Unity in Diversity?
Historic Family Forms in Southeastern Europe

This article argues that household organization in Southeastern Europe in the past can be understood only, if family forms are related to their social environment and the political economy. The significant variation in household formation patterns in Southeastern Europe, thus, is the result of an equally significant variety of patterns of social and political organization. The article starts with a critical review of the debate on complex household forms (the so-called zadruga) in Southeastern Europe. This debate, which was especially vital in the 1990s, not only produced original research on historic family forms in Southeastern Europe but also reflected on the association of specific family forms with “Europe”. After that I present the results of my own research on family forms and economy in the nineteenth century Rhodope Mountains in today’s Bulgaria. In this mountain region, the Christian population lived predominantly in nuclear families, while among the Muslim population (Pomaks), multiple family households were frequent. Yet, the average size of their households was also small. These findings have provoked me to ask why social organization in this mountain region was obviously very different to the mountain regions in the western parts of the Balkan Peninsula, where large, complex households dominated. I conclude that the level of integration into the state and the market was the major difference. The Rhodope Mountains were well integrated into the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century, and the state could provide safety. So, there was no need for the local population to organize themselves into tribes and create large, complex households for self-defense. The population in the Rhodope Mountains could also rely on the village community as a territorialized close network of reciprocal ties. In conclusion, the article argues against both culturalist and ecological explanations of family forms but stresses the importance of the political and legal framework.

Keywords: family forms, household organization, zadruga, Southeastern Europe, Rhodope Mountains
Introduction

In the 1990s the discussion of family forms in Southeastern Europe took an unusually political twist. There seem to be few others, if any, occasions when the problem of household typology was debated with so much fervor by scholars. The notoriously dry matter of computing household composition suddenly became ideologically charged because family forms were related to the question of belonging to Europe and to the deconstruction of stereotypical notions about the Balkans and of East-West dichotomies. Croatian ethnologist Jasna Čapo Žmegač observed in a 1996 article that,

> With the dissolution of the unambiguous and ‘natural’ boundary [of the Iron Curtain], the former political East began to struggle against the general identification with the East; this also concerned innocent and non-ideological questions such as family forms.¹

Maria Todorova’s 1993 book “Balkan Family Structure and the European Pattern” was already indicative for the course of this debate.² In her study of household structures in nineteenth century Ottoman Bulgaria, Todorova took issue with the notion that family forms in the Balkans were somehow “non-European”. Todorova analyzed tax records and parish registers from a number of localities in 1860s’ Ottoman Bulgaria and concluded that in most investigated towns and villages, simple families were the most frequent household type. She pointed to similarities of her findings to those about household structures in other parts of Europe. By doing so she critiqued John Hajnal’s and Peter Laslett’s assumption that family forms in Southeastern (and Eastern) Europe were essentially different from the “European” model, which these authors had constructed upon empirical data from Western Europe. One of her main points of critique was the then dominant notion that Southeastern European societies of the past had been characterized by the prevalence of a specific multiple family household form (the so-called *zadruga*). Todorova asserted that the *zadruga* was by no means the most frequent household form in all parts of Southeastern Europe. The *zadruga* was limited to certain parts of the region; neither was it an ancient social institution. Todorova suggested viewing it as a response to the collapse of state order in the Ottoman Empire at the end of the eighteenth century.³

Todorova’s more general goal – repeated thereafter in other publications – was to reject the classification of Southeastern Europe as a non-European region. Todorova assumed that notions about specific family forms in Southeastern Europe, that were allegedly ontologically different from a presumed “European” pattern, had become

¹ Čapo Žmegač 1996c: 192.
² Todorova 1993.
part of the stereotypical clichés about the region in the West. As she would demonstrate in her influential 1997 book “Imagining the Balkans”, Western imagination had been portraying the Balkans as not-quite-European or outright Oriental since the nineteenth century. In the dominant Western discourse, the Balkans were considered to be uncivilized. Western European observers looked on the Balkans as of a museum of living traditions and of archaic cultures. The zadruga family form and tribal organizations were essential parts of this image. In view of the long trajectory of distorted and usually degrading views of Southeastern Europe, the classification of family forms – especially if terms such as “European” were used – became a sensitive issue that was being related to normative statements. Jasna Čapo Žmegač, for example, challenged the model of the “Balkan family household” developed by Austrian historian Karl Kaser because Kaser linked his concept to the assertion that the Balkans were essentially different from Europe.

The idea that Southeast European societies were not part of the “European” cultural model but were rather shaped by other traditions and moral values than “European” ones attained a particular edge during the wars in the former Yugoslavia, which were often and incorrectly called “Balkan Wars”. Authors such as Todorova, Čapo Žmegač and others linked the frequent misperceptions of the Yugoslav wars to entrenched clichés and stereotypes about the region, which had a long pedigree. Todorova, for example, challenged the assumption that there was a direct connection between the system of patriarchy in Southeastern Europe – which in turn is often seen as one of the foundations of the alleged predominance of complex household forms in the region – and the wars in the former Yugoslavia. She refuted the idea that the Southeast European societies, because of a patriarchal tradition, had an endemic penchant for violence. According to Todorova, these assumptions reached “worrying dimensions” during the 1990s; they inspired the revival of “old stereotypes” and justified “undifferentiated generalizations on the region.” This critique addressed authors such as Joel Halpern, who had argued that there was a link between traditional “Balkan” mentality and the brutality of the wars fought in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In his view, there was a connection between patriarchal norms and complex household organization, that is, the zadruga, and its particular kinship system. If patriarchy was one reason for the brutality in the former Yugoslavia, then the wars also became related to the zadruga, for it was one important aspect of patriarchal culture in Southeastern Europe. “Thus, in the reality of these ‘warriors’ the old heroic myths and patriarchal notions attained a level of importance which ought not to be underestimated.” These heroic traditions were

---

4 Todorova 1997a.
6 Todorova 1997b: 296.
7 Halpern, Grandits 1999: 43. The essay was originally published in German in 1994.
said to be the result of a specific, age-old family ethos in which the male members were collectively responsible for the security of the family in a hostile environment.

Such reasoning was a remarkable inversion of ideological attributions to the *zadruga* as compared to the nineteenth century, when politicians and intellectuals in Serbia and Croatia had looked at the *zadruga* as a valuable tradition on which national identity and contemporary politics could be founded. Croatian nineteenth century conservatives considered the *zadruga* the essence of Croat popular culture and urged the state to legally protect it. The father of socialism in Serbia, Svetozar Marković, considered the *zadruga* as the “purest form of collectivism” and a source of democratic attitudes which, therefore, could serve as the basis for a peculiar Serbian style of peasant socialism. He, along with other thinkers, pinned their hopes on the *zadruga* as a bulwark against Western influences which they considered to be detrimental to their nation.

The concept of the *zadruga*, thus, was ideologized from its very beginning, that is, since the invention of the word by Vuk Stefanović Karadžić in 1818. Time and again, the *zadruga* became part of ideological visions and ascriptions, most recently in the 1990s with respect to the question of the European-ness of Southeastern Europe. This particular family form drew so much attention because it was regarded by many as a metonym for Balkan cultures, assuming that family forms in Southeastern Europe were of one and the same kind – and different from the “European” norm.

The critical debate of the 1990s proved to be immensely productive because it did not only reject certain well established but nevertheless inaccurate assumptions but also triggered fresh research on family and kinship in Southeastern Europe. This new research utilized previously untouched sources and expanded significantly our knowledge about regional household formation patterns in Southeastern Europe in the past and the present. The myth of the omnipresent *zadruga* was thoroughly destroyed in a way similar to the deconstruction of the notion of the “large family” in (Western) Europe in the past by the “Cambridge Group for the History of Population and Social Structure” some thirty years earlier.

The aims of my article

The aims of this paper are twofold: in the first part, I want to provide a brief summary of the research on household complexity in Southeastern Europe, focusing on the literature of the last two decades. The goal of this part is to highlight

---

8 Kaser 1994a: 244.
10 A note on the terminology is appropriate here: in this article, I will use the concepts for household typology, which has become the standard in the history of the family: nuclear (or simple) family
findings about the regional variation and the determents of multiple households in Southeastern Europe. This discussion serves to develop the argument of the second part of the article, which focuses on a particular regional case study. Based on the existing research I argue that household formation patterns can be explained only if they are thoroughly related to their political, social and economic contexts. Holistic approaches or culturalist explanations tend to be reductionist. A comparative case study can also reveal the complexity and interrelation of the factors which determine, or at least strongly influence, household formation patterns and household development cycles. Any such discussion needs to depart from what Jasna Čapo Žmegač expressed in the point: “It was impossible to establish a one-directional causality.”

My case study is located geographically in the Rhodope Mountains, a large mountains range in today’s southern Bulgaria and north-eastern Greece, and temporally in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, a time of significant political and socio-economic transformations in this region. Why a mountain region? First of all, mountains cover a large part of Southeastern Europe and are, therefore, an important geographic milieu in which a great part of the population lived. The social and demographic importance of mountains was greater in the past than it is today. Some mountain regions in Southeastern Europe played an important economic role, for example with regard to large-scale animal husbandry or the development of proto-industrial manufacturing, such as in cloth production. Yet, the mountains of Southeastern Europe are also typically regions in which scholars assumed a clear predominance of complex households. My research on the Rhodope Mountains refuted these assumptions.

The previous literature on the *zadruga* suggested a relationship between agro-pastoralism and nomadism, which were the most typical patterns of economic organization in the mountains of Southeastern Europe, and the tendency to form complex households. Bette Denich, in her article on “Sex and Power in the Balkans”, for example, asserted a correlation between pastoralism on the one hand, with patriarchal domination and complex families on the other. In a review article on historical family research in Southeastern Europe, Olga Katsiardi-Hering also stated that multiple household forms were primarily evident among the agro-pastoral

---

12 See Brunnbauer 2004b.
mountain populations. Karl Kaser extensively discussed the connection between transhumant and nomadic sheep breeding in the mountains and the development of complex households. In his model the complex “Balkan family household” was diffused from the mountains of the central Balkans to other parts of Southeastern Europe by populations who migrated from the mountains to the lowlands. Roxanne Caftanzoglou revealed a distinctive tendency towards the formation of complex households among the pastoralist (semi-nomadic or transhumant) population of the Vlach settlement of Syrrako in northern Greece at around 1900, while the permanent residents of the village lived in smaller and simpler households. Even Maria Todorova, who is generally wary not to overestimate the distribution of complex family forms in Southeastern Europe, wrote:

The geographical frequency of zadrugas unequivocally follows the curve of the mountain terrain in the Balkans overriding ethnic boundaries. Also, at least on the basis of the Bulgarian material, it can be assumed that the majority of the extended and multiple families of the zadrugal type were engaged in animal farming or mixed stockbreeding-crop growing economy.

I will argue that these assumptions have to be qualified. There was no uniformity in family forms in the mountains of Southeastern Europe, even not among similar professional groups. By using data about different mountain areas I will highlight regional differences in the frequency of household types and the household formation patterns. I will use this evidence for discussing potential links between the environment, political economy, and social organization on the one hand, household types and family organization on the other. I argue that the analysis of differences in household forms in a specific geographic-ecological milieu, thus excluding ecological variables as a potential determining factor, helps in understanding the reasons for the heterogeneity of family forms in Southeastern Europe. I locate these reasons not so much in culture but in the degree of state and market integration of particular localities. The integration into the wider world impacted on the social organization on the local level, including the family. My hypothesis is that the so-called zadruga thrived particularly in those regions where the state had great difficulties in guaranteeing safety and enforcing its laws. Insecurity was the prime reason why agnatic descent groups emerged; complex households were their most basic units. In the parts of Southeastern Europe, where nuclear families predominated, safety was much less of an issue thanks to a functioning state administration. There, the local social organization in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was dominated by the village community, that is, a territorial unit that embedded individual households.

