BARTULIN’S TILTING AT WINDMILLS: MANIPULATION AS A HISTORIOGRAPHIC METHOD
(A reply to Nevenko Bartulin’s “Intelectual Discourse on Race and Culture in Croatia 1900-1945”)

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In this article, which is written in a polemical tone, the author is making an effort to problematize a point of view from which the ideology of Croatian nationalism, the Ustasha movement and the Independent State of Croatia are even today being observed by a part of historiography. According to the author, the ideology of Croatian nationalism has not suffered much vital modification since the mid-19th century until the end of the Second World War, rather it has kept itself occupied with justifying the right of Croats as a multi-confessional European nation to establish an independent state. Not just political manifestations, but also literary and cultural achievements of the nationalist ideology protagonists clearly speak in that direction. The geopolitical position of Croatian lands, as well as the influence of foreign powers have not made the achievement of such a right of Croatian people and the evolution of Croatian nationalist ideology possible. As a result, that same nationalist ideology sometimes takes on foreign ideological and political influences which are visible only on its surface and purely out of tactical reasons. The Ustasha movement, being one of the manifestations of Croatian nationalism, is also characterized by ideological eclecticism. Thus, different and sometimes contrastive statements made by the leading persona of Ustasha movement regarding their attitude towards the ideologies dominating Europe in the time after the First World War are therefore understandable.

Key words: Croatian nationalism, Ustaša movement, Ustaša principles, Independent State of Croatia, racial theories, racial legislation

Introduction

In the foreword to the Croatian edition of his book Italian Support for Croatian Separatism 1927-1937, American historian James J. Sadkovich referred to some of the texts which deal with the same or similar themes: Croatian nation-

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alism in the period prior to the Second World War and the Croatian nationalists from that period, who – naturally – advocated separatist solutions vis-à-vis the Yugoslav state. In the context of assessments of those scholars who do not notice socially and militarily/politically influenced changes in the ideological-political toolkit of the Ustasha movement nor the amplitude of the differences between the Ustasha ideology and fascism during the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s (which means they do not distinguish between cause and effect and, thus, “statically and therefore incorrectly interpret history”), Sadkovich pointed out Nevenko Bartulin in one footnote.

In three sentences dedicated to Bartulin’s dissertation *The Ideology of Nation and Race: The Croatian Ustasha Regime and its Policies towards Minorities in the Independent State of Croatia, 1941-1945* (University of New South Wales, 2006), Sadkovich noted that Bartulin “claims that the Ustashe not only attempted to create a Croatian ‘nation-state’ but also ‘eliminate ethnic, racial and religious minorities’ that would have despoiled the ‘organic’ nature of state, which are two rather different tasks which can only be combined if one assumes that the Ustashe intended to perpetrate genocide (or something similar thereto) at the very onset of the movement”. Obviously deeming this thesis faulty, Sadkovich added that Bartulin, in an attempt to prove his “theoretical postulate”, employed something that constituted a “classic example of an imploded chronology”.

The texts by Bartulin which I have seen thus far lead me to a conclusion similar to Sadkovich’s, although I would formulate it much more sharply, with an incomparably less favourable assessment of his work.

To be sure, there are no personal motives involved. I am unacquainted with Bartulin personally. The comments on his dissertation I heard from those better informed than myself were such that I considered it not worth the effort to seek it out. Bartulin’s texts published in Croatian periodicals only reinforced my initial stance: it would be a wasted effort to deal with the works of scholars who, while perusing the relevant literature (foreign, to be sure, due to the belief that this creates the impression of being academic!), stumble upon some, quite often ill-conceived, theoretical model, and then believe it would be rather original and very scholarly to use this model to reinterpret and construe Croatian history, compiling the texts of others in the process, while sorting through data and concealing, fabricating and modelling facts in compliance with a preconceived formula. If, in the process, these and similar parvenus employ politically correct constructions in order to yield very recognizable and palpable earthly objectives, then I believe they should be ignored even more, for I feel that such intellectual artisans and – to once more use Sadkovich’s turn of phrase – academic entrepreneurs, are worthy of nothing more than contempt.

Briefly, Bartulin as a historian and scholar in general, was and remains entirely uninteresting to me.

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2 Ibid., p. 333, note 28.
I did not want to deal with him even when his article “The NDH as a ‘Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism’: An Assessment of Croatian-Italian Relations Within the German ‘New Order’ in Europe 1941-1945” was published in the respected Review of Croatian History (3/2007, 1, pp. 49-73). However, I highlighted some of the formulations in this text, rooted in a dismaying ignorance of the facts, in a note to one of my articles intended for another Croatian scholarly journal. This note was formulated similarly to Sadkovich’s observations, although it was half the length and – certainly – much more sharply worded.

Nonetheless the editorial board of this journal assessed that this brief note identified a tendency of some authors, despite a troublesome degree of ignoring basic facts, to boldly offer their own interpretations and make conclusions which overlook context and chronology, but are thus from today’s perspective politically correct. An additional problem is that these academic entrepreneurs are horrified by serious scholars whom they denounce for not noticing what had to be noticed: that racial teaching and racism were the alpha and omega, ceterum censeo of the Ustashe, and perhaps even Croatian nationalist ideology in general.3

For, if racist standpoints – as Bartulin suggested in his article – were advocated not only by “Ustasha intellectuals” (Mladen Lorković, Mile Starčević, Milivoj Karamarko and so forth), but also those whose lives ended when the Ustashe were only just beginning to emerge as an organization or were a marginal force (Ivo Pilar, Milan Šufflay), as well as those who viewed the Ustashe with diffidence or reproof for various reasons (Filip Lukas, Zvonimir Dugački, Živko Jakić, etc.), and even those who notably despised the Ustashe and the Independent State of Croatia (Josip Horvat, Ante Tresić Pavičić and so forth), or were Marxists, and in any case imprisoned during the time of the Independent State of Croatia (Mirko Kus-Nikolajev), then the conclusion is entirely clear: the Croatian intelligentsia, generally speaking, advocated racist views.

If one adds to this that, according to Bartulin, racist views in a nation that is mainly Catholic were advocated by people who matured or worked as Catholic priests (Kerubin Segvić, Stjepan Sakač, Filip Lukas, Ivo Guberina, Lovre Katić), the problem becomes even more serious. When one bears in mind that the NDH, according to Bartulin’s suggestion, whole-heartedly accepted writers who were at one point in their lives Yugoslav integralists (Lukas, Tresić Pavičić, Kus-Nikolajev), but later accused of Trotskyism (Kus-Nikolajev), as well as those who were not even Croats (Boris Zarnik) or were so only in the first generation (Čiro Truhelka), or (actually or allegedly) advocated racist views and made their way from the margins of society to the focus of attention, then what Bartulin wants to say is clear: these writers were accepted by the Croatian public precisely because of their racism.

The circle closes: a nation of racists whole-heartedly accepted even those who were foreigners or were “outcasts”, only if they were – racists. The Croats, thus, are racists and there is nothing in twentieth-century Croatian history that is not racist. And if there is by chance some Croat who is not a racist, he certainly did not advocate the idea of an independent Croatian state, nor accept it.

The syllogism is impeccable (which, in Bartulin’s case, is a genuine miracle!): the political stances of Croatian nationalists are not only inextricably tied to racist convictions, they are also its expression and legitimate offspring. And if one neglects, as Bartulin does, saying even a word to the effect that the works by the writers whom he mentions in his formulations indicate different, and even contradictory conclusions, and if one fails to mention that among the Croatian nationalist intelligentsia there were dozens and even hundreds of those who, in the anthropological sense, advocated markedly anti-racist (and, in the political sense, anti-totalitarian) views, then the didactic purpose of this quasi-scholarly prattle and its political message become crystal clear.

I have no doubt that there are “intellectual” circles that will greet such “scholarly” theories with enthusiasm, for we know that there were “great humanists” (such as, for example, Ernst Bloch), who proclaimed the Croatian nation “fascist”, and that during Croatia’s efforts to gain independence this and similar “scholarly”, “humanist” and “democratic arguments” were proffered against Croatia and the Croats. I similarly have no particular doubt that in his scholarly endeavours, Bartulin is vying for the sympathies of precisely such “scholars”, “humanists” and “democrats”.

Those who know me know that nothing delights me more than a vigorous debate. Perhaps this is why the editorial board of that journal proposed that I remove that note from the text to which it originally belonged, and to instead write a more extensive critique of Bartulin’s article, listing his factual errors and grappling with his claims, which were derived from prejudices and ignorance of the facts. At first I accepted this proposal. While I did not think it was useful to waste time on him (for he deals with politics, not scholarship), I maintained that it would be worthwhile to warn readers – particularly those not from Croatia – that Bartulin had misfired, and that prior to making any manner (even petty political) interpretation, it would have been fruitful if he had versed himself in the basic facts at the very least. For the magnitude of his ignorance is nothing less than insulting. However, due to other commitments and a lack of time, I could not fully develop my thesis. I apologized to the journal’s editorial board, both verbally and in writing, and then subsequently submitted a small part, actually the nucleus of my critique which may function as an independent text, to the RCH editorial board. My concisely formulated review of Bartulin’s article was in fact published in 2010.4

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Given the prehistory of this review as outlined above, I was unable to write even a word about a subsequent article on a similar topic which Bartulin published in that very same journal,\(^5\) because I was unaware of it at the time. Although published later (2010), my review emerged earlier and – as clearly indicated by its content – it pertains exclusively on Bartulin’s 2007 text, and not the article published in 2009. In it, I pointed out four or five of the most notable examples which demonstrate that Bartulin has no knowledge of the basic facts pertaining to the matters which he apparently deals with, and that he very uncritically assumes the assertions of writers who are proverbially unreliable. The majority (as much nine tenths!) of that review was dedicated to proving that Bartulin, due to his unfamiliarity with the classic works of Croatian literature, devised the most fantastic confabulations on the methodology and objectives of Croatian (“Ustasha”) propaganda at the time.\(^6\) The problem was compounded by the fact that it was a matter of very well-known verses by Vladimir Nazor, a poet who was never an Ustasha, rather prior to the Second World War he was known as voting for Yugoslav rather than Croatian parties, while during the war – despite the commendations and literary awards conferred to him by the Ustasha regime and the press under its control, and despite the fact that Ustasha regime leader Ante Pavelić appointed him to full membership in the Croatian Academy of Arts and Science – he stood on the opposing side, on the side of the Yugoslav Partisans and after the war he assumed formally high posts in Yugoslavia’s communist apparatus.

I deemed it worthwhile to publish at least this fragment, for I believe Bartulin’s logical and historiographic acrobatics merit a place among the top ranks of quasi-scholarly manipulation in recent decades. Lacking time, I did not specify all of Bartulin’s errors and oversights, but only a few, in the belief that doing otherwise would have contradicted my own Samaritan compassion. At the same time, I maintained that these several examples would underscore the reasons for which the review was written. One of them, as I said, was to point out mainly to foreign readers that Bartulin’s assertions should not be blithely accepted. Any more serious Croatian historian does not require such a caveat, but since \textit{RCH} is published in English language, I thought a possible outcome would be that Bartulin’s text could be used by those who would then proclaim themselves experts in Croatian history, and perhaps even become mentors for some new Bartulins. For, as we know, while many commendable doctoral dissertations have been submitted and defended at Croatian and foreign universities, there are also, unfortunately, many others which do not merit this appellation, defended as they were before mentors who can scarcely be called experts, much less authorities on Croatian history. This is, to be sure, a general problem that exceeds the bounds of this article and does not pertain to Bartu-

\(^5\) This would be Bartulin’s already mentioned article “The Ideal Nordic-Dinaric Racial Type: Racial Anthropology in the Independent State of Croatia”.

\(^6\) T. Jonjić, “From Bias to Erroneous Conclusions”, pp. 228-238.
lin’s dissertation, which still remains unavailable to me up to this point. Of course, it goes without saying that I have certain preconceived notions about it based on Bartulin’s available writings published in Croatian periodicals.

Some time after I submitted my brief review, the germ of an unwritten article in another journal, to the editorial board of RCH, the editor-in-chief at the time, Jure Krišto, notified me that the text had been approved for publication, and that the editorial board had immediately sent my review to Bartulin and offered him the opportunity to reply in the same issue of the journal. That would have been an opportunity for readers to hear both bells ringing in the same issue of RCH, and thus, a chance for Bartulin to refute my arguments in that same issue. If I was right, he should have apologized to the readers for his lack of knowledge; if I was wrong, he could have pointed this out and subjected me to at least the same level of ridicule to which I had subjected him. Not a great deal of effort was being sought: if he were an expert on this topic, he could have done so in a short time, because my review – as any reader can easily see – did not contain more than five or six main points. However, Bartulin rejected this possibility, which speaks sufficiently in and for itself. As seen in his most recent reply, Bartulin did not manage to prove me wrong in any single case, but naturally - he did not apologize. This would require more dignity and intellectual honesty.

I admit that I received Bartulin’s silence with Christian clemency, because I understand that it is not easy to acknowledge the four or five major factual errors that I mentioned incidentally, and simultaneously confront the fact that Bartulin’s entire edifice of “the Croats as the ‘progeny of wolves and lions’” emerged due to his dramatic ignorance of primer-level reading. In my naiveté, I even thought that Bartulin was grateful for the rather benevolent approach in my article. For if I have had the time to write that stillborn critique of his text, I would have identified a considerably higher number of instances which show that Bartulin is generally at war with the facts, so that not even his arcane interpretations should be taken too seriously.

While abstaining myself from delving into any interpretive differences, I could have pointed out that Bartulin often formulated his assertions in conditional form, or by using the words “seems”, “appears”, “probably”, etc. This happens to other writers as well. However, it is troubling that Bartulin, without hesitating or wavering, takes premises so devised to formulate exceptionally creative constructs which he serves up as apodictic conclusions. Even the old

7 Nevenko Bartulin, “The NDH as a ‘Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism’”, RCH, 3 (2007), no.1: 51, 53, 55, 62, 63, etc.
8 Here is rough illustration of Bartulin’s logical reasoning: regardless of the fact that everyone can see that a man is a being which walks on two legs, it is possible that he is nonetheless a quadruped and if he were a quadruped, than he probably would also have a fur coat. However, Bartulin does not stop at this spectacular discovery, rather in the following pages he will continue with a sage discussion of the qualities of human fur, the means to nurture and care for it, and

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Aristotle warned that such syllogisms are among the classic logical fallacies. This means that Bartulin’s relationship with logical reasoning has more than simply historiographic implications. However, they do not belong in this discussion, so I will not deal with them here.

But now that he has forced my hand by depriving me of the right to treat him as he deserves – that is, to ignore him – on this occasion I will not only shed light on Bartulin’s vivid imagination, but also underscore his habit of making factual errors even when not using conditionals. As opposed to Bartulin, who needed several years to respond to my review, I will now use the example of his article from 2007 to cite approximately sixty (!) examples which would have, had there been time in 2008, appeared in my statistics of Bartulin’s stubborn, merciless and endlessly brutal war with the facts.

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Thus, this is how Bartulin approaches what he calls “intellectual discourse” and which I – on the journal’s behalf, not Bartulin’s – will not describe using the words best suited to his process. This was not a difficult task, because the errors, superficialities, imprecisions, ambiguities and outright manipulations began already on the second page of Bartulin’s text.

Without any hesitation, he claimed that the first Ustasha camp was established in Bovegno (Italy), which, as it turns out, is not accurate. For the Ustasha chronicler Mijo Bzik already asserted that the first camp was established “in the north”, i.e., in Hungary. There can be no doubt that Bartulin – who otherwise has an acute fear of archives and source material – could not have known that in the unpublished sources held in private hands, such as the secret correspondence of Stanko Hranilović to the members of the so-called first Ustasha (military) section in the homeland (including to his imprisoned brother Marko), already mentioned “our men from Jankovac” in the spring of 1930. This turn of phrase may indicate the accuracy of Bzik’s assertion. If he does not know this, Bartulin should have known about Bzik. Even though everything this Ustasha propagandist said should not be believed, a serious historian would nonetheless have mentioned and assessed his statement. I would also mention that one of the most important Ustasha propaganda publications very clearly suggests that prior to the “first Ustasha camp in Italy” there was a “real Ustasha military camp” that was located “across the Drava”, in Hungary. The importance of this formulation, which was probably also formulated by Bzik,

then conclude by observing that the human fur trade is quite lucrative. And then to top it off, he will be shocked that other scholars were unable to understand this until he came along.

9 N. Bartulin, “The NDH as a ‘Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism’”, p. 50.
is all the greater since the best known commander of this camp in Hungary, Gustav Perčec, is mentioned nowhere in it. When this book was published, the camp in Hungary, unlike Perčec’s name, obviously could not be concealed any longer – and perhaps there was no desire to do so. However, for Bartulin, quite simply, none of this exists. He has no knowledge of this information, so he fails to evaluate it.

But, let us say that this oversight can be tolerated. It is different when Bartulin begins to write about the “first constitution of the Ustasha organization, written in 1932”.12 Logically, this does not mean that the Constitution of the Ustasha - Croatian Revolutionary Organization, was amended and modified, rather without doubt it means that this organization had several constitutions. It is entirely unclear where Bartulin found a second constitution (or perhaps he thought that there were more?), because nothing like this exists.

