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CROATIA AND EUROPE, 1789-1848: EUROPEAN OR NATIONAL INTEGRATION?

Abstract. In my exposition,¹ I do not intend to give a synthetic account of the problematic ‘Croatia and Europe’, which is the general theme of the second congress of Croatian historians, for the period from the end of the eighteenth century to the middle of the nineteenth century. The authors of the preceding papers show that Croatian identity in the preceding centuries shared in the European identity, while in my paper I intend to speak of the problem formulated in the subtitle: ‘European or national integration?’ This concerns the various levels of integration of European society, but also of the various rhythms of change in Europe, drawing attention to phenomena which speak of the simultaneous non-simultaneity in the European area of that period. I will observe the period from the end of the eighteenth century to the first half of the nineteenth century as the period on the boundary of the old system out of which the new era emerged.

1. From the ‘revolution of the notables’ of 1789 to the ‘liberal revolution’ of 1848
In historiography it is customary, in the periodisation of Croatian history, to denote 1790 as the beginning of the new historical period. That year in political history denotes the end of the absolutist rule of Joseph II and the beginning of the constitutional period characterised by the sitting of the Hungarian and Croatian parliaments which, after the death of Joseph II, were summoned by his brother and successor, Leopold II. These political changes were the consequence of the victory of the movement of the Hungarian and Croatian nobilities. The Hungarian nobility was on the edge of rebellion, opposed to the reforms that were leading to the creation of a unified, centralised and absolutist Austrian empire, the removal of the historical political autonomy of Hungary and Croatia and, generally, the limitation of the social and political power of the nobility. The movement obtained victory precisely in the preceding year, when Joseph II refrained from part of his reforms and, in December 1789, announced the convocation of the Hungarian and Croatian estates.² For European history, the outbreak of the French Revolution in 1789 is indeed more important. The convocation of the Estates-General in France itself, which historiography takes as the beginning of the French Revolution, was not a revolutionary act. It was the consequence of the rebellion of the nobility against royal absolutism, a rebellion that was, it is true, supported by the bourgeoisie, the consequence of the ‘revolution of the notables’ that did

not intend to destroy the system, but wanted to reform it and thereby preserve the social position and strengthen the political influence of the nobility in relation to the ruler.

The success of the movement of the Hungarian and Croatian nobilities against Joseph II did not, however, mean the end of the period of enlightened rulers in the Habsburg Monarchy and their reformist endeavours. Leopold II shared his brother’s enlightened views, but he intended to rule in co-operation with the estates, and thereby leaned on a group of reformist nobles. Thus it is not at all strange that Leopold was commendably expressive of Louis XVI because he convened the Estates-General as he himself convened the Hungarian and Croatian parliament. A member of the group of reformist nobility, Josip Keresturi, a nobleman of the Hungarian Kingdom, but (as he himself declared) a Croata Stridonensis, a Croat from Štrigove in Medimurje, then a part of the Hungarian županija (county) of Zalad, outlined allegorically his political program in a Latin poem in 1790, in a story about Joseph II in the Elysian fields (“Josephus II in campis Elysii”) where, after his death, in heaven (in the poem, the Elysian fields, in the classicist atmosphere, represent heaven), he was subject to the judgment of the Hungarian kings from St. Stephen to his mother Maria Theresia, who reproached him for ruling Hungary in an absolutist fashion, without the co-operation of the nobility. In his second poem in 1791, Keresturi signed his name as 'Eleutherius Pannonius' - eleuhterios in Greek means 'free' - therefore: 'Free Pannonian'. He put forward in the poem his mirabilia fata (miraculous visions), a conception of a harmonious society in the future under the rule of Leopold II, in fact a program of reform of the political system with the preservation of the estates system and a program of social reforms, but in a framework of the feudal system according to which the nobles and peasants would regulate their mutual obligations and duties with an agreement mutually relating to each other as fathers and sons. The very pseudonym 'Eleutherius' and the program that he put forward in his Eleutherii Pannonii mirabilia fata speak of Keresturi's libertinism, program of freedom, but also freedoms limited to the highest social layer, with the preservation of the estates system and feudal relations, that is, in the same way as represented by the bearers of the 'revolution of the notables' at the beginning of the French Revolution. Intensive activity in the conceiving of reforms to the social and political system in the same sense, though with a stronger limitation to royal authority over the Hungarian (and Croatian) part of the Habsburg Monarchy, was developed in this period by Nikola Škrlec Lomnički, one of the most prominent figures in Croatian political life, who also strongly present in Hungarian politics.

