SAŽETAK: Proces stvaranja moderne hrvatske obavještajne zajednice u skladu s načelima demokratskog svijeta, bio je opterećen brojnim zahtjevnim izazovima zbog čega taj proces nije bio ni brz ni jednostavan. Međutim, usprkos činjenici da je Republika Hrvatska za vrijeme transformacije obavještajne zajednice iz totalitarnog sustava u demokratski sustav bila izložena vanjskoj i unutarnjoj agresiji, uspješno je prvo transformirala, a potom i reorganizirala svoj sigurnosni sustav. Iako je prošlo više od 20 godina od početka tog procesa, zbog politikantskih djelovanja, hrvatski sigurnosni sustav i dalje je povremeno opterećen štetnim utjecajem zaostalog totalitarnog mentaliteta.

KLJUČNE RIJEČI: obavještajna zajednica, Republika Hrvatska, Domovinski rat, SFRJ, OZN, UDB, SID, KOS, UB, JNA, UNS, HIS, SIS

1 Stavovi izneseni u ovom članku osobni su stavovi autora i ne mogu se ni pod kojim uvjetima smatrati službenim stavovima institucije u kojoj je autor članka zaposlen niti izdavača publikacije u kojoj je članak objavljen.
ABSTRACT: The process of creating modern Croatian intelligence community in line with the democratic principles was burdened with many demanding challenges for which the process was neither quick nor easy. However, despite the fact that the Republic of Croatia during the transformation of the intelligence community from a totalitarian system to a democratic system was exposed to external and internal aggression, Croatia has successfully transformed it firstly, and then reorganized its security system. Although it has been over 20 years since the beginning of this process, due irresponsible political activities, Croatian security system is still, occasionally, burdened by harmful influence of remained totalitarian (communist) mentality.

KEYWORDS: Intelligence community, Republic of Croatia, Homeland war, SFR Yugoslavia, OZN, UDB, SID, KOS, UB, JNA, UNS, HIS, SIS

Introduction

Society and existing paradigms can be changed in different ways. The extreme sides are or peaceful, or violent processes (including armed conflicts). The changes can be rapid, or gradual or slow, may be complete or partial. The process that will occur depends on many internal and external factors. It especially refers to the process of transformation of a one-party totalitarian security system in a democratic system that exists in modern parliamentary democracies.

In those cases, Intelligence community is going through a complete changes: from the guardian of the Revolution, of the Communist Party rulers, from the sword and shield in the hands of the Party in the fight against political opponents, to a system that fight against all totalitarianism, defending human rights and freedoms, the system that cares about preserving the democratic order, which opposes the use of violence and illegal methods and means of actions.

During the process of creation and of the modern Croatian state, security system was successfully transformed. Afterwards, few reorganization of the system was conducted, that did not achieve established goals. The authors describe conditions and the principles according to which intelligence community was firstly transformed, and
then created to a modern Croatian intelligence community even during the war.

Each process is, inevitably, loaded and faced with a number of challenges that need to be used as an experience to eliminate possible errors in future. The authors point out that the intelligence community is not and cannot be strictly defined system. It has to be (organizationally, with adequate human power, technologically, logistically) customizable for many existing, and future, challenges.

**Abut the time and context**

Organization of individual Intelligence Community (IC), with its activity in line with the established goals and tasks, is in direct relation to the prevailing social norms and ruling politics. Therefore, it represents one of the relevant testimonies of time when it was created, developed and operated. Complete analysis (objective, full, credible) of individual national IC, should include the narrow and wider context (aerial and temporal) when it is created and starts functioning, because various internal and external factors significantly influence IC development.

Under the narrower context, we understand processes, traditions and relationships within the national corps to which an IC belongs. They influence development, organization and operations of observed IC.

Under the wider context, we understand events and processes in the international community (immediate and wider) that either directly or indirectly, influence the observed IC.

In the analysis of Croatian IC in the narrow context, it is necessary to consider the impact of the following processes and events:

- The disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRJ) and the aggression of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) and Serbia against Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter B&H),
- Yugoslav communist legacy (ideological, mental, social, human, organizational),
- Completion of armed conflict and calming of the situation in South-East Europe (hereinafter SEE) and
- The process of integration and admission of Croatia into the NATO and the EU.
In a wider context, it is necessary to consider the impact of the following processes and events:

- The collapse of WP, fall of the Berlin Wall and the Iron Curtain, and the unification of Germany,
- The disintegration of multinational states ruled by communist regimes such as USSR, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, and the emergence of 15 new states in Europe in the early 1990s,
- The 1st Gulf War,
- Misunderstandings in the international community, primarily between the USA-EU-RF and within the EU,
- Open ("unsolved") internal and inter-state issues in SEE and
- Relations of the United States with the countries with Islamic political provenance.

In order to understand the process of creation and development of Croatian IC, it is necessary to describe the emergence and development of Yugoslavian IC, because of the communist legacy, and the violent break-up of Yugoslavia.

Here we want, clearly and undoubtedly, to say that the modern Croatian IC is neither the successor of the communist IC from the time of the existence of Yugoslavia, nor any of its components. Also it should be noted that the intelligence and security services from the Yugoslavian IC had a direct impact on the process of creating and organizing of objectives and tasks of the of Croatian IC before, during and after the aggression on Croatia, as well as during the process of Croatian accession to the international organizations. Key opponent of Croatian IC in the process of defence and the creation of the Croatian state were the Yugoslavian (and Serbian) IC member services.

1. Yugoslavian IC

Yugoslavia was, from 1945, created as a multi-ethnic country with a one-party totalitarian political system in which all power had the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, later renamed the League of Communists (hereinafter Party). The absolute power in Yugoslavia had Josip Broz Tito (hereinafter Tito). The Constitution of Yugoslavia proclaimed him a lifelong President of Yugoslavia. In addition, he was the undisputed head of the Party. During the process of creation and existence of Yugoslavia, the most important
role in shaping processes at all levels and areas of life had
the Party and its loyal members that interpreted world and
relationships in society according to the communist ideology.
That means that the dependence on Yugoslavian IC of the
Party was no exception.

Development, methodology, organization and operations
of IC of Yugoslavia, especially in today's Croatia, can be
divided into several phases:

- Creating a first precursor of Yugoslavian IC during
  World War II, from 1941-1944;
- The first reorganization 1944 (creating the OZN)
- The second reorganization in 1946 (creating the
  UDB) and
- Transformation in 1966 - creating SDB and IC of
  Yugoslavia.

1.1. Creating a first precursor of Yugoslavian IC during
World War II, from 1941-1944

The way in which Yugoslavian IC was created, organized,
and how it worked, does not significantly differ from
processes that created IC of other countries with one-party
communist system on European soil (e.g. GDR).

During the World War II, the Party developed and
modelled, according to the Soviet NKVD, and with the help
of Soviet advisers, its own intelligence and security system.
During 1942 it took complete control and command of the
anti-fascist uprising in the former Yugoslavia. With full
integration in anti-fascist movement, primarily security and
then intelligence part of the Party structure, the Party
created the conditions that led to the elimination of anti-
fascist leaders who were not members of the Party.

On 6th of May 1942, VŠ NOP&DVJ² issued the
"Guidelines on the organization and functioning of
intelligence service in the partisan and volunteer units in the
field." On 27th of November 1942 VŠ NOV&POJ³ issued an
"Intelligence service manual" that defined intelligence
organization, its goals and objectives. Intelligence
Department consisted of two parts: intelligence and
counterintelligence.

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² Supreme Headquarter of National Liberation Movement and Volunteer
   Army of Yugoslavia.
³ Supreme Headquarter of National Liberation Movement and Partisan
   Detachments of Yugoslavia.
1.2. The first reorganization 1944 (creating the OZN)

On 13th of May 1944, Tito signed an "Order on the establishment of the Department for people’s protection - OZN". Department became the organizational unit of the Ministry of Defence.

OZN had five departments:
1. Intelligence,
2. Counter-intelligence activities in the liberated territory,
3. Counter-intelligence activities in the army,
4. Statistics, analytics and technology and
5. Foreign intelligence services and foreign nationals in Yugoslavia (this department was established on 3rd March 1945)

All heads of the OZN, in federal headquarter in Belgrade, and as well as in headquarters in republics and autonomous provinces were the Secretaries general of the central Party organizations. At lower levels of command in the OZN, were low-ranking party officials. For “ideological purity” and the control and supervision of the activities of the OZN, a special party cell operated inside the OZN.

In this way, the OZN really became what creators wanted it to be, "political police" modelled according to the Soviet NKVD.

On 15th of May 1944, the KNOJ⁴ was established as armed formations in the service of OZN that, as its executive organ "on the free territory" participated in numerous deportations, arrests and liquidations of "enemies of the people" at the end, and right after the end, of the 2nd WW. Statistical data shows that the OZN and KNOJ (and its successor), in the period from 1945 to 1951, arrested or killed about 150,000 persons.⁵

1.3. The second reorganization in 1946 (creating the UDB)

On 31st of January 1946, new Yugoslavian constitution was adopted. After that, OZN was reorganized and became the UDB, precursor of Yugoslavian IC that existed at the time of Yugoslavian dissolution in 1990.

