THE NAMELESS HERITAGE OF THE RÉSISTANCE

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Pregledni rad

Summary
The author is analyzing the significance of the Résistance as one of the ‘hidden traditions’ of European history. Invoking pre-WWII debates on pan-Europeanism and Hannah Arendt’s political theory, the author argues that the heritage of the Résistance is divided between the preserved idea of a united Europe and a lost ideal of the politics of spontaneity, councils and deep reforms of European politics and economy.

Keywords
Résistance, hidden traditions, Arendt, pan-Europeanism

In the pamphlet Indignez-vous (Cry out! – Hessel, 2010), the reason the author Stéphane Hessel gives for the necessity for public indignation makes us listen attentively: it is the “heritage of the Résistance” which obliges us to protest against contemporary grievances. The heritage of the Résistance – this is the emotion of indignation, but it is also the freedom of democracy, accompanied by social justice and the common good of the welfare state. And the contemporary grievances – these are the false promises of a neoliberal politics, the arbitrariness of the international financial markets, increasing state debts, the spectacles of populism, and the infamousness of xenophobic debates and movements.

By his essay, Stéphane Hessel declares implicitly that the heritage of the democratic Europe is based not only on the horror of the Holocaust, as Dan Diner called for (Diner, 2001: 65) – to which, I think, we should also add the horrors of Stalinism. This heritage is not imaginable without the civil actors of the fight for freedom, without the Résistance.

However, we are concerned here with a hidden tradition which does not have a slogan like “Auschwitz never again”. This hidden tradition is marked by its namelessness, by the absence of the right words. At the moment of the refounding of freedom in Europe, the resistance movements were substituted for the rule of the parties which at best administered
a myth of the Résistance whose dismantling years later dismantled also the Résistance as such.

In what follows I will first talk about the problem of the namelessness of experiences, then describe the heritage of the Résistance as a divided heritage preserved only in the idea of a united Europe, while the other part, the politics of spontaneity, councils and deep reforms of European politics and economy, nearly got completely lost. Finally, I will mention some of Arendt’s conclusions for political theory.

1. The Unnamed New

Hannah Arendt spoke of a ‘hidden tradition’ in modern times. The conscious rebellious Jewish pariah as vanguard of his own people (Arendt, 2007; see also Heuer, 2007), the sudden events of spontaneous political action in revolutions from France 1789 to Hungary 1956, and the forms of creating power in local associations. This political heritage is a nameless heritage, in the case of the United States a “Failure to remember and, with it, failure to understand” (Arendt, 1963: 219) (in her German translation Arendt wrote: “catastrophic deficit of capacity of judgment” [Arendt, 1963a: 279]), which made the US forget its own revolutionary heritage. “When we were told that by freedom we understood free enterprise, we did very little to dispel this monstrous falsehood” (Arendt, 1963: 219). No wonder, because to realize this as non-truth would have afforded not only to know the truth of the revolution but also to be able to live it. Obviously, together with this memory also the capacity got lost to understand freedom not only as the freedom of market economy but as political freedom. “For if it is true”, wrote Arendt, “that all thought begins with remembrance, it is also true that no remembrance remains secure unless it is condensed and distilled into a framework of conceptual notions within which it can further exercise itself. Experiences and even the stories which grow out of what men do and endure, of happenings and events, sink back into the futility inherent in the living word and the living deed unless they are talked about over and over again” (ibid.: 222).

To this forgotten heritage belongs the forgotten experience of the revolutionary societies at the beginning of the French Revolution which were annihilated by the leaders of the Revolution, as well as the republican heritage of the councils during the Russian Revolution and in Hungary.

When the French poet and Résistance fighter René Char wrote: “Our heritage is not preceded by any testament”, this does not only mean, as Arendt wrote, the challenge of the break of tradition for our capacities to understand, to judge and to act, and the challenge to find new words and concepts for a completely different world with totalitarianism, Holocaust and war of extermination. It was rather about the fact that the revolutionary experiences were forgotten which could have been helpful for the resistance fighters. Thus, the lament about the missing testament becomes a lament about the forgetting of a tradition which only occasionally but time and again lights up: the tradition of spontaneous self-organisation.