Events in the Habsburg Monarchy and France in 1789-1790, on the eve of events which will yet grow into that which we call the French Revolution, and on the eve of the collapse of Josephine absolutism and directly after it, were part of the same European phenomena in the framework of the European ancien régime. Between events which forced Louis XVI in the same year in France to convene the Estates-General, and events in Hungary and Croatia, which forced Joseph II to

3 | Tomo Matič, "Josip Keresturi i njegovi pogledi na političke prilike poslije smrti Josipa II," Rad HAZU 270 (1), 1941, pp. 148-188.

4 | Cf. the collected works of Nikola Škrlec Lomnički in the three published volumes: Nikola Škrlec Lomnički 1729-1799; sv. 1 (Zagreb: HAZU, Pravni fakultet, 1999); sv. 2 (Zagreb: HAZU, Hrvatski državni arhiv, Pravni fakultet, 2000); sv. 3 (Zagreb: HAZU, Hrvatski državni arhiv, Pravni fakultet, Filozofski fakultet, 2001).
promise the convening of the Hungarian and Croatian parliament, one can draw a parallel, but one must also draw attention to differences in their causes and consequences. A strong, centrally administered state was already built in France, and the French Estates General rarely sat from 1614 and was convened mainly to confirm the ruler's decisions. In the Habsburg Monarchy, on the other hand, the process of shaping a unified and centralised state was still not concluded, in other words, it was advanced in the hereditary Habsburg lands, while Joseph II only attempted to completely subject the Hungarian and Croatian part of the Monarchy to the central administration in Vienna, removing the historical political autonomy of Hungary and Croatia and their feudal constitutionality. As a result, events in the Habsburg Monarchy that characterised the immediate period that followed in the Monarchy and in Croatia we can compare only with one segment of events in France, and that is the segment which - in the highly stratified French society - was quickly pushed out of the centre of events. The enlightenment idea of the need to reform the social and political system, which to a great extent derived from France, originating in the highest, above all, noble layer of the ancien régime, was also present in the same layer in the Habsburg Monarchy, and so also among the Hungarian and Croatian nobility. However, in the different socially structured France and Central European Habsburg Monarchy they were not only extended to a different degree, they also encompassed various levels of social layers and, owing to this, 1789 was later operationalised to a different degree and in different ways.\(^5\)

Namely, there existed in France a strong bourgeois layer which, after the convening of the Estates General, took the course of events out of the hands of the 'notables' and directed them towards revolution in the sense which the word 'revolution' took from that time. There were no such layers in the structure of Central European society, especially not in Croatia, and as a result central Europe did not move onto the French path. Keresturi himself, putting forward his reform program in 1791, which actually experienced defeat in France, expressed the fear of the reformist nobility of the radical changes which were occurring in France, where the Constitutional Assembly moved towards the reshaping of the till then estates assembly into a representative body. "Nolite Francias pro exemplo accipere" ("Do not accept the example of France") - was Keresturi's message to those in Hungary and Croatia who were disposed towards reform. Namely: "Vae, vae vobis qui potentis estis, si spiritus Gallorum intravit in corda Hungarorum" ("Woe to you powerful if the French spirit enters the Hungarian heart").\(^6\) Before long, while the revolution in France was radicalised, after the death of Leopold II in 1792 and the arrival to government of his conservative son, Francis, during the wars of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars, the reformist spirit of the Hungarian and Croatian nobilities was halted. Only individuals and conspiratorial groups thought about destroying the old system, such as the quickly discovered and condemned members of the so-called Jacobin conspiracy of abbot Ignjat Martinovics in Hungary, in which individuals from Croatia participated.\(^7\)

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\(^6\) Josip Keresturi, Eleutherii Pannoni mirabilis fata, b. mj, 1791, 33; cf. Matić, pp. 185-186.

The reformist intentions among the Croatian nobility were only restored at the end of the crisis of the post-Napoleonic period. But it entered the revivalist period continuing the program of the 'notables'. In 1832, forty years later, we will find in the Dissertation of count Janko Drašković, a written document that contained the program of the Croatian nobility at that time, a conservative reform program and fear of the French example expressed almost literally with Kereprüki's words. Drašković, after the experience of the second revolution in France, the one from June 1830, put forward a proposal of social reform, in which he - also not touching upon the feudal system - suggested to the nobles that they be "otzi y njemu sirotochuvrini" ("fathers and protectors") towards the "stibraski puk" (štribraški = one who pays the štriba, tax), and that in accepting reforms there does not follow the "peldu" (the model and revolutionary path) of the French.  

