I was, I say, a man of mild disposition, of command of temper, of an open, social, and cheerful humour, capable of attachment, but little susceptible of enmity, and of great moderation in all my passions. Even my love of literary fame, my ruling passion, never soured my temper, notwithstanding my frequent disappointments.

(‘My Own Life’, p.xl of Essays Moral, Political & Literary)

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The interest in exploring fame and the love of it relates not only to Hume's autobiography where he hypothesises the love of literary fame as a key spur to his work, but also to 2.1.11 in the Treatise where Hume offers an account of praise and our delight in it as part of his theory of the passions. It is in this section that Hume first introduces us to the wondrous mechanism of sympathy, a notion which does much work in the Book Three theory of morals. And, as I hope to show in
this paper, a proper understanding of how sympathy is to function is needed if we are to understand both the ways in which Hume's theory of the passions ascribes to them an intentionality or directedness, and also the ways in which ideas of self and other are central to the operation of the indirect passions.

Those commentators who wish to emphasise that element of Hume's account which supports the idea that the passions are intentional in character, and are not mere raw feelings, typically decry the peculiar terms in which he outlines the theory. Robert Solomon, for example, sums up a common attitude when he issues the verdict that, “Buried beneath the sometimes unintelligible rubble of his atomistic sensationalism and quasi-Newtonian casual theory of association, Hume defends a view of emotions in which beliefs, attitudes, intentions and judgments play an essential role” (Solomon, 2003, p. 42). And Donald Davidson in his famous reconstruction of Hume's theory of pride offers swiftly to let Hume's atomism go and instead to offer him a propositional theory of this emotion.

When we place Davidson's reconstruction in the context of Hume's discussion of the love of fame, however, we can immediately see that something is problematic about this enthusiastic form of reconstruction. According to Davidson, Hume takes a man proud of his house to judge himself praiseworthy in virtue of possessing a beautiful house (Davidson, 1976, pp. 284-5). And with such a conception of pride in place we would predict that the account of why we are pleased at the praise only of some people and not of others is easy to explain: we will take pleasure at the praise of another where we suppose the praise to be merited and not where we suspect it ill-grounded. Now Hume starts out his discussion of fame with just the question implicitly raised: why do we seek the praise of some and not others? But the account he offers in 2.1.11 does not take the form (or, anyway, does not predominantly take the form) that Davidson's account would itself suggest. For according to Hume, it is not with respect to the merit of praise that we filter the pleasure it can induce, but rather with respect to the similarity between ourselves and the person offering praise. Indeed it is precisely because of the need to explain how questions of similarity and difference can make an impact on our passions that Hume introduces discussion of the mechanism of sympathy at this point. Davidson's reconstruction of Hume, therefore, seems to disagree with the letter of Hume's own account, at least when we look to the nature of fame.

Still the reconstruction may not be true to the letter of Hume's position, but it is not in itself entirely unintuitive as a picture of pride.¹ For we do commonly think of attitudes to propositions. 'H is proud that…' seems to be a factive construction analogous to 'H knows that…'. However, in contrast to knowledge, perception and recollection constructions which are factive in this way, emotion verbs do not admit of an indirect interrogative form: 'H is proud whether…’ is ill-formed. One might suggest, here, that there is the mere appearance of a propositional attitude ascription, and that this talk is better understood in terms of indicating the grounds or elicitation of emotional response – as in indicating that in virtue of which one is proud, afraid or hopeful. I return below to the question whether there are advantages in avoiding construing emotional states as attitudes to propositions. Davidson's inclination to treat pride as a propositional attitude is criticized by Baier 1978, Solomon 2003, and Árdal 1989, all of whom are sympathetic to the idea that pride has an intentional content in some sense.

¹ That is also to leave aside the question whether we should treat our talk of emotions such as pride as ascribing propositional attitudes. ‘H is proud that…’ seems to be a factive construction analogous to ‘H knows that…’. However, in contrast to knowledge, perception and recollection constructions which are factive in this way, emotion verbs do not admit of an indirect interrogative form: ‘H is proud whether…’ is ill-formed. One might suggest, here, that there is the mere appearance of a propositional attitude ascription, and that this talk is better understood in terms of indicating the grounds or elicitation of emotional response – as in indicating that in virtue of which one is proud, afraid or hopeful. I return below to the question whether there are advantages in avoiding construing emotional states as attitudes to propositions. Davidson's inclination to treat pride as a propositional attitude is criticized by Baier 1978, Solomon 2003, and Árdal 1989, all of whom are sympathetic to the idea that pride has an intentional content in some sense.
tudes involved in such social emotions as pride and shame to be in part evaluative. One might respond, then, on Davidson's behalf that the reconstruction is to be preferred, since it underlines Hume's better thoughts about the nature of the passions and their relations to moral distinctions. But this defence of Davidson would miss the point of the complaint.

For, the conflict between Hume's discussion of fame and Davidson's reconstruction is not that Davidson supposes that pride involves evaluation while Hume denies it. That is, Hume certainly does not intend all elements of the evaluative or the normative to be bleached out of an account of the indirect passions. After all, it is clear that the passions through which he goes on to explain the moral distinctions we draw are intended by him to support normative and evaluative assessment in the ethical domain. The problem in Davidson's rewriting lies elsewhere: Davidson's reconstruction requires that normative judgements be taken as the primitives in an account of pride, while for Hume these aspects are themselves open to further psychological explanation, namely in the ways in which the elicitation of pleasure and the operation of sympathy interact.

If we leave aside the details of Hume's account because it requires us to talk of impressions and ideas and associationist principles, then we simply miss the distinctive ways in which Hume himself wishes to account for the directedness of the passions.

So my aim in this paper is try to achieve a more focused attention on precisely those elements. Not, in the end, because I want to recommend that we should now endorse a theory of the passions like Hume's (although I do think that there are interesting parallels between Hume's account of the passage of the passions and recent appraisal theories of the emotions in cognitive psychology). Rather my concern is to try to get more of a sense of the way in which Hume's theory actually works, and where, relative to that, its key limitations lie. In part one I address the doctrine of the double relation of impressions and ideas and the extent to which that allows for the directedness of the passions within the terms of Hume's atomism. In part two I turn to a neglected problem in this account which the accounts of praise and sympathy in 2.1.11 raise. Entirely independently of the somewhat anachronistic concerns with whether Hume's theory allows for the proper intentionality of the passions, there is an internal problem for Hume's own account of how pride connects cause and object in the discussion of sympathy in 2.1.11. The problem is of interest not because it undermines Hume's account, for Hume's text itself offers a solution in later discussion, but because it makes explicit exactly how the idea of self and the mechanism of sympathy are taken to interact in Hume's account. And this places us in a much better position to evaluate the extent to which Hume can accommodate the intentionality of pride. In the third and final part of the paper, I turn to that account and spell out the way in which the idea of self is as circumscribed in Hume's moral psychology as it is in his theoretical work. In particular, I suggest that we can see why Hume's theory must fail for human beings because he does not properly

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2 For an introduction to appraisal approaches one might look at Frijda 1986 and 2002.
accommodate vicarious emotions and the ways in which we can enter the perspective of others through having such passions.

**Part One: Atomism & the Directedness of the Passions**

A key feature of Hume's theory of the passions, emphasised by critics and acknowledged by defenders alike, is that the passions are taken to be brute simple feelings or impressions, and to be contrasted with 'reason'. While that might seem to settle the question in the negative concerning Hume's attitude towards the intentionality of the emotions, at least if we stick to the letter of his account, it would do so only at the cost of overlooking an equally important element in his story: that for Hume, following Hutcheson, the passions are secondary impressions, or impressions of reflection, feelings which derive from antecedent original impressions. When we understand the import of the distinction between original and secondary impression, we can see it gives equal weight in favour of the attribution of intentionality to the passions as does their classification as simple feelings give substance to the opposite view.

Hume acknowledges the common early modern trope that we can gain no insight into the causes of original impressions. In his discussion of substance and qualities in Book One, for example, he insists that we have no way of coming to know why the texture of a particular fruit should give rise to the relish distinctive of fig (1.4.5). But Hume does not hold the same agnostic attitude towards the explanation of the secondary impressions. Rather, the secondary impressions arise in response to primary impressions, and in Hume's key examples (on the one hand that of necessary connexion, and on the other the varieties of passion) the occasion of secondary impressions is subject to various principles.

Hence it is possible for a theory of the passions, given that it is a theory of secondary impressions, to proceed through isolating the principles which determine when one has such secondary impressions. A theory of original impressions could at best enumerate the variety of sensations we in fact enjoy, while for Hume the account of the indirect passions, principally pride, humility, love and hate, over the first two parts of Book Two develops through finding overarching principles which explain when one feels pride or shame and when one feels love or hate. It is only when he comes briefly to the direct passions in part three that Hume resorts to little more than a list. And in beginning the discussion with the indirect passions, Hume emphasises the extent to which a systematic account can be provided of the passions.

