The paper analyses the question of relations between the mayor and the director of municipal administration on one hand and between the mayor and deputy mayor on the other, particularly in terms of division of competences. The paper also deals with the standpoints of mayors and deputy mayors regarding the institution of deputy mayor. Furthermore, it verifies the assumption that the current regulatory framework regarding the appointment (and determination of competences) of the director of municipal administration and deputy mayor is not entirely appropriate. Based on the analysis of objective data and research surveys among mayors, directors of municipal administration, and deputy mayors of Slovenian municipalities, we have ana-
lysed the problems of the functioning of those actors. We have learned that current Slovenian legislation is in favour of consolidating the position and power of the mayor, because he/she can freely appoint, dismiss, and determine the competences of the highest official in the municipality as well as of the deputy mayor.

**Key words**: mayor, director of municipal administration, deputy mayor, relation, competences, municipality, Slovenia

### 1. Theoretical and Methodological Origins

For a long time, various typologies of local self-government systems have been proposed. They are based on theory and/or empirical evidence and concern the horizontal division of power in local communities, i.e., the relationships between the local council, the mayor, and the executive officials (see Heinelt, Hlepas, 2006: 29–41). Mouritzen and Svara (2002) offer typology of local government systems oriented towards horizontal power relations based on an extensive empirical study, which has included fourteen countries.¹ The fourteen countries studied have certain institutions in common. Local government is based on the principle of representative democracy. Localities are governed by an elected body that has at its disposal an administrative organization staffed by appointed officials. However, these fourteen countries exhibit different ground rules (Mouritzen, Svara, 2002: 259). The founding fathers of local government and subsequent reformers in various countries have come up with different solutions to find a balance between layman rule, political leadership, and professionalism.² Whereas the layman rule means that citizens elected to political office should be involved effectively and intensively in the deci-  

¹ The name of research project was The U.Di.T.E. (Union des Dirigeants Territoriaux de L’Europe) Leadership Study. This research covered over four thousand directors of municipal administration and mayors from fourteen countries (Australia, Belgium, Great Britain, Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the USA). For more information, see Mouritzen, Svara, 2002.

² The consideration of Mouritzen and Svara relies on the following hypothesis: »The structural features of municipal government in any specific country reflect a balance or compromise among three organizing principles: layman rule, political leadership and professionalism« (Mouritzen, Svara, 2002: 50–51).
sion-making process, the notion of political leadership implies the concept of politicians »promoting value choices and feeding energy and passion into policy system«. Finally, professionalism rests on the crucial distinction that »as politicians respond to demands, professionals respond to and seek to address needs« (Mouritzen, Svara, 2002: 51–53). The form of government differs across the fourteen countries. Some countries emphasize strong political leadership, others power sharing and the involvement of laypersons in the executive and legislative functions of government, while still others have confined politicians to the legislative function and cast their lot with strong professional leaders. Although Mouritzen and Svara consider all three elements, »political leadership« is the starting point for the development of a typology of government forms. The key issue is how political power is obtained, maintained, exercised, and shared. Political power is the degree of control a political actor – a person or a collective body – has in two different arenas, the legislative and the executive. To what extent is the legislative arena of the city council controlled by one or more political actors? To what extent does control over the executive lie in the hands of one or more political actors? Formal structure is an important tool for answering these questions, but so are informal institutional rules and norms (Mouritzen, Svara, 2002: 53).

Based on an analysis of legal and behavioural factors in the fourteen countries, four forms of local government were identified:

- **Strong-mayor form** with an elected official leader of the governing board and considerable executive authority (France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, U.S. mayor-council cities);

- **Committee-leader form** with a quasi-parliamentary form with standing committees, an executive (or finance) committee, and a mayor, or majority leader in the case of Britain, drawn from the dominant party or party coalition in the city council (Denmark, Great Britain, Sweden);

- **Collective leadership form** with a cabinet leadership structure in which an executive committee of the council exercises executive authority along with a mayor who has limited authority and a chief executive officer primarily responsible to the executive committee (Belgium and Holland);

- **Council-manager form** with a governing board headed by a nonexecutive leader and an appointed chief executive officer (Australia, Finland, Ireland, Norway, and the United States) (Mourtizen, Svara, 2002: 55–56).
The Slovenian system of local self-government features two primary municipal bodies: the municipal council and the mayor. The municipal council is the legislative body, whereas the mayor represents the apex of the local-level executive (Brezovšek et al., 2008: 169). For the purpose of this article, we will analyse the strong-mayor form in more detail. In this form, the elected mayor controls the majority in the municipal council and is in full charge of all executive functions. Directors of municipal administration (DMA) perform tasks determined by the mayor; in this way, they are subordinated to the mayor, as the latter can fire and hire the director without prior consent of other politicians or political bodies. In addition to the DMA, mayors can also employ political advisors who help them with their functions. This form of government explicitly stresses the principle of political leadership. In this manner, rule by the people and expertise conform to strong political leadership. Local government systems with such kind of horizontal power relations are clearly presidential systems. Like in presidential systems at the national level, the mayor is a directly elected politician who is in full charge of the municipal administration. As a directly elected executive head, she/he has the legitimacy to nominate and to control the DMA as well as the deputy mayor(s). Furthermore, as a directly elected executive, the mayor is responsible and accountable for everything that happens (or not) in the municipal administration. Such mayors can delegate legitimation to carry out particular tasks and competences – and withdraw it anytime they choose to. We have selected the strong-mayor form to help us comprehend the Slovenian system in which the mayor can freely select, appoint, and dismiss the highest senior civil servant. Thus, the DMA is completely subordinated to the mayor. Additionally, the mayor may appoint other political advisors (such as deputy mayor/s) who are to offer assistance in the execution of mayoral functions (see also Kukovič et al., 2012: 218–233). Hence, the primary focus of this article is on the relationships between the aforementioned actors in connection with the division of their competences and functions. Furthermore, by using empirical data, we analyse the standpoints of mayors and deputy mayors regarding the institution of the deputy mayor and test the hypothesis stating that the current normative framework of the selection process of both the DMA and the deputy mayor consolidates the mayor’s position and his/her power.
2. Mayor’s Position in the Slovenian Local Self-Government