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⁴ People's Defence Corps of Yugoslavia
On 13th of March 1946, OZN was disbanded. New intelligence and security services were established:

- From the former third department, Counterintelligence Service of the JNA (known as KOS) was established; in later reorganization (14th of December 1955) it was renamed to Security Directorate (UB) of the Ministry of National Defence;
- From the part of the first OZN department, Intelligence Service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs - SID (Service for Investigations and Documentation) was formed;
- The remaining parts of reorganized OZN created a new service, the State Security Department (UDB), which was organizationally located in the Federal Ministry of the Interior. Republican OZN was reorganized according to the same principle. Remaining parts of the republic OZN organizationally transferred to the republican/provincial secretariat of the Interior.

1.4. Transformation in 1966 - creating of SDB and IC of Yugoslavia

After the 4th session of CK SKJ, because of internal political conflict and clash of interests between leading persons of the State and the Party (Tito vs. Ranković) the transformation of the UDB was ordered. Almost entire leadership, headed by A. Ranković (who at the time of dismissal and expulsion from the Party was vice president of Yugoslavia and Tito's deputy and a member of the highest party bodies) was released from all duties.

The UDB changed its name to the State Security Service (SDB). Its organisational chart is visible at Figure 1. SDB was active at the federal level and in the federal units. In various areas, SDB had a different names, and thus abbreviations. An SDB in Croatia had an abbreviation SDS that is going to be used later in the text when we are going to talk about the SDB in Croatia.

Although the SDB in the Republics were part of theirs ministries of the Interior, they were, for their work, under federal responsibility. On the level of the Republics, it was a professional, but primarily political responsibility. They did not need either a warrant or the approval from the Federal Security Service, if they wanted to operate within the national territory. If it was necessary to organize complex operational activities that would require activities that needs
to go beyond the borders of the base Republic, they needed authorizations from federal and territorially competent SDB.

In the federal headquarters of SDB in Belgrade (Figure 1.), but also in the Republican headquarters, an important role for the work of all SDB, had a "2nd Department". This department was responsible for repressive actions against political emigrants. Inside this Department, there was so-called "special activities group" that "independently planned and executed various actions abroad, using its own agent network. They carried out psychological campaigns of intimidation, harassment, disinformation; they were creating different documents and materials as well as the forgery of certain numbers of some emigrant publications, planned and organized burglaries at headquarters émigré organizations for exemption documents, and organized, according to specific indications, physical elimination of individuals"6.

At the federal level was an organizational unit, which dealt with cooperation with foreign ICs, because the cooperation with foreign ICs was allowed only to federal services. At the level of republics (Figure 2.), there was however, an organizational unit called "Independent Department for defence preparations of the country." The department created a network of associates in nearly the same manner and with the same objectives that had a "Stay-behind network" (also known as "Gladio" network) in the Western countries, but based on the communist political foundations.

Figure 1: Structure of the Federal SDB (part of Federal ministry of interior)
Figure 2: Structure of the SDB in SR of Croatia at the end of 1989 (part of Ministry of interior at the level of Socialist Republic of Croatia)

The structure and organization of the Yugoslavian IC, at the beginning of 1990, is visible at Figure 3. Yugoslavian IC, at the beginning of 1990, had two civilian (despite the fact that SDB in addition to the department’s headquarters, had jurisdiction over the six Republics and two provincial SDB) and two military services with different responsibilities and obligations.

Cooperation with foreign partners was allowed to almost all of them. It seems that coordination of those activities where organised at the political, not professional level, at the level of the federal ministers.

Red dot (Figures 3, 4, 5, and 6) shows where Party organisations where acted as an internal Party control of the IC, and a society at all. Quite often heads of the Party cells where more powerful then appointed heads of the institution.
Committee for GPD&SPS (presented as a red box in Figure 3) was very important part of the IC system, and a communist society in general. Members of the Committee were: President of the Party (of its Central committee), President of the State Presidency, the President of Parliament, the President of the Council for the protection of the constitutional order, the Prime Minister, President of SUBNOR, the ministers of defence, foreign and interior ministers (appropriate at the national level). Similar Committees were active also in the level of republics and local organisations. Despite the fact that this was state body, due to the fact that its chairman was a president of the Party, it was treated as a Party body. Everything what was important for the security of the communist society was
discussed in this body, from political, economical and security topics until personal appointments in the state institutions. Jurisdiction, differences, responsibilities and obligations of Yugoslavian IC member services are shown in Table 1.

**Table 1: Jurisdiction of Yugoslavian IC member services**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inside SFRY</th>
<th>Outside of SFRY</th>
<th>Members of Federal Coordination</th>
<th>Foreign IC cooperation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federal SDB</td>
<td>+7</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDB in Republics and AP</td>
<td>+8</td>
<td>+9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SID SSVP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UB SSNO</td>
<td>+11</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOS GŠ JNA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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7 Federal Service could, among other things, to act on the entire territory of Yugoslavia; it conducted co-ordination of activities of various republic/provincial agencies.

8 Republican and provincial (Vojvodina and the Kosovo and Metohija) services could act solely and exclusively within their borders. The activities outside the borders of their republic/province were not allowed without the consent of the Federal service and the republic/province in which they it was intended to carry out its temporary actions.

9 Republican/provincial SDB’s were allowed to act operationally, with the aim of collecting data of counter-intelligence nature, abroad only towards the citizens of their republic/province. In the event that they gathered data about citizens from other republic, they had to notify the Federal SDB (which already had to get all the relevant information) and the “home” SDB of that person.

10 Cooperation with foreign partners was allowed only through the Foreign ministry activities.

11 UB acted in accordance with the territorial organization of the JNA in the entire territory of the SFRY regardless of republican borders.

12 It was allowed to have a cooperation with some foreign, military counterintelligence, partners.

13 It was allowed to have a cooperation with some foreign, military intelligence, partners inside Yugoslavia and outside through the military attaché.
1.5. UB (Military Counterintelligence)

At the end of the 2nd WW, until 1990, UB went through numerous internal reorganizations caused by external and internal processes and events. At the end of this period (1989) UB was part of the Federal Ministry of Defense. Its structure is presented in Figure 4. During the whole period, UB was active in data collection by operational means. Since the JNA was a federal institution, UB acted in accordance with the territorial and branches organization of the JNA (Figure 7) in the entire territory of Yugoslavia. Members of the UB acted inside Territorial defense organization in republics (armed forces that were planned to be activated in crisis and/or a state of war). In this way, employees of UB had access to numerous civilian institutions. This access was abused by the members of UB after new JNA reorganization (Figure 7), when it became clear that the crisis in Yugoslavia is not going to be finished. UB recruited a number of persons for its agent network even among civilians. Although this was by that time law illegal, the leaders of UB, subsequently, justified these activities by the needs to preserve communist political system and the territorial unity of Yugoslavia at any cost.

Members of UB created a several networks with different agents in the area of today’s Croatia. Some of the members of those agent networks (at the territory of Socialist Republic of Croatia) were members of the republic’s Party bodies, ministry of Interior and even the SDS. Employees and agents of the UB, at the beginning of the Homeland war in Croatia (1990-1992) were responsible for carrying out numerous terrorist acts and sabotage (blasting the Jewish community and Jewish cemetery in Zagreb, the demolition of some of the monuments from the 2nd WW....)\(^\text{14}\).

UB acted also against “enemy emigration” and foreign intelligence services in cooperation with SID. All members of the UB had to take care about their own ideological and political orientation, but also ideological and political orientation of other members of the JNA, because preservation of communism and one-party totalitarian system was one of the key tasks of any member of Yugoslavian IC. The party organization that acted within UB took care about “ideological purity” and that UB is “in the line with Party decisions”. Cooperation with foreign services was restricted to the cooperation with services from friendly and non-aligned countries.

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\(^\text{14}\) Such as a groups called „Labrador“ and „Opera“.
1.6. VOS (Military Intelligence)

Just like UB, also the VOS went through several internal reorganizations caused by external and internal processes and events. At the end of the observation period (1989) VOS was part of JNA HQ and had the structure presented in Figure 5. During the entire period, VOS has put the focus on operational data collection, and later on RI (Radio intelligence).

Operational sources of VOS came from various sources: "Work of military attaches, operations of the intelligence centres in the country and abroad, units and institutions for electronic surveillance, inter-army cooperation, useful information, analysis, assessments and other materials of UB, SID, SDB and from other sources."\(^\text{15}\)

Cooperation with other Yugoslavian IC member services at the federal level was based on signed agreements. There

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\(^{15}\) Analitičko-informativna i izdavačka delatnost (1945-1985), author dr. Radomir Bogdanović, kapetan bojneg broda (pages 156-201); Razvoj oružanih snaga SFRJ 1945-1985: Vojnoobaveštajna služba, Beograd 1990; page 157,
was also territorial cooperation with each republic civil service SDB/SDS according to common objectives. It should be noted that the VOS developed a system that was supposed to be activated in the event of aggression against Yugoslavia through national territorial defense at the level of republics. It was the reason why, at the end of 1982, VOS intensified activities for organizing and activating several TIOO that operated in the area of individual republics.

![Diagram of VOS organisation](image)

**Figure 5: Organization of VOS**

1.7. SID (foreign intelligence service)

SID was acted as a foreign intelligence service of SFRJ. Priority tasks SID was gathering intelligence about "enemy emigration" abroad (especially about the Croats, Serbs and Kosovo Albanians). That was the reason for creating a several agent networks abroad. Members of SID were, quite often, members of SFRJ diplomatic and consular missions. According to the information that authors obtained during interviews with former employees of Yugoslavian IC, about 60% of all intelligence about persons that were, by communist authorities, treated as a "dangerous emigrants", collected through the SID agent networks. After the
reorganization of Yugoslavian IC after 1966, that time 3rd Department was integrated in the 1st Department within which the process of collecting data on "hostile emigration" continued.