In proceeding in this way, Hume's theory contrasts with Descartes's approach to the passions. Descartes conceives of the passions as arising from the passage of animal

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3 "Original impressions or impressions of sensation are such as without any antecedent perception arise in the soul... Secondary, or reflective impressions are such as proceed from some of these original ones, either immediately or by the interposition of its idea. Of the first kind are all the impressions of the senses, and all bodily pains and pleasures: Of the second are the passions, and other emotions resembling them." (2.1.1 ¶1, p.181)
spirits through the body, and typically describes the onset of a passion as something disruptive of the agent’s plans, such that the virtuous agent is one who learns appropriately to control his or her passions; the virtuous man learns how to prevent the passions coming to interfere with his ends. Of course, Descartes does not restrict the psychological solely to the mind; an account of the working of the beasts should still be (in part at least) a psychology of them. But still the passions are conceived of as at the periphery of the mind and not a central concern of the study of distinctively human nature, which requires both the study of the soul and the substantial union of the soul with the body.⁴

Hume’s theory of the passions, on the other hand, is intended precisely to be an account of human nature as such: the scientific endeavour which philosophers can carry out, and which the Treatise advertises itself as concerned with.⁵ The general principles by which we explain the onset of a passion and the succession of passions are taken by Hume to be paradigms of psychological explanation. And it is this which gives a route back in to thinking of the passions as intentional or directed in character. For although Hume conceives of himself as a scientist, and most specifically as anatomist, of the human mind, still the kinds of psychological explanation he seeks to provide are clearly to be seen as continuous with narrative and explanation in history, and hence as a species of reason-providing, or character-invoking, explanation broadly understood. Although Hume himself tends to emphasise the contrast between action explained by passion and that explained by reason, it would be a misreading to suppose that he takes action explained through passions to require a kind of arational, or purely causal, explanation. His various discussions of how one passion can lead to another, or how a man can bring himself to act on duty despite hot temptation to the contrary, all evoke patterns of explanation which in later terms would be thought to be reason-invoking and narrative in intent.

Now psychological states are liable to figure in reason-giving explanations of behaviour only where those states possess, or are at least closely associated with, intentional contents: being about aspects of the world; or directed on making one state of affairs happen; or averting another. To the extent that we conceive of psychological explanations as reason-providing and as exploiting the intentionality or directedness of the psychological conditions cited in explanation, then we should see Hume’s psychological theory as a rationalizing one which exploits the intentionality of the emotions. It is no surprise, then, that the account is amenable to such retelling in the hands of Davidson or Árdal.

Given that there are such conflicting indications in Hume’s text, explicitly in favour of a mere feeling approach, and implicitly in strategy in favour of an intentional conception

⁴ See Descartes 1986.
⁵ Solomon too notes the contrast between Descartes and Hume. Kenny, on the other hand, supposes the difference to lie only in Hume’s attitudes towards the infallible knowledge of the powers of the mind.
of the passions, one can only properly make sense of his theory if the two elements can be reconciled, or, at the very least, if the continuing presence of conflicting influences can be explained. To do this, one needs to avoid simply dismissing Hume’s atomistic approach to the mind, and his guiding assumption that we can see it as a nation of cooperating perceptions (possibly with hidden forces which explain the mysteries of belief, sense of self and conviction as to the external world). Instead one needs rather to try to see how that commitment might shape an otherwise perfectly sensible conception of how our lives are formed and guided by forceful emotions.

Hume’s initial account of pride can be given simply, and briefly. Having first argued for the need to find a suitable general principle to explain the elicitation of pride by such a variety of objects, including those entirely novel, Hume proposes that it arises through a double relation of impressions and ideas. First the impression of some object or quality of an object leads the subject to have a further original impression of pleasure – for most of the proper objects of joy or pride the pleasure in question is to be understood as a bodily sensation. In the case of aesthetic and moral beauty there is an original impression of pleasure which is not to be supposed distinctively bodily. The original impression of the object gives rise to an idea, and that idea in turn can give rise to a passion, matching the original pleasure. In the simplest case, the passion in question (a direct passion) would be joy. Pride, however, is consequent on this where the object at which joy is felt has a close relation to oneself. The pleasurable feeling then spreads between the idea of the object which gave rise to the initial pleasure and the idea of self. This is simply diagrammatised so:

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6 With the obvious exception of orgasm, one might well be suspicious of the existence of any such feelings – and suspect that here Hume is misled by the mirroring he supposes to hold between pain and pleasure.
For Hume the simple feeling of pride arises as a matter of the general operation of the mind: it is an intermediary perception between the idea of the object, the *cause* or *subject* of the passion, and the idea of self, the *object* of the passion. This offers a double relation of impressions and ideas because the valence of the passion (be it a pleasure or a pain) rests in the original impression from which it arises, while the directedness of the passion is reflected in the way in which the idea of the original cause of pleasure or pain in turn gives rise to the corresponding passion.

Giving an account of the passion in these terms does run together the initial elicitation of the emotion with further manifestations within the later history of the subject. The two original impressions belong with the initial elicitation: the impression of the cause together with the impression of pleasure (or pain). The centrality of ideas to the account of passions comes from the distinctive character of later revival of feeling when one reflects on the situation which raised or sustains the emotion: the idea of the cause (hence no longer at the time of onset) causes the distinctive pleasure which is pride and that engages the idea of self. We will return to the significance of this conflation below.

As I have already noted, commentators sympathetic to Hume are keen to find in these principles Hume’s commitment to the intentionality of the passions and even an implicit recognition of the alleged judgemental form that the emotions take. The parallel emphasis in Hume’s writing which critics seize on as evidence of the absence of any intentionality to emotions as such are the declarations that the passions are simple feelings and lack in representative force, for example:

> A passion is an original existence, or, if you will, modification of existence, and contains not any representative quality, which renders it a copy of any other existence or modification. When I am angry, I am actually possest with the passion, and in that emotion have no more reference to any other object, than when I am thirsty, or sick, or more than five foot high. (2.3.3 ¶5, p. 266)
Sympathisers are then inclined to take such passages as symptoms of the dread atomism, and the unfortunate associationism that Hume's philosophy displays. As a consequence, Hume's defenders tend to re-write the way in which Hume accommodates the directedness or intentionality of the passions when they recount the theory. Before following them in such a process of re-writing, we might pause instead, and ask: why, in the context of atomism, should Hume insist on the simplicity of the passions and their lack of representativeness? Why, if Hume is so sensitive to the general conditions under which the passions arise and transform into each other, should he be so insistent on treating them as simple existences, and as mere feelings?

The first thing to underline is that Hume not only takes each of the passions to be simple and not complex feelings, but also treats each of them as a variety of pleasure or pain. That is, although Hume thinks of the passions as pleasures and pains, and explains their status as such by reference to the original impressions which give rise to them, he does not treat them as complexes of pain or pleasure together with some further element. Indeed, given Hume's general account of perceptions (those things which he supposes predominantly provide the furniture of the mind), were he to suppose that pride, for example, was a complex feeling including pleasure and some further element, then we should suppose that the complex impression of pride should be separable into the pleasure pure together with an additional feeling. The additional feeling of pride would not itself be a pleasure, since the pleasure in pride would be accounted for by the simple feeling of pleasure which we had isolated out. Hence Hume, by holding these to be simple feelings, takes pride to be a determination of the determinable pleasure rather than something in addition to it. In this his theory accommodates that element of recent psychological theories which supposes that essentially the emotions have a hedonic tone – they reflect the positive or negative stance of being in the emotional state. At the same time he avoids the supposition that there are isolable feelings of pure pleasure within the passions themselves (although as noted before, he does not avoid that commitment in relation to original impressions).

Moreover, that pride involves three distinct elements – the idea of subject or cause, the simple feeling, and the idea of object, the self – and connects them not into one complex, but through the operation of principles within the mind, also reflects a necessary concomitant of Hume's approach. Notoriously Hume's discussion of perceptions presupposes an imagistic conception of thought, with some notable exceptions (principally of space, time and self, possibly also that of body). Ideas as copies of impressions reflect the seeming presentational element of the sense impressions copied. Complex ideas are typically treated as if the presentation of a scene composed from the elements presented by the corresponding simple impressions. In this way no separation and logical relation among elements can be presented in terms of just one idea, be it simple or complex. But in Hume's account of the passions just such a separation is required.

