Ivo Goldstein
Faculty of Philosophy, University of Zagreb

CROATIA IN THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES AND THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA (1918-1945)

It is obvious that, in this presentation, I am unable to adhere literally to the general theme - because 'European integrations' in today's sense do not exist. Thus I speak of 'Croatia in the European context', namely, the extent to which the Croatian political and social reality were part of the European surroundings and connected to them. Consequently, the issue is: Croatia in Europe - Europe in Croatia. To answer this question, however, one would require a much deeper analysis and much more space, and we will never arrive at definite answers that would satisfy everyone. In view of this, in this exposition I will only suggest some theses.

I have received the task of elaborating on two seemingly different periods - in the first Croatia was situated within a Yugoslav framework and, in the second, it found itself supposedly independent, but in symbiosis with Bosnia-Herzegovina. But seen from a formal perspective, namely, in conformity with international law, this concerns a period in which monarchist Yugoslavia existed. My text necessarily implies, whether I want it to or not, the question of what Yugoslavia was. Just as an explanation of what sort of position Croatia had in the Habsburg Monarchy was a challenge for several generations of Croatian historians, so too the question of Croatia's position in Yugoslavia remains a challenge for Croatian historiography at the beginning of the twenty-first century, as well as in the next few decades. In other words, posed is the question of how the Yugoslav framework acted upon Croatian society. The second problem is how to position the Ustasha ideology in the European context, and how to judge the existence of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH). The third question is how to position and judge the Communist idea.

When speaking of Yugoslavia - we can think about it as did Miroslav Krleža, who considers Yugoslav unification neither as a 'royalist' nor as a 'romantic' integration, but rather as the "permanent symptom of a higher stage of cultural consciousness." In history Krleža, congruent with his entire world-view, sees fatalistic motives - "wars, occupations and uprisings are the fatal motives of our existence on the Danube and in the Balkans." In contrast to this stands the creation of Yugoslavia which, according to Krleža, renders such wars, occupations and uprisings impossible. Krleža at least partially denied history: it was precisely monarchist Yugoslavia that ended its existence in blood, while the wars of 1991-1995 have their origins in socialist Yugoslavia, which Krleža almost deified. Was Yugoslavia, when specifically taking into account Croatia and, with

that, the socialist period, an ideal state framework, an artificial creation or a prison of nations? There are no simple answers, insofar as we are unsatisfied with lapidary and laconic witticism. It was all that and none of that.

With the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in 1918, more a result of the dictate of general conditions, and less the will of political elites and even less the result of the wider masses, Croatia became a part of the new state - Yugoslavia. It encompassed the area from the Alps almost to the Aegean Sea which, since the fourth century, was never under a united administration. The new state framework placed Croatia in a completely new situation: for Croatia, the centuries-old important Central European surroundings were demolished, and in return there was the attempt to create a new cultural and national self-consciousness of South Slavic/Yugoslav peoples. If it were a question of promoting the idea of separate nations or Yugoslav unitarism, then the national dilemmas were permanently in the centre of attention, while growing social contrasts and the growing number of workers also imposed the class question. Various solutions were offered, among which totalitarian concepts gradually obtained greater momentum, be they to the right or to the left. As the Second World War approached, the development of political conditions, and especially international ones, did not help civil-democratic solutions.

To understand what occurred after 1918 in the new state, it is important to know what was brought into it as a dowry.

Serbia entered Yugoslavia in 1918 convinced that the Karadorđević dynasty developed the most liberal system in Europe from 1903 to 1914. In later decades, and especially from the 1980s, this became a myth. Freedoms were based on the French constitution and other liberal legal decrees, but they were only normative - the courts rejected police decisions about censoring some newspapers, but then some unknown thugs would arrive in the printing offices where newspapers were printed and would smash the machines. In the supposedly liberal society, the dominant ideology was one that propagated equality in poverty and rejected every form of individualism. At the same time, this ideology was anti-urban, anti-liberal, collectivist and egalitarianist. The political discourse was war-like - politicians, when speaking of solutions to controversial issues, mentioned struggle and war, and when speaking of their political opponents, they mentioned friends and bloody enemies. According to this logic, every political opponent was in fact an enemy. The then Serbian ruling system was called by one opposition newspaper 'stambulovština', so named from the Bulgarian premier Stefan Nikolov Stambolov (1854-1895) who ruled the country despotically from 1887 to 1894. It was a system in which citizens formally had all rights, but they could not use any of them - formally, it was the negation of every freedom. The Serbian ruling class considered democracy as the rule of the majority, in which the rights of the minority could be realised once it became the majority. All these elements - traditional repression, backwardness and primitivism - were poured into the new state framework and society in which Serbia entered after 1918. Apart from this, one should take into account that Serbia was heavily wounded by the war, but encouraged by a triumphal victory and the already emerging legends of the march on the Drina, Kajmakčalan.