![Organization of SID](image)

Figure 6: Organization of SID

### 1.8. Party and State institutions

Despite the fact that Yugoslavia was a multinational state with, publicly proclaimed, certain level of decentralization of state administration, the State, and as well as every social activity, was under the strict supervision of the Party authorities. Therefore, the authorities and cadres of the Party had the most important role in determining objectives and tasks, and the staff selection at all levels of decision-making process in the Yugoslavian IC.

During the presented period, (1941-1990), Yugoslavian IC had the following characteristics:
• Strongly centralized system that was “Sword and Shield in the hands of the Party” in the fight against all, primarily ideological, enemy.
• The brutality and repression as a continuous method and mode of action, against all persons and organizations that were, by the Party identified as ideological and political opponents, both at home and abroad and
• Possession of police and judicial authorities in repressive actions.

Although the names and organizational forms changed through the time, what never changed was complete IC’s dependence on decisions and orders that came from the Party. Nothing important could happen in the Yugoslav IC, as well as in other important segments of Government, against Party decisions.

All IC member services were under control of internal Party cells that took care of ideological purity of the employees and keeping that IC is not going to be used against (especially) prominent Party members.

Power and influence that Party organizations had in the JNA was also very important. Because of its influence and the large number of Party members, the JNA was known as the “seventh Yugoslavian Republic”. There were 18 active JNA generals that were “elected” to be members of the Communist Party Central committee (CK SKJ) in 12th Congress of the Communist Party\(^\text{16}\) (held in 1982).

Party membership was mandatory requirement for any serious personal progress, especially for the middle and senior positions in the IC and the state administration. Most of the heads of SDB regional centres, before appointed on that duty, were in a different Party positions (from 10 heads of SDB centres in Croatia at the end of 1989, 6 of them were appointed directly from local Party leading positions\(^\text{17}\)).

### 1.9. Party influence to the media and the judiciary system

During the existence of Yugoslavia, the Party aimed to have the monopoly on:

- Truth,
- Information,
- Events and

\[^\text{16}\text{ Grupa autora, 1986, page 388-389}\]
• Interpretation of reality.

IC together with the police, the army, the judiciary and the media system, had an active role in the protection of the Party monopole. During almost entire time of existence of Yugoslavia, Tito and the Party, remained harsh and negative attitude towards the freedom of the press:

"Freedom of the press can not be unlimited and press should not be allowed to rage ...... We have to be sharper to the press ...... As soon as someone writes something in the press, it is sufficient material that he/she can be immediately arrested and immediately brought to justice ...... Our press is wild. I think that press needs to be hit; it cannot go wild as it is now. We should take the necessary measures and to achieve such control that it can not be done any more."\(^{18}\)

Why is it important to mention this fact? Most of the journalists during communist regime protected and supported communism and communist ideology. Some of them because they were communists, some of them because they were forced (by some kind of blackmail) to work for IC member services. Those who where looking for, or “even worse”, tried to establish real democratic institutions and processes, were publicly blamed. There was a huge number of cases when the first sentences, against political opponents, were firstly accused in newspapers, and then at the communist court.

Within each media, Party cells were quite active. Heads of party cells often had a function of "political commissars in media". Every media was under the supervision of IC ("Editorial Boards and leading journalists were under human and technical surveillance. Before delivery, mail was controlled"\(^{19}\)).

A significant number of journalists and editors of the media in the former Socialist Republic of Croatia (just like in other republics) were directly, and some indirectly, connected with different intelligence and security services, civilian and military\(^{20}\), on republic and federal level.

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18 Some of the quotes of Josip Broz Tito published during 1969-1971 when he was speaking about freedom of the press (B. Novak, 2005, pages 605, 670, 671, 699). The last sentence was practically an order given to the IC and Party organizations in media to take full control over the media.


20 Connections of different journalists with military counterintelligence service where of particular interest for Croatian IC.
There were two different types of journalist connections with IC member services:

- As a classical agents and
- As a members of the, already mentioned, communist “Stay behind network”\(^{21}\) (hereinafter SBN). They were trained for different activities in times of crisis and war.

Those journalists that were classical IC agents were part of the operational repressive system. They promoted communist ideology in their public appearances. They sent reports to the civil and/or military intelligence and security services, about "subversive, anti-establishment, anti-communist, anti-state" activities of their colleagues.

The second group of agents, members of the SBN network were the persons that should start with their pro-communist activities at a time when the area in that they operated is going to be directly affected by war activities or occupied by enemy forces. SBN members had different tasks: collecting and delivery of intelligence, maintaining communication with "free, unoccupied area", encouraging the population in the occupied territories to organize resistance to diversion, sabotage that should have undermined the opponent. Everything what the new Croatian government was faced with at the beginning of its mandate and during the first phase of the Homeland war (1990-1996).


After Tito's death (1980) the activity of the contemporary dissident and political emigration to overthrow the communist regime increased. Knowledge that was forbidden emerged and became part of the public knowledge. It was one of the main issues that endangered the communist system. The regime reacted with harsh repression, within and outside Yugoslavia, using civilian and military parts of the Yugoslavian IC.

As a response to the expected situation, in 1985 the JNA carried out its own internal reorganization in line with the new doctrine as it was apparent, to be prepared for the use of the armed forces not only against the external, but also possibly, against internal threats to the survival of the communist Yugoslavia.

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\(^{21}\) Those facts came to surface during authors conversations with several former high and middle level employees of Yugoslavian IC.
Military Counterintelligence Department (UB/KOS) had no problems with the limits of its operations as the civil services had. The military reorganization reduced the number of existing military districts (VO) to three: the first based in Belgrade, third based in Skopje, fifth based Zagreb and the Military maritime (Naval) district (VPO), based in Split.

![Figure 7: Organization of Military (Army) Districts at 1985 and comparison with borders of “Grater Serbia project”](http://www.nsf-journal.hr/issues/v1_n1/fig2_domazet.htm)

By analyzing the layout of mentioned VO’s and VPO, it is easy to see the similarity with the situation on the territory of Croatia concerning the occupied areas in 1993. The area covered by the first and third VO, and the most of the VPO on the northern borders, almost completely coincides with the area that was occupied in the Homeland war, and is similar with the political program of the “Great Serbia”. At the time of the adoption of these plans (1985), the authorities in Croatia and Slovenia were communists. Federal military

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22 Admiral (ret.) Domazet-Lošo, D., How Aggression Against Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina Was Prepared or the Transformation of the JNA into a Serbian Imperial Force; http://www.nsf-journal.hr/issues/v1_n1/fig2_domazet.htm
leadership apparently was prepared to use military force in order to preserve the territorial integrity of the "Great Serbia project" and communism as the only ideology to implement such a program.

After the crisis in the former Yugoslavia became more evident, due to strong internal pressures and awareness, that they could not deal with the upcoming Serbian aggressive attitudes, the Communist leadership in Croatia and Slovenia (early 1990), agreed to organise the first free and democratic multiparty elections. Newly created political parties won those elections. The process of taking over government institutions was essentially different in Croatia compared to the same process in Slovenia. While Slovenia, because of high ethnic homogeneity in the government and the society, passed the first period of transformation of government with no major obstacles and problems, the situation in Croatia was quite different.

The new Croatian Government, after the elections in 1990, confronted with serious problems:

- Political, economic, social and security crisis was obvious, with chances of being even worse;
- A new Government took power just "de iure", but not "de facto", containing numerous communist political and personal legacy in the state apparatus,
- Defence system did not existed,
- There was significant disproportion of ethnic composition in JNA and SDS in SR Croatia at that time (Table 2, and Table 3), and
- There were a significant number of internal and external opponents of Croatian independence.

Table 2: National structure of YPA officer corps in 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>% in census</th>
<th>% in JNA</th>
<th>difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>36,3</td>
<td>63,2</td>
<td>+ 174 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>19,8</td>
<td>12,6</td>
<td>- 64 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegri ns</td>
<td>2,3</td>
<td>6,2</td>
<td>+ 270 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The JNA and the political leadership of Yugoslavia and Serbia, were aware of the upcoming crisis, and were ready to use violence for overthrowing the newly elected democratic governments in "Western Republics" (Slovenia and Croatia). Therefore, the new Croatian and Slovenian leadership decided to make political moves that tried to stop the development of the crisis and prevent violence. They offered political solution to reform Yugoslavia as a union of sovereign states or a peaceful dissolution. However, Yugoslavian and Serbian leaders did not accept those offers. Croatian leadership, decided also to implement a policy of reconciliation in Croatia and create the Croatian defence system to defend against expected aggression.

In such conditions, it was decided to gradually, and as soon as the conditions allowed it, to completely transforms existing intelligence and security system23 according to the Western democracy values and principles.

The main objective of the new intelligence and security system was to be an instrument of new independent and sovereign state, and successfully stop the aggression on Croatia.

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23 It includes preventive, repression and judiciary system.
3. Croatian Intelligence Community (1990-2014)

The process of establishing democratic IC in Croatia, in general, can be divided in four phases:

1. Transformation from the communist to democratic IC: from 30th of May 1990 until 21st of May 1993;
2. The First reorganisation: from 21st of May 1993 until 21st of March 2002;
3. The Second reorganisation: from 21st of March 2002 until 30th of June 2006;
4. The Third reorganisation: from 30th of June 2006 until now.