For Hume's story about the passions offers in part a story of the elicitation or onset of a passion. One encounters some object or feature and thereby feels pleasure. At this
stage we have the conjunction of two impressions. The impression of the object gives rise to an idea, and the impression of pleasure to a passion directed towards that idea. Hume’s story introduces a psychological change in which an event leads to the elicitation of an emotional state. Yet, as we noted above, Hume does not mark any distinction between the initial onset of a passion and the later psychological manifestation of the same passion in a subject’s life. For example, suppose that you have offered a fine feast to your neighbours. As you survey and eat the food, the visual and gustatory pleasure gives rise to joy, and through the association of the objects with you, to pride. We have here a distinctive moment in your biography when the emotion of pride directed at the feast occurred. But Hume is not only interested in this, but also in all later manifestations of the pride in question. On those occasions the mere memory of the feast will be enough to lead to the swelling of one’s breast. As Hume tells the story, the idea of the feast causes the passion of pride which brings to mind the idea of self. The three-fold causal story marks the different roles that subject of pride, feeling of pride, and object of pride all play.

Hume’s manner of distinguishing between the subject and object of pride in terms of causal connections makes some sense in the context of the initial elicitation of the passion. The onset of a passion is, after all, a psychological change brought about through suitable antecedents. Given Hume’s conception of pride, the emotion in question is one of positive valence connected to objects and events which one sees as good, useful or pleasurable. Appraisal theories of the emotions typically mark the distinction between events which elicit emotional reactions and the re-appraisal or evaluation of one’s value structure in the light of that event. The separation of subject and object has the merit of reflecting that structural difference: pleasure directed at oneself indicates the positive re-evaluation in the light of a feature itself seen to be positive and appropriately connected to oneself.

It must be said, though, that the story looks artificial when applied not to the origin of the pride, but to any occasion in which the pride is taken to be manifested or the feeling elicited in the individual. As Hume tells the story, the mere idea of the cause of pride coming to mind is sufficient to bring about the feeling of pride itself which thereby directs the individual’s attention to him-or herself. As critics and sympathisers alike complain, this is to substitute a causal and temporal order for something which seems better to be thought of as indicating a logical or at least psychological connection: that in feeling proud the individual takes the feature to be the grounds of this positive self-appraisal; and that the appraisal in question is distinctively one involving oneself.

But if we leave aside criticism for the moment, and seek simply to understand the ways in which Hume can allow for the intentionality of passion within his scheme, then we can still draw the following moral. Given that the cause and object of the passion must play distinct psychological roles in the onset and sustenance of pride, Hume cannot treat them simply as simpler components within a complex idea. The various elements
which make up a complex impression or idea are not thereby distinguished from each other: each is simply an isolable part of the complex. So where the double direction that Hume discerns in pride (and the other indirect passions) is seen to be essential to the psychological role of that emotion, then the connection between subject on the one hand, feeling, and then object on the other must be marked in some other way than through the gathering up of impressions or ideas into complex perceptions. A complex impression or idea involving the elicitor of pride and the self would not itself reveal any causal or other relation among these elements apart from juxtaposition. For these to be related, from Hume’s perspective, requires that the mind relate them, and so move from one to the other. And this is precisely what the theory of double-relation of impressions and ideas provides: an account of how the mind moves from one presentation to another thereby expressing a commitment to the relation among them.

In turn, this explains why Hume is committed to having to think of the passions as simple impressions connected by such general principles. Since the passions in question can involve the evaluation of different subjects and, in the case of other-directed passions, different objects, the variation in the directedness of the passion needs to be accommodated in ideas of subject and object. By treating the passion itself as a third thing which is simple, Hume makes it something properly subject to the laws of association within the mind. Passions, for Hume, are real things which make a difference within the mind – were they complex (complex ideas or complexes of ideas and impressions), then the more fundamental psychological theory would deal with the combination of the simples out of which the passions are constructed.

I do not mean to be here some straightforward apologist for Hume’s account, suggesting that we should either think of the passions he discusses as feelings, or suppose his atomism gives the best account of the intentionality of the emotions. The fact that Hume must collapse the contrast between the elicitation of an emotion and its later manifestation is a clear indication of the limitation of his psychological theory. Hume writes as if the basic building blocks of the mind are the various elements of the stream of consciousness, even if some may be less to the fore in attention than others. But we do not think of the mind solely in this way, and it ill-fits our conception of most emotional states to suppose that they are simply episodes of feeling in the way Hume talks of. One should expect, therefore, that Hume’s picture will include some anomalies. Nonetheless, it seems to me anachronistic not to try and take on Hume’s discussion of the principles by which passions are aroused as offering an account of their intentionality, and thereby to assess the extent to which it can succeed at that.

Yet for the account to work, that is, for it properly to accommodate the intentionality of the passions within its own terms, it is necessary that Hume’s account of the sequence of ideas, impressions, and ideas be inviolable: that is, that pride is occasioned by the idea of its cause and consequently leads to the idea of self. For the role that each idea plays in relation to the passion is marked just by this temporal and causal structure. The
question then arises: can Hume really keep to this stricture? This raises a question not merely external to Hume's theory, asking of its adequacy given our own ends, but one internal to the discussion which Hume himself sets forward. For, as I shall argue in the next section, Hume's own gloss on the positive character of praise comes into tension with the theory of pride.

**Part Two: The Problem of Praise & the Remarkable Mechanism of Sympathy**

It is at this point that the discussion of love of fame becomes so problematic. Recall that, as we noted at the outset, Hume seeks to explain the role of the esteem of others in generating our self-love as not primarily a normative matter. I do not feel proud when praised because I think that some aspect of me merits the praise. Rather the differential effect of the ranking of others reflects the operation of sympathy: it is because another is sufficiently similar to me that my idea of their love of me for some quality brings about the same passion in me. Sympathy operates to transfer the idea of their passion, their love for me, into an impression in me, the pride I feel as a result.

Now sympathy is a fundamental mechanism within Hume's theory of mind. It belongs in the account of morality and in articulating Hume's attitude towards the self. Sympathy is not, or not normally, a feeling for Hume; it is not compassion or benevolence. Rather it is a 'remarkable mechanism' of the mind which takes one from the idea of another's sentiment to an impression. Contrast this with the other discussion of secondary impressions in the *Treatise*: for all that causal reasoning can do, no conversion of ideas into impressions takes place. One's beliefs are not seeming perceptions of future events, even if they come to have much the same force within the mind. Although there is no route back from ideas to impressions in the theoretical realm, when it comes to the passions, matters are different.

Hume's most common gloss on how sympathy achieves this feat is that it works by giving a subject the same passion as the person to whom they are responding. As he writes, when first introducing sympathy:

…the idea of the affections of others are converted into the very impressions they represent. (2.1.11, ¶8 p. 208)

And in later discussion he uses similes of mirrors or of strings resonating together:

In general we may remark, that the minds of men are mirrors to one another, not only because they reflect each others emotions, but also because those rays of passions, sentiments and opinions may be often reverberated, and may decay away by insensible degrees. (2.2.5, ¶21, p. 236)

The minds of all men are similar in their feelings and operations; nor can any one be actuated by an affection, of which all others are not, in some degree,
susceptible. As in strings equally wound up, the motion of one communicates itself to the rest; so all affections readily pass from one person to another, and beget correspondent movements in every human creature. (3.3.1, ¶7, p. 368)

The way in which sympathy operates is through the imagination acting on an idea (cf. 2.2.11 ¶7). And this might mislead one into supposing that sympathy works through a kind of empathising: namely, that the sympathetic agent arrives at an emotional response through imagining himself into the shoes of the other, imagining the affective significance of that situation and thereby forming an actual emotional response to the other’s plight. But, as many commentators stress, the mechanism is not equivalent to empathy. Although the mechanism of sympathy is a mechanism of the imagination, it works in a simpler way than the empathetic characterization requires. The mirroring and resonance metaphors suggest rather that one comes to have the passion that the other possesses: sympathy just acts as the conduit for you to match the feelings of the other. It is tempting, therefore to suppose that Hume intends here something like the idea of emotional contagion: as when a primary class is all overcome by panic, because one or two among the children become scared.

Yet even if the empathy story is inappropriate through being overblown in its psychological sophistication, the contagion story is also too simple to capture the way Hume must intend the mechanism to work. Because Hume's account of the operation of the passions is more properly seen as giving rise to complementary and not identical passions in a wide range of cases. Where you are hurt and come to feel grief at your discomfort, what Hume would call humility, the passion that I come to feel as the result of sympathy must be pity and not humility. Your humility is an indirect passion directed towards yourself, but my pity is an other-directed passion, with you as its object. According to Hume, both humility and pity are distinct simple feelings, conjoined with the idea of self or the idea of a loved one. In this case, then, sympathy has not produced the same passion in me as was present in you. So the action of sympathy must be such as to keep track of the appropriate object of the passion. The model of emotional contagion does not seem to offer the complexity which allows us to explain the way in which this can occur. With contagion, one child feels panic, and the next child feels panic and so on: the emotion is the same in each case and we do not have to worry about shifting the object of concern.

