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An Analysis of Some Highly-Structured Networks of Human Smuggling and Trafficking from Albania and Bulgaria to Belgium

SUMMARY

The authors examine the logistic ecology of 30 large-scale networks that were active in human smuggling and trafficking from Albania and Bulgaria to Belgium (1995–2003). Ten networks were studied in greater detail in order to determine three final profiles of networks, based on their use of structural and operational intermediary structures. They are called the “individual infiltration” and the “structural infiltration” human smuggling patterns, and the “violent-control prostitution” trafficking pattern. It should be noted that the business is organized in such a way that the organizers of the logistical support are never inculpated.

KEY WORDS: human smuggling, trafficking, intermediary structures

Introduction

In this paper we examine how 30 networks active in the human smuggling and trafficking business from Albania and Bulgaria to Belgium were organized between 1995 and 2003. We focus on identifying the entrepreneur of each network, and the logistic environment constructed for each. We conclude by identifying three distinct models of business organization.

It is not at all our intention to suggest that each form of human smuggling and trafficking from Eastern to Western Europe is carried out in the way that we observed. Nor is it our intention to claim that this business should be seen as a model for the overall current patterns of irregular migration from Albania or Bulgaria to Western Europe. We do think, however, that the structure we discovered occurs frequently enough to be meaningful. Further, we wish to suggest that studying closed judiciary files can complement the analysis of current organized smuggling and trafficking from and via Albania and Bulgaria to the West.
Materials and research questions

Between 1995 and 2003 we had access to 41 judiciary files concerned with human smuggling and trafficking from Albania and Bulgaria to Belgium. After some time we understood that some instances nearly always remained out of sight in the treatment of the files. This was due to the way the business was organized. As a consequence, we made an effort to study aspects of the system that are normally not examined by judges looking for guilty parties.

Table 1: Human trafficking and/or smuggling (41 files)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Albania</th>
<th>Bulgaria</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trafficking</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smuggling</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combination</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
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</table>

In their business model for analyzing the irregular migration process, Salt and Stein have called attention to the fact that specific analyses can be made of the exit, transit and entry phases in the migration process (Salt and Stein, 1998). Van Amersfoort has emphasized that not only the phases but also the relations between the phases can be analyzed. For him, these are the social and economic structures that link the countries of provenance and of destination, and these may be called the intermediary structures (Van Amersfoort, 1998: 15). We make a distinction between structural and operational links. Structural links include the material tools that are used. Operational links designate mechanisms of influence that are used.

The central research question is: who functions as the entrepreneur? The first complementary question then, is: what material tools are used by these entrepreneurs to support their businesses logistically? Material tools frequently identified in the literature include travel agencies, transport firms, and safe houses. Do the entrepreneurs of our research also use these tools? As a second complementary question we look for “patterns” in the business structure. The question of corruption, however, is not examined in this paper. A final remark will concern the judicial approach of the logistical ecology in this illegal business. Each time, we first make observations from the literature (which concerns a broader scope than only Albania and Bulgaria), and then we add our own findings from the study of our files.

Who are the entrepreneurs in our large-scale files?

In a report by a Belgian immigration officer about the situation in Albania, we find links between travel agencies and safe houses in human smuggling and trafficking, but also – in some cases – with (former) security services. Malevolent travel agencies cooperate with people who sell false documents, and with dubious attorneys. A number of former Albanian security agents have joined criminal organizations. They are active in human smuggling and trafficking and teach other network members the typical “in-
intelligence” techniques, for example, for internal secret communication within the criminal network (Belgian Ministry of Home Affairs, 2001).

Some reports about Bulgaria describe how certain smuggling networks started up originally by “intelligence” services that have been taken over by organized criminal organizations (CSD, 2004). The war in the Balkans created an environment in which these illegal organizations flourished. Originally it was principally drugs and weapons that were smuggled, but eventually the criminal organizations also began to focus on human smuggling and trafficking, using the same trafficking routes and partners (CSD, 2004; Hajdinjak, 2002). Border and visa controls then entered into the field of corruption of criminal organizations that collaborated closely with former security agents (CSD, 2003). Former intelligence service members could activate their contacts with Western embassies (which was important for easily obtaining visas), and they facilitated the access to hotels or other places of stay for the temporary housing of people in transit (Hajdinjak, 2002). These activities could often be accompanied by the establishment of collaboration with travel agencies in an Eastern European capital such as Sofia in the 1990s.