17 Todorova 1993: 166.
into a dense network of communal solidarity and reciprocity. These relations were not necessarily linked to kinship. In the parts of Southeastern Europe that were ruled by the Habsburgs, seigniorial estates which legally existed until 1848 played a similar role like the village community, though often with different outcomes for household forms.\(^\text{18}\)

Furthermore, I want to stress that analogies between household forms on the phenomenological level can be misleading; there is also real life behind typologies, and as historians we should be concerned with it. Numeric similarities in household composition and household size can be the result of very different family ideals. In 1976 ethnologist Hans Medick had already critiqued purely quantitative-structural approaches in family history:

> The danger arises from computing the incomputable. It is true that the industrial proletarian grandmother may have lived in an ‘extended family’ as did the peasant grandmother, but this apparent uniformity by no means indicates an identity of household structures.\(^\text{19}\)

To give another example from my own research: in 1970s’ Bulgaria many an urban household was multiple, comprising three generations. Was this a late reflex of a deeply entrenched cultural ideal among the Bulgarians which even communism could not wipe out? Of course not. These arrangements had the most prosaic of reasons: due to the tremendous lack of housing in socialist Bulgaria many newlyweds were forced to live with their parents(-in-law) for quite some time. Yet, a historical demographer looking exclusively into census results will see a country full of stem families and \textit{zadrugas}.

**Complex household structures in Southeastern Europe**

As a result of the research on household forms in Southeastern Europe of the last twenty years it is no longer possible to maintain that joint family systems were predominant in the region. Multiple family households appear to be typical, or at least frequent, only in a limited area in Southeastern Europe. In 1996 Karl Kaser came up with an attempt to sketch the geographic distribution of “traditional” household forms. He detected four different patterns of household formation in Southeastern Europe: the “neolocal-nuclear” one, dominant in most of the Romanian lands; the “neo- or uxorilocal-nuclear” one, to be found mainly on the Aegean islands; the pattern of “patrivirilocal-lifecycle complexity” characteristic of most of the Bulgarian lands, continental Greece and historical Hungary; and finally the pattern of

\(^\text{18}\) It is clear that the Austrian Military Border, with its specific regulations, does not easily fit into any such comparison (see below).

\(^\text{19}\) Medick 1976: 295.
“patrivirilocal-household cycle complexity” predominant in the western parts of Southeastern Europe from today’s Croatia in the north, Serbia in the east, Dalmatia in the west, to Albania and Macedonia in the south.20 Only two out of the four household formation patterns, identified by Kaser, led to complex households, though with different frequency and duration of household complexity. Hence, there is significant variability in family forms in Southeastern Europe, a fact already pointed out earlier by Croatian ethnographer Milovan Gavazzi.21

The “patrivirilocal-lifecycle” household formation pattern, which Kaser considered widespread in Southeastern Europe, resulted only in temporary phases of household complexity. Sons, upon marriage, would stay together with their wives and maybe children in their father’s household for some time but not permanently. Upon the father’s death or when all the sons had married, the household and its property were divided in equal terms among the sons, who established their own households. “Ideally, complexity was experienced by most people at two points of the lifecycle: in the phase of marriage until the complex household separated and in later age when the sons brought daughters-in-law.”22

The other joint household formation pattern, as identified by Kaser, resulted in “household cycle complexity”. Here is Kaser’s description:

The couple had children. Upon the marriage of the sons, their wives came to live with them, and the grandsons did the same. The group could thus become quite large. The transmission of property was not related to death or marriage and took place when the household divided into several different groups after generations. They shared the property equally according to descent lines.23

In regions where this household formation pattern was operational a high frequency of extended and multiple family households could be observed, and a significant part of the population lived in such households at any moment of time. These households often remained complex over several generations. Kaser, then, introduced further distinctions; a northern and a southern type of this pattern. The northern one was present in Civil Croatia and Slavonia and parts of Hungary. It was mainly the result of the scarcity of land and of feudal restrictions, and not so much of a particular cultural inclination: feudal lords prohibited household and property fission in order to prevent peasant holdings of becoming too small and unsustainable. The southern type of the household-cycle complexity pattern was distributed throughout much of what today is called the “Western Balkans”; it was there, where Kaser located the center of “Balkan patriarchy.”24 The patriarchal culture was manifest in an ideology

22 Kaser 1996: 381.
23 Ibid., 383.
24 Ibid.
of patrilineal descent as the only way to establish kinship, in a patrivrilocal post-
marital residence pattern, and in the exclusion of women from property. Women
did not even receive a dowry and were totally subject to the male members of the
household.25 This is the family form which traditionally used to be called \textit{zadruga}.
Its internal relations were classically described by US-American anthropologist
Philip Mosely, who did research on family forms in Southeastern Europe in the
1930s. Mosely denied that there was a single definition embracing all varieties of the
\textit{zadruga} but he put forward some basic principles:

\begin{quote}
[I]t may be considered, tentatively, as a household composed of two or more
biological or small families, closely related by blood or adoption, owing its
means of production communally, producing and consuming the means of
livelihood jointly, and the regulating of its property, labor, and livelihood
communally.26
\end{quote}

These households could grow into very large and complex units, indeed. Ethno-
graphic accounts, for example from Kosovo and Macedonia, in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries described \textit{zadrugas} of up to one hundred or even more members
with vertical and horizontal extensions including a variety of kin.27 These enormo-
usly large households were certainly very rare. Yet, reports about households of some
twenty members are quite frequent. Philip Mosely, for example, in a 1942 paper
described the Varžić \textit{zadruga} in a village in Slavonia (in today’s Croatia):

\begin{quote}
With twenty-six members, this household is the largest in the village. It is
made up of two brothers, Jozo and Djuro, their wives, four married sons with
their wives, and fourteen children. Except for the wives, who have married
into the \textit{zadruga}, the household consists of three generations of the descen-
dents of Ivan Varžić, who died in 1915, and his wife Janja, who lived until
1927. Blood-ties are close, and they are further cemented by the close under-
standing of the co-elders of the household, Jozo and Djuro.28
\end{quote}

The Varžić \textit{zadruga} was patterned on what Kaser would call “household-cycle com-
plicity”. The daughters of the family had to leave the household upon marriage,
wheras brides of sons were entering the household. Sons continued to stay with
their father even after their marriage and having their own offspring. Such house-
holds are also well described for rural regions of socialist Yugoslavia, especially its
less developed parts in the south.29

The phenomenon of the complex family household in Southeastern Europe is, in
general, richly described. There are abundant accounts of its domestic relations, of

\begin{flushright}
28 Mosely 1976c.
\end{flushright}
the homesteads and the economies of these families. There is also ‘hard’ statistical evidence. So, it is not the phenomenon as such which is contested, but its interpretation. The controversies about family forms in Southeastern Europe of the last two decades revolved mainly around two problems: firstly, the geographical distribution of the so-called zadruga; and secondly the origins and determents of household complexity.

**Distribution**

Ethnographic accounts of complex households provide little viable information about their frequency. The ethnographic data from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries also seem biased towards the zadruga because observers felt excited by such a seemingly exotic phenomenon. During state socialism, evolutionist models were also widespread in ethnography so that the existence of large families prior to socialist modernization was more or less considered as given. The use of computing and of statistical methods based on household listings and other demographic sources, therefore, meant a significant breakthrough in the research of the complex households and their distribution in Southeastern Europe.

One thing that the computing of demographic data made clear was the fact that complex households were primarily a rural phenomenon while in towns, even in regions with a high frequency of joint families, nuclear families were usually the dominant form of household organization. Yet, this result did not come as a surprise. More important, therefore, were the insights into rural family forms provided by quantitatively oriented research.

The first quantitative analyses of household structures in Southeastern Europe were carried out before the computer was invented, thus prior to the application of the Cambridge Group’s methods. Bulgarian sociologist Hristina Močeva, for example, analyzed 2,421 households in 520 villages in Bulgaria at the end of the 1930s. She found out that “large” families were frequent only in western Bulgaria (the border region to Yugoslavia), whilst in most of the country relatively “small” families predominated. In western Bulgaria some ten percent of households had more than ten members, while in southern and northern Bulgaria the respective number was only three percent. The average household size in Bulgaria in 1900 was 4.5 members in the towns and 6.0 members in the villages. Hence, the myth of the zadruga in Bulgaria should have been debunked much earlier than in the 1990s. An impressive sociological survey of households was also produced in interwar Yugoslavia by Vera Stein Erlich, who investigated 300 villages in all parts of Yugoslavia in the

---

30 A good example is the treatment of family forms in Bulgaria by the ethnographer Makaveeva 1991.
31 Močeva 1942.
32 Dolinski 1930: 12
late 1930s. Her book was published only in 1964. Erlich did not use ‘modern’
terminology for household typology, nor did she calculate the frequency of different
household forms. Yet her book includes valuable information about the regional
distribution of the *zadruga* showing that by the end of the 1930s, it was mainly
present in Macedonia and Kosovo. A second belt of lesser frequency was constituted
by Serbia and Bosnia, while in Croatia, the Dalmatian littoral and noticeably very
rare in Slovenia.

Similar conclusions were reached at that time by Philip Mosely on the basis of
case studies from villages throughout Southeastern Europe. He identified three
“belts of *zadruga* society” differentiating mainly by the time when the *zadruga*
tradition had withered away. One belt consisted of the tribal areas of Montenegro
and northern Albania. Interestingly, Mosely assumed that in this area the *zadruga*
had largely disappeared by 1938. According to Mosely, the increasing scarcity of
land in interwar Montenegro and the increasing integration of the country into a
market economy resulted in increased household divisions and a focus on the “small
family.” Mosely defined a second, larger *zadruga* belt extending throughout the
mountain systems of Bosnia, Herzegovina, western Croatia, northern and central
Macedonia and central Albania. Here, the *zadruga* was based on an economy whose
mainstays were cattle and sheep breeding, under conditions of “insecurity of life
and property. […] In the absence of peasant servitude to the landlords the strong
family household was the center of personal security, economic effort and social
satisfaction.” It was in this area that the *zadruga* persisted longest, whereas in the
adjacent third belt (the rest of Croatia, Slavonia, Serbia proper, western and central
Bulgaria, southern Macedonia and southern Albania) the *zadruga* tradition was fa-
ding away in the 1930s, when Mosely had conducted his research. In the other areas
of Southeastern Europe, such as in Slovenia, Dalmatia, most of Greece, Romania
and eastern Bulgaria the *zadruga* had never existed.

Mosely’s findings are important for several reasons. Firstly, he stressed the regio-
nal differentiation, although he did not differentiate much between different forms
of the *zadruga*. Secondly, he established a plausible connection between the dissolution
of the *zadruga* and larger economic and political processes, by pointing to the
scarcity of land, the intensification of the monetary economy and the centralization
of state power as influencing factors. Thirdly, Mosely stressed that he could not find
any ethnic or national specificities for the *zadruga*. So, despite its Slavic name the
*zadruga* was neither a typically Slavic institution nor typical for all Slavs of Southe-
astern Europe. Mosely pointed to some differences caused by religion, such as in

33 Erlich 1966. The Yugoslav original was published in 1964 in Zagreb.
34 Erlich 1966: 38.
35 Mosely 1976b.
36 Ibid., 62–3.
37 Ibid., 60.
the endogamy/exogamy rules, although generally there were *zadrugas* among the Muslim, Orthodox, and Catholic populations.

A crucial step in the clarification of the regional distribution and importance of complex households in Southeastern Europe was the application of the Cambridge Group’s household classification system to empirical material from the region. It allowed, for the first time, a systematic analysis of various forms of household complexity, rather than lumping together all forms of extended family households under the concept of the *zadruga*. Quantitative analysis helped to understand the formation patterns and to put evidence of ‘large’ households into perspective: even there, where multiple households were found in important numbers, many or most of the observed households often consisted of simple families. So, multiple households were neither ubiquitous in the whole region nor were they necessarily the most frequent household type even in those regions, where they did exist. Aside from that, there could also be significant variations in smaller regions.