Now the fact that sympathy must, in some cases, produce complementary and not identical passions may be thought to pose a problem for Hume. For, if sympathy is supposed to turn an idea of a passion into an impression, then how can it be that the idea of one kind of passion should produce a completely different one? Well, this is a problem to which we will return later. But we can note now that if Hume simply spoke of sympathy as a mechanism which turns ideas into impressions (and did not insist on its being an operation of the imagination), one would not have a problem with the idea that the mechanism in question must be sensitive to the self/other distinction. One can
think of the contrast as a toggle marking a passion as being self-or other-directed: when one inputs a relevant idea of an other-directed passion, then a self-directed passion will result as output; where an idea of a self-directed passion is input, the output is then other-directed. Before we consider further whether sympathy could work in this way, though, we need to raise a more acute problem for Hume's proposals.

Where the account of sympathy is really problematic if it operates simply to produce complementary passions is in the account where Hume first introduces it, that of the love of fame. Hume's own initial gloss of how sympathy is to work in this case is as follows:

…no person is ever prais'd by another for any quality, which wou'd not, if real, produce, of itself, a pride in the person possessst of it. The elogiums either turn upon his power, or riches, or family, or virtue; all of which are subjects of vanity, that we have already explain'd and accounted for. ’Tis certain, then, that if a person consider'd himself in the same light, in which he appears to his admirer, he wou'd first receive a separate pleasure, and afterwards a pride or self-satisfaction, according to the hypothesis above-explain'd. Now nothing is more natural than for us to embrace the opinions of others in this particular, both from sympathy which renders all their sentiments intimately present to us; and from reasoning, which makes us regard their judgment, as a kind of argument for what they affirm. (2.1.11, ¶9, p. 208-9)

And it is summed up at the end of the section with the principle:

...the pleasure, which we receive from praise, arises from a communication of sentiments... (2.1.11¶19, p. 210)

If we read this account at face value, Hume suggests that we love the praise of others consequent on the pride which it brings forth in our qualities. And such pride arises as a result of the operation of sympathy: when another praises me for some quality, I possess the idea of his or her love; where the individual is suitably like me (or in a superior social position) sympathy then acts to convert this idea of a passion of theirs, the idea of love, into the complementary passion in me, the self-directed pleasure of pride. That is, according to Hume, we are to understand why we value praise (and do so selectively) in terms of the operation of praise on one’s feelings of pride. Rather than thinking of praise in itself as of value to us, i.e., in Hume’s terms as something which directly can give rise to pleasure, we should instead think of it as something which is indirectly of concern, through its effects on pride. The praise of another can increase the pride one feels through the action of sympathy, and given that pride is a form of pleasure, one can thereby take delight in the praise which elicits it.

As noted at the outset, although this account is not given directly in terms of questions about the merit or demerit of praise, one should not suppose that Hume is entirely in-
different to this aspect of pride. Rather, the account offered is intended to explain that element. This is reflected in the brief list of objections that Hume considers right at the end of the section. For example:

Plagiaries are delighted with praises, which they are conscious they do not deserve; but this is a kind of castle-building, where the imagination amuses itself with its own fictions, and strives to render them firm and stable by a sympathy with the sentiments of others. (2.1.11, ¶19, p. 211)

The problem that plagiarists pose, I take it, is that the plagiarist, in having copied the work of another, actually lacks the quality proper to him or herself which would give the pleasure appropriate to pride. If the value of praise to us is an indirect one which operates through the pleasure of pride itself, the plagiarist is problematic because the plagiarist cannot be proud of his or her work, since there is none such to be proud of. How, then, can the plagiarist still take an interest in the praise of others? The suggested solution is that the plagiarist engages in imaginative make-believe and thinks of himself–or herself as possessed of the quality praised, the make-believe being reinforced by the operation of the praise of others, and thereby comes to feel the pleasure requisite to pride. In this way, that element which Davidson and others would wish to conceive of in terms of a judgement of merit can always be treated by Hume instead as the occasion of a suitable sentiment: a suitable feeling of pleasure or pain.

The account offered may remain consistent with our intuitions about the role of merit in the occasion of pride, and hence with the way in which praise should be filtered by considerations of its merit. To that extent one may think Hume's account of the love of fame is a success. The real problem, though, with this way of construing Hume's discussion comes from connecting it back to our earlier discussion of the directedness of the passions. For we saw in the last section that given the combination of Hume's atomism and his recognition of the psychological complexity of passions (that element of them which involves a double relation of ideas), he can accommodate the way in which passions are directed only in terms of the laws of human nature which bind passions to their subjects and objects. According to that approach, the indirect passion of pride requires: an object, the self; a subject or cause, the object or quality found pleasant; and there to be a ‘close relation’ between the two. Yet, on the story we have just told, we are to surmise that the mechanism of sympathy itself gives rise to the secondary impression of pride. That would give us a causal sequence of: an idea of another's love; the operation of sympathy; an impression of pride; the idea of self. Since the impression of pride is itself a simple feeling, the idea of its subject, the alleged cause of pride, can enter the picture only if it occupies the position of cause to the feeling. And if sympathy is operative in praise through converting ideas of love into feelings of pride, then there is no place for the idea of cause to play any role.
The passion of which one has an idea is directed onto some quality closely related to one, such that the pleasing nature of that quality issues in love for one. Pride in turn must be pleasure split between some idea of an object or quality which is closely related to self and the idea of self as a result of that relation. But if sympathy is directly responsible for the passion, then no account has been given of how the idea of one's own quality can be present as the cause of this passion and present as appropriately related to the object of the pride. For the idea which is input to the operation of sympathy will be an idea of the passion of the giver of praise, an idea of their love. But what one is to come to feel proud of is not their love, on this story, but rather of that aspect of oneself which they love. Now of course the fact that a praise-giver will cite that in one which they feel to be worthy of praise will bring to mind the appropriate idea. But this is not to say that the idea can be manifest in the mind as an operative cause of the feeling of pride. If sympathy is to play its role it must be operative in generating the feeling, doing so through one's idea of the other's passion. And so we seem to have a conflict, for this to be a genuine case of pride, the cause of the pride must be operative; yet for this to be an instance in which sympathy plays its role, the action of sympathy must be responsible for the feeling, and hence must treat the idea of the love of the other as the cause of pride. We end up, when reading Hume at face value, with an inconsistent story.

So, on the reading we have so far given we face the following problem. Given Hume's account in general of the directedness of the passions, we must suppose that for any given occasion of pride we are faced with the temporal and causal sequence of: i) an idea of cause; ii) an impression of pride; (iii) the idea of self. It is this exceptionless recurrence of the triad which exemplifies for Hume the sense in which pride is directed at the self, a form of self-appraisal, and is a form of pleasure with that object grounded in those qualities one possesses, or which are close to one which are themselves such as to please. Given the gloss that we have given of Hume's account of praise, we are to see sympathy as a mechanism which induces pride in response to the love of another. This would suggest in such cases the following causal sequence: idea of the other's love of one; operation of sympathy; impression of pride; the impression of self. Although further out, in the other's mind, so to speak, the idea of cause is present (for in that person's mind we have the sequence, idea of cause; idea of love; idea of loved one), it is not operative in the case of praise-induced pride in the way the original story requires. I have the idea of the cause of pride when the other praises me, but that idea doesn't get to play its normal role if sympathy itself is to explain how I come to feel proud as a result of praise. Hence, the account of the directedness of pride on the one hand and the gloss on the workings of praise on the other are inconsistent with each other.

Now one can respond to this problem in a number of ways. One can simply rest with the conclusion that Hume's theory of the passions is, as it turns out, inconsistent. Independently of any concern with whether the principles of association are an appropriate means of realizing the intentionality of the passions, one can see that Hume cannot get the principles to work together coherently. Alternatively, one can seek to revise Hume's
theory of the passions in order to restore consistency. Revision could be brought about either through altering the theory of pride or through construing the account of sympathy in a different way. With respect to pride one might argue that one needs to generate a more complex set of principles through which it arises and in terms of them to define its directedness. So, one might hypothesise that the outline of the theory in 2.1.5 and 2.1.6 is subject to revision in the light of the operation of sympathy as introduced in 2.1.11, and hence seek to reconstruct the theory much in the way offered earlier. Moving in this direction, I suggest, would require stepping outside of the terms in which Hume himself discusses the passions and the operation of sympathy. For nowhere does he suggest that the general principle by which pride and humility operate needs to be revised in the light of further aspects of the account.

An alternative strategy does have good textual basis, however. For one could instead seek to elaborate in a different way the operation of sympathy, and in the light of that re-construe the way in which love of praise is to arise. And, as we shall see below, there is ample textual evidence that the workings of sympathy are more complex as far as Hume is concerned than our discussion so far has given us reason to believe. Other parts of Hume's discussion of the passions and the operation of sympathy reveal that we can construe the account of the connection between praise and pride differently; although Hume himself never in fact offers any explicit gloss in the terms we will offer. Hume is less straightforward in his account of sympathy than one might have supposed. We therefore need now to turn to Hume's discussion of the problem of pity and malice.