Indeed, files clearly showed that some traffickers had previously worked for the intelligence services in their home countries. Some could operate on an individual basis and brought their know-how into the criminal network. However, in various files we observed a structural involvement of former security services that took with them a part of the infrastructure associated with their service, for example firms. They took over typical tasks of the authorities such as protection, now offered in their case by criminal networks. From the analysis of our 41 files it appears that in more than 25% of the cases, former intelligence personnel visibly played an important role in the activities of the criminal networks (Leman and Janssens, 2006).

Table 2: Security services

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Albania</th>
<th>Bulgaria</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security services</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No indication</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We saw in our files that where (former) intelligence personnel were active in the business, they usually opted for entrepreneurship. As entrepreneurs, they do indeed dispose from their past with expertise in the 3 phases of the intermediary structure (i.e. exit, transit and entry). They have at their disposal in their country of origin a special know-how for the falsification of official documents. Sometimes they also have good contacts with diplomats or with people in their direct environment. In the transit country, they dispose of well-hidden and sometimes very anonymous social networks. They also have access to financial capital through fake firms in which they had invested during their previous work and, later, sending out State capital immediately after the implosion of the communist regimes. In the country of destination they can dispose of a business network or have good contacts. They are well infiltrated in a certain number of import-export firms. They know people in the travel agencies and transport firms.
We distinguish two profiles in the way the intelligence people are involved. In a first profile, their role remains limited to a partial putting at disposition of expertise and contacts. Individual former intelligence agents who have integrated into the criminal world and play a central role as entrepreneurs in the network, continue to use techniques and expertise from their past. This is typical for our Albanian files. In a second profile, the criminal organizations can use the expertise, but also the existing infrastructure of some former communist intelligence services from Eastern Europe. In that case we see a mixture of espionage and smuggling networking, that later also specialized in human smuggling and trafficking. In this second case, travel agencies and transport firms are started up by former intelligence groups. This is typical for our Bulgarian files. In the Bulgarian case, it concerns parts of the former intelligence service that structurally takes over a business. In the Albanian case, we see rather individuals who previously were, but sometimes even still are, linked with “intelligence” agencies and offer their services.

We call these entrepreneurs mala fide. Why?

The notion of mala fide needs some explanation. We use a broad definition, in line with the interpretation of mala fide that is applied to commercial structures in general in countries such as Belgium in the annual reports of the Ministry of Justice (Belgian Ministry of Justice, 1999, 2000). A transport firm or travel agency is called mala fide when it is at least partially exploited by a criminal network. This could be a completely legally-established firm that is used by a criminal network with the systematic collaboration of one or more members in the firm, or even a phantom firm that functions as a cover for a criminal organization. We call both mala fide firms, but of course there is an important distinction between the two, which we’ll indicate while describing the profiles. There are also bona fide firms which may be used occasionally from the outside by malevolent entrepreneurs. The entrepreneurship that we see at work in the typical well-structured large-scale illegal smuggling and trafficking of human beings from Albania and Bulgaria into Belgium is partly linked with a past in the (former) intelligence services. These former members have the expertise to start up firms that may be malevolent in various ways. This brings us to the logistic ecology of their business practices.

The logistic ecology of the mala fide business

The literature, also about countries other than Albania and Bulgaria, mentions how various material, logistical tools may be distinguished, for example travel agencies (Bruckert and Parent, 2002; Arnold and Doni, 2002; IAM, 2002; Florida State University, 2003; OSCE, 2002; Regan, 1997; Tudor, 2000; Hajdinjak, 2002; Limanowska, 2002), bus companies (IAM, 2002; El-Cherkeh et al., 2004; Commonwealth Secretariat, 2002; Van De Bunt and Van Der Schoot, 2003; Hughes and Denisova, 2002), and transport with trucks (IAM, 2002; Van De Bunt and Van Der Schoot, 2003; Commonwealth Secretariat, 2002; Raymond, 2002; D’Cunha, 2002). Travel agencies and airline companies are explicitly called sectors at risk (Belgian Senate, 2003). Criminal organizations invest their criminal benefits in transport firms, travel agencies and hotels (Ober-
loher, 2004). In a number of situations, travel agencies and transport firms have also collaborated with employment agencies with malevolent objectives (UN, 2000b). Generally the managers of these travel agencies, transport firms and employment agencies have no criminal record (UN, 2000b; Massari, 2001; Ruggiero, 2003). Very often these firms simply try to maximize their profits (Massari, 2001). The objective of the insertion of such apparently *bona fide* firms was to make the tracing of the organizers of the smuggling more difficult (IAM, 2002).