Bartulin’s claim that Italy provided refuge to the Ustasha organization during the 1930s is neither accurate nor precise,13 for it is incomplete, since the Ustasha organization at the time still operated in a series of other European and even transoceanic countries, and especially in Croatia. This is precisely why it managed to survive, and even become stronger during the period when the European revisionist powers (Hungary, Bulgaria and, ultimately, Italy) denied assistance.

Bartulin’s implication that the leaders of the Croatian Peasant Party (HSS) did not seek foreign assistance14 is also inaccurate, because thousands of pages of historiographic literature have been written about the attempts of that party’s leadership to obtain foreign (even Italian) assistance.

It is not true that this attitude toward foreign assistance, combined with the decision on the use of (non-)violent methods, was the key difference between the Ustashe and HSS, as Bartulin thinks.15 The key difference is the fact that the HSS leadership generally advocated reform, while the Ustashe sought the destruction of Yugoslavia.

Bartulin’s assertion that Italian claims on the eastern Adriatic coast were limited to the boundaries foreseen by the secret Treaty of London of 1915 is similarly inaccurate.16 Bartulin maintains that he used Ciano’s diaries. If he failed to consult any sources more serious than this, he could have at the very least read it more carefully. How did he manage to overlook the fact that in this diary (in the entry under 1 May 1941), Ciano mentioned that a circle of not

12 N. Bartulin, “The NDH as a ‘Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism”, p. 50.
13 Ibid., p. 49.
14 Ibid., p. 50.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
exactly insignificant persons in Italian political life demanded that Croatia not be “ceded” even “a centimetre” of the seacoast? Is this not somewhat more than the concessions granted to Italy by the Treaty of London?

And it is obvious that the 1915 Treaty of London is not entirely clear to Bartulin. At the time, Italy was promised considerable concessions in Croatia, as well as in Montenegro and Albania. A vast majority of Italian politicians, and especially military leaders, wanted more across the board, and they very reluctantly settled for less (Mussolini: “Io non posso essere rinunciatore!”). It is interesting that Italy obtained much more in Albania and Montenegro in 1939-1941 than promised by the Treaty of London, while in Croatia it obtained – much less.

What prevents Bartulin from seeing these facts? And, if he had bothered to notice them, would this have had any impact on his conclusions?

It is a blatant falsification of the facts to reduce – as Bartulin does – the Ustasha techniques of struggle to terrorism. Just as Bartulin is entitled to utilize the term employed by the Yugoslav kingdom’s propaganda machine, and even – if he so desires – identify with it, so too are readers entitled to draw certain conclusions from his terminology. However, when using this term, a serious historian would note that in their foundational documents (number 8 of the Ustasha Principles) the Ustasha wrote that the Croatian nation has the right to achieve their independent state “by all means, including force of arms”, which means that they did not limit themselves solely to violent methods, but rather indicated that the latter were acceptable. A serious historian would have also cited the entire series of appeals, memoranda, and petitions which Pavelić and his associates – just like the leaders of the HSS – submitted to the League of Nations and many European governments, regularly calling for the application of democratic principles, the holding of plebiscites and respect for the right to self-determination, which always – without exception – fell on deaf ears. Violence was thus not the first choice, but rather a course dictated by necessity. An honest individual would have mentioned that in the documents compiled by Pavelić

19 N. Bartulin, “The NDH as a ‘Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism’”, pp. 50-51.
20 As we know, the use of the term “terrorism” for a national liberation struggle reflects not only the national/political stance of the person using said term, but also depends on the success or failure of that struggle. Jewish, Irish, Palestinian and other freedom fighters were “terrorists” until they became notable statesmen, and sometimes even Nobel Peace Prize Laureates.
21 For more on these appeals and memoranda, see Ante Pavelić, Aus dem Kampfe um den selbstständigen Staat Kroatien. Einige Dokumente und Bilder (Vienna, 1931), pp. 95-125; Rudolf Horvat, Hrvatska na mučilištu (Zagreb, 1942), pp. 447-451; Marko Sinovčić, N. D. H. u svjetlu dokumenata, 2nd ed. (Zagreb, 1998), pp. 91-94; Mario Jareb, Ustaško-domobranski pokret od nastanka do travnja 1941. godine, pp. 107-108, etc.
and his associates, they stressed hundreds of times that Yugoslavia was a threat to Europe’s peace, and that the establishment of a Croatian state was a prerequisite for that peace. Finally, an honest individual would have emphasized that even after a series of armed actions, Pavelić reiterated that “no reasonable person rejects regular and peaceful means of action and struggle…” but their value could be assessed in relation to the realistic prospects for success in achieving the ultimate objective: an independent Croatia.

Bartulin’s claim that Pavelić met with an Italian politician named “Roberto Forges D’Avanzati” in 1927 is a fabrication, for this individual’s name was Davanzati. The relevant literature contains differing interpretations of this meeting and its content, so a serious historian would have mentioned them at the very least, for he/she would know that Bogdan Krizman not only cited selectively, but that he also not infrequently forged sources. However, even Krizman, as opposed to Bartulin, was sufficiently honest to recount the source document, which indicates that in his conversation with Davanzati, Pavelić stressed that he came privately (and not as a representative of any political party) and that he was not seeking any aid. Anyone who suggests differently belittles him-/herself by doing so.

Bartulin certainly fails to mention this so he can continue his manipulations based on forgeries.

It is utter nonsense to claim that the Ustasha wanted to achieve “at least formal reality of an independent Croatian state”, because independence may be real or formal (apparent) but it cannot be “formally real”.

22 Pavelić’s program article “Uspostava hrvatske države, trajni mir na Balkanu” (1929) was published in several newspapers, and possibly also as a separate brochure (M. Jareb, Ustaško-domobranski pokret od nastanka do travnja 1941. godine, pp. 108-110)


24 N. Bartulin, “The NDH as a ‘Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism’”, p. 51.


26 This sentence (previously published by J. Jareb in the cited article!) was published again in B. Krizman, Ante Pavelić i ustaše, p. 12. However, Krizman, in his pro-Yugoslav fervour and lack of historiographic objectivity, was clever enough to refrain from comparing this memorandum with similar documents sent to the Italians before and after Pavelić by other (not only émigré) Croatian politicians, including Stjepan Radić, August Košutić and Vladko Maček.

27 N. Bartulin, “The NDH as a ‘Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism’”, p. 51.
Bartulin falsely claims that Pavelić exclusively saw the following alternative: Croatia as a part of Yugoslavia under Serbian hegemony, or statehood in cooperation with Italy, since he also petitioned the League of Nations and the European public in general, and concluded agreements with the Bulgarians (Sofia Declaration), Hungarians (Hungarian Revisionist League) and the Albanians (Kosovo Committee), all with the objective of creating Croatian state independence. It is therefore untrue that he wanted to achieve this objective only in an alliance with Italy, rather he was prepared to accept anyone’s assistance.

When speaking of the “Little Entente” and its members, Bartulin forgot that after March 1939 there was no Czechoslovakia, so its weakening (or rather disappearance), as well as the disappearance of the “Little Entente” could not have influenced German policy in the final two years prior to establishment of the NDH.

It is entirely untrue that Pavelić sent the document entitled the ‘Croatian Question’ (Hrvatsko pitanje; Die kroatische Frage) to the German government. This document was sent to Prof. Carl von Loesch, with the request that he pass it along “at the right place at the right time”. Von Loesch was never a member of the German government.

Bartulin’s assertion on the same page (!) that the German foreign ministry did not receive this document until April 1941 typifies his method of playing fast and loose with the facts. Thus, he first claimed that the document was sent to the government, then he said the ministry did not receive it for a full five years. This means that Bartulin has no idea that the foreign ministry was also a part of the government, or perhaps he is suggesting that the package travelled from Italy to Berlin for almost five years, or, in his attempt of manipulation he meant to say that the German government received the document in 1936, but only forwarded it to the foreign ministry five years later?

Is there any sense in this nonsense?

This is why it is entirely futile to expect someone like Bartulin to describe the circumstances in which Pavelić compiled this document, or to mention that in the mid-1930s he made vain attempts to move to Switzerland or move the bulk of his activity to Belgium. Naturally, Bartulin does not mention that

28 Ibid.
29 Ibid., p. 52.
30 Ibid.
31 M. Jareb, Ustaško-domobranski pokret od nastanka do travnja 1941. godine, p. 430.
32 N. Bartulin, “The NDH as a ‘Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism’”, p. 52.
33 J. J. Sadkovich, Italija i ustaše 1927.-1937., p. 79., 192., 303.; B. Krizman, Ante Pavelić i ustaše, p. 295. Naturally, in his manipulations, Bartulin did not mention that the first death sentence against Pavelić was pronounced in mid-1929, so this fact alone limited not only the possibility of him settling down but also his freedom of movement.
this document by Pavelić remained unknown to the public and even his adherents before the spring of 1941, while it was only published in the Croatian language the next year, in 1942, for this would lead a reader of even middling intelligence to the conclusion that it was not intended for the ideological/political indoctrination of adherents of the Ustasha movement.

To be sure, Bartulin passes over all of this in silence in order to construct his thesis on the Ustasha ideological dependence on the National Socialists.

Why did he not apply an analogous procedure to Pavelić’s multiple and fruitless appeals to the League of Nations? Why did he not derive from this the conclusion that Pavelić thus wanted to orient his adherents to a democratic way of thinking and acting, but that the so-called democratic forces ignored Croatian appeals and instead supported the dictatorial Yugoslav regime, by this very act limiting the room for manoeuvre and selection of methods for struggle by Croatian nationalists? Would this suggestion contain less logic? Is it possible that this is precisely why Bartulin disregards these appeals and attempts, and precisely why he insists upon “terrorism” as the key, and perhaps sole method of the Ustasha struggle?

And alongside this demonstration of his inability to differentiate between cause and effect, Bartulin’s factual errors keep coming, as though tumbling from a conveyor belt.

He does not appear to know that during the period of Hitler’s rule there was no such thing called Soviet Russia, because no such geographic term ever existed, while east of Poland as of 30 December 1922 there was a state called the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

It would have been good if Bartulin had known that a state called Yugoslavia was not formed in 1918, rather this name was given in 1929 to a state which was until then called the “Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes”.

Bartulin imagines that the coup d’état in March 1941 toppled “the government of Prince Pavle Karadorđević”, although Pavle Karadorđević was never the prime minister, so “his government” could not have been toppled.

Also scarcely convincing is Bartulin’s contention that in April 1941 Slavko Kvaternik was the ‘unofficial head’ of the Ustasha movement in the homeland. If it can even be said that this section of the Ustasha movement had an ‘unof-
ficial head', then one can say that from mid-1938 such a position would have been held by writer and politician Mile Budak, who did not participate directly in the proclamation of the state because he was in the hospital at the time. Budak’s status in this regard was derived from his formal post as deputy leader [doglavnik] (since 1935), as well as his reputation and the fact that since 1939 he was editor of the Zagreb-based weekly Hrvatski narod, the central Ustasha publication, and the fact that on 13 April 1941, something of an interim government was formed (the ‘Croatian state leadership’) which was not headed by Kvaternik, but rather by Budak.40

Bartulin fabricates that Pavelić, during his meeting with Mussolini in March 1941, agreed to concede parts of the Croatian coast so that in return he would be installed as the “leader” of the Croatian state.41 Much has been written about the two meetings between Mussolini and Pavelić (in March and April 1941), and I have written quite extensively about this topic as well, analyzing documents and the testimony of their contemporaries.42 This is why I invite Bartulin – who simply confabulates about the circumstances surrounding the proclamation of the NDH and the Karlovac conversation between Pavelić and Edmund Veesenmayer (not understanding the context, not knowing the facts, depending on unreliable sources and even then demonstrating the inability to correctly transcribe the work of others) – to offer evidence for his assertion.

It should be incidentally noted that it is typical of Bartulin’s manipulative methods that, in the brief description of that Karlovac meeting between Pavelić and Veesenmayer, he apparently only mentions as an aside that the latter was “a German with SS rank”,43 even though Veesenmayer’s post in the SS was entirely irrelevant to this meeting. However, it has blatantly obvious implications in Bartulin’s scholarly method: it is important that Pavelić spoke to a member of the SS, but Bartulin never mentions that he and other Croatian politicians (including, therefore, Ustashe) also contacted democratic politicians and democratic organizations.

Another complete fabrication without any supporting evidence is that Hitler was at least partially sympathetic to the establishment of the Croatian state due to the so-called Gothic theory of Croat origins,44 because – first – this

40 This is also indirectly indicated by the fact that Budak, on behalf of Croatian nationalists (Ustashe), occasionally paid visits to the Zagreb Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac, that groups of Croatian nationalists sent their protests specifically to him (such as the notable protest concerning the rumours of partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina), and that Slavko Kvaternik, in contacts with Veesenmayer, stressed that he had authorization to act from Budak. Thus, not even Kvaternik’s activities on 10-13 April, including the enactment of certain laws and the appointment of the Croatian State Leadership, does not supersede Budak’s leading role.
41 N. Bartulin, “The NDH as a ‘Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism’”, p. 53.
43 N. Bartulin, “The NDH as a ‘Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism’”, p. 53.
44 Ibid., p. 53.
theory was never the official theory of the Ustasha movement nor the NDH, and second – Hitler did not favour the establishment of a Croatian state at all, rather he viewed its emergence as unwanted and unexpected.

Bartulin's stance on chronology is demonstrated by the fact that as support for his fabrication he cites Hitler's alleged words in July 1941 (thus, in the period after the Croatian state was proclaimed). And understandably, he never posed this question: if the Croats wanted to present themselves as Goths to the Germans, why then in a propaganda publication intended for German readers, did one author (Lovre Katić) claim that the Croats were a people of Iranian origin who came into contact with the Goths in the fourth century and, under strong Slavic influence, soon became a single nation, while another author (Milovan Gavazzi) claimed that the Croats were the inheritors of the Carpathian Slavic culture? This publication was printed by the Croatian Publishing and Bibliographic Department (Hrvatski izdavački bibliografski zavod – HIBZ) "at the order of the State Information and Publicity Office under the governmental Presidency", which probably means that it was published at Pavelić's behest and under this supervision, and certainly with his knowledge.

On the eve of the Second World War (or ever at all during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries!), Trogir was not, nor is it today, among the ten largest Croatian sea ports. This is why it would be unclear why Bartulin contends that it was among the “main ports”, if we did not know the purpose of his manipulation: the territory grabbed by Italy in 1941 had to be as large as possible, so if it was not in fact large enough, then Bartulin enlarged it by resorting to – a confabulation.

He also confabulates that on 12 April 1941, Hitler talked to the “newly-appointed German Plenipotentiary General in Zagreb, Edmund Glaise von Horstenau”, even though Glaise von Horstenau was only conferred this title on 1 November 1942. Until then he was only a “German general in Zagreb”.

46 For more, see T. Jonjić, *Hrvatska vanjska politika 1939.-1942.*, passim.
50 N. Bartulin, “The NDH as a ‘Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism’”, p. 54.
51 Ibid., 53.
Only uncritical writers can claim that on 11 April 1941 Mussolini placed before Pavelić a demand for the cities on the Dalmatian coast with an expressly Italian character.\(^{53}\) There is no evidence for this except a subsequent claim by a single witness (F. Anfuso) who had reasons to be biased (and who made no attempt to conceal this bias, manifested in the invectives with which he honoured the Croatian representatives). However, as Vjekoslav Vrančić pointed out a few decades ago, not a single serious historian gave Anfuso any credence, and he himself showed that elementary logic and the course of events refuted the claims of this witness.\(^{54}\)

However, there are no facts nor logic for Bartulin, as utility is the sole criteria that he applies: whatever supports his constructs is fact, whatever challenges them does not exist.

Another of Bartulin’s typical imprecisions is when he claims that Italy held Istria, Rijeka, Zadar and the islands of Cres, Lošinj and Palagruža under occupation already after the First World War.\(^{55}\) An entire series of errors is contained in that single sentence! For Bartulin demonstrates that he does not know that Kastav is a part of Istria, although under the Treaty of Rapallo (1920) it was accorded to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. My Christian mercy could compel me to forgive him this, just as I could forgive his ignorance of those few villages around Zadar and several small islets that he forgot, but I cannot forgive him for a 50 km\(^2\) island just like that: this individual wants to be a scholar, writes about Croatian-Italian relations between the World Wars, but does not know that the island of Lastovo was also ceded to Italy under the Treaty of Rapallo, nor that Rijeka and its environs formally constituted an independent state until the conclusion of the Rome Treaties in 1924, after which this area was incorporated into the Kingdom of Italy!\(^{56}\)

He knows none of this.

Besides being something even non-historians should know, these facts are not unimportant to the history of the Ustasha movement – with which Bartulin purports to deal as a scholar – for Lastovo (like Zadar and Rijeka) served as a base for Ustasha activity, and it was there, by all accounts, that contact with the Ustasha was established by Peter Oreb, who made a failed attempt on the life of King Aleksandar in December 1933.\(^{57}\)

\(^{53}\) N. Bartulin, “The NDH as a ‘Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism’”, p. 54, note 25.