Into union with this type of Serbia entered, among others, Croatia. After 1918, Croatia was frightened by dark scenarios of possible partition, so that for realists a union with Serbia seemed the lesser evil.

Yugoslavism was created in Croatia, from the beginning of the second half of the nineteenth century, on the foundations of Illyrianism (even if it explicitly distanced itself from the Illyrian name and its meaning) as a specific supranational idea: it first called for the linking of the South Slavs in the Monarchy during the revolution of 1848-499. In it Croatianism, that is, Croatian national feeling, is primarily connected with a wider feeling of cultural affiliation with Slavdom and Yugoslavdom as a frame, and even as the condition for the survival of the small and weak Croatian nation. The Yugoslav ideology will have many interpreters in Croatia, namely, various currents, which will see the relation between Croatianism and Yugoslavism in different ways. Their position will depend on many factors, including, among others, events in the Monarchy and in the Balkans, as well as relations with Serbia and the development of Serbian national integrational ideologies. The chief ideologue of Yugoslavism was Franjo Rački who, in addition to that, was also a historian and politician, a defender of Croatian historical state rights. Yugoslavism mobilised educated individuals to create a modern civil culture. With its knitting of Croatdom and Yugoslavdom, Yugoslavism characterises literature, the struggle for a standard language and historiography. For decades, the idea of Yugoslavism among the Croats implied the cultural bringing together of the South Slavic peoples, thereby creating their own cultures which have their specific characteristics, with the vague idea that, in the future, one might create a common state. But it was completely uncertain in what boundaries. At the end of the First World War, with the founding of the state of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SHS) - there was practically no other choice. The state of SHS was unrecognised in the world, was frightened by Italian advances, was subject to manipulation, speculation and diplomatic games, did not have its own armed forces and its leadership was forced to take immediate steps. In principle, a common state with Serbia was accepted, but the warning of “not going into the fog like geese” simply could not be taken into account.⁴

The new Yugoslav state community integrated regions with very heterogeneous types of socio-economic relations that were already formed when they were part of other states - in Austria-Hungary, the most industrially advanced part were the Czech lands and, to some extent, Austria and Hungary, while the Croatian lands, Slovenia, Vojvodina and above all Bosnia-Herzegovina were the least developed parts of the Monarchy. These were, however, the most developed parts in the new Yugoslav state. In some parts of the former Kingdom of Serbia, the first civil practices penetrated the thin layer of the urban population, but they were still far removed from the way of life in developed, foreign civil centres. Ottoman rule in Kosovo and Metohija, in Macedonia and the Sandžak, left indelible traces of backwardness in social relations, life and work habits, commerce, trade and health. And the agrarian regimes were also essentially different: in Croatia, Slavonia and Vojvodina, large properties still existed in great measure. From the beginning of the nineteenth century, Serbia was already mainly a land of small parcels. In Dalmatia, the condi-

tions were characterised by colonate relations, and in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Metohija by the čivčija or feudal system.\(^\text{5}\)

In spite of the fact that very important ties with Central Europe, and especially with Vienna, Budapest and Prague, were with time increasingly cut off, the Croatian economy found itself in a good position in the new union: Croatia was also a predominantly agricultural land (it was only in the 1920s that the percentage of the agriculturally dependent population fell under 70%), but its industry was nevertheless essentially stronger than in the poorly developed eastern regions of the new state. Thus Croatian industry, and especially the timber industry, gained a secure internal market.\(^\text{6}\) In the space of a few years after the First World War, Zagreb, and also partly Croatia as a whole, experienced a dramatic transformation - during the period of Austro-Hungarian rule it was an area which lived as an agrarian appendage of the empire; the industrial centres were far away (primarily in the Czech lands and Hungary), and their production made the creation of industry in Croatia superfluous. After the war, Croatia and Zagreb, cut off from its earlier suppliers, obtained a strong impetus to become the supplier of a totally new political and economic region, with an agrarian potential that was much larger than were Croatian needs, but with an industrial potential that became dependent on Croatia and Zagreb as an organisational, financial and entrepreneurial centre.

