Professor Tomislav Petković is among those few contemporary scientists – at least in our own, MiddleEuropean region – who are active philosophers next to their main scientific work in “hard sciences”. His principal philosophical fields are philosophy of science, epistemology and philosophy of nature, including philosophical cosmology, and – last but not least – ethics. In this sense he also follows Einstein’s ideal of the unified knowledge, die Einheitlichkeit, which I have considered at the Einstein’s Theory of Relativity Symposium.

Such a “holistic” way of thinking, synthesis of scientific, mathematical methods on the one hand, and philosophical, conceptual analysis on the other, has been the ideal of the quest for knowledge almost in all principal scientific achievements of Modern Age, from Galileo and Newton to Einstein and quantum physicists. Great scientists, including Newton with his famous maxim Hypotheses non finito, were prominent philosophers of nature as well. We may mention just some more names: Ludwig, Boltzmann, Max Planck, Niels Bohr, Erwin Schrödinger, David Bohm, Roger Penrose – and, last but not least, Stephen Hawking.

However, in our time, i.e., in last decades when science has been developing in the superlative sense, it seems that scientists simply do not have enough time and interest to enter into philosophical issues and discussions, although they concern foundations, implications, cognitive and ethical dimensions of their own scientific work. This, for us philosophers not a very pleasant fact, is partly a consequence of the highest stage of specialization in contemporary science, so that many scientists think that they, as specialized researchers in their field, are neither called, nor qualified to discuss about “general” problems of science – but on the other hand, certainly the main trouble is to find an appropriate language which would enable constructive connections between exact sciences and philosophy. Unfortunately, such philosophical projects, as for example Rudolf Carnap’s Logische Aufbau der Welt, which were constructed in order to unify scientific and philosophical language and to build a single, comprehensive system of knowledge, founded on some basic axioms and intellectual intuitions, were not so successful as they intended to be. So, having these experiences from 20th century’s achievements and also failures, we have to look for new ways and “codes” of communication between philosophy and science.

My own professional activity in philosophy, namely investigations in the field of philosophy of nature, is very close or practically equivalent to investigations of Professor Petković – so that his books and articles are very interesting, informative and useful for my own quest for die Einheitlichkeit of all human knowledge. In the preface of his present book, Professor Petković reveals his principal intention in writing about physics and philosophy: to build “bridges” between them.

We know well that a necessary link, the “cement” for making such cognitive bridges is a proper language. But, as Petković points out: “with the development of science, communications in science are shifting more and more away from our everyday language... in the direction towards abstract, formal, mathematical language” (p. 107). Of course, in the general sense, it has been always so, from Euclid’s geometry on. However, in our time, an essential difference has entered into the relation between scientific, formal language on the one hand, and the “natural” language, which is ultima analysis also the basic medium of philosophy, on the other hand – namely: scientific theories and results of scientific in-
vestigations are not just less exactly expressed in the natural language, as they have always been, but are from year to year more incomprehensible in it! We may say even more: in a certain sense, theoretical languages of sciences themselves construct their objects, so that the scientific “reality” is more and more distant from the “objective reality” in Einstein’s or classical sense. This self-construction of scientific “reality” is especially evident in the most advanced theories, as in the “string theories” or in the “multiverse” theories of contemporary cosmology, etc.

From the didactical point of view – and this book of Professor Petković is supposed to be at least so much didactic for students as informative for a wider circle of intellectuals – we are confronted with the dilemma how much formal apparatus, how many formulas should we include we know the extreme attitude of Stephen Hawking who has not included a single formula in his famous book _A Brief History of Time_, since, as he said, every formula in a popular book on science halves the number of readers. But this is probably not the best solution; authors of other scientific bestsellers (for example, Roger Penrose, Steven Weinberg, Martin Rees, Brian Green and others, actually also Hawking in his later books) do include some formal apparatus – in order to be better understood! Professor Petković includes in his books, which are more scientific as popular, quite a lot formal explanations, so that it is for a not-scientist sometimes quite a “hard stuff” to come through them. Well, of course, these books are written not only for philosophers, but also – maybe even primarily – for students of exact sciences. However, here another, “symmetrical” problem emerges: how much philosophy should be included into books about epistemological and other philosophical aspects of science? How far could science students understand philosophical topics?

