UNDERSTANDING AND CRITICISM OF THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT IN ANTON BÁR

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Antun Bauer¹ (1856–1937) is not only one of the major Croatian Neo-Scholastics but actually the first who systematically philosophized in that spirit. In order to understand him well, we should understand Croatian Neo-Scholasticism. To understand it well, we should in turn systematically study all of its more important adherents and explore particular questions with which they dealt. This, however, would not be enough to form a final and competent judgement. We should also compare this with other Neo-Scholastics and other Neo-Scholastic schools, and they should be viewed inside the entire European philosophical thought, and only then we would be able to pass a competent judgement about it.

Of course, not even European philosophy is the final and best possible encounter with the reality. It should also be compared with other philosophies or at least wisdoms. Is it at all possible? Namely, a philosophy is philosophizing, so it is difficult to be two at the same time in order to be necessarily compared with something third. Thus we enter the eternal problem of the third as a reference — what is already obvious in the Platonian teaching about ideas.

Thus, we would reach an unfeasible task, because nobody is given that much time, or ability, probably, to tackle correctly and in detail all that goes under the name “philosophy”. Interdependency between everything and all may be assumed, but cannot be expounded in detail. The question of kinds of knowledge and the terms of their possibilities would be raised here. We should ask, with the same determination, not only what can be known but also how can it be known. Because every kind of knowledge is marked with the way it was reached.² However, this task of searching for the truth has been given to all for all times.

¹ Antun Bauer was born in Breznica, Croatia, and died as the Archbishop of Zagreb, in the headquarters of the diocese in 1937. His main works are *Natural theology* (1892), *General Metaphysics or Ontology* (1894), and articles “Area of Materialism” and “On Wundt’s System of Metaphysics.”

² Researching the conditions of the possibilities of knowledge already starts with some knowledge, so the question is whether it is possible to acquire an objective concept about it, which
It is interesting that exactly this demand for objectivity in research is forcing us into limitations. Objectivity, however, at the same time, keeps us from forgetting those limits. The wider the area of research is, the more general and “more distant” the result will be from the particular and experiential, and the narrower the area is the more concrete they will be. The safest way is to examine all members of a particular group, or all cases in a particular area. Because of limitations in human resources and time and the width of the area and myriad of cases, it is usually not possible. That is why man is forced to choose, and forced into limitations. There are, naturally, numerous studies and introductions to scientific work written about making right choices.

**Testing Bauer’s philosophy**

After we gained some knowledge about Croatian Neo–Scholasticism, and having no intention to deal with all of its representatives or all of the questions they touched, we chose, as the subject, Bauer’s understanding and criticism of the ontological argument. Namely, the ontological argument, its presentation and criticism, we understand as a test in order to enter, in the shortest way possible, the point of convergence of that Neo–Scholastic philosopher’s standpoints, and in that way, to continue in the easiest way possible towards a more complete understanding of his thought inside a wider context.

Apart from that, the discussion about this argument has been renewed today as well as about the existence of God, and religious questions in general. This is the reason why it is interesting to see what standpoint Antun Bauer took about that argument.

It is especially important because, Bauer’s work, according to Stjepan Zimmermann “has incepted, for scholastic philosophy in Croatia, the beginning of contemporary and critically independent work.” This opinion also confirms Zora Križanić, the writer of a book about our philosopher, when she is real and unsurpassable. From the nature of knowledge, it is already known that such a concept is not possible for humans. Knowledge itself is its judge and critic, because man possesses an unconditional measure of objectivity that principally cannot be theme. Compare “Erfahrung des Unbedingten” in Béla Weissmahr, Philosophische Gotteslehre, Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, Berlin, Köln, 1994., p. 25 ff.

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3  Cf. Met. 1, 2; 892a 20–25

4  The questions in today’s analytic philosophy are: What is religiosity? What does religious faith consist of? Are religious explanations of the world sensible or rational? The analytic philosophy of religion wants to analyse them so that it explains the meaning of religious speech in general. Christopher Jäger (Hrsg.) in the introduction to Analytische Religionsphilosophie asks about religious speech: “Gibt es gute Gründe dafür, diese Aussagen für wahr zu halten? Oder gibt es zumindest keine guten Gründe, sie für falsch zu halten?” (Schöningh, Paderborn, München, Wien, Zürich 1998, p. 13.)
says this: “Bauer is a representative of scholastic philosophy in our country. He is an excellent connoisseur of the history of philosophy, and in the same way of the philosophical systems of his time (....) The fact that development of philosophical thought in our country is dear to his heart is shown by those 60 Latin philosophical terms, which he made Croatian and used in his philosophical writings.”