In the 1972 volume “Household and Family in Past Time” three papers on Serbia were included, written by Eugene A. Hammel, Peter Laslett together with Marilyn Clarke, and Joel M. Halpern. Laslett and Clarke analyzed a parish register of the Orthodox population of Belgrade from 1733–4, when Belgrade was under Austrian control. The average household size (not counting for lodgers) at that time was 5.45 persons per household. 14.2 percent of the households could be classified as extended families, 17.6 percent as multiple families, and 54.5 percent as simple families. Hence, the findings did not fit in the image of large *zadrugas*. However, Belgrade as a town cannot be considered representative for a society in which more than ninety percent of the population lived in small villages and depended on farming. Differences between town and village were also highlighted in the chapter by US-American anthropologist Joel M. Halpern, who analyzed data on central Serbia from the Serbian census of 1863. Halpern concluded that in the market town of Arandjelovac the household size was much lower than in the villages, where the large majority of households contained six or more people. Between 69 and 89 percent of the village population lived in such households. Halpern did not present a distribution of household types but his data showed significant percentages of households with more than six members including kin other than the nuclear family. Hence, this data proved a high frequency of *zadruga*-like households in Serbia, though these households did not always form the majority of households in a given locality and rarely grew to the spectacular proportions as mentioned in ethnographic accounts.

In the next two decades further statistical evidence was found for the frequency of multiple households in the Balkans. At the same time, however, the quantitative exploration step by step limited the zone of distribution of the *zadruga* and highlighted further regional variations. Traian Stoianovich published data on average

---

household sizes in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1870, where the mean household size was 12.16 (Muslims having the smallest households on average, Catholics the largest). In the four Croatian territories featured in Stoianovich’s analysis average household size was 10.0 in 1810, whereas in Dalmatia households had about five members on average. In Montenegro the mean household size was 9.2 in 1806. For southern Serbia Stoianovich established smaller households based on data from 1879, that is, after this region had been annexed to Serbia: mean household size was 6.7 in the newly annexed territories.\(^{40}\) Hence Stoianovich’s data confirmed by and large Mosely’s assumptions about the spatial distribution of the \textit{zadruga}, which Stoianovich called the “domestic family”. Stoianovich modified Mosely’s model in so far as he insisted that extended families were more frequent in mountain regions than in the lowlands.\(^{41}\)

While Stoianovich confirmed the salience of extended family households in the areas of the Adriatic littoral and its hinterland, stretching from Croatia in the north to Montenegro in the south, Maria Todorova proved the opposite for Bulgaria. In her analysis of parish registers and Ottoman tax records she found a predominance of simple family households in northeastern Bulgaria in the 1860s. 67 percent of households consisted of nuclear families, 16 percent of extended and 12 percent of multiple ones, with insignificant variations between town and village; actually, in her sample urban households were more likely to be multiple.\(^{42}\) This data is very different from the Serbian village of Orašac, for example, where at the same time only a third of all households belonged to the nuclear type (Table 6 in the appendix). Average household size in northeastern Bulgaria was less than five persons in mid-nineteenth century.\(^{43}\) It should be noted, though, that Todorova also analyzed the household typology of a small Catholic village in southern Bulgaria, which displayed a strikingly different pattern: in the 1830s the mean household size in this village was about nine persons and more than half of all the households consisted of multiple families.\(^{44}\) Todorova does not really explain the difference but the Catholic village might have been exceptional. Catholics are a small minority among the Bulgarians and the sample from the village, which Todorova analyzed, was also very small (45 households in 1836 and 44 households two years later). The data from this village cannot be used for any generalization. Yet, they can serve as a reminder of the possibility of significant variations in household composition within micro-regions. Such differentiations might be lost if only aggregated data are used. This is why case studies on the micro level are so important.

\(^{41}\) Ibid., 140.
\(^{42}\) Todorova 1993: 104–6.
\(^{43}\) Ibid., 115.
\(^{44}\) Ibid., 104.
One case in point is Jasna Čapo Žmegač’s analysis of the Cernik estate in Civil Croatia in the second half of the eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth century. She proves significant differences in household size and composition between two groups of villages on this estate. The villages, in which the population combined farming with income from non-farming activities, as well as the estate’s central town, showed smaller households compared to those villages, in which the families lived almost exclusively from farming and possessed more land. Her research also shows a generally high frequency of complex households on the Cernik estate in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, though households were rarely extremely large. Almost 53 percent of all households were multiple and 30 percent were simple in the 1850s. This means that the majority of the estate’s population lived in multiple family households (zadrugas) at that time. The average household size was 8.37, with statistically significant differences between the villages of the estate. If these findings can be taken as representative for Civil Slavonia, which Čapo Žmegač asserts they are, then it follows that these parts of today’s Croatia were historically characterized by a household formation pattern which, by tendency, led to complex households that were regularly divided. In his research on an area of Civil Croatia south of Zagreb Hannes Grandits came to similar conclusions. Analyzing estate registers he suggested that in this area, households with ten to twenty members were the most frequent household category by size in the early nineteenth century.

The knowledge about household structures in Southeastern Europe was greatly expanded by Karl Kaser and his “Balkan Family Project,” which he initiated at the University of Graz in the early 1990s, and by his former students. In these research projects, a significant amount of previously unused statistical material was analyzed in combination with ethnographic records. One of the foundations of this effort was the materials which Joel Halpern had collected during his fieldwork in Yugoslavia in the 1950s and 1960s. Taken together, the research by the “Graz Group” produced original empirical results and new analytical insights, yet it also provoked critique.

To begin with, Kaser suggested a new terminology: he introduced the concept of the “Balkan family household” (Balkanfamilienhaushalt) as a replacement for the term zadruga. Kaser found the term zadruga inappropriate because of its etymologically Slavic origins while this family form was neither limited to Slavs nor ubiquitous among Slavs in Southeastern Europe. Kaser also insisted on a differentiation between various types of complex households: not all extended families in Southeastern

---

45 Čapo Žmegač 1991; Čapo Žmegač 1996b.
49 Among the researchers of the project and its follow-ups were Hannes Grandits, Siegfried Gruber, Robert Pichler, Enriketa Papa, Gentiana Kera and the author of this paper.
50 A collection of essays which were published in the Graz projects on Balkan family history is under preparation; its editor is Karl Kaser.
Europe can be classified as a “Balkan family household.” This particular form of household organization was based, according to Kaser, on peculiar formation patterns and cultural values that were not present in all parts of Southeastern Europe. Kaser maintains that the “Balkan family household” is a unique pattern in the European context; this assertion drew critique because it was seen as supporting the notion of the non-European nature of the Balkans. In his massive study “Family and Kinship in the Balkans” (Familie und Verwandtschaft auf dem Balkan) Kaser attempted to map the distribution of complex household forms in Southeastern Europe. Using a large body of quantitative and qualitative data Kaser proved the high frequency of multiple family households in the nineteenth century in a region stretching from Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, large parts of Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia to Albania and northern Greece. Kaser assumed that the (semi-)nomadic pastorialist groups of the Vlachs and Sarakatsani tended to live in large, complex households as well. The eastern boundary of the zone of distribution of extended families was Serbia and western Bulgaria. East of this imaginary border, i.e. in the Romanian lands and most of Bulgaria, no pattern of complex households could be established, not for the nineteenth century or before. It is rather likely that these regions have a tradition of a joint family household pattern that reaches far back.

Kaser also stresses that in the nineteenth and especially twentieth century multiple family households in Southeastern Europe were in a process of dissolution, so that the zone of their distribution was constantly shrinking. By the end of the twentieth century, the “Balkan family household” was common only among the Albanian populations of Kosovo and Macedonia. The process of the dissolution of complex households was analyzed in detail by Hannes Grandits and Siegfried Gruber drawing on data from Civil Croatia and the Military Border. Grandits and Gruber compared two villages in which the average household size had declined from almost twelve in 1857 to 5.2 and 6.6 respectively in 1890. A similar process was observed in the Serbian village of Orašac in the same period. Complex households divided increasingly into smaller units in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Interestingly, the reduction of household complexity over time was not a one-directional pattern. While it is true that on an aggregate level, the frequency and

51 See Čapo Žmegač 1996a.
52 Vlachs and Sarakatsani were traditionally dependent on nomadic sheep breeding, roaming through the Balkans in the Byzantine and Ottoman times. Vlachs speak an eastern Romanic language (Aromanian) and Sarakatsani speak Greek. In the nineteenth and twentieth century, when these people became sedentarized, the majority of them assimilated into the dominant host society. Today, small Aromanian speaking communities can be especially found in Albania and Macedonia, and Sarakatsani communities in northern Greece and Bulgaria, where they are known as Karakatchani.
53 For the Romanian lands see Stahl 1986.
54 Grandits, Gruber 1996.
salience of complex households was greatly reduced during the late nineteenth and the twentieth century, there could be interesting local variations. Under certain conditions populations would respond to demographic and economic transformations by increasing the size and the complexity of their households, mainly by the way of delaying or preventing the fission of the household upon the marriage of sons or the death of its head. Croatian historical demographer Nenad Vekarić, for example, found “an increase in the average number of household members” in the region of Dubrovnik in the nineteenth century. The detailed analysis of the village of Gruda showed that the mean household size increased from 9.69 in 1830 to 11.86 in 1880. 70 percent of all the households of this village, which was no exception, had six or more members, 35 percent even more than ten members in 1880. Vekarić explained increasing household size and the stability of joint families as an appropriate response to the increasing scarcity of land in times of fast population growth. Jasna Čapo Žmegač put forward a similar argument in her historical-demographic analysis of household forms on the estate of Cernik, Civil Slavonia, in the early nineteenth century. She explains the increase in the size and complexity of households in some villages of the estate as a response to economic crisis and population growth.

Research by followers of Kaser not only detailed his findings for the distribution of household types in Southeastern Europe but also qualified some of them. In Albania, for example, which had previously been considered an area where complex households were almost ubiquitous, Siegfried Gruber and Robert Pichler found significant regional differences. Based on the detailed analysis of the first census of Albania in 1918, the authors concluded that “the joint family system was predominant in rural Albania” but the frequency of complex households was very uneven. The authors differentiated four zones with decreasing household complexity.

They pointed to the existence of villages in which the majority of the population lived in nuclear families. Actually, the differences were striking: in the village with the lowest level of household complexity in their sample, almost 70 percent of households consisted of nuclear families, while the opposite extreme was a village where 50 percent of all households were classified as joint families, housing 70.4 percent of the village population. The research of the author of this article has rebutted another assumption of Kaser and others, that is, that mountain communities in Southeastern Europe tended to form complex households (see below).

One of the few recent works on family history by a historian in the region confirmed the high frequency of complex households in nineteenth century Serbia but nonetheless revised the assumption that households in Serbia were very large.

56 Ibid., 468.
59 Ibid., 355.
Aleksandra Vuletić carried out a detailed analysis of the 1863 census of Serbia. Unfortunately, she did not use the Laslett-Wall typology but instead tried to create a statistical category for the *zadruga*, which she differentiated from other forms of multiple household formations. In her view, a household with parents and one married son (that is, a stem family) did not constitute a *zadruga* and she also included in the category “simple families” (*inokosne porodice*) households that consisted of extended families. So, her classificatory scheme is idiosyncratic and does not correspond to the established models in family history. For the sake of comparability I re-calculated her numbers using the usual typology. Accordingly, in 1863 in rural Serbia, 50 percent of village households consisted of nuclear families, 19 percent of extended families and 27 percent of multiple family households. Average household size was 6.1 persons. The most frequent forms of multiple households were those in which one son with his family lived with his parents (9.9 percent of all households) and of two married brothers (9.7 percent). There was some regional variation: the share of nuclear families among all households ranged between 34 percent and 72 percent, with all but two districts being in a 40-to-60 percent range. A significant portion of the population lived in complex households: 40.3 percent lived in a multiple family household, 19.4 percent in an extended one, and 39.7 in a nuclear one.

Vuletić also provides statistical data on household compositions in the towns of Serbia in 1863 (alas, the primary data for Belgrade and Kragujevac, the two largest towns in Serbia at that time, had not been preserved). The average household size in the seven towns, for which household data is available, was between 2.4 and 4 persons. Extended families and multiple family households were much rarer in the towns. Nine percent of all urban households consisted of extended family households and five percent of multiple ones. Half of the households were nuclear families. The percentage of solitaries was very high as well, especially if compared to the villages (35 versus 4 percent). Hence, the household formation pattern in towns varied considerably from the rural one. The urban population consisted mainly of craftsmen, servants and apprentices, traders, and clerks.

