Mario Brdar
Josip Juraj Strossmayer University, Osijek


The bilingual volume under review is intended to present preliminary results of the ongoing research conducted within the project The problem of evidence in theoretical linguistics, coordinated by the Research Group for Theoretical Linguistics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences at the Universities of Debrecen, Szeged and Pécs. The introduction to the volume by the editors is followed by two parts with seven chapters altogether (out of which three are in German). The first part comprises four state-of-the-art papers concerned with theoretical and methodological issues, while the second part brings three case studies.

The introductory chapter acquaints the reader with the project and provides the necessary background. As pointed out by the editors, the issue of empiricalness is one of the most fundamental problems in linguistic research. One aspect of the issue that was in the focus of attention in the early stage of the debate concerns more or less abstract methodological issues, often without much regard for concrete data. More recently, the other aspect has come to the fore, viz. the study of the nature of linguistic data and evidence, in extreme cases almost completely removing methodological issues from its research agenda. The project whose initial results are presented in this volume aims to find a way of steering between the two extreme approaches by establishing a novel metatheoretical model of linguistic data and evidence, resting on the following premises: i. the structure of linguistic theories cannot be separated from the heuristic process of raising and solving problems; ii. linguistic theories are processes of plausible argumentation; iii. the distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification cannot be upheld; iv. the construction, the application and the testing of hypotheses are inseparably intertwined.

The paper by Kertész and Rákosi (Daten und Evidenz in linguistischen Theorien: Ein Forschungsüberblick) opens the first part by providing a meticulous analysis of the answers offered in the literature concerning the central questions constituting the data and evidence problem:

i. what types of data do linguistic theories use, and what types of data should
they use;
ii. what data do they consider as evidence, and what data should be considered as such;
iii. what functions do they attribute to the latter, and what function should evidence be attributed to?

All the approaches analyzed in the chapter turn out to exhibit two types of double-facedness of varying degrees. The first sense in which they are double-faced is that these models attempt to gloss over some apparent methodological prejudices concerning various aspects of the structure and function of data and evidence while yielding some important insights regarding them. The second type of double-facedness has to do with the fact that while, on the one hand, all these approaches declaratively acknowledge the necessity of metascientific reflection, they at the same time fail to realize the untenability of the standard view of the analytic philosophy of science which necessitates a search for an alternative metascientific perspective, one the other hand. The authors draw the conclusion that an adequate account of linguistic data and evidence calls for the elaboration of a new metascientific approach.

The same authors continue the state-of-the-art surveys in the twin chapters on conservatism vs. innovation, first in the context of the (un)grammaticality debate, and then in the discussion of data in the generative paradigm. The former debate was sparked by the publication of Sampson (2007), who claims that the concept of “ungrammatical” or “ill-formed” word-sequences is a delusion based on a false conception human language, and that there is no clear-cut dividing line between grammatical and ungrammatical structures. Sampson goes on to claim that corpus data, which are completely free of subjective factors, are the only acceptable type of data, in contrast with intuitive data (both introspective and experimental). What emerges from the comments and replies to Sampson concerns some sort of consensus: i. regarding i. the judgement that linguistic data are theory-dependent, diverse, subjective, unreliable and uncertain, and ii. regarding the need to combine different methods and data types originating in different sources. However, Kertész and Rákosi single out as the most important innovative insight of the debate is the notion of the cyclic argumentation process labelled as reflective equilibrium in the spirit of Goodman (1955). This is elaborated further in Kertész and Rákosi (2009), where they discuss the phenomenon in the context of cyclic and prismatic plausible argumentation (Rescher 1987). In the third chapter the authors ask similar questions about the debate started by article by Featherston (2007), in which grammaticality judgements are called into question from a different perspective: he pleads for the use of multiple informants and suggests that the binary notion of grammati-
cality be replaced by gradable judgements. Another novelty stemming from the debate that Kertész and Rákosi stress is reference to the non-linear relationship between data and theory.

The fourth paper in this part (*Die introspektiv-intuitive Datensammlung und ihre Alternativen in der konzeptuellen Metapherntheorie*) by Péter Csatár deals with the use of introspective method in cognitive semantics. The author considers the reliance of the Conceptual Metaphor Theory on native speakers’ metalinguistic intuitions as the sole source of data as problematic. Several remedies are suggested, e.g. Steen’s five-step model of metaphor analysis, or the corpus linguistic approach as in Stefanowitsch and Gries (2006). Csatár concludes that although intuition as the data source for the identification of metaphors is insufficient, it cannot, however, be dispensed with entirely and that the combination of different data collection techniques is in keeping with the interdisciplinary nature of metaphor research.

The case studies in the second part of the book have a three-fold function. In the first phase of the research project reported in the volume under review the task of preliminary case studies was to identify the aspects of linguistic data and evidence to be targeted by later elaboration of the model. Secondly, they are meant to provide the basis for the future development of the model. Finally, after the model is constructed, case studies provide the testing ground for the solutions to the data and evidence problem, pointing out the shortcomings and provide guidelines for the improvement of the model. One of the most conspicuous common threads in these case studies is that theoretical considerations have to be continuously confronted with methods of data collection and their role as evidence in particular studies.

The first chapter in this part is *Multiple data sources in semantics: A case study on mood choice in Hungarian complement clauses* by Enikő Tóth and Csilla Rákosi. The authors employ experimental data in examining Hungarian complement clauses where two morphologically identical moods, the subjunctive proper and/or the imperative may be used. It turns out that the authors’ conclusions inferred from an experiment could not have been obtained from introspective data alone.

Katalin Nagy C. considers some aspects of the data problem in historical pragmatics on the example of Catalan periphrastic perfective past. Specifically, she studies the grammaticalisation of the Catalan construction *anar* + infinitive as well as the role of implicature in semantic change. The author concludes that concludes that the data problem in historical pragmatics calls for a continuous broadening of sources, even including some non-traditional ones.
The volume is rounded off by Kertész and Rákosi’s case study (Daten und Argumentation in der Theorie der konzeptuellen Metaphern) which examines the factors determining whether the relationship between the data and the hypotheses of a given theory is based on fallacious or plausible argumentation. This is exemplified on Lakoff and Johnson’s Conceptual Metaphor Theory, which has been charged with circularity in connection with several aspects of the relation between the data and the hypotheses. It would be fatal for Conceptual Metaphor Theory if these charges were justified because circularity is one of the most serious objections that can be raised against a scientific approach. The authors first show that this issue cannot be resolved without a metatheoretical framework allowing for the definition of fallacies and the demarcation of fallacies from plausible argumentation. It is demonstrated that Conceptual Metaphor Theory is basically founded on a bidirectional, but not circular, relation between data and hypotheses. However, the authors have found that in the process of Lakoff and Johnson’s theory-making, besides the basically cyclic character of the argumentation, the retrospective revalidation of data has several aspects which indicate circularity rather than cyclicity.

To conclude, the volume under review is a balanced collection of insightfully written papers that has managed to push forward the frontiers of the empiricism debate. Most chapters have their own introductory and concluding sections where the main results are summed up, and there are also plenty of cross-references to other places in the volume. Authors carefully introduce previous relevant work and take the reader through the main arguments, but the book is admittedly not an easy read. This is, however, offset by the fact that it is rewardingly provocative, and can be recommended because it raises a cluster of fundamental questions that any conscientious linguist should reflect on before engaging in research.

References


