Roles and Styles of Local Political Leaders on the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia: Between Authoritarian Local Political Top Bosses and Citizen-Oriented Local Managers

Ivan Koprić*

New countries on the territory of the former Yugoslavia can be divided into three groups, with regard to direct election of local mayors: forerunners (Slovenia, Macedonia), lead-legs runners (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro), and hesitators or latecomers (Serbia, Croatia). A research of local leaders’ roles and styles perceptions was conducted in the winter of 2008, when all those countries except Croatia had directly elected local mayors. Mayors in Croatia were elected by the local representative bodies. Conceptual framework distinguishes four local leaders’ roles or leadership dimensions: political (politician), administrative and managerial (manager), internally oriented (populist or domestic worker), and externally oriented

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leadership (network builder or foreign minister). Six styles’ characteristics were also researched (participative vs. authoritarian style; personal autonomy vs. political party dependence; authority-orientation vs. service-orientation; proactive vs. reactive style; external vs. internal orientation; business-like vs. specific local political style). From the research results, an optimist can conclude that direct election of mayors on the territory of the former Yugoslavia produces mainly expected results, but a bit more slowly than expected. He/she can stress that the observed differences are in line with the expectations. A pessimist can conclude that the way of electing mayors is not decisive for their real political behaviour, at least in the current stage of the development of local political systems.

Key words: direct election of local mayors, local political systems, local self-government, roles and styles of local political leaders, local politics and management, countries on the territory of the former Yugoslavia

I. Introduction

The purpose of the research on the roles and leadership styles\(^1\) has been to check a widespread statement that directly elected mayors tend to behave in quite different manner than those elected indirectly.\(^2\) It seems reasonable to predict that new countries on the territory of the former Yugoslavia still share a common tradition originated during the period of the first and

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\(^1\) The paper is based on the results of the research project on the roles and leadership styles of the local executive functionaries. Research project was designed and conducted by the author during January and February 2008. Research project and the first results were presented at the Third International Conference on Local Politics *Town Chief, City Boss or Place Bound President? Comparing Local Political Leadership in Europe* in Ghent, Belgium, on 14 and 15 March 2008. Conference was organized by the Centre for Local Politics at Ghent University and the CEVIPOF at the Université Libre de Bruxelles.

\(^2\) Most of the countries on the territory of the former Yugoslavia have directly elected mayors and Croatia still does not. That situation allows the comparison of the styles and roles self-assessment between directly and indirectly elected mayors.
Because of such a common history and accompanying political culture, which tends to resist changes, it can be also predicted that there will still be only minor differences in styles and role perception between directly and indirectly elected mayors. In other words, the basic assumption is that harmonisation in the region based on relatively long common history and similar public sector culture hinders full effects of a new institution, such as directly elected mayors.

The tendency of strengthening local political leadership can be seen on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, as well as in other parts of Europe. However, legal changes are not enough – changes of role perceptions and actual behaviour are needed. Under such dynamic circumstances that prevail at local scene in contemporary Europe, there are several possible development lines of local leaders’ conceptualisation: they can be seen as strong political top bosses, managers oriented towards citizens, or relatively weak symbolic presidents. It seems necessary to develop an adequate conceptual frame and proper research methods for analysing contemporary changes in local leadership, having in mind the necessity to enable cross-country comparison and mutual learning.

Research results with regard to the roles and styles of local leaders will be presented in this paper, while the results with regard to the institutional design of local leaders, tradition and public sector culture were presented elsewhere (Koprić, 2009b). Short information on election of mayors on the territory of former Yugoslavia has been given. Theoretical model underlying research has also been described in the paper. At the end, empirical data are presented and results analysed.

II. Election of Mayors on the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia

Similarly to the situation in many other parts of the World, there is an ongoing debate about the role of local executive bodies in the countries on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Direct election of local mayors

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3 It has been often argued that different history till the end of World War I and different development paths after the dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia have caused substantial differences in traditions and political cultures of the new countries on the territory of the former Yugoslavia.
is one of the most prominent ideas. Direct election of mayors seems to be a panacea, cure for all diseases of rather unhealthy governance systems. Although the institution of direct election of mayors has been criticised by many academics, politicians and citizens are very much in favour of it. It seems that citizens are interested in its introduction particularly in those countries that have a long tradition of the executive bodies elected by the representative ones, like Croatia and Serbia.

Criticism is based on wider social and historical circumstances in the countries of the region, on possible issues and problems with implementing direct election, and on the typical effects of a new institution (for details see Koprić, 2009b).

A large majority of countries on the territory of the former Yugoslavia have recently made changes in their local self-governments by introducing direct election of mayors. Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Montenegro have chosen such a direction. Serbia introduced direct election, but then turned back to the »old« type of mayors elected in the local representative bodies. In Croatia, the new Law introducing direct election of mayors will be fully effective at general local elections in 2009.4

In a way, there are three groups of countries on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. In the first group (forerunners) are those countries that introduced direct elections of mayors as part of the first institutional package within the frame of political transition to a democratic system. Slovenia5 and Macedonia6 belong to that group. Despite strong criticism, especially in Slovenia, they do not consider the possibility of abandoning direct elections of mayors – they have upgraded the system in the course of some incremental measures.

In the second group (lead-legs runners) are the countries that are eager to introduce direct election, but have certain difficulties in developing their political systems at both central and local levels (war and connected social disadvantages, fight for independence, general delay in developing demo-

4 For more detailed comparative analysis see Koprić, 2009b.
5 Slovenia introduced direct election of mayors as early as in 1993. Candidates have difficulties trying to win in the first round, and the second round of elections is a rule. The recall procedure for mayor has not been regulated.
6 Macedonia introduced direct election of mayors on the ground of the Local Government Act of 1995. Citizens dissatisfied with their mayor can initiate a vote of no confidence (at least 20% of them).
cratic institutions, etc.). These are Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Kosovo. They acquired their very first experiences with direct elections and with directly elected mayors (Montenegro in 2003, Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2004, and Kosovo in the end of 2007 onwards).

