The European Union Training Mission in Mali: A case study

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Abstract

For several years, the European Union (EU) has been increasing its international presence and moving into the role of a global security actor. To support the goal of greater crisis management capabilities, European security integration (ESI) has been deepening. This article therefore examines an EU operation — the European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali) — with the aim of gauging the success of the EU’s efforts at ESI. To determine the success of EUTM Mali and thus of ESI, three propositions are examined: if EUTM Mali is a security operation showing successful security integration, there will be evidence of (i) broad participation, (ii) financial burden-sharing and (iii) the successful incorporation of troops and equipment. The first and third propositions are supported whereas the second does not receive as much support. Overall, EUTM Mali shows considerable success and bodes well for further ESI.

KEY WORDS:
European Union, EUTM Mali, security, integration
Introduction

Over the past few decades, the European Union (EU) has progressed from an organization based on limited economic cooperation towards a more fully realized state of political integration. One aspect of this increased interdependence is European security integration (ESI), the integration of the security policies of the EU in terms of both the policies common to the EU and those of the member states. Despite differences of opinion among certain member states as to the wisdom of such action, the EU has been moving steadily in the direction of becoming a global security actor. After the Helsinki Summit of 1999, it was acknowledged that the EU should begin to develop a more unified security presence – although limited European capabilities meant that US and NATO dominance were not to be challenged (Die Zeit 2000). To this end, the EU has developed a common security policy, common defence organs and cooperative military forces. As Europe has grown stronger, as well as more deeply and broadly integrated, security integration in particular has been made a priority. Javier Solana, the first High Representative for EU foreign policy, advocated a stronger EU role, saying “the European Union is, like it or not, a global actor; it should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security” (Solana 2003: 2). The Berlin-Plus Agreement of 2003 granted the EU conditional access to NATO’s crisis management capabilities, aiding the EU in beginning to conduct its own international crisis management operations (European Council 2003; European External Action Service (EEAS) 2011).

The integration prompted by this shared belief has been augmented by the onset and continuation of the current global economic downturn. With European defence spending on the decline, the need to spend more effectively is growing, not least because it is becoming increasingly untenable for states to field a comprehensive military force (Giegerich and Nicoll 2012; Menon 2011). As the EU remains committed to maintaining an international security presence, particularly in crisis management operations, and one goal of ESI has been to improve the EU’s performance in such operations, the success of ESI can reasonably be measured by the success of its performance in a crisis
management operation. Other relevant measures include the efficacy of EU security institutions, such as the European Defence Agency, and the acceptance of ESI by EU member states. However, these measures, although they would certainly provide valuable insights, are outside the scope of this article.

The method of inquiry used in this paper is a structured, focused case study in the tradition of Alexander George. Based on George’s (1979) standards for case study research, a series of general questions are proposed which focus on the effects of ESI on the EU’s most recent crisis management operation, allowing a relatively standardized and objective assessment of its success. Andrew Bennett (2008) affirms George’s view of the case study as a valuable and scientific method of research for theory development and policy applications, inter alia. Drawing also on Robert Yin’s (2003) work, the case study approach is considered appropriate because the event studied is contemporary, no control can be exerted by the researcher and the context is crucial – EUTM Mali is ongoing and situated within the larger context of ESI. It is also appropriate because it facilitates the development of theory through relating the data to propositions and seeks to be helpful in determining if the object of study actually relates to the observed outcome (Bennett 2008; George 1979; Yin 2003). In this case, the theory to be examined concerns the longstanding and ongoing debate between supranational and intergovernmental forces in the EU. Supranationalism entails national governments sharing power with transnational institutions legally and normatively. A supranational entity takes on many functions of the traditional state, supersedes national laws when the two conflict and has a shared set of values (Ruszkowski 2006). Intergovernmentalism is quite the opposite: the supremacy of national privilege over a supranational entity. International organizations are to be dependent on the will of national governments. In a more recent variant, liberal intergovernmentalism, domestic factors influence a state’s perception of the benefits of integration and thus its willingness to engage in integration (Moravcsik 1993, 1995).