The French Revolution and the Napoleonic period was characteristic of the quarter century of events on the European continent, and neither the defeat nor the Vienna congress of 1815 and the Holy Alliance, the alliance of conservative rulers who were vigilant with fear due to new revolutionary movements, could not push aside that which the French Revolution introduced to Europe. The French Revolution brought essential social and political changes to France, and to the rest of Europe it created not only a model for change, but also the concept of revolution as armed rebellion which no longer meant only the change of the bearers of authority, but reform of the social and political system as well.  

After 1815, the Rhine was established as the border between two social systems, but the structure of society east of the Rhine, included in the early modernisation processes, changed and thereby came into conflict with the old system. There began the period in which historical perspectives are called 'pre-March' because it was felt as a preparation for changes, which will begin after the disturbances in Vienna in March 1848. It was precisely the new revolutions in France after 1815, at intervals less than two decades, 1830 and 1848 in particular, which were a release that gave stimulus to the discharge of accumulated tensions between the growing social forces and the old system in Central Europe and on the Apennine peninsula. The July revolution of 1830, which removed the regime of Restoration and established the constitutional monarchy (at whose head was the 'citizen king' Louis-Philippe) and brought to power the wealthy bourgeoisie, provoked a differentiation in the till then united opposition bloc to the European absolutist regimes, and at the same time, opened the period of movements east of the Rhine and south of the Alps which put reforms to the social and political system at the top of the agenda. Lastly, the process of social and political change, as begun in France in 1789, was carried during the 'liberal revolution' of 1848 to these areas, again falling behind contemporary events in France. In 1848 various political programs of reform were presented, but the scale was tipped in favour of the liberal-conservative (that is, not democratic) program of interest groups of the wealthy bourgeoisie and nobility, characteristic of these areas. Feudal relations were unravelled, but with the preservation of the economic strength of the nobility, the predominant programs of reform to the political system did not go further than a constitutional monarchy, the estates were abolished, but with

high electoral census it was wished to preserve the economic and political dominance of the wealthy bourgeoisie and nobility. Predominant political programs advocated a political system in the interest of the wealthiest social layers, such as the one which was established in France with the revolution of 1830, and which was destroyed in France by the revolution of 1848. The second half of the nineteenth century and the twentieth century were filled with the movement, full of stagnation, but also new penetrations, on the path to the social and political system in which there was a "meeting of liberalism and deomcracy." On this road, Croatia further fell behind, and only reforms at the end of the twentieth century opened the possibility of beginning to reach western development.

2. *Vive la nation! - political (civil) and ethno-nationalism*

The French revolution brought forward the national principle. How much this was a novelty, and how much contemporaries were aware of the changes the French revolution introduced to Europe, is witnessed by the impression an experience left on Johann Wolfgang Goethe (in an episode I have many times extracted). In attendance at the retinue of the Saxon prince in the battle at Valmy in 1792, the first French victory over the coalition army of the feudal states, when he heard how the cry of *Vive la nation!* ("Long live the nation!") was carried through the ranks of the French army, Goethe declared: "On this day and in this place, begins a new era in world politics." This was most likely not the first time that Goethe encountered the notion of the nation, but it was the first time he encountered the fact that the idea of the nation had been taken up by the masses. In the political theory of the nobility of the late feudal society there existed the notion of the 'nation', but it encompassed the feudal estates, which saw themselves as the bearers of the political system that shares authority with the ruler, and this conception, based on Rousseau's theory of the social contract, provided support to the resistance against the absolutist monarchy. Behind the cry at Valmy stood, then, the concept of the nation, concretely, Frenchmen as a nation that was awoken by the French Revolution, a political community of equal citizens sharing the same rights, in opposition to the feudal division of the population into estates with different legal status. Such a political or civil nationalism conceived of the nation as the only bearer of sovereignty, that is, as the source of authority in opposition to the ruler *Dei gratia*, the ruler who ideologically legitimised his rule by the 'grace of God'. A nation thus understood must participate in government through its representation, or in the consistent radical variant, take authority completely into its own hands. The framework for the realisation of the nation thus understood was the state as it was till then framed in France by the absolutist monarchy, and which was now taken over by the bearers of the revolution.

Taking over the state and destroying the feudal institutions, the revolution removed the remains of the historical autonomy upon which the nobility leaned in opposition to the revolution. It established a consistent centralised administration, abolished the historical provinces and founded geographically and economically encompassed departments, in the same manner as Joseph II


abolished the authority of the županije in Hungary and Croatia, and founded districts which he rounded off, assembling in them territories from both sides of the Drava River, that is, not giving consideration to the borders between historical Hungary and Croatia. Until then individual provinces in France, in spite of the unified French language of the central state administration, performed business in their own dialect, for example, in the northern province of Brittany, settled with Bretons, in the Breton language, which, like Cornish and Welsh, belongs to the group of Celtic languages. During the revolution, the introduction of the French language as the unified and only official language, thus as the educational language in schools, was justified not only by the needs of a unified and efficient administration, but also as a guarantee of the unity of the ‘nation’, indeed, as the guarantee of the defence of the revolution. Thus in the Convent of 1794 Breton was proclaimed the language of counter-revolution, and the proclamation of the French language as the only language of administration, the judiciary, education and public life was supported by the claim that, “in a democracy, it would represent a betrayal of the homeland if the citizens did not know the national language.”