In the third group (hesitators or latecomers) are the countries that are reluctant to introduce direct election of mayors. Croatia and Serbia belong to this group. Croatia hesitated, but finally provided for direct elections of mayors. Serbia introduced direct election by the Law of 2002 and then gave them up in the new Constitution of 2006.

Each country with direct election of mayors has certain specific rules and institutional varieties. Some of them have certain additional bodies or functionaries or professional position holders, along with a representative body and the mayor. Some of them ought to ensure: additional ways of cooperation between the two bodies with interests that are different to a certain degree; control of mayors and their spending; extend mayor’s managerial and political capacity; etc. A recall procedure has been regulated, as a rule, also with certain differences in various countries.

III. Roles and Styles of Local Political Leaders

Ample literature on leadership and management offers a lot of possibilities to conceptualise the work of leaders, political leaders, and local political leaders.

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7 In Bosnia and Herzegovina the first direct elections were held in October 2004. The second elections for mayors were held in October 2008, applying relative majority vote in one electoral round.

8 In Montenegro, directly elected president of municipality has five-year mandate. The Law of 2003 provides for two election rounds if none of the candidates has won the majority of votes in the first round. Citizens may have significant role in the recall procedure.

9 In Kosovo, UNMIK Decree 2007/30 on Local Elections has provided for direct election of mayors. The first direct elections according to that Decree were held in November 2007. Only six mayors were elected in the first round, while runoff elections were held in 24 municipalities.

10 Croatia has been the most cautious among the countries on the territory of the former Yugoslavia with regard to direct election of mayors. Each municipality has two executive bodies, the mayor and the executive board. The relationship between the representative and executive bodies is more parliamentary-like.

11 Serbia tends to choose more parliamentary-like local governance system. Direct elections of the presidents of municipalities were held only once, in September 2004. The recall procedure was regulated. However, the new regulations about parliamentary-like local governance system have been effective since local elections held in May 2008.
leaders. The range of leadership concepts in organisation theory, adminis-
trative science and political science has been spreading from the classical
Weberian notion of monocratic leadership in the legal-type bureaucracies
to the notion of leadership as a kind of organisational instrument to cope
with anxiety (Morgan, 1997: 230–236; Denis et al., 2005). Many vari-
ables have been researched in the context of leadership: decision-making,
authority and power, coordination, motivation, culture, etc. Various de-
finitions\(^{12}\) and components of leadership, such as necessary leaders' skills
(Perry, 1990: 44–45; Bozeman, 1992: 334–336) and competences (Benni-
s, 1992: 312), leadership types, managerial functions and jobs, have
been taken into account (Henry, 1995: 136–143). Political leadership
attracted questions like legitimacy, roles, styles, social background and
paths of selection, longevity and political career, and the like.

At the local level, analysing and researching political leadership roles and
styles can be especially productive.\(^{13}\) Building on rich theoretical ground
ameliorated by a number of social sciences' researchers, local political lea-
dership can be conceptualised in the proposed, twofold manner. On one
hand, the roles of local political leaders are interesting – at least four roles
of such leaders can be differentiated – political, administrative and ma-
agerial, internally oriented, and externally oriented leadership. On the
other hand, different styles of local political leaders can be seen.

Local political leaders mainly situated in the local executive bodies are at
the junction of at least two lines of influence. The first is the line between
politics and administration, the second is that between local communi-
ty and central government. Ivanišević developed an interesting theoreti-
cal frame for comparative analysis of local executives building on such a
premise. Among other developments, he identified six functions or roles
of local executives and leaders: administrative coordination, political in-
tegration, transmission of political decisions, isolation between politics
and administration, vertical integration of the whole political system of
a country, and representation of local interest before central state bodies

\(^{12}\) James D. Mooney, for example, defined leadership as follows: »I would define
leadership as the form in organization through which authority enters into process; which
means, of course, that there must be leadership as the necessary directive of the entire orga-

\(^{13}\) For interesting example in organisational world see Adizes, 1989 (1979). He dis-
tinguishes four leaders' roles, producer, administrator, entrepreneur, and integrator, and
five basic styles of mismanagement. He considers that a good leader (or good management
team) should succeed to act all four roles. Strand (1993) and Gerding (1993) used the same
typology of roles for analysing public bureaucracies.
(Ivanišević, 1987: 78–82, 113–129). Similar first four functions (without vertical integration and local interests representation), proposed by Leach and Wilson, are used in Bäck (2006: 125–126).\textsuperscript{14} Also, the position of mayors in vertical power relations, having in mind dynamics of local – regional – national governments, is empirically tested in Kübler and Michel (2006).\textsuperscript{15}

Similar roles are comprised in the survey form (Appendix 1), in section III1 on work time spending assessment. Respondents have been asked to assess how much work time they spend on relations with certain subjects and group of subjects (11 of them), on average, in percentage. Relations with representative and other executive bodies, if such exist, and relations with political parties and other political actors constitute the political role of local political leaders. If such work time spending dominates, the local political leaders can be identified as »politicians«.

Administrative and managerial role can be identified by having data on local political leaders’ work time spending on relations with civil servants in local units, with business community and with civil sector subjects.\textsuperscript{16} The purpose of such relations is to ensure quality public services to citizens and local community. Local leaders devoted to such orientation can be called »managers«.

