

COOPERATION BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY SYSTEMS OF GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AND YUGOSLAVIA

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Summary: Intelligence and security system of GDR and Yugoslavia, despite the fact that it might look strange, did not have significant level of cooperation. The main reason for that was a huge political and ideological difference on political level. Each of them had their own, "unique", way to create socialist society under the leadership of Communist party in power. But, despite the fact that they did not had any significant cooperation, both of those systems were established and organised according Russian intelligence and security systems. Repression against their citizens was one of the main similarities between those two systems. Due to the existence of the documents in German BStU it is possible to research their relations in those time of Cold war conflict, and huge antagonism between NATO and WB.

Keywords: GDR, DDR, BRD, FRG, Yugoslavia, SFRJ, intelligence and security systems, Stasi, UDB-a, SDB, SED, SKJ, communist party, repression

INTRODUCTION

Constant conflicts of various imperialistic policies with the aim of gaining political, military and economic superiority over the opponent marked, especially in Europe, marked last century. These conflicts led to two world wars that have caused enormous human and material destruction with strong short- and long-term consequences for the involved states. In Europe had happened also several low-intensity conflicts that have not led to the involvements (or in direct conflict) significant number of states. Therefore, effects of those conflicts had limited (political and territorial) consequences.

One can say that Germany is one of those states that marked the twentieth century: times of wars, time between wars as well as during the Cold War. As a result of agreement between victor states in the 2nd World War, the defeated Third Reich was divided into four occupation zones which were governed by: the U.S., UK, France, and the Soviet Union.

After the representatives of the Third Reich signed an unconditional surrender, Allied troops withdrawn to previously agreed areas of Germany in which they took over the task of organizing the administration system. Those areas became the foundation of two German states: West Germany (Federal Republic of Germany, internationally known as FRG or in German language, BRD), and East Germany (German Democratic Republic, internationally known as GDR or in German language DDR).

Political, economic, and social system including institutions of, lately named, West Germany were organized and managed by the U.S., Britain and France. East Germany become part of the Soviet zone of interest and as such introduces socialism as a form of organization of state and society.

In this paper, we will give a basic organization of intelligence-security and justice systems of GDR, compare it with the same systems in the former Yugoslavia and describe level of co-operation of those systems during their existence.

To illustrate those relationships, we will show a number of official documents created in the institutions of the GDR in from 1973rd to 1987th, which are part of the archives of the former Ministry of State Security (MfS) GDR and are available for scientific research.

Please note that these are mostly one-sided (from the position of the GDR) vision of relations with Yugoslavia. However, the documents offer quality and sustainable quantity of information so the conclusions can be reliable.

Creation of GDR

A border between two German states was also the line of direct and intense Cold War conflict between two strongly opposing military-political blocs: NATO and the Warsaw bloc.

Soviet occupation zone (SOZ), at the 7.10.1949., declared the existence of GDR. SED (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands - Socialist Unity Party of Germany) has become, and soon the only, political force in the country. Soviet commander Army General Vasily Čujkov at the 14.1.1950 decided to close the internment camps in GDR where, by the end of the war until 1950, "interned" around 154 000 German and 35 000 foreign nationals. The largest camps of detained persons, out of 12, were Buchenwald, Sachsenhausen and Bautzen.

One of the important milestones in the development of the GDR took place in a time 16.-19.6.1953., three months after Stalin's death, when strike began in East Berlin. A strike on 17th of June expanded through the GDR, and led to strong repression that has resulted in the arresting of 6057 persons and more then one hundred of human casualties¹. On 17.6., at 13.00 hours, soviet military commander Major General Dibrov has declared a state of emergency in East Berlin. With intention to spread the truth about the situation in this part of Germany about the revolt against Soviet influence, against imposition of socialism and difficult working conditions and living in the Soviets occupied part, government of FRG released a commemorative postage stamps² (Fig. 1).

1 Wolf, 2004., page 51.

2 Deutsche Post Berlin, URL: <http://www.ebay.de/itm/Berlin-110-111-zarter-Stempel-919-/260649236906?pt=Briefmarke&hash=item3cafe7b9aa>, 7.7.2012.