Thus, the recovery of the hidden tradition becomes a recovery of forgotten experiences which themselves consisted in understanding something new. The important problem of naming something new is described among others by
Brice Parain, philosopher and friend of Albert Camus, and the Hungarian writer Sándor Márai. Both knew not only the problems to find the right words for the new but also the incapacitation of previous concepts based on other experiences or concepts based on lies and hypocrisy.

Parain begins his *Studies about Function and Nature of Language* with speechlessness when facing a new world: like “the farmer returning to his village” and not being familiar anymore with human noises, “we made the acquaintance of this surprise when we returned from war. A long experience of distrust in talks and books had finally repelled us to our own elementary impulses. Only in the moments without images and words when we were nothing else than a sheer joy – as if just being born – or a natural sorrow – as if just about to die – we were sure not to dream” (Parain, 1969: 9f). But we cannot live without words: “Whenever we are in misery it is the language which brings us the right solution. There is no other one. ... The absurd is named. The despair is being sung. All wears off in words and revives in them” (*ibid.*: 16f).

Only by defining the new we can find our place. Sándor Márai’s novel *Liberation* about the liberation of Budapest by the Red Army is told by a woman hiding in a basement, where a Russian soldier enters. She offers him her confidence and is raped by him. Like Parain, Márai describes the distrust in words and experiences, the fact “that there is something which is more than party and politics, and this is the authentic, most extreme action: countenance” (Márai, 2010: 36). “Words are not reliable and therefore superfluous” (*ibid.*: 39), reliable is only the glance examining the face of the other. But only when the woman can tell what happens to the Red Army soldier after the mute rape, when she can think “he is ashamed about something, therefore he is hiding his face ... He is ashamed of being a man ... Now when formulating this, the trembling in her body ends” (*ibid.*: 181). With her capacity to understand by articulating in her own words what happens, the woman can understand reality and recovers her inner balance.

But words can be full of ambiguities, false images and lies. In a review of Parain’s writings, Camus pointed out that sometimes we are lacking the right words, and sometimes words are deceiving us, even when our heart is talking with utmost honesty, e.g. when sayings like “to fulfil someone’s duty for society” or “to die on the field of honour” are to hide experiences which make us despair (Camus, 1981: 1672f).

To say what is (Herodotus), to tell the truth, and to narrate – those activities for Arendt are not only the key to find sense and to understand, but at the same time are inseparably bound to naming. For it is not sufficient to tell stories as such even if they are the basis for all future memory. The new must also be called the new, otherwise totalitarianism remains misunderstood as one of the brutal forms of domination of the past and the Résistance as a series of actions of armed resistance. The normative power of the *de facto*, the rule of the victorious, leads straight to oblivion, especially when the defeated remains unnamed. How little the rebellions in the GULags of Nowoscherkassk, Kengir, Sachalin and Workuta were of interest to the West though described by Solzhenitsyn, how little effect had the declaration of the Polish historian and politician Bronislaw Geremek in 2000, that the West does not even have the slight-
est bad conscience for having left Poland in the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union! (Spinelli, 2002: 15f).

In the same way, the essence of the Résistance as a spontaneous form of self-organisation of the people was not framed in words, but left to oblivion in the light of the power of the de facto, the victory of the allied forces, and the subsequent elections of old parties into new parliaments. In the after-war Europe, divided into spheres of domination of liberalism and communism, there was no place for a new republican form of self-organisation of the peoples.

2. The Divided Heritage: Europe Yes, Councils No

The Résistance is marked by two aspects of its activities: the clear goal of a united Europe, and the less clear goals of new forms of political and social organisation of the European societies. The latter dealt with creating horizontal power and federation in a republican sense inhibited after the war by power politics of traditionally organized parties. They assumed slowly the idea of Europe, but rejected the model of power of the Résistance.

First the idea of Europe: This idea was by no means first mentioned by Churchill in his famous speech in Zürich in September 1946 or invented by one of the founders of Europe – Robert Schumann, Paul-Henri Spaak, Konrad Adenauer or Alcide de Gasperi. It was rather endorsed since the twenties by persons like Coudenhove-Kalergi in his plea for Pan-Europe, a bestseller in 1923 (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1923) and by the German Social-democratic Party in its program of Heidelberg in 1925. Coudenhove-Kalergi declared that between the “Scylla of the Russian military dictatorship and the Charybdis of the American financial dictatorship”, only a small path lead to the future: “This path is called Pan-Europe and means: self-help by uniting Europe to constitute a political-economical partnership of convenience” (ibid.: XI) from Portugal to the borders of the Soviet Union, including the African colonies, but excluding Great Britain because of its worldwide empire. This union would also be a community of values.