The dominant orientation of local political leaders can be towards local community, at the expense of »foreign relations«. Such local »populists« or »domestic workers« spend a lot of work time on relations with citizens, general public, and the media, and on community and public events (citizens’ meetings, cultural and similar events).

The fourth category are »network builders«, local leaders who act as their communities’ foreign ministers, searching for opportunities for their local units in wider environment and trying to strengthen their local units’ position in competition with other self-governments.

\textsuperscript{14} They are: (1) maintaining the cohesion of the administration (internal networking), (2) developing strategic policy direction (agenda setting), (3) representing the authority in the external world (external networking), (4) ensuring task accomplishment (task accomplishment).

\textsuperscript{15} See also very detailed theoretical and comparative analysis in Ramljak, 1982.

\textsuperscript{16} In that sense Peters and Pierre (1998: 230–231) stress that »output control can manifest itself either through customer satisfaction and other performance indicators ... or through generating compliance and customer-attuning of public services by bringing private and voluntary sector actors and interests into public service production and delivery« (italicized by I. K.).
Although popular, conceptualising local political leaders’ styles is a more complex task to a certain degree (more details in Getimis and Hlepas, 2006). Simple definitions that it is »the way in which the leader operates« (Leach and Wilson) are hiding a lot of issues. The survey form is used to indicate six dimensions of leadership style.

a) Local political leaders can be a community’s instrument for making political decisions and agenda setting or can insist on their formal competences and position in the hierarchy. In the first case, they will allow and ask for participation of wider community. In the second, they will obey the will of their political parties, political patrons and friends, and/or other dominant political actors, irrespectively of citizens’ will. This constitutes the difference between participative and authoritarian leadership style (see also Getimis and Hlepas, 2006: 180–181; Peters, 2001: 38; Heller et al., 1998; Cartwright, 1965: 2; Golembiewski, 1965: 116–117; Tannenbaum et al., 1961: 88–100; etc.). Higher support of the statement that the leader tends to consult associates, professionals, citizens and other interested subjects before making decisions (statement a) indicates a more participative style. Stronger affiliation to the statement that the leader tends to consult his/her political party before making decisions (statement b) indicates an authoritarian style.

b) It can be assumed that some local political leaders are more interested in preserving and strengthening their own personal autonomy and integrity, building their networks and increasing power, and executing their own ideas and conceptions about the development of their local unit and ways of achieving well-being of their local community. On the other hand, one can identify those leaders who try to stick to their political party’s line, probably having in mind their political career advancement prospects. In other words, »partisanship (and independence) of mayors does influence style« (Getimis and Hlepas, 2006: 121). Fallend et al. are speaking about »divided loyalties ... between party representation and local community interests« (2006). That dimension reflects the significance and degree of party politics influence at local level and presence of non-partisan politics, also. Too strong an influence of national political parties on local political leaders has been often complained of especially in transitional countries, but is a wider phenomenon (Kasapović, 2004: 81). Of course, even political party members could be more or less autonomous as political leaders. To hide behind a kind of formally »independent« position is empirically verified, too (Reiser, 2008: 285). Personal autonomy of local leaders and their political party dependence can be measured by their ranking of two
different statements; that they in most cases have a firm idea about the final decision, even before they consult all interested actors (statement f) and that support of their political party is crucial for their further political advancement and reaching better positions (statement k).

c) Local political leaders can be twofold oriented and act in different manners. On one hand, they can be loyal to formal authority structure in the state, having in mind that local self-government is the creature of central state constitution, tailored by central state legislation – nothing else but a form of political de-centralisation.\footnote{Even European Charter of Local Self-Government recognises that such situation is desirable – regulation exclusively by constitution and laws adopted by parliaments gives a sort of protection from illegal influence of central governments and administrative bodies.} A more pragmatic reasoning would stress that central governments have in hand finances necessary to implement many local projects.\footnote{For both legal and financial kinds of limitations see Wollmann, 2003: 90–91.} Of course, local political leaders can be politically connected with the members of the political party ruling the central state and loyal according to the internal party lines. Waves of national homogenisation and pride can add to such orientation significantly, as in many newly established states on the territory of the former Yugoslavia or former Soviet Union. On the other hand, local political leaders can see local citizenry and local community as the main source of legitimacy and be service-oriented. At the same time, when the satisfaction of local citizens is decisive for local actors’ political success, a large percent of citizens are »simply interested in getting good quality services« (Swianiewicz, 2001: 27, 30). Authority-orientation and service-orientation can be measured by following statements: »Central government has the greatest influence on development possibilities and solving local issues in my unit« (statement l) and »Satisfaction and support of citizens, and community cohesion are the ultimate values to me« (statement j).

d) One of the basic questions about leadership in the contemporary public sectors is about space and possibility of leaders to act proactively. Are they able and willing to act proactively or they are mainly passive chargé d’affaires? In similar manner Denis et al. differentiate between entrepreneurial and stewardship model of leadership in public sector organisations (2005: 450–452). Stronger estimation of the statement that a leader tries to recognize new development opportunities and foresee problems before they arise (statement i) indicates a proactive style. The leader that solves
issues and problems one by one, as they come, and tries not to cause new problems (statement e) acts in reactive manner.

e) During everyday functioning, local political leaders can be directed to broader environments, building networks of useful contacts and communications with influential external actors, be they at the central, regional or (and) European levels, in business or the civil sector. Or they can be oriented to internal issues and values of local community. Although external orientation seems to be one of »must be« leadership functions (Pusić, 2002: 300), it is obvious that some leaders have more external style of functioning (see Kickert and Koppenjan, 1997: 58) and some of them are putting local community at the very first place (see also Baldersheim, 2003: 257). If latter is the case, the leader will put more esteem to the statement that he or she is ready to take responsibility for decisions supported by local community, despite probable sanctions from the central state level (statement d). Quite the opposite, externally oriented leader will firmly accept the statement that it is hard to find development opportunities in a close community which orients him or her to cooperate, in the name of the community, with outside subjects (statement g).