Tradition and experience in banking dealings secured for Zagreb, as well as Croatian business in general, the leading position, and especially in the financial life of the Yugoslav monarchy. In 1931, there were almost two-hundred fiscal and other related societies in Zagreb, of which seventy-five were banks or savings banks and thirty-eight insurance companies. Through the mediation of Zagreb banking institutions, influential international financial circles were included in the Yugoslav economy.\(^\text{7}\) Zagreb became the leading trading centre in the area of the state.

From the periphery of a powerful empire, Croatia became the centre of a peripheral European state. However, these favourable economic circumstances for Croatia will remain temporary, they will last to the 1930s, until the great economic crisis and the stronger interventionist policies in economic life directed from Belgrade.

It is worthwhile placing these events in their political and social context - in the whole inter-war period, a very reduced and limited democracy was created, with a powerful repressive apparatus that was characterised by centralism, hegemony and greater Serbianism. The power brokers in Belgrade simply continued to behave in the same way as before the war - apart from that, they imposed on Croatia and the Croats, as well as other regions and peoples, a greater Serbian concept that the great majority of Croats could not accept, and that small number was reduced as the Second World War approached. From the perspective of the power brokers in Belgrade, it could appear as if they were dealing with problems in a united, unitary state, and that it was not

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\(^5\) ibid., p. 36.

\(^6\) Dubravka Stojanović, Srbija i demokracija 1903-1914 (Beograd: 2003).

\(^7\) The words of Stjepan Radić, which, with time, took on a mythical meaning, do not at all mean that Radić was opposed to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, but rather that he sought to obtain specific guarantees that the Serbian side would respect the obligations arranged upon in preceding agreements. See S. Radić, Politički spisi (Zagreb: 1971), pp. 323-335; B. Krizman, 'Stjepan Radić 1918', Historijski pregled 5 (Zagreb: 1959), pp. 270-279; B. Boban, 'Stjepan Radić i Država SHS', Radovi za hrvatsku povijest 26 (Zagreb: 1993), pp. 234-236.
a national issue. The Belgrade government did not comprehend, and later did not want to comprehend, that the integrative processes of national individualities among the Serbs, the Croats and the Slovenes were in the final stages or were already complete. In other words, they did not comprehend that it was too late (if it was even possible before) to canalise them towards the creation of a united nation, namely, that it was dealing with an irreversible process. When their concept was confronted with resistance, they reacted, in the traditional manner of a repressive regime, with repression. They recognised the existence of a ‘Croatian question’ only in the second half of the 1930s, frightened by external and internal pressures, but by then it was too late. From the Croatian perspective it was, totally logically, a question of the national problem! Growing social contrasts led to the collapse of the state in 1941 which, after 1943-1945, was reconstituted in a considerably different way.

As the Second World War drew nearer, the regime leaned more and more on right-wing concepts, and with the establishment of the Croatian banovina, a part of the repressive apparatus began to act in Zagreb, and not only in Belgrade. This was all very similar to conditions in neighbouring states - in Hungary, Romania and partly in Austria up to 1938. The late formation, and especially the possibility of realising national-integration ideologies and the solution of national questions, favoured the creation of extremism and stimulated ideas of radical solutions.

The Ustasha ideology advocated a ‘new order’ according to the Italian-German model: the cult of the nation, the state and the leader. The totalitarian idea was most concisely expressed in the programmatic text in the newspaper Ustaša from June 1941:

In the Ustasha state, which was created by the Poglavnik (Leader) and his Ustashe (insurgents), one must think like an Ustasha, speak like an Ustasha and most importantly - work like an Ustasha. In one word, life in its totality in the Independent State of Croatia [NDH] must be Ustasha.8

The Ustasha ideology (apart from its connections with Nazism and Fascism) favours the rural over the urban. With those parts which emerge from concrete Croatian circumstances, the Ustasha ideology is the product of a poor agrarian society in a deep identity crisis and a petit-bourgeois society in the making.