In this respect, one of the main problems is a choice and definition of a proper philosophical, conceptual “reference frame” for dealing with scientific problems. What philosophical method shall we choose: analytical, phenomenological, historical, dialectical…? Professor Petković presents and proposes several different philosophical “frames of reference” – and this is good, in principle, however, this multiple approach is quite difficult for a reader who is not at home in philosophy. The main philosophical method of this book in the analytic philosophy in the broad sense, which is probably the best candidate for considering most issues in the epistemology of science (Popper, Kuhn etc.); but the story does not end here: the author goes on to Heidegger’s “ontological” conception of science and technique as “cybernetics”, and in some passages of the book we find also the nowadays nearly forgotten Marxist historical dialectic (in author’s critical survey of Engle’s _Dialectics of Nature_, and later in a kind of revival of Marx’s _Theses on Feuerbach_, which are connected with the subject-object relation in quantum physics).

Yes, in principle and also in this case, I like such a “polyphonic approach” in philosophy – and in my own work I also apply several methods and “reference frames”, combining logical-analytical approach with various “continental philosophies”, going back to the eternal Platonic metaphysics – so I know very well the difficulties which we philosophers encounter in search of some conceptual “multiverse”, which would connect our endeavors with modern scientific investigations.

Let me conclude: I am convinced that Einstein’s ideal of _Einheitlichkeit_ still remains behind all “polyphony” of scientific and philosophical discourses, and that is – among other things – also the reason of my pleasure in reading such books as Professor Petković’s _Experimental Physics and Theory of Knowledge._

Marko Uršič

_Ksenija Premur_ 

_Filozofija života Zen Buddhizma_  

_(Life Philosophy of Zen Buddhism)_

_Naklada Lara, Zagreb 2006_

A crucial determinant of our times is not only the phenomena of globalisation and “informationalisation”. In _nuce_, in the dimension of spiritual existence, our time is entering _nexusality_ of spiritual components of the third millennia, _ex fundamentis_ terramorbing earthly existence in the context of spiritual evolution / involution and preparation of the Divine life on the Earth.

Spiritual components occur, in terms of development, through multicomplexification of planetarisation, processes which manifest through polylogisation (multi-voicing / poly-voicing) of spiritual traditions, religions, phi-
losophies, cultures in their perennial heritage / values. Planetarisation as polylogisation is a basic feature of our times, complementing and concordant with material / mundane processes of globalisation.

Polymodality of polylogisation, as a spiritual matrix of the third millennia, represents a framework where suppositions of supraliteralisation of the Earth, as the next stage in spiritual evolution / involution of earthly existence, begin to emerge.

Modes of philosophical, religious and cultural openness and ambiguities of all discourses of contrasts / comparisons, of all ecumenical and other participations and utopisations – they all find their place within polylogisation. And every theoretical excourse into a certain area strives for the reality of polylogy. So does this immensely important work by Ksenija Premur, articulating issues and problems of the Zen-Buddhism. Absolutely thoroughly and correctly, she contemplates over certain important features of Zen spirituality and contributes appropriate choice of classical texts which “document” theoretical reflections.

Every theoretical subject of certain spiritual traditions and hermeneutisation of features and values of a particular spiritual tradition needs to be observed in the crucial context of planetarisation suo modo of tradition itself and its meaning in the polylogisation of spirituality of the third millennia.

Zen-Buddhism is the crown, the very peak of the development of Buddhist traditions, an inner telos of totality of Buddhist experiences and values. We can track down historically developmental stages as well, we can conceptualise features of those traditions in philosophical and theoretical terms, we can, ad finitum, rely on comparison / contrasting just as we do with any other tradition (e.g. the tantric tradition) but that is uno in secondo. The primary issue is the life of Zen in the reality of planetarisation. What counts are the spiritual experiences of Zen at the front of supramentalisation of the earthly existence.

And Zen means life!

Zen is a blessing of the Pure Mind, a path and experience of the Zen Mind.

Zen is an ultimate denial of a constrained, conceptual mind regarded as a minor mind. And in ultima linea, a release from the Impure Mind.

And those are both philosophical and religious minds, not only minds in different modalities of mundanity, a political mind, etc.