f) In recent decades, the new public management (NPM) ideology claims that leadership in the public sector is not significantly different from the private sector leadership. NPM-inspired reform practices have been considerably anchored at local level (Vetter and Kersting, 2003; Banner, 2006). For this reason, Berg tested the claim that local political leadership is nothing else but organisational leadership (as simple as any other managerial job) and raised criticism that »NPM ideas on political leadership ignore the complexity of politics« (2006: 315). However, to identify business-like style and specific local political style of local leaders, two statements are used. The first one is that the executive function in a local unit is the same as a management function in the private sector, having in mind that citizens’ satisfaction is equally important as customers’ satisfaction (statement c). The second statement stresses that local political functions are characterised by democratic, social and ecological values to a significant degree; quite the opposite than in the private sector (statement h).

Based on the analysis of roles and styles of local political leaders, some hypotheses for empirical testing are developed. They are as follows:

1. Managerial role will outweigh the political one in each country, but in those with direct election the difference will be more pronounced.
2. Internal role will be more important than external role in the countries with directly elected mayors.

3. Directly elected mayors will be more participative, autonomous, service-oriented, and proactive than the mayors elected by councils.

4. Only the mayors with previous engagement mainly in the private sector will conceptualise their function as more business-like.

1. Managerial role will outweigh the political one in each country, but in those with direct election the difference will be more pronounced.

Such an expectation has been rooted in the observation that contemporary local self-government is much more oriented to solve real life problems of local people and community than to more general political issues. The focus of legitimacy has been moved from input (political) to output (managerial) legitimacy – results are becoming more and more important. More political issues are anchored at the wider levels, primarily at the central state level. It can be reasonably expected that local problem-solving, quality local services, better economic and general life prospects, economic and social development are the most important criteria for voters. Other researches show that mayors perceive such tasks as the most important (Heinelt, 2006: 210–211). However, directly elected mayors are faced with even clearer picture of citizens’ expectations: they can count on citizens’ support as much and as long as they produce results. Because of that, directly elected mayors will be more managerially and less politically oriented.

2. Internal role will be more important than external role in the countries with directly elected mayors.

Having in mind the necessity of acquiring and maintaining citizens’ political support, directly elected mayors will be more engaged in internal affairs, even at the expense of the central state support. It has already been observed that citizens have clear expectations that directly elected mayors will be more responsive (Larsen, 2005: 210), i.e. more internally oriented to the needs and voice of citizens and community itself. They should have a vision of local development, both economic and social, and be very familiar with local circumstances and opportunities. Some of them would even try to act as a kind of local heroes, provoking conflicts with the central state government – especially when they do not belong to the same political option which is ruling at the central level.
3. Directly elected mayors will be more participative, autonomous, service-oriented, and proactive than the mayors elected by councils.

It may be predicted that directly elected mayors will search for broader and stronger citizens’ participation in local policies and local affairs (see also Vetter, 2006). By participation, mayors can learn about citizens’ political preferences and expectations and citizens can invest their input in public decisions and public interest. Participation can be seen both as classical forms of turnout in mayoral elections and mayors’ recall, as well as softer versions such as citizens’ initiative, information sharing, interactive internet tools, etc. Comparative data and assessments show that directly elected mayors are more autonomous and independent than those elected by councils (see, for example, in Larsen, 2002: 123).

4. Only the mayors with previous engagement mainly in the private sector will conceptualise their function as more business-like.

Although such an expectation does not seem to be fully acceptable, it may have some rational grounds. Import of the private sector managers into the public sector has been considered as one of the typical measures aimed at strengthening managerial orientation (Barlow et al., 1996: 5; Depré et al., 1996: 288). Having in mind that the vast majority of organisational issues have at least similar answers in both private and public sector organisations, it is not a big surprise that managers tend to perceive problems and to behave in similar manner in both sectors (Strand, 1993: 171). However, it is probable that conceptualising their role as more business- or private sector-like will be more stressed by those mayors who have previously been engaged in the private sector. Vice versa is also true: mayors with longer public sector experience will see more specific elements in performing local political, i.e. mayoral position.

IV. Empirical Data and Results Analysis

The survey questionnaire was sent to 314 local self-government units in all countries on the territory of the former Yugoslavia during January and

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19 For putting such an oversimplified idea into a broader context see for example Lynn, 1996: 143–166.

20 The sample was formed taking, as a rule, every 5th municipality from the lists designed according to the alphabetical order of local self-government units in Bosnia and Herzegovina (separately for the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Srpska Repu-
February 2008. The research referred only to basic local self-government units, not to other self-government units, like counties, regions, or forms of self-government below basic local level. The questionnaire asked for quantitative and qualitative data on local self-government units, mayors (or other chiefs of local executive), and their assessments, attitudes and perceptions. Total of 99 answers was received, counting for less than 32% units in sample. Directly elected mayors were in seats in all countries except in Croatia.

Table 1 Survey sample and answers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Local units in sample</th>
<th>Answers</th>
<th>Percentage of answers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>43,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– BH Federation</td>
<td>(16)</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>(62,5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Republic of Srpska</td>
<td>(13)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(23,1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Brčko District</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(–)</td>
<td>(–)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>40,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– towns</td>
<td>(27)</td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>(33,3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– municipalities</td>
<td>(87)</td>
<td>(37)</td>
<td>(42,5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>25,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>33,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>22,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>25,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>31,5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data for testing hypotheses on roles and styles of local political leaders on the territory of former Yugoslavia and on local political leaders' attitudes towards direct elections are collected and show interesting results.