The EU Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali) is a useful candidate for study as it is the second most recent operation, having been initiated in February 2013, and incorporates elements of EU military and civilian
participation. The recent and ongoing nature of the mission provides ample opportunity for novel study. Also, it is the most up-to-date example of ESI for which sufficient data for study are available. The dual military and civilian aspects provide the opportunity to study European participation in a more comprehensive manner than in other instances.

**Background**

EUTM Mali is hardly the EU’s first effort at crisis management; between the adoption of the European Security Strategy and the Berlin-Plus Agreement in 2003 and mid-2012, the EU has initiated 24 civilian, military, or comprehensive operations under the auspices of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Over the course of 2013, the total increased to 30 operations; 13 have been completed and 17 are ongoing, while one additional operation began in 2014. The Security Strategy highlights the importance of effective crisis management as a crucial aspect of the EU’s collective identity, as well as emphasizing the need to combine civilian and military elements of peacekeeping. Prior to 2003, any military undertakings were carried out by the Western European Union (WEU), an organization separate from and smaller than the EU. In 1999–2000, the WEU’s crisis management responsibilities were transferred to the EU and the entire organization was eventually disbanded after its functions were gradually taken over by the EU (Council of the European Union 2009; EEAS 2013a; Hynek 2011; Jacobs 2012; Muratore 2010).

Operation Concordia in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was the first EU-led military mission, launched in March 2003. The EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, launched in January 2003, was the first civilian mission under the Common Security and Defence Policy, previously the European Security and Defence Policy. Operation Artemis (June 2003) in the Congo was the first out-of-area military operation, as well as the first operation completely independent of NATO. Many of the EU’s missions have complemented the efforts of other international organizations.
As for the success of those earlier operations, in 2009, High Representative Javier Solana remarked that although the EU had made significant progress, “Our ambitions are growing, not diminishing. However, there is a gap between our ambitions and the reality of our capabilities” (Solana 2009: 2). At the same time, the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Carl Bildt, praised the success of civilian rule-of-law missions in improving state-building (Council of the European Union 2009). A 2010 RAND study identifies an impressive increase in EU civilian missions since 2003, but cautions that the bulk of these have been small and of an advisory nature. The EU has also favoured police missions, especially in the Balkans, focusing on strengthening the rule of law in countries where it is weak or absent. A few later missions, notably those to Afghanistan and Kosovo, have been more ambitious; EUPOL Afghanistan involved 19 EU member states and substantial development aid. Initial logistical and technical problems were largely overcome, although understaffing has been a consistent issue. EULEX Kosovo met with more success, although internal divisions over Kosovo’s independence have created problems. In 2009, 26 member states were participating, with several large contributors (Chivvis 2010).

The general trend of early African engagements in particular seems to be moderate success tempered by setbacks. Operation Artemis in 2003 involved 14 EU member states, with a large French contribution, and fulfilled its mandate. It was, however, only three months in duration. Later missions encountered coordination issues both within the EU structure and with outside entities, although they also managed to produce some achievements and in most cases fulfilled their mandates. For example, EUFOR DR Congo in 2006 involved 21 member states and fulfilled its mandate, although interactions with the UN force were largely uncoordinated and the German command of the operational headquarters put several limitations on the EU forces. Communication problems were still seen in the 2008–2010 EU SSR Guinea-Bissau operation, together with understaffing (Revelas 2013). On the other hand, the EU Naval Force operation ATALANTA, initiated in 2008 with a mandate to deter and prevent piracy in the Gulf of Aden and to protect ships, particularly those of the World Food Program and the African Union Mission in Somalia, has met with some success. A decrease in successful attacks by pirates and numerous rescue missions are among the operation’s
achievements (EU NAVFOR 2014), although it has been unable to rid the Gulf of piracy entirely. Originally intended to last one year, the mandate has been extended twice to increase not only the time frame but also the area of operations. The creation of the Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa (MC-HOA) and the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC), among other initiatives, has resulted in a reduction of successful hijacking attempts in the IRTC and among ships following MC-HOA’s best practice guidelines. There are other organizations working in the area, including two NATO operations over the course of the EU operation, which makes it difficult to assign success to the EU. However, it has been noted that many of the more successful initiatives in the area have been EU-led (Muratore 2010).

By all rights, if the EU has been experiencing successful security integration, EUTM Mali should show distinct signs of that integration. The following propositions are developed to clarify and organize the quantifiable aspects of integration:

**P₁:** If EUTM Mali is an EU security operation showing successful European security integration, then broad participation by member states should be evident.