Figure 1
 Postage stamps issued by the post office of West Berlin (Deutsche Post Berlin) on the occasion of a strike in East Berlin and the GDR of the 17.6.1953.

The judicial system

Judicial system in the GDR was under the complete control of SED. The judicial employees have conducted politics and justice in accordance with ideological position of the party leadership: The dictatorship of the proletariat in accordance with democratic centralism. They were part of a complex, numerous and brutal repression system against, as they called it in countries with communist parties in power: the class enemy. During the existence of the GDR, were between 200 000 and 250 000 sentences issued by the politically motivated judges. Immediately after the unification of the two German states, the judicial system was placed under the full supervision of the judicial and State Attorney's Office of West Germany. Those members of judicial system that did not respected human rights and violated them were fired from their posts; some of them were prosecuted. However, those "prosecutors and judges involved in the judgment with very high penalties for purely political offences, have been accused of perversion of justice."³

3 Koehler, J.O., bBNET, The CBS Interactive business Network, East Germany: The Stasi and De-Stasification, Demokratizatsiya, Summer, 2004., URL:http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3996/is_200407/ai_n9409113/, 20.6.2010.

Intelligence and security system of GDR

Intelligence and security system (ISS) of FRG was under the direct supervision of, mainly, the USA, while in the GDR was under the direct supervision of the Soviet Union. In the process of creating a new system, FRG hired some high-and middle-ranking members of the Third Reich, especially those who where, as it was general Gehlen, in their actions directed toward the USSR. In the GDR, however, the ISS was under the full control of former Communist Party members who become members of the SED. One of their key tasks was, as defined by the Minister Mielke, "the struggle against political and ideological sabotage"⁴.

It was the communist cadres, trained in the Soviet security services and Comintern, which organized the repressive system modelled by the infamous Soviet Cheka. Intelligence and security services of GDR effectively used the "personal Third Reich history" of the West German officers and officials in order to destabilize FRG, shaken the confidence of its citizens in the new institutions, undermined the international reputation, to achieve a better unity on their own side. Although the GDR citizens (16 million of them) were also citizens of the Third Reich, and although a significant number of leading figures of the communist GDR came from the area "remained" in the FRG, the responsibility for the World War II almost completely transferred to the FRG. The conflict of these two "national" but completely different ideological systems was a logical consequence of the global Cold War conflict.

While in the FRG, slowly but surely, civil institutions were established in accordance with the democratic traditions of multiparty parliamentary democracy, in the GDR was created the communist system by imposing a "dictatorship of the proletariat" and the one-party totalitarianism modelled by the Soviet Union.

MfS (Ministerium für Staatsicherheit - Ministry for State Security) was, by merging of existing effectives, established on 8.2.1950. Later, MfS became known as Stasi. External intelligence service of GDR was established 16.8.1951 under the name "Institut für wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Forschung am Ministerium für Auswaertige Angelegenheiten" - "Institute for economic and scientific research at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs". Eight German citizens and four Soviet advisers founded it⁵. The Institute

⁴ Gieseke, 2000., page 33.

⁵ Wolf, 2004., page 37.

became part of the MfS's at 1953 as the "Department X". On 1.5.1956 was renamed as "HV A" (Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung - Main Intelligence Directorate).

MfS precursor was part of the criminal police established by the Soviet authorities, known as the K5 (which functioned as political police). The task of K5 employees was a "struggle against the elements and anti-Soviet spies"⁶ in the Soviet occupation zone and their handing over to Soviet authorities. In June of 1949, K5 had 1600 employees.

MfS was a "special authority of the proletariat dictatorship" and a "shield and sword of the Party", the leader in "severe class struggle during which the revolutionary process must be conducted against the enemy."

MfS was under strong political influence and leadership of the SED party organization. Minister of MfS was, for a long time, a direct member of the SED Politburo and Central Committee. He had to cooperate closely with the Politburo member who was directly responsible for the MfS. More than 84% of employees were members of the SED, while other employees were "members of the SED without membership cards"⁷.