Table 3: Transport firms and travel agencies (41 files)

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<th></th>
<th>Albania</th>
<th>Bulgaria</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Travel agency (a)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport firm (b)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both (a) and (b)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither (a) nor (b)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>41</td>
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The analysis in Table 3 seems to indicate that travel agencies and/or transport firms play an important role in more than half of cases. A criminal organization may use *mala fide* drivers in various transport firms, in which the management is not necessarily aware of the drivers’ intentions or actions. In that scenario, the smuggling entrepreneurs pay the drivers on an individual basis to smuggle their clients. None of the travel agencies are implicated and the transport firms may even be *bona fide*. Another possibility is that *mala fide* transport firms and/or travel agencies are under the control of a criminal organization that develops both legal and illegal activities. In that scenario, transport firms develop legal activities but may mix them with illegal ones. For example, some travel agencies may organize cultural trips for tourists and may add some clients who simply want to be smuggled. A third profile concerns malevolent travel agencies in the hands of criminal organizations that focus mostly on illegal activities. They may, for example, exploit a bus company to transport victims for prostitution. But they may also offer a special course for future asylum seekers and create a network of solicitors to help them with these matters in the country of destination.

Besides the use of travel agencies and transport firms, the literature also shows that in smuggling networks, safe houses are mostly linked with the transport in the intermediary structuration. These safe houses are mostly situated in the transit phase (Savona et al., 1996; Jandl, 2004). At particular places during the journey, the traffickers want total control of the movements of the smuggled people (KPLD, 2005; McCulloch, 2000; Chin, 1999; Kwong, 2001; ICMPD, 1999). In such places of stay, various details might be handled by the managers of the local safe house (Savona et al., 1996; ICMPD, 1999; Iselin, 2003): payments, for example, for parts of the trip (KPLD, 2005; ICMPD, 1999; McCulloch, 2000; David, 2000; Chin, 1997, 1999; Kwong, 2001). The victims can be detained in the safe house until the payment has been made (Friebel and Guriev, 2002, 2004; Bruckert and Parent, 2004). Pressure can be used from the safe house *vis-à-vis* the family in the country of provenance; or illegal employment can become a tool.
(KPLD, 2005; Bruckert and Parent, 2004). Shopkeepers can rent safe houses (Merrit, 2003), and this may be a way to launder money and to organize contacts with legal commerce (IAM, 2002). Physical violence might be used in order to obtain more money (Graycar, 1999; KPLD, 2005; Chin, 1997; David, 2000; Skeldon, 2000; Charlton, 2003). Safe houses can also be useful for dealing with false documents (IAM, 2002). Safe houses are clearly more than simply places to stay for the night during the trip (Leman and Janssens, 2007).

Table 4: Safe houses

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Albania</th>
<th>Bulgaria</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Safe house</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No indication</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In more than half of the files, safe houses play an important role. From their professional past, former intelligence people can well have the needed contacts to organize the smuggling process without too many problems in the areas of transit and of destination.

For a clarification of the patterns that become apparent in the files, we focus on those files that offer enough data to permit an integral analysis of the logistical know-how, i.e. concretely 10 files, 5 Albanian and 5 Bulgarian ones. There was always some information lacking in the other files. For each pattern, we first explain the story in a few words. However, to add one important remark: the indications with “Albanian” or “Bulgarian” aren’t an indication of ethnic characteristics, but are due to the fact that the networks with such a profile in our files are rooted in these countries, very probably due to contextual reasons.

The “individual-infiltration” large-scale human smuggling pattern

Let us look at a case where 13,000 smuggled clients were transferred by an Albanian network through Belgium into England over a two-year period. Two leaders of this network seemed, as was written, to have worked till 1977 in the Albanian “intelligence” in the period of Berisha. It was seen in the files that money earned by the smuggling went directly to the party of Berisha. The visas were obtained through a person with excellent contacts in the Greek Embassy in Albania. The boss, who could continue to give instructions from a Belgian jail, had previously used a diplomatic passport. From the police reports it appears that the Albanian network had achieved a huge degree of professionalism. Some members appeared to be trained in counter-techniques against observation. Normally these techniques are taught by persons who work for an “intelligence” agency.