In 2.2.9, Hume raises the problem that the good or ill fortune of others can produce different results in different people. A pain in one victim (which naturally produces the passion of humility in them) can cause in one person a corresponding passion of pity and in yet another a corresponding passion of malice. I may in response to different people, or to the same person at different times, feel pity and then malice. And according to Hume there is equal variability in response to positive emotions. Someone with a suitable great quality which gives them pride may induce in me a corresponding emotion of love and esteem for them with respect to that quality; but I may as well be caused to feel a pain, envy, in response to their good fortune.

Hume himself takes this to be a major concern for his theory of sympathy and gives over the whole of section 9 of part two to solving the problem. While the problem itself is clearly delineated, the elements of the explanation of how Hume can solve it are less perspicuous. In part the explanation goes by how large the pain of the other is that one is to attend to; and in part the explanation is through the desire that one then has for the other to do well or badly, dependent on whether one loves or hates them; in addition, one's sense of their rank relative to one also plays a key role. All of these seem relevant catalytic elements in bringing about differential responses. What they do not do, so far, is help with indicating how it can be that the operation of sympathy in response to the idea of another's sentiment can produce differing sentiments, even where it works simply to turn an idea into a corresponding impression.
However, although it is not underlined, it is easy to extract the required solution from the text. The key thought in the account which addresses this concern is Hume’s admission that a passion that arises in one through sympathy is not conceived to arise solely through the operation of sympathy on one’s idea of the other’s passion. The passion that results in one’s own breast arises from the action of sympathy in concert with the operation of other elements. As Hume puts the point:

…”tis not the present sensation or momentary pain or pleasure, which determines the character of any passion, but the general bent or tendency of it from the beginning to the end. (2.2.9, ¶11, p. 247)

But still, the question remains: how can these other elements, already to some extent listed, have an appropriate causal influence? We can best pursue this question negatively, by ruling out certain options. The activity of sympathy, we have been told, is just to convert an idea into an impression, so we cannot conceive of these other elements as acting as somehow in consort with this idea on the operation of sympathy, as if they were catalysts or further chemical elements which cause sympathy to output different impressions. If they operated in that manner, then we could not conceive of sympathy as being a mode of the imagination which simply made more forceful or vigorous the idea of a sentiment until, remarkably, an appropriate impression resulted.

If these elements are not to act as causal influences on sympathy directly, however, they could still be causally operative in relation to the effects of sympathy; i.e., they could act together with the effect of sympathy on the passion which ultimately results from its operation. Indeed, that would make most sense of the italicized principle which Hume thinks we need to take to heart: in order to work out what passion arises in the breast we need to look at the full manner in which passions arise in response to desires and other concerns. In that case, we need to conceive of it in terms of sympathy having produced an impression which, in the context of these further mental elements, leads now to one passion, and now to another. And hence we should more properly think of sympathy as initially producing an impression more akin to an original impression which would then give rise to passion as a secondary impression. On this model of the working of sympathy, it operates through the idea of another’s pain or pleasure: those ideas give rise to corresponding impressions, that is, to instances of pain or pleasure. If sympathy is to produce a matching impression to an idea, the proper object of matching here should be thought not to be the secondary impression – the passion in question – but rather the original impression, the pleasure or pain which the other has.

And so we find that Hume in ¶11 of 2.2.9 contrasts primary and secondary sensation in the action of sympathy, paralleling his talk at the outset of Book Two of the contrast between original and secondary impression, and then again in ¶15 uses the contrast between original impression and subsequent desire. In the same paragraph he goes on to talk of a ‘double tendency’ to mirror the discussion elsewhere of a ‘double relation’ in
the case of the indirect passions. The parallel here has to be handled carefully. Hume, I take it, does not want to go as far as to say that one literally feels a physical pain when one observes the humiliation of another: rather one has a sentiment which moves one and which is itself a pain. Recall that in the case of beauty Hume supposes that the feeling a beautiful or virtuous thing induces in one is a pleasure but not a bodily sensation. Likewise here there would be room within the terms that Hume has sketched already for himself to suppose that there are pains and pleasures involved which are not strictly bodily. Nonetheless the point is not one that Hume makes himself.

His silence on this matter does not affect the important conclusion to draw: the enduring passion in which we are interested on the basis of the activity of sympathy is not the immediate effect of sympathy but that which can arise consequent upon it. And feelings arise consequent upon original impressions in accord with general principles. The further conditions that Hume highlights for us then can be seen as the conditions which determine the principle thereby in operation.

In accord with this, Hume argues that the differential responses reflect the manner in which the original impression arises such that it can interact with the observer’s desires of benevolence and anger. In ¶15, Hume suggests that where the distress of the other is too slight, or one’s sympathy with them too meagre (and hence, despite great distress on the part of the other, will produce too weak an impression within one’s own mind), the resulting original impression will be a pain but will not in itself engage with the benevolence one feels towards fellow men. The resulting response within the observer’s mind is then just to the distress he or she feels, and the consequent passion will be a painful one directed towards the other: hatred or contempt. On the other hand, where the other suffers sufficiently great misery that the original impression formed through sympathy is significant, then that sensation will be sufficient to engage one’s further feelings towards the other, and hence where there is benevolence directed at that person, will lead to an appropriate passion of pity or compassion. In turn there is an upper bound to this process, as ¶18 spells out: if the event occurring to the other is so horrendous as to capture all attention, then again one’s further desires towards the other will be immobilised and nothing but horror can arise.

Now that we have seen that the operation of sympathy in inducing passions in one in response to those of others is more complex than the simpler glosses Hume sometimes gives of it, we can apply this back to the account of sympathy in general and more specifically to our original problem of the functioning of praise in relation to pride.

The first thing to note is that once we mark the distinction between the original sensation resultant from the operation of sympathy and the further passion persisting as a result, there is no puzzle why complementary rather than identical passions should arise through the operation of sympathy. When the other person is humiliated and suffers great misery, the impression which results is a pain. As the possibility of hatred or contempt indicates, the pain which immediately follows can as easily be taken to be
a concern for self as for the other. So the complementarity of the passion which finally occurs rests on the further desires and concerns of the agent.

Now in the case of praise, the relevant passion signified through the praising words and behaviour of the other is a positive passion, a pleasure, namely one of love or admiration directed towards some quality proper to oneself. The operation of sympathy in this case should produce a first sensation or original impression of pleasure. The persisting passion which results should likewise depend upon the further mental context in which this impression arises. In this context, what is present to the mind are the ideas of the praise itself, and the idea of the quality of self mentioned in the act of praise, which idea bears suitable relation to self. The pleasure which results from praise, therefore, will determine in one an impression of pride through the operative cause of the idea of the quality of one which thereby determines the pleasure as properly belonging to self.

That is, what will determine the passion that should arise from praise as a self-directed pleasure, namely pride, is only that in addition to the pleasure which arises as a result of the activity of sympathy in response to the praise itself, the idea of the object of love is present in the mind and hence can turn the mind to the fact that this is proper to one and so requires self-satisfaction. Indeed, the necessity of this within the story is reflected by the possibility of sympathy acting in relation to expressions of love in relation to objects other than oneself. Suppose that someone suitably similar to you declares love not of some quality that you yourself possess but rather that some third party does. Since the declaration is the expression of love, one cannot but form the idea of a positive passion on the enthusiast's part. With sufficient similarity between the two of you, the idea of this pleasure will be strong enough to convert on your own part to a pleasure that you feel. Nonetheless, the appropriate passion to arise cannot be that of pride, since there is nothing directed towards oneself in the love. Rather, it should appropriately result in love on your part for the same object of adoration as the enthusiast. And it could only do so if the idea of the quality praised in one's own mind can also suitably be associated with the idea of the object which the original love was directed at, and towards which one's own passion will be directed. These further associations must occur in one's own mind, and so occur consequent on the action of sympathy.

Therefore, once we apply back the distinction Hume himself employs in 2.2.9 to the discussion of praise, we can see more easily how sympathy can give rise to differently directed passions, and how the relevant idea of the cause of an indirect passion can still play its required role in the explanation of why one ends up with increased pride or love as the result of the talk of others. However, we can purchase this advantage only at the cost of two further problems to be answered. So our final answer to the riddle posed above can be had only when these are addressed.

The first of these is that, as we noted above, Hume's original gloss of the operation of praise would seem to make the pleasure in praise secondary to the pleasure of pride induced. For example, as we noted, both the problem posed by the example of plagiarists,
and the solution offered would seem to be located in the supposed absence of a ground for the pleasure of pride, and its substitution through the action of imagination. Yet if merely hearing praise from someone, which is after all the expression of love, is itself something which gives rise to pleasure, then the story needs reversing. The love of fame itself will be primary: it is pleasant to hear the expression of pleasurable passions, and it is more pleasant to hear this where one is suitably similar to the one expressing their pleasure. The connection with pride will then be secondary. Is this reversal consistent with the actual discussion in 2.1.11?