That Pure / Great / Zen Mind, that Innocent Mind is the foundation and the source of the Pure Life, Zen Life.

The state of a pure / alert life is a release from impure mind / impure life. That is an ultimate meaning of a satori. That is a signum of sunyata “existence”.

The realisation of the Zen “existence” (here we use that philosophical term only figuratively) occurs on the Path of Awakening as the Moment of Pure Life.

Zen is the Path of a Pure Mind / Pure Life with numerous trails. Each of the trails sacralises one human and mundane manifestation of a conscious being.

Thus there is a Path of Pure Word (haijin), there is a Path of a Sword, but also of an Onion, a Path of a Flower and many others.

Each path was given a blessing of Zen watchfulness / purity in the way it is dharmic to that life. Quintessentiation of a lifestyle was given throughout the Zen path as the most rigid and most subtle form and expression of spiritual experience of a being among beings.

Zen is transcendence of a mental life dimension like ekstasis from a lower life form into the vicinity of divine light and love.

This is a sudden or gradual experience, or both, or neither.

This is “a sudden passage through the impassable”, invisible breakthrough and impassable leap – these are all mental traps. Beyond these traps, in the playful game with them, through the deceptions of an unwatchful mind – this is where Zen life begins. Zen of life occurs in the heart of a quotidian earthly existence.

As many Zen experiences, so many “schools” and so many traditions there are. Some have used strict methods of koan; some have considered koans residues of unwatchful mind.

“The goal” is a satori, yet not even that is completely accurate! Satori is more than koan, but Zen is more than satori!

Some have seen all Zen in Zazen, others have rejected Zazen; some have “walked” or “laughed” Zen as a quotidian “meditation”, others have sunk into the silence…

But they have all acknowledged “Noble Silence”, they all worshipped the Smile of a Being.

It is almost unacceptable to talk about Zen outside Zen. It is almost like wiping off dew from soft petals at the crack of dawn using a rough, dirty cloth.

Utter only as many words as Zen itself permits.

It is advisable to follow the experience of the Pure Word of Zen (haijin – haiku poetry), or the Path of a Sword leaving its sword in the sheath, the Bow shooting itself rather than an
arrow, the Teacup filling itself in the silence of an empty teapot…
Zen is being friendly with all beings without getting attached to them, without any “motivation” of a mind or “desire” of a body.
Zen is a quintessence of Love when love ceases to be a need and becomes a pure vibration of energies.
Zen is a Freedom giving its blessing to all beings and receiving a blessing from all beings, thus making the man disappear and the blessing, too.
Zen is giving gifts, a process in which both the giver and the recipient and the gift itself disappear.
Zen is a coaxing of the divine, in which the divine is being silenced in the human, and the human in the natural.
Zen is an absolute correction to numerous spiritual experiences emerging from different spiritual traditions.
Zen is a supreme power of purifying the spirituality itself from the inside out.
Zen is an experience where a higher life melts with the lower one in a perfect transformation into the Purity.
Zen is a signpost to supramentalisation.
Koan, Zazen, satori and other moments of a Zen life are but a breath of a divine existence in the form of a smile and caressing of subtle energies of the consciousness and corporality.
Zen “conquers” the West? No, the West has already been “conquered”!
This is happening at the dawn of supramentalisation, through supramental dimensions, through that involutional which reduces the Divine Power to the human.
It is more than being arhat or bodhisattva.
At this point of evolution, Zen is the very peak of evolution.
In Zen experience, earthly existence becomes transparent for the divine existence.
However, we cease to “register” that with the existing mind, it is beyond our conceptualisation abilities.
A philosophical mind keeps babbling, while the religious one stutters.
Stillness comes through stillness.
Yet, any theoretical interest our bringing our existing mind closer to the Gates of Silence and Great Watchfulness.
Even more if it had absolutely correctly articulated fundamental characteristics of the “topic” of Zen documented in memoirs and tales and occasional sutric record of the tradition.
The existing philosophical mind must not be ignored, either. It has a certain meaning.
The work by Ksenija Premur, in its expertise articulation and presentation of the intrinsic issues deserves only the highest ratings.
Jadran Zalokar

Michael Walzer

Politics and Passion
Toward a More Egalitarian Liberalism
Yale University Press,
New Haven-London 2005