**P₁₀:** A majority of EU member states participate.

**P₁₀:** Tasks are distributed relatively evenly among contributing states, including both troop and equipment contributions and between the necessary functions.

**P₃:** If EUTM Mali is an EU security operation showing successful European security integration, financial burden sharing should be evident, with a good part of the funding coming from the EU collectively, and a civilian aspect should be present during, following, or concurrent with the training mission.

**P₃:** If EUTM Mali is an EU security operation showing successful European security integration, the successful incorporation of troops and equipment from different member states will be evident.
To examine this crisis management operation, a short background on both the Malian conflict and French and EU intervention is given to provide the necessary historical context, followed by information on the level of participation, funding, nature and interoperability of the mission. The vast majority of the sources used are journalistic, with a few academic and governmental sources. The reliance on journalistic sources should not be a hindrance given the nature of the inquiry, particularly as at least one of the journals used is exclusively concerned with the affairs of the EU. The necessary information is presented and supplemented with government information, reports, statements and a very few academic papers.

Conflict and Mission Background

The conflict in Mali has been ongoing since January 2012, although the Tuareg people have been in near constant conflict with the Malian government since Mali gained its independence in 1960, with more recent events in the early 1990s and the period 2007–2009, so it is useful to examine the more recent events leading up to intervention. The Tuareg are a nomadic people living in the northern areas of Mali and have developed a culture that is somewhat divergent from the wider culture of the entire state. In the 1990s, the Tuareg began a rebellion for the purpose of gaining territorial and cultural autonomy. The conflict was exacerbated by the 2011 revolution in Libya, when an influx of arms and an increasingly chaotic situation created an opening for the regional al-Qaeda group, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), to move into Tuareg land. After a military coup in March 2012, which ousted President Toure before appointing civilian interim President Traore in April, AQIM and the main rebel group, the National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA), joined forces and established harsh military law in the north. After only a few months, the AQIM turned on the MNLA and began to move south towards the capital, Bamako. When they reached Konna, a city in relatively close proximity to the capital, the Malian government asked for French intervention, which
they quickly received in the form of Operation Serval. This included French helicopter raids on terrorist cells and the provision of French soldiers to guard the capital city. France’s intervention, which received UNSC support and was justified by French President François Hollande under Article 51 of the UN Charter (providing a “natural right” of defence should a member state come under armed attack), was intended to provide support until an Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) contingent could be deployed, which was considered too far in the future to be safely relied upon (Alexander 2013; BBC News 2013a; Le Monde 2013).

In June 2013, a deal was brokered between the government and the MNLA after weeks of negotiation facilitated by the President of Burkina Faso. The deal called for a ceasefire and for government troops to reclaim some rebel territory taken from the Islamists after the French intervention in February. It paved the way for the July 2013 presidential election, one held up as legitimate, even “credible and transparent” by the EU and the UN (BBC News 2013b; Deutsche Welle 2013a; UN News Centre 2013). Periodic violence has continued into 2014; despite clashes between northern Malian rebels and Malian troops, rebels and the elected Malian government participated in a ceasefire in May 2014 and peace talks in June and July 2014 (Markey 2014; Penney 2014).

The timeline of EU intervention is slightly more reactionary. Prompted by the French intervention almost a week earlier, on 17 January 2013 approval was granted for EUTM Mali by EU Foreign Ministers in an emergency meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC), creating a legal basis for the mission. The launch of operations required a separate legal act that was agreed for the next month (Vaudin d’Imécourt 2013). Citing UNSC Resolutions 2071 and 2085, as well as the Malian authorities’ direct appeal to the EU, the FAC not only established EUTM Mali, but also named French General François Lecointre the Mission Commander. They invited Lecointre to accelerate the existing preparations, in place since December 2012, with an eye to launching the training mission in mid-February at the latest and to send a technical team to Bamako within a few days. The FAC decision also covered financial assistance to Mali, restating a willingness to resume development cooperation that had been suspended in 2012 after the coup and supporting an
immediate increase in assisting the humanitarian organizations in Mali and its neighbours (Council Decision 2013/34 2013; Council of the European Union 2013a).