The mayor is the individual municipal body, a holder of political function, elected by secret ballot in direct elections for a four-year term of office. The right to vote is limited to voters who have permanent residence in the municipality (Local Self-Government Act, LSGA, Article 42). Suffrage for mayoral election is identical to suffrage for the election of the municipal council (Kavčič, Grad, 2008: 392). The right to vote and to be elected mayor is thus given to every citizen who has the right to vote in municipal elections. The Slovenian system of local self-government features a fairly simple candidacy procedure, since candidate-mayors can be proposed by political parties or groups of voters. In the latter case, the candidacy must be supported by the number of signatures equal to at least two per cent of all voters who cast their votes in the first round of the most recent mayoral election, and this number cannot be smaller than fifteen or larger than 2,500. Mayoral elections use a double-round absolute majority vote system. In other words, the candidate who receives the absolute majority of the votes cast is elected mayor. If none of the candidates receive the majority of the votes cast, a second round of elections is held for the two candidates who received the highest number of votes in the preceding round. If two or more candidates receive the same highest number of votes or if two or more candidates receive the same second highest number of votes, the choice of candidates that will enter the second election round, which has to be held no later than 21 days after the first round, is determined by lot. The names of the two remaining candidates appear on the voting paper in the sequence reflecting the respective number of votes each candidate received in the first round. If the number of votes received by each of them is equal, their sequence is determined by lot (Local Elections Act, Articles 106, 107). The mayor can be elected either in regular elections or in by-elections. Regular mayoral elections, which are held together with the regular municipal elections, are called by the chair of the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia. By-elections for the mayor are held in case a mayor’s term of office ceases prior to its formal expiry, for whatever reason(s), and are called by the municipal electoral commission (Kavčič, Grad, 2008: 392).

Candidate-mayors can be determined by political parties and groups of voters. Non-partisan candidates can submit their candidacies if they are supported by groups of voters; the size of any such group is ultimately
determined by the size of the municipality in which such a candidate is proposed. Thus, non-partisan candidates have a relatively simple way of asserting their passive suffrage, which is also confirmed by empirical data on four recent local elections. These reveal that non-partisan candidates have been successful, since they have achieved a high percentage of elected candidates relative to the number of candidacies submitted. Haček (2010: 43) concludes that the absolute number of mayors who, at least formally, have not run for the office as members of political parties has been constantly increasing. Since the 1998 local elections, the majority of municipalities have had mayors who have not been proposed by any political party (43 in the 1998 local elections, 59 in 2002, 66 in 2006, and 70 in the 2010 local elections).

In accordance with the organisation of the municipality and the distribution of competences in the municipality’s scope across municipal bodies, the function of the mayor is simultaneously executive and coordinative. The initial arrangement of the LSGA envisaged quite a strict separation of the function of mayor from the function of municipal council; however, this hampered the operation of local self-government, resulting in tighter integration of both functions by subsequent amendments to the Act. Now, the mayor even has a direct link to the municipal council, as he/she represents it, calls its sessions and chairs them, but is not a member thereof and does not have a right to vote. In addition, the mayor has various functions in relation to the municipal council as well as influence

---

3 According to Article 33 of the LSGA, mayors, acting within their competence, represent the municipal council: (1) before the public or citizens, they represent the work of the municipality’s representative body; (2) they communicate council’s decisions to the public, i.e., assure that it operates publicly; (3) on the basis of the decisions adopted by the municipal council, the mayor can publish and sign legal acts adopted by the council; and (4) they represent the municipal council before state authorities if the law has thus stipulated (e.g., before the Constitutional Court, etc.). Within his/her competence of calling and chairing the sessions of the municipal council, the mayor is responsible for: (1) the preparation of the proposal of work programme for the municipal council; (2) the coordination of the work of the municipal council’s committees and commissions; (3) proposing the draft agenda of the municipal council’s session; (4) calling sessions of the municipal council; (5) giving direction to the work of municipal administration with regard to its expert and administrative activities intended to support the municipal council’s requirements; (6) the oversight of correctness and due professional quality of the materials prepared for the proposed draft agenda; (7) taking care of the observance of the municipal statute and municipal council’s rules of procedure concerning the preparations of council sessions, the latter’s work, and adoption of decisions; (8) chairing the sessions of the municipal council; (9) assuring legality of council’s decisions; (10) taking care of legal and de facto correct documentation of the council’s sessions, handling and keeping record of documentary materials; and (11) public operation of the municipal council.
on its operation. On one hand, the mayor’s responsibility is to take care of the implementation of decisions adopted by the municipal council;\(^4\) on the other, he/she has an important function of proposing decisions to the municipal council\(^5\) and, finally, to oversee the legality of the latter’s operation\(^6\) (Kaučič, Grad, 2008: 369–370).

The mayor (on a daily basis) takes care of the municipality’s assets and increases their value and quality by signing different contracts, launching public tenders, rational and economical implementation of the budget, and consistent adherence to the principle of good diligence. His/her task is also to call citizens’ assemblies and (when people’s lives and/or property are compromised) to adopt urgent measures\(^7\) (Prašnikar, 2000: 46).

However, the mayor’s most important function is to be the head of municipal administration. The mayor is sovereign and practically untouchable throughout the entire term of office. Together with the municipal administration he/she heads, the mayor can pursue a rather independent policy in the municipality, regardless of those pursued by the municipal council. However, this can cause trouble in case the elected mayor does not come from one of the parties that control the majority in the municipal council. As the head of municipal administration, the mayor: (1) decides on administrative matters in municipal competence at the second

---

\(^4\) The mayor (1) provides for the publication of the statutes, decrees, and other municipal general legal acts; (2) provides for the annulment of conclusions and the execution of other decisions of the municipal council; (3) directs the work of municipal administration with regard to the execution of decisions adopted by the municipal council; and (4) executes the decisions of the municipal council in accordance with their own powers and tasks (LSGA, Art. 33).

\(^5\) The mayor submits proposals of the following: (1) the draft municipal budget and the draft consolidated balance sheet, as well as other budgetary acts; (2) the establishment of bodies of municipal administration and the body(-ies) of joint municipal administration; and (3) the appointment of deputy mayors and the decision on (non-)professional performance of the function of deputy mayor.

\(^6\) Within his/her competences, the mayor provides for the lawfulness of regulations and other decisions adopted by the municipal council, as follows: the mayor may (1) withhold the publication of a general legal act of the municipality; (2) submit a request to the Constitutional Court for the assessment of the compliance of a municipality’s general legal act with the Constitution and the law; (3) withhold the execution of the decisions adopted by the municipal council and notify the competent ministry of the unlawfulness of the decisions in question; and (4) initiate the procedure for the nullification of administrative decisions before the Administrative Court (LSGA, Art. 33; Catalogue, 1997).