Rising the number of objectives and tasks in the process of attempting a comprehensive and thorough oversight of GDR internal and external enemies, the MfS staff was constantly strengthened. At the end of its existence, 31.10.1989., MfS had 91 015 active employees, or 5.7 employees per 1,000 inhabitants (as a comparison at that time in the USSR the ratio was 1.8 employees per 1,000 inhabitants and in Czechoslovakia 1.1 per 1000 inhabitants). In the previously mentioned number of employees of MfS, it is necessary to add 13 073 members of MfS's protective force "Felix Dzerzhinsky", 2232 "agents on specific tasks" (OibE) and the 2118 "full-time/long-term unofficial sources" (HIM)⁸. In that case, there were 6.7 employees per 1,000 inhabitants of GDR.

There were about 6 million inhabitants of the GDR under the "treatment" of MfS. Today available archival documents (not counting those who are (un)intentionally destroyed by the citizens in the attacks on the offices and MfS as well as those documents which were destroyed and separated by the employee's of MfS) are located at 111 km long shelf where lies and 1.6 million photos. There are also 15 500

6 Gieseke, 2000., page 13

7 Gieseke, 2000., page 19.

8 Gieseke, 2000., page 87.

bags with cut-out documents that are waiting for restoration⁹ (it is estimated that those bags contains about 45 million pages). A detailed analysis of these archives confirmed many previous suspicions and open some new. From those documents, the public is aware of the fact that the Soviet KGB recruited the Bulgarian secret service to carry out the assassination of Pope John Paul II. In the same time, KGB asked MfS to participate in covering their tracks. In those documents, among other things, were a large number of detailed personal dossiers of many West German politicians, businesspersons and other influential people. Those documents were "occasionally" publicised with intention to scandalize the German public, such as the case with a personal dossier of H. Kohl, "Unification Chancellor". He persistently fought to prevent disclosure "of his personal file" from the MfS archives. As a result of MfS activities toward FRG public opinion, one president (Heinrich Lübke) and one Prime Minister (Willy Brandt) had to resign from there duties.

Total number of MfS informants (IM) at the end of 1989 was about 173 000 persons (eg 1977 were 203 000 IM's registered). Nine out of ten were male between the ages of 25-40 years, about 1% of them were younger than 18 years. Average work time of IM's for the MfS was between 4-7 years. One third of IM's were members of the Party. The identity of some IM's is not yet clearly established. Markus Wolf¹⁰ has repeatedly refused "gratitude prise" in millions in cash to reveal those, still unknown identities of some IM's who continue to live in the EU and the U.S., despite the efforts of domicile security services. Publicly known case is a "Rosenholz" collection of documents. Those HVA documents where "collected" by the U.S. intelligence service. Only after several years of discussion and negotiation documents where returned to the FRG, stored at 381 CD. On them was written 280 000 original documents about MfS/HVA employees and IM's.

MfS, according to available data, during its existence, organized and carried out more than 700 kidnappings aimed at bringing fugitives back to the GDR. In addition, there were a significant number of executions, organised and done by the MfS staff, in and outside of the GDR. GDR security forces killed 809 people while more than 75 000 people arrested while attempting illegal crossings from GDR to FRG (including incidents on Berlin wall).

9 A Day when some friends became friends again, but some other friends become - traitors, Deutsche Welle, URL:<http://www.dw.de/dw/article/0,,15640900.html>, 26.6.2012.

10 Generalleutnant Markus Wolf was, untill may 1986, was chief of HVA.

Under public pressure, 07.11.1989 the then Minister for State Security, Erich Mielke resigned from the post he held for nearly 40 years. Shortly after, 17.11.1989, the GDR Council of Ministers renamed the MfS to the National Security Office (NSO). However, it is 08.12.1989 when Hans Modrow, the Prime minister of GDR, ordered and the Council of Ministers adopted dissolution of NSO and its transformation into two agencies: the Agency for protection of constitutional order and the Foreign Intelligence Service (all modelled as it is in the FRG). However, due to additional public pressures, on 13.01.1990, the Council of Ministers adopted the final decision about complete dissolution of the GDR intelligence and security services GDR. All former employees of MfS were fired.

HVA has had about 4000 employees. Germany was there top priority objective in operating activities. More than 20 000 citizens of FRG (in different areas and with different goals and tasks) worked for MfS as a member of IM network. Significant part of them was hired by the HVA because was a responsible for MfS foreign activities.