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21 The author owes thanks for technical help to Tijana Vukojičić, lecturer at the Social Sciences Polytechnic in Zagreb, and Mihovil Škarica, assistant at the Faculty of Law in Zagreb, both PhD students in public law and public administration at the Faculty of Law in Zagreb.

22 Small number of answers from certain countries or entities, especially from Kosovo and Srpska Republic, allows only tentative conclusions (for them).
Roles of local political leaders. Time consumption assessment of local political leaders systematised according to previously described criteria to four roles, shows the pattern presented in the Tables 2 and 3.

Table 2  The roles of local political leaders according to time spending self-assessment (dominant role has been bolded)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Bosnia and Herzegovina</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
<th>Kosovo</th>
<th>Macedonia</th>
<th>Montenegro</th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
<th>Serbia</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>16,97</td>
<td>20,27</td>
<td>22,50</td>
<td>14,20</td>
<td>22,29</td>
<td>15,44</td>
<td>18,22</td>
<td>18,56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative and managerial</td>
<td>34,42</td>
<td>33,74</td>
<td>23,00</td>
<td>31,50</td>
<td>29,43</td>
<td>37,11</td>
<td>28,00</td>
<td>31,03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>31,77</td>
<td>31,39</td>
<td>30,75</td>
<td>30,20</td>
<td>24,29</td>
<td>30,67</td>
<td>33,67</td>
<td>30,39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External</td>
<td>16,84</td>
<td>14,53</td>
<td>23,75</td>
<td>24,10</td>
<td>23,28</td>
<td>16,77</td>
<td>19,23</td>
<td>19,79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>9,93</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>99,29</td>
<td>99,99</td>
<td>99,12</td>
<td>99,77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 Countries ranked by time consumption for each local leaders’ role

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Managerial</th>
<th>Internal</th>
<th>External</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Kosovo</td>
<td>Slovenia 37,11</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>33,67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Montenegro</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina 4,42</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>1,77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Croatia</td>
<td>Croatia 33,74</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>31,39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Serbia</td>
<td>Macedonia 31,50</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>30,75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>Montenegro 29,43</td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>30,67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Slovenia</td>
<td>Serbia 28,00</td>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>0,20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Macedonia</td>
<td>Kosovo 23,00</td>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>4,29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Expectation from hypothesis 1, that managerial role will outweigh the political one in each country, and that in the countries with direct elections the difference will be more pronounced was not confirmed. On one hand, Serbia and Kosovo (and Srpska Republic within Bosnia and Herzegovina) show internal role as dominant, opposite to expectation, although both countries have directly elected mayors. On the other hand, Croatia shows administrative and managerial role as dominant, also opposite to expectation, although its mayors were not directly elected.
Similar situation is with expectation from hypothesis 2, that internal role will be more important than external role (only) in the countries with directly elected mayors. Internal role is occupying mayors (much) more than the external one in all countries. The difference is small only in Montenegro, but also to the advantage of internal role. The greatest difference between time consumption for internal role in comparison to external role is in Croatia, indicating – surprisingly – that local leaders like to act more as populists than as network builders despite the election by the representative bodies, not by citizens themselves.

What is also interesting is that in all countries mayors reported more frequent occupation with administrative and managerial role than with political one. Almost all countries show a similar pattern – administrative and managerial role outweighs political almost doubly, the most in Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the least in Kosovo and Montenegro.

It seems that administrative and managerial role consummates a substantive part of local political leaders’ work time. Such a finding sounds very optimistic and may indicate that there is a rather widespread tendency in local political leadership on the territory of the former Yugoslavia to ensure good public services to citizens and community or, in other words, a tendency to redesign local political leadership from predominantly politically coloured to managerial one. However, what is responsible for such a result? From more detailed data23 follows that local leaders’ engagement with local civil servants (time consumption for relations with civil servants) outweighs real managerial orientation (time consumption for relations with business community and the civil sector). Such a situation is in Slovenia (24 to 13% of total working time) and, to a smaller degree, in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. Opposite situation is in Serbia, where managerial orientation outweighs administrative one by 6% (17 to 11%) and, to a smaller degree, in Kosovo (13 to 10%).24

Internal role is also very consumptive, taking at least the second place, regardless of the way in which mayors are elected. While administrative and managerial and internal roles together occupy about 2/3 of mayors’ work time, the remaining 1/3 is spent on political and external roles. This shows that, firstly, contrary to the expectations, local leaders are not ready

23 Available from the author at request.

24 Ranking with regard to managerial orientation time consumption is as follows: Croatia (17,47%), Serbia (17%), Bosnia and Herzegovina (15,96 %), Montenegro (14,43%), Macedonia (14%), Slovenia and Kosovo (both 13%).
to spend too much of their time on political games with representative and other local bodies. There are some differences between the countries, but regardless of the way in which mayors are elected. The highest time consumption for such relations has been reported by the mayors in Montenegro (17.86%) and the lowest in Serbia (9.11%). Similarly, local leaders spend various time on relations with political parties and other political actors, but regardless of (in)direct election. It is interesting that the highest time consumption for such purpose has been reported by Serbian mayors (11.11%) and the lowest by Macedonian mayors (only 4%).