The usual problem of books on tolerance and cultural differences in liberal societies, although they often presuppose tolerance and advantages for groups that are intolerant and oppressive toward their own members, is the question who are those “we” to enounce that, while some injustices are intolerable, some other, of less importance, could be tolerated?
On what grounds can we claim, as some theoreticians of multiculturalism do, that violent submission and oppression within some different collective or culture can be tolerated, for example, to preserve certain traditional group identity, although, with this claim, we implicitly approve significant rights restriction to some citizens that majority in society unquestionably possess?
To discuss this well known problem of multicultural theory, we should start with the following question: who are interest parties in this bargaining with other people’s rights? Do such claims under the aegis of preservation of traditional group identity really represent all members of certain collective, especially oppressed ones, or just demands of those members of the group that advantage from present configuration of power so they, naturally, want to preserve it at any cost?
For example, how often participants of those discussions are also those members whose deprivation, supposedly, as a right on cultural survival demands the “whole” group?
Wouldn’t the political struggle for our own deprivation of rights be, after all, some kind of political contradiction?
To return to the multicultural theory; who are “we” to tolerate deprivation, violence or op-
pression of some citizens, for example, for the sake of some suspicious and, in its demands usually anachronistic cultural diversity? Or, partially moderated, to give our consent or just not to argue about, for example, the derivation of women’s rights in some religious communities but to oppose to those attempts that try to deprive them of the right to participate in political decision making or education?

In his intention to be – as the author says – on many points a corrective of liberal theory, Michael Walzer’s book Politics and Passion brings up some apparent contradictions and problems to justify its, allegedly, moderate view on those rights. For example; by claiming that individuals from marginalized groups could achieve more if they act together, as an interest group, Walzer does not explain why this would be in contradiction with voluntary association of free and autonomous individuals that act in concern to achieve some political goal, a kind of association liberalism would defend?

The point is that Walzer presuppose that by accepting our own submission in some particular group we could act from the inside to change configuration of power within the group. But it remains unclear why this could not be achieved by leaving the group and state of oppression too, to use other possibilities and opportunities that could give us a wider society, and within this wider society free association instead of manifold and usually degrading compromises that an individual must accept if he or she chooses to stay in his or her subordinate position in native surrounding?

The other question, more ethical in nature that I shall not push much further though it is often an inspiring material for social sensitive films and novels is; who, after all, can claim to have the right to deprive some individuals of rights to choose, even if this deprivation could mean long-lasting suffering and unhappiness for those individuals?

To return to the author. Walzer claims that by leaving the group and by assimilation of its members in wider society those already marginal groups become socially and politically weaker, but it is not so clear on what ground can we ask for (maybe sentimental?) solidarity of those members with the group that are oppressed by its unjust norms and internal organization? The other question is should the state, only because it is a minority group, really help communities that, as one of their demands, ask tolerance for internal oppression and traditional submission that, allegedly, can not be even discussed because they are, for example, based on some religious dogma? Is it possible, for example, to tolerate violence and deprivation only because the group that does it is politically weaker or a cultural minority, or the opinion that supports this kind of tolerance is, in fact, just another offensive stance toward the other whose beliefs and principles could not be even rationally questioned and discussed because those same others are so irrational or sensitive that rational discussion is out of question? And finally, can we really define subordination and violence within not just minority groups as “a pluralism of worldviews” or “a cultural diversity”?

Walzer responses on these and similar questions remain eventually unclear. Equality – yes, but in solidarity with the group. That, in fact, means a battle on two different battlefields: for affirmation of a collective where we are born and activism within the group for equality of rights and chances. In other words, the activism within the group should not jeopardize political influence and “a good reputation” of the collective in wider society that internal inequalities make, true, regrettable but only an internal affair of certain collective.

The other problem is that Walzer – by accentuating cultural values, traditional relations and worldviews of the group in which we are born and that, in many ways, define who we eventually are – indirectly identifies cultural values with configuration of power in some group that makes any claim for changes more difficult, not to mention any kind of social pressure. On the other hand, by pointing that a liberal society as a society of completely free and independent individuals is an utopian conception, that after works of Michel Foucault, Judith Butler or, if we want, even Hannah Arendt is not such a new observation – Walzer uses this well known theoretical stance to cut down ambitions of this same individual if they are in conflict with community values and norms. From the other point, it is true that Walzer advocates fight against inequalities, but for him this fight cannot be a matter of individual “escape” but an issue for collective action. But then we go back on a previous observation that asks who, after all, can deny free and (maybe only relative) autonomous individuals the right to associate and act in a wider liberal society or, in other words: why would acting from some other social position or from some different surrounding be of less importance, efficiency or value then the acting from certain roles within the collective?