The most direct way to address this is to work out what sense we can make of the example of the plagiarist in terms of this new account. Again the first thing to note is that the praise expressed by others will itself be an expression of love for the works stolen. In as much as a pleasurable passion is being expressed by those relevantly similar to one, the plagiarist cannot but feel an original pleasure in response to the praise as expressed. So far this is consistent with the question of merit in relation to the written works. Given that the plagiarist has stolen works of sufficient merit, then both he and his admirers will be moved to pleasure by just the same qualities of these works. Yet that pleasure in the work is not yet a pleasure directed at an appropriate object and so yet grounded in the relevant quality. What Hume is concerned with is that the plagiarist does end up with a feeling of pride as a result of the praise, even though the writings praised are not proper to him or her. And this concern will remain whether the expression of praise initially gives pleasure or not. For the question remains: how can it reinforce a pleasure directed at the plagiarist him: or herself? So, even on this retelling, imagination must play just the role that Hume indicates that it does: the plagiarist needs to imagine the writings as being produced by him or herself, in order that the pleasure that arises be a suitable feeling of pride.

Hence, the introduction back into the story of the distinction that 2.2.9 exploits between the initial impression and the persisting passion just requires us to note that Hume’s focus in 2.1.11 is, in effect, on the persisting passion. With that in mind, there need be no real contradiction between the explicit terms of 2.1.11 and the doctrine as we have now expanded it. In turn this raises the second problem. If Hume in fact supposes that sympathy works in the more complex way indicated over the last few paragraphs of this paper, why does he offer the glosses that he does in the simpler terms of mirrors and resonating strings? Is Hume here not simply inconsistent in the conception that he has of sympathy?

In answering this question, we must bear in mind competing elements in Hume’s account of human nature. In the closing remarks of the Treatise, Hume compares his enterprise to that of an anatomist rather than a painter. The account of morals and the theory of passions are both theories which Hume puts forward as subject to empirical confirmation (although he also expects his readers to be able to confirm the correctness of the doctrines through experimentation on themselves and through reflection.
on appropriate historical examples). He does not expect the details of his theories to be self-evident truths to his readership, and this should be emphasised in relation to the proposal that we are to understand the operation of the indirect passions through a double relation of impressions and ideas. At the same time, there are elements of the theory which Hume does expect his readership to find plausible just from the initial description. So we can see some of the passages about the working of sympathy, particularly in relation to the theory of morals, in these terms. When Hume is concerned to sketch the broad working of sympathy in the mind he is as concerned to highlight its effects as to underline the hypothesis about how it should produce these effects. In relation to our particular concern with praise and pride, it is as important for Hume to get confirmation for the theory by showing how it accords with our initial judgements about when one does or does not feel pride in response to praise, as to sketch the exact route by which pride should arise in response to praise.

That is, the suggestion is that Hume buries the details of the workings of his account in order better to get the reader to accept the overarching details. However, in order for us to see how the theory of passions can accommodate the directedness of the emotions, we need to lay bare fully the various mechanisms which Hume avails himself of. Once we do that, we can see that Hume does indeed have the resources to render his accounts of pride and praise consistent.

**Part Three: Intentionality & the Self**

Over the last few pages enough has been done, I take it, to illustrate how Hume's theory of the passions does accommodate the directedness or intentionality of the passions through appeal to the double relation of impressions and ideas, namely through the causal pattern for the occasion and revival of such sentiments. Within the context of Hume's atomism, this is the only way in which the peculiar intentionality of the emotions could be accommodated.

Leaving aside just the strict question of making sense of Hume, how well does his account fare, though, in providing for the intentionality of the emotions? The most obvious concern to press is the one that led Kenny simply to reject Hume's position out of hand: that he makes the connection between the intentional objects of an emotion and an emotion contingent and seemingly knowable only experimentally. As Kenny puts it:

> An examination of pride itself, therefore, could no more teach us that it was connected with the idea of self than an *a priori* examination of a stone could show that it would fall downward if unsupported (Cf. *Enquiry*, IV).

It always happens that we feel proud of our own achievements and not, say, of the industry of ants in stone-age Papua; but the suggestion that we might feel proud of such things is as perfectly intelligible as the suggestion that the
trees might flourish in December and decay in June. The idea of self is not part of the nature of pride and humility; all that belongs to this is a particular experience. The “very being and essence” of these passions is “the sensations, or peculiar emotions they excite in the soul”, namely a non-bodily pain and pleasure. (Kenny 1963, pp. 24-5)

Certainly it seems part of our ordinary understanding of the emotion of pride that it is a form of self-evaluation, and it does not seem genuinely intelligible that pride should be anything other than a form of self-evaluation. The question, therefore, is to what extent Hume can accommodate these thoughts.

There is a problem for Hume if Kenny is right that Hume’s claims that pride is a simple feeling and that it is related to its object only through causal and temporal connection lead to the conclusion that these propositions are entirely contingent and knowable only through experiment. And before one can draw any such conclusion, one needs to note the special context of Book Two. For, in the context of Hume’s theory of the passions, it is not clear that Hume would affirm the separation of distinct existences in quite this way. For to put it in the proper context, compare what Hume does say when he thinks that two elements involved in a passion are distinct, even if difficult to separate:

The conjunction of this desire and aversion with love and hatred may be accounted for by two different hypotheses. The first is…[that] love is nothing but the desire of happiness to another person, and hatred that of misery. The desire and aversion constitute the nature of love and hatred. They are not only inseparable but the same.

But this is evidently contrary to experience. For tho’ ’tis certain we never love any person without desiring his happiness, nor hate any without wishing his misery, yet these desires arise only upon the ideas of the happiness or misery of our friend or enemy being presented by the imagination, and are not absolutely essential to love and hatred. (2.2.6 §§4-5 p. 237)

In Book One, when the concern is with metaphysical speculation, Hume does suggest that distinct existence means the possibility of the one thing existing without the other, and closely associates that with the imaginability of one thing without the other. But things seem to have shifted in Book Two, where we are concerned with constructing an account of human nature and so the principles by which the mind operates. In this context, Hume is much less keen to insist on the separability of distinct existences. The text shows that this is clearly so for the passion of love and desire of happiness for the loved one. We should not suppose it otherwise for the case of pride and the idea of self. It is obvious that the passion of pride is distinct from the idea of self – after all the idea of self can as easily accompany the passion of humility as that of pride. But this is not to say that Hume need suppose the impression of pride and the idea of self are really
separable such that the former might cause the occasion of some other idea than that of self. Hume need not countenance that the feeling could be directed, given human nature, towards any other object than the self.

Nor is it obvious that Hume must claim it quite intelligible that someone should know what pride is, through having had the simple feeling, and yet be quite unaware that the emotion connects to directing pleasure to the self. Hume does not assume that his readers are already aware of the principle which he elaborates in Book Two Part One, namely that pride is a feeling of pleasure occasioned by the ideas of those things which have given one pleasure which are taken to be proper to the self. After all, he sets out to argue that we must suppose that there is a general principle which governs the operation of pride. Nonetheless, given that the principle does obtain, and the temporal sequence of idea of subject, impression of pleasure and then idea of self is inviolable, then no subject will ever have had an occasion of feeling pride which does not lead to the idea of self. At best, then, the recognition of the possible dissociation of pride and idea of self would require one to conceive them coming apart. And that then raises again the issue brought out above, whether that conception is to be in the context of holding human nature fixed or not.

But one may still feel that there is a lingering concern that Kenny has put his finger on. For Hume, pride is a form of self-evaluation because the simple feeling causes the idea of self rather than any other idea. So, we can certainly imagine another feeling, not pride but say ‘snide’, a feeling which invariably leads to the idea of something other than the self, say to the idea of Kenny’s Papuan ants. And if the only difference between the two, apart from the distinction of the feelings, is that one leads to one idea and the other to another, then one might complain that the sense in which pride is distinctively self-evaluation has been lost. Now for this complaint to have any force, we would need to spell out a bit more what is special about the self and how Hume himself cannot accommodate those distinctive features. And that is what brings us to the question of the special role of the idea of self in the *Treatise*.

Many commentators have noted that Hume in his discussion of the idea of personal identity in Book One, contrasts the idea of self as it relates to our passions and as it relates to thought or imagination. For some, this suggests that there is an inconsistency between his writing about the self in Book One and Book Two. For others, the Book Two discussion offers an advance and an improvement on the Book One conception. I will suggest that the idea of self plays a special role in the account of the passions in Book Two, one which would disarm the worry which I have just raised, but it does so in a manner which is entirely consistent with the discussions of Book One. Moreover, there is a flaw in the Book One discussion which remains in Book Two, and this, I shall go on to argue, reflects a way in which Hume’s theory of the passions is clearly inadequate in human moral psychology. There are ways in which we relate to each other and each other’s feelings which Hume can provide no room for.
Notoriously, Hume presents some form of ‘bundle theory’ of personal identity in 1.4.6. As he writes:

… I cannot compare the soul more properly to any thing than to a republic or commonwealth, in which the several members are united by the reciprocal ties of government and subordination, and give rise to other persons, who propagate the same republic in the incessant changes of its parts. (1.4.6, ¶19, p. 170)

Seemingly we form the idea of the self not through encountering any simple impression of it but through a fictive operation of the imagination which binds together the various perceptions, impressions and ideas, which are proper to one person over time.

