The purpose of the essays collected in the book *Morality and the Emotions*, as noted by its editor Carla Bagnoli, is to “reclaim emotions as a subject of investigation for moral philosophy” (27). Do emotions have any role in morality? And if they do, what is it? Many will be inclined to answer the first question affirmatively, but they will encounter serious difficulties in attempting to answer the second question. As soon as one examines the latter question in more detail, one realizes that the connection between emotions and morality is far more complex and puzzling than it might appear at first sight. There is a sense in which this connection is marked by various conflicts and problems that one cannot easily see how to resolve. For example, should one worry that placing emotions within the domain of morality can result in undermining its authority? Emotions are usually considered to be unstable, fleeting and unreliable mental states and it might seem doubtful that as such they can provide the firm ground for morality. This also becomes vivid when one considers the possibility of reconciling the partial nature of emotions with moral impartiality. And there are more specific questions one should try to answer when thinking about the role of the emotions in our ethical lives. What is the link between the emotions and moral responsibility? What is the role of the emotions in forming one’s moral identity? The book *Morality and the Emotions* addresses all these questions. It consists of three parts, and an excellent introduction written by the editor Carla Bagnoli. Bagnoli gives a useful overview of the whole field, providing the reader with the solid ground for further research of this important topic.

Part I opens up with the paper “Emotions and the Categorical Authority of Moral Reason”, in which Carla Bagnoli deals with the problem of the authority of morality. The authority of morality and its binding force is something that requires explanation. According to rationalism, the explanation is given by grounding morality in practical reason; morality provides reasons for action – reasons that apply to all rational agents. The trouble with this approach, it is often pointed out, is that it cannot explain the motivating force of morality. This feature of morality is nicely explained by sentimentalism – the view that, roughly speaking, grounds morality in emotions. But the sentimentalist approach faces the opposite problem. Since emotions represent the true source of motivation, the sentimentals can easily explain the fact that morality moves us to action, but they have difficulties in explaining the authority of morality. Bagnoli tries to reconcile the two approaches by appealing to the notion of respect. The two views are complementary, she argues, because respect is “the emotional attitude that is constitutive of rational agency” (75).

The attempt to find the middle ground between two seemingly conflicting conceptions – Aristotle’s rationalist account and the psychoanalytic approach – is also present in Edward Hartcourt’s paper “Self-love and Practical Rationality”. But this time it is not *respect* that is constitutive of rational agency, but the constitutive connection rather exists between practical rationality and *self-love* (93). In “Craving the Right: Emotions and Moral Reasons”, Patricia Greenspan tries to find the place for emotions in deontological
ethics, attributing them a role “that is compatible with both rationality and genuinely moral motivation” (41). Since the common feature of all these essays is the attempt to reconcile what might be thought to be conflicting philosophical views, it is hardly surprising that Part I closes with the topic dealing with the nature of compromises. In his clearly written essay “The Nature and Morality of Romantic Compromises”, Aaron Ben-Ze’ev suggests that the distinctive feature of compromises is that one sacrifices something that has value in order to get greater value in return. But if this “negative aspect” – sacrificing something one values – is a constitutive part of compromises, one could wonder whether this might affect one’s autonomy in romantic relationships. Unfortunately, Ben-Ze’ev does not deal with this question.

There are at least two ways in which one may approach the discussion about the relation between emotions and values. It is sometimes argued that emotions are like perceptions: it is exactly by means of emotions that we perceive values. In such way, emotions may play a very important role for us as moral agents. People who lack the particular emotions may not be able to perceive certain situations in moral light. They may not be able, in other words, to perceive certain features as morally relevant and that may greatly affect their general moral understanding. It is only when we have emotions of love or compassion, for example, that we may “see” the suffering and misfortune of others.

The problem about the relation between emotions and values, however, could be approached from another angle as well. Instead of being concerned with the question of whether emotions have perceptual role, one may be primarily interested in values themselves, and attempt to determine whether they can be analyzed in terms of emotions. The close link between values and emotions already emerges when we consider everyday concepts such as shameful and disgusting. At least at first glance, it just seems very hard to analyze these concepts without appealing to emotions of shame and disgust. In this way, emotions seem to provide basis for our evaluative judgements. These and many related issues are covered in Part II.

Although it is very hard to deny that certain evaluative concepts can be analyzed in terms of emotions, the problem emerges when one realizes that this analysis may take many different forms. Christine Tappolet’s paper “Values and Emotions: Neo-Sentimentalism’s Prospects” is concerned exactly with this problem. The core claim of neosentimentalism is that evaluative concepts are response-dependent: to say that $x$ is shameful, for example, is to say that the emotion of shame is an appropriate response to $x$. But what does it mean to say that the emotional response is appropriate? Tappolet argues that there are two ways in which the concept of appropriateness may be understood: it may either mean that the emotion is required (that one ought to feel shame as a response to $x$) or that the emotion corresponds to the independent states of affairs (that the emotion of shame is a correct response to $x$). Thus, Tappolet develops two different arguments in order to show that the descriptive version of neo-sentimentalism is to be favoured over its normative version.