The reason for studying Bauer’s philosophy is this: today, namely, a discussion blazed up between philosophers and scientists about things belonging to the other side, starting, naturally, from the secrets belonging to this side. Bauer conducted similar discussions in his time. These discussions are always new for several reasons. Namely, there are always new people appearing to deal with these questions, naturally, in the spirit of their time, so that they bring about a new situation that results partly from the insight in nature, partly from the participation in overall knowledge. The spirit is not repeated. It is always in a new situation: opening to the new without forgetting the old.

Every man and every time has and must have its own opinion. As every individual is an individual so are his standpoints in relation to overall reality, no matter how general or objective they are, they are nevertheless colored by the context in which they were developed or accepted. This does not mean that every cognition, although to a point subjective, is completely subjective.

5 S. Zimmermann, Historijski razvitak filozofije u Hrvatskoj (Historical Development of Philosophy in Croatia), Zagreb 1929, p. 22.
6 Zora Kržanić, A. Bauer i njegova filozofija (A. Bauer and his Philosophy), Kršćanska sadašnjost, Zagreb 1986, p 129.
8 From Proslogion II: “Et certe id quo maius cogitari nequit, non potest esse in solo intellectu. Si enim vel in solo intellectu est, potest cogitari esse et in re, quod maius est. Si ergo id quo maius cogitari non potest, est in solo intellectu: id ipsum quo maius cogitari non potest, est quo maius cogitari potest. Sed certe hoc esse non potest. Exstit et ergo procul dubio alicquod quo maius cogitari non valet, et in intellectu et in re.” This is a part of the famous formulation of the so called ontological proof from the second chapter of the Anselm’s work Proslogion. In English it says: That of what something greater cannot be thought of, certainly cannot be only in reason. If it were only in reason, it could be thought of as if it existed in reality, and that would be greater. Therefore, if that, of what something greater cannot be thought is only in reason, then it is exactly that something greater what cannot be thought of, nevertheless that what can be thought of as something greater. Therefore, there is no doubt that there exists something that something greater cannot be thought of, in reason and reality.” (S. Anselmi Opera omnia, t. I, Friedrich Frommann Verlag, Stuttgart — Bad Cannstatt, 1968, pp. 101–102)
Nevertheless, there is some truth in well Fichte’s known saying that the man is as his philosophy is.

In the attempt to get an insight in Bauer’s philosophy, in order not to fail in our task, we had to limit our research to the question about where basic philosophical standpoints converge, and in which basic standpoints of Bauer’s philosophy must show. Our job will be simplified by the fact that they must unavoidably be shown in a concentrated schoolbook exposition of the ontological proof in Bauer’s “Natural Theology or To What Extent Can Man Know God”, the book printed in Zagreb more than a hundred years ago (1892).

Here we should be careful not to forget the significance and the mystery of that philosopher. Namely, some maintain that the destiny of the ontological argument is very much like the destiny of the question of the existence of God. To a degree, the opposite of that could be said. The destiny of the ontological argument, although not by destiny of the existence of God, is nevertheless the destiny of a question about it, so is also a measure of human concessions regarding now one, now another opinion. Simply said, human opinion on God is often measured and determined according to the position of the ontological argument in it. Naturally, we are talking about systematic and reasonable thinking.

Kant, however, maintained that the existence of God could not be proved by the theoretical mind, but neither could the nonexistence of God be proved. The last part of the statement, however, is for a reason not known to me, much less often mentioned. The first part of the statement was considered a definitive solution regarding the problem of the existence of God. The Critique of Practical Reason, where a postulate of the existence of God is given, was usually considered less important than The Critique of Pure Reason.

Today, however, we again have explicit statements that the question of the existence of God cannot be philosophically eliminated. Whether we answer it positively or negatively, it is emerging again. It seems that, for now, there is no “final” answer. After each attempt to give a definitive answer,

9 Antun Bauer, Naravno bogoslovje ili koliko može čovjek samim razumom spoznati Boga, Bauer’s (Natural Theology or To What Extent Can Man Know God), C. Albrecht, Zagreb, 1992.