Some phases had their intermediate phases that we are going to especially indicate and explain.

3.1. The wider context of the process of creating Croatian IC

Numerous demanding and complex processes in the international community had an important influence on the events in the former Yugoslavia, and therefore in Croatia. A key event that influenced a wider context was the collapse of WP and the collapse of the USSR as its leader. The consequence of those collapses was a unification of the two German states, the reintegration of East Germany in the Federal Republic of Germany.

At that time, for the international community, Yugoslavia had the role of “buffer zone”. Although by social order and political system Yugoslavia belonged to the communist totalitarian system, due to historical reasons (e.g. Tito-Stalin conflict in 1948) Yugoslavia was not a member of the WP, and it was not a member of Euro-Atlantic integration processes either. Yugoslavia was one of the leading members of the Non-Aligned Movement. Negative development of the crisis in Yugoslavia had happened at the same time with similar processes in WP member states, primarily the former Soviet Union.

Although the break-up of the WP and fall of the communist totalitarian system marked the victory of democracy over totalitarianism, the international community was not ready to support the break-up of Yugoslavia. Especially not the violent break-up of Yugoslavia because international community did not want that similar, violent, scenario repeated itself in other East European communist countries, because of the possible catastrophic
consequences for the peace and stability in Europe and probably the whole World.

The Republic of Croatia had several advocates in the international community. However, even Germany, just like some other states, changed there previous position about necessity to preserve the restructured Yugoslavia in the second third of 1991 after realizing that Croatia was a victim of aggression. At the end of 1991, majority of influential international community member states accepted Croatian and Slovenian requests for independence.

Croatian political leadership, individually and with the help of allies, knew how to use a favourable moment in global international relations, and how to turn over previous opponents to support Croatian independence.

It is not a secret that the relations between the United States and the EU, in resolving the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, passed various stages. Only after the EU's efforts to calm the crisis proved unsuccessful, and when the crisis transformed to the asymmetric warfare\(^\text{24}\), the United States, pressed by their own public opinion, decided to involve actively trying to stop the war.

The United States, at the transition time from the state of crisis to the state of war in the former Yugoslavia, were mostly completely focused on solving the crisis in the Gulf region as a result of Iraq's aggression on Kuwait. The U.S. and most of its allies in the region of the Near- and Middle-East, focused on the situation in that area. That situation aggressor (JNA and Serbia and Montenegro) tried to use it and achieve a quick victory in their aggression against Slovenia and Croatia. The United States decided to use involvement in Yugoslavian crisis as an advantage for their own global interests, because of the fact that in B&H numerous Muslim population lives. In fact, protecting the Muslims in Bosnia, even when they were responsible for a number of negative effects and inflammation of internal conflicts in Bosnia, the United States tried to dismiss arguments that came from some states in “Muslim world” that the U.S. policy is anti-Muslim policy\(^\text{25}\).

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24 JNA as an aggressor, unlike the Slovenian, Croatian and B&H Armed Forces, had significantly more kinetic weapons, significantly more people, much better organization, approach and control of domestic and, at some level foreign, media and logistics. We should not forget the fact that the aggressor had at its disposal other components of a state (judiciary, police, customs, and diplomacy). Slovenia and Croatia, at that time, had almost nothing of it.

25 Clinton, B.: Ending the Bosnian war: The personal story of the President of the United States; page 9; in “Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency”, 1st of October 2013,
3.2. Transformation from communist to democratic IC: from 30th May 1990 until 21st of May 1993

This period was very turbulent for Croatia, and thus for its IC. It is divided into several phases:

- The existence of the Croatian security system in the legal framework of the existence of Yugoslavia,
- Resisting the aggression, and
- The existence of the Croatian security system in the legal framework of the internationally recognized state.

A number of essential processes determined this period:

- Trying to find a political solution for the crisis in the former Yugoslavia with the aim of peaceful dissolution;
- Achieving international recognition of the Republic of Croatia;
- The organization of an effective defence system to end the aggression on Croatia and B&H, and
- Making the effective foundation for the democratic transformation of the IC according to democratic principles.

After the elections in 1990, Croatian government offered an opportunity to all those who wanted to continue to work in the SDS according to the new, democratic principles. Some of the personnel left the SDS by their own will. The SDS ceased to be an instrument of repression, as it was during the communist totalitarian system.

The new government did not allow revenge as a form of behaviour in any segment. By the order of the President Tudjman, almost immediately after taking power, the SDS in Croatia stopped to treat religious communities in Croatia as “subversive and enemy organisations”. It is necessary to add that leaders of Croatian SDS, after the election results were published, suspended secretly positioned audio and video

26 SDS was abbreviation for SDB in Croatia. That means that every time when we are going to use abbreviation SDS it will mean SDB that was in communist Croatia, and when we are mentioning SDB, it will mean Yugoslavian, and/or Serbian intelligence service.

27 Some of them left the system because they supported Yugoslav and Greater Serbia political idea, some of them were retired but some of them stayed in the system according by instructions received from Yugoslavian and Serbian intelligence and security services.
surveillance equipment for tracking activities of Franjo Tuđman in his home. The surveillance system was in the apartment that was above the Tuđman's home. However, some persons that remained in the SDS, acted as a "fifth column". During time, Croatian IC successfully identified most of them. They were arrested or they left the Croatian territory before being arrested (such as some members of terrorist group called "Labrador", ran by the Yugoslavian military counterintelligence service - UB).

The transformation process to a new democratic IC during Croatian Homeland war, was based on new principles:

- Loyalty to the new democratic Constitution, rule of law, patriotism,
- Organization of IC (even during the immediate state of war and threat to the existence of the State) by the principles similar to IC in NATO member states (primarily US), European community (EC) and Israel,
- A clear division of responsibilities between civilian and military intelligence and counterintelligence services,
- The organization of an effective institutional system of control and supervision over the work of IC,
- IC member agencies were no longer instruments of political violence.

Croatian political leadership recommended that in newly created IC, only young persons should be employed, that do not have any communist past, that were in the Homeland war proven patriots, ready to learn and to share a knowledge and experience to future generations. Those persons were supposed to be pillars of the new democratic IC that would not have anything in common with any totalitarian legacy from the recent Croatian history. Transformation and reorganization of the existing security system in Croatia started during the Homeland war. In May and June 1991, basics for new IC, in accordance with the standards of Western democracies, were established.

In late May 1991, the Office for the Protection of the Constitutional Order (UZUP) was established as a central...

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28 Under the name “Soča 1” and “Soča 2”, military counterintelligence (KOS/UB) recruit the agent, neighbour of Franjo Tuđman. They installed, in the agent's apartment, technical means for audio and video surveillance of Tuđman's apartment. We do not know exactly when that had happened initially. After some time, the use of that means was transferred to communist civil service in Croatia – SDS (Despot, Z.: Feljton: Tajna služba bivše SFRJ, Večernji list)
government body tasked with, among other things, coordination of IC. The UZUP was directly subordinate to the President of the Republic. Legal control was carried out by internal organizational units inside different agencies and by the activities of the UZUP.

In June 1991, amendments to the Law of Internal Affairs were adopted. Service for the Protection of the Constitutional Order (SZUP) was established as a civil intelligence and counterintelligence service. SZUP employees remained to have only a small part of powers that they had had before the elections in 1990. The SZUP primary task was protection of constitutional order, fight against violence, terrorism and organized crime (OK) and counterintelligence protection. Article 16 of the same Act, set out the procedure of supervision of the SZUP activities by the Parliamentary Commission for the control of legality of its work. Members of the Commission were appointed by the Parliament. The Commission should at least annually submit their report to the Parliament.

On 20th September 1991, Defence Law (adopted 28th June 1991) was published and therefore became a law. Security Intelligence Service (SIS) of the Ministry of Defence was officially established. The SIS had the same goals and objectives as well as the SZUP, but with the limits that their activities had to be carried out in the military domain. The Control of the legality of the SIS activities was exercised through, recently established, the UZUP.

There were some suggestions that the SIS has to be organizational part of the armed forces (which were primarily advocated by some of the former JNA officers that came in the Croatian Army). However, Croatian leadership, in line with the practice in western democratic systems, decided that the SIS had to be an organizational part of the Ministry of Defence and Military Intelligence Directorate part of the Armed forces General Staff.

Organization of Croatian IC in 1992 is shown in Figure 8.

29 It was a time when SFRJ still existed as a state.
Part of the former SDS employees (from the Croatian Ministry of Interior) became, shortly after its founding, SIS members aiming to create an efficient military counterintelligence service. The reason why it had happened is, today, the object of many theories. The fact is that, Gojko Šušak, at that time Minister of Defence, was under the influence of media proclaimed as a leader of the right fraction within the ruling HDZ party, came from political emigration circles. The Minister accepted former SDS employees and gave them confidence at that, very sensitive time of the creation of the state and defence system. The reason for such behaviour of Defence Minister is very simple and can be found in the foundations of that time state policy:

The need to strengthen the unity of the “Domestic” and “Emigrant” Croatians, to support policy of reconciliation embodied in previous enemies: political emigrants and their former "surveillance/prosecutors" from the SDS and

Those persons, like former high-ranking employees of the SDS, had the necessary knowledge about the UB/KOS JNA, which, at that point, was the most serious and most dangerous opponent to the Croatian state and Croatian IC. UB/KOS had a very wide network of sources in all social spheres in Croatia (there was a calculation about the number of 300 reliable sources). Therefore, the process of creating, developing and strengthening the SIS in order to
protect key national interests in the domain of defence, protection of military sensitive data, and specifically detect the opponent's agent network was a priority.