The German Social-democratic Party propagated the idea of “creating a European Union of Economy compellingly necessary for economic reasons, of constituting the United States of Europe to reach a solidarity of interests of the peoples of all continents” (Osterroth / Schuster, 1980). In 1929 the French minister of foreign affairs Aristide Briand hopefully proposed at the League of Nations to establish a Pan-Europe, an initiative which became obsolete with Hitler’s seizure of power in 1933.

But the idea of Europe did not only exist as the idea of an economic and cultural union, but also as a völkisch pan-Europeanism discussed by Arendt in her The Origins of Totalitarianism as an attempt to create a völkisch, and not a democratic Europe.

Hitler and WWII demonstrated the failure of the League of Nations, but the national resistance movements formulated the goal of a united Europe. As distinguished from Coudenhove-Kalergi and the Social Democrats, their main interest was not the economic union but a political, federal and republic unification to prevent the restoration of conflictive nation states and of a disastrous pan-Europeanism.

In this sense, the group “Federalist Movement of Europe” founded by Alti-
Enrico Spinelli in Milano in 1943 declared that "the defence of peace and freedom on the whole continent could only be secured by a European federation and its institutions" (cited in Lipgens, 1968: 157).

In Germany above all the "Kreisau Circle" declared in its manifesto "Principles, goals and tasks", written by Helmuth James von Moltke in 1941, that the end of power politics, nationalism, race thinking and rule of the state violence over the individual had come and offered "the opportunity of a beneficial reorganisation of the world ... not experienced by humankind since the collapse of the medieval church" (ibid.: 114). The essence of the reform should be a clear rejection of any traditional thinking in categories of sovereignty and nation states. "Europe is a federal state with a common sovereignty" (ibid.: 116). Anyhow, Moltke could only imagine a Europe under German leadership (ibid.: 125), as well as Carl Goerdeler, member of the national conservative resistance, who only argued for a loose European union (Goerdeler / Beck, 1965: 98).

Polish resistance delegates of three of the four most important organisations formulated political statements saying: "The Polish republic will be member of the federation of free European peoples" and try to "support in it the highest possible cohesion being powerful enough to protect the federated peoples against attacks from outside and to oppress all attempts to create disunion by nationalism" (Lipgens, 1968: 157).

In France, Léon Blum, factual leader of the Socialist Party and three times prime minister, presented with his government program in 1947 his political testament – the vision of Europe as an "international third force" beside the United States and the Soviet Union. He declared "that considering the contemporary economic development, none of the big problems can any longer be solved satisfyingly within the borders, that without a vivid solidarity with the others no people can live anymore in wealth or survive, and that we have to form groups, federate and unite or we will perish".

Also, resistance groups in France and Italy wanted a federated Europe including Germany: "Libérer et Fédérer" with Albert Camus, whose "Third Letter to a German Friend" opposed a common, pluralistic and civilised Europe to the Pan-Europe of Nazi-Germany; the group "Combat" with Henri Frenay, and in Italy, among others, the group "Partito d’Azione" (Party of Action) with the future senator Norberto Bobbio, Arendt’s friend Nicola Chiaromonte, Primo Levi and the later president of Italy Carlo Ciampi.

Beside the orientation of a united Europe, all non-communist resistance groups were especially interested in a democratisation of their countries. The Italian "Federal Movement of Europe" favoured a constituency to create the United States of Europe on the basis of a republican constitution of all their federated states. "The unity from above cannot be favoured by federalism", the movement declared in 1944. "What is important is the unity from below, that means a structured unity respecting the specific plurality of the centres of political life and developing detailed exigencies for the unity formulated by them..." (Lipgens, ed., 1968: 98).

The "Kreisau Circle" developed ideas of a federal and decentralized union of states with a strong commonweal orientation: a Europe of small communities
and national economies in strong federated countries. With regard to the citizenship, “commonweal-oriented functions” should get “political privileges” (Moltke, in Lipgens, 1968).

In his critique of the old France, Léon Blum endorsed a thorough reform, the implementation of a strong democracy abandoning state centralism, adding to the political institutions “the gravitation of small satellites” (ibid.: 187), the democratization of the economy, and the integration of France into an effective international union of states.