\(^7\) As commander of the civil defence, the mayor decides on all matters concerning the protection against environmental and other disasters and adopts the protection and rescue plans (LSGA, Art. 33; Catalogue, 1997).
level; (2) decides on appeals filed against the decisions adopted by the body of joint municipal administration that belong to the territorial jurisdiction of the municipality the mayor governs; (3) decides in disputes over jurisdiction between bodies of municipal administration; (4) appoints and dismisses the DMA and heads of bodies within the municipal administration; (5) acting with other mayors, appoints head of the body of joint municipal administration; (6) determines the systematisation of posts in municipal administration; (7) decides on the appointment or conclusion of employment relationship(s) in the municipality; (8) orders the municipal administration to perform the tasks in support of the municipal council and is accountable to the council for the performance of municipal administration with regard to the execution of decisions adopted by the municipal council; (9) provides for expert and administrative assistance of the municipal administration to the municipal oversight committee; and (10) directs the work of municipal administration and the body of the joint municipal administration (Juvan Gotovac, 2000: 17). To conclude, the mayor of a Slovenian municipality is thus the central figure of the Slovenian local self-government system, and being a single-person body, he/she is the most prominent figure among local citizens.

3. The Relationship between the Mayor and the Director of Municipal Administration

Provisions of the LSGA, which regulate the decision-making and management of municipal administration, are too general to enable a mutual normal, fair, and professional division of competences and responsibilities between the mayor and the DMA. The notion of the »head« has no clear definition in the legislation, making unclear what it encompasses, thus resulting in numerous difficulties encountered by the actual management of municipal administrations. As a consequence, the distribution of competences pertaining to the management of administration between the mayor and the DMA is subject to gross variations. This distribution most frequently depends on the professional capacities of the holders of respective functions, on whether the mayor performs his/her function professionally or not, and not uncommonly, on the two actors’ personal relations. One has to bear in mind that the success of municipal administration mostly depends on its senior professionals, since holders of political functions come and go, most often leaving the administration when they
have acquired the necessary expert knowledge and skills of administrative management. The majority of drawbacks and confusions in managing the administration can be overcome simply by clear definition of the mayor and DMA's tasks, as well as through intensive education of the senior personnel (Prašnikar, 2000: 48–49).

Thus, the unclear relationship between the mayor and the DMA poses the greatest problem. Since legislative provisions are too vague, the definition of concrete substance of the terms head of administration and direct management of administration is urgently required within the limits of these provisions, as well as what the actual competences and responsibilities are, what the relationships between heads of different departments (sectors, units) and the DMA within the administration are, and what the proceedings and verifications of individual documents in various procedures (public tenders, preparations and the procedure of signing contracts, etc.) are. The more detailed the definition of these relationships, the fewer ambiguities and potentially conflicting situations (Prašnikar, 2000: 48). The mayor should hence de facto perform only the functions of decision-making, directing, delegating, and controlling. The DMA should be entrusted with the managerial function, although this division is (often) very mild. The problem is that the role of civil servants is neither completely administrative nor entirely political. Case by case, differing policies provide for the mixing of politics and expertise, since the DMAs (must) often act politically, whereas the mayors are frequently faced with circumstances in which they are expected to show expertise.

Because of unclear relationships between mayors and DMAs and because of too vague legislative provisions on the concrete tasks of the latter, situations of confusion occur, which municipalities attempt to resolve in unique ways, most often with mayors authorising their DMAs. Therefore, the role and power of DMAs in Slovenian municipalities vary, since certain directors tend to enjoy a far greater scope of powers conferred upon them by their respective mayors than do their counterparts in other municipalities. Of course, this (can) manifest(s) itself in the participation of the DMAs in the policy-making process, because some of them can participate in and influence the adoption of (political) decisions, whereas others only execute the already adopted decisions.

---

8 We emphasise the problem of democratic legitimacy, since the DMA is not elected by the voters/citizens but is appointed by the mayor. Authorisation of the DMA for the execution of tasks originally belonging to the scope of mayor’s competences may also mean politicisation of the DMA’s function.
These theoretical bases have served as a foundation of our empirical research. The interest of this research was in the mayor as the apex of political power in the municipality on one hand, and in the DMA as the apex of the municipal administration on the other. Due to the fact that the survey respondents comprise two larger groups – by virtue of who they are – we divided them accordingly, so as to facilitate comparisons of formal roles and relationship(s) between holders of political function and senior civil servants within the local-level political process.

Our empirical survey covered relationships between mayors and DMAs that included the delegation of execution of mayoral tasks to the DMA and mutual relationships. We primarily intended to establish the percentage of mayors that actually authorised their DMAs to execute tasks originally belonging to the scope of mayoral competence, and to see which tasks were delegated to the DMAs for execution. 82.5% of mayors included in the survey said they had authorised their respective DMAs to execute at least one task that was otherwise within their own competence. Even slightly higher (85%) was the percentage of DMAs who said they had been authorised by their mayors in this manner. The comparison of the mayors and DMAs’ responses regarding the type of task reveals that the majority of DMAs are authorised to carry out tasks concerning cooperation in project groups, the most demanding projects in municipalities, and the most difficult tasks of municipal administrations, especially covering public procurements and tenders. The fewest DMAs are authorised to perform the tasks of civil defence, relief and fire safety, as well as other tasks related to municipalities’ defence plans and other tasks in the field of defence.

9 Our research project Models of Structuring the Local-Level Executive Power was conducted by the Centre for the Analysis of Administrative-Political Processes and Institutions in spring 2011 and covered mayors and DMAs of Slovenian municipalities (the survey was conducted only in those municipalities that had the position of the DMA – 191 out of 210 municipalities). Survey response rates were good, as 100 DMAs (52.4%) and 80 mayors (41.8%) took part in the survey.

10 The term »delegation« is used in the sense that the mayor transfers his/her tasks and responsibilities to the DMA (only) for the execution/implementation.