The detailed calculations of household typologies in different regions of Southeastern Europe, thus, resulted in a demystification of the so-called *zadruga*. Household structures varied significantly between different regions. As has been shown also for other regions east of the so-called “Hajnal Line,” such as Hungary, there was no uniform household formation pattern in Southeastern (and for that matter, Eastern) Europe. Even in regions where household complexity was salient the majority of the households were not always complex. In some regions, there was a significant varia-

---

60 Vuletić 2002.
61 My calculations based on ibid., 39–52.
62 Ibid., 115–121.
63 On the diversity of household structures and formation patterns in Hungary see Andorka, Faragó 1983; Faragó 1986; Faragó 2000.
tion even on the local level. On the other hand, the application of the Laslett-Wall typology and the computing of household registers did unequivocally prove the existence and significance of complex households in Southeastern Europe, especially in its western parts.

Yet, even statistical evidence for the preponderance of simple households in large parts of Southeastern Europe does not necessarily imply that the joint family was not the dominant cultural model. Such data could also indicate that specific conditions, such as demographic constraints, might have made the achievement of an ideal impossible. Take for example the fact of high mortality, which decreased the likelihood of more than only a few children growing to adulthood and establishing their own families, and of grandparents seeing their grandchildren marry. Numbers as calculated from household listings and census results usually only give a snapshot of a particular time and do not depict the lifecycle of households and individuals. Even if complex households constituted only a minority of the households at a specific moment in time, it is theoretically still conceivable that in the life of most households, phases of complexity would appear, and that most people would live – for shorter or longer periods of their life – in joint families. The share of complex households can also be an indicator of the duration of complex phases in the household development cycle. It is, therefore, necessary to relate statistical evidence to findings about the cultural and legal norms underpinning the household formation process. The Croatian legal historian Valtazar Bogišić had noted already in the 1880s that the *zadruga* was mainly defined by its legal aspects (such as common property) and not by its composition: nuclear families could be *zadrugas* as well, if demographic constraints prevented the establishment of households containing two or more families.

Cultural ideas (and almost each society had a notion of how an ideal family should look) are not necessarily reflected in phenomena that can be counted. We need, therefore, to go beyond the structural-phenomenological level and try to understand the origins of household formation patterns in order to avoid two traps: either to lump together different household forms in one type because of the similarities in demographic appearance, or to overlook similar cultural models because they are manifested in different forms of households.

### Origins and determents of household complexity in the Balkans

In order to explain household formation patterns we need to consider the social, demographic, economic and political conditions as well as the cultural norms based on which people make decisions about their lives. These contexts are manifest in institutions (state, law, church, village, etc.) and shape the integration of families in the wider world. They also define the scope to which individuals and families

---

64 Hammel 1990.
65 Quoted in Čapo Žmegač 1996b: 378.
are owners of their own fate and can modify dominant patterns. One important question in this context is whether a certain culturally defined family norm can be established which families struggled to achieve. So, what are the reasons for the fact that complex households were so important in some parts of Southeastern Europe – and not in others?

Karl Kaser is the author who has devoted the single most effort to explaining the specific forms of household complexity in Southeastern Europe. He differentiates two basic models of household complexity; this is also why he suggests avoiding the term *zadruga* because it usually denoted two very different forms of joint family households. Kaser maps out a northern and a southern variant of complex households in Southeastern Europe. It is the latter one which attracts his prime interest because it constitutes the so-called “Balkan family household.”

The northern variant was typical for Civil Croatia and Slavonia and also parts of Hungary (to which the Kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia of course belonged to until 1918). Rural Dalmatia might also be added to this pattern. The tendency towards household complexity in these areas is explained by Kaser as a response to the land régime and the scarcity of land. Rural society in Civil Croatia and Slavonia and Hungary was characterized by a feudal land régime that officially lasted until 1848. Landlords had an interest to prevent household and property fission in order to maintain viable economic units that would work the land and provide sufficient labor. In his detailed analysis of life in the Croatian village of Lekenik, Hannes Grandits points out that the landlord restricted household division until the emancipation of the peasantry in 1848. Divisions of peasant households had to be approved by the landlord, who preferred undivided households because of their larger labor resources. Due to the practice of equal inheritance for sons in this region, household division would have automatically also led to property division endangering the economic viability of the farmstead. Kaser concludes that “The most practiced strategy to avoid the diminution of landed property through equal partible inheritance was to make the sons stay together so as to prevent fission.”

A connection between the (non-) availability of land and households being more complex was also established for parts of Hungary in the eighteenth and twentieth centuries. Similar constraints existed in Dalmatia, where the land régime was characterized by the so-called *colonat*, in which peasant families were usually sharecroppers dependent on urban landowners.

Under these conditions household complexity was not so much, if at all, the result of a certain cultural norm but of the combined effects of demographic pressures on land and interventions by landlords. The noted frequency of household complexity and of large households in late eighteenth and early nineteenth century

---

68 See Őri 2009.
Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia were, therefore, caused mainly by an increase in population growth under conditions of a rather inelastic agrarian economy. Landlords and families responded by delaying household fission. Complex households (as a pattern) were, thus, a relatively new phenomenon in these regions. It is indicative that after the official abolishment of peasants’ feudal obligations in the Habsburg Empire in 1848, a rapid process of household division was set in motion in Civil Croatia and Slavonia. Despite some toing and froing by the Croatian Sabor for the legal regulation of household division in the second half of the nineteenth century, simple households became the most frequent household form among the rural population. According to statistical data from 1895, only some 20 percent of all family households in Croatia and Slavonia were organized as complex ones, with the highest percentages in the areas of the former Military Border. The Military Border, which was finally abolished in 1881, had also been characterized by a high frequency of complex households. This was mainly the result of regulations by the military authorities that ruled the Military Border and who wanted to prevent the division of households because households were supposed to provide enough men as recruits for the army and to farm the land.

In most of the Ottoman Balkans, however, no such legal constraints existed because the Ottoman land régime typically did not know of a land-owning aristocracy that would interfere in the family life of its subjects. Hence, it was mainly common law traditions and potentially religious laws that provided the legal context for household formation. The Ottoman state had no interest in family matters and did not favor any particular family form (in contrast, for example, to the Habsburg authorities in the Military Border). Household form was, therefore, mainly the result of local traditions and contexts. For the zone of distribution of the “Balkan family household,” Karl Kaser established a set of culturally embedded norms which could create large complex households. The overarching concept is that of patriarchy as the underlying ideology which resulted in particular family forms and specific relations within the family and the society in general. This family ideology could be theoretically manifest in nuclear family households as well, but it found its most ‘natural’ expression in multiple households.

What were the concrete characteristics of the household formation pattern of the “Balkan family household”? Kaser summarizes them as “strong blood ties, blood ancestor worship, patrilineality, patrilocality, bride-price, blood feuds and patrilineal kinship structures.” These formation patterns did not necessarily lead to a dominance of complex households at a given moment but provided a strong cultural ideal and shaped the mentality of the affected communities. The cultural ideal was often realized only in particular phases of the household development cycle, which might

---

also include longer or shorter spells of a simple family make-up. Demographic con-
straints such as high mortality – especially of infants – did reduce the likelihood of
households growing very large and complex. Contingent reasons might also lead
to the break-up of households, for example, if they grew too large or were marred by
family conflict. Eugene Hammel, therefore, proposed the model of the “zadruga as
a process”, which under certain conditions would lead to large and complex house-
holds but not under all:

The zadruga, as a process, is a set of rules operating within certain constraints
that influence the rates at which persons are added to residential groups and
that control the maximum size of these groups by introducing pressures for
continued accretion or for division.73

Hammel insists – such as Bogišić almost a century earlier – on a qualitative defi-
nition of the zadruga in order to prevent an overestimation of temporal snapshots
as manifest in household registers. Size and composition alone do not qualify a
family as a zadruga. The formative principles and cultural values, and not necessa-
rily their results, are important. Stoianovich made a similar argument and stressed
the collective aspiration to “perdurability” as an important feature of the “Balkan
domestic family.”74 Scholars of complex households in the Balkans, therefore, want
to identify the family ideology which under ‘ideal’ conditions leads to large and
complex households.

Kaser stresses that in the “Balkan family household” women were totally subserv-
ient to the men, while the agnatic links between fathers and sons were of utmost
importance. Daughters married out, whereas sons brought their wives into the pa-
ternal home. Due to a very low age at first marriage and of universal marriage, such a
post-marital residence rule spurred the formation of complex households. Women
did not inherit property nor receive a dowry. The property of the household was
collective and not divided between each generation because the male members of
the household often continued to live together after the death of the head of the ho-
usehold. Kaser also stresses the connection between the “Balkan family household”
and a particular kin-ideology that was strongly patrilineal and descent oriented.
Only filiation constituted kinship. The birth of sons was, therefore, one of the most

72 See Hammel 1990.
74 Stoianovich 1992a: 141.
75 As for age at first marriage, the area of the zadruga indeed belongs to the region east of the so-
called “Hajnal Line.” Until the introduction of minimal ages for marriage by the new national
states in the Balkans in the 19th century, females and males appear to have married well before they
turned twenty; girls some years earlier than boys (Kaser 1995: 152). The empirical data, though,
is very sketchy because neither the Ottoman state nor the religious organizations kept detailed
records on this issue. Under the influence of the modern state, mean ages at first marriage grew to
more than 20 years for men and around 20 years for women in the late 19th and early 20th century
(see Todorova 1993: 39).
important functions of women in this family system. The male members of the household who all belonged to the same patrilineal kin group possessed a deep ancestral memory, often reaching back more than ten generations. This was important because one had to know his ancestors in order to know to whom one was related. Within the agnatic kin group marriage exogamy was practiced, hence women had to come from other kin groups. The significance of the agnatic line was expressed in ancestor worship: the celebration of the family’s ancestor (in Serbian the slava ritual) was one of the most important festivities in the annual cycle of a family. On that occasion the kin group came together and remembered the ancestral generations.76 Households in the distribution area of the “Balkan family household” were thus constitutive elements of larger patrilineal descent groups (tribes or patrilineages). This marked another significant difference to the northern zone in the spread of complex households in the Balkans, where the kin system tended to be bilinear.

So, how, why and when did this particular kinship and family organization emerge? In Kaser’s model the interrelated phenomena of the “Balkan family household” and the patrilineal kinship systems were institutions developed by pastoral societies as a response to particular historical conditions. Kaser also believes that they have a long tradition that can be traced back to antiquity.77 Large households, in the first place, corresponded to the labor needs of families engaged in (semi-) nomadic or transhumant sheep breeding with relatively large flocks. The more male members a household had, the more sheep and goats it could graze. Since population density in the Balkans was low until the nineteenth century and land for pasture was abundant, the size of flocks was not limited much by natural factors but depended mainly on the size of the household.