In our case of 13,000 smuggled clients, we observed various transport firms. The drivers were contacted and paid throughout the network. It couldn’t be shown that the management of the transport firms was informed of the drivers’ involvement in illegal
activities. During the transit phase, various functions of the safe houses were revealed that could be linked at the transport phase, the component of finances and of stay: control over the victims, arrangement of the transfer to the next criminal organization, the payments and the instruments of pressure applied, links with economic entities, removal of passports, new chances for clients, and adaptations by the network management of the transport capacity. The traffickers had absolute control over the behavior of the smuggled clients. Violence was not seen as out of line in the safe houses. Further payments were arranged with various clients/victims at the safe houses. The clients being smuggled were forced to phone family members in their country of provenance to put them under pressure to pay more money.

In the various ethnic organizations that were suppliers for the Albanian network, the management of a safe house was placed each time in the hands of the traffickers of the concerned ethnic organization. For example, the safe house of a collaborating Chinese smuggling organization was managed by two local Chinese snakeheads, one of whom also lived in the safe house. That snakehead was part of a social network around the smuggling network, and he appeared to own a firm in Belgium and The Netherlands.

The various supplying ethnic organizations also used safe houses in transit countries such as Russia, the Ukraine, Chechnya, Poland, Italy, France and Germany. Along the route, the clients came into touch with various persons who always made a part of the journey with them. The migrants were locked up in safe houses in the various countries and were sometimes also beaten. For example, when arriving in Moscow, the Chinese victims were housed together with other nationalities in safe houses. Their passports were taken away. They were transferred into the Ukraine where Russian traffickers were expecting them. Then, they were separated per nationality into different safe houses.

This case is an example of a large-scale smuggling network that makes use of extremely well-controlled safe houses and of corruptible truck drivers. What is *mala fide* here is the systematic collaboration, under the orders of a criminal organization, or of one or more malevolent collaborators of what might be *bona fide* transport firms. One of the leading bosses of the network is an ex-agent of the former Albanian intelligence service who made his expertise and contacts (with embassy personnel) available to the criminal network. The level of corruption is an individual one.

We found this first pattern in 9 Albanian files. In short, we saw a large-scale smuggling network that controls its clients/victims very efficiently in the safe houses, where violence is frequently used. In this sense, the safe houses in this pattern could be called “hell houses” (cfr. Chin, 1997). As for the transport, one looks at *mala fide* drivers of *bona fide* transport firms. A central role is played by ex-members of intelligence services, who bring with them their expertise, good knowledge of specific techniques and a lot of contacts where needed. Where it is necessary, corruption is used. We call it the “individual-infiltration smuggling” pattern. This pattern has some similarities with the Trade and Development model in the way it is executed, but not in the way that the profits are invested at the end, as described in connection with the large-
scale Chinese smuggling networks that use strict control in an integrated way throughout the whole network (Shelley, 2003).

**The “structural-infiltration” large-scale human smuggling pattern**

In various cases from Bulgaria and Belgium – situated in the 1995–2000 period – our files show an activity cluster carried out by former members of Bulgarian intelligence, originally networks for espionage and smuggling and multiple criminality, that was oriented at a certain moment to the human smuggling and trafficking market. The criminal network had good contacts with a Western embassy in Sofia and obtained visas through its travel agencies and transport firms whenever necessary. The clients could stay in small hotels.

In one particular case we saw a *mala fide* Belgo-Bulgarian travel agency belonging to the family of a former head of the Bulgarian “intelligence”. Till July ’96, tourist visas were given in a quasi automatic way to the Belgo-Bulgarian travel agency, without any control by the Belgian foreigner administration in Brussels (Leman, 2002). This changed only from 1996 on, when the visas were refused because of a new diplomatic secretary at the embassy. One of the persons who had obtained visas in that way – that were only refused from 1996 on – appears to have been convicted in Belgium at the end of 1996 – so we learn from a judiciary file – for exploitation of prostitution. Another person was cited in an international judiciary file on the Kurdish PKK because of his trade in weapons and child soldiers. Still another person was charged with international illegal trafficking of stolen cars near the end of the 1990s.