FRG institutions, political parties, media, and its public, were "priority of all priorities" in the work of HVA. They, as one of the main forms of activities against the various target audiences in Germany, planned and executed an "active measures": a systematic and targeted dissemination of disinformation. To carry out such activities, there was a special department within the HVA, named after the model of the KGB, the Department X (HVA X). Two departments (with same name and same duties) from the KGB and MfS were very closely involved in planning and implementation of disinformation (information and media operations) against FRG public and institutions.

Placement of disinformation for MfS means: "Treatment of important media institutions and influential journalists from West Germany, the publication of processed content (documents, letters, informative publications, etc.), providing (financial) support publications, and agents of influence use"¹¹.

The internal organization of MfS is given in Figure 2¹².

11 BStU-Struktur und Aufgaben des MfS,
http://www.bstu.bund.de/nn_712108/DE/MfS-DDR-Geschichte/Hintergruende-zur-Staatssicherheit/Struktur-und-Aufgaben/struktur-und-aufgaben-des-mfs__node.html__nnn=true, 21.6.2010.

12 Schmeidel, 2008., page 163.




Figure 2
MfS - organizational structure on day 31.10.1989.

Berlin Wall - Antifascist Protection Wall

Legal and, especially, illegal migrants from GDR to FRG, led to political, social and economic decay of the GDR. One of the results was significantly deteriorating security situation in the GDR, but also in the Warsaw bloc (WB). In the first half of the 1950s, around 300 000 persons left the GDR, and crossed to the FRG. From 17.6.1953 until December 1957, about 500 000 people¹³ has left GDR. Up to August 1963, about 3 million people left GDR and went to FRG¹⁴.

Political leadership of the GDR, in very close cooperation with the Soviet authorities and by the request of WB member countries ("introduction of effective surveillance at the border"¹⁵) decided to raise the "anti-fascist protection" on the GDR borders, including in Berlin. In the GDR this wall was named "Antifascist Protection Wall" (Antifaschistischen Schutzwall) while for the FRG it was a "wall of shame". The Berlin wall has become a global symbol of division and conflict and strained relations of opposing military-political blocs in the Cold War conflicts.

In fact, Berlin was located deep in the Soviet occupation zone, or GDR. Berlin was, into four occupation zones, divided. The Soviet occupation zone of Berlin was named East Berlin, and united American, British and French sectors become West Berlin. West Berlin was settled inside GDR, using the land route about 150 km away from the FRG. Therefore West Berlin became important and easy transit point on "escape route" from GDR to FRG, before the Wall. Migration of East German citizens to West Berlin made possible faster and simpler (by airplane from West Berlin) escape to the FRG than using existing land roads.

On 13.8.1961, started, extremely well organized, fast construction of protective barriers, a forerunner of the Wall, which should prevent the free circulation of people and goods from the Soviet occupation zone to other German occupation zones and vice versa.

The question of efficient prevention of illegal border crossings was one of the main priorities of the MfS's. HVA regularly "inserted" their IM's between illegal/legal migrants. They have had different duties and obligations: to serve as

13 According to the official data, at the end of the war 16.7 million inhabitants lived on the territory of future GDR. Return of prisoners and during the war displaced persons, this number rose until 18.4 million. But, because of the (i)llegal migration toward FRG, the total number of GDR population decreased, in 1989, to 16.4 million inhabitants. (Schroeder, 2000., page 76.)

14 Schroeder, 2000., page 46.

15 Wolf, 2004., page 85.

messengers for contacting and delivery/pick up of intelligence data and secret documents between IM network and HVA, and as a future logistical and/or information support with intention to become a part of FRG institutions and companies (as agent-sleepers, agents of influence...). Because of the Wall, the HVA find itself in problems and in position to try to find new ways and methods to send their IM's to FRG.

The construction of the Wall took place in several stages. Each phase had created a stronger protective wall around West Berlin and at the border between GDR and FRG. Therefore, the Wall, in the final phase of construction, was only part of a complex system of protective barriers, as shown in Figure 3¹⁶.

Pionier- und signaltechnischer Ausbau der Staatsgrenze zu BERLIN-West

(gegenwärtig)




Figure 3
"Antifascist Protection Wall" - the last construction phase

¹⁶ Berlin Wall; URL: http://conservapedia.com/Berlin_Wall, 10.7.2012.