11 Question: »Does the mayor authorize the DMA to perform the tasks within mayor’s competence?« If »yes« the secondary question was »What are these tasks?«

12 According to the data provided by mayors who participated in the survey (N = 79), 85.2% of the mayors who perform their function professionally and 80% of those who perform their function non-professionally have authorised their DMAs for the execution of at least one of their own competences. This leads us to conclude that the (non-)profes-
Considering the significant percentage of mayors who had delegated at least part of their powers to the DMAs, we were somewhat surprised by the data referring to their mutual relationships. Namely, 72.2% of the DMAs chose the answer »I am subordinated«, which corresponds to the opinion of mayors, of whom 84.4% said they were the superiors.\(^{13}\) We can conclude that the mayors – even when they authorise their DMAs for the execution of tasks that are otherwise within their own jurisdiction – remain aware of their superior position in relation to the DMAs; the same is true vice-versa: despite having powers of executing certain tasks on mayors’ behalf, the DMAs are still aware of their inferior position.

When ascertaining the (non-)cooperation between mayors and DMAs, we used the laws of teamwork.\(^{14}\) On the basis of principles that govern teamwork,\(^{15}\) survey respondents were given an array of statements.\(^{16}\) Both the mayors and the DMAs most often chose the answer »always or often«; the highest percentage (87.8% on the part of DMAs and 92.5% on the part of mayors) of such answers applied to the statement, »The mayor and..."
the DMA abide by and fulfil mutual agreements.« On the basis of these data, we claim that the mayors and DMAs in Slovenian municipalities to a large extent behave in accordance with the principles of a good team. Miglič and Vuković (2006: 71) further establish that the atmosphere inside a successful team is relaxed, informal, and pleasant. Since we were interested in the relationship between the mayor and the DMA at work, we included the question on this topic as well. Most DMAs (48%) opted for the answer »strictly formal«, followed by the answer »semi-formal« (45.9%), and only a few individuals chose the answer »informal« (6.1%). As for mayors, the highest percentage (48.6%) gave the answer »semi-formal«, followed by the answer »strictly formal« (41.9%). Just as the DMAs, the mayors also chose the answer »informal« least frequently (9.5%). The answers provided by both groups of actors allow us to see that the workplace relationship between the mayor and the DMA is not of the informal type in most Slovenian municipalities. Nevertheless, it is interesting that mayors more frequently perceive their relationships with DMAs as semi-formal, whereas DMAs in most cases claim that their relationship with mayors is of strictly formal nature. Maybe this too can be connected to the fact that the DMA is subordinated to the mayor and hence more frequently takes a strictly formal stance, whereas mayors are aware of their dominant position and thus tend to have a more relaxed and less formal attitude towards DMAs.

In addition to the already described relationships, we wanted to find out about the general views of each of the two groups of actors regarding the local-level dichotomy between administration and politics. For the first question, survey respondents were given a numerical scale with which they had to express the perceived degree of influence on the area that was supposed to be the domain of the opposite group of actors. Thus, the DMAs had to assess the intensity of their influence on (local) politics, and the mayors, in turn, had to assess their impact on expertise. The data reveal that the average value of answers provided by the DMAs was 4.69; while the average on the part of mayors was 6.22 (on a scale ranging from 0 – »no influence at all« to 10 – »very high influence«). These results allow us to conclude that the mayors have more influence on expertise than the DMAs have on (local) politics. This question was followed by a set of statements regarding the relationship between politics and adminis-

---

17 Question: »Your relationship with the DMA (or with the mayor in case of DMA) in the workplace is?« There were three available answers to choose from »strictly formal«; »semi-formal« and »informal«.
tration, whereby mayors and DMAs were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with them (see Table 1).

Table 1: Attitudes of mayors and DMAs towards the local-level politico-administrative dichotomy (per cent of agreement with individual statements)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil servants should primarily deal with technical and expertise-related problems.</th>
<th>DMAs</th>
<th>Mayors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>85.6</td>
<td>84.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The policy-making process should be the exclusive domain of politicians, since citizens have given them the mandate to deal with it.</td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>54.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The mayor leaves the management of the municipal administration entirely up to the DMA and does not interfere with it in any way.</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The mayor does not interfere with the decision-making in administrative procedures at the first stage.</td>
<td>83.5</td>
<td>91.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The DMA participates in the formulation of (local-level) policies.</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>51.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The mayor of an average Slovenian municipality should leave the management of the municipal administration entirely up to the DMA, as the latter is the highest and the most qualified senior civil servant in the municipality.</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research Project Models of Structuring the Local-Level Executive Power (2011).

We must emphasise the agreement of 63.8% of DMAs with the statement that »The mayor of an average Slovenian municipality should leave the management of the municipal administration entirely up to the DMA as the latter is the highest and the most qualified senior civil servant in the municipality.« If we compare this to the actual situation in Slovenian municipalities, we are faced with a surprisingly low percentage of agreement with the statement »The mayor leaves the management of the municipal administration entirely up to the DMA and does not interfere with it in any way«, both by the DMAs (36.5%) and the mayors (33.3%). Based on this, we conclude that the DMAs are in principle in favour of a wider autonomy of municipal administration and the increase of their own independence at work vis-a-vis the mayor. However, in practice, this is not the case, as our research results show, since most mayors do not leave the management of municipal administration in any significant part up to their DMAs.
Furthermore, we emphasise the fact that the relationships between the mayors and DMAs are cooperative in the majority of Slovenian municipalities. How is it possible that the relationship between the mayor and the DMA is cooperative even though we have established that the DMA is subordinated to the mayor? The answer to this question may be looked up in the legislation, namely in the provision claiming that the DMA is appointed and dismissed by the mayor (Local Self-Government Act, Article 49). Obviously, the mayor also selects the DMA. According to the data we collected, 72.2% of mayors who took part in the survey claimed they had appointed »their own« DMA and 65.6% of DMAs participating in the survey were appointed by the current mayor. As the main motivations behind the selection, both groups listed positive experience from preceding cooperation (mayors 53.6%, DMAs 47.5%), followed by application to public tenders/the mayor and the DMA had not cooperated on before (mayors 26.8%, DMAs 31.1%), personal acquaintance (mayors 5.4%, DMAs 4.9%), other (recommendations; the DMA had already been employed in the municipality; expertise – mayors 14.3%, DMAs 14.8%), and lastly, political motifs (none of the mayors chose this answer and a very low percentage of DMAs gave it – only 1.6%). These data allow us to draw two conclusions, (1) the mayor appoints the DMA for whom he/she believes to be cooperative and (2) if the function of the DMA is performed by a person with whom the newly elected mayor cooperates according to the principles of teamwork, this person is not dismissed or replaced.