Minister Šušak had a sense of a political reality and the necessity of creating a state based on a policy of reconciliation, not division. His work proved practicality and effectiveness of the idea of reconciliation of people of different political views, for the purposes of fulfilling/achieving key national interests: creation of the state and its defence.

After the last peace agreement in Sarajevo (2nd of January 1992) signed between the Croatian Ministry of defence and JNA, came time to continue with process of transformation of IC to the modern democratic one.

3.3. First reorganisation: from 21st of May 1993 until 21st of March 2002

This period had several phases. Croatian IC retained “war structure”, objectives and tasks until the end of the process of peaceful reintegration of the Croatian Danube region in January 1998. After the reintegration, the process of changing IC from war- to peace-time, the adaptation of new goals and tasks started. In early 2000, parliamentary and presidential elections held. Previous opposition leaders won the elections. A new legal framework enacted in early 2002, two years after the administration takeover. However, the new government largely interpreted the existing legislation in accordance with their desires until the Parliament accepted new legal framework.

Following processes determined time from 1992 until 1998:

- Trying to find a political solution in order to liberate occupied parts of Croatia or to use armed forces when political process proved not to be successful,
- To end the war, and to stabilize situation in B&H,
- The protection of members of the international forces deployed in the former Yugoslavia and
- Ending the process of organizing a new Croatian IC modelled on the democratic system.

By decree of the Croatian President, on 21st of March 1993, the UZUP was dissolved and the National Security Office (UNS) was established. The UNS was not the legal successor of the dissolved the UZUP.

One of the primary reasons for establishing the UNS and new Intelligence Community of the Republic of Croatia was
the political necessity of coordination of operational activities and consistent intelligence reporting to the political leadership. Until 1993, quite often, the primary users of intelligence reports and analysis received conflicting reports about the same issues.

The National Security Office Law\textsuperscript{33} (from the 14th of June 1995) organized the Croatian IC, almost fully compatible with similar systems in democratic countries, adjustable to Croatian needs. Organization of Croatian IC according to that Law is visible in Figure 9.

\textbf{Figure 9: Organisation of Croatian IC until 2002}

\textsuperscript{33} Zakon o Uredu za nacionalnu sigurnost, NN 037/1995, URL: http://cadial.hidra.hr/searchdoc.php?query=Zakon+o+osnovama+sigurnosti+transporta+naftovodima&searchText=on&searchTitle=on&resultdetails=basic&lang=hr&action=search&showeurovoc=on&filterdesc=176&id_doc=y2moMFQ8fU%2BGJ59%2FkRt0cQ%3D%3D
3.3.1. National Security Office (UNS)

The UNS was the main state institution that brought into conformity, directed and oversaw the work of the IC member services and other institutions whose activities were connected with national security activities. The National Security Office, as appears in Article 2 of the Law on the National Security Office\(^\text{34}\):

- Coordinated the work of state ministries connected with national security topics,
- Directed and oversaw the work of the intelligence and counter-intelligence services,
- Directed, connected and analyzed intelligence data and reports necessary for the performance of the constitutional duties of the President of the Republic of Croatia and the Government of the Republic of Croatia and
- Provided counter-intelligence protection and security for the President of the Republic, Croatian State Parliament, the Government of the Republic of Croatia, the offices they use and foreign VIP guests.

In order to perform the duties of the National Security Office as prescribed by the law, the following services were founded:

- Croatian Intelligence Service (HIS),
- Security Headquarters (SO) and
- Control and Supervision Service (NS).

In order to perform the technical and professional activities for all IC member agencies, the following services were formed under umbrella of the National Security Office:

- Croatian National Sigint Service (NSEI - established in 1996) and
- Intelligence Academy (ObAk\(^\text{35}\) - established in 1998).

Only HIS could practice operational, intelligence, activities. Therefore, other parts of UNS are presented with dash-line.

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\(^{34}\) More about this topic can be found in article: Tuđman, M., The first five years of the Croatian Intelligence Service: 1993-1998; National security and the future, Vol.1 No.2. June 2000.; URL:http://hrnak.srce.hr/index.php?show=clanak&id_clanak_jezik=2877

\(^{35}\) Although the abbreviation for Intelligence Academy was OA, here we use the abbreviation ObAk because the new law from the 2002nd established Intelligence Agency, which also used abbreviation OA. Therefore, wanted to avoid mistake, Intelligence Academy abbreviation will be ObAk, and Intelligence Agency abbreviation will be OA.
A director, appointed and relieved of duties by the President of the Republic, administered the Office. The President of the Republic appointed, by the recommendation of the Director of the UNS, various directors of the individual services of the UNS. The Director of the UNS was responsible to the President of the Republic for the work of the UNS and its individual services.

National Security Office prepared regular reports to the President of the Republic and the Government about issues and activities of interest to the national security.

Supervision over the legality of the work of the National Security Office was performed by, that time, the House of Representatives of the Croatian State Parliament through the Domestic Policy and National Security Committee. The National Security Office provided yearly reports on its work to the Committee and, on the request of the Committee, special reports on individual issues about different topics from national security domain.

3.3.1.1. Croatian Intelligence Service (HIS)

The Croatian Intelligence Service (HIS) was the central service of the National Security Office and the only external intelligence service of the Republic of Croatia that:

- Collected intelligence of national interest outside Croatia,
- Analyzed, combined, and distributed different intelligence reports to the President of the Republic, the director of the National Security Office, president of the Government as well as state and other ministries within the Government,
- Coordinated activities of other Croatian intelligence and security services in activities of interest for national security and led, or monitored, the joint IC operations,
- Cooperated with foreign intelligence services and
- Was involved in counterintelligence protection of Croatian diplomatic missions abroad.

Within the territory of the Republic of Croatia, HIS was allowed to operate only in collaboration with other, domestic, intelligence services.

In addition to the aforementioned duties, the Croatian Intelligence Service performed other tasks in conformity with the law and other regulations.

The director administered the work of the Croatian Intelligence Service. Director was responsible for its work
and for fulfilling tasks that were received from the President of the Republic, the director of the National Security Office and the Joint National Security Committee.

The director of the Croatian Intelligence Service was able to call and preside over the meetings of the Coordinating Committee of the Intelligence Community, organized the work of the intelligence and security services, and represented the Intelligence Community and the Croatian Intelligence Service in meetings with representatives of foreign intelligence services.

### 3.3.1.2. Control and Supervision Service (NS)

The Control and Supervision Service (NS) monitored the constitutionality and legality of the work of the IC member services. It was also responsible for following, collecting and analysing information about the work of the members of the IC as well as services and various sections of the National Security Office. Monitoring was conducted through direct contact, investigation or as the result of a requested special supervision.

After the report of a suspected situation was finished, The Control and Supervision Service delivered it to the director of the National Security Office and the appropriate minister, to resolve problems or make progress in the work of the individual services and the IC.

The NS was administered by a director. The employees of NS were delegated to work in NS as representatives of the various intelligence services of the Croatian IC. That means that NS conducted professional control and supervision of IC member services.

It was not allowed to the members of the Control and Supervision Service to run any kind of agent network.

### 3.3.1.3. Security Headquarters (SO)

The Security Headquarters (SO) of the UNS was not really an intelligence service. It was a body that coordinated, supervised and directed the work of the IC member services that performed security tasks (counterintelligence and physical) and protection of VIP individuals and offices.

The SO recommended goals, strategies and protection plans for the highest state officials of the Republic of Croatia, presidents of foreign states, governments, parliaments, delegations and individuals whose visit to Croatia were of a
great significance. It was also in charge of security and protection of the President of the Republic, Speaker of the Croatian State Parliament, Government of the Republic of Croatia and other VIP persons, as well as offices they used.

The director of the SO presided over the Supreme Security Committee, whose members were: director of the SO, deputy director of the SO, assistant to the director of the Croatian Intelligence Service for counter-intelligence activities, the appropriate assistant of the Minister of Internal Affairs, the appropriate assistant of the Minister of Defence, the head adjutant of the President of the Republic, the commander of the First Honor Guard, and the director of State protocol.

3.3.1.4. National Sigint Service (NSEI)

The National Sigint Service (NSEI) was an expert agency of the National Security Office, which was functionally connected to the Central Sigint Services of the Directorate of Intelligence Affairs within the Croatian Army Headquarters (ObU GSOSRH).

The NSEI coordinated, directed and oversaw electronic monitoring, of all kinds of signals outside the borders of the Republic of Croatia and as well as suspected terrorist communications and prohibited signals of an intelligence nature within the borders of the Republic of Croatia.

NSEI director was responsible for the work of the NSEI and performance of the tasks received by the Joint National Security Committee (SONS) and the director of the UNS.

3.3.1.5. Intelligence Academy (ObAk)

The Intelligence Academy (ObAk) was an educational and research institute of the National Security Office that provided training and education of the cadres in order to meet the needs of the Croatian Intelligence Community. The Intelligence Academy organized basic and specialized education for members of the intelligence community; it also had its own publishing activities.

3.3.2. Intelligence Community (IC)

The Croatian Intelligence Community, at that time, was comprised of agencies that by special means and methods collected both within and outside the country, data and...
information of interest to national security. The Joint National Security Committee (SONS) and Intelligence Community Coordination Committee (KOOZ) determined goals and tasks of the Intelligence Community (IC).