Connected to this case is the one of a transport firm that invested in the same period in transferring people to Belgium, who had been invited by Belgian firms. In a note of the Belgian intelligence service, one can read that that person was “actively responsible in a firm with connections with the Bulgarian branch of the mafia, well known for its violence and supply of false documents, visas and job permits”. The efficiency of the criminal system was based on corruption.

Here we see a *mala fide* travel agency and transport firm whose management is completely under the control of a criminal network. The *mala fide* character is situated here at the level of the firm’s management, where legal and illegal activities are connected with one another. From money laundering operations the management slowly, and through diversification, develops into a firm that, while maintaining a legal appearance, tries to exploit the desire of many people to emigrate to or to simply see the West, meanwhile organizing a trip to the West for criminals belonging to the organization. The corruption here has a structural dimension that reaches into certain Western embassies.

The second pattern, that we see represented in 8 Bulgarian files, can be seen as a human smuggling network that organizes transport and tourist trips, using travel agencies and transport firms for illegal asylum seekers who stay in small hotels (as their safe houses). One uses illegal visa applications (Leman, 2002). It concerns *mala fide* transport firms or travel agencies that are under the control of a criminal organiza-
tion, but that develop both legal and illegal activities. There is collusion between segments from the intelligence services and the world of organized crime. This concretizes itself in the taking over of firms of the former intelligence members by a criminal network. The former intelligence services openly play an entrepreneurship role. This is the “structural-infiltration” human smuggling network.

**The “violent-control prostitution” trafficking pattern**

In the literature about Bulgaria, one can learn about the security firm VIS that has strong links with former intelligence agents (Nikolov, 1997). A UN study confirms that VIS is a Bulgarian criminal organization that is very well integrated into social and economic life. Originally it was one of those typical protection firms that was born in the period of transition in Bulgaria and recruited intelligence agents (Nikolov, 1997). The first ones that were protected by VIS even received a special sticker referring to VIS (Nikolov, 1997).

In one of our files we see the case of a perfect example, where mechanisms of protection are at work, and where a new mafia-like organization has been created at the moment of the implosion of the communist regime in Bulgaria, recruiting agents of the former intelligence agencies. After the initial flight of State capital, and of a host of other smuggling activities, girls were brought to Belgium and The Netherlands through a travel agency with the objective of entrepreneurship to make new money putting the girls into prostitution. Credible sources inform us that the head of the traffic was strongly linked with the former Bulgarian intelligence service. The traffickers were themselves owners of one of the travel agencies with tourist busses with which they transferred the victims for prostitution. The head of the network is a well-known mafia member who owns a chain of restaurants, cafes, a pawnshop, a bank and a fleet of taxis. He has good contacts with at least ten criminal organizations in Bulgaria, including the security firms VIS and SIC. From a witness in this file, it appears that a meeting was organized between ten mafia-like organizations in which a number of criminal activities, including prostitution in the Netherlands and in Belgium, and activities in such economic sectors as transport, food service, travel agencies, hotels and car rental were discussed and internally divided. When analyzing the case one also sees how some officials, both among former Bulgarian authorities and in Western embassies, had contacts with people from these groups.

In this case, the intermingling between the intelligence and criminal network is located in the global societal field and focuses on the taking over of typical responsibilities of the authorities, such as providing protection. For the transport of the prostitution trafficking, the criminal network uses bus companies and travel agencies that it itself owns and that are only used for illegal transport. The victims being trafficked for prostitution are placed in the country of destination in safe houses, that we call control houses.

In the third pattern, represented in 2 Bulgarian files, we see a prostitution network as a prototype that places its victims in a control house from where the victim is brought every day to various prostitution bars. The transport from the country of prove-
nance takes place through a travel agency or a bus company. It involves \textit{mala fide} travel agencies and bus companies that are under the control of a criminal organization predominantly focused on illegal activities. There is collusion between segments of the intelligence services and organized crime. This becomes concrete, for example, in taking over typical authority responsibilities such as protection by the criminal network through security companies. The corruption is structural and is situated at the level of officials. We call it a Violent-control prostitution-trafficking model.