\(^{55}\) N. Bartulin, “The NDH as a ‘Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism’, p. 54.


Is there even a point in attempting to explain to such an individual something even more complex and intellectually challenging, i.e., the content of the term *occupation* and its legal and political meaning? For the *de facto* status of these areas (occupation) was legalized in Rapallo in 1920, so the aforementioned parts of the Eastern Adriatic seaboard were no longer occupied, rather they became integral parts of the Kingdom of Italy, except for the provisional state of Rijeka, which only existed as such – as noted above – for not quite four years afterward. To be sure, certain other areas were under Italian occupation for a time, albeit not those specified by Bartulin, but these other areas were ascribed to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes under the Treaty of Rapallo.

These are not trivial matters, but they are matters which Bartulin obviously does not understand, so it comes as no surprise that he completely fails to understand the military/political and state/legal course of events in April 1941.

At that time, Germany and its allies attacked and occupied the state which was called the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, so Italian forces in the territory of the newly-proclaimed NDH had the status of an occupation army until 18 May 1941. After this, they had the status of a garrison force in the territory of the NDH in the sense of international law and they retained this status until September 1943, regardless of the fact that they very often behaved like an occupation force. It simultaneously follows from this that the Croatian side in the negotiations with Italy in April and May 1941 did not have the status of a stable, internationally recognized state with clearly delineated borders, rather it had the negotiating status of an emerging state, which means that it was incomparably weaker in aspects of international law, political, military and economic power.\(^{58}\)

Bartulin’s identically superficial approach comes to the fore even when he claims that according to the Rome agreements of 1941 “some autonomy” was foreseen for Split and the island of Korčula.\(^{59}\) No such autonomy was foreseen, rather Croatian civilian administration was stipulated, and the problem is that Bartulin does not distinguish between these two very different things. If he had asked some passer-by on the streets of Split, he probably would have received a more precise response.

Also inaccurate is Bartulin’s claim that three agreements were signed in Rome on 18 May 1941,\(^{60}\) for at the time a considerable number of documents were compiled, of which three were called treaties or agreements, while a fourth one (“Concluding Protocol”) also has the character of a treaty, for it stipulates

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\(^{58}\) I have discussed the entire series of foreign and domestic political reasons dictating the Croatian position at length in the book T. Jonjić, *Hrvatska vanjska politika 1939.-1942.*, pp. 343-389, ff.

\(^{59}\) N. Bartulin, “The NDH as a ‘Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism’”, 55, note 29.

\(^{60}\) Ibid., 55.
rights and obligations for the signatories. Something like this could never have happened with a serious historian like, say, Ljubo Boban. But, Bartulin is not capable of even copying from people that are more adept than him.

It is inaccurate that Mussolini agreed to Croatian sovereignty “over Bosnia”, for Herzegovina also shared the same fate as Bosnia. Moreover, it was precisely with reference to the eastern Croatian border in Herzegovina (and not in Bosnia) that the Croatian-Italian Treaty on Establishment of the Border between the Independent State of Croatia and Montenegro was concluded on 27 October 1941. Bartulin, naturally, knows nothing of this.

The Italians supported the Serbian Chetniks practically in the entire territory south of the demarcation line, and not only “throughout their entire zone of occupation”, but Bartulin, as we have seen, does not distinguish between an occupation and garrison zone, nor does he know that the legal status of the area south of the demarcation line changed, so it is roughly all the same to him.

That Bartulin not only finds history, but also geography challenging, is shown by his contention that Croatia was not in the “first ring” of German influence, which - according to him - encompassed “the entire Danube valley”. In other words, Bartulin believes that Croatia is not a Danubian country. If the Danube constituted part of the border of the NDH (and it did!), how then was Croatia not even partially in “the entire Danube valley”? For example, the Grand County of Vuka and its administrative seat, the city of Vukovar – which is located on the banks of the Danube – were part of the NDH. This river formed the Croatian border not only upstream (to the mouth of the Drava River), but also downstream, almost 140 kilometres to Zemun, which was also part of the NDH. If the entire “Danube valley” was in Bartulin’s “first ring” of German influence, then how was that part of Croatia, for which the Danube formed an almost 200 kilometre-long border, not in the Danube valley?

One precludes the other, but Bartulin completely fails to see this. This is why it almost goes without saying that Bartulin’s knowledge of the military and political schemes surrounding the colloquially designated “Zemun triangle” is more than meagre.

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62 Lj. Boban, *Hrvatske granice od 1918. do 1993.*, 47, wrote that among the Rome agreements of 1941, “three [were] particularly important...”
63 N. Bartulin, “The NDH as a ‘Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism’”, p. 55, note 29.
64 Ibid., p. 56.
65 Ibid., 57.
66 T. Jonjić, *Hrvatska vanjska politika 1939.-1942.*, pp. 738-751 and the sources cited therein. Incidentally, it is worthwhile mentioning that Pavelić published a discussion of the Danube valley – which includes, according not only to every geography textbook but also in his opinion, Croatia – in 1932 in several foreign languages, which was released in Croatia under the title
With a lack of criticism typical of copyists and compilers, Bartulin cites the assertion that the territories of the so-called zones 2 and 3 were already in the hands of the Yugoslav Partisans in June 1942.67

According to Partisan sources, just prior to Christmas 1941 the Partisan movement had approximately 250 armed members in throughout Dalmatia, including the Livno region. Soon the districts of Bugojno, Glamoč and Tomislavgrad came under the jurisdiction of the Dalmatian command staff in addition to Livno. In mid-December 1941 the Partisan detachments in Croatia did not have more than 6,370 members, and the General Staff did not have any direct contacts with Slavonia, the Croatian Zagorje and Dalmatia. An interesting fact is that at the time, besides the aforementioned 250 Partisans in Dalmatia, there were, according to Partisan data, an additional three hundred or so in Slavonia, and only about thirty Partisans in the Croatian Zagorje. In the entire territory under the command of the Dalmatian Staff in mid-March 1942, the Partisans only numbered 610, while in southern Dalmatia “from Dubrovnik to Kotor” there was no Partisan movement at all up to then (and not even then).68 According to the data of the command staff of the Fourth Operative Zone of the People’s Liberation Partisan Detachments (NOPO) of Croatia (which encompassed Dalmatia and the south-west parts of Bosnia) of 1 July 1942, this Operative Zone had about 1,800 Partisans under its command. However, vast majority of them were not armed, and the only piece of heavier artillery of the entire Operative Zone was “a smaller grenade launcher”.69

Zdravko Dizdar believes that at the end of 1942, the Croatian armed forces had between 148,700 and 220,000 members.70 These forces were, in fact, deployed both north of the demarcation line and to its south, in the garrison zone – thus in the territory which Bartulin claims was largely in the hands of the Yugoslav Partisans – in which, according to Dizdar, there were approximately 220,000 Italian troops in mid-1942, and their number grew to 250,000


67 N. Bartulin, “The NDH as a ‘Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism’”, p. 56, note 39. In the same context, Bartulin uncritically accepts the speculation that the foreign minister, Mladen Lorković was conducting – probably in relation to Pavelić – some sort of parallel foreign policy and a “parallel diplomatic war” against Italy in 1941/42. These subsequent conjectures by unreliable authors are not backed by original sources nor in the memoirs of contemporaries. If he had not selectively transcribed the claims of unreliable authors, Bartulin would have known that the protests against Italian pretensions and the attempts to curtail Italian influence were an integral component of overall state policy, and not just something undertaken by Lorković alone.


by the end of that year. Dizdar believes that in the entire territory of the NDH in mid-1942 there were approximately 20,000 Partisans, and that a good deal of them were north of the demarcation line. According to Velimir Ivetić, who dealt with the Yugoslav data less gallantly than Dizdar, in mid-August 1942, there were 12,990 Partisans in the NOPO of Croatia, of whom there were roughly 1,800 Partisans south of the demarcation line in Dalmatia, 2,138 in the Croatian Littoral, Gorski Kotar and Istria, and 2,052 in Lika.

Whether Dizdar, who uses very rounded numbers to suggest that in mid-1942 there were ten to fifteen thousand Yugoslav Partisans south of the demarcation line, or Ivetić, who claims that there were only 5,990 of them and perhaps a few thousands more in Bosnia-Herzegovina, is right makes no difference to this discussion. For what is important here is the following: does Bartulin truly think that six or twelve thousand Partisans, who generally did not have modern means of communication nor heavy weapons (a single light grenade-launcher!), were able to hold “in their hands” roughly 40,000 km² of hilly and forested terrain, on which at least the (majority!) Croatian population was not particularly fond of them, and on which close to 300,000 enemy soldiers were stationed at the same time? Does he truly believe that something like this can be asserted in a serious discussion? Or does he finally comprehend that historiography is not simply copying, and that even copying requires some critical thought?

Let us go on, for Bartulin’s superficiality has not been exhausted in the above cases.

Contrary to his claims, in April 1941 Pavelić did not meet with anyone named Weesenmayer, but he did meet with Edmund Veesenmayer. Even though Italy was in fact the weaker partner, it is not true that in 1941 it was “completely subordinate” to Hitler’s Germany, so it would be good if Bartulin had explained in advance what he meant, and then offered some evidence for his contention. Does this mean that in 1941 Italy was a German colony or protectorate? Or perhaps it means that Italy was implementing German, and not Italian, policy? For Bartulin has a tendency to proclaim a single analysis produced by the NDH foreign affairs ministry – and such ministries produce

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71 Ibid., 173.
72 Ibid., 175.
74 The fact that the Yugoslav Partisans proclaimed uninhabited areas “liberated” may to some extent be compared to people who manage to register their “property rights” to Mars or Saturn in some countries. This comparison did not originate with me: it was made by the Partisan general and Yugoslav diplomat Vladimir Velebit. In 1998 he wrote something similar about the appearance of “liberated territories” (T. Jonjić, Hrvatska vanjska politika 1939.-1942., p. 636).
75 N. Bartulin, “The NDH as a ‘Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism’”, p. 58.
76 Ibid., p. 59.
dozens, and even hundreds of similar documents on a daily basis – as representative of overall state policy. If one such analysis, which emerged on 11 September 1944, indicates that the NDH at that time (1944!) must be the Central European bulwark against Italian imperialism, how was it then possible that in 1941 Italy was already “completely subordinate” to Germany. Musso- 
lini’s Italy was incomparably weaker in 1944 than it was in 1941, so if it was “completely subordinate” to Germany in 1941, how could it have endangered “Central Europe” in 1944? That is Bartulin’s idea of chronology and logic.

It is completely untrue that the Ustasha preferred Croatia as “a ‘confederated province’ within a German Europe”, so it would be useful if Bartulin had backed this assertion with even a single piece of evidence. When and where did the Ustasha ever speak of Croatia in any other way except as an independent state?

It is utter nonsense to claim that Pavelić believed that only “a militarily strong, racially pure Croatian state, centred in the ‘Dinaric heartland’ of Bosnia” and closely allied with Germany could preserve Croatian independence, and only after establishment of such a state could Dalmatia be restored to Croatia. Except in his imagination, can Bartulin find any evidence for this? Did Pavelić, on 10 September 1943 upon the annulment of the Rome agreements, say that this apparent prerequisite had been fulfilled: a militarily strong and racially pure Croatian state? Was its centre in Bosnia?

Why does Bartulin concoct such notions? Who has any use for such fabrications, since they have nothing to do with scholarship?

It is not true that Eugen Dido Kvaternik was “the chief of all Ustasha police and security forces” in early June 1941, for Kvaternik was appointed director of public order and safety on 18 April 1941, while on 4 May 1941 he became state secretary in the Internal Affairs Ministry, which were state, and not party (Ustasha) functions. Bartulin makes no distinctions here. Even when Kvaternik was appointed the Ustasha supervisory commander of the Ustasha Supervisory Agency (UNS) on 23. August 1941, which was established seven days earlier (on 16 August 1941), he did not formally oversee the entire police and security apparatus in the NDH, even though he attempted to acquire such authority. The UNS did, in fact, outlive Kvaternik’s command, but even as long as it existed, this agency was not superior to the military intelligence service in the Croatian Home Guard Ministry, which also means that Kvaternik

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77 Ibid., p. 67.
78 Ibid., p. 59.
79 Ibid., 61.
80 N. Bartulin, “The NDH as a ‘Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism’”, p. 60.
81 V. Vrančić, Dr. Andrija Artuković pred sjeveroameričkim sudom (Buenos Aires, 1959), pp. 76-77, 79-80.
was not superior to it. Also, neither the UNS nor Kvaternik were placed above the repression/security apparatus nor the regular courts, nor even the analogous Ustasha Disciplinary and Criminal Court.

In other words, Bartulin is making things up.

In fabricating, as well as in uncritical transcribing, he is tireless. He thus states that the Ustashe constantly claimed that “Dalmatia had been sacrificed” in the interest of state independence.82

I am unfamiliar with any instances of the Ustashe saying precisely this, but even if they had done so, a scholar should point out that they could not have made such a claim with any grounds, for most of Dalmatia remained within the NDH (more precisely: it went to a new state in the process of Yugoslavia’s disintegration). This means in the creation of the Croatian state, Dalmatia was not sacrificed, rather only a (smaller!) part of it. Namely, during its second period under Austrian administration (1814-1918), the province of Dalmatia— which later became synonymous with Dalmatia in the geographic sense, regardless of subsequent changes in political borders— covered an area of 12,840 km².83 The Croatian-Italian border in compliance with the Rome agreements of 1941 was never actually delineated in the field, but it is estimated that at the time approximately 5,400 km² went to Italy. However, this surface also pertains to its gains in Istria (Kastav!), Gorski Kotar and in the Croatian Littoral and Dalmatia (including Boka Kotorska and the Konavle region).84 In other words, Italy gained approximately 3,800 km² in Dalmatia.85

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82 N. Bartulin, “The NDH as a ‘Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism’”, p. 61.
83 According to: Dinko Foretić, ”O ekonomskim prilikama u Dalmaciji u drugoj polovici XIX stoljeća do Prvog svjetskog rata”, Hrvatski narodni preporod u Dalmaciji i Istri, Zbornik, ed. Jakša Ravić, Matica hrvatska, 1969, 9, p. 39. The same area is cited by Šime Peričić, ”Glavne značajke gospodarstva Dalmacije od 1835. do 1848.”, Dalmacija u narodnom preporodu 1835-1848. Prilozi sa znanstvenog skupa u Zadru od 8. do 9. svibnja 1986, održanog u povodu 150. obljetnice jubileja Ilirskog pokreta i 30. obljetnice Filozofskog fakulteta u Zadru, Zadarska revija, no. 4-5/1987. Zadar, 1987, p. 315 (29). There are negligibly different data. Thus M. Lorković, Narod i zemlja Hrvata. (Zagreb, 1939), p. 141, claimed that in 1818-1910 the territory of Dalmatia encompassed 12,934 km², while in the entry ”Dalmacija”, Hrvatska enciklopedija, vol. 4. Zagreb, 1942, p. 441, is stated that Dalmatia has 12,829 km². It is possible that this difference was due to the fact that Rab, normally considered a Kvarner rather than Dalmatian island, was part of Austro-Hungarian Dalmatia. In 1929 it was separated from the Split district and attached to the Sava Banovina. In any case, after the territorial losses which Croatia incurred in post-war Yugoslavia, Dalmatia as a part of the Socialist Republic of Croatia had an area of 11,758 km². (Veliki geografski atlas Jugoslavije, ed. Ivan Bertić. Zagreb, 1987, p. 123).
85 Adding the surfaces of the districts and parts of districts which went to the Kingdom of Italy results in roughly the same number, but a precise determination is not possible, because the border— as mentioned— remained unestablished on the ground. But, for example, the island of Krk alone has a surface of 410 km².
Thus, if he claims that the Ustasha declared that Croatia had lost (more accurately: did not obtain) all of Dalmatia, then Bartulin must show that they said precisely that, and then point out that the claim is not entirely correct, since under the Rome agreements two thirds of this Croatian province went to Croatia. However, the difference between two thirds, or 7,000-8,000 square kilometres, does not mean much to Bartulin’s scholarly approach, for this surface is negligible: it is two, but not three, times larger than today’s surface area of Luxembourg! To a thorough-going scholar like Bartulin – quantité négligeable.

For Bartulin, facts exist only to be ignored.

Also completely unfounded is his contention that Pavelić, at least temporarily, sacrificed “hundreds of thousands of Dalmatian Croats.”86

This figure assumes that it was certainly a case of over 300,000 Croats. However, after the Rome agreements, Italy obtained territory in which – according to Sundhaussen – approximately 280,000 Croats lived.87 However, this encompassed the entire annexed territory (and not just its Dalmatian part!) and estimates of its population before the war, which depended on the last pre-war census conducted in 1931, but did not take into account that a high number of people had moved to Zagreb or other parts of Croatia prior to the onset of the war, and particularly after it broke out.88 Bearing in mind that in 1940 the estimated population of Sušak was 37,034, Krk 20,043, Kastav 10,535, Rab 14,598, and Čabar 10,22389 which together accounts for 92,433 people, then – even if we leave out the remaining non-Dalmatian areas which Italy annexed on 18 May 1941 – it is entirely clear that less than 200,000 Dalmatian Croats came under Italian sovereignty in May 1941. This is why it is entirely baseless to speak of the sacrifice of “hundreds of thousands”.