For the Résistance, the place of Germany in the future was without any doubt within the international community.

Henri Frenay asked in 1941: “What do the French know about the new order they are wanting? They know that the Third Republic is dead, but that they cling to the republican form, they know that liberalism is dead, but that individual freedom is very important for them, that capitalism is dead, but that they do not want to substitute it for a state-monopolistic, but for a differentiated organisation of production” (Frenay, 1968: 195).

And he answered these questions in 1943: “Some of the governments far away in their exile do not hear the thunder of the wave rising in their peoples. They should take care. The peoples progressed in their misery and with it in the last three years faster than they had before in half a century. It is now up to the governments to adjust themselves, otherwise they will have to realise after their return that an abyss has emerged between them and the nation which can hardly be bridged” (Frenay, 1968a: 229).

“Libérer et Fédérer”, one of the strongest resistance groups, attracted revolutionary Marxists, syndicalists of the Proudhon orientation, and Christian socialists (see Clair, 1944: 229), and fought in its manifesto and program of action in 1944 for an economic and political turnover of the French central state in favour of decentralisation and social justice. In its program the group propagated the nationalisation of the basic materials industry, the transfer of big companies into the hands of “councils elected by the assembly of workers and technicians”, and “the organization of a new political framework through the election of councils of the different enterprises, institutions, establishments expressing the various other activities and collective functions … Federation of these councils on the communal, departmental, regional and national levels in connection with a representation of the people established on the basis of universal suffrage and the civil equality of both sexes”, and “the integration of France into the United States of Europe” (ibid.).

For Camus, the democracy of pre-war times was only a caricature of itself; now the task was to develop popular politics which does not yet require the suffering and indignities of the people for allegedly higher goals (Camus, 1991: 47f).

Arendt was enthusiastic about this movement. In her essay “Approaches to the ‘German Guilt’” she called them “the true homines novi” whose “main enemy is fascism, not Germany; their main problem is the crisis of all State organizations of the Continent, not merely the German or Prussian State” (Arendt, 1994: 113f). She wrote to Jaspers in 1946: “There are still real men; they are of course an evanescent minority, but they are there and they are, what is decisive, still ready to fight and risk their lives” (Arendt / Jaspers, 1985: 101). “There
is now in all European countries suddenly a new type of man who is simply and without any ‘European nationalism’ European. I knew such an Italian. Camus belongs to them. They are already at home everywhere. Sartre in contrast is still too much a typical Frenchman ...

For me this is quite new, before the war I did not see nearly any of those people. It is as if the common experience of fascism, when you really made it, let several people accomplish in an instant what in former times only was an idealistic program without any reality” (ibid.: 103).

In autumn 1945, in her essay “Parties, Movements, and Classes”, Arendt emphasised that with the Popular Front and the Résistance two movements had emerged which had nothing to do with the disastrous communist and fascist movements. “The Résistance ... took over not only the principle of proclaiming the people (and not solely classes) the subject of politics, but it inherited the new political enthusiasm which was expressed in the revival of such fundamental concepts of political life as justice, liberty, human dignity and basic responsibilities of the citizen” (Arendt, 1945: 511). Thereby, as Arendt wrote, and in their goal of a federated Europe and their interest in each other to create a “unity without uniformity”, they distinguished themselves from the traditional parties marked by class differences and economic interests.

When in 1952 Arendt met Henri Freney in Paris, she wrote in a letter to her husband Heinrich Blücher: “The only one who could have seized power after the Libération – and did not do it because of decency and stupidity, but who is not at all stupid but concise and intelligent, understands America (that is really incredible), he is a modern man and should in fact really make politics instead of being annoyed in this lost dump of Federal Europe. I liked him very much ...” (Arendt / Blücher, 1996: 256).