The launch of EUTM Mali was decided a month later on 18 February 2013 with the intention of beginning the operation in March. Headquarters were established just northeast of Bamako and a cap of 200 instructors plus support staff and protection forces for the instructors and staff brought the initial total to around 500 EU personnel with a 15 month mandate (Fiorenza 2013a). The Council Decision to launch the EU military mission approved the Mission Plan and Rules of Engagement presented in the proposal from High Representative Catherine Ashton and officially authorized Mission Commander General François Lecointre to begin execution of the mission. Although formal approval was granted on 18 February, the first experts were already working in Bamako, Lecointre having previously been asked to send the first technical team to Bamako on 20 January 2013 (Council Decision 2013/87 2013; Radio France Internationale 2013; Vaudin d’Imécourt 2013). The FAC decision was passed without any debate, thus concluding the protracted process of creating an EU crisis management operation ahead of schedule. Approval covered the approximately 500 European soldiers who participated in the operation and placed the mission under French command with an initial budget of around €12 million and a goal at the outset of training 650 Malian soldiers. Both of these estimates were later increased.

When the 200 EU instructors arrived in Koulikoro on 2 April, ready to train the first battalion of 670 soldiers out of an expected number in excess of 3,000, the peak number of EU troops was to be 550. Of these 150 were allocated to be a protection force. Although 16 states initially announced a desire to participate and a few followed through in the beginning months, only a very few of those states were prepared to shoulder the more risky task of securing instruction sites. Excluding the French, who had already demonstrated their willingness to participate in every way, many other member states offered political or logistical support, preferring not to assist militarily (Africa News 2013; Glaudot 2013; Radio France Internationale 2013; Speak 2013).
As the expiration of the initial mandate neared, EUTM Mali was extended by the Council of the EU for two years. On 15 April 2014, the completion date of the mission was moved to 18 May 2016. The additional common cost to EU members of extending the mandate is expected to total around €27.7 million (Council of the European Union 2014).

The legitimacy of the mission stemmed from two separate sources, each holding significant diplomatic weight; the UNSC produced several resolutions concerning Mali, the two most relevant being UNSCR 2085 and UNSCR 2071. The Malian government also requested assistance from both the EU and France specifically. UN Security Council Resolution 2085 was passed on 20 December 2012 and authorized the deployment of an African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) for an initial period of one year, to be executed in coordination with international partners, at one point referring directly to the planning of an EU mission. UN Security Council Resolution 2071 called on UN member states, regional and international organizations, including another direct mention of the EU plan, to “provide as soon as possible coordinated assistance, expertise, training, and capacity-building support to the Armed and Security Forces of Mali” (UN Security Council 2012a: 4). The goal of this assistance was to restore the Malian government’s authority and thus to preserve the state’s territorial integrity by reducing the threat from AQIM and its ilk (UN Security Council 2012a). Part of authorizing AFISMA included working closely to “contribute to the rebuilding of the capacity of the Malian Defence and Security Forces” with the EU (UN Security Council 2012b). As for Mali’s request, on 11 January 2013 when Malian interim president Dioncounda Traore declared a state of emergency, French President François Hollande responded to Traore’s appeal for French help in stopping the advance of Islamic rebels towards the capital city (Al Jazeera 2013).

Public justifications for EU participation and for the earlier French participation were based on similar rationales. President Hollande justified his country’s intervention on 11 January by stating that the rebels were attempting to “deal a fatal blow” to Mali and “France, like its African partners and the entire international community, cannot accept that” (Al Jazeera 2013). EU High Representative Catherine
Ashton echoed Hollande’s reasoning, citing the intentions of terrorists in northern Mali to destabilize the government along with several other related reasons for the Union’s involvement, among them the human rights abuses committed by terrorists and the threat to neighbouring countries and the EU itself, saying “they have taken many hostages, a lot of them originating from European Member States. We cannot be indifferent” (Ashton 2013).