On the one hand, the Ustasha ideology was constructed by Ante Pavelić, Vladimir Singer and other émigrés, while extremist inclined intellectuals in Croatia also offered a considerable contribution - above all Kerubin Šegvić and Stjepan Buć, but also Filip Lukas, Mladen Lorković and some others,9 inspired by texts which arrived from Germany and Italy. Eugen Dido Kvaternik and Maks Luburić resided in Germany in 1941 and, from there, brought with them considerable knowledge about the organisation of the system of concentration camps.10 Nevertheless, it is not

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8 Ustaša, Ustaša 2, Zagreb, 13. 06.1941.
9 See L. Goldstein, Židovi u Zagrebu 1918-1945 (Zagreb: 2004), pp. 519-530.
10 The statement of Vjekoslav Luburić in the minutes of 05.11.1941, Hrvatski državni arhiv (HDA), MUP RH, spis II-91, USIKS 337/41; HDA, 013.2.30, Dosje Ljubo Miloš, 10, 64; A. Miletić, Konzentrationslag Jasenovac (Beograd
all that straightforward - intellectuals armed with knowledge, such as Milovan Žanić, only partly constructed the Independent State of Croatia. In articles written before and during the war, Ivan Oršanić conceived of a state structure similar to Fascist corporatism, but he was marginalised. Vladimir Židovec claims that it was an

... extensive and detailed plan about how to build the new state. It encompassed all social, political and economic suppositions... A. Pavlić received this plan while in emigration, but it was the furthest thing from his mind to take any note of it.11

Anti-intellectualism was one of the key features of the implementation of the Ustasha ideology - Vladimir Židovec, one of the most lucid analysts of the Ustasha movement from the ‘inside’, claimed that Pavlić surrounded himself with ‘primitives’. According to Židovec, Pavlić considered intellectuals ‘vacillating’ and ‘unstable’. By that he implied that intellectuals “did not want to blindly and unconditionally subject themselves to him, as did the primitives,” chiefly with regard to the

... critical stance which an intellectual takes in opposition to dictatorial methods... intellectually, Pavlić was markedly weak. It is certain that this was one of the decisive motives for his marked suspicion towards real intellectuals (similar to Hitler)... in his close surroundings, one could only find either people of a submissive character and without strength, such as Artuković, the brothers Frković, Dumandžić, Lovro Sušić... or unprincipled and ambitious careerists and opportunists, such as A. Nikšić, Stjepo Perić, Vrančić, Košak and others, who were willing to step over all moral obstacles and who were capable of anything!12

The NDH had a terribly negative selection: “A reasonable statesman would have given Mile Budak, during the period of the NDH, only one position, and that was the position of president of the writers’ association.” Pavlić ridiculed Budak while he fulfilled the office of minister of foreign affairs!13

The establishment of the NDH and its four-year existence also carried with it contradictory traits - on the one hand, it was a system which negated the many civilisational achievements of earlier democratic systems and, on the other, it was part of a system which ruled over the greater part of European territory.

In twelve years of emigration, Pavlić adopted more than an authoritarian system of governance, that is, a system of personal despotism modelled on Mussolini. In his eyes and in his consciousness, the state was not an organ and expression of the will of the people, but was rather an organ

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12 | HDA, fond MUP SRH, 013.0.56, V. Židovec, Moje sudjelovanje u političkom životu, pp. 42, 43.
13 | ibid, p. 46.
and medium in the hands of authoritarian power brokers for the subordination and submission of the will of the people.\textsuperscript{14}

Secondly, Kvaternik agrees that, while in emigration, Pavelić “did not learn anything other than what he studied of the methods and way of ruling according to Machiavelli.”\textsuperscript{15}

What was the NDH? To give a precise answer or answers to this question is not easy because, needless to say, it is question about one of the crucial issues from the history of the Second World War in Croatia. In such reflections, it is worthwhile starting from what I hope are indubitable assumptions. The Second World War in Croatia, as well as in the world in general, was a very complex event which can be examined on several levels, but it is worthwhile accepting in full that, irrespective of erroneous moves and crimes committed by all the warring sides, one has to always know who was on the right side, and who was on the wrong side of the war. We should never lose sight of the fact that one side was characterised by original evil, which classified people as being right and wrong according to what they acquired with birth, and that the other side defended humanity from that evil.

Someone will say, and why not give that person the right to do so, that the NDH had nothing in common with Croatian political traditions, nor with the political conceptions (for between Ante Starčević and Ante Pavelić there is a huge difference, in fact a gulf, in every sense)\textsuperscript{16} and real needs and goals of the majority of Croats. On the whole, the Independent State of Croatia, Ante Pavelić and his closest collaborators, as well as the Ustasha regime in general, should be judged only by their deeds. Research into these actions irrevocably lead to the conclusion that the Independent State of Croatia was proclaimed in a terrible period, that it was proclaimed by extremist political elements, under a patronage which was well disposed towards them; that it acted according to perverted principles, in the service of tyrants, and that it could only end in a tragic manner.