In other words, Bartulin – like all manipulators – has a very casual stance on numbers, and thus his political and ethical (dis)qualifications should not be taken seriously, regardless of whether it is a matter of his assessment of the ethical responsibility of individuals and groups for territorial solutions,90 or for the fate of populations. For under the Treaty of Rapallo (1920), Italy expanded

86  N. Bartulin, “The NDH as a ‘Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism’”, p. 63.
87  H. Sundhaussen, Wirtschaftsgeschichte Kroatiens im nationalsozialistischen Grossraum 1941-1945, p. 82
88  Just how deceptive common notions of “hundreds of thousands” can be is shown by the far more scrupulous approach of Krunoslav Draganović, “Hrvatske biskupije (Sadašnjost kroz prizmu prošlosti)”, Croatia sacra. Arhiv za crkvenu povijest Hrvata. 11-12/1943., no. 20-21. Svečani broj u čast prve godišnjice Nezavisne Države Hrvatske, ed. K. Draganović (Zagreb, 1943), pp. 78-130. Draganović, as is known, analyzed church data and edited Opći šematizam Katoličke crkve u Jugoslaviji (Sarajevo, 1939).
89  Data from: Statistički godišnjak 1940, pp. 80-82.
90  N. Bartulin, “The NDH as a ‘Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism’”, p. 63
its sovereignty over 10,000 km$^2$ of Croatian and Slovenian territory, and over a half million new Croats and Slovenes came into its borders.

Did Bartulin anywhere proclaim the signatories of this agreement criminals against their own (Croatian) people? If not, why? Perhaps because this territorial sacrifice was made on the altar of Yugoslavia? After the collapse of the NDH, the entire territory of Austro-Hungarian Bosnia-Herzegovina, Eastern Srijem and Boka Kotorska were carved out from Croatia and the area of the remainder of Croatia was cut into two sections at Neum and Klek Peninsula. Did Bartulin somewhere, in his scholarly fervour, proclaim the participants in this demarcation criminals against their own (Croatian) people? If not, why? Perhaps again because these territorial losses were (again) carried forward in order for Yugoslavia to exist?

And when Bartulin expresses disgust for Pavelić due to his responsibility for the deaths of tens of thousands of his innocent co-nationals killed in the massacres perpetrated by the Yugoslav Partisans after the surrender at Bleiburg in May 1945,\textsuperscript{91} at first glance this seems to be his interpretation, which would not qualify for my list of Bartulin’s factual errors. But only at first glance. For this theme is interesting and it opens a series of different questions and potential interpretations. However, since Bartulin formulates it conclusively and as a generally-known fact, then it necessarily follows that his assessment assumes a minimum of two facts in the logical, legal and ethical senses. First, Pavelić may have been responsible for that massacre, if he had known or should have known that the Western Allies would, contrary to international law, surrender Croatian soldiers and civilians to the slaughterhouse of the Yugoslav authorities; and second, if he had known or should have known that the latter would conduct killings indiscriminately and without conducting any, and particularly not fair, trials.

So I am interested in Bartulin’s explanation: was Pavelić aware of these facts or could he have been aware of them, and if so, how did Bartulin arrive at such a conclusion? Does he believe that Pavelić held séances at which he consulted with the Almighty? Or perhaps Bartulin arrived at this conclusion on the basis of practical knowledge on the ethics and legality of conduct of the Anglo-American and Yugoslav armed forces? Why is Bartulin afraid to pose this question? Is he incapable of thinking logically, or does he want to avoid being politically incorrect? Or perhaps he simply believes that scholarship consists of uncritically transcribing the confabulations of others?

His assertion that Pavelić criticized Dalmatian Croatian nationalists, while he was allegedly also something of a regionalist, primarily interested in Bosnia-Herzegovina and other Dinaric regions, should similarly not be taken seriously.\textsuperscript{92} It certainly does show that Bartulin does not know that Ustasha

\textsuperscript{91} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{92} N. Bartulin, “The NDH as a ‘Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism’”, p. 62.
propaganda not infrequently underscored Dalmatia as the “heart of the Croatian state” and the “purest Croatian region”. Even worse, it shows that Bartulin does not know that all of Dalmatia (and not perhaps just its inland section, Dalmatinska Zagora!) belongs to the Dinaric zone.

This is interesting for someone who built his entire scholarly house of cards on the alleged dichotomy between Dalmatia and the Dinaric region. But this does not stop him from writing about it while considering himself a – scholar.

And the assertion that Pavelić was a regionalist is simply – absurd. It can only be made by someone who has little – and erroneous at that – knowledge of Pavelić’s political activity, while someone who uncritically cites such an assertion shows that he knows even less (even if he calls himself a scholar). However, even someone like that – if he were honest – would have mentioned an entire series of commands and orders issued by Pavelić aimed at preventing discord based on regional mentalities and disputes among the Ustashe in the pre-war émigré milieu. Even someone like that would have asked whether any of Pavelić’s legal decrees or personal solutions contain a shred of evidence of this “regionalist” preference. Perhaps Bartulin came to this conclusion on the basis of the fact that the Dalmatian Croats were overrepresented in the political and administrative organs and in the diplomatic corps of the NDH, and particularly in its propaganda and culture, which is clearly indicated by the following names: Edo Bulat, Stijepo Perić, Branko Benzon, Nikola Rušinović, Danijel Crjlen, Ivo Bogdan, Tias Mortigija, Josip Berković, Andrija Karčić, Ivo Lendić, Vinko Nikolić, Filip Lukas, Dušan Žanko, Marko Soljačić, Marko Tarle, Ante Sugia, Ivan Petrić, Luka Fertilio, Ante Bonifačić, Mirko Eterović, Ivo Guberina, etc.
Mate Ujević, Luka Puljiz...? Perhaps his conclusion on Pavelić’s animosity toward the Dalmatian Croats is based on the fact that Pavelić selected the Dalmatian Franciscan Dionizije Juričev as his spiritual guide and confessor? Or perhaps he drew this conclusion on the basis of the fact that the national radio broadcaster (the Croatian State Radio Station) aired Dalmatian songs everyday, much to the chagrin of the Italians, and that those songs which testified to the Croatian character of the regions which Dalmatia annexed were performed publicly, and even on official occasions (among which the best known was that anthem of Split, “Marjane, Marjane...”)?

But Bartulin mentions none of this.

And nothing more can be expected from someone who, without any qualifications, entirely uncritically cites Ivan Meštrović’s confabulations, as well as an entire series of claims made by Pavelić’s opponents, both the elder and junior Kvaternik (who were both dismissed in autumn 1942, and until then were colloquially referred to as the “dynasty”), and who entirely and without compunction accepts the statements made by individuals standing at the gallows, and despite this wants to be considered a scholar. This is why I do not even dare comment on Bartulin’s statement that “Pavelić was adamant that the NDH had to be led by the Dinaric ‘spirit’ of Ottoman Bosnia-Herzegovina.” I consider it impolite to say, much less write down what I think of this.

As we have seen, the scholar Bartulin does not notice the contradictions in his own statements. First he says that Pavelić and the Ustashe considered the designated king, a member of the Italian royal dynasty, as entirely irrelevant and an attempt to lessen Italian territorial aspirations in April and May 1941, and then he claims that Pavelić thought he could retrieve Dalmatia with the help of

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95 For more on Meštrović’s imagined depictions of this and that, including his conversation with Pavelić, see T. Jonjić, “O pokušaju osnivanja Hrvatskoga komiteta u Švicarskoj. “Diplomatska izvješća Senjanina Josipa Milkovića”, Senjski zbornik, 38 (2012), pp. 262-268. Naturally, other writers before me have pointed out Meštrović’s unreliability.

96 Many émigré writers pointed out that Eugen Dido Kvaternik was a very untrustworthy witness, such as V. Vrančić, Jozo Dumandžić, M. Sinovčić and others. The latter wrote an entire book about this (N. D. H. u svietlu dokumenata, 2nd ed. Zagreb, 1998). I have also pointed out Kvaternik’s unreliability in my own works many times, and this was also done by others who did not have any need for Kvaternik’s confabulations to back their own preconceived conclusions.

97 There are not, in fact, any memoirs by Slavko Kvaternik, as some uncritical writers suggest, rather there are investigative documents, studies and statements which Kvaternik (probably) dictated or signed before Yugoslav communist interrogators in the hope of saving his life. These materials should therefore be approached with even greater caution than that required by memoirs. The circumstances in which these materials emerged is illuminated, for example, by Kvaternik’s servile petition for mercy of 7 June 1947, in which he wrote: “I am a traitor, but not the worst”.

98 N. Bartulin, “The NDH as a ‘Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism’”, p. 63.

99 Ibid., p. 55.
this manoeuvre. Can both be true? If, after 18 May 1941 this designated king became entirely irrelevant and if absolutely no attention was paid to him, how could anything be expected of him in the subsequent period and how could anything be accomplished with his help? Actually, the idea of the king was not Croatian, but when Pavelić accepted it as a lesser evil, then a number of different ideas continued to simmer as possibilities, as demonstrated by Kerubin Segvić’s mission and a series of preserved Croatian diplomatic reports.

Bartulin claims that some kind of reception was held “at the Italian embassy in Zagreb” in 1942. Neither Italy nor any other state had a diplomatic mission at the embassy (Botschaft, ambasciatta) level in Zagreb, so Bartulin – since he is incapable of distinguishing between the ranks of diplomatic missions – could have accorded some attention to the writers and sources he transcribed. For even transcribing requires a certain critical approach. Similarly untrue is Bartulin’s assertion that Croatia had established an “embassy” in Venice, nor could there ever have been any sort of reception at the Croatian “embassy” in Berlin, because the NDH did not have a mission of that rank anywhere. And not even a lower-level Croatian mission was “set up” in Venice, rather it was simply moved from Rome.

Contrary to Bartulin’s claims, the Croatian professor named Ćiro Gamulin was not killed due to something he said to his students on the first anniversary of Italian rule in Split. Had he consulted the basic sources (such as, e.g., the Croatian biographical lexicon – Hrvatski biografski leksikon), Bartulin would have known that Gamulin died after beatings on 17 (or 18) April 1942, while he was arrested for commenting on the anniversary of the entry of the Italian army into Split. Naturally, Bartulin does not distinguish between the Italian army’s entry into the city and the Italian seizure of power, so he again requires instruction: the city of Split formally became a part of the Kingdom of Italy on 18 May 1941, but the Italian forces in it did not actually assume power at the time, nor on 17/18 April, but rather several days after entering the city: on 21 April 1941.

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100 Ibid., p. 62.
101 Bartulin is obviously unaware of the fact that the idea of a personal union and similar monarchical solutions were a frequent phenomenon in Italian politics, and not only in relation to Croatia (or Albania), but also Hungary, Spain, etc. For more, see T. Jonjić, Hrvatska vanjska politika, p. 46 ff.
102 N. Bartulin, “The NDH as a ‘Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism’”, p. 64.
103 Ibid., p. 66.
104 Ibid., p. 68.
105 Ibid., p. 65, note 85.
106 Hrvatski biografski leksikon, vol. 4, Zagreb, 1998, 570-571, mentions only the first of these two dates!
107 Cf. the report of Athos Bartolucci of April 1941, Narodnooslobodilačka borba u Dalmaciji 1941.-1945. Zbornik dokumenata, book 1 (Split, 1981), doc. no. 159, pp. 414.-417 and the tele-
In the context of this discussion, this means that Bartulin – again – uncritically copied somebody else’s fabrications.

He is probably aware that the Sandžak was not a part of the NDH, even though this does not follow quite clearly from his text,\(^{108}\) for the Italians killed and abused Croats and Muslims in Montenegro as well, so it is unclear why he mentions the Sandžak region in the context of Italian violence against Croats and Muslims in the NDH.

It would also be difficult to comprehend Bartulin’s contention that the ideas of Stevan Moljević from June 1941 were among the two major causes of the Serbian genocidal massacre of Croats and Muslims (the other being revenge for Ustasha atrocities),\(^{109}\) if we did not already know that chronology means nothing to Bartulin, and that he does not distinguish between causes and effects.

He therefore simply ignores the Serbian massacres of Croats and Muslims which preceded the establishment of Ustasha power, and thus the Ustasha atrocities and Moljević’s plan, even though by all accounts several thousand were killed.\(^{110}\) One may speculate as to whether these data are completely unknown to Bartulin, or if he is attempting to amnesty Serbian crimes. Perhaps this is an attempt to support his intriguing theory that the Greater Serbian ideology was “supranational”?\(^{111}\)

Or perhaps the Ustasha being the first to perpetrate massacres is necessary to some of Bartulin’s other ideas, so he then ignores such facts for just that reason? Perhaps these are the same reasons why he passes over in silence the “Serbs assemble!” campaign, wherein a considerable portion of the Serbian minority opposed even the provisional autonomy of the Banovina of Croatia in 1939-1941, which reoccurred in 1989-1991 in an undeniably similar fashion? Perhaps this is why Bartulin needs to ignore the fact that already as of April 1941 – regardless of any Ustasha crimes – the political representatives of the Serbian minority in Croatia forcefully, politically and militarily, supported Italian aspirations to the Eastern Adriatic seaboard, in Dalmatia (Niko Novaković-Longo and others), and later in Bosnia-Herzegovina as well (Novica Kraljević and others)? Does Bartulin think that it is scholarly to leave out this campaign in an analysis of the outbreak of the extremely savage Croatian-Serbian conflict in the territory of the NDH (including, therefore, the quite

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\(^{108}\) N. Bartulin, “The NDH as a ’Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism’”, p. 65.

\(^{109}\) Ibid., p. 65, note 86.

\(^{110}\) A documented overview of these (earlier) mass killings and massacres, both those occurring from 1918 to 1941, and those in the April war of 1941 can be found in: Ivan Gabelica, 

\(^{111}\) N. Bartulin, “The NDH as a ’Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism’”, p. 50.
brutal retaliations by the Croatian side) and an assessment of its intensity? Or perhaps he thinks that it is scholarly to fail to notice that even after Moljević’s plans, and after the Serbian genocidal massacres of Croats, both actual and formal alliance between the Chetniks and Partisan movement led by the Yugoslav Communist Party continued for a considerable time?

Even though in this context his scrupulous distinction between a part and whole (which, unfortunately, is nowhere to be seen in his description of the Rome Treaties of May 1941) is interesting, Bartulin also fabricates that in September 1943 most of Dalmatia was in Partisan hands. He should once more pick up a ruler and take measurements, and we shall see the results at which he arrives.

The assertion that the Italians interned between 30,000 and 40,000 Croats as a part of their campaign to ethnically cleanse the annexed parts of Dalmatia shows that Bartulin does not know the difference between internment and confinement. If he had simply used a dictionary of foreign words – for it would be too much to expect that he would notice the difference and consult the relevant sources – he would have seen that this was a matter of confinement, which is a politically and legally different term, for internment in this context would have assumed an armed conflict (a state of war) between Croatia and Italy, but this was not the case.

Whatever Bartulin may say, it is not true that on 10 September 1943 Pavelić announced the annulment of “both the 1941 Rome agreements and the installation of Aimone as ‘King of Croatia’”, for nobody – not even Aimone di Savoia-Aosta himself – was ever installed as the king of the NDH, so there was never any need to annul this non-existent installation.

It is entirely untrue, as Bartulin claims, that Mussolini’s new regime (the Italian Social Republic) refused to send an envoy to Zagreb to protest the Ustasha anti-Italian measures. Bartulin’s inability to understand anything is astonishing! The newly-appointed Italian envoy Tamburini did not come to Zagreb because the Croatian government made this contingent upon Italy’s (Mussolini’s) explicit acknowledgement of the annulment of the Rome agreements.

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112 Ibid., p. 66.
113 Ibid., p. 65–66.
115 N. Bartulin, “The NDH as a ‘Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism’”, p. 66.
116 Ibid., p. 66, note 90.
117 J. Jabr, Pola stoljeća hrvatske politike. Povodom Mačekove autobiografije (Buenos Aires, 1960), pp. 108–110; B. Krizman, Ustaše i Treći Reich, I (Zagreb, 1983), pp. 224–225 ff; T. Jonjić, Hrvatska vanjska politika 1939–1942, pp. 497–498. Of course, neither Bartulin nor similar scholars notice that at the time Mussolini could not have referred to alleged earlier, pre-war obligations on Pavelić’s part and secret pacts with Italy. Nothing like this appeared even later, and they do not exist today, almost seventy years after the end of the war.
When Bartulin claims that “formerly annexed Dalmatia” became part of Croatia on 10 September 1943, does this mean he is claiming that Croatia annexed also those Dalmatian areas which became a component of Italy prior to establishment of the NDH (such as, for example, Zadar, Palagruža or the ill-fated, forgotten Lastovo)? Or does he think these areas do not belong to Dalmatia, or – most likely, – he does not think about it at all, because he simply knows none of this, so such matters do not even cross his mind as he uncritically copies the work of others. I am inclined to believe the latter explanation, for if this problem had occurred to Bartulin at all, then he would not have simply stopped at “formerly annexed Dalmatia”, rather he would have offered an answer to the questions posed above, and he would have had to say something about the fate of parts of Gorski Kotar, Kvarner, and even a small part of Istria that Italy annexed in May 1941.