Apart from the economy, a second important determent of the “Balkan family household” was insecurity. This form of household organization was typical mainly in those regions of Southeastern Europe where insecurity was endemic and state power was weak. Montenegro and northern Albania, for example, were never deeply integrated into the Ottoman administrative machinery. Mobile pastoralist groups, on the other hand, had special security concerns since they moved with large flocks of animals between summer pastures in the mountains and winter pastures in the valleys or coastal lowlands. A good indicator for the connection between weak institutional penetration and household complexity is the fact that in the twentieth century, large complex households in Southeastern Europe were mainly found in the Albanian areas where the modern state had problems to establish itself. The power vacuum was filled by patrilineal groups, whose members cared for the safety of their families and for their property, and whose common law traditions had not

77 He developed his argument in two major books: Kaser 1992; Kaser 1995.
been replaced by state (or canonical) law. Since protecting family and flocks was a male thing, a strongly patriarchal culture emerged. According to Kaser and others, carrying weapons and embracing a heroic ethos became important elements of the male role model. The patrilineal descent group (tribe or patrilineage) was the most important social organization which structured social space and emotional attitudes. It acted as a corporative group with collective solidarity and responsibility. Any act against one of its members had to be avenged by the whole group, and the descent group of the perpetrator was held responsible. Hence the existence of blood-feuds in the western parts of the Balkans which could last generations and lead to the extinction of whole kin groups.78

In the absence of formalized institutes – such as those of the state, the church or landlords – it was up to the household to perform many important social, economic and cultural functions: production, consumption, protection of the family, cult of the house patron, jurisdiction, socialization, and biological reproduction. Property was held in common by the whole household; the ancestors were kept alive in memories; the continuation of the household and kin group was one of the most important goals in life. This required male offspring. The families, in particular their male members, therefore developed a very strong sense of communality and family spirit, which pitted one’s own group against an environment perceived as hostile (and often acting in such a way). Elaborate common law provisions defended the integrity and honor of the family and the patrilineage in the absence of any noteworthy state jurisdiction.79

In Kaser’s model, the “Balkan family household” and the patriarchal ideology on which it is predicated originated in the inaccessible Dinaric, Pindus and Epirus mountain regions. From there the model was transferred to adjacent hilly territories and lowlands by long lasting migratory movements.80 After the Ottoman occupation of Southeastern Europe, parts of the nomadic peoples came from the mountains and settled in the lowlands, where they were granted privileges by the new rulers. Other such migratory movements included the settlement of modern day Serbia in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by families from Montenegro and Herzegovina. Many families in Kosovo also trace their family history to the tribal areas of the northern Albanian and Montenegrin mountains. Kaser assumes that these settlers from the mountains brought their family ideology and household model to the lowlands. In this process Kaser also sees one of the explanations for the significance of complex households in the Habsburg Military Border: this depopulated area was also resettled by people from the patriarchal areas of the Ottoman Balkans. They brought with them their family model, which would thrive in the Military Border.

78 See Boehm 1984.
because the Habsburg authorities put severe restrictions on household division. So, imported cultural traditions conflated with the designs of an interventionist state.\(^{81}\)

To sum up: Kaser assumes that various migratory movements from the patriarchal mountain areas diffused the “Balkan family household” to the north and the east. In the process of adaptation to new geographic and political realities the model experienced changes but its basic features (patriarchy, patrilocality, patrilineal kinship organization, collective property, and delayed household fission) remained the same. This leads to a contradiction in his explanatory model because on the one hand he stresses functional aspects, on the other hand traditions. Why would people that moved from one context to another one with completely different socio-economic conditions maintain the same household formation pattern, which in the first place had emerged as a functional response to certain socio-economic and political circumstances? Another problem is the role of temporality because the model of the “Balkan family household” seems to be grounded in a *mentalité* that is hardly affected by changes throughout the centuries.

One important aspect of Kaser’s explanatory model is the assumption of the age of the phenomenon. This is in tune with the older literature about the *zadruga*, which portrayed this institution as the almost eternal family form of the South Slavs. Milovan Gavazzi, for example, pointed to documents from Dalmatia from the eleventh century, which allegedly suggested the existence of extended families.\(^{82}\) Eugene Hammel concluded from the analysis of three Serbian sources from the fourteenth century, which listed households on ecclesiastical estates that an extended family pattern existed even though in two of the listings, simple family households formed the overwhelming majority of all households. Hammel points to demographic constraints which often made impossible the realization of the ideal household form, which he assumed was a multiple one.\(^{83}\) Traian Stoianovich also claimed that the “domestic family” had pre-1500 foundations and was later spread over a larger territory.\(^{84}\) Kaser assumes an even more ancient pedigree of the patrilineal kinship and household organization: he sees an Illyrian cultural legacy which was preserved in the mountains of the Balkans after the Romans had left, especially by Vlach and Albanian nomads.\(^{85}\) Immigrating Slavs in the early medieval period, who settled in the mountains, presumably adopted this form of social organization and would spread it to the lowlands centuries later.

Maria Todorova provided a radically different explanation of the emergence of complex households in Southeastern Europe. She doubted that medieval or early Ottoman sources, such as those analyzed by Hammel, really indicated the

\(^{81}\) See Grandits 2002: 147–8.
\(^{82}\) Gavazzi 1982: 90.
\(^{83}\) Hammel 1975: 147.
\(^{84}\) Stoianovich 1990a: 122.
\(^{85}\) For a summary of the argument see Halpern, Kaser, and Wagner 1996: 428.
occurrence of extended family households of the *zadruga* type. Ottoman tax registers give only mediate information on household formation, and before the nineteenth century there are no ethnographic accounts on which a modern analysis could rest. Todorova, therefore, suggests an alternative explanation. She dates the emergence of the *zadruga* in the late eighteenth century, at least as far as western Bulgaria was concerned. This was a time when Ottoman state control had virtually collapsed and the empire was experiencing far-reaching decentralization. Large swaths of land were characterized by a high level of insecurity, as regional elites and renitent Janissaries fought for local control. One of the results of these developments was a renaissance in cattle breeding, as the population declined and fertile soil was deserted due to insecurity and the pressures of an increasingly self-assertive notable class. The *zadruga* may have been a response to these new conditions.

Todorova, however, stresses that the dearth of sources for the period before around 1800 does not allow an unequivocal answer to this question: “Instead, what is argued here is solely that this possibility has as many, if not more, valid points, than the generally accepted one [of the old age of the *zadruga* as an institution].” Yet, her hypothesis is buttressed by other evidence that links household complexity to insecurity and the dominance of mobile cattle breeding. The above quoted evidence from early nineteenth century Dalmatia and Civil Croatia also fits into this picture, showing a positive correlation between household complexity and crisis. The case study, which will follow, may help to further elucidate the relationship between household formation, political economy and social conditions.

Mountains, Shepherds, Households: the Rhodope Mountains in a Comparative Perspective

The Rhodope Mountains today form the border region between Bulgaria and Greece, the larger part being located in Bulgaria. Until 1885, the whole region belonged to the Ottoman Empire. In 1885 Bulgaria acquired the northern parts of this mountain region and in 1912-3 most of the rest. In 1919 Bulgaria lost the southern slopes of the Rhodope Mountains to Greece, together with its access to the Aegean Sea (Western Thrace). One major characteristic of the Rhodope Mountains is the fact that the region is populated by Muslims (Pomaks and Turks) and Christians (Bulgarians and Greeks). During Ottoman times as well as in the early post-Ottoman decades the majority of the population was Muslim.

---

87 On complex households in western Bulgaria see also Frolec 1967.
89 Pomaks speak a dialect of Bulgarian as their mother tongue.
When I set out to research household structures in the nineteenth century Rhodope Mountains, I expected to find large complex households as suggested by the existing literature. Bulgarian research on the family in this region also had pointed to the predominance of “large”, zadruga-like families in the past. The empirical reality was different, though. The analysis of household registers from the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first three decades of the twentieth century as well as the use of other demographic evidence deconstructed the notion of large families in this region. The mean household size in the analyzed villages was between four and six persons in the period under consideration (Table 1 in the appendix). There was no reliable evidence that household size was larger before that. As for household structure the analysis revealed significant differences between the Christian and Muslim populations in the region. Among the Christians, nuclear families clearly predominated, constituting up to 80 percent or more of all households in most of the investigated villages, while complex households (extended and multiple family households) accounted for at least 40 percent of all households among the Muslims (Table 2 and Table 3). More than three quarters of the Christian population lived in nuclear families at the time of the creation of the household listings. The majority of the Muslims tended to live in extended or multiple families. If the Orthodox population of the Rhodope Mountains is compared to the Orthodox one of Serbia at that time, the differences in household organization are striking: among the latter, complex households were much more widespread (Table 6).

Hence, in the Rhodope Mountains there were obviously two different household formation patterns at play. Yet, these two formation patterns interestingly resulted in households of similar size. This means that Muslim households did have longer phases of household complexity, thus showing higher frequencies of complex structures in the household listings, but they were obviously not led by the ideal or perdurability. They did not grow large, and complexity was usually limited to parents living with one married son, who after a while would leave the parental home as well. It is indicative for the absence of the “Balkan family household” in the Rhodope Mountains that households usually consisted only of primary kin of the head of the household, that is, his wife, siblings and children. Among the Christians, more than 90 percent of the population in the household listings were primary kin of the head of the household, and among the Muslims some 80 to over 90 percent. These are high rates for Southeastern Europe, where secondary kin usually occur

---

90 Makaveeva 1991.
91 My analysis of household structures in the Rhodope Mountains is based mainly on different household listings from the region. These were either produced by local priests or by the state after the integration of the region into Bulgaria. In these listings households were separately listed and the members of the household recorded in their relationship to the head of the household. The oldest register used is from the large Christian village of Široka Lăka from 1877. The data have been computed and calculated using the program SPSS.
More frequently, Muslim households were more likely to contain more than two generations; yet, also among the Muslim population the overwhelming majority of households comprised only two generations which means that most married men left their parental household at some time in their life cycle. (Chart 1 and Chart 2 in the appendix). Extensions were most likely to be vertical: a surviving parent with one of his married sons or a parent family with the family of one of the sons.

**Economy and Society in the Mountains**

The tendency towards small households in this region came as a surprise to me at first glance because the economy of the Rhodope Mountains in the nineteenth century was clearly dominated by agro-pastoralism, with a focus on sheep breeding. So, according to conventional wisdom, *zadruga*-like households were to be expected. Most households in the region – especially until the 1870s – were involved in large-scale sheep breeding of the transhumant type: sheep were grazed on mountain pastures in the summer and brought to coastal areas on the Aegean for winter pasturing, up to 100 kilometers away from the mountain villages. Contemporary reports speak of flocks of sometimes more than 10,000 sheep that were pastured in the mountains near to the shepherds’ domestic villages and brought to the coastal plains in the autumn, where they stayed until March or April. Conditions for transhumant sheep breeding were ideal, especially until 1878-1885: the whole mountain range was part of the Ottoman Empire, thus there were no borders limiting the movement of flocks and people (that began to change in 1878 and especially in 1885, when the northern parts of the mountains were acquired by Bulgaria). Summer and winter pastures were abundant, and the proximity to major urban centers (such as Salonika, Plovdiv and, of course, Constantinople) provided demand for meat, dairy products and wool to stimulate mountain sheep breeding.

These conditions, however, operated in different ways for the Muslim and the Christian mountain populations. As a result of the privileges Muslims had enjoyed in the Ottoman Empire for a long time, the Muslim mountain population on average owned more land than the Christian and could depend on a combination of pastoralism and agriculture, while among the Christian population the agricultural activities usually amounted to only horticulture. Christian families were usually forced to engage in money earning activities because they could not make a living by simply working their own land. Another important difference in the economic activities of the local Muslim and Christian populations concerned the ownership of sheep. Muslim households usually tended only their own sheep, whilst among the Christian village population many men worked as hired shepherds who grazed the

---

92 For more detailed data on households in the Rhodope see Brunnbauer 2002. Secondary kin are the primary kin of the primary kinsfolk of a person (without the latter’s primary kin, of course). The children of one’s brother, for example, are secondary kin to oneself.

93 See Brunnbauer 2004a; Brunnbauer 2004b.
flocks of either large landlords in the lowlands or of rich families in the mountains. Hence, there were two different patterns of transhumant sheep breeding in the Rhodope Mountains in the ‘long’ nineteenth century: one in which the shepherds were members of the families who owned the animals; another one with hired shepherds. The Christian population was also heavily involved in seasonal labor migration as a consequence of their limited access to arable land. In some villages of the Rhodope Mountains most males were occupied in itinerant craftsmanship (mainly as stonemasons). Other popular trades were tailoring and weaving. Seasonal labor migration became even more important in the late nineteenth century because large-scale sheep breeding began to decline for a variety of reasons. The professional structure of the mixed Christian-Muslim town of Čepelare at the turn of the century gives a good illustration of the religious division of labor: between 1893 and 1900, 95.2 percent of the Muslim bridegrooms were classified as farmers as opposed to 22.2 percent of the Christians. 22.2 percent of the latter were masons, 18.5 percent civil servants, 11.1 percent shepherds, and 7.4 percent tailors.