---

18 Question: »Did you appoint the current DMA?« or in the case of DMA »Were you appointed by the current mayor?« If »yes« the sub-question was: »What was the main motive?« The possible answers were »positive experience from preceding cooperation«; »personal acquaintance«; »application to public tenders/we have not cooperated before«; »political motive« and »other.«

19 Despite the fact that the answer »political« motive was chosen by less than 2% of DMAs and by 0% of mayors, we nevertheless question whether the very appointment of the DMA is (frequently) about the division of »political booty« and the associated search for compromises or even a local-level coalition.
4. The Relationship between the Mayor and the Deputy Mayor

Article 33a of the LSGA stipulates that the municipality shall have at least one deputy mayor who is appointed (and dismissed) by the mayor. The mayor selects and appoints the deputy mayor from among members of the municipal council, meaning that every deputy mayor is previously directly elected to the municipal council. The deputy mayor’s task is to assist the mayor with his/her work and to perform tasks belonging to the mayor’s competences for which the former has been authorised by the latter. Furthermore, the deputy mayor acts on mayor’s behalf in case the latter is absent or non-attending. During the time of absence, the deputy mayor performs current tasks in mayor’s competence plus those tasks the mayor has additionally authorised him/her to execute.

Since the Act contains no specific provision as to the number of deputy mayors (»at least one«), the municipality may have several. If this is the case, the mayor is supplanted by the eldest deputy mayor, unless one of them has been predetermined for this role by the mayor. A similar arrangement exists in case of early termination of a mayor’s term of office – the deputy mayor takes over the mayor’s position until a new person is elected and takes office. If a municipality has several deputy mayors, the mayor is replaced by the person whom he/she has selected, provided that the mayor is not dismissed. If the mayor selects none of the deputy may-

---

20 This legislative arrangement has been in force since 2005 (Official Gazette, No. 72/05). Prior to this, the Act stipulated that the deputy mayor was to be appointed and dismissed by the municipal council, acting on a proposal submitted by the mayor, who selected a member of the municipal council as candidate deputy mayor (Official Gazette, No. 74/98).

21 At this point, we stress the problématique of simultaneous performance of two functions by the deputy mayor, since the deputy mayor, as an individual, acts both as a legislator when acting as a member of the municipal council and as the executor of their own legislative decisions and solutions when performing the function of the deputy mayor. This is obviously contentious from the point of a clear division of competences and political power. Initially, the Act on Local Self-Government (until subsequent amendments were passed in 1998) had been built upon a strict division of power concerning the municipal bodies and their mutual relationships – especially between the municipal council and the mayor (Grafenauer, 2000: 415). This is clearly stipulated with regard to mayors: since they usually head the municipal administration, their participation in the decision-making of the municipal council would be unacceptable (Vlaj, 1998: 273). However, this fact is simply overlooked in the case of the deputy mayor, who can de facto substitute the mayor and who performs tasks belonging to the latter’s competences, whilst retaining his/her right to vote in the municipal council.
ors to hold the office temporarily or in case the mayor is dismissed, the principle of seniority does not apply. Instead, the municipal council determines which one of its members will take this post (LSGA, Article 33 a). Just as the mayor and the members of the municipal council, the deputy mayor is a holder of political function in the municipality. Municipal politicians are usually non-professionals (this is true of all municipal councilors); however, the mayor has the choice of whether to perform their function professionally or non-professionally. The deputy mayor may also opt for (non-)professional performance of his/her duty. Each holder of a local-level political function is entitled to a salary, provided their functions are professional, or at least to remuneration if they perform their duties non-professionally. Salaries of professional holders of municipal political functions are determined in accordance with the Act regulating salaries in the public sector. If the deputy mayor is a non-professional, he/she is entitled to remuneration no higher than 50% of the salary he/she would receive for professional duty. The exact sum of the deputy mayor’s remuneration is determined by the mayor, taking into account the scope of the deputy mayor’s powers, whereby allowance for the years of service is not considered (LSGA, Article 34a).

According to the LSGA, every municipality ought to have at least one deputy mayor. However, the data we acquired reveal that this is not the case. We found that 34 municipalities have no deputy mayors at all; most such municipalities belong to the group of municipalities with a population between 3,000 and 5,000 inhabitants (14 out of 53). Table 2 shows that most municipalities without deputy mayors are small (up to 5,000 inhabitants), whereas in the groups of large(r) and largest municipalities (over 20,000, more than 30,000, and exceeding 100,000 inhabitants), there is no municipality that does not have at least one deputy mayor.

---

22 The phrase »perform their function professionally« is used in sense that this is mayor’s/deputy mayor’s full-time job and that she/he is not employed somewhere else.

23 According to data from the Ministry of Justice and Public Administration, Local Self-Government Department, there were 108 professional mayors in Slovenian municipalities in 2009; in 2010, there were 111; in 2011, the number somewhat increased, to 128; in 2012, the data has so far been submitted by 182 municipalities, in which 104 mayors perform their functions professionally (Ministry, 2012).

24 Data collection took place in the second half of December 2011, by virtue of an inquiry regarding the number of deputy mayors and the form of their function (professional or non-professional) sent to official e-mail addresses of Slovenian municipalities.
With respect to the number of deputy mayors appointed, most municipalities have a single deputy mayor (109 out of 177, or 62%), followed by municipalities with two deputy mayors (54), three deputy mayors (11) and three urban municipalities (Kranj, Maribor and Ljubljana), which have four deputy mayors each. Clearly, the number of deputy mayors is proportional to the size of municipalities, in terms of population. In December 2011, a total of 262 municipal councillors held the office of deputy mayors in Slovenian municipalities.\(^{25}\)