Bartulin’s assertion that Germany was perceived in Croatia as its one true ally is not accurate. There were hundreds of Croatian objections to the Germans over their repression or due to the fact that German forces continued to protect the Chetniks after Italy’s fall. There were also combinations containing far-reaching German-Serbian plans to Croatia’s detriment, particularly in eastern and north-eastern Bosnia, which were prevented by Croatian resistance. There are numerous examples of Croatian displeasure over the tendency of certain German circles to see a “New Europe” emerge under Germany’s explicit domination, with the erasure of national and state identities. Is Bartulin unaware of all this, or does he just want to engage in manipulations? Perhaps this is why he does not mention the Croatian disapproval of German plans for separate Muslim military units? Perhaps this is why he fails to mention that SS officer Wilhelm Beissner was forced to leave Croatia in spring 1942 because of anti-Ustasha plots with the marginal (and also banned in the NDH) Croatian national socialists around Slavko Govedić? Perhaps this is why he does not want to mention that the massacre committed by the Prinz Eugen SS Division against Croats in Dalmatia in the spring of 1944 led to a very hostile response from the Croatian ministry of foreign affairs, a kind of response not recorded by the Germans from any of their allies during the 1939-1945 period? For the only thing more drastic than this response would have only been the severance of diplomatic relations and a declaration of war against Germany.

118 N. Bartulin, “The NDH as a ‘Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism’”, p. 66.
119 Ibid., p. 67.
120 For more see. T. Jonjić, Hrvatska vanjska politika 1939.-1942., pp. 797-803 and the sources cited therein.
121 I highlighted some of these examples in: T. Jonjić, Hrvatski nacionalizam i europske integracije (Zagreb, 2008), pp. 59-81.
Thus, Croatian-German relations were not idyllic, even though the imbalance of power prevented any deepening of their disputes.

And where are similar Croatian objections to, for example, Bulgarian state policy? Was the sincerity of the alliance with, for example, Slovakia ever questioned? Did not the Croatian press designate Slovakia as a nation and state as perhaps the friendliest and closest to Croatia on a number of occasions? But, naturally, Bartulin knows none of this or, if he does know by some chance, he wishes to ignore it. The reasons are plain: while necessity compels him to proclaim the Croatian-German alliance an attempt at ideological identification, expressions of Croatian-Slovak friendship cannot be used for manipulation. This is an obvious reason why Bartulin selectively uses the relevant sources, and why he suppresses the facts!

He is being equally manipulative when he claims that Ustasha ideologues praised Islam for preserving the Croatian national spirit and 'Croatian blood' in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Any respectable Croatian primary school pupil knows that this and similar ideas had their origin in the founder of modern Croatian nationalism, Ante Starčević (1823-1896), that all Croatian nationalists decades prior to the Ustasha repeated these ideas, and that they have nothing to do with racist teaching (and even less with racism), rather they are part of a national-political platform that was formulated at the onset of the latter half of the nineteenth century, at a time when the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in the Croatian lands were generally considered "Turks" and "Asians". Therefore, Ustasha ideologues were only repeating something defined several decades before, precisely because they cited Starčević and the ideology formulated eighty years prior to the declaration of the NDH.

But when it comes to manipulation, Bartulin is tireless.

A classic example of this manipulation is his instrumentalization of the ideas of Filip Lukas in the context of the Croatian anti-Italian press campaign after the fall of Italy. As usual, this manipulation is seasoned with a factual error. For Lukas was not the “the head” of the Croatian cultural and literary organization Matica hrvatska, rather he was its president in the period from 1928 to 1945. This need not be the same thing, for someone without the title of president can also be “the head”. Perhaps Bartulin also knows that the chief of an American Indian tribe is also the “head” but not the president; that the pope is the “head” but also not a president, that even a Catholic bishop is the “head” of his diocese, but that nobody calls him a president? This is not simply a mat-

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123 N. Bartulin, “The NDH as a ‘Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism’”, p. 68.

124 This practice continued, unfortunately, deep into the twentieth century, but never among those Croatian political forces which cited Starčević. This is not unimportant to this discussion as well, but the tallying of Bartulin's factual errors is, unfortunately, already taking up too much space.

125 N. Bartulin, “The NDH as a ‘Central European Bulwark against Italian Imperialism’”, pp. 67-68.
ter of splitting hairs, for by designating Lukas like he did, Bartulin demonstrates his ignorance of what the president of Matica hrvatska could and could not do according that organization’s bylaws. However, even more important is that Lukas’ ideas, which Bartulin cites and places originally in 1943/44, were actually formulated several decades earlier, before he became president of Matica,126 and that he reiterated them on a number of occasions before the establishment of the NDH and afterward. An honest man would have mentioned this; a manipulator remains quiet.

He engages in a similar manipulation with reference to Ante Tresić Pavičić’s book Izgon Mongola iz Hrvatske (Expulsion of the Mongols from Croatia). Bartulin indicates two times that this book was published in 1942, whereby he obviously wishes to suggest that it belongs to the body of “Ustasha literature”127. However, he does not say – or simply does not know? – that the book was written far prior to the declaration of the NDH and that Tresić Pavičić (who has perhaps only slightly more ties to the Ustasha than the Dalai Lama!) submitted its manuscript to a publisher (Matica hrvatska) on 21 October 1940, i.e. six months before the NDH was proclaimed, at a time when no one knew such a thing would ever happen.128 The book itself explicitly says so. The first page of the authors text, i.e. the part immediately after the foreword, contains a note that literally says: „This work was handed to Matica Hrvatska by the author on 21 October 1940.” Therefore, only two solutions are possible: one, Bartulin has not even read Tresić Pavičić’s book, so he knows nothing about that matter, or two: he has read the book, but insists on manipulating with the year of its printing by purposely eliding that information!

I have grown tired of listing all of Bartulin’s errors, fabrications and manipulations, and I am certain it is no easier for readers!

And as apparent in cited observations, if I were bereft of Christian mercy, already in my first review I could have cited not only Bartulin’s errors registered there, but also those cited here, and concluded that there is no need to pay any attention to an individual who makes roughly sixty factual errors over the course of 19 pages (49-67).130 This is the reason why I hoped that Bartulin became aware of my implicit yet obviously well-meaning recommendations, for after such impressive statistics (roughly three factual errors per published page of text!) only a stubborn man would fail to comprehend that he has chosen

126 See, for example, F. Lukas, “Geografska osnovica hrvatskoga naroda”, pp. 21-91.
130 I shall return to the remaining pages of Bartulin’s 2007 article below, as they are – as I have shown in my review – a completely fabricated edifice which grew out of Bartulin’s fundamental ignorance of Croatian literature.
the wrong profession. This is why I would not have been surprised if I had never heard of Bartulin again, or that I had been told he had become, say, a salesman, handyman, cactus farmer or origami artist, or maybe even switched to politics (primarily the kind conducted in presidential offices or in so-called non-governmental organizations, since he has performed all of the necessary preliminary work for this in his scholarly texts!), and that this was why he did not accept the RCH editorial board’s invitation to immediately reply to me.

However, my hope was shaken when I saw that Bartulin submitted a text on a similar theme for the same journal.131 I did not look into this, because I thought that this was a late paper or the chance remains of Bartulin’s once impressive intellectual efforts. This is why I did not notice that my polemical rival continued in the same tone, churning out errors and nonsense. Because of the limited space, I will not recount them here. However, I could not entirely resist the temptation due to my own all-to-human flawed nature, which I acknowledge in a humble, Christian spirit.

This is why I call upon Bartulin to succinctly explain two things to us. First, he claims that Boris Zarnik (1883-1944?) was the main expert who drafted the NDH’s racial legislation.132

Here I am not thinking of the amateurish mistake of proclaiming legal decrees (low-ranking regulations) for laws (higher-ranking regulations), for – who could expect Bartulin to understand the distinction?! I am not even thinking of Bartulin’s typical manipulation when he cites Zarnik’s text on the supposed superiority of the Nordic and Dinaric races, published in the journal Priroda in 1931,133 while simultaneously failing to mention that Zarnik was actually recycling his text in which he was not speaking of the Croatian, but rather “Yugoslav nation”, i.e. the South Slavs, among whom he did not see any racial differences.134

So I am not thinking of these manipulations on Bartulin’s part, rather of something else: Zarnik’s supposedly crucial role in formulating “the NDH’s race laws”, or rather, the decrees (which ones, for there were many!) which belong to the set of racial legislation.

Ustasha apologists would undoubtedly be delighted by this hitherto unknown fact, for it would additionally bolster their not entirely frivolous contention that the so-called racial legislation was enacted under German pressure, so then it would not be illogical that they were midwived by a Slovenian biologist who

131 This is Bartulin’s already mentioned text “The Ideal Nordic-Dinaric Racial Type: Racial Anthropology in the Independent State of Croatia”.
133 Ibid., p. 202, note 64.
admired Ernst Haeckel as a man who deserved “one of the most honourable ranks in the history of the natural science”, known for his pre-war support for non-Croatian and anti-Croatian parties, and for his fondness for National Socialism. However, perhaps all Ustasha apologists are not as uncritical as Bartulin, so they would seek proof. The latter simply cannot be found where Bartulin says it is. Bartulin is therefore skilled in the use of both scissors and glue – to use a bit of wit whose source and context any expert on Croatian history will recognize – so I demand: bring the evidence to the light of day!

In the meantime, I must stress out that Zarnik’s academic career in NDH was cut short: he was one of the few professors of the Zagreb Faculty of Medicine who were retired by NDH authorities. Spomen-knjiga prve obljetnice Nezavisne Države Hrvatske 10.4.1941.-10.4.1942., which was distributed - according to newspaper articles - late June or early July 1942, lists Zarnik amongst other retired professors. Official data regarding academic administration and the organization of the university published in later periods of NDH have no mention of Zarnik. According to Jaroslav Šidak, Zarnik was retired on 27. October 1941. The Education Minister at the time, Dr. Mile Budak, knew that he himself was to be named as an envoy in Berlin, which occurred on November 2, 1941. Since it was well known that German intelligence agencies were suspicious towards Budak (among other, for evasion of anti-Jewish regulations!), it is very unusual that those same agencies would not have protested about the retirement of a man that had a quintessential role in making such regulations, especially bearing in mind that the retirement was in the domain of Budak’s Ministry. The Yugoslav communist authorities, however, bore in mind that Zarnik had been retired under Budak’s mandate. I do not think Bartulin meant to depict Budak as such a vivid adversary of Nazi Germany, so I call upon him to prove his claim that Zarnik played a major role in the creation of “race laws” (racial law decrees).

136  According to the posted list of voters in the (public!) elections for the National Assembly in May 1935, Zarnik voted for the government’s (Yugoslav) slate. His Yugoslav convictions and political fickleness is shown not only in his articles in numerous periodicals, but also in the reminiscences of contemporaries. Cf. Dnevnik Blaža Jurišića. Edited by Biserka Rako (Zagreb, 1994), p. 147, 217.
137  Daily HN, 4/1942, no. 421 reported on 9 May 1942, on p. 4, that subscriptions were no longer possible, because the book was already sold out in pre-orders.
140  Incidentally, the registration log of the NDH Education Ministry under no. 480/1941 of 15 July 1941 notes the request of the retired M. Kus-Nikolajev for reactivation (Croatian State Archives, NDH Education Ministry fund /hereinafter: HDA, MNP NDH/, Urudžbeni zapisnik
Surely it would not be possible for a scholar of Bartulin’s caliber to copy a piece of information he read somewhere, but forgot where he read it, and thus cannot name his source? Truth be told, at one time the Yugoslav communist authorities suspected Zarnik of being a German sympathizer (his wife was German, and his two daughters were studying in Germany), and they believed that he had participated in the preparation of anti-Jewish regulations and was in conflict with the Catholic clergy. Evidence supporting that claim were never published, but the fact remains that soon after the fall of the NDH, articles appeared in Yugoslav communist journals praising his Darwinism and materialistic views. An interesting piece of information is that Zarnik, who was a professor of the Constantinople (later Istanbul) Faculty of Medicine, is still regarded as being exceptionally important for the development of Croatian biology and its „orientation towards the biology of development and evolution“.

Perhaps the fact that Zarnik, who may have outlived the NDH, was by all accounts a Freemason for most of his life sheds some light on his unusual life’s path. However, toward the end of his life, it would appear that he left Freemasonry behind and became a devout Catholic.

In any case, there can be no doubt that he was among the associates who worked on the fourth and fifth volumes of the Croatian encyclopaedia, *Hrvatska enciklopedija*. The latter was published in 1945, and the Yugoslav authorities had destroyed most of its copies, while the fourth volume was designated as published in 1942, even though was actually released at the end of 1943.

There, in the fourth volume of *Hrvatska enciklopedija*, Zarnik wrote an extensive entry on “Man”. When was it completed (and was it at the time when Zarnik became a “devout Catholic”) is not known. However, it is interesting that in it he discusses at length the human races and the differences between them, and underscored that “to benefit cultural progress, racism...”}

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142 An article in this tone was written about him by his departmental successor, Zdravko Lorković, “Prof. dr. Boris Zarnik”, *Priroda*, 35 (1946). For more, see Josip Balabanić, “Darwini zam u Hrvatskoj između znanosti i ideologije”, *Nova prisutnost*, 7 (2009), no. 3: 373-406.


aspires to preserve that race deemed the most capable as pure as possible. There are, however, facts which may be interpreted in the opposite sense; that, in fact, the mixing of races impels the development of those spiritual forces which lead to cultural progress.\textsuperscript{147} Even more important is his conclusion, according to which “racist efforts have no foundation in the science of races.”\textsuperscript{148} It is interesting to see this powerful condemnation of racism and racist efforts in the most representative publication of a state administered by a regime which – according to Bartulin – was rooted in and found the meaning of its existence in racist teaching...

Another question from Bartulin’s 2009 text pertains to his – rather unoriginal, just as everything about Bartulin is unoriginal – interpretation of no. 11 of the Ustasha Principles: “No-one who is not by descent and blood a member of the Croatian nation can decide on Croatian state and national matters in the Independent State of Croatia. In the same manner, no foreign nation nor state can decide on the fate of the Croatian nation and Croatian state.”\textsuperscript{149}

I am interested as to whether Bartulin, in his intensive, deep and unusually fruitful scholarly work, has come upon exactly the same formulations of both Croatian and also foreign writers, which emerged decades earlier, at the height of the national renewals and creation of nation states, without any indication of racialist teaching or racism?

Since Pavelić and the Ustasha constantly referred to Starčević and considered themselves his heirs in the political sense, did he ever ask himself how often Starčević thundered against “foreigners”, and that it may have been honest to ask whether number eleven of the Ustasha Principles has its roots in Pavelić’s interpretation of Starčević’s writings? I am not saying that it has such roots, rather I am saying that such a question \textit{must} be posed. And I can only speculate as to why Bartulin did not pose it, i.e., why he avoids discussing Starčević in this context.

Perhaps Bartulin is simply unfamiliar with him? In his dissertation, he allegedly wrote that Starčević established a party that was even formally called the “Croatian Party of Right”. At first glance I found this difficult to believe, for if Bartulin did not know that this was not the party’s formal name, then his mentors should have – for how could have they otherwise been mentors to such an intellect?! However, it became apparent that my optimism was misplaced and that Bartulin truly does not know the name of the party headed by Starčević when he made the same assertion in an article published in a Croatian journal.\textsuperscript{150}

\textsuperscript{147} Ibid., p. 355.
\textsuperscript{148} Ibid.
In it as well he claimed the Party of Rights was called the “Croatian Party of Right”. And since he does not know this, it is unsurprising that he thinks there is no place for Starčević in a discussion of Ustasha ideology.

Someone who lacks mastery of elementary concepts can easily be misled by another author, who is almost as reliable as Bartulin. This particular author glibly claimed that Starčević’s Selected Writings (Izabrani spisi), which were compiled by Blaž Jurišić, “were printed in 1943, but were only released for sale after the war, because the Ustasha regime could not face the genuine Starčević, with his original affinity for democratic principles and his obsessive hatred of Germans”.\footnote{Ivo Goldstein, \textit{Židovi u Zagrebu 1918-1941} (Zagreb, 2005), p. 523.}

It would be difficult to prove Starčević’s alleged “obsessive hatred”, but the sense of this formulation is clear: if he is not a racist, a Croatian politician and ideologue must at least be “obsessed by hatred”.

However, what interests us here is the supposed (formal or actual) banning of Starčević’s writings in the NDH. This was truly an unusual ban, if we can see with our own eyes that, say, a pupil in the Third Men’s State Secondary School in Zagreb, “for commendable learning and exemplary conduct” in the 1943/44 school year, received precisely this book as a gift. How could this be, if the book was not released for sale prior to May 1945, a month when Croatia was characterized by the killing of people and the burning of books under the Yugoslav communist regime? Perhaps the school stole a copy from the printer somewhere in 1944, and then gave it to its exemplary pupil?