Although Walzer’s thesis about the exigency of collective engagement to improve the position of marginalized and stigmatized groups is convincing, it is not so clear why would this be incompatible with other ambitions of an individual and, eventually, with the “escape” from damaging position or oppressive
surrounding? After all, acting from a different social position is still acting within the same society, that is – not from some other planet – and solidarity, that should not be equalized with solidarity by force, does not mean that the only way to act in concert presupposes submission to the same degradation, injustice and humiliation if the individual wants and can avoid it, for example, by leaving the group that oppresses him/her.

The other, perhaps more inspiring part of the book deals with the role of passions and emotions in achieving certain political goals. The role of emotions in political decision making, especially of the human ability to empathize in other people's situation, is one of the significant topics of political and social theory today that, as it seems, look at the role of emotions in more favorable light. On the other hand, it is almost obvious that to exclude the role of emotions from discussion of any kind of engagement would be superficial as it would be doubtful to neglect them from thinking about many other aspects of human life. Rational or not, intelligible or obscure, emotions are “human condition”, they can be suppressed, even cultivated, but we cannot do without them. On the other hand, in distinction from our average, everyday life whose situations, after all, could also be serious and potentially damaging, in political decision making we are usually more careful because it can have long-lasting, even irreplaceable consequences for a large number of people. Therefore I would like to emphasize two aspects of the problem that a theory of the role of emotions in politics sometimes overlooks.

The first is that a critic of “insensitiveness” of politics usually does not criticize a lack of emotions in politics but the certain hierarchy of values that defines political decisions. The other is the simple question whose emotions a politics oriented on emotions should engage; those of decision makers, what is less probable usually we want that important problems and goals are well thought through and effectively achieved, or those of partisans of certain politics that opens the eternal question of manipulation with citizens. But, how much is only deliberate and rational acting without emotional engagement efficient in politics?

By criticizing the stance that only discussion backed with rational arguments is important in politics, Walzer tries to show that people engage in many projects also on the other, less rational grounds. What Walzer suggests is that a passionate devotion to some goal doesn’t has to be necessarily wrong, moreover, sometimes it can be more efficient than the rational deliberation about pros and cons. From the other point, many vast atrocities were planned and executed very rationally. In short, Walzer holds that neither emotion alone, neither rationality without emotions is, apart from its goals, good or bad. But one must be careful. The fact is that many people spontaneously react the right way while some others deliberation makes to caution so they can omit to do the right or necessary thing. Walzer sees that as a weakness and ineffectiveness of exclusively rationally based political action. Nevertheless, by missing to discuss more thoroughly which emotions would be socially more beneficent or useful and not just effective, Walzer leaves a job undone and exposes his theory to the critic of those thinkers that, like Susan Sontag did, claim that the emotional aspect is important but, in principle, we should act deliberately, especially in politics. Even emotions that Walzer recognizes as efficient or useful, abstracted from values and goals that set them in motion, aren’t positive beyond any doubt. The mentioned courage, solidarity, devotion and passion could be used by some criminal ideologies too, in distinction from the ability to sympathize with other (see Martha C. Nussbaum) which can be used (and, usually, it is used in war propaganda), but, after all is more benign because of the sole fact that it starts with the care for the other human being.

The fact is that passion and devotion to a good cause can achieve a lot. History shows that they achieved a lot in fighting various social injustices. The problem is that Walzer’s book doesn’t discuss enough various aspects and consequences of emotionally engaged acting, though the sole question is inspiring.