But is our emotion of shame itself a reason to judge that $x$ is shameful? Those who answer this question affirmatively often bring our attention to the similarities between emotions and perceptual experiences – just like we often appeal to our perceptual experiences in order to justify our empirical beliefs, we often appeal to our emotional experiences in order to justify our evaluative beliefs. In his “Emotions, Perceptions, and Reasons”, Michael S. Brady raises doubts about this “perceptual model” of emotions by highlighting the crucial differences that exist between emotions and perceptions. It is not my emotion of shame, Brady argues, that gives me a reason to judge that $x$ is shameful, but rather the feature of $x$
to which my emotion of shame is a response.

This is not to say that there is no way in which emotions can provide justification of our moral judgements. As Paul Thagard and Tracy Finn argue in their paper “Conscience: What is Moral Intuition?” denying the role of emotions in forming moral judgements would be equivalent to denying the epistemic role of moral intuitions. This is because moral intuitions “are inherently emotional” (163). The evidence for this claim the authors find in the neural theory of emotional consciousness according to which “emotions are both cognitive appraisals and somatic perceptions, performed simultaneously by interacting brain areas” (151). It is exactly because these two components that we may often rely on our moral intuitions as good evidence for the appropriateness of our moral judgements. In contrast to Thagard and Finn, Blum’s paper “Empathy and Empirical Psychology: A Critique of Shaun Nichols’s Neo-Sentimentalism” aims to show that approaching the study of emotions from the perspective of experimental philosophy may not always bring the best results. Thus Blum points out that empirical psychology does not capture the true nature of the emotion of empathy, and suggests that the reason for this failure presumably lies in ignoring the long tradition of philosophical moral psychology, which can still significantly contribute to our understanding of moral emotions.

And the existence of moral emotions is another reason for thinking that there is a very close connection between morality and the emotions. Even though there is no exact classification of moral as opposed to non-moral emotions, it is commonly thought that emotions such as resentment, guilt, remorse, shame etc. fall into the former category. The question of what makes a particular emotion a moral emotion is also not easy to answer, but it would not be far from the truth to say that the explanation of their existence involves appealing to one’s personal moral outlook or moral system to which one belongs. Most essays included in Part III analyze the nature of moral emotions from different perspectives and question the extent to which they can contribute to our understanding of various moral issues.

As P. F. Strawson has famously argued in his “Freedom and Resentment”, attributing moral responsibility crucially depends on reactive attitudes such as resentment, guilt and indignation. Strawson’s argument is the central theme of John Deigh and Bennett W. Helm’s contributions to the volume. While both authors examine Strawson’s proposal in relation to the account of reactive attitudes given by R. Jay Wallace and Stephen Darwall, they reach somewhat different conclusions. John Deigh’s primary aim is to show that Wallace and Darwall go wrong in assuming that reactive attitudes involve beliefs about reasons and are thus essentially concerned with rational agents. Reactive attitudes should not be understood in terms of human rationality but rather in terms of “human sociability” (213). Helm, on the other hand, thinks that there is at least one aspect of Wallace’s suggestion that should be preserved – that our reactive attitudes occur as a response to a failure to live up to certain expectations and demands.

Since Wallace starts from the presumption that reactive attitudes are those that occur when moral expectations are violated, his list of basic reactive attitudes considerably differs from the one proposed by Strawson. Wallace’s understanding of reactive attitudes makes him think that only the negative emotions (i.e. anger, guilt) are important for attributing moral responsibility. In “Moral Sentiment and the Sources of Moral Identity” Jacqueline Taylor argues that this approach should be abandoned because it makes us lose sight of the role that the positive emotions play in morality. There is a very good reason why sentimentalists of the eighteenth century emphasized their importance: it is because the positive emotions “are crucial sources of moral identity and agency” (257). The importance of the emotions in
forming one’s moral identity is also the focus of Talbot Brewer’s “On Alienated Emotions”.

Instead of focusing on moral emotions as such, in her paper “Guilty Thoughts”, Angela M. Smith focuses particularly on the emotion of guilt. It is rational to feel the emotion of guilt if one performed the action she ought not to have performed. But how to account for cases when a person feels guilty because of the mere fact that she has certain thoughts or emotions? If these thoughts and emotions are not expressed, then why do people feel guilty just having them? In dealing with this question, Smith firstly confronts and dismisses three objections to the thesis that people should be deemed responsible for their inner feelings. After having established that there are cases in which such feelings of guilt could be rational, Smith rejects two possible explanations of this phenomenon – the virtue-ethical response and the consequentialist response. According to Smith, the solution to the puzzle lies in the acceptance of a contractualist moral theory proposed by T. M. Scanlon.

Although the problem of emotions is often discussed in current philosophical literature, the question of the role of emotions in morality is still not given the attention it deserves. In this regard, this question lingers on the margins of current discussions, even the most influential ones in the field of the philosophy of emotions. This is why the book *Morality and the Emotions* is a valuable contribution and a good starting point for professionals working in this area.