The aforementioned Vladimir Židovec thought that Pavelić obtained administration over the state in April 1941 “after that fantastic play of chance.”\textsuperscript{17} This ‘play of chance’ was well-defined by Mile Budak in his well-known speech in Gospić:

The Poglavnik has created this state in spite of all difficulties, not asking permission from anybody, not seeking the blessing of anybody, not seeking an agreement with anybody, except from our large neighbours, who were the only ones able to help us and who did help us, and those are the German Reich and Fascist Italy.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{15} ibid, p. 165.
\textsuperscript{16} On the unsuccessful attempts of pro-Ustasha inclined intellectuals to show Starčević’s teachings as the basis of Ustashtism, see I. Goldstein, \textit{Židovi u Zagrebu 1918-1945}, pp. 516-517.
\textsuperscript{17} HDA, fond MUP SRH, 013.0.56, V. Židovec, Moje sudjelovanje u političkom životu, p. 54.
\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Hrvatski narod}, Zagreb, 4 June 1941.
During the Second World War, on the territory of Croatia there was no relative peace as there was in countries in a similar position - Slovakia, Romania, Hungary or Bulgaria. The large number of crimes, and subsequently the large number of war operations, practically unfolded from the invasion of the Axis powers of the Croatian area. Connected with this is the fact that the local population, in relation to these events, was more sharply differentiated than in the majority of other countries under the occupation or influence of Nazi Germany: there were relatively more supporters of the Ustasha, but also even relatively more local resistance to the Ustasha regime and the occupation forces. Andrija Artuković and Eugen Dido Kvaternik were not alone in organising murder - "the conscious and calculated directors and authors of the cut-throat plan were Pavelić himself and the most intimate circle around him (Budak, Lorković, Puk, Dido Kvaternik, etc.), the leaders on the ground were people such as Gutić, Luburić, V. Tomić, etc., while the great number of cut-throats were frequently the unconscious tools of the real offenders, blinded by racial and other theories." On the other hand, Slayko Komar and Ivan Šibl were not the only ones to throw bombs and join the Partisans.

On the other hand, it is worthwhile mentioning something about the Communist idea and the Communist movement, which also decisively characterised the period from the end of the First to the end of the Second World War. In view of widespread social dissatisfaction with the Yugoslav area, and with the unification of the socialist and social-democratic parties, there grew a considerably strong Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPi). Up to June 1920, until the revolutionary Leninist current did not predominate in it, the Party was called the Socialist Worker's Party of Yugoslavia (communists). In the only elections in which it participated - at the end of 1920 - it came out with a program which, while not completely declining the path of slow reform and parliamentarism, advocated class warfare and socialist revolution. In Croatia, the communists were stronger than in other parts of the new state.

As a result of stiff persecution, the Communist Party in fact ceased to function at the time of the January 6 dictatorship, and the leadership fled abroad. But in the second half of the 1930s, their activity was once again strengthened: urban dwellers, but also villages, increasingly felt social problems as being essential, and the communists knew how to take advantage of this and became more active. Within the KPi in 1937, the Communist Party of Croatia and the Communist Party of Slovenia were formed, by which time the communists enabled the formulation of their own national policy and expressed more understanding for the national problem.

Both before and during the Second World War, the Party and Josip Broz Tito uncritically accepted some Stalinist solutions, but they also knew how to reject them, if they saw that reality denied them. Thus they began to rebel against rigid concepts - it was claimed, namely, that the revolution had to begin in towns. But it was quickly shown that, beforehand, this imposed scheme brought only great sacrifices in communist ranks. This certainly became clear to Josip Broz Tito earlier than to some activists in the field (for example, Josip Kraš, Rade Končar and

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19 | HDA, fond MUP SRH, 013.0.3, Dizdar, Ustaštv i NDH, p. 55; see HDA, fond MUP SRH, 013.0.56, V. Židovec, Moje sudjelovanje u političkom životu, p. 138; Viktor Gutić was prominent in the persecution of Serbs, to which the Germans also drew attention. See Tko je tko u NDH.

others). In the meantime, the rebellion (which was only partly due to the communists) flared up on completely different foundations.