In the nineteenth century there was also another important occupation in this mountain range: proto-industrial cloth production. This started on a large-scale in the 1830s and was triggered by orders from the Ottoman state, which ordered cloth for the uniforms of its new European style army. The Rhodope Mountains became one of the most important producers of woolen cloth for the needs of the state but also for private consumers thanks to a combination of fortunate circumstances: first of all, the region produced the main resource for cloth, wool, on a large-scale. Secondly, there was under-utilized labor, in particular of women who were neither engaged in sheep breeding nor in seasonal labor migration. Women did work the land, but holdings of arable land were small and in the winter there was not much to do in terms of farming, the cattle (sheep and goats) being away and tended by the males of the village. So, female household members became employed in proto-industrial cloth production. Thirdly, the development of a well organized cloth putting-out system was facilitated by an entrepreneurial family of traders (the Gümuşgerdan family) from the nearby town of Plovdiv, which was a regional center of commerce and administration some thirty kilometers to the north of the mountains.

The economy of this mountain region in the nineteenth and early twentieth century was, therefore, integrated into larger networks of trade and commerce. The mountains were by no means isolated. The Christian population was especially exposed to the market because they depended to a large degree on the sale of their labor, while Muslim households reached a higher degree of self-sufficiency because they owned more arable land. Yet the Muslims had also been integrated in the proto-industrial cloth production and they marketed products of their sheep breeding. So, the Rhodope Mountains fit well in the general assumption that mountain

---

94 Seasonal labor migration was widespread in the 19th century Balkans, especially in mountain regions. See Palairet 1987.
populations in pre-industrial times had to engage in auxiliary, non-farming occupations because of the lack of arable land, and that mountain communities were often not self-sufficient.⁹⁵

Despite these differences in economic adaptation, household size was equally low for both Christians and Muslims. It was not necessary for the households to include many members for working the resource they owned. This was a marked difference to the mountains in the west of the Balkan Peninsula where the labor requirements of pastoralist production were one of the reasons for the emergence of large households. Kaser writes that “herding needed a certain amount of manpower that exceeded the capacity of a nuclear household.”⁹⁶ In the Rhodope Mountains, in contrast, part of the manpower employed in sheep breeding came from hired (Christian) shepherds, who owned only small flocks. Average Pomak households did not own very large flocks either and worked relatively small pieces of land, where they would grow rye, maize, potatoes, beans and other fruits. In the eastern parts of the mountain range many households also grew tobacco. Tobacco is labor intensive but gives very good yields per hectare so that an individual family can make some money. Among the Christian population a large part of the households depended mainly on income from itinerant crafts. Hence, they did not feel any pressure to adapt the size of their household to their natural resources.

Still, in the annual rhythm of pastoralist and other economic activities there were moments when households did require additional hands. Yet, these were not necessarily recruited on a kin-basis: ethnographic reports from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries describe a well structured pattern of reciprocal labor exchange amongst not only kin but also amongst unrelated neighbors and the whole village community.⁹⁷ Families helped each other in harvesting and building houses, and the village community often managed the summer dairy communally. The village community carried out other important responsibilities as well:⁹⁸ it mediated between the households and the state, it often owned communal mountain pastures, and it decided which parts of the land would be farmed and which would have to lay fallow. The Soviet ethnographer Ljudmilla Markova even found evidence from the nineteenth century that in some villages in the Rhodope Mountains the regular redistribution of land among the households was practiced (similar to pre-modern Russia).⁹⁹

---

⁹⁶ Kaser 2010: 139.
⁹⁷ Brunnbauer 2000.
⁹⁸ In 19th century Ottoman Empire villages gained administrative recognition; they were also often collectively responsible for the payment of taxes. Also after the establishment of the independent Bulgaria, villages remained an important social institution, although formal power was gradually shifted away to the central state.
⁹⁹ Markova 1963.
The significance of the village community in the Rhodope Mountains corresponds to the general assumption that the village community is of particular importance in mountain societies. There are many tasks in keeping the mountain environment inhabitable which exceed the possible efforts of individual families and, thus, require cooperation and coordination. The village community and dynamic kinship systems are generally more typical solutions to the problems of labor recruitment in a mountain environment than the relatively static unilinear descent groups. In a comparative study of human adaption in mountain habitats, David Guillet writes that “As one moves up from the intensive to the extensive production zones, there is increasing pressure on households to diversify production to reduce risk and to recruit reciprocal labor during peak periods.”

The village community was the most important social institution above the level of the household in the Rhodope Mountains and also in many other parts of Southeastern Europe outside the zone of tribal organization. The village coordinated the efforts of households, provided a dense network of shared responsibilities and reciprocity, and integrated families into a larger community. The local society was thus organized in a horizontal and territorial way, not in a vertical way in those regions of Southeastern Europe where descent groups provided the primary form of social organization. The salience of the village community is also evident by its efforts to prevent outsiders from buying land in the village and by the practice of village endogamy: people tried to marry within the village and if this proved impossible, for example because of religious exogamy rules, they preferred to take a partner from a neighboring village. A case in point is the small Christian village of Hvoina in the central part of the Rhodope Mountains, which was too small for people to marry solely within the village. Between 1894 and 1900 the parish registers recorded 64 marriages. Of the 128 partners involved, 121 came either from the village of Hvoina or its immediate neighboring villages but in only 56 percent of all marriages, both partners came from the same village. There were only two spouses from outside the region.

In the social environment of a strong village community there was no need for the formation of joint family households. The eminent family historian, Michael Mitterauer, stressed that such households were also a consequence of the fact that they were forced to carry out a variety of functions. In the Rhodope Mountains, many of these social, economic and cultural functions were in the responsibility

---

102 For the Bulgarian lands see Markova 1960.
103 A tendency towards village endogamy was typical for most of Ottoman and independent Bulgaria. See Todorova 1993: 52. People, with very few exceptions, only married within their religious community.
104 ODA Smoljan, f. 10k, op. 1, a.e. 1-7.
of the village, not the individual household. A similar nexus has been established by Traian Stoianovich: “The *domestic* family may compensate thus for the absence of large or numerous territorial communities.”  

The Rhodope Mountains — and most of the Bulgarian lands — are similar to the dominant Romanian pattern in this regard, despite the varying landownership patterns. Daniel Chirot stated that:  

> In Romania, the village as a whole was communal, not the extended family. Within the village, families were considerably smaller than in the *zadrugal* areas. The tradition was that sons, except for the youngest, left their father’s home at marriage (…) In other words, the Romanian communal village must be seen as a functional alternative to the *zadruga* and by its existence precluded the development of *zadrugas*.

The significance of the family was even lower for the craftsmen and artisans of the Rhodope Mountains. They were organized into guilds which provided material and emotional support. Guilds were organized on a purely professional basis and brought together members in different localities; they often had their own charters and collected membership fees. They were an important regulating force in the lives of their members and their families, and they connected the villages to the outside world. The social significance of the guilds is evident in the fact that they were often among the largest supporters of local schools and churches.

The territorial local social organization in the Rhodope Mountains, akin to the Romanian lands for example, was linked to the prevailing kinship system. As already mentioned, patrilineal kinship organizations — either as tribes or patrilineages — were the dominant model of social organization in the most of the mountainous western parts of Southeastern Europe. In the Rhodope Mountains as well as throughout most of the Bulgarian lands a mixed kinship system appears to have been the rule in the nineteenth century. There was a clear preference, at least ideologically, on the male line, as evident for example in naming patterns and the exclusion of women from inheritance. Yet the female line and affinal kinship links were important as well. Hence, kin was horizontally organized; there was no dominant descent ideology and therefore no ancestor worship. This is also evident in the Bulgarian kinship terminology, which for only some positions made a difference between paternal and maternal kin.

Widespread practices of establishing ‘artificial’ kinship, such as through blood-brotherhood, ‘milk kinship’, or voluntary sisterhood, led to a dynamic kinship system in which new relationships of trust and loyalty were created and existing ones reinforced.

So, why was local social organization and concomitantly household organization in the Rhodope Mountains so different from similar ecological milieus to the west?

---

106 Stoianovich 1992a: 143.  
108 For more on guild organizations in the Rhodopi Mountains see Brunnbauer 2004a.  
109 Georgieva, Moskova 1972.
of it? The single most important reason for the lack of patrilineal kin groups in the Rhodope Mountains was security. In the nineteenth century this region was relatively well integrated into the Ottoman state, which was also a precondition for it becoming a major provider of cloth, meat, and dairy products for the needs of the state and the market. The proximity to the imperial capital and other important cities was an important factor in this. For Ottoman standards, administrative and market penetration of the region was quite high, as evident by the fact that property transfers were often properly recorded and that the cloth producing households concluded written contracts with the wholesale traders. The absence of patrilineal kin groups made a joint family household pattern even more unlikely because in the area of the “Balkan family household”, the multiple households were essentially the smallest unit of a tribe or patrilineage.

This kinship system also improved the situation of women in comparison to the extreme patriarchy in regions such as Montenegro and Albania. In the Rhodope Mountains, the relatives of a woman were also a source of support for her family. The neolocal post-marital residence pattern among the Christians and the fact that most married Pomak men would establish their own household also facilitated the position of women: an adult woman was usually not subjected to the authority of men other than the one with whom she was married, in stark contrast to the “Balkan family household.” This is not to deny that family authority was also clearly patriarchal in the Rhodope Mountains but male domination did not take the same extreme forms as described for the tribal areas of Southeastern Europe; the absence of many men over long spells of the year was another reason for that.

**Muslim and Christian Household Formation Patterns**

The importance of the village community and the existence of a mixed kinship system which recognized affinal and matrilineal kin – though perhaps not conveying the same ideological importance to them – were characteristic for both the Christian and Muslim populations of the region. Nevertheless, the frequency of complex households was significantly different between the two communities, even if they lived in one and the same village. How can we explain this difference?

I argue that the main reason for the difference in household structure was the varying ages at first marriage, especially of males and closely related to this, the different patterns of post-marital residence and household fission. Christians married on average considerably later than Muslims, and Christian couples tended to form a new household upon marriage (or shortly thereafter), while Muslim newlyweds usually continued to live in the parental home of the bridegroom for a couple of years. According to ethnographic reports from the late nineteenth century, Pomak girls married at an age of between twelve and fifteen years, and Pomak boys
at between fifteen and eighteen years of age.\textsuperscript{110} Statistical evidence corroborates this assumption: the marriage records of the Pomak village of Vladikovo from the turn of the nineteenth to the twentieth century, for example, indicate an average age at first marriage of males at about eighteen years and of females at less than seventeen years.\textsuperscript{111} In the first decades of the twentieth century, age at first marriage also rose among the Pomaks because of minimum age requirements set by the Bulgarian state which gradually gained the administrative capacity to enforce its laws in the mountain villages as well. In the interwar period Muslim women in the Rhodope Mountains appear to have usually married at eighteen years of age, men at twenty two or twenty three (many men would first complete military service).\textsuperscript{112} Among the Christian population, age at first marriage was significantly higher especially for men. In the large village of Široka Lâka, for example, which in its economic and social outlook can be considered typical for a Christian village in the Rhodope Mountains, male average age at first marriage was around 27 years in the 1870s, when this region was still part of the Ottoman Empire.\textsuperscript{113} The evidence for other Christian villages in the second half of the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century point in the same direction: men tended to marry between twenty-five and thirty years of age, women at twenty or soon thereafter. Hence, the Muslim marriage pattern falls in line with Hajnal’s “East European” model for marriage behavior, while Christian marriage behavior is similar to the one west of the imaginary Hajnal Line.\textsuperscript{114} Common to both communities, though, was the practice of universal marriage, such as in the other parts of Southeastern Europe (Table 7).