Examination of Propositions

In terms of proposition 1, concerning EU participation in EUTM Mali, the number of contributing member states started relatively small and grew as the mission continued. When the training mission was formally approved by the EU’s foreign ministers in February, only 10 countries had signed up: Cyprus, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Slovenia, Spain and the UK (Vaudin d’Imécourt 2013). In February, Cyprus had dropped out, but 11 other countries had joined (EEAS 2013b, 2013c). By the time the mission began in April, the number of participating member states had jumped to 23 with the addition of the Netherlands and there were around 550 soldiers scheduled for deployment. The largest troop contributor at the time of initiation was, unsurprisingly, France. The country sent 210 troops to the Bamako and Koulikoro camps, consisting of three sections composed of just under 30 people each with the addition of a 10-member command group. Germany, Spain, the UK and the Czech Republic completed the list of the top five contributing states. Other contributors included Swedish and Lithuanian instructors, although their numbers were small, as well as German doctors and Belgian helicopter pilots (Glaudot 2013). As of April 2014, 23 of the 28 member states were still contributing – every country barring Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Malta and Slovakia (EEAS 2014). Several more detailed analyses are presented below, beginning with and focusing predominantly on the states contributing the largest numbers of troops.
France’s participation is somewhat unique among the European states for its early entrance and independent mission. On 11 January 2013, the French led land and air forces into Mali with support from other EU member states (Coolsaet, Biscop and Coelmont 2013). French troops began withdrawing in February 2013, to be replaced by Malians trained by the EU and the 3,300-strong AFISMA (Fiorenza 2013a). In early April, when the EU mission took control, French troops were the only ones engaging in combat operations, using the early months and 1,200 troops to carry out follow-up operations in northeastern Mali, although they were preparing to hand over military responsibility to the Malian army along with a regional African force (Speak 2013). As of late April 2013, France had 3,850 troops in Mali and was participating in conflict against insurgents. The air force had flown 130 sorties and contributed 40 fighter jets. French Minister of Defence Jean-Yves Le Drian’s plan was to reduce troop levels to 2,000 in July (Svitak 2013). In June, the withdrawal of French forces was in train, albeit slowly so as to coordinate with the 1 July UN mission. Between 3,500 and 3,600 French troops remained, primarily performing searches for weapons caches and terrorist networks, something Le Drian called “mopping up” after securing relative stability (Le Drian 2013). In September 2013, French President François Hollande declared victory for Operation Serval, claiming the north to be secure and praising the elections that resulted in the inauguration of Malian President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta. Although there were still 3,200 French soldiers in the country, the goal was to leave only 1,000 in place by the end of 2013. Hollande guaranteed that French forces would remain to assist, but that it should be first and foremost Africans ensuring their own security (Revault d’Allonnes 2013).

Germany did not contribute to Operation Serval, although the Cabinet decided on 19 February 2013 to send military trainers, medics and transport and tanker aircraft to Mali for EUTM. On this, final approval rested with the Parliament, the Bundestag. As of the Cabinet’s decision, Germany already had three transport aircraft supporting AFISMA, which is separate from but bolstered by the EUTM, operating from Senegal and transporting African troops to just two airfields in Mali. The new mandate would allow the German aircraft to operate throughout Mali, directly supporting French forces militarily and refuelling French
planes. Both the AFI-SMA and the EU mandates lasted initially until 28 February 2014 (Müller 2013). On 28 February 2013, the Bundestag approved the aforementioned second mandate regulating air transport support and mid-air refuelling services. The combined troop ceiling for the two mandates was 330, with up to 180 soldiers involved in EUTM as of March 2013. Of these, 80 soldiers were earmarked for training engineering units and up to 100 soldiers for logistical and administrative services on the ground and medical services. Germany’s contribution to the AFI-SMA mission was to be up to 150 soldiers for air transport inside Mali and mid-air refuelling. In addition, the Bundeswehr’s Airbus A310 tanker aircraft would be used to support French aircraft (The Federal Government 2013). The two mandates were approved simultaneously by a vote for the EU mission of 496 to 67 in favour and a vote for the AFI-SMA mission of 492 to 66 in favour (Fiorenza 2013b). As for the extension of the mission, on 5 February 2014, the German Cabinet decided not only to extend the mandate, but to expand the state’s participation by raising the maximum troop allowance to 250. The Bundestag approved the Cabinet’s decision on 20 February. Although German troops will participate in the extended mandate, they will only be present until 28 February 2015 (Associated Press 2014a, 2014b; German Federal Foreign Office 2014).