Table 2: Municipalities according to the number of inhabitants and the number of their deputy mayors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Municipalities</th>
<th>Do not have</th>
<th>1 Deputy mayor</th>
<th>2 Deputy mayors</th>
<th>3 Deputy mayors</th>
<th>4 Deputy mayors</th>
<th>Number of Deputy-Mayors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Up to 3,000 inhabitants</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 3,001 to 5,000 inhabitants</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 5,001 to 10,000 inhabitants</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 10,001 to 15,000 inhabitants</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 15,001 to 20,000 inhabitants</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 20,001 to 30,000 inhabitants</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 30,001 to 100,000 inhabitants</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 100,000 inhabitants</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^{25}\) During our data collection, the new composition of the National Assembly was constituted, which included 7 deputy mayors (all of them came from municipalities with over 10,000 inhabitants), whose function expired as a consequence; in addition, the function of one deputy mayor expired because that person was appointed to another post that is also incompatible with the deputy mayor’s function (if these persons were considered, the total number of deputy mayors would be 270). These 8 deputy mayors were excluded from the analysis and subsequently from the research itself.
In the earlier section on institutional basis, we mentioned that the deputy mayor – in consultation with the mayor – decides whether to perform his/her duty professionally or non-professionally. The data show that Slovenian municipalities have 245 non-professional deputy mayors (94%) and only 17 professional deputy mayors. Since we were interested whether professional status of deputy mayor is conditioned by the non-professional status of the mayor, we checked whether the mayors of these municipalities performed their duty professionally or non-professionally. The results show that in 9 municipalities, the functions are performed professionally by both the mayor and (at least one) 26 deputy mayor; in the remaining 7 municipalities, mayors are non-professional and their respective deputy mayors are professional. We add the data on deputy mayors with regard to their gender. As with mayors, the ratio is strongly in favour of men on deputy mayoral function. There are only 42 female deputy mayors, which amounts to 19%. As a curiosity, we may add that 7 female deputy mayors perform their duty professionally, from among 17 professional deputy mayors in Slovenian municipalities, which is 41%.

Apart from objective statistics, we wanted to gather data on the relationships between mayors and deputy mayors of Slovenian municipalities by analysing the answers in survey questionnaires. For this purpose, we conducted a survey among current mayors and deputy mayors of Slovenian municipalities and asked them about their standpoints regarding the institution of deputy mayor. From among 114 mayors who participated in the survey, 100 (87.7%) responded that they had appointed (at least

26 Only the Urban Municipality of Maribor currently has two professional deputy mayors.

27 Research project Mayors and Deputy mayors was conducted by the Centre for the Analysis of Administrative-Political Processes and Institutions in February 2012 and covered mayors and deputy mayors of Slovenian municipalities (it included 200 mayors and 262 deputy mayors; 11 mayors were subsequently excluded from our analysis as they were elected in parliamentary elections in December 2011, which resulted in the termination of their terms of office as mayors and by-elections of mayors took place in March 2012; additionally, we excluded 8 deputy mayors as well). 114 completed questionnaires for mayors (57%) and 123 for deputy mayors were returned (47%).

28 Question »Did you appoint the deputy mayor?« If »yes« the secondary question was »How many?« If »no« the secondary question was »Why not?«
one) deputy mayor. 14 (12.3%) mayors claimed they had appointed no deputy mayors. As far as the delegation of powers is concerned, 80% of mayors who took part in the survey responded that they had delegated part of their powers to their deputy mayors. On the other hand, the percentage of deputy mayors who claimed that they had been delegated part of the mayor’s competences was somewhat higher (91.1%). Survey participants were further asked to state the approximate share of delegated powers; 79% of mayors and 46.2% of deputy mayors said this share was below 25%. Table 3 shows that most mayors delegate their competences of representation and legal representation of the municipality to deputy mayors (48.1% of mayors, according to mayors and 76.6%, according to deputy mayors included in the survey). However, none of the mayors claimed that they had authorised their deputy mayor(s) to manage the municipality as a sui generis enterprise and act in legal relationships of the municipality under property law.

29 Of these, 64% of mayors have one deputy mayor, 29% two and 7% three deputy mayors. The mayors who appointed more than one deputy mayor were asked why they did so. Mayors were given several possible answers from which they had to pick the ones they agreed with. Most mayors (47.2%) agreed that this was a manner of overcoming political discord; 33.3% said this was due to the size of their municipalities or excessive scope of their work; 30.6% agreed with the statement that this was the more efficient division of work; 22.2% of mayors stated that the deputy mayor was a matter of coalition treaty. However, 80.6% of mayors opposed the statement claiming that they had appointed several deputy mayors because they were performing their function non-professionally.

30 The mayors who have appointed no deputy mayors were asked about the reasons for such a decision. 21.4% of mayors responded that they had no available funds; 14.3% claimed there had been no suitable personnel to recruit from in the municipal council; and 64.3% of mayors answered that they had no deputy mayor because they simply did not need one.

31 Question: »Does the mayor authorize deputy mayor(s) to perform the tasks within mayor’s competence?« If »yes« the secondary questions was »What are these tasks?«

32 Question: »The proportion of such tasks is?« The possible answers were »less than 25 percent«; »between 25 and 50 percent«; »between 50 and 75 percent«; »more than 75 percent« and »don’t know.«

33 In total, 97% of mayors said that the percentage of matters belonging to the scope of their competences they had delegated to the deputy mayor was less than 50%; while 84% of deputy mayors estimated the share of these matters to be below 50%.
Table 3: Competences of the mayor delegated to the deputy mayor (percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Competence</th>
<th>MAYORS YES</th>
<th>MAYORS NO</th>
<th>DEPUTY MAYORS YES</th>
<th>DEPUTY MAYORS NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Complete powers in case of mayor’s absence</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>43.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representation and legal representation of the municipality</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>76.6</td>
<td>23.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representation of the municipal council plus summoning and chairing of its sessions</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>87.7</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>68.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submitting proposals of decrees and other general legal acts of the municipality</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>92.6</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>83.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Execution of the decisions adopted by the municipal council</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>80.2</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>57.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heading the municipal administration</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>97.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>96.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providing for the publication of adopted general legal acts of the municipality and the protection of constitutionality and legality of the operation of municipal bodies</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>98.8</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>89.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management of the municipality as a <em>sui generis</em> enterprise and acting in legal relationships of the municipality under property law</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>95.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public relations, calling citizens’ assemblies, calling local referenda and responding to citizens’ questions, initiatives, and proposals</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>91.4</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>59.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance of delegated tasks and decision-making in administrative matters belonging to the scope of municipality’s original and delegated (i.e., state) competences</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>92.6</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>93.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management of project groups for the most demanding, crucial projects and largest investments</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>63.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Execution and monitoring of the municipal budget</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>90.1</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>64.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tasks in the field of public tenders and procurement</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>82.7</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>75.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent formulation of key systemic solutions and other materials of considerable complexity</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>95.1</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>84.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management of procedures and decision-making in matters of employment relationships (i.e., personnel recruitment)</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>98.8</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>96.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other*</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>82.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Other: responses related to: a) civil society activities, societies; b) the work and coordination of local communities and city quarters; c) various duties of protocol and presence at public events; d) management of projects for public water distribution and sewerage systems and management of civil servants’ work; e) the area of economy and assistance with small-scale projects intended for the municipality’s development.