The differences in age at first marriage are explained by different social expectations for the preconditions for a marriage: among the Christian population, males were expected to be able to establish a new household upon marriage. Hence, they needed to have a house and some property. Itinerant craftsmen and shepherds were also expected to have learnt their trade before marriage. The cultural household formation ideal was one of neolocality, which explains the high rate of nuclear family households. Neolocality could not always be realized but usually it was. Take for example the typical lifecycles of Christian men and women in the village of Široka Lâka: to live in a complex household became more likely only in old age while at the age of marriage most men and women typically lived in a simple family household (Graph 2 in the appendix). The chart in Graph 2 also indicates that some newlyweds did not immediately manage to form their own household but lived for a few months or a few years with the parents of the bridegroom.

\textsuperscript{110} Makaveeva 1991: 62; AEIM 72-III, p. 2; AEIM 84-III, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{111} ODA Smoljan, f. 376k, op. 1, a.e. 1.
\textsuperscript{112} For more detailed data see Brunnbauer 2004a: 348–57.
\textsuperscript{113} ODA Smoljan, f. 44k., op. 2, a.e. 7.
In contrast to the Christians, Muslims married much earlier. Their early marriage was most likely conditioned by two factors: first, there was no culturally embedded expectation as for the minimum property which the spouses had to possess when marrying. Since girls left their parents’ homes upon marriage, households had to compensate the loss of a helping hand by encouraging the early marriage of one of their sons, whose bride would then come into the house. Secondly, the early marriage of girls made it more likely that they married as virgins, which – according to accounts from that time – was extremely important to the local community. Also among the Christians, local morals expected brides to be sexually untouched when marrying, but they also seemed to have preferred a not-too-extreme age distance between the spouses. The goal of maximizing fertility by early marriage appears to have played a minor role, if at all, because demographic data from the nineteenth century suggest that natality among the Muslim population was lower than amongst the Christian one in the Rhodope Mountains.\textsuperscript{115} Muslim families may have also practiced various forms of traditional birth control, which are less demonized in Islam than in Christianity, in order to limit demographic expansion and to check property fragmentation. Such concerns were of less importance for the Christian population because they either depended on the income from seasonal labor migration or on sheep, and herds could relatively easily be increased due to the availability of pastureland.

Despite a patrivirilocal post-marital residence pattern, Muslim households would not remain complex throughout their developmental cycle. Rather there was a cyclical process of accretion and division, which can be illustrated by typical lifecourses (Graph 1): an individual would normally be born into a complex household, live in a complex constellation in the first years after his/her marriage, then again when one’s own children married, and finally in old age because one of the married sons (usually the youngest) would stay in his parental home. Most married men, though, would become head of their own household often before they even turned 30 years of age (Table 8 and Table 9). In the typical development cycle of Muslim households there were, thus, stages in a nuclear family’s composition. There is neither ethnographic nor statistical evidence, that the dominant cultural ideal of a family would have prescribed a different outcome. There is no indication, thus, that there was ‘zadruga as a process’ amongst the Muslims or, in other words, that the actual households were defective as measured against an abstract cultural ideal. Hence similar household sizes of Christians and Muslims despite differences in the formation patterns. It was mainly the timing of household fission and property transfer that were different: households usually divided upon marriage amongst the Christians, and after marriage or upon the death of the father amongst Muslims – but in both cases, households were divided in every generation. Married Muslim

\textsuperscript{115} Rodopa, 12:3 (1933).
men left the parental home some years after marriage and established their own households, which was not the result of any ‘deviation’ from a norm; i.e., this family practice was obviously what the people wanted to do.

It is important to note that household division did not mean an end to close cooperation between siblings. In their historical-anthropological study of two villages in South Tyrol, John Cole and Eric Wolf correlate the intensity of reciprocity and solidarity between brothers after household fission to the rule of equally divisible inheritance. This was also the case in the Rhodope villages: sons knew that each of them would inherit the same share of their father’s property and, therefore, had no reason to compete with each other. Cooperation between the families of siblings was also fostered by the fact that they usually lived close-by because their father had built their house near to his own one.

On a final note about the Rhodope Mountains I want to point to the fact that the inclusion of this region in the Bulgarian national state brought about the gradual destruction of the local, market-oriented economic activities. The mountains became isolated – which had not been the case in the nineteenth century. In the interwar period the Rhodope region was considered one of the least developed ones in Bulgaria. Ironically, the Christian population probably lost even more in economic status than the average Pomak household, because their traditional trades (transhumant large-scale sheep breeding and seasonal labor migration) almost completely disappeared after World War One. The Christian population experienced a process of re-agrarianization which was also made possible by the redistribution of land of the Muslim refugees who had left the region when it was annexed by Bulgaria in 1912-13. The economic transformation resulted in, amongst other things, problems in maintaining the practice of neolocality because young men and their fathers now lacked the means to build new houses. Under increasingly difficult economic conditions the capacity of supporting an independent household was greatly reduced. Such a nexus between the demise of non-farming economies and a tendency to prevent or delay household fission was also observed by Roxanne Caftanzoglou in the village of Syrrako in northern Greece. Jasna Čapo Žmegač showed that on the estate of Černik in Croatia the increase in household size and complexity in the early nineteenth century resulted from a decline of non-farming economic activities. In a sample from the small town of Čepelare in the central part of the Rhodope Mountains the percentage of multiple family households amongst the Christian population rose from 6.8 percent in 1880 to 12.9 percent in 1934 and the one of extended family households from 7.9 to 20.9 percent. Household size also grew slightly (Table 4). In other Christian villages as well, in which the population eked

---

116 Cole and Wolf 1974: 244.
out a living mainly by agriculture, complex households were more widespread and households larger than in the pastoralist and migrant villages of the mountains.\textsuperscript{120}

**Conclusions**

The detailed analysis of household structures in the Rhodope Mountains reveals the existence of alternative models of domestic organization in the mountain environments of Southeastern Europe. The Rhodope sheep herding families operated in a very similar ecological milieu like the populations of the Dinaric, the Epirus and Pindus Mountains in the western part of the Balkan Peninsula. It was what Karl Kaser called a milieu of “long distance”, that is, sheep (and goats) were moved over significant distances. In Kaser’s model, this economic-ecological milieu gave rise to patrilinear tribal organizations and joint family households.\textsuperscript{121} Not so in the Rhodope Mountains (and nor in the Carpathian Mountains for that matter, which had a similar economic profile): as my case study shows, transhumant sheep breeding could also be practiced in a social environment of small and relatively simple households. Hence, there is no causal link between ecotype and household organization because labor and society could be organized in different ways even when similar natural resources were exploited in similar ways. This assessment fits in historical anthropological research of the family in other mountain regions which “stress more the diversity than the homogeneity of the patterns and practices observed.”\textsuperscript{122} This is not to say that Michael Mitterauer’s suggestion of a link between ecotype and household organization can be easily dismissed.\textsuperscript{123} This is still a working hypothesis especially in cases where different ecotypes in a similar or identical political-legal setting are concerned. What I want to say is that under different political conditions, similar ecotypes can be linked to different family forms.

I argue that the major factor for this divergence was the patterns of the wider social organization and of the interaction of households with their social environment. Three institutions played a particular role in this connection: the state, the market, and the village. In the eastern parts of the Ottoman Balkans state penetration was significantly stronger than in the western parts of the peninsula. This led to a weakening of common law traditions and higher levels of security. The state provided services, such as a legal system, which it did not in the area of the “Balkan family household”. Closely related to security was the integration of the region into supra-regional networks of economic exchange. Marketed activities, such as large-scale sheep breeding or seasonal craftsmanship, created new dependencies but also resulted in

\textsuperscript{120} Brunnbauer 2004a: 457–9.

\textsuperscript{121} For a summary of his argument see Kaser 2010.

\textsuperscript{122} Mathieu 2010: 185.

\textsuperscript{123} Mitterauer 1986.
monetary income which would facilitate individualization and household division. It is indicative that this correlation can even be observed in northern Albania, a region which otherwise was characterized by tribes and complex households: Siegfried Gruber and Robert Pichler revealed an untypically large percentage of nuclear families (70 percent) in the village of Dikanca, where a large proportion of men worked as seasonal migrants.124

Another important factor impacting on household formation patterns was the forms of local, supra-household social organization. In the Rhodope Mountains, as well as more generally in the Bulgarian and Romanian lands, the village community functioned as a territorialized network of solidarity and reciprocity. The village community was a source of help, it organized households and mediated between the family and the state and other institutions; it also played an eminent role in economic decision making and often possessed communal lands which could be exploited by all households of the village. The village, thus, played a similar key role like patrilineal groups in the mountain regions in the western parts of Southeastern Europe.

The various patterns of social organization resulted in differences in household formation and interpersonal relations in the nineteenth century and beyond. On the one hand, the territory-oriented organization of the village community, together with relative safety, resulted in relatively small households, which were formed either as simple family households or developed into such over the development cycle of the household; on the other hand, the descent-oriented patrilineal tribal organization facilitated the formation of large and complex households. In the former pattern, the preeminent mechanism for the formation of new households was marriage; in the latter it was household division, whereas households would often not be divided in each generation and could, therefore, grow very large. The kinship system was different as well - bilineal vs. patrilineal – and the intensity of patriarchal domination differed accordingly. It is a good indicator for the difference in social organization that the practice of blood feuds was known in Southeastern Europe only in those areas where strong patrilineal descent groups dominated local social organization until they were dissolved by the modern state during the twentieth century. In the Rhodope Mountains, for example, the blood feud was unknown.

Household forms are, therefore, interdependent with other social institutions and the political economy of a society. Households cannot be explained in a holistic way by relating them solely to local cultural traditions and the endowment of a given locality with natural resources. This is particularly evident when powerful institutions interfere directly in the family lives of ‘ordinary people.’ Hence relatively large

124 Gruber and Pichler 2002: 355. However, the evidence for a relationship between seasonal labor migration and simple families is not unequivocal: Roxanne Caftanzoglou provides an opposite example in her case study of the village of Aristi in northern Greece, which was populated mainly by itinerant craftsmen and traders. Here, 25 percent of all households contained extended families and 32 percent joint families in 1905 (Caftanzoglou 1997: 414).
households in Civil Croatia and Slavonia and the Military Border in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, for example: until peasant liberation in 1848 and the final abolishment of the Military Border in 1881, feudal lords and military authorities, respectively, restricted household division. It was mainly these impositions and not a native cultural inclination, which created complex household structures. So, a strong state could also produce household complexity. In the Ottoman parts of Southeastern Europe, there were neither feudal lords nor a state that particularly cared about family forms, so it was other institutions that shaped household formation. The significant variety in political, legal and social-economic contexts in this region resulted in the noted heterogeneity of family forms in the ‘traditional’ rural societies of Southeastern Europe. It is noteworthy that such a variety existed despite important commonalities for household formation patterns across the region, such as universal marriage, divisible inheritance, the absence of servants, and the exclusion of women from property. Yet, under different contexts these common features resulted in different household formation patterns and structures.

The analysis of household structures in the Rhodope Mountains as well as in other regions in Southeastern Europe also shows the possibility of significant differences on the micro-regional level. This fact should warn against sweeping generalizations. It points to the necessity to reconstruct local milieus in all their varying shades. In one and the same region population groups occupying different positions in the social division of labor and/or having a different religious background could be affected by similar political-economic conditions and constraints in different ways. Or, to put it otherwise: they could adapt their designs for the family in different ways to a given framework of social action. The processes of political, social and economic change in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were also accommodated by families in different ways. Cultural norms and local contexts mediated large-scale forces in their impact on the family. Families were also participants in these processes not only by adjusting their strategies to a changing environment but also by changing – or reproducing – their social environment. The changes in household structures and demographic behavior as a reaction to socio-economic transformations were not one-directional, as the increase in household size in some cases shows. Yet, we still do not know enough about the dialectical relationship between social change and the family in Southeastern Europe. This should be the next major endeavor of family history in the region after the regional distribution of household types and their formative mechanisms have been established by the research efforts of the 1990s.