The Breton nobility (if we further follow the example of Brittany) was not successful in preserving its municipal position, its resistance to the revolution was defeated, the province Brittany was divided into five departments and the French language was imposed in the administration and schools. The Breton ethnic group, like the Provencal and the Basque in France, did not have at the time sufficiently strong social forces that could - opposing the centralised administrative and linguistic policies of the revolution - preserve the framework for the slowed modernisation processes according to its own interests and for political modernisation, that is, administrative modernisation and, with that, an associated cultural standardisation on a Breton linguistic basis. This disenabled Breton proto-nationalism, leaning on the Breton historical and ethnic identity, to develop a full national identity according to (more on this later) the Central European model. (The Bretons today are developing their non-French identity, but only a fifth of Brittany’s population can speak Breton and that as a second language to French).

On the other hand, almost at the same time, the somewhat earlier attempts of Joseph II to remove the historical autonomy of Hungary and Croatia and build the Habsburg Monarchy as a united Austria, a centralised state with one German official language, were shattered owing to the strength of the resistance of the Hungarian and Croatian nobility. The Hungarian and Croatian nobility also had at their disposal the idea of the nation in a political sense, but they limited it to their class. The aforementioned Nikola Škrlec Lomnčić, moderately reformist oriented, in his political documents from 1790 proposed that civil rights be recognised for citizens as individuals (that is, not corporate rights as members of free royal cities till that time), and also to peasants, that is, he adhered to the patent with which Joseph II gave freedom to serfs, in other words, the right of freedom of movement (liberae migrationis libertas, as Škrlec writes, which the Hungarian parliament legalised in 1790). But he did not touch upon the feudal arrangement. He was consequently prepared only to accept the citizenry as a fourth estate, and considered

that the peasants were represented in the estate assemblies through the lords of the lands which they tilled.\textsuperscript{14} As a result, he limited the ‘nation’ to the members of the estates and, proposing reforms to the Hungarian parliament, he pleaded for important questions in the parliament to be discussed during common sittings of the upper and lower houses, and that one should not vote according to estate, that is, that voting should be individual and not corporative, without regard to membership of estates, with the explanation that the “nation [natio in the Latin original] must have its will in connection with all subjects which concern it directly, so there must be a way to comprehend that will.”\textsuperscript{15}

These proposals were shaped in the atmosphere of the rise of Hungarian and Croatian proto-nationalism. As the contemporary count Adam Oršić bears witness, on the news of Joseph’s withdrawal from the policy of centralisation and Germanisation, and the return of Hungarian and Croatian constitutionality, the “Hungarian nobility are seized at once by some patriotic giddiness... they have given to cutting dresses according to the old Hungarian fashion, and the ladies are beginning to wear clothing of Hungarian cut, with furs, and on the head they place native head-wear; nobody wants to speak anything other than Hungarian, and in Croatia, Croatian.”\textsuperscript{16}

The Hungarian and Croatian nobility succeeded - where the aforementioned Bretons did not succeed - in preserving the feudal constitutionality as a framework for the implementation of (proto)modernising operations according to their own degree and as a frame (in that complex) for cultural standardisation, including the standardisation of language, necessary for the shaping of their own unified state administrations. They only wanted to carry out what Joseph II attempted to carry out for the entire Habsburg Empire, according to their own needs and in the framework of their own state. The Hungarian and Croatian languages had already reached a definite level of standardisation, thanks to - paradoxically - among other things, the efforts of the central authorities in the period of enlightened rulers, who, retaining Latin or introducing German as the unified administrative language, supported the purposive standardisation of vernaculars and their orthographies, so that they could insure the free flow of channels for the implementation of their decisions to the lower administrative and social levels. Thus, the “decree of crimes and their punishment,” that is, the penal code of Joseph II, was published in the kajkovski dialect.\textsuperscript{17} (After all, the French absolutist monarchy did not remove the use of provincial vernaculars). The purpose of these efforts of the Viennese centre was not the creation of national standardised languages. For example, in the Croatian case, the intention was not to shape a unified Croatian standard language and orthography. Rather, the standardisation of the language on the kajkovski and štokavski basis was supported with the preservation of separate ‘Croatian’ (horvatski) and ‘Slavonian’ (slavonski) orthographies. Work on the forming of a ‘national’ standard language, and its transformation into the language of the state administration and public life, became the

\textsuperscript{14} Nikola Škrlec Lomnički, \textit{Pia desideria}, 1790, in: Nikola Škrlec Lomnički, sv. 3, pp. 198-199.