3. The End of the Résistance

What Arendt discovered in the Résistance of those years was an experience of the joy to act, to be actor and challenger, to be “visited ... by an apparition of freedom”, and thus to find oneself (Arendt, 2006: 4). We find this apparition of freedom in many movements, observed by Alexis de Tocqueville also in the French Revolution: "What has made so many men, since untold ages, stake their all on liberty is its intrinsic glamour, a fascination it has in itself, apart form all ‘practical’ considerations. For only in countries where it reigns can a man speak, live, and breathe freely, owing obedience to no authority save God and the laws of the land. The man who asks of freedom anything other than itself is born to be a slave" (Tocqueville, 1955, ch. III, 3: 168f). René Char phrased this in his poetical resistance-diary Leaves of Hypnos (Les Feuillets d’Hypnos, No. 188: “Entre le monde de la réalité et moi, il n’y a plus aujourd’hui d’épaisseur triste”), and the Italian writer Luigi Meneghello, activist of “Partito d’Azione”, in his autobiographical novel The Little Masters about a resistance group of students in northern Italy. But Meneghello described also the fundamental problem of theoretical ignorance of the Resistenza: “It would have been very simple to start a revolution. Of course, we would have been annihilated soon, at least the first push, and then the second, and the third. But Italy would have had at least a taste of what it means to renovate oneself from scratch ... It would have been enough to know the texts, but we did not know
them” (Meneghello, 1990: 46), the texts of revolution. And, he wrote, they did not find answers to the questions posed by the war: what was Italy, society, conscience, and virtues.

In 1944, the non-dogmatic socialist and American sociologist Lewis Coser wrote optimistically in the journal *Politics* about the strength of the Résistance – two years later, he already searched for the reasons of its defeat. The movement, he explained, was only held together by the existence of the enemy, it was socially diffuse, its solidarity against the enemy did not survive the end of the war, and it suffered from the absence of political theory. In explicit contradiction to Arendt, he declared that internationalism was not sufficiently internalized by the movement, so the Résistance was in its essence not more than a national movement (Clair, 1946: 117). But, also, Arendt already realized in her above-mentioned essay that the Résistance lost its political potential with the increasing economic interests of its members immediately after the war; the same had happened to the Popular Front in France, she wrote, losing the fight against Fascism since the moment when the workers no longer fought for the defence of the Spanish Republic, but were only focused on their own economic interests in France.

The fact that the Résistance did not find the power to transform itself into a political movement created a vacuum which the traditional parties occupied immediately. On the one hand, De Gaulle, for Arendt representing the forces “of the day before yesterday” of “patriotism and nationalism in the old sense” (Arendt, 1994: 118), adapted himself in a clever way to the demands of the underground for democracy, and focused together with the Allied Forces on rapid elections for a tired population. On the other hand, the French Communist Party already agitated during the time of resistance against the supposedly “super state” of Europe and requested the Résistance to advocate above all the “independence of France and the restitution of its Grandeur” (Zentralkomitee..., 1968: 240). Arendt wrote: “The resistance movement waited for the liberation but believed that it would be liberated in order to choose free and establish a new order of things. This did not come true. Chief factor: Communism. The terrible massacre in France” (Estate, Library of Congress, Washington, p. 023769), meaning the summary execution of collaborators. “The greatest contribution” of the Résistance, declared the historian James D. Wilkinson, “remained a moral one: the defeat of nihilism and the creation of an ethical consensus based on the principle of human dignity. Its most serious failure was the inability to implement its values in the political or social sphere” (Wilkinson, 1981: 263; see also Sumner, 1996: 81). A 1944 report in *Politics*, a journal of a group of American radicals around Arendt, about a supposedly coming “dual power” in France of the Résistance and de Gaulle (Maco- nald, 1944: 290-294), turned out to be wishful thinking. Finally, the liberation movements were squashed everywhere in Europe by realpolitik – Stalin in Poland, Churchill in Greece, and the restoration of Europe in terms of nation states with collective security, clearly demarcated spheres of interest and bilateral alliance (see Arendt, 1994: 118).

But the real problem consisted in the fact that there was no theoretical consideration of these experiences. Coser observed hopelessly: “They never had grasped that the main moral demand...
of our times is precisely to understand these times – so as to be able to change them” (Clair, 1946: 117). And Arendt declared in 1961 in her preface to her book *Between Past and Future*: “The tragedy began not when the liberation of the country as a whole ruined, almost automatically, the small hidden islands of freedom that were doomed anyhow, but when it turned out that there was no mind to inherit and to question, to think about and to remember. ... without this thinking completion after the act, without the articulation accomplished by remembrance, there simply was no story left that could be told” (Arendt, 2006: 6).