Spain was the second state to contribute to the Mali intervention, sending a transport airplane with 50 servicemen in late January at France’s request to participate in Operation Serval. Spain also deployed 54 soldiers to EUTM Mali but resisted a request for 30 more to protect the mission force. Spain’s soldiers arrived in mid-April (La Vanguardia 2013). More specifically, the Spanish troops arrived at the training base in Koulikoro on 13 April with a platoon of 32 servicemen to protect the base and 15 Special Operations Unit instructors. Before the mission even formally began, however, eight Spanish servicemen joined the scouting party on 8 February to act as liaisons and reconnaissance officers and six officers joined them on 1 March (ABC 2013; EUTM Mali 2013). After the Spanish Ministry of Defence approved an increase in forces to a maximum of 110 troops on 7 June, 43 paratroopers (Light Infantry Parachute Brigade) were sent in July as a protection force for the instructors. Spain and Belgium were tasked with protecting the instructors and alternated command every six months. As for Spain’s role
in the training, the country was responsible for the Waraba battalion’s commando units; 15 Spanish instructors taught the first 35-member Malian special operations team and training was underway for the second group in late June. For the third and fourth battalions of the Malian army’s tactical groups, 10 instructors and one superior officer focused on artillery and mortars (Servimedia report on ABC 2013).

The UK initially committed to sending approximately 40 soldiers (Radio France Internationale 2013). British and Irish troops were jointly deployed for the first time under a UN military mandate, with eight Irish soldiers and 18 British soldiers deployed at the end of February (Flanagan 2013). In September 2013, the British sent an additional regiment of instructors for six months, including civilians specializing in human rights and humanitarian law to underscore the importance of civilian control over the military, a key factor in military reform in general and in the restructuring some believe is necessary for Mali’s military after the September inauguration of its newly elected president, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, or IBK as he is often known (Lowery and Paolo 2013).

The Czech Republic initially committed to sending some 50 soldiers to the training mission (Radio France Internationale 2013). By the first week of April, more than 30 Czech soldiers were already securing mission HQ and escorting vehicles to Koulikoro (Glaudot 2013). According to a Czech newspaper, in early April the Czech Republic had the fourth largest contingent in Mali (France had 207 troops, Germany 71 and Spain 54). On 13 March, the Czech Senate, the Senát, voted to send 50 soldiers to Mali beginning 1 April. The first contingent deployed held 34 soldiers who were on protection duty, including guarding the HQ in Bamako. After six months, 16 instructors were sent (Speak 2013). By April 2014, the Czech Republic had 40 soldiers remaining in Mali. They are expected to stay through to the end of the year, although any further participation in the extended mission is uncertain (Czech News Agency 2014).

Belgium also participated in Operation Serval with mandates lasting only through to March 2013. The Belgians provided two C-130 aircraft based in the Ivory Coast with which they flew the second most supply missions in Operation Serval after the French according to the Belgian
Ministry of Defence. They also supplied two medical helicopters based in Gao, Mali. After their participation in Operation Serval, this equipment was assigned to EUTM Mali and helped protect the training camp in Koulikoro together with 50 troops deployed for the EU training mission on 10 July. These troops were given the task of protecting convoys and EU instructors during training (De Standaard 2013; Fiorenza 2013c). Belgium was the first country to commit to providing two helicopters for medical evacuations from the instruction site, a critical ability promised at the mission’s inception (Radio France Internationale 2013).