10 “La logique philosophique (et non pas religieuse ou théologique, rappelons-le) de cette question peut se résumer en un mot: la relance.” (Bernard Sève, La question philosophique de l’existence de Dieu, PUF, Paris, 1994, pp. 273–274.) For Sève, the ontological proof is emblematic (significant) for the question of the existence of God. Considering that the question of the existence of God returns, whether we provide a positive or negative answer to it, so does the ontological proof rise from the ashes or is regarded as questionable after it was considered unfutable. Philosophical Logic, according to Sève, is the same in one or the other case. (Cf. p. 274).

11 Cf. ibid.: For Bernard Sève, the question the existence of God is a question, not a problem. Namely, the problem can be solved. The question, however, is reappearing.
the question, after some time (or even at the same time — even with the same author), reappears with the same forcefulness.\textsuperscript{13}

As a small contribution to the discussion about Bauer’s meaning inside Croatian philosophy, we bring an overview of his interpretation of the sense and the validity of proof of the renowned, almost a thousand years old, so called “ontological proof.” We say “so called” because Kant, giving it its name, was inspired by the rationalist understanding of ontology. As an example of rationalism that Kant knew, it is usually taken the one argued by Descartes, Wolff and A. G. Baumgarten, and they were accused of dealing with “vom möglich Seienden”, of course, regardless of the experience.

It is almost useless to mention that this understanding of ontology is completely different from the teaching about entity in Aristotle\textsuperscript{14} and Thomas Aquinas. Namely, they first examine entities experienced by the senses or first substances (in whose existence, according to the Aristotle, nobody doubts) and they search for their sources and causes, not stopping before cognition of the latter. They are considered the thinkers who in their philosophizing, start with experience. They, of course, understand it in their way — according to some opinions, too narrowly.\textsuperscript{15}

Kant, however, from what reached him of Anzelm’s argument (unum argumentum), taken from the cognitive–theoretical view, made an extremely a priori mental formation or apparition.\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Unum argumentum} in the beginning, or according to its inventor could not be like that. Anzelm, namely, in his program \textit{fides quaerens intellectum}, started with the religious experience and the living faith, and Kant denies the proof of any experiential\textsuperscript{17} basis and leaves it to deal with purely transcendental, mental concept, designated for regulative and heuristic function in the encounter of a cognitive (transcendently logical) subject with sensory data that are regulated through a priori forms of space and time which are subjected to concepts, determined by categories.

So, we cannot really say that Kant encountered Anzelm’s original formulation\textsuperscript{18}, or better, he was concerned with a similar, but nevertheless, different

\begin{itemize}
\item[12] According to Thomas Aquinas there can be no final answer exactly because of our capabilities and modes of cognition of the existence of God. We cognize God indirectly and never completely.
\item[13] Ibid.
\item[14] Παράτος ἡ σίας ὥθεσις. Τὸ γὰρ οἱ σιῶν αὐτὸς καταλήκτος αἱ ἔργα ἔγρανται. “Our research is about existence, because origins and causes of existences are searched for. (Met XII, 1; 1069a)
\item[15] Compare the understanding of “transcendental experience” in Karl Rahner!
\item[16] Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B 620–630.
\item[17] Philosophy inquires about everything, so, of course, it inquires about experience. “Experience” is not understood unambiguously.
\end{itemize}
form of the argument. Maybe it was even an essentially different form of it. He does not even take into account Proslogion 15, which states that God is something larger than everything that can be imagined. Considering that everybody tries to attack his enemy where he is the weakest, Kant behaves the same way. However, he does not allow his enemy to prepare his defense, but rather he himself puts forth structures and fortifications to make dealing with his enemy easier. Such an ontological proof or the form which Kant criticizes really starts from the concept itself, from which, according to Descartes, based on a clear and articulate insight according to geometric criteria, it should be concluded in favor of the existence of the most perfect, and with that, the most real entity.

Naturally, here is instantly inserted Kant’s distinction between the most real entity and its existence. By the way, we can recall that existence for Kant does not belong to the contents of a concept, or it is not a “real predicate” at all. Existence is the position of thought in a concept. It does not enrich or expand the contents of a term in any way. So based on itself, if it were the concept of the most real entity, its existence cannot be concluded. Dealing with the term itself always produces only a concept — never a real existence.

Kant disabled the way to God that would start from experience by proclaiming that the laws valid in the experiential world, understood in the Kantian way, or those that are applied only on that world, cannot in any way, by performing some transcendental illusion, extend over the boundaries of a “possible experience”. A possible experience is identified with the sensory, and no other is even mentioned, for example like that transcendental (defining the object of cognition with reality) that would be the condition of the possibility of individual cognition precisely defined, by objects experienced through senses.