This made it even easier for those French intellectuals, professionally creating opinions and telling stories, to collaborate in a Gaullist and communist formation of legends (Benfredj, 2003). These legends comprehend at the same time the betrayal of incorruptible freedom and justice. Camus complained in his speech “Bread and Freedom” in 1953 about the division of the intellectuals to partisans for the West and partisans for the East. The confusion of the language expresses this betrayal, he said; the absence of freedom and justice in one’s own camp is rectified by denouncing the same fact in the other camp. The dictatorship of Franco is defended by pointing to the dictatorship in Poland, and *vice versa* (Camus, 1960: 51). Camus criticised that freedom is thereby discredited as bourgeois freedom, and justice without freedom or freedom without justice is defined as real justice or real freedom. “For all of us there can be only one slogan”, Camus declared, “not to cede in anything that refers to justice and not to resign in anything that refers to freedom. ... There is no ideal freedom which would be presented us some day at a single blow like receiving pension at the end of one’s life. The freedoms must be conquered, one after the other ... We choose freedoms today only on the level of those who are suffering and fighting everywhere, there and only there. We choose them at the same time together with justice and, in fact, in the future it will no longer be possible to choose one of them without the other” (ibid.). This intransigent critique was the heritage of the Résistance Camus wanted to preserve, adding to this his plea against all killing, especially against the hunting down and summary execution of collaborators, and his rejection of any politics of revolutionary violence (“Neither Victims nor Executioners”).

The long-lasting isolation of Camus in the intellectual public of France is the consequence of the victory of the lie and the failure of the intellectuals, of an impartial judgment; it meant the domination of phantasms.

4. The Unknown Social Contract

Arendt’s book *On Revolution* represents her “effort to recapture the lost spirit of revolution” (ibid.: 226). She defined the spontaneous self-organisation of councils and revolutionary organisations as forms of generating power and politics of its own, as a new form of state. So she puts the Résistance into a context with a political phenomenon whose theoretical concept is still missing.

According to Arendt, the historical experience reveals the contradiction between parliament and people, between delegation of power at election day and permanent generation of power, between the rule of parties as representatives and councils as places of public debate and judgment. Councils override the right-left-schema and the rule of the so-called
public opinion, they consist in division of power, decentralisation and federalism, they represent the republic and not the nation state, and finally, according to Arendt, they are the only places of freedom. “Wherever knowing and doing have parted company, the space of freedom is lost” (*ibid.*: 268).

This way of thinking about politics implies rejection of the social contracts of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, and that is exactly what Arendt implicitly does in her unpublished lecture “From Machiavelli to Marx” (Arendt, 1965). In distinction to Camus and his “new social contract”, she is not dealing with an ethical social contract, which Camus advocated in his essay “Neither Victims nor Executioner”;¹ but with the political social contract of a citizen’s republic based on the existence of political spaces of practical freedom.

In a Europe in which different forms of federalism, participation and civil society have been emerging for decades, we should use the opportunity to recapture the thread of a hidden, oppressed and forgotten history, to think about it in theoretical terms, and to confront it with liberal democracy and the monopolistic supremacy of parties, parliaments and bureaucracies. The heritage of the Résistance does not only consist in the defence of our freedom against populism and neo-liberalism, but first of all in the task to give this tradition voice and face.

¹ “Let us suppose that certain individuals resolve that they will consistently oppose to power the force of example; to authority, exhortation; to insult, friendly reasoning; to trickery, simple honour. Let us suppose they refuse all the advantages of present-day society and accept only the duties and obligations which bind them to other men. Let us suppose they devote themselves to orienting education, the press and public opinion toward the principles outlined here. Then I say that such men would be acting not as Utopians but as honest realists. They would be preparing the future and at the same time knocking down a few of the walls which imprison us today” (Camus, 1947: 146).
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**Neimenovano nasljeđe Résistance**

**SAŽETAK** Autor analizira važnost pokreta Résistance kao jedne od ‘skrivenih tradicija’ eu-
ropske povijesti. Pozivajući se na rasprave o pan-europeizmu prije Prvog svjetskoga rata i
političku teoriju Hanne Arendt, autor brani tezu da je nasljeđe pokreta Résistance podije-
ljeno između preživjele ideje ujedinjene Europe i izgubljenog ideala politike spontanosti,
vijećanja i dubokih reformi europske politike i gospodarstva.

**KLJUČNE RIJEČI** pokret Résistance, skrivena tradicija, Arendt, pan-europeizam