As for the remaining states, many contributed approximately 20 troops or fewer, some sending only one or two. Italy planned in January to provide logistical support in the form of two C-130 transport planes and one 767 refuelling plane together with around 20 instructors (Defense News 2013). When the Polish government adopted President Komorowski’s motion on 30 January 2013, Poland also sent 20 instructors, 10 of whom were responsible for logistics training, at a cost of PLN 5.8 million (EUTM Mali 2013; Polish News Bulletin 2013). Austria was initially planning on sending 10 medical personnel to the camp in Bamako, but by June had reduced that number to seven. Although maintaining a small presence and determining that its troops were not to take part in combat, Austria has provided a great deal of humanitarian aid and food aid since the crisis began – €3.1 million in 2012 with another €1.25 million set aside for further aid in 2013. Mali’s neighbouring states are also receiving aid (Austrian Foreign Ministry 2013a, 2013b; GlobalPost 2013). Sweden is participating with up to 15 army personnel, decided in late January 2013. This comes after the provision of a C-17 transport aircraft in support of AFISMA – a deployment lasting from 24 January to 31 May 2013 (Permanent Mission of Sweden to the UN 2013). In February 2013, Finland decided to send a maximum of 12 soldiers to participate as instructors and to serve in the mission HQ. Finnish trainers also head up the Nordic-Baltic training unit (Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2013). Hungary contributed 10 soldiers: six marksmen, three medical officers and a liaison, deployed on 18 March. The Hungarian marksman began training “elite shooters” in Koulikoro in April. Bulgaria sent five medics on 7 March and Slovenia sent three troops. Romania approved sending 10 soldiers. Slovakia was politically supportive in April and said they had instructors and medics standing by if they were needed. Greece sent
four intelligence specialists to train Malian forces in Koulikoro, also in April (EUTM Mali 2013; Speak 2013).

Lithuania sent two military instructors on 24 March 2013 to serve until mid-2014. The Lithuanian instructors will be part of the Nordic-Baltic training group led by Finland and serving in Koulikoro, marking the first direct participation of Lithuanian soldiers in an African mission (Baltic News Service 2013a; Lithuania Tribune 2013a). According to one of the Lithuanian instructors, the work has been going well, with the first batch of trainers sent home in September after successfully completing their mission, progressing from basic skills to more advanced tactical instruction. In addition to the instructors, Lithuania has also sent an officer to Bamako to serve in a logistics unit (Lithuania Tribune 2013b). Estonia has provided only two personnel, sending one officer and one non-commissioned officer (NCO) to Bamako in March to plan the training of Malian armed forces. In so doing, they will work closely with other European personnel. In mid-September the Estonian contribution grew with the addition of a six-person team serving with the Nordic-Baltic training group; the personnel are responsible for imparting soldiering skills and platoon tactics. Estonia has chosen to specialize in providing ship protection, consistently contributing to EU naval operations such as Operation ATALANTA and becoming a leader in defence spending (Baltic News Service 2013b, 2013c). In March 2013, Luxembourg sent a single NCO as an instructor, who was replaced by an Army sergeant in September (Luxemburger Wort 2013). As of late June 2013, the Netherlands had still not sent soldiers to EUTM Mali despite a stated desire to do so by the Dutch cabinet. Some in the government view the lack of participation as undesirable and seek to atone through strong participation in the UN mission in Mali, led by former Dutch Development Minister Bert Koenders (DutchNews 2013a, 2013b; Volkskrant 2013).

In relation to proposition 2, concerning funding, the EUTM Mali has partially been financed by ATHENA, the mechanism for funding common costs in EU missions into which member states pay according to the size of their economies. Costs covered include HQ running costs, medical services and essential equipment where appropriate (Council of the European Union 2013c). The joint costs of the operation for the initial 15-month mandate were €23 million as of September, up from €12.3 million at the
onset, and each state finances its own troops (EEAS 2013c; Van Puyvelde 2013). For the second half of the proposition, having to do with a civilian element, Britain’s humanitarian civilian instructors fit the bill quite well. Britain’s contribution works well with Lecointre’s inclusion of theoretical basics in the Malian training regimen, including courses on how to comply with humanitarian law, enacted because of an observed need to rebuild the Armed Forces “from the ground up” (Gloudot 2013). So too does EU development aid to Mali. The European Commission authorized €523 million in aid (EEAS 2013c). €50 million has been earmarked specifically for AFISMA support, mainly for financing troops and officers; no military equipment is covered. In addition to the monetary contribution to AFISMA, technical assistance has also been granted to help ECOWAS manage the African-led mission in Mali financially (Africa News 2013).