18 “I also sometimes use the expression ‘the ontological argument.’ But ‘the ontological argument’ is best taken as referring to a group of related arguments.” (Brian Davies, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, Oxford University Press, Oxford–New–York 1993, p. 55) Alvin Plantinga has a similar assertion, that there are more ontological arguments, in his article “Ontologische Argumente” in Christoph Jäger (Hrsg.), Analytische Religionsphilosophie, Schöningh, Paderborn, München, Wien, Zürich, 1998, pp. 86–123.


20 Of course here comes the question of understanding of the concept, its origin, and relation towards reality. Is there a concept that does not conceptualize anything, i. e., that has no reference?

21 Not even Kant defined what the term “real predicate” means.

22 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B 627.

23 For example, something related to the experience of dependency like the one in Schleiermacher, or even less than the transcendental experience of Joseph Maréchal developed by K. Rahner, J. B. Lotz, or E. Coreth.
It is interesting that the standpoint about the ontological argument of our author, Antun Bauer, will be conditioned by standpoints, time, and the way of philosophizing of distant philosophers: Thomas Aquinas and Immanuel Kant. He mentions exactly these two philosophers right in the beginning of the first article in his book “Natural Theology”\textsuperscript{25}, and then in the discussion and about other proofs he profusely quotes them — in the notes and in the original.

As the name of the argument, Bauer uses “ontological”, because, he says, it was accepted by ontologists. He does not mention that Kant named it. “Some, however (St. Anselm, Descartes, Leibnitz etc.) with the analyses of the concept of God, as the objective concept and the concept in itself, prove that there is a God.”\textsuperscript{26} After that, Bauer immediately asks whether it is possible “from the concept of some thing” or from only thinking about it to expound the real existence of the thought of it. (Here he does not tackle the problems of the concept and how to reach it, nor does he enter the difference between the concept of some limited thing and the concept of God).

That question he answers in the form of the thesis named “The Ontological Proof of the Existence of God Does Not Prove Anything”. Here, he finds strong support in Kant and Aquinas. The latter one, Thomas, resting on the Philosopher’s(Aristotle’s) thought, admits that the basic principles of proving are themselves understandable, like it is itself understandable that God exists. We, however, do not know what God is, so it cannot be understandable from the concept that he himself exists. The word “God”, therefore, does not belong among the words that are so understandable themselves, so that we immediately know that the existence of the said belongs to them, as it is clear that the whole is greater than its part.\textsuperscript{27} Thomas wants to prove the existence of God starting with the facts (effects in the world — effectus), that are more understandable to us, although they are by their nature (quod naturam) less understandable than the necessary existence of God. It is in itself (conceptually) more understandable that the necessary entity exists rather than the unnecessary one.

\textsuperscript{25} P. 3.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., p 8.
\textsuperscript{27} “Illa dictuntur per se nota, quae statim, cognitis terminis, cognoscuntur: quod Philosophus attribuit primis demonstrationis principiis, in I Poster.: scito enim quid est totum et quid pars, statim scitur quod omne totum maius est sua parte. Sed intellecto quid significet hoc nomen Deus, statim habetur quod Deus est.” StI q. 2 a 1, Sancti Th. Aquintis, Opera omnia, Romae 1888. (Leon XIII).
In his attempt to be righteous towards, as he called them, ontologists, Bauer admits that neither do they maintain that, when limited entities are in question, their existence can be concluded from thinking about them, nor real being from their concepts.

However, they are, he says, convinced that it is possible to do so with the entity without limits. That is why it is asked what makes that one concept so different from the others and, anyway, whether it belongs among concepts or somewhere else.

Bauer himself does not have here one precisely defined formulation of the ontological proof, but uses concepts from more formulations so that he once speaks about the unlimited, then about the unlimited and highest, and the third time about the unlimited perfect, suggesting that these are synonyms. Therefore, for him exists one ontological proof and not more of them: e.g., one in Proslogion II, another in Proslogion III, and many other attempts of perfecting and rising in a higher complexity, even in Trans-conceptuality through affirmation, negation and eminency or even “double transcendence”.

In his text, Bauer sticks to one proof without separately dealing with either Anselm’s or Descartes formulation, which is improved by Leibniz, or Bonaventura’s, or Scot’s or Hegel’s etc. For him, it was more important to emphasize that from thinking itself about any of the above mentioned concepts cannot be derived that the thought of or thought about is real, and especially not necessarily existent.