Baier and others have emphasised how the body figures as proper to the self in Book Two in a way that contrasts with the 1.4.6 treatment of personal identity. And this is taken to suggest that somehow we have a more robust conception of selves and a plurality of such in the discussion of both the passions and of morality which follows it in Book Three. Yet if this is taken to imply that Hume is now operating with the idea of the self as a kind of entity and one among many such entities, then the text does not really support this. When the idea of self is introduced in 2.1.2, Hume tells us, ‘This object is self, or that succession of related ideas and impressions, of which we have an intimate memory and consciousness’, and in the next paragraph, he speaks of ‘that connected succession of perceptions, which we call self’. In addition, consider what he says at 2.2.2:

…if we consider that in sympathy our own person is not the object of any passion, nor is there any thing, that fixes our attention on ourselves; as in the present case, where we are suppos’d to be actuated with pride or humility. Ourselves, independent of the perception of every other object, is in reality nothing: For which reason we must turn our view to external objects; and ‘tis natural for us to consider with most attention such as lie contiguous to us, or resemble us. But when the self is the object of a passion, ‘tis not natural to quit the consideration of it, till the passion be exhausted; in which case the double relations of impression and ideas can no longer operate. (2.2.2 ¶17, p. 221)

These passages suggest that even though Hume allows himself the idea of self, the self is not introduced as a further entity above and beyond the variety of perceptions which make it up. Simply pointing to the fact that the body and its various qualities can now be proper to the self does not alter this. It is not as if Hume now treats the impression of one’s body as after all the impression of self that he had failed to find in Book One.

Rather, these passages recommend a way of thinking of the idea of self along the lines of the ideas of space and time in Book One, Part Two. Space is ‘nothing but the idea of vis-

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ible or tangible points distributed in a certain order’ (1.2.5 ¶1, p. 40); we do not have an impression of space in addition to the impressions of various points organized within space; the same holds of time and with notes of a melody (1.2.3, ¶10, p. 29). In relation to the idea of self, we may then think of it as an organizing principle which sorts all perceptions into those which are proper to the self and those which are not. Where ideas of what is proper to the self elicit pleasure, then the pleasure in question will be one of pride and excite that idea which makes explicit that that idea is on the side of self and not that of other. As the discussion of sympathy above makes clear, the kind of switch among one's passions between self- and other-directed requires no more than this kind of drawing of a boundary between what is mine and what is not.

Now once we think of the idea of self as playing such an organizing role among our perceptions, then we can see that the worry raised from Kenny is misplaced. Although Hume talks of an idea of self as he talks of the ideas of other things, still the idea of self has a special status as that of one of the organizing elements of the mind, and is not to be thought of imagistically. A feeling which elicits this idea, therefore, need not be thought of as analogous to a feeling which would elicit the idea of something which could be encountered in experience. For anything that could be encountered in experience, there would be the further question whether it was proper to the self or not, and hence whether it would elicit the idea of self. Clearly the idea of self cannot itself prompt that question.

But if this solves Kenny’s problem with respect to Hume’s theory of psychology, it raises another one about the adequacy of his moral psychology. For, one may be concerned whether an idea of self which simply draws a boundary between self and other is really adequate to the conception we have of self as it is invoked in our social emotions. Put bluntly, the way in which Hume can allow for the distinction between self and other does not allow for a proper understanding of how each of us is just one self among others, yet a proper account of how we interact with each other emotionally requires just that.

The most direct way to illustrate this is to consider what we might call the range of vicarious emotions. One such negative emotion is resentment on behalf of another. Resentment is a reactive attitude one has towards another agent who has harmed one. Resentment is not merely anger at some harm, or some wrong in the world. For example, if I discover that a beautiful valley has been despoiled by a company seeking precious minerals, I may feel angry or outraged at their behaviour, but normally I cannot resent it. On the other hand, if I take you to have deliberately taken the last slice of cake to which you are indifferent but know I am over-partial, then I may resent you greatly, despite the insignificance of the harm. While we cannot in general resent other people who have done wrong, but not wrong to us, we can in some circumstances re-

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8 See in particular Frasca-Spada 1998 for the importance of this comparison between Hume's account of space and his attitude towards the self.
sent them vicariously when we identify, typically through loving, some third party who has been wronged. In such a case we seem to put ourselves into the position of the third party and feel the resentment on their behalf, from the point of view of the one who is wronged.

On the positive side, it seems possible to have vicarious feelings of pride. This is certainly one of the conceptions of pride that we suppose possible in relation to our children. One way in which one can feel pride in respect of one’s loved ones is through seeing them just as extension of oneself. When a child does well, it is easy for one to feel proud given that the child is a part of one’s family, and so one feels proud on behalf of one’s tribe or team. Likewise, one may feel somewhat possessive towards the child, and so feel proud of their achievements through it being proper to oneself, just as one might be proud through one’s horse or greyhound winning a race. Such feelings of pride are self-directed, although the relevant conception of self may be spread out to encompass some group with which one identifies. The idea of vicarious pride, however, is more selfless than this. When one is proud on the other’s behalf, one adopts their point of view and feels pleasure for them as they should for themselves (whether or not they in fact do themselves recognize the merit of their achievements). Where one does achieve genuinely vicarious pride there need be no assimilation of the other to being a part of oneself, and there need be no self-regard or pleasure directed at oneself in the admiration.

It is this adopting a first personal perspective on the other’s point of view which distinguishes vicarious pride from simple admiration. One can admire (or in Hume’s terms, love) another through recognizing the merit in some aspect of them or what they have done. The wonder one feels need only be entirely other-directed: if one does imagine oneself into their perspective on the world that will help in discovering whether the quality in question is of merit, or could be falsely taken to be of merit. But the emotional reaction one has, of admiration or contempt, will not involve further considering their point of view on the matter. With vicarious pride, on the other hand, one takes up the appraisal in question on the other’s behalf.

This element of displacement is reflected in our appraisal of emotional reactions. As Hume himself notes, displays of pride are generally subject to censor. Yet vicarious pride is selfless, although there is an embedded form of self-appraisal within it, and genuine pleasure in that self-appraisal, because one is engaged with the other’s virtues in positive appraisal, the pleasure in question is not egotistical, rather in this it has the characteristics of admiration. As with resentment, the vicarious emotion must exploit a central psychological attachment or relation to the object of vicarious feeling. Exactly what the range of possibilities open here is is a nice question. Clearly a salient one is that of a relation of love, and there is a parallel here with the idea, canvassed by Frankfurt, that through love the needs of others become reasons for us to act. But our main
point is made just by there being a significant contrast in at least some cases between three kinds of option: straightforward admiration for the virtues of another; a kind of extended pride in the other which arises through assimilating that person to oneself, either through identifying both as part of some larger collective, or seeing them as a part or belonging of oneself; and a vicarious, selfless pride, when one feels a pleasure which is entirely on the other’s behalf.

Now Hume himself does note that admiration or love in relation to loved ones can lead to pride, but Hume’s account of this does not go beyond the kind of assimilation or identification which we find in other cases:

The virtue of a brother must make me love him; as his vice or infamy must excite the contrary passion. But to judge only from the situation of affairs, I shou’d not expect, that the affections would rest there, and never transfuse themselves into any other impression. As there is here a person, who by means of a double relation is the object of my passion, the very same reasoning leads me to think the passion will be carry’d farther. The person has a relation of ideas to myself, according to the supposition; the passion, of which he is the object, by being agreeable or uneasy, has a relation of impressions to pride or humility. ’Tis evident, then, that one of these passions must arise from the love or hatred.

This is the reasoning I form in conformity to my hypothesis; and am pleas’d to find upon trial that every thing answers exactly to my expectation. The virtue or vice of a son or brother not only excites love or hatred, but by a new transition, from similar causes, gives rise to pride or humility. Nothing causes greater vanity than any shining quality in our relations; as nothing mortifies us more than their vice or infamy. (2.2.2 ¶¶12-13, p. 219)

So Hume highlights the way in which love of another can lead to pride but only in terms of the ‘greyhound’ model, that one assimilates the loved one to oneself as proper to one. He does not speak in terms of vicarious pride as we have sketched the notion.