\textsuperscript{17} Općinska naredba od zlocinsntvah i njihovih pedepsah (Budim: Kr. Mјadoskupština, 1788).
aim of Hungarian and Croatian (proto)nationalisms. This aim was realised only six decades later, with the parliamentary decisions by which Hungarian was proclaimed the official language in Hungary (1844) and Croatian in the ‘Triune Kingdom’ (1847).

At the very beginning of this period of Hungarian and Croatian (proto)nationalisms, they not only opposed the absolutist, centralist and Germanising intentions of the enlightened rulers, but they were also in mutual conflict. The Croatian nobility defended and affirmed common Hungarian and Croatian constitutionality, but Croatian and Hungarian proto-nationalisms clashed when the Hungarian nobility attempted to transform Hungary into a unified and centralised state, and thereby remove Croatian political separateness based on Croatian municipal rights (which it, after all, endeavoured to do since the beginning of the eighteenth century) and give Hungary Magyar characteristics (which was a new phenomenon), imposing on all of Hungary, ‘from the Carpathians to the sea’, Hungarian as the official language. The viceroy Ivan Erdődy had already opposed these efforts in the Hungarian parliament in 1790, with the words “Regnum regno non praescribit leges” (“A kingdom cannot impose its laws upon another kingdom”), defending the separate state-legal position of Croatia, as did the Croatian representatives in the declaration Declaratio ex parte nunciorum Regni Croatiae (its author was Nikola Škrlec), who opposed the introduction of the Hungarian language as official in all the lands of the crown of St. Stephen, with the claim that, among others, the acceptance of a foreign and unknown language would be a ‘stamp of servitude’ (nota servitutis). In the same year, Josip Keresturi also emphasised, defending Latin similarly to Škrlec as a neutral buckle of a linguistically diverse Hungary, the principle that a foreign language must not be imposed upon anyone.

In the period to the middle of the nineteenth century, together with strengthened social stratification and, with that, the creation of a basis for the formation of a civil, non-feudal society, conditions were emerging in the areas of Central Europe, and also in Croatia, for the shaping of the nation as a community that encompasses individuals, stepping over class boundaries. But in these areas, there was no shaping of a political nationalism on the Western model, but ethno-nationalism based on a linguistic understanding of the nation, or at least (as in the Hungarian and Croatian examples) a combination of political and ethno nationalism. The causes for this were twofold. This type of nationalism was characteristic for European areas in which strong centralised states did not arise in time, in the early modern period, as on the Apennine peninsula (I intentionally did not write ‘Italy’), where the political division of the peninsula was maintained by the influence of external and internal factors, as in the historical political creation, the Roman Empire of the German Nation, where, because of the same reasons, the emergence of a strong central authority was prevented, or as in the Habsburg Monarchy, where attempts to create a unified and centralised Austria did not succeed. This left space for local elites to attempt to create a framework for the implementation of (proto)modernising processes in harmony with their own

19 | Matić, Josip Keresturi, p. 185.
interests. These spaces of modernisation according to one’s own measure were closed by linguistic boundaries, tying it to popular proto-nationalism and also taking traditional institutions into their own hands, tying themselves to popular and aristocratic proto-nationalism (which in the Habsburg Monarchy was the case with the Hungarian and Croatian social elites). On the other hand, the nationalism of these areas did not find its basis, as Western political nationalism did, in the individual as an equal citizen, and did not see in him or her the source of the sovereignty of the nation as a political community of equal citizens. Instead, it laid its basis on ethnicity as a collectivity above the individual, who creates his or her welfare through the nation. As a result, these nationalisms did not see the bearers of sovereignty in the nation as a political community of individuals and equal citizens, but in the nation understood as an ethnically and linguistically-culturally based community. The elements of Hungarian and Croatian traditional statehood gave Hungarian and Croatian nationalisms specific characteristics, and they were a combination of political and ethno-nationalism, which was mirrored in the concept of the Hungarian and Croatian ‘political nations’ respectively, present in various ways in the Hungarian and Croatian national ideologies of the nineteenth century.