This “ban” becomes even odder, if we know that even someone who did not manage to find this antique-quality copy of Starčević’s Izabrani spisi with precisely this dedication, can – if interested in the facts at all – notice that Jurišić’s selection of Starčević’s works was reviewed in many newspapers and magazines, which would have been difficult to do if the book had not been released for sale.

For example, Jurišić’s selection of Starčević’s writings was reviewed in the newspaper \textit{Novine} in early August 1943, and it was noted that “certainly the most interesting part of the book […] is the chapter under the title ‘Sparks’ […] they show Starčević in a completely, not necessarily new, but well-rounded light, an assessment we could not attain from a book of collected works”.\footnote{“Izabrani spisi Ante Starčevića. U priredbi Dra Blaža Jurišića”, \textit{Novine}, 3 (1943), no. 91, 9. 8. 1943, p. 5.} Bartulin would have trouble with this, for these “Sparks” (Iskrice in the original) include not only Starčević’s numerous thoughts on human dignity, political freedom and harmony between nations, but also Starčević’s assertions that each nation is a “mixture of different peoples, different bloods”, and that
“nationality [...] is a matter of spirituality”, so it therefore cannot be a racial/biological category.

This book had been also reviewed by Dragutin Gjurić in the respected monthly published by Matica hrvatska, *Hrvatska revija*, who also stressed that Starčević’s thoughts constituted a “lesson, advice, and way for our further work”, particularly underlining the value of the “Sparks”. And a historian, if serious, would not overlook that Jurišić’s selection from Starčević’s works was also reviewed in the main Croatian daily newspaper, *Hrvatski narod*, which was actually and formally the bulletin of the Croatian Ustasha Movement. And so, precisely on the Feast of St. Anthony (13 June), a day also celebrated in the NDH as the name-day of its leader, Ante Pavelić, this newspaper carried a review signed by certain ‘š’. There are catalogues in Croatia, that happen to be some of the most serious and most thorough, which state that this initial concealed the name of historian Jaroslav Šidak, but it would be best not to confuse Bartulin with this.

So this enigmatic reviewer wrote that the book was released “on precisely this day, on St. Anthony’s” (1943!), and he added that “the immensity of Starčević’s significance and the importance of his political thought will be [...] recognized by the Croatian public in this book, which should be a textbook on Croatian national politics and a signpost for all of those who intend to engage in public affairs in their liberated homeland”. A serious historian would not miss something that bypassed the imagination of an inventive manipulator: that almost the entirety of this special edition of *Hrvatski narod* was dedicated to Starčević, and that it contains texts about much more than Pavelić. And the featured authors are *nothing to sneeze at* either: Ivo Bogdan, Blaž Jurišić, Emil Laszowski, Savić Marković Štedimlija and Milivoj Magdić.

A serious historian would similarly not fail to miss that precisely this book was constantly advertised among the HIBZ editions (e.g. in the magazine *Vienac*), much less that in the professional, historiographic *Časopis za hrvatsku povijest* a change in the book’s price was announced. For one may perhaps expect that a historian would at the very least page through the main journal

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156 *Časopis za hrvatsku povijest*, no. 1-2 (Zagreb, 1943) has an advertisement on its wrappers according to which Starčević’s *Izabrani spisi* cost 500 kuna. A price of 800 kuna is advertised in “Vestiima iz HIBZ-a” (‘News from HIBZ’), printed as a supplement in *Vienac*, 36 (1944), no. 3, May 1944, p. 7., while in “Popis izdanja Hrvatskoga izdavačkoga bibliografskog zavoda” (List of editions of the Croatian Publishing and Bibliographic Institute), included as a supplement in *Vienac* no. 5 (July 1944, p. 8), Jurišić’s book is considerably more expensive at a cost of 1,500 kuna.
in his field of expertise. And then conclude that none of this would have been possible, if Starčević’s Izabrani spisi was not released for sale. Right?

And when constructing the reasons for the alleged non-release of this book for sale, it is worthwhile noting that on 5 June 1944 the Headquarters of the Men’s Ustasha Youth of Zagreb proposed to the minister of national education that he stipulate a certain number of books that each secondary school graduate should study and demonstrate knowledge of them in the matriculation examination. These were books compiled by “morally and nationally strong Croatian professors”, and among “the most vital political books” they specified Starčević’s writings as published by HIBZ.157 Only four days later, the Ministry of National Education sent a letter to the “superintendents of all state gymnasia and teacher-training schools” and the Association of Croatian Secondary School Teachers entitled “Croatian Reading Material for Secondary School Youth”. It contains questions on library inventories, and it requests that the Association of Croatian Secondary School Teachers compile a “list of national instructive and literary works for national, political and civic education of secondary school youths”, and among the only three titles that would have been mandatory, the letter literally contains this: “Jurišić: Ante Starčević, Izabrani spisi, izdanje H. I. B. Z., Zgb 1943.”158

All of this is truly unusual for a book which – alas – according to a typically misleading historiographic manoeuvre, had not been released for sale due to ideological reasons, because of the supposed Ustasha inability to deal with Starčević’s genuine thoughts (including those about the equality of all peoples). And who could doubt that Bartulin has a predecessor, teacher and mentor?

But to return to no. 11 of the Ustasha Principles.

I would ask Bartulin, who calls himself a historian, whether he ever heard of the term “rulers of national blood” and whether he is aware that for a century and a half it was used not only in the professional literature, but also in primary school Croatian history textbooks? Is he aware of the dozens of political platforms and declarations in the Croatian lands during the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century which use the term “national blood”, “ruler of the same blood and language”, “down with foreigners”, “foreign servants” and so forth? Did Bartulin observe that at the opening of the Yugoslav Academy of Arts and Science, one of the most important ideologues of Yugoslavism, Josip Juraj Strossmayer, Bishop of Đakovo, spoke about a land “fed by rivers of Croatian blood” but also about “brothers of the same blood and same tribe”?159

157 HDA, MNP NDH, box 2, no. 2052/44 of 5 June 1944.
158 HDA, MNP NDH, box 2, no. U. m. 446/44 of 9 June 1944.
159 “Jugoslavenska akademija. Strossmayerov govor o akademiji i sveučilištu govoren u saboru dne 29. travnja 1861.”, Hrvatska njiva, 1/1917, no. 21 (Zagreb, 28 July 1917), pp. 355-357.
Is he aware that the Rightist ideologues (Starčević, Kvaternik and others) already then began waging a verbal war against these claims of “brothers of the same blood and same tribe”? Did it occur to Bartulin that no. 11 of the Ustasha Principles may have been a derivative of Starčević’s view, a Rightist reaction to the obscure idea of “brothers of a single blood and a single tribe” from Triglav to Vardar and to the Black Sea? Did he ever pose the question as to the substantial difference between that point of the Ustasha Principles and Starčević’s slogan that the fate of Croatia had to be decided “only by God and the Croats”, a slogan which, otherwise, was characterized by Nadko Nodilo in 1908 as a mere variation of sayings of Voltaire and Mazzini?160

And until I learned about Nodilo’s observation, I admit that I used to associate Starčević’s slogan with the Irish “Sinn Fein”, wherein it is interesting that Starčević preceded the Irish (or did he actually precede them, since this same thought is shared by all subjugated nations during their struggle for state independence?). Starčević’s slogan has survived in Croatian political life to this day, so it is entirely logical to ask how it came about and how it has been existing and animating spirits for over a century and a half? What is its relationship to other political slogans and mottos? Can it be associated with the Ustasha Principles? Can one overlook the fact that among the ranks of the Ustasha there were claims that the Ustasha Principles could already be discerned in the “Principles of the Kvaternik Croatian Academic Club”, which was established in 1921 by Rightist university students in Zagreb?161

How is it possible not to notice that one of the leading exponents of Ustasha propaganda, Danijel Crljen, in probably the best known – but not the only one! – interpretation of the Ustasha Principles, used Starčević’s motto precisely as the heading for his commentary on principle number 11?162 Does it not seem obvious that this heading is not just coincidental and that the author meant for it to serve as a focal point for the analysis and interpretation of his (Crljen’s) text, and the formulation of Pavelić himself? If this is the case, then does this heading show the way, or perhaps it leads readers astray? So regardless of the possibility of dissonant answers – which falls within the realm of interpretation – this question cannot by any means be avoided, for it is a matter of logic.

But did Bartulin pose it?

Did it ever occur to him that this particular Ustasha principle may have had something besides a racial connotation, all the more so since Pavelić’s historicism was generally well known, at times to the point of caricature? If the Ustasha claimed that their movement was nothing new, but rather the contin-

162 Danijel Crljen, Načela Hrvatskog ustaškog pokreta (Zagreb, 1942), p. 61.
igation of an earlier Croatian struggle, and not just the struggle of the most recent centuries, but one that had "its germ in the ninth and tenth centuries," should it not occur to an honest man who wants to be a historian dealing with the Ustasha movement to verify the extent to which that propagandistic platitude is founded?

For example, did Bartulin ever read that Fr. Mihovil Pavlinović (1831-1887), a Catholic priest and ideologue of the Croatian national renewal in Dalmatia, used the following words to explain to the unschooled Croatian populace in 1870 what the Croatian magnates arranged with the envoys of Ferdinand I of Habsburg in Cetingrad on 1 January 1527, four centuries before the Ustasha movement: "No non-Croat in Croatia is to hold power; no law not made by the Croats with their king is to be enforced in Croatia. No language but the Croatian language shall reign in Croatia."

Did he notice similar formulations in literary – and not just literary – works by Dragutin Rakovac, Franjo Rački, August Šenoa, Nadko Nodilo, Ante Radić, Gjuro Arnold, Antun Gustav Matoš...? Let us say that they did not occur to Bartulin, because – as he tells us – he does not know much about Croatian literature. This is why it is impossible to expect Bartulin to take note of a rather common rhyme in Croatian literature, stranac – lanac (foreigner – chain). Henri Murger, using the lips of his Bohemian hero Schaunard, would probably have noticed that this rhyme is no millionaire in the literary sense. However, in the political sense it is another matter altogether. And not only in the case of the Croats. For there are other nations who have been taught by history that foreign rule is the same as slavery.

And did Bartulin at least assess the various, often very different Ustasha interpretations of the Ustasha Principles? Did he see that in Valenta’s interpretation of this principle, he stressed that the Croats were entirely equated with those foreigners who have united with the Croats “in spirit and in blood”, so they align their feelings, love and interests with that nation, while others in a free Croatia will have all of their rights, but will not be able to decide on its fate.

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163 This was noted in a review of M. Bzik’s book. The review was written by Vilim Peroš, “Ustaške knjižice i brošure”, Hrvatska revija, 15 (1942), no. 11: 614.


165 Thus, for example, Croatian writer A. Šenoa (1838-1861), in his historical sketch on the death of Petar Svačić (1877) admonishes those who “call foreigners to their land, / to execute revenge on their freedom, / they put chain on their freedom” (In the original: “…u svoju zemlju zovu strane, / slobodi svojoj da se svete, / slobodi svojoj kuju lance.”)

Did he see what Mile Budak, Pavelić’s long-time personal friend, party colleague and his closest associate in the Ustasha movement for years, thought about the problem in 1933/34? Did he notice that when Budak spoke of foreigners (who may be personally honest and intelligent, highly cultured and esteemed, but lack an “authentic feeling” for the Croatian people) he was thinking first and foremost of Ljudevit Gaj, Bishop Strossmayer and similar promoters of the Yugoslav ideology? Did he read that Budak did not deny the high human qualities, membership in the Croatian nation and even the Croatian patriotism of these people, but thought that at crucial moments they chose the wrong way for the Croatian nation, and that wrong way was – Yugoslavism?167

Has he read that Budak took aim at Croatian advocates of Yugoslavism and Panslavism elsewhere as well?168 In the context of debate on this topic, Budak’s thoughts are not insignificant not only due to his pivotal position in the Ustasha organization. They are also important because it is entirely possible that Budak, as the commander of the Ustasha camp in Italy, organized some sort of political education for the Ustasha, and delivered speeches in which he interpreted the Ustasha Principles, while his book was the principal manual for the political education of the Ustasha.169 In any case, is it not irrefutable, that Budak in his biography, which was published in 1938 as a appendix to his novel Ognjište [The Hearth], found only the kindest words for his former employer? He was, Budak said, “the attorney Mr. Julio Oswald, the most ideal and honourable representative of the old guard of former attorneys, gentlemen which were Jews and Croats at the same time”.170

Did Bartulin anywhere mention Moškov’s claim that in Ustasha émigré circles, the “question of the Jews” was never posed “as such”, that Pavelić did not even deal with racial matters, and that in his speeches sharply distinguished between “Jewish extortionists” who colluded with Belgrade from those Jews who stood forth as Croatian patriots?171 Moškov, of course, never wrote any memoirs – which is often uncritically alleged – rather he wrote, under extremely trying circumstances, an investigative study and, as a prisoner, dictated

167 Budak wrote how “these Štooses, Webers, Wiesners, Demeters (an ethnic Greek), and even Vrazes, Lisinskis nor Gaj himself did not possess a Croatianness that was big enough, broad enough and strong enough to encompass the entire Balkans, and they did not feel the depth of soul of their own [sic!] nation, which was always content with itself alone, rather seeking instructions and models from others, and by no means people who would fulfil them!” (M. Budak, Hrvatski narod u borbi za samostalnu i nezavisnu hrvatsku državu, Youngstown, Ohio, USA, 1934, pp. 13-14).


169 A. Moškov, Pavelićevo doba, p. 177, 199.


171 A. Moškov, Pavelićevo doba, p. 206, 236.
extensive statements to the Yugoslav authorities. In them he was merciless (and obviously unobjective) not only with regard to Budak, but also Pavelić. But even Moškov in this light – and under those circumstances, when diverting culpability to Pavelić and Budak could have only helped him – said that both “very sharply reacted” to several anti-Jewish statements made by ordinary Ustashë.173

Pavelić’s attitude toward racial issues and Rosenberg’s drivel is described almost identically by another former associate, and later strident opponent, Branimir Jelić.174 How did this as well escape the sharp eye of the scholar Nevenko Bartulin?

How did he fail to notice that Crljen’s interpretation of the Ustasha Principles is actually a variation of Budak’s thoughts from 1933/34, although he added a strong anti-Jewish tone to them?175 To Bartulin, chronology and context mean nothing, so I note: it is now 1942, not 1934, and Hitler is no longer just a potential threat to the Versailles order, rather his troops are on the shores of La Manche, in the Sahara and facing Moscow and Stalingrad!

Did Bartulin find a racist tone in Karamarko’s interpretation of the Ustasha Principles?176 Did he read their interpretation in the ‘Calendar of St. Anthony (Kalendar sv. Ante, 1943) from the pen of Fr. Andrija Radoslav Glavaš, a Catholic priest, literary critic and high state official?177 Why did these “Ustasha officials” not notice, much less emphasize, the racist tone in the Ustasha Principles even at a time when – according to Bartulin’s – it could have suited them?

And has it ever occurred to Nevenko Bartulin that the Ustasha Principles, including no. 11, were published prior to the war accompanied by photographs of Pavelić and Maček,178 wherein the photograph of Vladko Maček is placed

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173 A. Moškov, Pavelićev doba, pp. 206.-207.
175 D. Crljen, Načela Hrvatskog ustaškog pokreta, pp. 61-67.
178 See the facsimile in: M. Jareb, Ustaško-domobranski pokret od nastanka do travnja 1941. godine, pp. 126-127. Since there were many years of firm notions about the harmony and correspondence between the views of Pavelić and Maček, the photographs of both in the Ustasha
first, and he – Bartulin knows this at least – was also “not by descent and blood a member of the Croatian nation” but rather a Slovene?

At some point it should have occurred to him that in this context it would have been worthwhile to read the text of Pavelić’s pathos-laden speech to Croatian workers on Labour Day 1944: “...Whosoever was born in this country, whosoever has the graves of his ancestors and the cradle of his descendants in this country is duty-bound, and also entitled, to call this country his own. As soon as he calls it his own, it cannot be foreign but only his...”

Just to be clear, I am by no means whatsoever claiming that this proves that Pavelić, Budak and other Ustasha leaders may not have nurtured different thoughts privately. A multitude of differently intoned statements can be found in the press after the declaration of the NDH, particularly illustrations with anti-Semitic content. However, even this – like the indisputably tragic fate of the Croatian Jews – merits research, with establishment of the facts and interpretation. This problem cannot broached using Bartulin’s scholarly methodology, i.e., by ignoring facts and data which do not support a preconceived conviction.

But Bartulin proceeds precisely in this fashion, evading the need to place statements, moods and events in their proper context and objectively interpreting them. This is why he never manages to cite the Ustasha sources which, not only before the war (whether in Pavelić’s proclamations or in the foreword to the ‘Croatian University Student Almanac’ – *Almanah hrvatskih sveučilištaraca*), but also after proclamation of the NDH, very clearly assert that the Serbs and Serbian propaganda “christened [the Ustasha] fascists”, while the Ustasha never considered themselves fascists. Moreover, such assertions were always rejected. How is it that Bartulin failed to note that the Germans criticized Pavelić and the Ustasha for sending diplomatic representatives to neutral foreign countries who were known for their anti-Nazi stance? Why is he incapable of observing that Pavelić – for the needs of negotiations on the potential Swiss recognition of the NDH – appointed as his political advisor the

Principles were not coincidental, and those who know something about Croatian political history in the 1930s know that Pavelić and Maček did not part because of their attitude towards the dominant political ideologies of the day, and even less because of the racial questions.