3.3.2.1. Joint National Security Committee (SONS)

The Joint National Security Committee (SONS) was responsible for setting goals, and tasks of the intelligence community. It had an ability to approve annual plans of IC, and was able to direct and coordinate the work of the state ministries with the National Security Office on tasks related to the national security. The SONS determined policies and strategies related to protection of the domestic and foreign officials and prescribed measures and activities related to protection of national interests.

The director of the National Security Office presided over meetings of SONS. Members of SONS were the deputy director of the National Security Office, the director of HIS and ministers of the state ministries (ministers of internal and foreign affairs, defence and finance) and responsible advisors from the Office of President of Croatia. SONS was responsible for defining objectives and tasks of the Croatian IC.

3.3.2.2. Coordinating committee of the Intelligence Community (KOOZ)

The Coordinating committee of the Intelligence Community (KOOZ) was responsible for the implementation of tasks received from SONS. KOOZ coordinated the joint operations of all agencies in the implementation of their appointed tasks.

The director of HIS presided over the sessions of KOIC, whose members were:

- Director and the Deputy director of HIS,
- Assistant minister of Internal Affairs (director of the Service for the Protection of the Constitutional Order),
- Assistant minister of defence for security,
- Head of the Security Intelligence Service,
- Head of the Directorate of Intelligence Affairs within the Croatian Army Headquarters and
- Head of the Department of international military cooperation of the Ministry of Defence.
The director of HIS was able to, when it was necessary, invite representatives of the NSEI, the Intelligence Academy, financial police, Croatian customs, criminal police and military police to the sessions of KOOZ.

According to the Handbook about the work of the Croatian Intelligence Community, the Coordinating Committee, among other things:

- Prepared yearly plans and work programs of the Intelligence Community,
- Approved and accepted joint operative activities,
- Organized the work of the members of the IC,
- Performed analyses and evaluations of the more important operative activities,
- Brought methods of the agencies' activities into conformity with regulations,
- Monitored the state of affairs in the various services and undertook steps to make improvements,
- Suggested systems of training, procurement and preparation of members of the IC in operational-technical sense and
- Resolved conflicting interpretations in cases where jurisdiction of activities in various services overlapped or were unclear and other cases where conflicts existed.

The Intelligence Community of the Republic of Croatia was responsible for obtaining data of significance for:

- National security, and especially for conducting foreign and defence policies and ensuring economic well-being in accordance with laws and regulations,
- Opposing terrorism and organized crime and
- Protection of the highest state officials, diplomatic representatives in the Republic of Croatia, Croatian representatives outside Croatia as well as objects of state and national interest.

The Intelligence Community was responsible for providing assessments and intelligence to the President of the Republic of Croatia, the president of the Government, and ministers of state ministries in order to enable them to, more effectively, protect national security.

### 3.3.3. IC Member services

The core of the Intelligence Community was comprised of four services that were allowed to perform intelligence activities:

- Croatian Intelligence Service (HIS),
The Department of International Military Cooperation of the Ministry of Defence was a member of the Intelligence Community, but it was not an intelligence agency in the true sense of the word, as it collected data through diplomatic contacts and official cooperation with other countries ministries of defence.

Because the HIS is described in section 3.3.1.1., herein the remaining members of the Croatian IC will be described.

### 3.3.3.1. Service for the Protection of the Constitutional Order (SZUP)

The SZUP, in conformity with regulations on the Law on internal affairs, performed tasks related to the protection of the constitutional order, especially counter-intelligence tasks within the entire territory of the Republic of Croatia. The SZUP was responsible for preventing actions and intentions that could violently endanger or destroy the constitutional order of the country. The SZUP was also involved in antiterrorism and anti-organized crime issues within the territory of the Republic of Croatia.

### 3.3.3.2. Security Intelligence Service (SIS)

In conformity with the Law on defence, the SIS collected information involving counter-intelligence protection of the armed forces and the Ministry of Defence. The SIS had no authority over civilian citizens of the Republic of Croatia except in cases of wartime operations when, by order of the Minister of Defence, the activities could be expanded to civilians in areas of military activity. The SIS also performed counter-intelligence and security protection of military production regardless of the status of participants.
3.3.3. The Directorate of Intelligence Affairs (ObU GSOSRH)

The Directorate of Intelligence Affairs collected intelligence that could be used by the Croatian army. The Directorate was not permitted, in the performance of those tasks, to create an agent network or implement operations outside the Republic of Croatia, except in times of war. Outside Croatia, it was possible only to exchange intelligence data through official channels with military bodies with whom the Republic of Croatia cooperated.

3.3.3.4. Department of International Military Cooperation.

This Department was responsible for collecting data obtained only through official channels by military envoys of the Republic of Croatia outside Croatia from institutes by which they were accredited. Such reports were provided to the Minister of Defence and the Croatian Intelligence Service. Department was not allowed to act operationally either outside or within the Republic of Croatia.

Table 4: Jurisdiction of the Croatian IC member services

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<tr>
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<th>HUMINT</th>
<th>SIGINT</th>
<th>Phone communication</th>
<th>Cooperation with foreign IC</th>
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3.3.4. IC control

Domestic Policy and National Security Committee of the Croatian Parliament exercised parliamentary control over the legality of the activities of all IC member services, including the UNS.

3.3.5. Homeland war experiences

Such organization of Croatian IC arose modelled on experiences of existing IC, primarily EU and NATO member countries (USA) and Israel. As it can be seen, Croatia did not change only the organizational form of the communist IC. The member services lost considerable powers that communist intelligence community had. The changes were also at the level of symbols. The new symbol of Croatian intelligence community became an owl as a symbol of wisdom. The motto was "Sapere Aude" (Do not hesitate to use your brain).

Although the 7th Department of Ministry of foreign affairs (MFA) was listed as a member service of IC (see Figure 4.), it should be said that it was an organizational entity of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that was closely related to the HIS. This Department did not have any operational abilities and it was not allowed to run intelligence sources. The main responsibility of this department was technical and physical protection of the MFA and Croatian diplomatic missions abroad.

The intelligence community had a very active and important role in planning, preparation and conducting military and police operations during 1994 and 1995 when conditions for peace enforcement in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were created, such as acceptance and signing of the Dayton Peace Accords. Although the Croatian armed forces were prepared and ready to liberate the occupied Croatian Danube region, Croatian political leadership, headed by President Tudjman, decided to give priority to the diplomatic actions in relation to the military operations. That decision is still subject of different interpretations. Because of the fact that Croatian intelligence community had actively helped operations in order to liberate the occupied parts of the country and to end the war in Bosnia, we think that it is necessary to present the underlying reasons for such decision:
The reintegration of the Croatian Danube region by use of military and police forces would lead to many casualties on both sides, killed, wounded and missing persons;

With the expected powerful military activities, the population would certainly leave the areas that would be directly and indirectly exposed to war activities. Among these people, would be many persons of Serbian origin. That fact could lead to a reduction in the number of ethnic Serbs in the total number of Croatian population; it could be used by Croatian political opponents as an alleged indication of the anti-Serbian nature of government authorities. At the same time, withdrawing from the military operation, Croatian political leadership expressed the willingness to forgive (abolition) and for integration of citizens of different nationalities in the constitutional order of the Republic of Croatian.

Knowing and accepting all the complexity of political relations in the international community, not denying the fact that in the area of the SEE many different national interests of some of the leading countries in the international community were in conflict, taking into account the fact that the Republic of Croatia was exposed to multiple standards since its creation, realizing that the process of international recognition was very difficult and full of obstacles, trying to avoid to complicate the position of those political forces in the international community who were inclined to support Croatian national interests, working on preventing the further divisions in the international community, Croatia abandoned military operation in favor of a diplomatic solution to integrate occupied Croatian Danube region.

3.3.6. Transition to a peacetime period (1998-2002)

After the Croatian vital national interests were fulfilled (in January 1998 Croatian Danube region, occupied in 1991 was successfully reintegrated to Croatia), defence sector (military, police, IC) began the process of reorganizing and adapting to the new, peacetime activities according to the new tasks and duties that were received. The new tasks included strengthening cooperation with foreign, friendly and partner, intelligence and security services to stabilise the SEE, to protect civilian and military members of the international peacekeeping forces in the SEE and to integrate Croatian IC in international multilateral organizations. The IC was rejuvenated and ready to work in the new conditions and to face with new challenges.
3.3.6.1. Information and Media Operations

The period from 1998 to 2002 (especially before the election in 2000) was time of the culmination of the IC politicization in the media. The politicization of the IC by creating constructed affairs and “Media Satanisation” of the IC as a whole, and its individual member services, aimed at possible acquisition of political points during the election campaign. It seriously undermined the integrity and operations of the IC, and created serious problems for its future success in fulfilling the national and international goals and tasks.

Groundless reviews and defamations indicated the inadequacy of certain political elites to the expected challenges, their irresponsibility to the national security system and to the fundamental values necessary for democratic development of the country that they intended to operate. On the other hand, it created high level of uncertainty by international partners of targeted IC. That was the reason why the state could incur serious security, political and economic damage. The IC member services, in addition to their usual activities, in accordance with national interests, also served (during the Homeland War, 1991-1996) as the key medium in the “shadow diplomacy” because the messages sent through this channel forwarded to the recipient systems could have a significant impact on decision-making persons.