Secondly, local leaders do not seem to be good network builders and foreign ministers of their respective self-government units. Only Macedonian, Montenegrin, and Kosovo mayors spend more than 20% of their work time on relations with the central state, other self-government units at all levels, and foreign subjects. On the other side of the list are Croatian mayors who spend only 14.53% of their working time for the same purpose. Mayors in Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina spend slightly more for the same purpose. Mayors spend strikingly small amount of time on the relations with subjects from abroad. Croatian mayors reported the smallest time consumption for such a purpose (only 1.89%), but Slovenian mayors – and Slovenia is the EU member state – reported the second smallest time spending for the same purpose (3.22%). Mayors in Kosovo and in Montenegro reported the highest time spending on relations with foreign subjects (6.25% and 6%). Such a situation may be a reflection of very small units in Croatia and Slovenia, and intensive donor activities in Kosovo and in Montenegro.

**Style of local political leaders.** Mayors were asked to rank their agreement with the offered statements about their leadership style. There are pairs of statements for each characteristic of style, with ranking in opposite way – if someone attributes a higher degree of concurrence with one of them, he/she would probably report lower degree of concurrence with another, in conditions of fair and honest answering and adequate measurement statements. The research has provided 99 answers. Having in mind a low number of answers per country, except for Croatia, the results can be presented for two groups. One group comprises the answers of mayors from all countries with then (during research period) directly elected mayors (all except Croatia; 53 answers). The other group is with Croatian answers (only Croatian mayors were not elected directly; 46 answers). However, such systematisation enables sharpening possible differences between the countries with directly elected mayors and Croatia as the only representative of parliamentary-like local governance system.
The differences between the frequencies of answers have been tested for statistical relevance according to the $\chi^2$ procedure (see for example in Petz, 1985: 235–259). Answers are ranked from 1 as the weakest to 5 as the strongest agreement. Results are shown in tables 4–8 (for hypothesis 3) and Table 9 (for hypothesis 4).

Table 4 Participative vs. authoritarian style

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Participative style (a)</th>
<th>Authoritarian style (b)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1+2 3 4+5</td>
<td>1+2 3 4+5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directly elected</td>
<td>2 5 46</td>
<td>25 12 16</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3,8% 9,4% 86,8%</td>
<td>47,2% 22,6% 30,2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirectly elected</td>
<td>1 5 40</td>
<td>12 11 23</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,2% 10,9% 87,0%</td>
<td>26,1% 23,9% 50,0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3 10 86</td>
<td>37 23 39</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3,0% 10,1% 86,9%</td>
<td>37,4% 23,2% 39,4%</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 Personal autonomy vs. political party dependence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Autonomy (f)</th>
<th>Party dependence (k)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1+2 3 4+5</td>
<td>1+2 3 4+5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directly elected</td>
<td>4 24 25</td>
<td>23 19 11</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7,6% 41,5% 47,2%</td>
<td>47,2% 22,6% 30,2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirectly elected</td>
<td>3 20 23</td>
<td>22 16 8</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6,5% 43,5% 50,0%</td>
<td>47,8% 34,8% 17,4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7 44 48</td>
<td>45 35 19</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7,1% 44,4% 48,5%</td>
<td>45,5% 35,4% 19,2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6 Authority-orientation vs. service-orientation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Authority-oriented (l)</th>
<th>Service-oriented (j)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1+2 3 4+5</td>
<td>1+2 3 4+5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directly elected</td>
<td>7 23 23</td>
<td>1 3 49</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13,2% 43,4% 43,4%</td>
<td>1,9% 5,7% 92,5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirectly elected</td>
<td>6 13 27</td>
<td>1 3 42</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13,0% 28,3% 58,7%</td>
<td>2,2% 6,5% 91,3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13 36 50</td>
<td>2 6 91</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13,1% 36,4% 50,5%</td>
<td>2,0% 6,1% 91,9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7 Proactive vs. reactive style

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Proactive style (i)</th>
<th>Reactive style (e)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1+2 3 4+5</td>
<td>1+2 3 4+5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directly elected</td>
<td>– 2 51</td>
<td>– 8 45</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3,8% 96,2%</td>
<td>15,1% 84,9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 8 External vs. internal orientation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>External orientation (g)</th>
<th>Internal orientation (d)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1+2 3 4+5</td>
<td>1+2 3 4+5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directly elected</td>
<td>3  5,7% 8  15,1% 42  79,2%</td>
<td>4  7,5% 6 11,3% 43  81,1%</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirectly elected</td>
<td>1  2,2% 7  15,2% 38  82,6%</td>
<td>10 21,7% 7 15,2% 29  63,0%</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4  4,0% 15  15,2% 80  80,8%</td>
<td>14 14,1% 13 13,1% 72  72,7%</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The expectation that directly elected mayors will be more participative, autonomous, service-oriented, and proactive than the mayors elected by the councils (hypothesis 3) has not been confirmed. Quite contrary, there is not any characteristic of the style with regard to which the data show statistically significant differences between the countries with and without direct election of mayors! Certain differences may be mentioned although the data allow only vague and tentative conclusions. There are some differences with regard to authoritarian style (statement b), specific local political style (statement h), and internal orientation of local leaders (statement d).\(^{25}\)

There is a difference with regard to authoritarian leadership style: Croatian mayors (50% of them) show stronger agreement (ranks 4 and 5) with the statement that they tend to consult their own political party, coalition, political friends or other relevant political actors before making decisions than directly elected mayors (only 30% of them). Opposite, only 26% of Croatian mayors, in comparison with 47% in other countries, are against such practice (ranks 1 and 2).

Mayors have been asked to rank the statement which should show their consideration of local self-government as a quite specific area, especially in comparison with the private sector (h). Almost 96% of indirectly elected and 83% of directly elected mayors strongly agree (in the second group 13% are hesitant).