This profile shows some similarity with the Violent entrepreneur model, that seems to be typical for the Balkan crime groups that are active in trafficking of women, and it shows the strong implication of some officials in the country of provenance and sometimes also in a Western embassy (Shelley, 2003).

**The three business patterns**

\textit{Table 5: The three patterns}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pattern 1: \textit{The “individual-infiltration” human smuggling pattern}</th>
<th>Pattern 2: \textit{The “structural-infiltration” human smuggling pattern}</th>
<th>Pattern 3: \textit{The “violent-control prostitution” human trafficking pattern}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence (ex-)agents</td>
<td>ex-agents structural infrastructure</td>
<td>ex-agents structural authority tasks protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malevolent individual</td>
<td>mix of legal and illegal activities</td>
<td>illegal activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport truck drivers</td>
<td>travel agency transport firm</td>
<td>travel agency + bus company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe house hell house</td>
<td>small hotel</td>
<td>control house</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption form individual</td>
<td>structural visa demands embassy</td>
<td>structural officials</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We see pattern 1 in 9 Albanian dossiers (that represent 5 networks), profile 2 in 8 Bulgarian dossiers (that represent 4 networks), and profile 3 in 2 Bulgarian dossiers (representing 1 network). The other, less complete files, with a less complete view of the logistical environment of the networks, seem largely to tend in the direction of one of these described profiles.

**Concluding remarks**

We distinguished three patterns, representing 20 of the 41 files from Albania and Bulgaria. The 21 files that are not discussed don’t permit a complete profile analysis, as they are incomplete. We only constructed those patterns for which we could
find all the necessary data in the files. When we tried to situate the 21 incomplete files, they seemed to tend in the direction of the described profiles. The patterns were also confirmed by police officers with whom we discussed them. As a conclusion, we think that they can more or less be generalized for the current practices in that business.

When looking at the difference between patterns 2 and 3, we suggest a second conclusion, namely concerning the difference between human smuggling and human trafficking. The official definitions given in the UN protocol state: “Smuggling of migrants shall mean the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or permanent resident. (…) This becomes trafficking if there is exploitation, which shall include sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs” (UN, 2000a). We could perhaps add some qualification. Various studies have shown that human smuggling can well degenerate into human trafficking (Meese et al., 1998, cited in Salt, 2000: 22). At least in our files, we note there is a grey area between human smuggling and human trafficking. Some large-scale human smuggling networks clearly also invest in human trafficking, or smuggling activities can shift in the direction of human trafficking in some of their safe houses.

A final observation concerns the fact that the managers of the logistic ecology can very often remain unpunished. In our files, not one driver, not one manager of a travel agency nor of a transport firm, and not one owner of a safe house was punished when the cases were brought to court. Apparently, the system itself can remain intact. Almost always, it is only the most “visible” (and easily replaceable) actors that are condemned and put in jail.

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Johan Leman, Stef Janssens

ANALIZA NEKIH VISOKO STRUKTURIRANIH MREŽA KRIJUMČARENJA LJUDI I TRGOVANJA LJUDIMA IZ ALBANIJE I BUGARSKE U BELGIJU

SAŽETAK


KLJUČNE RIJEČI: krijumčarenje ljudi, trgovanje ljudima, posredničke strukture

Johan Leman, Stef Janssens

ANALYSE DE CERTAINS RÉSEAUX HAUTEMENT STRUCTURÉS DE TRAFFIC ET DE TRAITE D’ÊTRES HUMAINS DE L’ALBANIE ET DE LA BULGARIE VERS LA BELGIQUE

RÉSUMÉ

Les auteurs examinent l’écologie logistique de 30 grands réseaux qui étaient actifs dans le trafic et la traite d’êtres humains d’Albanie et de Bulgarie vers la Belgique (1995–2003). Dix réseaux ont été étudiés de façon détaillée pour aboutir à dégager trois profils de réseaux, basés sur leur utilisation des structures intermédiaires structures et opérationnelles. Ils se définissent en deux modèles de réseau de trafic, de type « infiltration individuelle » et « infiltration structurelle », et un modèle de réseau de traite de type « contrôle violent – prostitution ». Il faut noter que leurs affaires sont organisées de manière que les organisateurs du support logistique ne sont jamais inculpés.

MOTS CLÉS : trafic d’êtres humains, traite, structures intermédiaires