The foothold of Bauer’s standpoint is that anything thought of remains thought even if we think about it as existent. He explicitly says: “we can certainly think about this entity as existent, but this existence is just our thought: and this thought of an entity remains a thought.”28 That, however, according to Bauer, does not prevent our thinking to be true even if the thought of entity does not really exist. This is true even for the unlimited and greatest entity. Because when we think of the greatest entity, that is exactly thinking about the greatest entity — whether it exists or not. But our thinking of, unless proven otherwise, is truly equivalent to the greatest entity. However: “If the greatest entity really exists outside the mind, then the greatest entity is certainly higher than the one that was only thought of.”29 He does not say: how higher? Probably corresponding to the level of being! And its content? For Kant, we know, it is not — because the existence is only a position of the thought of something. Here Bauer nevertheless differs from Kant, stating that the existence belongs to the essence of the unlimited perfect entity.” In Kant, existence does not belong to the perfect. Here Bauer is a Thomist in as much as Being

28 Naravno bogoslovje (Natural Theology), p. 8.
29 Ibid., p. 9.
is the form of all forms. The existence of the unlimited perfect entity is the same as its essence. Kant would never say that. The ideal of the mind, exactly because it is an ideal, does not necessarily include the existence.

Bauer thinks that we would, if we were looking at the essence of God in itself, see that existence belongs to it, but we do not look at it that way, we become aware of it through abstraction\(^{30}\), we have “a concept we made by abstracting”\(^{31}\). In such an abstract concept\(^{32}\) of the unlimited perfect entity, the entity to whom existence belongs is thought of. The concept of entity is abstracted from something that is, and according to the way we perceive it, is not and cannot be God. Therefore, the existence of that entity which is not given to us directly, must be proven, in order for it to be talked about as real, and not only a thought entity.

Bauer, however, says that it ought be proved that such an essence like God really exists outside of mind. In the end, undoubtedly, he concludes: “The existence necessarily belongs to the essence of the unlimited perfect entity, but only the thought of existence to the thought of essence, and real existence to real essence.”\(^{33}\) By comparing it to the conceptualization of a triangle, we could say that three angles belong both to a thought of a triangle and to a real triangle: a thought of angles to the thought of a triangle, and real angles to a real triangle.

The existence of really realized triangles, should be proved from experience — a posteriori. The existence of God, therefore, can only be proved a posteriori. It cannot be proved a priori, as explained. The fact that this proof,

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\(^{30}\) Bauer proclaims the same thought about acquiring concepts in his book *Opća metofizika ili ontologija* (General Metaphysics or Ontology), Zagreb 1894: “Therefore, metaphysics is the science about super-sensational causes of objects and phenomena. Above all, abstractly derived general concepts belong in metaphysics, like the concepts of: entity, substance, cause, purpose, but not in as much these terms are cognitive acts of mind, but as much as they designate something real and objective, they are the subject of metaphysics or ontology.” (p. 2)

\(^{31}\) Bauer could be asked what is that concept abstracted from. It certainly could not be reached by the same abstraction we reach the concepts of objects that are available to our senses. If not that way, we have the question of its origin. It seems that Bauer’s answer is not satisfactory.

\(^{32}\) It is good to have in mind how Bauer explains the arrival at the concept of “entity”. When cognizing the concept of “entity,” he says, “we abstract every other item of significance, and every entity that exists, has some other item of significance. Every one of them is either the entity of itself (ens in se) or of the other (ab alio), or the entity by itself (ens in se) or by other (in alio) etc. He abstracts the bare concept of “entity” from any other item of significance. According to Bauer, we do not cognize that which makes some entity a substance or accident, God or creature, but we cognize only that it is something.” *Opća metofizika ili ontologija* (General Metaphysics or Ontology), Zagreb, 1894.

\(^{33}\) Naravno bogoslovje (Natural Theology), p. 9.
in the ontological sense is argumentum a simultaneo, is of no use here, i. e., ontologically speaking, the essence and existence are the same in God.

What Bauer missed in his text (to differentiate more formulations of the ontological proof), he provides in a large note that is two pages long in fine print 35. He brings condensed opinions of St. Anselm, Scotus, Descartes and Leibniz and answers each of them, always following his basic standpoint, already given in the text.