\(^{25}\) For statement b) \(\chi^2 = 5.40\), while lower limit of statistical relevance with two grades of freedom at 5% significance is 5.99. For statement h) \(\chi^2 = 2.80\), while lower limit of statistical relevance with one grade of freedom at 5% significance is 3.84. For statement d) \(\chi^2 = 3.50\), while lower limit of statistical relevance with two grades of freedom at 5% significance is 5.99.
With regard to internal orientation, 63% of indirectly elected mayors strongly agree with the statement that they are ready to take responsibility for decisions supported by local community, despite probable sanctions from the central state level. Directly elected mayors are more frequently ready to enter into conflict with the central state authorities, on behalf of local community. Such an answer has been reported by 81% of them. Nevertheless, 22% of indirectly, in comparison with 7.5% of directly elected mayors are not in favour of such a statement (ranks 1 and 2).

Another characteristic showing some differences is authority-orientation. Expectedly and consequently, more indirectly elected mayors agree with the statement 1) that central government has the greatest influence on development possibilities and solving local issues, in comparison with directly elected mayors (59% vs. 43%). However, no less than 43% of directly elected mayors (in comparison with 28% of indirectly elected ones) are hesitating while assessing that statement.

To conclude: indirectly elected mayors might be to a larger degree characterised by authoritarian style, orientation to central state power, and discipline; they consider local governance as a specific public area especially in comparison with the private sector; they are less internally oriented and ready to fight for their local community, in comparison with directly elected mayors. However, having in mind that there is no statistically significant difference with regard to the mentioned characteristics, such a conclusion must be interpreted as only tentative. With regard to other style characteristics, there is not any difference between directly and indirectly elected mayors worth mentioning.

It is interesting that pairs of statements which should sharpen the pairs of local leaders' styles characteristics do not work. For example, a similar pattern of agreement and disagreement founded with regard to statement h) has also been found with the opposite statement c) which should have shown business-likeness of local management. Consequently, local leadership seems to be specific, but also the same as management function in the private sector at the same time! Similar is with almost all pairs of styles' characteristics. It is obvious – without entering into discussion on possible reasons – that such a style self-assessment of local leaders deserves additional attention.

The prediction from hypothesis 4 that only the mayors with previous engagement mainly in the private sector will conceptualise their function as more business-like has not been confirmed, as can be calculated on the grounds of data from Table 9.
Table 9 Business-like vs. specific local political style

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Business-like (c)</th>
<th></th>
<th>Specific style (h)</th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1+2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4+5</td>
<td>1+2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directly elected</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
<td>75.5%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirectly elected</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>87.0%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>80.8%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is no statistically relevant difference between the mayors previously predominantly engaged in the private sector and those previously predominantly engaged in other sectors with regard conceptualising their style as business-like. It can be concluded that even the mayors with previous engagement in the public and civil sectors have learnt new concepts and ideas, more managerial and market oriented.

Furthermore, there is no statistically relevant difference in the number of mayors previously predominantly engaged in the private sector between the two groups, those directly and those indirectly elected. Surprisingly, as many as 15 out of 53 (28%) have come from the private sector in the group of directly elected mayors; while in the group of indirectly elected those with predominant previous engagement in the private sector stand for 41% (19 out of 46). It means that direct elections were won by those with previous experience in the public or civil sectors, as a rule. They obviously know the election procedure and the whole political »technology« very well, they have strong networks of supporters, and are able to win according to new rules of direct elections.

All those results lead to the conclusion that legal introduction of direct election of mayors is not the only factor responsible for role perceptions, styles and attitudes of local political leaders. Other factors, such as public sector tradition and political culture, national politics, design of the other governance institutions, and the size of local units and their fiscal and personnel capacity, may deserve additional attention (see also Koprić, 2009b).

The absence of statistically significant differences in research variables between directly elected mayors and mayors elected by the representative bodies does not mean that direct election is an institution which does not fit region of south-east Europe. First of all, certain differences exist and correspond to the theoretical expectations. Directly elected mayors seem to be less authoritarian and authority-oriented, more ready to fight for the...
well-being of local community, and consider local executive less specific (in comparison with the private sector leadership).

Secondly, almost all countries in the region were faced with war during the first half of the 1990s. The war inevitably produced chaotic, non-linear development of political institutions and their crisis. It shook political systems of the respective countries and reinforced certain undesirable characteristics of social and political systems – authoritarian political and social culture or widespread unethical behaviour, for example. Only after the war, the development of new, democratic institutions, i.e. the phase of consolidating new, dissipative structures\textsuperscript{26} of political systems could start.

Thirdly, there are obviously certain common characteristics of political environment in almost all observed countries, especially similar authoritarian political culture and self-management tradition, which do not allow such a new institution as direct election to show effects to a larger degree, at least not in a short period. A lot of encouraging signs have been identified in that respect in all countries irrespectively of the way of electing mayors. On one hand, strong service orientation (92% of all mayors), high estimation of an administrative-managerial role, 34% of mayors with substantive previous private sector experience, 22% of them seeing local self-government modernisation as the main purpose of introducing direct elections of mayors (Koprić, 2009a), are all indicators of a new, managerial and modernisation culture that spreads throughout the region. On the other hand, democratisation purpose as highly esteemed (77,8%), strong sensitivity to participation (87%) (Koprić, 2009a), and vigorous orientation to the internal or populist role, are probably signs of political transition and democracy consolidation.

Additionally, differences in the role perception between the countries with identical institutions (directly elected mayors) show that there is – after a relatively long common history – some autonomous and specific development of political systems in various countries in the region. The stress on local populism in Serbia and Kosovo is clearly different than the stress on administrative and managerial role in other countries in the region and ought to be in relation with deeper characteristics of those countries and their political systems.