In the areas east of the Rhine and south of the Alps, during the period from the end of the eighteenth century to 1848, one of the most essential components of political programs, with the aspiration for reform of the social and political system, became the demand for the re-shaping of the political map on the basis of the national principle, that is, the creation of nation states. The nation and nationalism, though of different types or as a combination of different types of nationalism, became a uniform European phenomenon, but these types were realised locally. In the area east of the Rhine and south of the Alps, they engendered national movements, in the first stage in the shape of characteristic ‘revival’ movements, such as the Croatian national revival of the first half of the nineteenth century (the Illyrian movement). These movements experienced their greatest rise and thereafter collapse during the revolution of 1848-1849.

In the following stage, the Italian and German national movements realised their goals of uniting Italy (1861) and Germany (1871), and the Hungarian movement procured, with the Austro-Hungarian Ausgleich of 1867, a comprise solution with the realisation of Hungarian statehood in the frame of the dual solution. (In South-Eastern Europe, this process was tied to the solution of the ‘Eastern question’. One of its most important stages was characterised by the ‘Eastern crisis’, which was concluded at the Berlin Congress of 1878.) From then on the efforts of national movements were blocked until 1918, when new national states emerged (but also some multinational ones, such as Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia) upon the ruins of the multinational states of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and the Russian empire. The process of forming nation states in the area from the Baltic to the Adriatic and Black Seas was concluded only at the end of the twentieth century, when an independent Croatia also emerged.

3. Modern European integrations

Having come to the conclusion about differences between Western and Central Europe in the rhythm of modernisation, national-integrational processes and the types of nationalism they espoused, we have come to the question from the subtitle of this paper on the period of 1789-
1848: European or national integration? But the causes of these differences in the framework of a uniform European cultural, political and social area are not to be found only in that period. They have deeper roots which stretch all the way to the boundary between the Middle Ages and the early modern period.

Zdenka Janešić Römer stated in her paper that the Middle Ages established the identity of Europe in which Croatia also participated. But it was precisely at the end of the Middle Ages and the beginning of the early modern period that a unified system of European political relations was created, on the one hand, and conditions were created, on the other, which, on the united basis of European society, gave a separate characteristic to development in Central and Central-Eastern Europe, including Croatia. Here a personal reminiscence occurs to me, the memory of a fact that I first heard from Prof. Jaroslav Šídak who, to a great many historians, is today only a name from the history of historiography, but who introduced my generation - though we later separated over methodology - as well as the earlier one starting in 1945, to scholarly work. Namely, as a student in the second year, I heard from Prof. Šídak for the first time the judgement that the crossing of the French king Charles VIII with his army over the Alps in 1494, with the aim of taking the Neapolitan crown, which was worn at that time by the Spanish house of Aragon, together with the wars of the European states that followed, and in which the European states from the Pyrenean peninsula to Central Europe participated (the Turkish empire was also included), denoted the beginning of a uniform system of European politics. From then on, every move that upset the relation of forces of the European states included all European states in conflict.

Indeed, there existed other levels upon which Europe in the modern period functioned as a whole. Precisely around the year 1494, other events are chronicled which speak of new European processes, but also about their diversification. Two years earlier, in the year 1492, with the conquest of Córdoba the centuries long Reconquista on the Pyrenean peninsula was completed, with which the last territory of geographical western Europe was included in the cultural, social and political concept of Europe. In the same year, 1492, Columbus sailed to the until then non-existent (for Europe) continent, and this so-called discovery of America was, in the long term, one of the most far-reaching consequences of the fact that the centre of European development was carried from the area of the Mediterranean to European lands in contact with the Atlantic Ocean. This was one of the symptoms that showed that it was precisely from that time that development proceeded, and which would transform them during the course of the following centuries into the world’s modernising centre. In contrast to this, however, in the region ‘east of the Elbe’, almost simultaneously, laws were produced that opened the process of ‘refeudalisation’. In Hungary (1492 and 1498), Brandenburg (1494), Poland (1496) and the Czech lands (1497), the earlier money annuity, which the serfs gave to their feudal lords, was transformed into a natural and working annuity, the raising of manorial revenue and others had begun, with which the nobility will become the active economic factor, the development of the productive bourgeoisie will be slowed, and the economic and social predominance will be taken over by an interest group of the nobility and the wealthy, above all the mercantile bourgeoisie. This entire

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20 | Zdenka Janešić Römer, Što je Europa (Hrvatska) u srednjem vijeku, paper for the II congress of Croatian historians, for the plenary session 30 Sept. 2004.
region came into a position at that time of a periphery of modernisation and detached itself as Central-Eastern Europe with its separate characteristics of development. Croatia also belonged to this area. Furthermore, almost simultaneously with the conquest of Córdoba, in the eastern region of Europe the battle of Kravsko Polje took place, which bore witness to the rise of the Ottoman empire and the beginning of its extension onto the European continent and the shaping of South-Eastern Europe as one more European region with its separate characteristics of historical development. A part of Croatian territory also became a component part of South-Eastern Europe, and the wars in which Croatia was directly included additionally influenced it falling behind modernising processes. The position on the boundary with the Ottoman empire directly influenced the decision to include Croatia (and Hungary) in the framework of Habsburg lands, and the destiny of Croatia in the modern period was essentially connected by the way in which the 'Eastern question' was solved.