In Figure 4, we can notice 13 parts of the "Antifascist protective wall" complex:

- 1st: East Berlin,
- 2nd: Safety area between the buildings and the first wire fence,
- 3rd: First concrete-wire structures (68 km),
- 4th: The second concrete-wire barrier (148 km),
- 5th: Barriers for vehicles (38 000 pieces) and pedestrians (19 km),
- 6th: Reconnaissance and surveillance towers (190 units),
- 7th: Lighting (177 km),
- 8th: Road (172 km),
- 9th: The control field to monitor the possible transfer of defectors (165 km),
- 10th: Anti-traffic protection (92 km),
- 11th: Protective concrete wall elements with protective concrete arch at the top (162 km),
- 12th: Free field in West Berlin,
- 13th: West Berlin.

The Wall also had a second, for the GDR government probably "useful", justification of existence. For each arrested person and for those who wanted but were not allowed to leave the GDR, Government of FRG paid more than 90 000 DM (pro person) to the Government of the GDR in order that they can leave GDR. From the 1964-1990 FRG authorities, literally, bought freedom for the 33 000 GDR prisoners and the right for another 250 000 people to leave GDR due to "family reunification". To these funds should be added funds, sent in the GDR by religious organizations from FRG as a help for their citizens (goods worth around 3.4 billion DM, or about 1.8 billion euros)¹⁷.

Objectives and tasks

MfS has had three main tasks:

- to act as an internal security service to protect the socialist-communist system and the party in power,
- GDR foreign intelligence service
- as an instrument of inter-party struggles for power at all levels of decision making and action in the SED.

¹⁷ Schroeder, 2000., page 103.

FRG was priority number one for MfS activities. HVA invested huge efforts (personal, time, resources) to reach and to recruit persons who can create FRG's public opinion journalists and politicians at all levels all around FRG. Also, based on the initial operational success, HVA began to plan operational activities on systematic accession and recruiting secretaries in FRG institutions and government offices. They estimated that more than 30% of the employed secretaries were unmarried or divorced. Therefore, in HVA assessed that secretaries were suitable for recruiting efforts. HVA employees, which had to fulfil those tasks, were parts of, subsequently called, "Romeo" network. HVA also systematically collected information about the illegal activities of individuals, and political parties in the FRG, including possible existence of "black" (from political parties and private persons) funds abroad.

MfS had fulfilled some of their own, and Soviet, objectives in close cooperation with international terrorists. They provided logistical support (information, documentation, material, organized shelters and sanctuaries, training areas) for many internationally known terrorists such as Ilych Ramirez Sanchez known as "Carlos The Jackal", Abu Nidal, and the chief planner of the terrorist attacks that occurred at the Olympic Games in Munich (in Syria recently deceased leader of the "Black September") Abu Daoud. MfS provided the same kind of support and temporary protection to the members of the FRG terrorist group "Red Army Faction" (Rote Armee Fraktion - RAF).

In their work, MfS did not hesitate to commit even murders. Thus, after the opening of MfS archives, investigation of such activities has started (trying to find the masterminds and perpetrators of many previously unsolved murders). One of the investigators was experienced police director Manfred Kittlaus, former head of criminal investigations of West Berlin Police in Berlin Central Research Group for researching GDR government illegality activities. He investigated unlawful activities of GDR Government and institutions. The subject of investigations were "73 murders, 30 attempted murders, 583 cases of murder without premeditation, 2938 case of premeditated murder and 425 cases of suspicious death. Of the 73 murders, 22 were qualified as a contract killing".¹⁸

¹⁸ Kohler, 2004.

The basic similarities and differences of intelligence and security systems/services of GDR and Yugoslavia

Repressions against political opponents modelled after the Soviet Cheka (persecution, harassment, arrest, torture and liquidation) was one of the similarities of those two systems. Large-scale repressive actions depended on the current political and security assessments. Intensity of repression against the population was not always the same.

Intelligence and security systems of both countries were organised, on the beginning, as a political secret police, based on party cadres who worked mostly in the underground (due insecurity) or did worked in the USSR in/for the Comintern.