182 For more, see. I. Gabelica, *Blaženi Alojzije Stepinac i hrvatska država*, pp. 112-143.
183 For several such German complaints, see: T. Jonjić, “O pokušaju osnivanja Hrvatskoga komiteta u Švicarskoj”, p. 224.
well-known Anglophile and Shakespearian expert Vinko Krišković, and the Swiss accepted him as such?184

Bartulin did not manage to observe any of this!

In this vein, I begin to perspire at the very thought of everything he would think of if he were to seriously page through the periodicals of the NDH period, and came upon, say, these verses: “...Here our people vigorous and strong / Pulverized the wild hordes, / By the blood of Croats / The entire West is saved”185 Only the Almighty knows how many Hitlers and Rosenbergs would hasten from these verses, how many coincidentally found citations by experts and quasi-experts Bartulin would adorn with these innocent pathetic verses, what kind of scholarly tract would emerge from this, and the disgust Bartulin would express over decades of historiographic research which, alas, did not manage to notice something that he instantly saw with his Argus-like vision and unrivalled learning.

As I said, I did not pose these questions earlier because I had long forgotten about Bartulin. But he did not forget me, so – after two years – he decided to reply to my review. If readers compare his reply in this issue, they will easily note that Bartulin actually rewrote his article published in the same journal in 2009.186 Both contain the same assertions, the same sentences and the same notations. That is somethings that illustrates Bartulin’s historiographic method in a complete way: compilation is his universal cure, and he has concluded that he has reached the phase in which he is allowed to compile his own constructs without sanction. And it is typical of his intellectual honesty that in his reply he avoids debating the subject matter of my response, rather he attempts to divert the river to a new course, i.e., into a discussion of how Croatian intellectuals dealt with the issues of race and racial theory.

It is easy to see that in my review – with the exception of a brief note on Yugoslavism as a racial and racist concept – I did not write a single word about it (!).187 I did not write anywhere “that anti-Yugoslavist Croat intellectuals had no interest in the question of racial identity and racial anthropology”. This and a series of other similar statements by Bartulin in his reply188 could be described using a very precise and a quite rough appellation. Only that one would be

185 In the original: “...Ovdje divlje čete smrvi / Rod naš čil i zdrav, / Hrvatskom se ovdje krvi / Spasi Zapad sav.”
188 “...Jonjić would have his readers think that anti-Yugoslavist Croat intellectuals had no interest in the question of race...”; “...Jonjić seems to think that only Yugoslavist ideologists referred to ‘the allegedly dramatic differences between ‘Dinaric’ and other Croats’...” etc.
accurate and appropriate. However, for the sake of this journal and its readers, I shall make use of a euphemism, and satisfy myself by pointing out that Bartulin is again – fabricating and manipulating the facts. I did not say a word regarding that matter. I never even wrote that Croatian intellectuals with pronounced Yugoslav orientation were spearheading Darwinist (and thus social Darwinist) views and standpoints.189

Bartulin feels best when tilting at windmills. This is why, using his own peculiar logic (that same incomparable logic that led to the conclusion on the quality of human fur), he confabulates that I wrote something that I did not, so that he can then engage in polemics with this straw man, in the hope that it will somehow back his contentions.

It never once occurs to him that already at the logical level his insinuation that I claim that anti-Yugoslav intellectuals showed no interest in race issues is problematic. For how can something like that be insinuated about someone who has written about Starčević, about Croatian-Serbian relations, about the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina, about the Ustasha movement, the tragedy of the Jews in the NDH, on fascism and National Socialism in interwar Europe, and so forth?

When treating these subjects how could one fail to notice that even Starčević, due to national-political reasons, touched on the issue of race, in the process most often using the archaic term “breed” ("pasmina") instead of “race”. In that era, when the term race had a different meaning than today, “breed” denoted what would today more precisely be called “sort” or “kind” ("soj") (e.g. “the Slavo-Serb breed”).190

This imprecise terminology was customary for that time, so everything was referred to as a race (“rasa”), sometimes – in polemical texts – even confessional identity.191 Other terms were used with an identical lack of precision, so – as Bartulin does not know – even the much more frequent term “tribe”

References:
189 Usp. Josip Balabanić, Darvinizam i njegovi odrazi u Hrvatskoj (do 1918). Disertacija obranjena na Prirodoslovno-matematičkom fakultetu Sveučilišta u Zagrebu (Zagreb, 1980). It could be interesting to state out that the main opponents of Darwinist sympathizers (those opponents belonged mostly to Catholic clergy and Catholic intelligentsia) also usually had a very pro-Yugoslav stance.
190 There is too little space here to cite the writers who showed that Starčević did not mean any nation specifically when he used the term “Slavo-Serb breed”, rather he meant an ethical category, a sort of people who only deserved contempt in his ideological system.
191 At the turn of the nineteenth into the twentieth century, something of a Kulturkampf broke out in the Croatian public. In this confrontation between proponents of traditional, conservative values and the representatives of new ideologies (liberalism, anarchism, Marxism, etc.), it was impossible to avoid debates on Social Darwinism, evolutionism and eugenics. These debates proceeded in very heated tones, so that, for example, the Catholic periodical Hrvatska straža ironically accused its opponents of considering Catholics an “inferior race” (“Katolici – inferiora rasa?”, Hrvatska straža za kršćansku prosvjetu. Časopis namijenjen nauci i književnosti, 3 (Krk, 1905), pp. 57-70, 198-206).
“pleme”) has many and very different meanings in Croatian cultural and legal tradition. The same applies to the terms “rod” (clan/lineage), “dom” (home/homeland), and even narod (nation/people). However, even today the use of these terms is imprecise. In southern Croatia, even today the term “raca” (undoubtedly derived from the Italian “razza”, race) indicates a plant or animal breed, but also human blood kinship or lineage: close relatives belong to the same “raca”, so a small village may contain five or six “race”.

And at places I indicated that Starčević was not the only one to imprecisely and inconsistently use the term “breed”. Many of his followers used the terms “breed”, “race” “nation/people” and “tribe” with the same lack of precision. However, in an entire series of texts I underscored that it was typical of them that in racial and religious matters they were far more tolerant than most other Croatian political forces, particularly those of a Yugoslav bent.

It takes Bartulin’s peculiar logic to construe that I claimed they were completely uninterested in these issues.

In his joust with this particular windmill, Bartulin actually implies that I had said Croatia is a world for itself, entirely separated from European and global trends. This is of course untrue. Even though I believed and still believe that most Croatian nationalists who assumed influential posts in the Ustasha movement and the NDH did not actually favour either fascism or National Socialism, I never doubted that among the Croats there were those who embraced these ideologies with all of their deviations, including those concerning racist teaching. As I noted in another polemic, anything else would have been impossible, for Croatia is an integral component of Europe, so it would have been impossible for these ideologies not to penetrate it during the interwar years.

Already in the first sentences of his reply, Bartulin laments that he did not have sufficient space in a single article to say everything he wanted. This jermiad touched me, but: it is simple to calculate that, if his tilt at windmills had been ten pages longer – keeping his standards - Bartulin would probably have made an additional thirty or so factual errors. This would have delighted all of those who seek humour pieces even in the pages of scholarly journals. But

193 V. Mažuranić, Prinosi za hrvatski pravno-povjestni rječnik, p. 1254.
194 Ibid., p. 259.
195 Ibid., p. 715-716.
197 T. Jonjić, “Iz povijesti zabluda i nesporazuma. Predgovor trećem izdanju knjige ’Nekoji nazori i zapovijedi svetih otaca papa glede nepravednog proganjanja izraelićana”, V-XX (Zagreb, 2010)
naturally, this does not stop Bartulin from tastelessly imputing what I know or do not know about authors such as Dinko Tomasić, Ćiro Truhelka, Ivo Pilar or Filip Lukas.

He thereby – in typical Bartulin fashion – makes a double error.

First, and less importantly: it shows his ignorance of the fact that I wrote about all of these authors – except Tomasić – on a number of occasions. I have written many studies about Lukas and, especially, Pilar, and I have prepared for publication (alone or in collaboration with others) many original, previously unpublished texts, memoranda and studies. This should excuse the fact that in this response to Bartulin I am citing my own texts more than what might be considered proper. Otherwise, as opposed to Bartulin, who so gladly cites his own compilations, I do not consider my own texts on these topics or anything in my bibliography in general something that should interest the general reader.

Second, and certainly more important, Bartulin’s error in this context shows that his notions of these authors are superficial and one-sided.

The extent of Bartulin’s knowledge of Pilar is clearly reflected in the fact that he persistently cites one and the same excerpt from a single – admittedly the most important – work: Die südslawische Frage/Južnoslavensko pitanje (The South Slav Question). He does the same with Truhelka, citing only one of his books: Studije o podrijetlu: Etnološka razmatranja iz Bosne i Hercegovine (Studies on Descent: Ethnological Considerations from Bosnia-Herzegovina; Zagreb, 1941) and one article written in 1907. He notes of this article that it was published anonymously, but – naturally – he does not know why, or simply passes over this.

Bartulin approaches these two authors – like, indeed, all of the rest of those he cites – tendentiously, extracting individual thoughts out of context and reducing them to their anthropological observations, entirely ignoring the context in which these texts appeared and the political engagement of their authors. Both Truhelka and Pilar wrote their discussions as active participants in political life in Bosnia-Herzegovina, at the time when the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy annexed this territory (1908) and immediately thereafter, as a part of considerations on the possible reorganization of the Monarchy into a trialist system. Pilar was deeply politically involved at the time, first as one of the founders of the Croatian National Union (Hrvatska narodna zajednica), and then as a writer of many studies on the status of the Croatian nation, while toward the end of the war he was the spiritus movens and actual author of one of the most important documents which overturned the thesis on so-called national unity and the aspiration to create a Yugoslav state.199

Both Truhelka and Pilar held similar political positions and had the same objective: to unite the Croatian lands and create an independent Croatian state. Both believed that the unification of Bosnia-Herzegovina with Banal Croatia (Banska Hrvatska) and Dalmatia was a prerequisite for the survival of the Croatian people. In order to achieve this, it was necessary to blunt both Hungarian and especially Serbian aspirations to Bosnia-Herzegovina. As a component of this idea, it was necessary to show that the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina were actually Croats, for otherwise the Catholic Croats would remain a significant minority, and thus unable to achieve that objective. Since political and also social life in Bosnia-Herzegovina during this period was organized along confessional lines, and Croatian national awareness only existed among the majority of Catholics and a thin layer of the Muslim intelligentsia, both Pilar and Truhelka had only two arguments they could use to legitimize the demand for the incorporation of Bosnia-Herzegovina into Croatia. One was the Croatian statehood right, while the other was to prove the common origin of the local Catholics and Muslims.

The first doctrine is historicist, and both felt that it meant little in practical politics. However, the second concept was practically usable, particularly at a time when the development of biology and other natural sciences was leading to a flood of various scientific and quasi-scientific theories, valuable insights but also serious misconceptions (including those from the fields of anthropology, palaeoanthropology, ethnography, etc.). This concept could also have been acceptable to the general populace, particularly if the emphasis on this common descent was accompanied by reminders that the Serbs considered the Muslims “Turks” and “Asians” (so that they almost entirely exterminated them after the creation of the independent Serbian state!), while on the Croatian side (among Starčević’s followers) it was stressed that the Muslims were “the Croatian breed, the oldest and purest nobility that Europe has”. This is why both Pilar and Truhelka adopted a markedly philo-Muslim stance, and why they used Starčević’s classical arguments, even though both – and Pilar especially – were critical of Starčević and his political activism.

This was, therefore, a matter of political pragmatism, rather than a well thought-out system of scholarly or quasi-scholarly standpoints.

Truhelka wrote quite extensively on the necessity of such political pragmatism, also stressing the great importance of the so-called agrarian question in

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the process, in an undated study that emerged around 1908,\textsuperscript{200} while in his memoirs he wrote briefly about his contribution to this activity, pointing out that he also wrote and published for this purpose a number of unsigned articles and texts released under a pseudonym.\textsuperscript{201} However, when he died in 1942, the obituaries published during the NDH emphasized Truhelka’s accomplishments in the fields of archaeology, ethnography, numismatics, etc., while at that time when it could have been politically correct to highlight his fragmentary anthropological postulates and his alleged racial theories, nobody wrote a single notable word about this.\textsuperscript{202} If this had been important to Ustasha propaganda, the situation would have undoubtedly been different. Even in later discussions about Truhelka, nobody noticed nor stressed that which Bartulin wants to present as the focus of Truhelka’s work.\textsuperscript{203}

Naturally, Bartulin overlooks all of this, just as he overlooks the fact that Pilar’s and Truhelka’s anthropological observations that emerged in the above-described context and for the above-described purpose, were only a single – and surely not among the most important – aspects of their intellectual activities. These omissions are a component of Bartulin’s manipulations, which are aimed at construing the leading Croatian intellectuals of the first half of the twentieth century as the founders or at least promoters of Croatian allegedly racist concepts.

However, Bartulin cannot avoid making flagrant factual errors in this manipulation. He is, to be sure, right when he writes that in 1929 Pavelić commended Pilar,\textsuperscript{204} but is wrong when he says that Pavelić praised Pilar’s anthropological observations. To this point, Bartulin is obviously unaware that several years later Pavelić’s closest associate, Mile Budak, wrote a negative assessment of another work by Pilar.\textsuperscript{205} Pilar himself died in 1933, at a time when the Ustasha movement was far from the peak of its power, and he also had an obviously detached view of it.\textsuperscript{206} Even so, when Pavelić and his followers cited him,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{200} HDA, Osobni fond Isidora Kršnjavoga [Isidor Kršnjavi personal papers], box 19, unregistered.
\item \textsuperscript{201} Ćiro Truhelka, \textit{Uspomene jednog pionira} (Zagreb, 1942), pp. 131-132, 136-137.
\item \textsuperscript{202} Cf. the texts on Truhelka published in \textit{HN}, 4/1942, no. 533 (19 Sept. 1942) or in no. 535 (22 Sept. 1942). See also the extensive obituary by Viktor Živić in the same daily, no. 541, 29 Sept. 1942, 9 or the one by Agata Truhelka, “† Ćiro Truhelka”, \textit{Casopis za hrvatsku povijest}, no. 1-2 (Zagreb, 1943), pp. 149-152.
\item \textsuperscript{203} Cf. articles by several authors in: Ćiro Truhelka. \textit{Zbornik}, ed. Nives Majnarić Pandžić (Zagreb, 1994).
\item \textsuperscript{204} N. Bartulin, “The Ideal Nordic-Dinaric Racial Type: Racial Anthropology in the Independent State of Croatia”, pp. 195-196.
\item \textsuperscript{205} M. Budak, \textit{Hrvatski narod u borbi za samostalnu i neovisnu hrvatsku državu} (Youngstown, 1934), pp. 178-180.
\end{itemize}
then they did so not because of Pilar’s anthropological and sociological considerations, but because they thought his works were useful as an argument against the survival or restoration of a Yugoslav state.

The fact that Pilar as a person and even his work did not particularly fascinate Pavelić is reflected in the fact that it was only in early 1943, after almost two years of life as a state, that an honorary, and relatively modest, pension was instituted for Pilar’s widow at the proposal the internal affairs minister. If Bartulin had compared who had received honours and honorary pensions in the first months of the NDH’s existence and why, even he would have arrived at certain conclusions.

Meanwhile, the didactic purpose of Pilar’s book on the South Slav question during the NDH era is clearly shown by the fragments thereof published in the Croatian press of the time. It is also reflected in the statement of a writer of numerous analyses of this book, the priest and historian Dragutin Kamber. Reportedly he and Croatian Prime Minister Nikola Mandić agreed that “it would be good to abridge this book and supplement it with the ‘Yugoslav’ experiences between 1918 and 1941 and prove that there is no life for the Croats without their state, so it [the book – author’s note] should be adapted for the Croatian youth”; Equally clear is the recommendation by the Headquarters of the Men’s Ustasha Youth of Zagreb to stipulate Pilar’s book, together with Starčević’s Izabrani spisi and, naturally, Pavelić’s Strahote zabluda [The Horrors of Delusions], as mandatory texts for secondary schools: not on racist or eugenic grounds, but as a warning that an independent nation state is a value worth making sacrifices.