Maja Profaca

Alan Bryman

The Disneyization of Society


The idea of Disneyization of society is based on conviction that there are changes in contemporary societies that the Disney theme parks exemplify. Bryman is emphasizing and analyzing theming, hybrid consumption, merchandising and performative labour as a four dimensions of Disneyization. Also, he marks control and surveillance as a crucial for the successful operation of Disneyization. The book is divided into seven chapters. In the first chapter the author define the main notions with special emphasis on distinction between Disneyization and Disneyfication. In the following four chapters four dimensions...
of Disneyization are analyzing. In the sixth chapter Bryman is analyzing Disney’s control and surveillance system and in the last chapter he mentioned several implications of Disneyization process. In the general sense (described on the last cover of the book), Disneyization process is characterizing by: the growing influence of themed environments in settings like restaurants, shops, hotels and zoos; a growing trend towards social environments that are driven by combinations of forms of consumption (shopping, eating out, gambling, visiting the cinema, watching sports etc.); the growth in cachet awarded to brands based on licensed merchandise; an increasing prominence of work that is a performance in which the employees have to display certain emotions and generally convey impressions as though working in a theatrical event; and the growing significance of control and surveillance in consumer culture.

For Bryman, Disneyization process is “the process by which the principles of the Disney theme parks are coming to dominate more and more sectors of American society as well as the rest of the world” (p. 1). The first Disney theme park was open in Anaheim, California in the year 1955. Called “Magic Kingdom”, it was organized into lands (Adventureland, Frontierland, Tomorrowland and Fantasyland). Later on many other theme parks were opened, for example, in the year 1971 theme park in Orlando, Florida was open, in the year 1983 Tokyo Disneyland was open, and in the year 1992 Disneyland Paris was open.

Disneyization process is essentially connected with consumption, and consumption (especially increasing the inclination to consume) is Disneyization’s driving force. Naturally, this recalls another similar process and that is McDonaldization process which is connected with fast food restaurants. But Bryman emphasized that “Disneyization seeks to create variety and difference, where McDonaldization wreaks likeness and similarity” (p. 4). McDonaldization is based on rationalization and conceptions of Fordist, scientific management and bureaucratization, and Disneyization represents Post-Fordist world of variety and consumers choices. One of the main goals of Disneyization is moving consumption beyond mere necessity. For example, eating in McDonald’s could fulfill basic need relatively cheaply and in predictable environment, but Disneyized restaurants could provide an experience with impression of being different.

Furthermore, Bryman is explaining his choice of Disneyization notion contra Disneyfication notion. Namely, Disneyfication notion is generally connected with transformation of some object into something superficial and simplistic. Association of Disneyfication with trivialization and sanitization is mainly used as critiques against Disney production. Bryman emphasize that as one of the reason to abandon Disneyfication, for the sake of neutral analysis. Among other things, he mentioned that emphasis in Disneyfication “tends to be upon cultural products like stories and historical representations rather than upon wider changes in culture and the economy” (p. 9). Bryman is distinguishing “structural” and “transferred” Disneyization. The first one is related on changes in the Disney theme parks, and second one represents Disney principles of action transferring into other fields, such as shopping malls.

One of the obvious dimensions of Disneyization is theming. Bryman is defining theming as a “clothing institutions or objects in a narrative that is largely unrelated to the institution or object to which it is applied, such as casino or restaurant with a Wild West narrative” (p. 2). In that sense theming in some way provides transcendent meaning of actual situation. Theming is connected with entertainment economy, and especially with so called “experience economy” in which “consumers seek out services that will be provided in an entertaining way and will result in a memorable experience” (p. 16). The very nature of themed environment is connected with consumer’s identity and with different lifestyles. Possible problems of theming project are increasing costs and constantly increasing people’s expectations. The sources of themes are very different, from tropical paradise, Wild West and classical civilization, to nostalgia, fortress architecture and modernism and progress. Furthermore, sources of themes could represent some specific place, or sport, time period, music, cinema, fashion, consumption, architecture, natural world, literature etc. For example, Disneyland was firstly imagined as a combination of American history and celebration of progress’s ideology. Theming could be related on amusement parks (Disneyland), restaurants (Hard Rock Café, Planet Hollywood), hotels (Hotel Cheyenne with Wild West theme), shopping malls, zoos, museums and even whole cities.