However it may be, a substantial amount of time should pass to allow the new institution to produce more visible and identifiable effects.

\textsuperscript{26} For application of chaos theory in the public sector see for example Kiel, 1994.
V. Conclusion

The basic assumption behind the comparative study presented in the paper is that some sort of common characteristics can be expected in this part of the World. Relatively long common history during the First (Kingdom) and the Second (Socialist) Yugoslavia, even longer ties for some countries (i.e. within the Austro-Hungarian Empire), similar languages and other cultural characteristics, shared legal and political institutions, similar external expectations during the Europeanisation process, are among the factors that can influence on similarities in today's local institutions, the way of conceptualising roles in the local governance system, and the very way of behaviour.

General development tendency is quite clear, at least at the formal, legal level: direct election of mayors has spread throughout the region. In real life, the whole region is in continuous search for better democracy and the acceptable level of quality public services, new balance between citizens and authorities, the appropriate ratio of managerialism and political participation, right delimitation of the private and public sectors, and proper relationship between individual autonomy and community engagement. There is a lot of space for institutional design, and many chances for making wrong choices.

Basis on the data collected during the research, an optimist can conclude that direct election of mayors on the territory of the former Yugoslavia produces mainly expected results, but a bit slower than expected. He/she will certainly stress that the observed differences are in line with the expectations. A pessimist can conclude that the data have shown that the way of electing mayors is not decisive for their real political behaviour. The truth must be somewhere in-between. Further research is needed, and citizens' perception should also be taken into account, to get a more precise picture of local political leadership in the region.

References


ROLES AND STYLES OF LOCAL POLITICAL LEADERS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: BETWEEN AUTHORITARIAN LOCAL POLITICAL TOP BOSSES AND CITIZEN-ORIENTED LOCAL MANAGERS

Summary

New countries on the territory of the former Yugoslavia can be divided into three groups, with regard to direct election of local mayors: forerunners (Slovenia, Macedonia), lead-legs runners (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro), and hesitators or latecomers (Serbia, Croatia). A research of local leaders’ roles and styles perceptions was conducted in the winter of 2008, when all those countries except Croatia had directly elected local mayors. Mayors in Croatia were elected by the local representative bodies. Conceptual framework distinguishes four local leaders’ roles or leadership dimensions: political (politician), administrative and managerial (manager), internally oriented (populist or domestic worker), and externally oriented leadership (network builder or foreign minister). Six styles’ characteristics were also researched (participative vs. authoritarian style; personal autonomy vs. political party dependence; authority-orientation vs. service-orientation; proactive vs. reactive style; external vs. internal orientation; business-like vs. specific local political style). From the research results, an optimist can conclude that direct election of mayors on the territory of the former Yugoslavia produces mainly expected results, but a bit more slowly than expected. He/she can stress that the observed differences are in line with the expectations. A pessimist can conclude that the way of electing mayors is not decisive for their real political behaviour, at least in the current stage of the development of local political systems.

Key words: direct election of local mayors, local political systems, local self-government, roles and styles of local political leaders, local politics and management, countries on the territory of the former Yugoslavia
ULOGE I STILOVI LOKALNIH NAČELNIKA NA PODRUČJU BIVŠE JUGOSLAVIJE: IZMEĐU AUTORITARNIH LOKALNIH POLITIČIKA ŠEFOVA I LOKALNIH MENADŽERA USMJERENIH NA GRAĐANE

Sažetak

Nove zemlje na području bivše Jugoslavije mogu se u pogledu neposrednog izbora lokalnih načelnika svrstati u tri grupe: predvodnici (Slovenija, Makedonija), »trkači olovnih nogu« (Bosna i Hercegovina, Kosovo, Crna Gora) i ogljevala ili »zakašnjeli« (Srbija, Hrvatska). Empirijsko je istraživanje percepcije uloga i stila lokalnih voda provedeno tijekom zime 2008. kad su neposredno izabrani načelnici postojali u svim zemljama osim u Hrvatskoj. U Hrvatskoj su načelnici bili izabrani od lokalnih predstavničkih tijela. Konceptualni okvir razlikuje četiri uloge lokalnih voda ili dimenzije lokalnog vodstva: političku (političar), upravnu i menadžersku (menadžer), interno orijentirano vodstvo (populist ili domaći radnik) te vodstvo usmjeren u izvan lokalne samoupravne jedinice (graditelj mreže ili ministar vanjskih poslova). Istraživanje je i šest karakteristika stila (participativni ili autoritarni stil; osobna autonomija ili ovisnost o političkoj stranci; orijentacija prema vlasti ili prema služenju; proaktivni ili reaktivni stil; vanjska ili unutarnja orijentacija; stil nalik onome u privatnom sektoru ili specifičan stil lokalnih političara). Na temelju rezultata istraživanja optimist bi zaključio da neposredni izbori načelnika na području bivše Jugoslavije dovode do očekivanih rezultata, ali nešto sporije nego što bi se moglo očekivati. Smjer razlika koje postoje između zemalja s neposredno izabranim načelnikima na jednoj strani i Hrvatske na drugoj u skladu je s očekivanjima. Pesimist bi zaključio da način izbora načelnika nije odlučan za njihovo stvarno političko djelovanje, u najmanju ruku u sadašnjoj fazi razvoja lokalnih političkih sustava.

Ključne riječi: neposredni izbor lokalnih načelnika, lokalni politički sustavi, lokalna samouprava, uloge i stilovi lokalnih političkih voda, lokalna politika i upravljanje, zemlje na području bivše Jugoslavije