists of (aspects) WP (language-games) and practices (actions). A WP consists of at least three types of remarks, namely grammatical (or hinge), empirical (or experiential), and axes remarks (as shown in Figure 6). They create his final concept of clarity.

![Figure 6. A form of life and its aspects structured like a whirligig (OC 152)](image)

### 6. Conclusion

Wittgenstein used the concept of clarity in his later philosophy. His later concept of ‘clarity’ as ‘perspicuity’, ‘certainty’, ‘seeing’, ‘seeing as’, etc. has little in common with the ‘clarity’ in earlier writings used as a logical term. However, in later works the concept “developed” from mere mentioning, like in *The Blue and Brown Books*, and some more substantial descriptions, like in *Philosophical Investigations* and *The Big Typescript*, to fully developed concept of clarity which plays its role in the concept of certainty, especially in *On Certainty*. Parallel with this development there is a development in differentiation between various kinds of “remarks”, namely: empirical or ex-
periential remarks (in The Blue and Brown Books), besides them grammatical remarks (in Philosophical Investigations which are called ‘hinges’ in On Certainty), and finally axes remarks (in On Certainty). Such fully developed two-aspectual concept of clarity is important for general philosophical method as conceptual clarification, and for understanding particularly epistemological clarity or in fact certainty. Perhaps these remarks can change our understanding of main task, methods, goals, scope and limits of epistemology and philosophy of science. As such Wittgenstein stands fairly alone in contemporary philosophy thinking that such concept of clarity is not just the correct one but besides that a clear one as well (auto-referentially consistent) and applicable to all philosophical issues (not just to epistemological ones).

Kristijan Krkač

“Quid pro quo, Clarice“:
Wittgenstein’s Multiaspectual Notion of Clarity

Sažetak
U članku autor pojašnjava poznati zahtjev za jasnoćom J. R. Searlea i multiaspektni pojam jasnoće kod L. Wittgensteina. Pojam jasnoće uvodi se preko Searlova zahtjeva i problema tog zahtjeva koji razotkriva primjena Wittgensteinove morfološke metode. Višeznačnost jasnoće vidljiva je u razlici između jasnoće kao preglednosti i jasnoće kao razumijevanja. Wittgensteinov jednoznačan ali višeslojan pojam preglednosti kao vidijenja i kao razumijevanja nudi se kao rješenje poteškoća. Primjer takvog pojma preglednosti vidljiv je u slici rijeke iz Wittgensteinova djela O izvjesnosti na način eksplikacije slike kao slike svijeta koja se sastoji od tri vrste napomena (rečenica), tj. iskustvenih napomena, gramatičkih ili „pant” propozicija te napomena osi vrtnje, a sve te vrste napomena prikaz čine potpuno preglednim i dakle jasnim u praktične svrhe.

Ključne riječi
gramatičke rečenice, jasnoća, John R. Searle, iskustvene rečenice, Ludwig Wittgenstein, napomene osi vrtnje, percepcija, praksa, preglednost, razumijevanje, slika rijeke, transparentnost, svjetonazor

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„Quid pro quo, Clarice“:
Wittgensteins multiaspektischer Begriff der Klarheit

Zusammenfassung

Schlüsselwörter
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“Quid pro quo, Clarice”
Le concept multiaspectuel de clarté de Wittgenstein

Résumé
Dans cet article, l’auteur éclaire la fameuse exigence de clarté de J. R. Searle et le concept multiaspectuel de clarté de L. Wittgenstein. Le concept de clarté est introduit via l’exigence de Searle et le problème de cette exigence l’est via la méthode morphologique de Wittgenstein. Une équivoque du concept de clarté est présentée, à savoir la différence entre clarté en tant que transparence et clarté en tant que compréhension. La notion univoque de L. Wittgenstein de caractère synoptique comme vision et compréhension est proposée comme solution à cette difficulté. Un exemple d’un tel concept est visible dans l’image de la rivière dans De la certitude de Wittgenstein et l’explication de l’image en tant qu’image du monde qui consiste en trois sortes de propositions, à savoir empiriques, grammaticales ou gonds et propositions pivot, lesquelles rendent une présentation complètement comprise en pratique.

Mots-clés
propositions grammaticales, clarté, John R. Searle, propositions empiriques, Ludwig Wittgenstein, propositions pivot, perception, pratique, caractère synoptique, compréhension, image de la rivière, transparence, vision du monde