The second dimensions of Disneyization process is hybrid consumption. Bryman is defining hybrid consumption as a “general trend whereby the forms of consumption associated with different institutional spheres become interlocked with each other and increasingly difficult to distinguish” (p. 2). By “forms of consumption” he means things like: shopping, visiting a theme park, eating in a restaurant, going to the cinema, visiting
a museum, gambling in a casino etc. Hybrid consumption for Bryman represents general trend of re-combination of different forms of consumption. The basic principle of hybrid consumption is “stay longer”, and the main goal is to create “destination” with conditions for long staying. Hybrid consumption is based on the idea that “the more needs you fulfill, the longer people stay”. Of course, idea of hybrid consumption is not so new, but systematic approach to realization of this idea is new. There are many examples of hybrid consumption, such as shopping malls with all kinds of restaurants, café bars, places for children etc. Bryman emphasized two crucial principles of hybrid consumption: “destination” principle and “stay longer” principle. The third dimension of Disneyization is merchandising which is referred to “the promotion of goods in the form of or bearing copyright images and logos, including such products made under licence” (p. 79). Merchandising is originated from mass production of souvenirs and later this production will be associated with copyright logos and images. “The key principle behind merchandising is a simple one of extracting further revenue from an image that has already attracted people” (p. 80). In that sense merchandising is closely connected with franchises (see Jeremy Rifkin’s book from the year 2000 for analysis of franchise’s importance in a new “net economy” which is based on “access”). Among other things, Bryman mentioned that Walt Disney didn’t create the idea of merchandising or even merchandising animated cartoon characters. Felix the Cat was the focus of merchandise just a few years before Mickey Mouse, and Walt Disney’s first animated star was Oswald the Lucky Rabbit (about one year before Mickey Mouse). Mickey Mouse was appeared in November 1928 and merchandising with Mickey Mouse images (and with other characters from Disney production) was (and still is) very profitable. For example, “The Lion King” movie from 1994 “earned” over a billion US dollars till today, but only one third of that money was from box office. Fourth dimension of Disneyization is performative labour. Bryman emphasized that “there is a growing trend for work, particularly in service industries, to be construed as a performance, much like in the theatre. The employee becomes like an actor on a stage. By ‘performative labour’, then, I simply mean the rendering of work by managements and employees alike as akin to a theatrical performance in which the workplace is construed as similar to a stage” (p. 103). Mentioned trend is also called “emotional labour” which refers to all kinds of work situations in which workers are trying to convey emotions and look alike those emotions are deeply held. The main reason for this trend in the service field is recognition that the style and quality of the delivery of a service are crucial in the consumer’s perception. Emotional labour represents source of differentiation of the services that are otherwise more or less identical or very similar. “The ever-smiling Disney theme park employee has become a stereotype of modern culture” (p. 107). But, except of obvious advantages, emotional labour could bring some not so obvious problems. Among other things, Bryman mentioned possible discrepancy between “acting” and “feeling”, which could cause some psychological problems. Furthermore, Bryman is emphasizing control and surveillance of visitors (and employees) as one of the crucial characteristics of the Disney theme parks. “Control is a key feature of the Disney theme parks in a variety of ways: in the way in which the behaviour, imagination and experience of visitors are controlled; as a recurring motif; in terms of control over behaviour of employees; and in its control over its own destiny” (p. 155). The behaviour of employees is strictly controlled through modes of recruitment, special training and socialization, very detailed rules and regulations, through scripts and of course, through surveillance. Because of that the Disney theme park conception is sometime calls as “a sort of Vatican with Mouse ears”. Precisely, this conception of strictly hidden control entertainment and forcedly smiling freedom in limited and controlled space we consider as a crucial characteristics of contemporary western world. Disney theme parks are representing picture of consumer’s spectacle where hypnotized masses are served by robotized employees which are often “switch off” for the sake of “daily survival”. Alan Bryman’s book “The Disneyization of Society” represents valuable analysis in the field of sociology of culture, but also in the broader field of analysis (post)modern society generally. Alan Bryman is Professor of Social Research at the University of Loughborough. On the end, we think that this book directs on, at least, two paradigmatic messages which are important in the analysis of contemporary western world. First one is “stay longer”: alive, young, beautiful, handsome, in the mood, on the party, in shopping, in the Trans and fantasy, at the position of the power, in the war, into constant threat. The second one, directly connected with first one, is “non-consumers are suspected”. In that way, the former political unfitness is replacing with consumerist one.

Krunoslav Nikodem