These are the long-term causes of variation and the delaying of changes in the Habsburg monopoly and Croatia in the period from the end of the eighteenth century to the first half of the nineteenth century (their consequences can still be felt today). Figures on the extension of the so-called Industrial Revolution, that is, of the rhythm of the implementation of technological innovations that revolutionised production and consequentially influenced the dynamism of society, and were one of the essential components of the modernisation process in this period, speak of the lateness of the modernisation process. The Industrial Revolution made decisive steps precisely on the eve, during and after the French Revolution, that is, this was not a momentary revolution, but a process, a revolutionising of production and transport. The Habsburg monarchy, and in it even more so Croatia, were late in implementing the new technologies. The first factory with machines run by steam engines began to function in England in 1772, in the Habsburg monarchy the first steam machine was installed in 1808, while in Croatia it was not until 1835 (in Rijeka). In 1848 there were a few-hundred steam machines in operation in the monarchy, while in Croatia there were only four, and that with a total installed strength of 51 kilowatts. (When I first accounted for this fact, I concluded that the measurement was approximately the strength of one Fiat 600).

Conclusion

In conclusion, we can state that Europe in the early modern period, in the framework of the system of the ancien régime, was integrated on various levels, and the period from the end of the eighteenth century to the first half of the twentieth century added new elements. In this period, the process began, or the foundations were laid for the stepwise process, of modernisation and the establishment of social relations and political systems in European states based on new, but unified bases of liberalism and democracy. As a result, one could speak of a process of integrating


Europe on the principles on which the social and political systems and social values (and cultural values, about which there has been no word in this exposition) were founded.

In the period from 1789 to 1848, Europe was on the path to being conceived on united social bases, its states were netted into a united and mutually dependent system of political relations, and Europe was also a cultural whole. But there did not exist integrations in the sense of common, permanent European political institutions. Europe was, as in earlier centuries, a system of states with conflicting interests. Disputes between states were solved by the system of diplomatic relations between states, which were held in periods of peace, but growing tensions were also solved with wars. Napoleon sought to unite Europe through war, but under French hegemony. After the wars, which were not a novelty of the age, new relations of forces were established by peace agreements, or a new continental system of relations was established, as it was in 1815 at the Vienna Congress.

The new period introduced new phenomena of integration and conflict in Europe. Europe entered the age of nations, and the nineteenth century would become (in the words of the Croatian revivalists) the 'century of nationality'. The nation was a general European phenomenon. But the initiated process of national integration will simultaneously segment European society. Nationalisms (though of various type) formed the segments which will distinguish themselves in the European social area externally as sovereign nations, namely, as nation states, and internally as states in the sense of the apparatus of authority which will be resisted by various social layers. Europe was entering the age of nationalism. In the West the concept of the nation as a political community enabled group interests to clearly be politically articulated, and the ethnic-cultural concept of the nation, according to which the nation was a collectivity above the individual, enabled individual social groups to attempt to homogenise members of the nation in their interests, presenting their own interest as the national interest through their own idea of national identity. From this follows the condemnation of opponents (the bearers of different programs) who are not 'true' Croats, for example. The nation had a motivational effect, it could stimulate noble endeavours, stimulate the sacrifice of individuals in the interests of the national collectivity, to the laying down of one's own life on the 'altar of the nation', and individual groups could abuse it as a means for stimulating bloody battles, provoking wars, the implementing of genocide and so on. 'National interests' in individual variants became the means for dividing the European continent.

Crossing into the competence of other speakers, I will conclude that the first beginnings of integration, in the already-mentioned sense of unified and permanent political institutions, were established only in the middle of the twentieth century, after the end of the Second World War, provoked by the attempt to subject Europe to a criminal system based on extreme nationalism. On the other hand, the space for the completion of the process of shaping nation states in Central and Eastern Europe was symbolically opened only by the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, that is, the year when the two-hundredth anniversary of the French Revolution was celebrated. Among these states, Croatia was recognised as an independent state in 1992, that is, on the two-hundredth anniversary of the battle at Valmy in which the cry of Vive la nation! echoed. In contrast, in the period when the process of the formation of nation states was completed in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, in the same year when Croatia was recognised as an independent
state, the earlier European Community grew into the European Union, to which the member nation states transferred a part of their sovereign rights. Had this occurred two years later, in 1994, it would have been exactly half a millennium since the year 1494, which was denoted by the crossing of Charles VIII over the Alps. Passing over these minor differences in anniversaries, one could state that, from the year that demonstrated that a unified system of relations among the European states was established to the foundation of the institutional unification of Europe, half a millennium has passed.