Croatia was, during the process of its formation, exposed to a variety of different Great Serbian, Yugoslav and international information strategies that had different political and ideological goals. There are numerous examples that testify that information attackers attempted to take control and management of the Croatian information space. Only at the end of the observed period (1999), information and media offensive operations were successfully implemented. The clearest recognition of such operations is described in a study written by Aaron Rhodes:

“A Croatian informant said: “We have been used to achieve political objectives [the overthrow of the HDZ party], and then abandoned. Assistance was not to promote democracy and values.”

________________________

36 The goal of “Media Satanization” is to compare targeted persons with the Satan/Devil.
In the middle of this period, in Croatia were held regular parliamentary elections (3rd of January 2000) as well as, because of the death of President Tudjman, early presidential elections (25th of January 2000). The victories in the both elections were reached by the unified opposition that started a number of changes in the society and the state. One of these changes affected the Croatian IC.

New leading figures of all of the IC member services were appointed. However, time from the takeover of power until the adoption of new laws (21st March 2002) was marked by scandals and conflicts of political parties that were part of the ruling coalition, among other things, in connection with the IC member services. The new government dismissed many of IC’s current employees (all of them that were fired, sued the state, and they all got a positive for them, final judgment before the Croatian courts for illegal dismissal). The new government ordered the police intervention in the Croatian Intelligence Service (HIS), an action unprecedented in democratic countries. This example was only a confirmation of the existence of serious conflicts within the ruling coalition about key national interests.

In fact, little more than three months after the new director of HIS (distinguished university professor, who was publicly known by his political preferences to the ruling coalition) was appointed, the top state officials (the President and the Prime Minister) decided that it is necessary to replace him. The removal was performed by members of the Special police of the Ministry of Interior that armed with full equipment and weapons, occupied HIS offices, and conducted police control and supervision of the HIS staff. As a director of Foreign Intelligence Service (what HIS was), a former police inspector who wanted to convert Intelligence Service into a police-investigative agency, was appointed.

This move only showed a lack of vision and strategy for using the IC as one of the key segments in the process of protection and development of the countries key national interests. Once the intelligence community becomes the object of conflicts between political parties that are part of ruling coalition, when the intelligence agency is criminalized by the invasion of special police, its future becomes very uncertain, its success in the protection of national and international interests becomes very questionable. Using the
IC according to only party criteria, and not according to the national interests, does not achieve long-term benefits. Short-term benefits for the ruling coalition are several times lower than negative consequences that such politicization can caused.

3.3.6.2. Journalists and “Journalists”

There are numerous examples from the history of the development of Croatian intelligence community in which individual journalists "discovered" state secrets and published classified documents. None of these disclosures was a result of coincidence or investigative journalist’s activities. They were a part of the planned process of information and media operations with different objectives, as defined by David Alberts\(^{38}\), the struggle for achieving information superiority in information and cognitive domain. Unsatisfied persons\(^{39}\) from former communist and that time present the governing administrations who fought against the creation of a new democratic IC, used some of the journalists, especially those who were agents of Yugoslavian IC\(^{40}\), for there own personal purposes.

It was very a simple reason: they did not want to lose their “privileges” to be the only service responsible for collecting, interpreting, and delivering intelligence to the customers. They used those journalists as a communication channel for the publication of false and tendentiously interpreted disinformation trying to impose a certain public perception. An analysis of the writing of the media during 1995-1999 showed that the HIS and SIS were blamed, tendentiously, in specific media that belonged to the same owner. The actual problems existed in the civil service, the SZUP, in which certain roles still had members of the old


\(^{39}\) Those who were unsatisfied with the system were not the only sources of (mis)information. In that group of informants should also be included some foreign diplomats and members of foreign intelligence services who acted in accordance with their own national interests and even some Croatian politicians who, unaccustomed to the state-responsible behaviour consciously placed (mis)information in order to mislead the public and tendentious/distorted interpretations of some events.

\(^{40}\) We should not exclude the possibility that some journalists in Croatia remained linked to the masterminds of former Yugoslavia, later Serbia’s intelligence agencies for which they deliberately placed misinformation in many Croatian and international media coverage. More about that in the book: „Specijalni rat 3“, G. Akrap
Yugoslavian IC. The power of media is similar to the illusion of power that provides fire: a good servant, but a bad master.

Media exposure of successful intelligence operations of Croatian IC, self-managed and those managed with international partners, had a significantly negative effect to the security of IC personnel, as well as on the effectiveness and credibility of the IC in general. A well-known example is the publication, by then the most heavily guarded state secret, that Croatian IC could surveillance phone communication used by Slobodan Milosevic, the president of Serbia, for years. The newly elected (in 2000) Minister of Defence, Jozo Radoš released, to the media house that stood out in the media attacks on the late President Tudjman, transcripts of Milosevic conversations that were secretly recorded by Croatian IC. This was fully, against any Croatian law, act of the minister Radoš.

Even the media that was usually reluctant to the HDZ and President Tudjman demanded Radoš resignation. The publication of these documents had a very bad resonance in the international intelligence community since the Croatian side suddenly became an unreliable partner for any serious and responsible work, especially in the implementation of complex activities with one or more partners and friendly services. It is not necessary to mention that, immediately after those documents/transcripts were published, Serbian side found and disabled further surveillance.

In the area of international cooperation, it is necessary to know that at least three different levels of possible cooperation exist:

- Partners,
- Friends and
- Allies.

Any violation of the written and unwritten rules of intelligence activities, brings into question the responsibility to set tasks, and seriously undermines the confidence of partner/friend/allies agencies. A special problem for the credibility of the selected IC represents the behaviour of primary users when they use IC reports with the aim of acquiring its own personal/political interests at the expense of national interests. In such circumstances, such an IC, or a particular member service, cease to be serious by its friends.

and allies. Cooperation with such systems, very quickly, is reduced to the level of protocol.


After the elections held in early 2000, political situation was changed. The new administration decided to, almost fully, ignore the existing legislation about the structure and organization of Croatian IC. It was therefore a matter of days when the multi-party coalition was going to reach an agreement with that time President of the Republic of Croatia, about the new legal framework of IC.

More than two years after the change in power, on 21st of March 2002 the Law on Security Services of the Republic Croatia (http://www.poslovniforum.hr/zakoni/zss010.asp) was adopted in the Parliament. That meant the reorganization of the IC. The HIS was renamed to Intelligence Agency (OA), the SZUP was renamed to Counter-intelligence Agency (POA), and the SIS was renamed to Military security agency (VSA) while the UNS, as a state institution, ceased to exist. The directors of those services were appointed after political negotiations within the ruling coalition, as well as with the President. After a while, instead of the UNS, Office of the National Security Council (UVNS) was established. The UVNS had partially changed responsibilities and powers. There was a change in the duties, tasks, and responsibilities in certain departments. Intelligence Academy, which was supposed to be the core of the future professional education, professional and politically independent staff, was also abolished.

The negative consequences of such a law came out very quickly: coordination of activities ceased to exist, a clear division of responsibilities of certain services was missing, it led to overlapping of jurisdiction and to serious misunderstandings (some of which have erupted in the public) and to conflicts between directors of the individual services.

Neither in the field of international relations was coordination of activities, although the new law allowed to the OA and POA opportunity to maintain cooperation with foreign partners.

Even some politicians suggested that the work of the intelligence community needed to be supervised and controlled by members of some NGO’s, e.g. civil society organizations despite the fact that they did not have the
necessary knowledge and, especially, necessary security clearance. Such ideas were not accepted due to the reaction of the international expert community that warned the contemporary Croatian authorities that there existed some procedures, including the security certificate that had to be respected if Croatia wanted to become a responsible member of the international community.

The new law did not improve the system of national security. It opened a number of problems that had to be resolved by the new law.

3.5. Third reorganisation: from 30th of June 2006 until now (2014)

At the end of 2003, the parliamentary elections were held. The HDZ, but now with new leadership, won. The HDZ launched a process of change in the intelligence community that led to the reorganization and creation of the new IC. On 30th June 2006, the new Law on security-intelligence system of Croatia (http://narodnenovine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/127655.html) was adopted. This law combined external (OA) and internal (POA) intelligence and security agencies into a new, unified agency, Security Intelligence Agency (SOA). In military domain, Military Security Intelligence Agency (VSOA) was established (Figure 10).

Although the system was reorganized to strengthen its effectiveness, subsequent events showed that those who criticized the changes from the 2002, especially changes in the 2006, were right. The key objections to the reorganization of the 2006 were focused on the fact, that there was no definition of the intelligence community; there was no, or it was poor, coordination of the various parts of the intelligence-security system as it lacked a clear and an unambiguous definition of objectives and tasks on the basis of which it should have developed annual work plans; there was no real effective system of supervision and control over the legality of action; too much power (information, personnel, material) is concentrated in the hands of one person (the director of the organization).

After 24 years of Croatian independence, it happened (September 2013) for the first time that heads of the IC member service were accused for abusing the power. In April 2014, they were (two generals; the Director and the
Deputy Director of VSOA) officially charged by the USKOK\textsuperscript{42} for misusing special funds.

According to this Law, Croatia has two intelligence and security agencies. Their directors are, jointly, appointed to the duty by the State President and the Prime Minister.

National Security Council (VNS) members are: the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, a member of the Government responsible for national security, the minister responsible for defence affairs, the minister responsible for internal affairs, minister responsible for foreign affairs, the minister responsible for justice, Advisor to the President for national security, Chief of the Croatian Armed Forces, director of SOA, director of VSOA and head of the UVNS. Council, among other things, discusses issues in the domain of national security and establishes guidelines for annual plans of intelligence and security agencies.