In addition to our interest in the percentage and type of mayoral tasks deputy mayors tend to execute, we asked both groups of actors where (if at all) their respective municipalities had stipulated the competences or tasks of their deputy mayor(s).\textsuperscript{34} 61.6\% of mayors and 69.7\% of deputy mayors responded that these competences were stipulated by the statutes of their municipalities; a relatively high percentage of both mayors (41.4\%) and deputy mayors (48.4\%) said that these competences were stipulated by decisions on the appointment of individual deputy mayors; this was followed by the rules of procedure of the municipal council (29.3\% of mayors and 32\% of deputy mayors maintained that the competences of deputy mayors were regulated by this act). Less than one tenth of mayors and deputy mayors who participated in the survey replied that the deputy mayor’s competences were not stipulated anywhere.

Since there have been frequent allusions to the (non-)necessity of the institution of deputy mayor, we asked both groups of survey participants a question that referred to this issue.\textsuperscript{35} Nearly 86\% of mayors and 98\% of deputy mayors answered that the municipality undoubtedly required a deputy mayor. Furthermore, 82\% of mayors and 53\% of deputy mayors said that one deputy mayor was necessary; 16\% of mayors and 37\% of deputy mayors claimed that two were required; 2.6\% of mayors and 10.3\% of deputy mayors thought that the municipality should have three deputy mayors.\textsuperscript{36} At the same time, more than 64\% of mayors and 45\% of deputy mayors

\textsuperscript{34} Question: »The competences or tasks of deputy mayor(s) were stipulated...« The possible answers were »competences were stipulated by the statute«; »competences were stipulated by decisions on the appointment of individual deputy mayor «; »the competences of deputy mayors were set down by the rules of procedure of the municipal council «; »competences were not stipulated anywhere « and »other.«

\textsuperscript{35} Question: »Does the municipality need the deputy mayor?« If »yes «, the secondary question was »How many?«

\textsuperscript{36} Mayors and deputy mayors were given some suggestions as to what determines the number of deputy mayors in a municipality. They expressed their agreement with each of the suggestions as follows: the size of the municipality (52.7\% of mayors and 65.5\% of deputy mayors agreed with this statement); available funds (9.7\% of mayors and 12.6\% of deputy mayors); scope of work (57\% of mayors and 56.3\% of deputy mayors); the type of mayor’s
mayors agreed that the function of the deputy mayor should be non-professional, while only 4% of mayors and 12% of deputy mayors stated the opposite. 29.5% of mayors and 43% of deputy mayors think that the type of the deputy mayor’s function should depend on the (non-)professional status of the mayor.37

It is also interesting that just over 78% of mayors and almost 84% of deputy mayors said that the deputy mayor’s holding a double function (the legislative and the executive) was acceptable; the statement that the deputy mayor should give up the function in the municipal council was supported by 13% of mayors and by less than 7% of deputy mayors.38 At the end of our survey, there was a question for deputy mayors, asking whether or not they were satisfied with the remuneration they received for their work,39 and 65% of deputy mayors said they were,40 which hardly comes as a surprise, as this is their extra income.41

5. Conclusions

This article deals with three actors within Slovenian municipalities – the mayor, the DMA, and the deputy mayor. Its primary interest is in the relationships between the mayor and the DMA, and between the mayor term of office (non-professional) and potential other deputy mayors (53.8% of mayors and 52.9% of deputy mayors); and balance of power in the municipal council (22.6% of mayors and 10.9% of deputy mayors).

37 Question: »Do you think that the deputy mayor(s) should be in his/her office:«
   »professionally«; »non-professionally«; »depending on the (non-)professional status of the mayor«; »don’t know.«

38 Question: »Do you think that deputy mayor’s holding a double function (the legislative and the executive) is acceptable?«

39 Question: »Are you satisfied with the remuneration you receive for your work?«

40 Remuneration for the non-professional mayor includes attendance fees for attending the sessions of the municipal council and membership in its committees and commissions. These amounts are categorised under the budgetary term of »municipal expenditures of system’s operation« (including all those expenditures related to the maintenance of the system or the operation of the municipality, i.e., its bodies – the mayor, municipal councilors, municipal administration, etc.) and even though these costs vary widely across municipalities, they typically represent around one fifth of all budgetary expenditures of an average Slovenian municipality (Brezovnik, Oplotnik, 2012: 283).

41 As a curiosity, we mention a comment made by one of the deputy mayors who took part in the survey, claiming the amount of his remuneration to be too high with respect to the duties he performs as a deputy mayor.
and the deputy mayor, particularly from the aspect of division of powers. We can conclude that the mayor is free to delegate (or not) tasks from the scope of his/her own competences both to the DMA and the deputy mayor, without being obliged to take any consultations with other municipal (or state) authorities. In this manner, tasks and competences of DMAs and deputy mayors vary significantly across Slovenian municipalities. Moreover, despite the fact that the legislator intended that each municipality must have one DMA and at least one deputy mayor, there are several municipalities whose situation remains unlawful, because their mayors have appointed neither of the two required persons – 19 municipalities lack the highest senior civil servant and 34 have no deputy mayors.\footnote{Data from June 2011.}\footnote{Data from January 2012.}

However, we want to put special emphasis on the legislation regarding the very method of appointment of the DMA and the deputy mayor and the manner in which their competences are regulated. As we have already said, both the DMA and the deputy mayor are autonomously appointed and dismissed by the mayor; it is therefore urgent to consider a different selection method. Considering that DMAs comprise the local-level administrative elite, their characteristics (expertise, independence, permanent office) and their ambitions towards wider independence (primarily) from mayors, their competences, tasks, and role urgently require a more precise regulation. At the same time, it would be necessary to ponder a method of selection of the DMA that would be different from the one currently in force, allowing the mayor to autonomously hire (appoint) and fire the DMA. This would undoubtedly contribute to greater professionalism and non-interference of the political sphere in the operation of the municipal administration. Quite to the contrary, current legislation tolerates the situation in which the highest-ranking and most competent senior civil servant of the municipality is formally subordinated to the mayor, as the former is held accountable by the latter for the work of entire municipal administration. Moreover, the mayor authorises the DMA for the execution of certain tasks. The data we acquired also support our assumptions about the DMA’s subordination to the mayor, which clearly makes favourable conditions for the creation of grey areas or blind spots of accountability for certain actions.
A similar logic applies to the appointment of deputy mayors. The law has stipulated that there has to be at least one deputy mayor, whilst giving no maximum number of deputy mayors and also lacking criteria that would justify (if at all) more than one deputy mayor per municipality. Therefore, the authors propose a reflection on different methods of selection, such as direct election of the deputy mayor by citizens, that is, by voters (and from among them), or election of the deputy mayor by the municipal council. Current legislation is far too much in favour of consolidation of the mayors’ position and power, as they can (and in most cases do) appoint their followers to the functions of the DMA and deputy mayor, who in turn (often uncritically) support their mayor in every aspect. Apart from a more appropriate regulation of selection of the DMA and deputy mayor, a clear delineation of competences of each of the two actors is necessary, because the more precisely the responsibilities and relationships are defined, the less room there is for confusion and potentially contentious situations.