The period from 1790 to 1848 is only a short section in the history of Europe and Croatia during the course of a half a millennium of the modern period. In this period, in Europe were laid the foundations, though in different rhythms in individual European regions, of a social and political system designed on uniform principles and, at the same time, the foundations of new divisions, which will with full force flare up in the first half of the twentieth century. After the founding of the Community for Coal and Steel in 1951, there began the process of the gradual integration of Europe, which was continued with the founding of the European Economic Community in 1957 and then the European Union in 1989, which unified the states of Western Europe. This year, 2004, the greater part of the countries of the former Central and Central-Eastern Europe have joined the European Union, and Croatia has been called to begin talks on admission to the Union.

This article was completed on 29 October 2004, on the day when the Constitution of the European Union was signed in Rome, which will come into force when the members of the Union ratify it. The presidents of governments and states emphasised in their commemorative speeches that, through the acceptance of the Constitution, they accepted the idea of a large 'European nation'. The historian cannot predict the further progress, but can only raise questions that follow from the development of foundations that are found, in essence, in the period from 1789 to 1848. For example, will the development in a politically united Europe lead to the standardisation of the two parts, which until now have been included in modernising and national-integrational processes according to different rhythms? Will Central European nationalisms grow into political nationalism which, as members of a political community, encompasses citizens regardless of their ethnic affiliation, and will Croatian nationalism lean more heavily on its tradition of the 'Croatian political nation'? What sort of relationship will there be between such a Croatian and other political nationalisms and the 'European nation'? Will the European Union survive as a political community of existing nation states, or will perhaps ethno-nationalisms strengthen in the European West and will the European Union, this 'European nation' as a 'new superpower from the Atlantic to the Ukraine', be reshaped into a federation of small nations (as was foreseen by Otto Molden, a matrilineal descendant of Petar Preradović, and member of the intellectual group, Alpbach), passing into the twenty-first century through more or less stormy processes through which Central Europe, including Croatia, passed during the course of the previous two

centuries? Future answers to these questions and development, which because of its ‘non-linearity’ can surprise us, will bring new questions, which today we perhaps do not even suspect. 24

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Hrvatska i Europa 1790. – 1847. – europska ili nacionalna integracija?

Do druge polovice 20. stoljeća nisu postojele europske „integracije“ u smislu stalnih zajedničkih institucija europskih država. Od početka novog vijeka postoji jedinstveni sustav europske politike, a nestabilnosti sustava koje su završavale ratovima razrješavale su se kongresima europskih sila koji su za određeno vrijeme uspostavljali novi sustav odnosa. Europski prostor kretao se kao cjelina prema oblikovanju modernog društva, ali se uz stare podjele na europski Zapad i Istok podijelio u različite varijante društvenih oblika i kretanja prema modernom društvu, određenih pojmovima Zapada te srednje (srednjoistočne) i jugoistočne Europe. Francuska revolucija je na kraju 18. stoljeća dala impuls društvenim promjenama na europskom kontinentu. Intencije prema promjenama iskazivat će se u prvoj polovici 19. stoljeća i na hrvatskom prostoru, ali će one biti provedene tek 1848. u sklopu promjena na cijelom srednjoeuropskom prostoru. Francuska revolucija dala je impuls i nacionalnim pokretima, težnjama koje će voditi prema stvaranju novih država na nacionalnom načelu, tj. težnjama koje će voditi segmentaciji europskog društvenog prostora u nacionalne države. Hrvatski narodni preporod bio je dio fenomena nacionalnih pokreta na prostoru srednje Europe i Apeninskog poluotoka. Istodobno je napoleonska politika, kao derivat Francuske revolucije, bila pokušaj političkog objedinjavanja Europe pod izravnom vlasti ili hegemonijom Francuske. U tako zamišljeni imperij bio je uključen i dio hrvatskih zemalja. Bečki je kongres 1815. nakon poraza te politike bio nastavak novovjekovne prakse reguliranja odnosa među europskim državama po završetku kriza i uspostavio je novu ravnotežu koja će se u osnovi održati do sredine 19. stoljeća. Hrvatska politika tražila je svoje mjesto u tom sustavu, ali je Hrvatska bila manje politički subjekt, a više objekt politike imperijalnih sustava.