Members of a Council for coordination of security and intelligence agencies are: member of the Government responsible for national security as president of the Council, Advisor to the President for national security as vice president, directors of security and intelligence agencies and head of UVNS. Council, among other things, implements decisions of the President of the Republic and the Government related to the activities of IC, operationally coordinates the work of security and intelligence agencies and other bodies of the security and intelligence system, and gives an opinion about the cooperation with the corresponding services of other countries.

Office of the National Security Council (UVNS) performs professional and administrative affairs for the National Security Council and the Council for coordination of security intelligence agencies, helping the National Security Council to analyse the reports provided by the security and intelligence agencies, assesses whether the goals of the security intelligence agencies are according to the plans, assess implementation of the decisions of the President of the Republic and the Government in directing the work of security and intelligence agencies and helps to the President.

Figure 10: Organisation of Croatian IC according to the Law from 2006

of the Republic and the Government to provide supervision over the work of security and intelligence agencies.

This law established the Operational and Technical Center for Surveillance of Telecommunications (OTC) with the task of collecting data through secret surveillance of telecommunications for the IC member services, the police, and the State Attorney’s Office.

The Law also founded the Information Systems Security Bureau (ZSIS) as a central government body to perform, in the technical area, norms and procedures of information security to the state bodies of the Republic of Croatia.

The law allows supervision and control of the IC member activities that can be performed by the employees of UVNS, through the appropriate parliamentary committee of Croatian Parliament and civic society through the Council for Civilian Oversight of Security and Intelligence Agencies (members of this Council are appointed by the Croatian Parliament).

Supervision of the IC is shown in Figure 11.\textsuperscript{44}

\textsuperscript{44} Oversight of SOA Activity; URL:https://www.soa.hr/en/soa/oversight/ access 4th of June 2014
CONCLUSION

The history of the creation of Croatian IC showed that the first 10 years of its creation were a process that continuously created and developed a system of national security in accordance with the Western democratic principles. During this period, Croatian IC had clearly defined goals and objectives, and had a certain level of continuity of personnel and its activities. The analysis shows that Croatia has successfully, in a situation when it was faced with aggression with an uncertain outcome, successfully achieved the vital national interests (defence and creation of an internationally recognized state) including the process of communist IC transformation into a democratic IC. Even
during the time of war, it became a respectable partner of many foreign IC member services. After the completion of the transformation, the system had to be restructured in line with new goals and tasks, and fully aligned with similar systems that existed in the Western democracies. After the peaceful reintegration of the Croatian Danube region ended, Croatian IC shifted towards new, peaceful activities and organisation, towards new goals and objectives.

The change of the government in 2000, the new six-party ruling coalition, started the processes that caused instability and collapse of the national security system. For international partners' Croatian intelligence service became insufficiently effective and volatile partner, due to the fact that primary users were insufficiently aware of the role that the IC has in modern democratic states. The six-party coalition agreed a "division" of the IC according to the party interests, which led to numerous leaks of most heavily guarded documents in public, with the aim of gaining personal and party political interests. There was a change in the internal and external policies that reflected the work of the IC. The primary users were not able to establish priorities, short- and long-term objectives and tasks of the IC member services, because Croatia, as a state, after year 2000 had no precisely defined strategic goals. It turned out that those actions created numerous problems to the national security system and, among others, led to a rapid shift of the ruling administration, in the next elections.

The problems that can still be seen in the work of Croatian IC are in fact that Croatia has the National Security Strategy, adopted in March 2002, 12 years ago. This strategy is obsolete in almost all its parts, especially in the part where is written that the Republic of Croatia needs to become a member of the Euro-Atlantic Integration (Croatia became a member of NATO in early 2009, and joined the EU's 1st of July 2013).

Each IC is a living organism that is organised according to the nature and type of challenges that IC is faced with, or it might be faced. The organization, structure, objectives and tasks of individual IC depends on a number of historical, political, and civilization values and social relations in which it is created and operates. It depends on the situation and the complexity of international relations and conflicting (internal and external) interests.

In this sense, the imposition of a uniform IC model to the different countries is a process that produces long-term damages to the real national interests, particularly to the
societies that are in transition. A return to the system that, by its organizational form, has a reminiscent to the system that existed in communist systems is not and cannot be a long-term sustainable solution.

By comparing the IC that was formed in the Homeland war, and the one that exists now, important differences are visible. Why the Republic of Croatia then (1990-1992) decided to use a model that exists in the NATO member states and (primarily the United States) and Israel (as today's IC remind to the IC that existed during the former Yugoslavia)? Croatia was faced (1990-1992) with numerous and serious threats to its survival, such as the problems that Israel faces every day for decades. Croatia was faced with a very tough and demanding situation and changes in front of itself that needed to be done quite fast, primarily to change the communist constitution, system and mentality. Likewise, the Croatian leadership wanted to show, what they already said when they were dissidents during the existence of Yugoslavia, that the future of the Republic of Croatia is in the Western Europe and NATO, and not in the communist and/or Non-aligned organizations. The experiences that individual NATO countries had in the process of creating their own IC during the Second World War were also one of the models for the creation of Croatian IC.

Croatian IC has had its ups and downs (just like almost any other IC) that were/are substantially caused by the internal political relations at the Croatian political scene, as well as by the external influences of certain influential countries in the international community. Croatian IC was most effective at the time from 1990 to 1999 when national interests and objectives were defined very clearly. The lack of a clear vision about the role, position and importance of IC in processes to identify, promote and protect national interests negatively affects the IC. Weak and ineffective IC presents a problem for the international IC because instead of facing the challenges, it becomes a problem that dissipates people, resources, and valuable time in time of crisis.

At the end, we have to say that there is not such a thing like perfectly organized intelligence community that certain bad personal solutions can damage. Also badly organized IC can be launched toward positive side of organizational forms that will allow more democratic and better results, if at the key positions are appointed persons that are able to neglect their personal interests over the interests of the state.

That is the necessary determination of state leaders who have to know what they want from IC, without violation of
human rights of the individual and the community, except under strictly defined procedures and in a clearly defined situations. Reaching the general, social and political, consensus about key national interests is one of the cornerstones of the success of the state and the society. States, where the core standards change with each change of party in power (especially in the coalition governments with numerous members) are “sentenced to” constant crisis, and therefore are subject to numerous risks (economic, social, security, cultural ....). Therefore, an important responsibility for the successful operation of each IC depends on both the ruling and opposition politicians, who should be aware of the problems that the politicization of IC brings huge problems in the short and long term.

Precisely democratic procedure as well as already mentioned consensus of major political parties will safeguard the integrity of the IC, its continued successful activities. IC is one of the systems that cannot produce, rapidly, high quality results without the certain risk level. Therefore, the continuity in the area of professional personnel, as well as in the goals and objectives in accordance with clearly, and unequivocally, established national (and international) targets are one of the cornerstones of successful activities of each IC.

Abbreviations:

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<td>DDR</td>
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<td>Ratno vazduhoplovstvo i protuvazdušna odbrana</td>
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<td>Služba Državne Bezbednosti</td>
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<td>SEE</td>
<td>Jugoistočna Europa</td>
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<td>SFRJ</td>
<td>Socijalistička Federativna Republika Jugoslavija</td>
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<td>Služba za Istraživanje i Dokumentaciju Saveznog sekretarijata za inostrane poslove</td>
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<td>Sigurnosno-informativna služba</td>
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<td>Stožer Osiguranja</td>
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<td>SOA</td>
<td>Sigurnosno Obavještajna Agencija</td>
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<td>SONS</td>
<td>Stožerni Odbor za Nacionalnu Sigurnost</td>
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<td>Savezni Sekretarijat Inostranih Poslova</td>
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<td>SSNO*</td>
<td>Savezni Sekretarijat Narodne Odbrane</td>
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<td>SSSR</td>
<td>Savez Sovjetskih Socijalističkih Republika</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSUP*</td>
<td>Savezni Sekretarijat Unutrašnjih Poslova</td>
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<td>SUBNOR</td>
<td>Savez udruženja boraca Narodno oslobodilačkog rata</td>
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<tr>
<td>SZUP</td>
<td>Služba za Zaštitu Ustavnog Poretku</td>
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<td>TIOO*</td>
<td>Teritorijalna izviđačko-obaveštajna organizacija</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>English Name</td>
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<td>TO</td>
<td>Territorial defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>UB*</td>
<td>Military Counterintelligence Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDB*</td>
<td>State Security Department</td>
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<td>UNS</td>
<td>National Security Office</td>
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<td>USKOK</td>
<td>Bureau for Combating Corruption and Organized Crime</td>
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<td>UVNS</td>
<td>Office of the National Security Council</td>
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<td>UZUP</td>
<td>Office for the Protection of the Constitutional Order</td>
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<td>VNS</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>VO*</td>
<td>Military (Army) District</td>
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<td>VOS GŠJNA*</td>
<td>Military Intelligence Service of Yugoslav People’s Army Headquarter</td>
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<td>VPO*</td>
<td>Military Maritime (Naval) District</td>
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<td>VSA</td>
<td>Military Security Agency</td>
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<td>VSOA</td>
<td>Military Security and Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>VŠ NOP i DVJ</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarter of National Liberation Movement and Volunteer Army of Yugoslavia</td>
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<td>VŠ NOV i POJ</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarter of National Liberation Movement and Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia</td>
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<tr>
<td>WP</td>
<td>Warsaw Pact or Warsaw Treaty</td>
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