Turning to proposition 3, which has to do with the integration of national troops in an international mission, there are several examples of such interoperability; the “historic” joint British and Irish contingent and the Nordic-Baltic training unit mentioned above are good examples. The Finnish and Swedish-led unit formally invited Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to form a multi-national team of instructors. Finnish, Swedish and Estonian teams and Latvian and Lithuanian personnel have been deployed in Koulikoro having completing compatibility training as a unit in Finland (Baltic News Service 2013c; Lithuania Tribune 2013a). The German transport and refuelling of French planes also supports this. Further Franco-German cooperation was initiated in February 2014 when it was decided that a French-German brigade would be deployed as part of EUTM Mali in the spring. This is the first deployment of the joint forces in Africa since WWI and the first under the auspices of the EU (Agence-France Presse 2014; Associated Press 2014b). In addition, during a visit to the Koulikoro camp, Minister Le Drian remarked on the coherence of the EU instructors and their ability to put aside national considerations and strive towards a common goal (PR Newswire 2013). However, France has fielded so many troops that they have formed their own units, as have a few other states.
Evaluation of Propositions

The first proposition of this paper that if EUTM Mali is an EU security operation showing successful ESI, we would expect broad participation by member states, can be broken down into two main aspects: (i) the scope of participation across the EU and the nature of that participation; (ii) the relative equality of participation across states and which tasks states chose to fulfil. In terms of the scope of participation, the proposition is supported. Well over three quarters of EU member states have contributed in some way. That number is even more impressive when Denmark’s defence opt-outs and Malta’s extremely limited military capabilities are taken into account. However, the second portion of the proposition is not well supported. France has borne almost half of the burden of the operation in terms of troops and accordingly a large part of the financial burden not taken care of by ATHENA. The French component is necessary to the functioning of the mission; the two Mission Commanders have been French and the whole operation follows from French leadership in Operation Serval. Relatedly, French troops are engaging in combat in support of AFISMA forces, which is forbidden for EUTM Mali troops but necessary for ensuring stability. However, several of the other main contributing countries have provided troops for protection as well as instructors and equipment.

The second proposition – if EUTM Mali is an EU security operation showing successful European security integration, we would expect a good part of the funding to come from the EU collectively and to include a civilian element – is supported in part. The EU crisis management funding mechanism ATHENA has been employed for EUTM Mali, one of only a few EU operations to receive such funding. Relatively, compared to other EU operations, the mission is highly Europeanized. A good deal of collective funding has been provided but individual countries are still obliged to finance their own troops. The civilian element is not present within the framework of EUTM Mali, but when the context is broadened to include EU assistance to Mali, this aspect finds more support. Significant development aid is the most fitting example.
The third proposition, concerning the incorporation of troops and equipment within European structures, is supported to a degree. The limited number of troops sent from many nations necessitates their cooperation within larger units. In addition, this situation means that several states have sent transport and refuelling equipment to assist troops not of their own nationality.

Conclusion

EUTM Mali has shown not only significant improvement from early crisis management operations, but also a successful result in its own right. When it comes to displaying signs of successful security integration, a vast majority of EU member states have worked together to train Malian Armed Forces personnel and to transport and protect those who are doing so. Furthermore, despite initial reluctance to place their people in harm’s way, many countries have taken on the relatively more dangerous task of securing the instructors and the mission’s camps and HQ. Not only have the troops taken on diverse tasks, they have also worked effectively together, particularly within units but also between them. Funding for the mission came in no insignificant part from a common EU mechanism, showing a unified approach. Balancing out these indicators of success, however, are elements indicative of strong nationalistic tendencies. The French have been far and away the largest contributor of troops, providing almost half of all involved personnel. This contribution means France has also provided a great deal of funding, as each state is responsible for funding its own troops. The reverse is true of those states which have contributed only a handful of troops; they have contributed individually very little. In terms of relation to theory, the mission shows supranational elements in its initiation and extension by an EU body and its successful cooperation and common funding. There was also a normative agreement on the necessity of the mission, as demonstrated by the citing of human rights abuses as a justification for intervention and the broad participation of member states. However, the mission also shows an
obvious intergovernmental element in the varying degrees of national contribution. Despite the downsides of the mission in Mali, its strengths outweigh its flaws and a strong showing of supranational elements balances the intergovernmental tendencies of the member states. While French intervention was critical, EU participation has been broad; although troop funding is national, mission funding has come from the EU. Thus it is not unreasonable to conclude that this mission, while not completely supranational, nevertheless presents a good showing of ESI. Given the decades it has taken to bring ESI to its current standpoint and the relative success of EUTM Mali, the findings presented here suggest that it bodes well for the successful integration of EU security policy currently under way and for further integration in the future.
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