Both systems paid "special attention" to the religious communities. In the GDR, the main target was the Catholic and Protestant churches, while in Yugoslavia the subject of intensive operational and technical actions were mostly Catholic and than Orthodox Church and Islamic religious communities.

Neither of them developed a democratic system of control. Both were completely loyal to the ruling Communist Party, both systems supported single-mindedness and political party monopoly on shaping the reality, the interpretation of the past and projecting the future. In both cases, the party leadership determined goals and objectives of the repressive system. Both systems were above the law. Respect for basic human rights for them was unknown and unnecessary burden.

Both systems intensively used parts of the ISS against internal and external enemies, and for fighting within the communist party political "factions".

In contrast to the SED, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was still more independent in their activities, especially in a relation toward the Soviet Union, but only after 1948. However, the SED and MfS leadership continue to conduct repressive activities and methods in order to stabilise there influence supporting Stalin's ideas until the end of GDR. Erich Mielke, minister of MfS objected, in April 1989, to the Deputy Director of the KGB Leonid Schebarschin¹⁹ that KGB is responsible for what was published in Soviet media about Stalin's personal history. He complained that, freely and without liability, was written that Stalin was an informant of the Imperial Russian secret police

¹⁹ Gieseke, 2000., page 91.

Ochrana. According to Mielke, the public has every right to ask the question "what is socialism, which has been built by an informant of the Imperial Police, as what kind of message this article is sending to the world" because it is that the "idea of socialism is called into question."

Another area that has led to difficulties in establishing official relationships between political, therefore also in intelligence, security and police areas of activities, was the fact that every state "has developed its own socialism." Each state tried, in the international relations especially in third world countries, to represent their socialism as the "only true" way of building a socialist society. The political leadership of the GDR did reject a new course that Gorbachev imposed in the USSR. They opposed to the processes of democratization and the changes in WB advocated by Gorbachev.

ISS system in GDR was organised on the level of independent, strong and influential ministry. Minister was also a, for a long time, member of the Politburo and SED. In Yugoslavia, however there has been some sharing of responsibility of repressive system within several government ministries. Part of federal civil service responsibilities transferred to civil intelligence and security services that existed in federal parts of Yugoslavia. Military counterintelligence services in Yugoslavia was very powerful and influential, sometimes more influential than civil services. The GDR's military service was in different situation: they never got a special importance.

As noted above MfS documentation is mostly preserved. Documentation is kept separately and is subject to an organized and systematic study and research in a special federal institution (BStU), which manages them. Unlike the GDR, the documents about, and produced in, intelligence and security services of the former Yugoslavia, did not have such destiny and they are not available, in most cases, for systematic study and researches.

As a part of movement that turn down the SED government, were many former IM's and HIM's of MfS. For one of them, Ibrahim Böhme²⁰ (one of the leading members of the East German democratic opposition and a leading member of the East German SPD) was even assumed that he, with his party, could win in the first multiparty elections²¹. In the case of Croatia, there were informants of the Yugoslavian ISS in a leadership of newly established

20 Gieseke, 2000., page 94. (after the MfS archive was opened, it was established that Boehme was a member of IM network of MfS).

21 Wolf, 2004., page 9.

political parties, but never at highest levels of the major political parties.

Cooperation of intelligence and security systems/services of GDR and Yugoslavia

On 15.10.1957, GDR and Yugoslavia²² established diplomatic relations. However, relations between the two intelligence and security systems, according to the available data and documents from MfS archive, almost did not exist until 1976. As already mentioned, a major cause of conflict was the ideological orientation of two systems.

Occasionally Yugoslavia was used as a meeting place with members of IM/HIM network. Markus Wolf states that he met one of the key informants of HVA, Gabriele Gast (she had a very high position in the Federal intelligence service of FRG) on the coast of Yugoslavia²³.

Yugoslavia, according to existing data, did not represent a special interest of intelligence and security system of GDR except in cases when the GDR citizens used the territory of Yugoslavia to escape toward West. Although the MfS had, at least one member detached as a staff at the Embassy of the GDR in Belgrade, and as well as members of MfS in different offices and tourist organizations of the GDR in Yugoslavia, the official meetings between representatives of two ISS's did not occurred for a long period of time.