The National Liberation Struggle (NOB) in Croatia and the whole of Yugoslavia was a specific part of the wider anti-Fascist coalition. Namely, the alliance was created on several levels: the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was part of the Communist front with the USSR at its head. Apart from that, as the war approached its end, the Yugoslav anti-Fascist movement potentially, and afterwards actually, co-operated with anti-Fascists in Albania and Greece, with whom they attempted, partly successfully, to unify themselves politically and operationally.

The anti-Fascist movement in Croatia gave a significant contribution to the anti-Fascist coalition. The Croatian anti-Fascist movement was a very important, and indeed the strongest (beside the Bosnian-Herzegovinian), part of the Yugoslav anti-Fascist movement. So excluding the occupied parts of the USSR, it was subsequently the strongest anti-Fascist movement in Europe.

The intertwining of political differences and influences within the great anti-Fascist coalition, and within the Communist front, was reflected in the four war years in the anti-Fascist movement in Yugoslavia, and in the specificity of the NOB in Croatia in relation to the overall Yugoslav NOB.  

The program declared struggle for national equality as one of the specific components of Yugoslav anti-Fascism and the NOB, and offered a basis for a certain level of autonomy of Croatian anti-Fascism and the Croatian NOB within Yugoslavia as a whole. That autonomy was occasionally bound by the centralist organisation of the KPJ as the leading force, but in spite of this, it maintained itself thanks to the autochthonous roots of Croatian anti-Fascism, which emerged from the specific political conditions in Croatia.

In the Croatian anti-Fascist movement, as well as in the entire NOB on the territory of Yugoslavia, the communists always had the key functions. The Communist Party of Croatia was the main organisational and leading force of the war-time anti-Fascism movement and the NOB in Croatia. In the wider Yugoslav context, it was the KPJ. During the war years, as the various organisations, and afterwards, state bodies were founded, and in those which had an anti-Fascist character, there were represented individuals from various political parties, but they were practically led by communists. They continued to appear with anti-Fascist and democratic programs and slogans, but as the end of the war approached, it became all the more obvious that they would not let power slip from their hands after the war. Therefore anti-Fascist slogans, namely, the struggle against the enemy, were continually and coherently tied to typical communist slogans that touched on issues concerning social justice and the rule of 'workers and peasants'.

With its autochthonous strength the National Liberation movement determined, in many respects independently of external factors, the course of events on Croatian territory. In one sense, it is paradoxical that only when it strengthened during the first years of war, though in continual conflict with German and Italian occupiers and NDH and Chetnik units, the movement had to increasingly take into consideration international circumstances. The reason for this was, naturally, the disentanglement of events after the war. But that is a topic for another occasion.

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Bibliography


Ivo Goldstein

Odsjek za povijest Filozofskog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, Zagreb

Hrvatska u kraljevstvu SHS i u NDH (1918. – 1945.)

Polovinom 20. stoljeća Miroslav Krleža je smatrao da jugoslavensko ujedinjenje nije ni „rojalistička“ niti „romantična“ integracija, već „trajni simptom višeg stepena kulturne svijesti“. Danas, početkom 21. stoljeća, Krležinu tvrdnju valja uvažavati kao autoritativno mišljenje
izrečeno u određenoj povijesnoj situaciji. Čini mi se da bi stoga primjereno bilo zapitati se - što je bila Jugoslavija za Hrvatsku – idealan državni okvir, umjetna tvorevina ili tamnica naroda? Bila je sve to i ništa od toga. No, to je razdoblje puno proturječnih procesa koje valja različito vrednovati. Primjerice, u civilizacijskom smislu – izgubile su se stoljetne veze sa srednjoevropskim prostorom, a stvarale su se nove na prostoru koji od 4. stoljeća nikada nije bio u jedinstvenoj državi. U ekonomskom smislu Hrvatska više nije agrarni privjesak jednog imperija, već dobiva snažan poticaj da postane organizacijski, industrijski i financijski centar u novom političkom okolišu. S druge strane, represivni državni aparat bitno je otežavao prilike, ne samo na političkom planu, i u konačnici znatno pridonio razgradnji države 1941. godine.

Uspostava NDH i njezino četverogodišnje postojanje također sa sobom nosi proturječne značajke – s jedne strane riječ o sustavu koji je negirao mnoge civilizacijske dosege dotadašnjih demokratskih sustava, a s druge, to je bio sustav koji je tada vladao većim dijelom evropskog teritorija.