So, in his answer to Anselm: “Real existence is a great advantage, but by thinking of this advantage, the advantage does not become real.” 36 To Scotus’ comment (or a coloration — colorare) that, if the most perfect entity were not existing, it would not be possible, and it is possible, therefore it exists, he answers, by differing internal and external possibility. He grants God the internal possibility, while the external should be proven. If man were looking at God’s essence, Scotus would be right, but according to Bauer, we have it only in abstraction. Therefore, God’s existence must be proven some other way.

He grants Descartes that an idea, clearly and articulately thought of, contains only the thought of existence. He answers to Leibniz that what is internally possible does not mean it exists. Leibniz, namely, insisted that God’s possibility should be proven first, and only then his necessary existence. It is not enough for an entity, even if ens a se, to be possible in order to, based on his possibility, conclude its existence. It means that not even such an entity, even if we proved that it is such, necessarily exists.

One more time he conclusively says: “From our concept about an entity reached through abstraction we are allowed to infer only its internal possibility, i. e., the concept of such an entity necessarily contains in itself the concept of existing, and only a real essence contains a real existence as well; but, for such a real essence to be, it is not contained, nor can it be inferred from our concept.” 37

Bauer is so convinced in the power of his arguments that he does not even argue with Kant his refutation of the ontological proof. He only says that Kant intelligently refutes the ontological proof, but that there is room to object something there. 38 His most fervent criticism is directed towards Kant’s critique of the cosmological proof. Bauer cannot avoid here mentioning the ontological proof, to which the cosmological nor the physical–theological can be reduced

34 Cf. Walter Brugger, Summe einer philosophischen Gotteslehre, Johannes Berchmans Verlag, München 1979., p. 207
35 Naravno bogoelovje (Natural Theology), pp. 9–11.
36 Ibid, p. 10.
37 Ibid, p. 11.
as Kant did.39 There remains Bauer’s wondering how such a genius (as Kant) managed to overlook the differences of their starting points. Kant, however, differentiates experience from experience in general and thinks that the cosmological proof starts from this other in order to somehow get the concept of the necessary entity, and then everything would go easily.

Conclusion

We may conclude that Bauer in his book “Natural Theology”, published in the same century Kant died, who was considered the one who “settled” things40 about proving God’s existence, is a true contemporary in presenting the ontological proof. He brought out mostly what was usual at that time in arguing against Anselm’s attempt to find one argument. Nevertheless, he does that in his own original way. However, Bauer may be criticized due to his sparse presentation of Anselm’s thought, and Thomas’ and Kant’s critique of the ontological proof. In the background of Bauer’s criticism one should certainly not overlook Thomas’ and Kant’s influence.

Of course, Bauer did not have today’s tools of analyses at his disposal, such as modal logic. However, even with all of today’s logical tools, it will never be possible to calculate the existence of God with abstract symbols, functions and mathematical operations. In the same way, it is impossible to replace an experience in its full extent, as well as the wonder about beings, and the wonder about wondering, and returning to yourself, looking for transcendental conditions of every experience. Bauer would certainly criticize any attempt to prove the existence from mere possibility, whatever logical tools used and analyses made.

He, however, is not afraid to accept the possibility of the existence of God like the Oxford Dictionary in 1996, which sees the major answer to the ontological proof in showing only the illusion in which the necessary entity is possible. He would deal with all of those who often exercise their thought in

38 Ibid, p. 41.
40 Namely, Norman Malcolm, in 1960, noticed that Proslogion 2 and 3 are different arguments. This caused many reactions in Philosophical Review. A number of people are studying “the ontological argument” since then. A part of the discussion is available in the compilation: Friedo Ricken (ed.), Klasiche Gottesbeweise in der Sicht der gegenwartigen Logik und Wissenschatstheorie, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, 1991.
41 Cf. Simon Blackburn, Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford University Press, 1996. “The ontological argument: “This concession is much dangerous than it looks, since in the modal logic involved, from possibly necessarily p, we can derive necessarily p.”
purely logical tasks, thus staying, as Kant says, in the hall of science (Vorhof der Wissenschaft).

The fact that there are more and more philosophers of religion shows that this is not only a matter of logic, which was unthinkable not so long ago. Whoever thinks this is only a matter of logic should answer Hegel’s question: What have we done to the concept, and should we turn back to Anaximander to teach us about the old tension between conceptual and supra-conceptual, about that what is pretty much “tight” in our concepts? When we deal with the existence of God, no side should feel triumphant. All thinkers suggested humbleness in that area. Is it not said that St. Thomas considered everything he had written worthless straw? Philosophizing certainly helped him to understand his limits, and likewise to reach beyond them.

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