BStU published, in February 2011, document with a list of output documents created in HVA (reporting to the General Administration of MfS's). This list also contains info about HVA documents (made from 1966. to 1988.) relating to Yugoslavia. Those document, divided into several groups according to the subject we describe in Table 1 (titled by the subject and the number of existing documents within the year of manufacture)²⁴. For years between the 1966.-1988, which are not presented in Table 1, there are no data about the document with Yugoslavia in subject.

Interestingly, in the 1977 two documents were produced about the estimates of the future situation in Yugoslavia after Tito's death. One has a NATO origin and the other from the

22 Chronik der DDR (1949-1960),
URL:http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chronik_der_DDR_%281949%E2%80%931960%29#1955, 12.7.2012.

23 Wolf, 2004., page 304.

24 Verzeichnis der Ausgangsinformation der HV A des MfS, Version 3.2, 09.02.2011., BStU – Abteilung Archivbestaende, Februar 2011.

FRG-in. So there is a slight possibility that it is the same, or similar, document.

Table 1
HVA output documents organized by theme and year of creation

Subject	Relations between FRG-SFRJ	Relations between DDR-SFRJ	Situation in SFRJ	Relations between SFRJ and other socialist states	Other relations between SFRJ and – US, France, NATO
Year / number of documents					
1966.	1				
1968.	1				
1969.				1	
1972.			1		
1973.	2				
1974.	2	1	1		
1975.	1	1			
1976.	1				1
1977.	3	2	1	2	1
1978.			1		
1979.	2		2		
1981.	1		2		
1982.	1	1			
1983.				3	
1984.	2		4	2	2
1985.		3	2	2	
1987.			1		
1988.		1			
Total	17	9	15	10	4

Yugoslavian authorities tried several times to establish official contacts with MfS on highest level. However, these relationships were of very low, limited, intensity. Relations intensified before, and during, international sports events organised in former Yugoslavia (the Winter Olympics in Sarajevo in 1984. and the Universidad games in Zagreb 1987.). Primarily MfS was interested to establish a closer relationship with the intelligence and security services of Yugoslavia in preserving the integrity of their sports teams.

It happened quite often that, GDR successful athletes left their sport teams and fled to the West. Political elite of GDR was "particularly sensitive" for those illegal migrations. Sport activities were in the GDR raised to the highest levels of importance with the aim of strengthening and promotion of GDR abroad. There are many indications and statements that GDR athletes, in competitions and as well as during training time, organized and systematic, used illegal stimulants that make sports achievements better.²⁵

More details about cooperation of ISS of those two states are in attached documentation that is an integral part of MfS archival material.

One of the documents, dated 26.8.1986, shows the chronology of the relationship between ISS of GDR and Yugoslavia. The first note is from 1976, when the topic was state security and the fight against terrorism. Yugoslav government declared an interest about the activities "of Croatian immigrants in Western countries." The next meeting held at the 1977, on the sidelines of the visit by Erich Honecker to Belgrade, when the ministers Mielke and Hrljević (then Yugoslavian Minister for internal affairs) met each other. After that meeting, there were no official contacts until 3.2.1983, when there was a meeting between head of Consular Section at the Embassy of the GDR in Belgrade and Dragoljub Mihajlovic, then head of the Department of International Cooperation at the Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Documents

Here we are publishing MfS documents that represent only a fraction of documents that are available in BStU and are closely associated with the former Yugoslavia. Documents are from 1976 to 1987. They are arranged in chronological order, not by subject matter they deal with. The documents are in German language.

The most frequent subjects of documents are:

- Attempts to establish formal cooperation between ISS's of the GDR and Yugoslavia;
- Reports on the collaboration of various institutions of the GDR and Yugoslavia,
- Operational reports on the "Croatian fascist exile" in Germany,

²⁵ Doping in der DDR; URL:<http://www.on-dope.de/doping-in-der-ddr>, 12.7.2012.