Note that Hume’s discussion of the indirect passions and of the role of sympathy in general exploits the possibility of entering into another’s point of view, and of doing so in a sophisticated way. For example, in Book Three, Hume raises the conundrum of how chaste women can find something admirable in ladies’ men. He comments:

To begin with the advantages of the body; we may observe a phaenomenon, which might appear somewhat trivial and ludicrous, if any thing could be trivial, which fortify’d a conclusion of such importance, or ludicrous, which was employ’d in a philosophical reasoning. ’Tis a general remark, that those we call good women’s men, who have either signaliz’d themselves by their amorous exploits, or whose make of body promises any extraordinary vigour of that
kind, are well receiv’d by the fair sex, and naturally engage the affections even of those, whose virtue prevents any design of ever giving employment to those talents. Here ’tis evident, that the ability of such a person to give enjoyment, is the real source of that love and esteem he meets with among the females; at the same time that the women, who love and esteem him, have no prospect of receiving that enjoyment themselves, and can only be affected by means of their sympathy with one, that has commerce of love with him. This instance is singular, and merits our attention. (3.3.5 ¶2, p. 392)

If the admiration that chaste women felt for comely men was grounded solely in their judgements of the merits of these men, then there could be no problem to be solved by the action of sympathy. The fact that a woman would make no use of the advantages provided by such a man should not prevent her from recognizing the presence of that virtue. For Hume, however, the form of sentimentalism he recommends in the Treatise requires a connection with an appropriate affective result: the very recognition of a virtue in the man in question must arouse a sentiment of pleasure on the part of the judge. Expectation of advantage might be enough to ground the recognition of approval, but clearly cannot be present in women whose chastity rules out any such hope. In that case, the action of the imagination in placing oneself in the position of another gives rise to the idea of the pleasure one would then enjoy and, as a result, will bring forth a suitable impression of pleasure to ground the relevant passion of esteem.

A second example reveals a greater complexity in Hume’s account and his attempt to accommodate judgements of esteem where the possibility of pleasure is remote or displaced. When Hume discusses the esteem we feel for the rich and powerful in 2.2.5, one of his concerns is why we should admire the miser. Money lacks any intrinsic properties which would lead to pleasure. The attraction of money is the power it confers on its possessor for gaining the genuinely good things in life which do bring pleasure to us. Yet the miser hoards his money and does not spend it. As part of our common picture of the miser, his life is precisely devoid of the ordinary pleasures of life, given that he prefers to preserve his hoard of money rather than exchange it for things of proper value and utility. Hume sets out to explain how this is possible through claiming that we imagine ourselves into the position of the rich man and as he puts it:

Now I assert, that where we esteem a person upon account of his riches, we must enter into this sentiment of the proprietor, and that without such a sympathy the idea of the agreeable objects, which they give him the power to produce, would have but a feeble influence upon us. An avaritious man is respected for his money, tho’ he scarce is possest of a power; that is, there scarce is a probability or even possibility of his employing it in the acquisition of the pleasures and conveniences of life. To himself alone this power seems perfect and entire; and therefore we must receive his sentiments by sympathy,
before we can have a strong intense idea of these enjoyments, or esteem him upon account of them. (2.2.5 ¶7, p. 233)

In order to esteem the position of the rich man we must imagine ourselves into the position of the rich man and imagine the pleasures of his position in order to think of his circumstance as fortunate and so come to feel the requisite pleasure from which our admiration or esteem can flow. In the case of the miser, because he in fact lacks the power of possession of goods, given his hoarding disposition, the imagination must work twice over. For the miser is under the delusion that his riches do indeed provide him with the power to gain any pleasure he so desire, and that anticipation itself is a pleasure. By imaginatively adopting his point of view and the falsely anticipated pleasure associated, we discount the incapacity for pleasure on his part and so come to admire his position and esteem him.

The double action of imagination here allows Hume to explain two aspects of our attitudes towards the miser. On the one hand, the psychological possibility of esteeming the rich man is allowed for through the supposition that we enter into his imagining of his situation when being led to admire his situation. On the other, when we despise the lot of the miser and mock those who would esteem him, we can point out that his situation is really not one of great pleasure, and that it is only through the delusion of supposing money as worthwhile independent of the actual pleasures it can lead one to, that one would find anything to envy in the miser’s lot.

In our earlier discussion we stressed that the mechanism of sympathy should not be confused with empathy. Sympathy does not work by putting ourselves in the shoes of others. These examples bring out, however, that Hume is not averse to appealing to concerns very close to empathy to explain the ways in which we coordinate our affective responses to the situations people find themselves in. And so, one might imagine, Hume ought to have the resources to explain and highlight what we have been calling vicarious emotions, and vicarious pride in particular: the propensity to imagine oneself into the position of a loved one and thereby to feel the pleasure from that perspective that the qualities possessed by the loved one command. The absence of this from his discussion therefore demands comment and in turn explanation.

I suggested above that we should see Hume’s model of the idea of self as one which has an organizational role, sorting among perceptions those that belong to self and those that are mere other. If we think of this organizational role as simply one of drawing a line around some of all the perceptions to which one may have an affective response, then there is no obvious difficulty in picturing how many minds can be confronted in experience: one needs not only to bundle the perceptions proper to oneself (that is, thoughts, feelings, bodily graces and virtues, impressive servants, children and pets) in one pen, but bundle various of the perceptions belonging now to this man in another, and those for that women in yet another corner. The idea of each person would then
simply be the lasso one employs to mark out their property in its entirety of which one has any experience or thought.

Yet clearly such a representation would be inadequate to how we typically conceive of the role of first person thought and hence thought about the self, particularly in situations of affective and practical concern. As John Perry famously pointed out (Perry 1979), one's response is liable to be rather different between learning that MM’s trousers are on fire and learning that one's own trousers are on fire, if one doesn't realize that one is MM. So if the unique position of the self for each thinker in turn is to be respected in how their idea of self organizes the field of perceptions, then there is only one special lasso within that field, and no other lasso is a self-idea in the same way. And this, of course, is what one would expect if empathy is to play so important a role in understanding the position of others. What it is to imagine oneself into the position of others is just to take up a first person position from their perspective, and consider things as they would strike one in that position. That doesn't require that one make explicit the presence of more than one self in the world: one considers it in terms of the self that would be located where that person is, were one them.

Now thinking of empathy in this way, as simply imagining oneself in the shoes of another, even imagining oneself in the shoes of another, with the other's preferences, turns out to be something different and less of an achievement, seemingly, than vicarious pride. For when one feels pride on a loved one's behalf, one must both adopt the first personal perspective associated with their position, since the passion which moves one is a form of self-evaluation and not simply admiration of another, and yet within the emotion that moves one have a sense that one is not that self, on behalf of which one feels the pleasure, since this is not a case of assimilating the loved one to being part of oneself. So in the vicarious emotions, it seems one keeps track of the existence of two selves simultaneously. In contrast, in common discussions of empathy, one need only keep track of the contrast between actuality, the position one is in, and what is imagined, one's occupying the perspective that is in fact that of another.10

It has been common to complain that Hume's account of the idea of self in thought and imagination is inadequate. Those who have bothered to read beyond this to Book Two have often been tempted to find a more pleasing picture of the self there, to be put to work later in Book Three. What our discussion here suggests rather is that the inadequacies of Book One are equally present in Book Two. Hume's conception of the idea of self does not allow one to have an understanding of how one is just one self among many others within the world. To the extent that Hume manages to give an account of the social emotions which is recognizable to us, we can see that a full-blown conception of self need not be in play in all forms of self-evaluation. But the possibility of vicarious

10 Here I disagree with Penelhum in his conception of how the operation of sympathy must already presuppose a proper understanding of the contrast between self and other.
emotions such as vicarious pride in a loved one’s achievements indicates an area in our thought where genuine self-consciousness is called for. It is here that one can see that Hume’s moral psychology is compromised.

Hume’s theory of the passions has been passed over in most recent discussion of emotions, often treated simply as a feeling theory, and at best a precursor of James and Lange. I hope that the preceding discussion shows that this does a grave injustice to Hume’s approach. Within the constraints of his atomism, his account particularly of what he calls the indirect passions is supple and subtle, and sensitive to the ways in which such passions are directed at qualities that we admire or shun and relate to self or to other. At the same time, in pursuing Hume’s theory to its limits we see that philosophical problems of self-consciousness enter into our understanding of our social emotions and the ways in which we can take on and respond to the perspectives of others. We can learn from Hume’s failure here through the challenge it poses to do better.\(^{11}\)

\(^{11}\) This paper was given as one of the two inaugural Kolnai lectures in Budapest July 2006. This work originates from a long running seminar on Hume’s Treatise held jointly with Véronique Munoz-Dardé at UCL; I thank her and other participants, in particular Keith Allen, Mark Eli Kalderon and Richard Parkhill for comments and suggestions. Various portions of this material have been presented at Nottingham, Princeton, Brown, a conference on Hume and Descartes in Manchester, the University of Warwick and Stanford University. I thank those various audiences for their criticisms and comments.
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Received: November 15, 2006
Accepted: November 20, 2006

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