The research on the family in Southeastern Europe in the past, therefore, must look beyond the household and must not essentialize the household as a separate entity. The household is a useful analytical and heuristic category but we must be aware that much of what constitutes life is made-up of the links and actions

125 For household structures in the Military Border see Kaser 1995: 296–306.
between, beyond, and within the household. The popularity of the household as the major unit of analysis in family history is also due to the fact that it was the concept used by record-takers, and that we can run statistical methods over these records with the household as a category for calculations. Yet, when analyzing households, we must always interrogate our sources whether this entity is more than a mere statistical unit. What did the household mean in ‘real’ life? Households are neither a monolithic nor monadic entity; for a fuller understanding of the family in the past and present we therefore need to look into its manifold connections to other collectivities.

**SAŽETAK**

**Jedinstvo u raznolikosti? Povijesni oblici obitelji u jugoistočnoj Europi**

Autor smatra da se organizaciju kućanstva u povijesti jugoistočne Europe može razumjeti samo ako se oblike obitelji poveže s njihovim društenim okolišem i političkom ekonomijom. Značajna varijacija u obrascima oblikovanja kućanstava u jugoistočnoj Europi rezultat je jednako značajne varijacije u obrascima društvenog i političkog organiziranja. Članak započinje kritičkim osvrtom na raspravu o kompleksnom obliku kućanstva (tako zvanoj *zadruga*) u jugoistočnoj Europi. Ta rasprava, koja je bila posebno aktualna 1990-ih, nije rezultirala samo novim istraživanjima o povijesnim oblicima obitelji u jugoistočnoj Europi nego je razmatrala i poveznice specifičnih oblika obitelji sa širom europskom situacijom. Autor potom prezentira rezultate svojih istraživanja o oblicima obitelji i ekonomiji u devetnaestostoljetnim Rodopskim planinama, na prostoru današnje Bugarske.

U toj je planinskoj regiji kršćansko stanovništvo živjelo uglavnom u nuklearnim obiteljima, dok su među muslimanskim stanovništvom (Pomaci) česta bila kućanstva s više obitelji. Ipak, prosječna veličina njihovih kućanstava bila je također vrlo mala. Ponukan ovim nalazima autor se pita zbog čega je društvena organizacija u toj planinskoj regiji bila toliko očito različita od one u planinskim regijama zapadnog dijela Balkanskog poluostrva u kojem su dominirala velika, kompleksna kućanstva. Zaključuje da je razina integracije u državu i ekonomiju činila temeljnu razliku između dvije regije. Rodopske planine bile su u 19. stoljeću dobro integrirane u Osmansko Carstvo, a država je mogla osigurati sigurnost. Stoga lokalna populacija nije imala potrebu organizirati se u plemenata stevariti velika, kompleksna kućanstva za samoobranu. Populacija u Rodopskim planinama mogla se osloniti i na seosku zajednicu kao na teritorijaliziranu, usku mrežu recipročnih veza. Zaključno, autor odbacuje i kulturalno i ekološko objašnjenje za oblikovanje obitelji i naglašava važnost političkog i pravnog okvira.

**Ključne riječi:** oblici obitelji, organizacija domaćinstva, *zadruga*, jugoistočna Europa, Rodopske planine
References

Archival Sources

Archive of the Ethnographic Institute with Museum at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Sofia:
- AEIM 72-III
- AEIM 84-III

District State Archive of Smoljan (Bulgaria):
- ODA Smoljan, f. 8k, op. 1, a.e. 137
- ODA Smoljan, f. 10k, op. 1, a.e. 1-7.
- ODA Smoljan, f. 142k, op. 1, a.e. 4
- ODA Smoljan, f. 247k, op. 1, a.e. 25.
- ODA Smoljan, f. 376k, op. 1, a.e. 1.
- ODA Smoljan, f. 44k, op. 2, a.e. 7
- ODA Smoljan, f. 8k, op. 3, a.e. 1

Municipality of Čepalare (household listings, without serial numbers)
Municipality of Smiljan (household listings, without serial numbers)
Municipality of Trigrad (household listings, without serial numbers)

Publications


Halpern, Joel, Hannes Grandits 1999: “Traditional Value Patterns and the War in Ex-Yugoslavia”, *Beiträge zur historischen Sozialkunde. Special Issue: The Balkans. Traditional Patterns of Life*. Vienna, 32–44.


### Table 1: Mean household size in nine central Rhodopi villages, 1877–1935

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mean size</th>
<th>Median</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Široka lăka</td>
<td>1877</td>
<td>4.68</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stojkite</td>
<td>1880</td>
<td>4.79</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Čepelare</td>
<td>1880</td>
<td>4.58</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rupčos (district)</td>
<td>1880</td>
<td>5.13</td>
<td>4.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stojkite</td>
<td>1906/07</td>
<td>6.05</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arda</td>
<td>1913</td>
<td>4.43</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progled</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>5.27</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Čepelare</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>4.71</td>
<td>4.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bogutevo</td>
<td>1928</td>
<td>5.31</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arda</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>4.92</td>
<td>4.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barutica</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>4.62</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smiljan</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>4.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trigrad</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>6.38</td>
<td>6.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Čepelare</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>4.81</td>
<td>5.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progled</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>5.97</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: for Široka lăka: ODA Smoljan, f. 44k., op. 2, a.e. 7; for Stojkite: ODA Smoljan, f. 247k., op. 1, a.e. 25; for Čepelare: ODA Smoljan, f. 142k, op. 1, a.e. 4; for Arda: ODA Smoljan, f. 8k, op. 1, a.e. 137 (1913) and ODA Smoljan, f. 8k, op. 3, a.e. 1 (1934); for Bogutevo: Registär za naselenieto na s. Bogutevo za 1930-1935 god, kept in the municipality of Čepelare; for Trigrad: Registär za naselenieto ot s. Trigrad, kept in the municipality of Trigrad; for Barutica: ODA Smoljan, f. 8k, op. 3, a.e. 1; for Progled und Čepelare (1920 and 1934): Registär za graždanskoto sástojanie na s. Čepelare, kept in the municipality of Čepelare; for Smiljan: Registär za naselenieto na Smiljan, Peštera, Tekir, Marino, Doganovo i dr., kept in the municipality of Smiljan.
Table 2: Household structures of Orthodox Bulgarians and Muslim Pomaks (1877–1928)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household Type</th>
<th>Široka lăka (437 households)</th>
<th>Čepelare (89 households)</th>
<th>Arda (160 households)</th>
<th>Bogutevo (161 households)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Solitaries</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No-family households</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simple families</td>
<td>80.8</td>
<td>80.7</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>49.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extended families</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple families</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: for Široka lăka: ODA Smoljan f. 44k, op. 2, a.e. 7; for Čepelare ODA Smoljan f. 142k, op. 1, a.e. 4; for Arda: ODA Smoljan f 8k, op. 1, a.e. 137; for Bogutevo: Registăr za naselenieto na s. Bogutevo, kept in the municipality of Čepelare.

Table 3: Household structures of a religiously mixed village (Čepelare 1920)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household Type</th>
<th>Orthodox (61 households)</th>
<th>Muslim (37 households)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Solitaries</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simple families</td>
<td>82.0</td>
<td>48.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extended families</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple families</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Registăr za graždanskoto sostoianje na obština Čepelare, kept in the municipality of Čepelare.
### Table 4: Development of household structures in Čepelare (1880–1934)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household Type</th>
<th>Christians</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1880 (N = 89)</td>
<td>1920 (N = 61)</td>
<td>1934 (N = 62)</td>
<td>1920 (N = 37)</td>
<td>1934 (N = 41)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solitaries</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No-family households</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simple families</td>
<td>80.7</td>
<td>82.0</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extended families</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple families</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average household size</td>
<td>4.58</td>
<td>4.71</td>
<td>4.81</td>
<td>4.42</td>
<td>5.17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: ODA Smoljan, f. 142k, op. 1, a.e. 4; Registăr za graždansko sастojanie na SOU Čepelare, kept in the municipality of Čepelare.

### Table 5: Household typology of mountain communities in the Balkans, 19th and early 20th centuries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Syrakko*</th>
<th>Konaj#</th>
<th>Dikanca°</th>
<th>Montenegro&amp;</th>
<th>Široka lăka§</th>
<th>Arda§</th>
<th>Bansko+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Pindus</td>
<td>North Albania</td>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>Rhodopi</td>
<td>Pirin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>1898</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>c. 1860</td>
<td>1877</td>
<td>1913</td>
<td>1909</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faith</td>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Protestant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household type</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solitaries</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simple families</td>
<td>54.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extended families</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple families</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: ODA Smoljan, f. 142k, op. 1, a.e. 4; Registăr za graždansko sастojanie na SOU Čepelare, kept in the municipality of Čepelare.
Notes:
Main occupation of the (male) village population:
‡ Mainly transhumant agro-pastoralists. N = 42 households (Gruber/Pichler 2002).
§ Mainly seasonal migrant workers. N = 46 households (ibid.).
¶ Small-holders, combining agriculture and transhumant sheep breeding. N = 160 households (ibid.).
• Mainly traders and artisans. N = 68 households (ibid.).

Table 6: Household typology in the Rhodopi Mountains and in Serbia (second half of the 19th century)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household type</th>
<th>Široka lăka (1877) (437 households)</th>
<th>Orašac (1866) (125 households)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Solitaries</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No-family households</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simple families</td>
<td>80.8</td>
<td>35.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extended families</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple families</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>42.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: Percentages of unmarried persons by age group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>Široka lăka (1877)</th>
<th>Stojkite (1880)</th>
<th>Arda (1913)</th>
<th>Bogutevo (1928)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td></td>
<td>Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15–19</td>
<td>99.1</td>
<td>94.0</td>
<td>95.2</td>
<td>81.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20–24</td>
<td>92.6</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25–29</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45–49</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: as Table 2.
Table 8: Married men by status and age, part one

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Široka lăka (1877)</th>
<th>Čepelare (1880)</th>
<th>Bogutevo (1928)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age group</td>
<td>Married heads</td>
<td>Total of married men</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10–14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15–19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20–24</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25–29</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30–34</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35–39</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40–44</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45–49</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50–54</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55–59</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60–64</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65–69</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70–74</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75–79</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 80</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: as Table 2.

Table 9: Married man by status and age, part two

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arda (1934)</th>
<th>Čepelare (1920)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age group</td>
<td>Orthodox</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20–24</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25–29</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30–34</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35–39</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40–44</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

126 Tables 9 and 10 present the share of household heads among all married men in specific age cohorts. A percentage of 100 percent, for example, means that all married men are also head of a household. If the percentage is lower, then a certain number of men are already married but live in a household which is headed by another person.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>Arda (1934)</th>
<th>Čepelare (1920)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45–49</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50–54</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55–59</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60–64</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65–69</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70–74</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75–79</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 80</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: for Arda: ODA Smoljan, f. 8k, op. 3, a.e. 1; for Čepelare: Registăr za graždanskoto sąstojanie, kept in the municipality of Čepelare.
Graph 1: Life-courses of Pomak women and men by household type and age (Bogutevo, 1928)

Women

![Graph showing the life-course of Pomak women by household type and age.](image)

Men

![Graph showing the life-course of Pomak men by household type and age.](image)

Source: Registăr za naselenieto na s. Bogutevo, kept in the municipality of Čepelare.

Note: This graph shows the share (in percent) of persons in a specific age cohort who lived in a specific type (simple, extended or multiple). This graph allows tracing the changes of household constellation throughout a life cycle. To give an example: the graph for men shows that men aged 40–44 years are pretty likely to live in a simple family, whereas men aged 20-24 – that is the time of marriage – are likely to live in an extended or joint family because they probably stay in their parental household upon marriage.
Graph 2: Life-courses of Orthodox women and men by household type and age (Široka läka, 1877)

Women

![Graph of life-courses for Orthodox women by household type and age]

Men

![Graph of life-courses for Orthodox men by household type and age]

x = age cohort, y = per cent of population

Source: Široka läka: ODA Smoljan f. 44k, op. 2, a.e. 7.
**Chart 1:** Number of generations present in households, Široka laka (Orthodox, 1877)

Source: ODA Smoljan, f. 44k., op. 2, a.e. 7.

**Chart 2:** Number of generations present in households, Bogutevo (Muslim, 1928)

Source: Registär za naselenieto na s. Bogutevo za 1930-1935 god. kept in the municipality of Čepelare.