- Preparation of meetings of political representatives of GDR and Yugoslavia,
- Reports on the activities and behaviour of citizens of Yugoslavia during their stay in the GDR,
- Reports from the Embassy of the GDR in Belgrade on various internal political issues in Yugoslavia, and the comparison of Yugoslav authorities attitudes to other states,
- Issue of defectors/illegal migrants from the GDR which used territory of the SFRY as the last hurdle on their way to the West (toward Italy, Austria or Greece),
- Questions concerning official cooperation on major sporting events (Winter Olympics in Sarajevo in 1984, Universidad 1987, Zagreb),
- Relations between party and government officials of Yugoslavia and the USSR and other socialist countries,
- Notes from official meetings of different representatives of various state institutions of GDR and Yugoslavia, and
- Analysis of political and economic situation in Yugoslavia.

End of the GDR

After the results of local elections were forged, protests all around the GDR began in May 1989. This was a beginning of the end of the GDR as a state, and beginning of, in near future, integration into administrative, legal, political, economic, financial, judicial and security system of Germany (and in NATO and the EU also). After several months, on 9.11.1989, there was a symbolic destruction of "Antifascist protective wall" and the opening of borders of the GDR, especially toward FRG.

Government of Germany, led by Chancellor Helmut Kohl, has had an extremely difficult task that they need to fulfil before unification of two German states:

- Unite the two German states by reducing the political influence within the West Germany announced opponent of unification²⁶,
- Integrate two fundamentally different systems into one that will be able to continue to exist and function,

²⁶ In Bundesrat, against unification voted representatives, and prime ministers of those German states: Gerhard Schroeder (who was a German Chancellor later) for Lower Saxony and Oskar Lafontaine for Saar. (Schroeder, 2000, page 120.)

- To provide political support in Europe (primarily from the UK and France), the U.S. and the Soviet Union to continue the process of German unification and
- Active participation (as much as it is possible) to solve military and political crises in South East Europe that erupted at the same time.

From the position of FRG the dissolution of Yugoslavia, and especially the aggression of Serbia, Montenegro and the Yugoslav Army against Croatia and Slovenia could significantly complicate the process of German unification. However, Chancellor Kohl has succeeded in his plan and, on 3.10.1990 unification of the two German states and the termination of DDR was officially declared.

The process of German reunification was marked by some demonstrators' messages. The message "We are the people" slowly converted into the message "We are one nation". The final message was "Germany – united homeland".

Conclusion

In the communist totalitarian systems, intelligence and security system covered all aspects of society and state. It also includes all levels of communist party structures. Intelligence and security services had there informants, whether they did it voluntarily or the ones who were, by using other methods, forced to cooperate.

Based on the reports of informants (including those informants within the Party), various documents delivered to the state and party officials were made. Party leadership was in position to give to those services tasks, set their goals, led the personnel policies and oversee their work. Therefore, one may legitimately ask the question: in such systems who had a superior position: Party leadership against the leadership of the IIS or ISS leadership against the Party leadership because the ISS was able to monitor and supervise activities of a large number of Party members? The truth is probably somewhere in the middle: only a narrow circle of top party officials had been acquitted of any responsibility and able to use ISS for their purposes. Services dealt not only with the protection of the state but also the closest associate of top political leaders in the fight against "external and internal enemies" but also in the fight with the political opponents inside the party.

Their intelligence and security, and judicial systems were known by the strong repression against the differently

thinking population. Those are some of the key features of intelligence and security services of the former GDR, and the former Yugoslavia.

This article is just a short introduction for a book that will be written about same subject and with much more details.

Abbreviations:

Abt – Abteilung – Directorate

BRD – Bundesrepublik Deutschland

BStU - Der Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik - The Federal Commissioner for the Records of the State Security Service of the former German Democratic Republic

DDR – Deutsche demokratische Republik

FRG – Federal Republik of Germany

GDR – German democratic republik

HA – Hauptabteilung – Main directorate

HIM – Hauptamtliche Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter – full-time/long-term source/informant

IM – Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter – source/informant

ISS – Intelligence and security system

NVA - Nationale Volksarmee – National people's army

OiBE - Offiziere im besonderen Einsatz - Officers on special assignments

SED - Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands - Socialist Unity Party of Germany

SOZ – Soviet occupation zone

WB – Warsaw bloc

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Views published here expressed the attitudes of the author and cannot be connected with attitude of the institutions where author worked or still works.