We conclude with the triangle of relationships between the mayor, the DMA, and the deputy mayor. This article has thoroughly analysed the sides represented by the relationships mayor–DMA and mayor–deputy mayor. What remains is the connection between the DMA and the deputy mayor. Our data show that, in general, this relationship also works, since 86% of deputy mayors included in the survey claimed that they had good, fair relationships with their respective DMA (Research Project »Mayors and Deputy mayors« 2012). We nevertheless stress the question of hierarchy of the DMA and the deputy mayor (as both are appointed by the mayor), namely, whether DMAs see themselves as more subordinated and accountable to the mayors or to the deputy mayors. This is also a question of the delegation of mayoral powers to the DMA and to the deputy mayor: are the two always authorised for; do they execute separate powers without overlapping, or does a collision of powers occur? In addition, we want to draw attention to the general problématique of authorising the DMAs and deputy mayors, since in this way, legitimacy, which voters confer upon the directly elected politician (i.e., the mayor) is lost.

44 We support this claim with the data acquired by this year’s survey among mayors and deputy mayors, in which 87% of mayors and 90% of deputy mayors who took part claimed the current method of deputy mayor’s selection to be inappropriate. Question: »What do you think about current method of the deputy mayor’s selection?« The possible answers were »it is appropriate«; »deputy mayor should be chosen among citizens« deputy mayor should be elected by municipal council«; »deputy mayor should be directly elected«; »don’t know.«
What then happens with accountability? Is authorisation of mayors for the execution of certain competences (according to the legislation currently in force for the appointment of DMAs and deputy mayors) acceptable and admissible? In this regard, the DMA–deputy mayor side unquestionably represents yet another interesting aspect worth researching. Surely, the DMA and the deputy mayor are connected by (at least) one common point – the mayor.

References

Armstrong, Michael (1994) How to be an even Better Manager. London: Kogan Page


Brezovšek, Marjan, Miro Haček, Milan Zver (2008) Organizacija oblasti v Sloveniji. Ljubljana: Faculty of Social Sciences


Haček, Miro (2009b) Politiki in visoki javni uslužbeni: Kdo vlada? Ljubljana: Faculty of Social Sciences


Miglic, Gozdana, Goran Vukovic (2006) Spretnosti vodenja in sporazumevanja. Ljubljana: Ministry of Public Administration, Academy of Public Administration


RP-1 (2011) Research Project Modeli strukturiranja izvršilne oblasti na lokalni ravni. Ljubljana: Centre for the Analysis of Administrative-Political Processes and Institutions, Faculty of Social Sciences

RP-2 (2012) Research Project Mayors and Deputy Mayors. Ljubljana: Centre for the Analysis of Administrative-Political Processes and Institutions, Faculty of Social Sciences.


Vlaj, Stane (1998) Lokalna samouprava – občine in pokrajine. Ljubljana: Faculty of Social Sciences

Legal sources

Act on Local Self-Government (ZLS-J), Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, OG, No. 74/98, 72/05, 94/07 – Official Consolidated Version (ZLS-UPB2)

Act Regulating Wage Rates in Public Institutions, State Bodies and Local Community Bodies (ZRPJZ), OG 18/94

Act on Civil Servants (ZJU-UPB3), OG 63/07

Act on Local Elections (ZLV-UPB3), OG 94/07

Ordinance on officials’ salaries (OdPF), OG 14/06
MAYOR, DIRECTOR OF MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION
AND DEPUTY MAYOR: A LOVE TRIANGLE

Summary

The paper analyses the question of relations between the mayor and the director of municipal administration on one hand and between the mayor and deputy mayor on the other, particularly in terms of division of competences. The paper also deals with the standpoints of mayors and deputy mayors regarding the institution of deputy mayor. Furthermore, it verifies the assumption that the current regulatory framework regarding the appointment (and determination of competences) of the director of municipal administration and deputy mayor is not entirely appropriate. Based on the analysis of objective data and research surveys among mayors, directors of municipal administration, and deputy mayors of Slovenian municipalities, we analyse the problems of the functioning of those actors. We learn that current Slovenian legislation is in favour of consolidating the position and power of the mayor, because he/she can freely appoint, dismiss, and determine the competences of the highest official in the municipality as well as of the deputy mayor.

Key words: mayor, director of municipal administration, deputy mayor, relation, competences, municipality, Slovenia
GRADONAČELNIK, DIREKTOR GRADSKE UPRAVE
I DOGRADONAČELNIK:
LJUBAVNI TROKUT

Sažetak

U radu se analizira pitanje odnosa gradonačelnika i direktora gradske uprave s jedne strane te gradonačelnika i dogradonačelnika s druge strane. Posebna se pozornost poklanja podjeli njihovih ovlasti. Razmatraju se i stajališta gradonačelnika i dogradonačelnika o funkciji dogradonačelnika. Nadalje, potvrđuje se pretpostavka da sadašnji zakonodavni okvir koji regulira imenovanje i nadležnosti direktora gradske uprave i dogradonačelnika nije sasvim primjeren. Na temelju analize podataka i rezultata dobivenih anketom provedenom među gradonačelnicima, direktorima gradske uprave i dogradonačelnicima slovenskih lokalnih jedinica, analiziraju se problemi funkcioniranja tih aktera. Očito je da važeće slovensko zakonodavstvo podržava konsolidaciju položaja i ovlasti gradonačelnika, budući da on može po volji imenovati, razriješiti i odrediti ovlasti najvišeg službenika lokalne jedinice kao i dogradonačelnika.

Ključne riječi: gradonačelnik, direktor gradske uprave, dogradonačelnik, odnosi, ovlasti, lokalna jedinica, Slovenija