Even after the war – and even in Pavelić’s circle – these qualities of Pilar’s most important work were stressed, rather than those suggested by Bartulin as primary. Thus Marko Sinovčić, who was generally known among post-war émigrés as the ‘mouthpiece’ for Pavelić himself, stressed that the particular value of The South Slav Question lies in the fact that it dissected Serbian imperialism and demonstrated why Croatia and Serbia cannot live in the same state framework. The same assessment was made by Vjekoslav Vrančić, and the same thought

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207 For more, see T. Jonjić, “Politički pogledi dr. Ive Pilara 1918.-1933.”, p. 70.
208 Izbor najboljih svjetskih članaka, no. 2 (Zagreb, August 1944), pp. 12-16.
211 HDA, MNP, box 2, no. 2052/44 of 5 June 1944.
213 V. Vrančić, Branili smo Državu. Uspomene, osvrti i doživljaji, 2, Barcelona-Munich, 1985, p. 64.
was expressed by other Croatian émigré political writers: that this book is “epochal” for it “systematically reveals the Greater Serbian ideology and its aggressive intentions against the Croats.”214 But not all Ustasha approved of his arguments, and those who had originally belonged to the Catholic movement were particularly repulsed by Pilar’s religious and cultural views.215

Nobody said a word about races, eugenics or racism! Everyone – except Bartulin – comprehended the political motivations underlying Pilar’s writings.

Stated briefly, political, historical, geopolitical, sociological, religious/cultural and economic aspects played a much more prominent role in Pilar’s ideological system. This is also clearly indicated by Pilar’s intellectual activities under different circumstances. As the president of the Sociology Association in Zagreb, he dealt with these problems even after the First World War, but always for the purpose of unification of the Croatian lands and their independence in the state/legal sense.216

Even Pilar could not avoid eugenic themes, primarily because eugenics were exceptionally popular at that time.

Already at the end of the nineteenth century, the enforcement of measures began in the United States of America to infringe upon the human rights of persons suffering from various mental and psychosomatic ailments. The first measures were introduced in Connecticut, while in 1907 Indiana became the first state to enact a law stipulating the sterilization of criminals, rapists and the mentally ill. Between 1909 and 1930, as many as 33 states in the US enacted regulations on the sterilization of persons which were motivated by eugenic considerations. This may seem horrifying. However, its true dimensions are illustrated by the voting statistics in the state legislatures: such laws were passed by overwhelming majorities. Tens of thousands of people were forcefully sterilized, which, unfortunately and despite the terrifying experiences of the Hitler era, continued to be practiced even after World War II, and not only in the United States, but also in a number of Western European democracies and even in Australia.217 The adherents of this manner of “improving the human

215 For example, Dušan Žanko praised Pilar’s intention of proving the Croatian ethnicity of the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina: “This healthy thesis going back to Starčević’s time is very solidly treated such that I has never been refuted in Croatia, and it was even advocated by Šišić”. However, this thesis cannot be backed by the speculation about Bogomilism, as done by Südland (Pilar), in his “stupid anti-Roman and anticlerical standpoints” (D. Žanko, Srjedoci: izabrani eseji, prikazi, sjećanja, Barcelona-Munich, p. 248)
217 More in Newton Crane, Marriage Laws and Statutory Experiments in Eugenics in the United States, Reprinted from ”The Eugenics Review”, April, 1910, Eugenics Education Society (London,
species” included, for example, George Bernard Shaw, H. G. Wells, John Maynard Keynes, Winston Churchill and many others. It is not difficult to find examples in Nazi propaganda in which Hitler’s regime defended itself from criticism of its racial laws by pointing out that they had predecessors and like-thinkers in the United States and other (democratic) European states.

Anthropological and eugenic topics were so popular in the first half of the twentieth century that the Brazilian academic Tristan de Athayde, while paraphrasing the “father of eugenics” Francis Galton, pointed out that “anthropology” had become a “modern religion” and the “Gospel of the twentieth century”. It was written about both in and out of Croatia, and particular attention – and an exceptionally critical approach – to these teachings could be found among the Catholic writers and in Catholic periodicals (such as the Jesuit Život in Zagreb, or the Makarska-based Nova revija).

An uninformed reader may think that this “scientific” theory had been extinguished in May 1945. Unfortunately, it continued in theory and practice in states which call themselves democratic well into the twenty-first century. Even today it is defended by numerous “scientists”, although disguised in somewhat more sophisticated terminology than that used by Chamberlain, Galton, Haeckel and the German National Socialists. For example, in Sweden over 60,000 Swedes, among them 90 percent women, were sterilized between 1941 and 1975 based on eugenic reasoning.

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The racist mood and racist measures in the first decades of the twentieth century also had an impact on Croatian workers in West European countries, and especially in the United States, so that sociologist Dinko Tomašić dealt with this matter. This is why the topic could not be avoided by Pilar, even though it remained at the margins of his interests. This is why a few of his observations which reflect his interest in the corporatist organization of society and eugenics cannot be interpreted as Pilar’s acceptance of racialist theories nor his approval of the totalitarian movements of his time.

If Bartulin would like himself to be considered a scholar, a serious man, while arguing about Pilar’s political and sociological views, he would have to indicate that Pilar considered the Croats a Slavic nation throughout more than thirty years of his public activity. Actually, he was very thorough while working on matters of Slavic mythology and the pre-Christian beliefs of ancient Croats and Slavs in general, which is more then one can say about most of his contemporaries. And, while considering the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina as Croats, at the same time he considered Serbs as a nation which is most closely related to Croats. But, that view never stopped him from being one of the harshest critics of Serbian politics and one of the most avid adversaries of both the Yugoslav ideology and the Yugoslav state. That shows that his political views had nothing to do with racial, language or religion issues, since Pilar was convinced that national identification of an individual is determined by “internal sense of belonging”. Of course, Bartulin does not know anything about it, or he chooses simply to elide it, in order to make further mystifications possible.

In summary, the notions and convictions which Pilar, Truhelka, Lukas, etc. had about races and their qualities (regardless of whether or not these notions and convictions were correct) did not result in that which may be called their Croatian nationalism, rather – just the opposite – they attempted to uphold their national-political positions and convictions and possibly even implement them (or contribute thereto) using historiographic, archaeological, ethnographic, religious-cultural, linguistic and other arguments, including anthropological. Thus, Bartulin, adhering to a standard formula, proclaims effects causes and then continues to tilt at windmills!

Just as he falsely claims that I stated that anti-Yugoslav Croats showed no interest in racial issues, Bartulin also built up a new windmill: he claims that I wrote that the Croats are “exclusively a Western people”. In my text it is quite

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apparent that – while refuting Bartulin’s fabrication about the alleged Ustasha system of extolling barbarism – I was speaking of a series of writers who pointed out the Croatian Western tradition. In his duels against windmills, Bartulin is not even capable of seeing that in that same text I cited several Croatian politicians and writers who expressed bitterness over the West’s stance toward the Croatian nation. Even Nazor’s wretched verses about the Croats as the “progeny of wolves and lions” was a glove thrown at the feet of the West, not the East.

But Bartulin is unstoppable in his process of imagining windmills. He fabricates that in my text I claimed that the Croats have nothing to do with the Balkans. A nation which claims a territory that is by no means insignificant in what has been referred to as the Balkans over the past two centuries, cannot have nothing to do with the Balkans. And if Bartulin knew anything about the Rightist ideology, he would then at least know at the anecdotal level that one of Starčević’s most important discussions is called ‘The Eastern Question’ (*Istočno pitanje*) and that it deals precisely with the Balkans and the Balkan nations.

Perhaps he also stumbled onto the fact that the writers August Harambašić and Nikoš Kokotović, both otherwise born to the Orthodox faith, edited a journal called *Balkan*, and that history remembers them as Rightist leaders. If Bartulin knew something about the Ustasha ideology, then he would have noticed that in 1929 Pavelić wrote the already herein mentioned text “Establishment of the Croatian state, lasting peace in the Balkans”, with the title itself indicating that even he did not consider Croatia entirely separate and different from the Balkans.

The forward march of windmills in Bartulin’s mind never ceases.

He also claims that I proclaimed racial anthropology a quasi-scientific discipline.

He obviously has trouble understanding relatively simple texts, so he is incapable of noting that I never wrote a single word about racial anthropology, but rather proclaimed quasi-scientific certain assessments by Jovan Cvijić, and then also Dinko Tomašić. These are in fact two different things, are they not? Both of those men, by the way, cannot be seen as synonymous with racial anthropology: Cvijić was first and foremost a geographer, while Tomašić was a sociologist.

I have truly never dealt with racial issues as such, because I believe nations are a political and not biological category, so – to make a football comparison – I draw absolutely no distinction in value or in national-political sense be-

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227 Ibid., p. 230.
between Zvonimir Boban, Džemal Mustedanagić, Milan Rapajić and Eduardo da Silva. By the same token, I believe racial issues in the formulation of the ideologies of Croatian nationalism (including Ustasha ideological eclecticism) were and remain of peripheral importance.

However, if I had bothered to define my own view of racial anthropology, I would have doubtless assessed that this discipline – not in the sense of studying, e.g., the differences between the skin pigmentation of the Bushmen and Icelanders, but in the sense of teaching about the differing value of human races and racist interpretations of history – is a quasi-scientific theory. For I hold the view that science/scholarship cannot be separated from an ethical foundation, so in this regard I believe that anything amoral or immoral cannot be science, even though such may constitute its abuse. Thus, I consider the theories of Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Francis Galton, Ernst Haeckel and similar thinkers an abuse of science, the consequence of which we have seen in the hundreds of thousands of people in the so-called democratic countries and in Hitler’s Third Reich who were sterilized, locked into psychiatric hospitals and concentration camps or simply killed on behalf of human “progress” and “improvement of racial qualities”.

I do not prevent Bartulin from believing that these mass crimes were based on scientific foundations, but I am appalled by his arguments. For he believes that this is science simply because at the time it was generally accepted (“in the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century there was nothing ‘quasi-scientific’ about racial anthropology at all”).

Thus, Bartulin sees science as what the majority considers scientific. This scientific logic is fascinating! For centuries women were burned as witches, and this was deemed scientifically provable. Does Bartulin think that these convictions and sentences had merit because of the generally accepted belief that these women consorted with the devil? For a long time, millions of Europeans did not eat potatoes, because they believed this plant’s tubers were inedible. Does Bartulin then accept the belief that potatoes were only useful as a decorative plant as scientific? For quite a few centuries, the world’s greatest intellects believed that the world was flat. Does the scholar Bartulin therefore deem this opinion was scientific? Or does he simply want to demonstrate the value of his own scholarly work to readers?

And in the stance that racial anthropology understood in this fashion is a quasi-scientific discipline, I generally concur with the conclusion accepted by Hrvatska enciklopedija in the NDH period as shown above in the text by Zarnik: that “racist efforts have no foundation in the science of races”.230 I will even accept the risk of having Bartulin suddenly accuse me of being Zarnik’s adherent, for he accuses me of writing things I did not, so why would he not

find some way of confabulating an accusation based on something I did, in fact, write down? I know that it will be of no help either to myself or Hrvatska enciklopedija in his forays against windmills that almost exactly the same assessment of racism was present in the Yugoslav encyclopaedistics.231

Nevertheless, in the context of this debate, I believe it noteworthy that an entirely identical position was advocated in the school and university textbooks used in the NDH, which conferred the highest state honours to books which advocated the view that all people are of equal value, regardless of racial, national, religious or any other differences.232 In this vein, even beginner-level schoolchildren had to learn these verses by rote: “Oh my dear God, / I humbly pray to thee; / teach me how / to love all men...”233 However, at the same time this state passed a series of differently intoned legal decrees, and not a small portion of its apparatus participated in the implementation of such discriminatory provisions.

Therefore, the true question is one which Bartulin avoids: why did this happen, what are the causes and what were the consequences?

How was it possible – to use just one example – that Budak, as education minister who made a series of anti-Jewish statements, declined the proposal to publish a state-funded grammar of the Gypsy (Roma) language in 1941, but not because it was contrary to “racial decrees” in force, but by saying that he had more important tasks so that this grammar could wait a year or two?234 Why did Budak refer to a lack of revenues rather than legal provisions contained in racial legislation, and why did it never occur to him to undertake any action against the individual who proposed the publication of a Gypsy language grammar? Why did it not occur to him that such a proposal did not comply with precisely the one from the “racial decrees” he co-signed himself? Does this say anything about the reasons why he co-signed it, and the circumstances under which he did so?

These are questions worth asking, even if no certain answers to them can be found as this moment.

231 In it, racial theory is described as “a pseudo-scientific social and polit.[ical] ‘theory’ based on a value differentiation of races (...) and the assertion that biological racial qualities exclusively dictate the cult.[ural] and hist.[orical] mission of individual nations” (Enciklopedija Leksikografskog zavoda, 6, “Perfekt-Sindhi”, Zagreb: Jugoslavenski leksikografski zavod, 1962, pp. 352-353).

232 Space here does not allow a list of all of these textbooks, but interested and objective readers can easily verify my statement even by a perfunctory overview of primary and secondary school textbooks, and the mandatory textbooks used in the university departments of medicine, philosophy and law.

233 In the original: “O moj Bože dragi, / malen ti se molim; / pouči me, kako / da sve ljude volim...” (Moj dom. Početnica i čitanka za I. godište pučkih škola u Nezavisnoj Državi Hrvatskoj, Zagreb, 1941, p. 88).

234 HDA, Osobni fond Mile Budaka [Mile Budak personal papers], bx. 1, vol.. 3, no. 147.
In other words, it is entirely clear that Bartulin’s constructs stand on flimsy legs.

And his approach to a serious topic is illustrated by the defence he offers when forced to acknowledge that I was correct when I pointed out that the words “We are the progeny of wolves and lions” was not a phrase from Ustasha propaganda, but rather a verse by Vladimir Nazor. Bartulin defends himself by saying that he is not “a historian of Croatian literature and do not claim expertise on the subject of the use of literary metaphors by Croatian poets and writers”.

This clumsy response is not fit for a scholar and highlights a minimum of three sad facts.

First, not only is Bartulin not an expert in Croatian literature, he does not even have an rudimentary knowledge of the subject. For as I showed in my review of his article, Nazor’s verses are not some exotic detail from the margins of Croatian literature, they are rather included in every school primer, and due to their programmatic character, they were often cited and used as a political slogan and catchphrase. They are not, therefore, solely a literary but also a political fact. In other words, for an intellectual, particularly one in the humanist disciplines, and especially a historian, to be unaware of them is actually an affront.

Second, only Bartulin himself may – after being forced to do so – acknowledge that he is not an expert in Croatian literature (and that he even need not be!), but despite this he still wants to engage in a debate on Croatian culture, and even state in the title to his reply that he is debating Croatian culture in the 1900-1945 period. For only Bartulin can believe that literature is not a part of culture.

And third, and worst of all, this indicates Bartulin’s silent acknowledgement that he believes one may write about Croatian political and cultural-political history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries without knowledge of the Croatian arts, and Croatian literature in particular. This admission is shocking and by itself demonstrates why Bartulin’s texts cannot be classified as scholarship, but rather attempts to write politically correct pamphlets whereby the author intends to achieve some other objectives.

Namely, it is simply impossible to write about topics during the period between 1815 and 1945 without a firm grasp of Croatian art and literature, since the vast majority of Croatian politicians and political ideologues more or less successfully engaged in artistic or literary activity during that era. Such work was an integral component of their social and political activity, and they used it to formulate their own ideological/political views, and also to popularize them. I can count major Croatian political leaders and ideologues who were not also poets and/or prose writers on the fingers of one hand.

235 T. Jonjić, “From Bias to Erroneous Conclusions”.
236 The same applies to the preceding period, when writers assumed the role of national ideologues or when national ideologues tried their hand at writing. The examples of Marko Marulić,
T. JONJIĆ, Bartulin’s Tilting at Windmills: Manipulation as a Historiographic Method

Literary work was, for example, produced by Pavao Ritter Vitezović (1652-1713), Fr. Andrija Dorotić (1761-1837) and Maksimilijan Vrhovac (1752-1827). During the period of the Croatian national awakening, it was actually impossible to draw a clear line between the political and cultural/artistic dimensions of the activity of Croatian public activists, since their literary and political activities constituted an organic whole: the national and literary awakenings were two dimensions of the same movement.237 The writers included: Janko Drašković (1770-1856), Antun Mihanović (1796-1861), Pavao Štoos (1806-1862), Šime Starčević (1784-1859), Ljudevit Gaj (1809-1872), Ante Kuzmančić (1807-1879), Mirko Bogović (1816-1893), Ivan Kukuljević Sakcinski (1816-1889), Ivan Franjo Jukić (1818-1857), Grga Martić (1822-1905), Ivan Mažuranić (1814-1890), Ljudevit Vukotinović (1813-1893), etc. Literature was also a serious and rather successful preoccupation of Ante Starčević, the founder of the Party of Rights, the Father of the Homeland, while the leaders of the Croatian national awakening in Dalmatia, Fr. Mihovil Pavlinović (1831-1887) and Nadko Nodilo (1834-1912), also tried their hand at literature. Safvet beg-Bašagić (1870-1934) entered public life through literature, and literary work was also produced by the leaders of the Croatian national awakening in Istria: Bishop Juraj Dobrila (1812-1882), Matko Lagicja (1852-1930), Matko Baštijan (1828-1885), Vjekoslav Spinčić (1848-1933) and others.

At the end of the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries, an important role in Croatian political life was played by literary giants. Ivan Mažuranić served as ban (vicerey), Eugen Kumičić (1850-1904) was a deputy in Croatian Parliament (Sabor) for many years, and for a time he was also chairman of the Pure Party of Rights. The respected prosaist Ksaver Šandor Gjalski (1854-1935) was a deputy in both the Croatian parliament and the Hungary assembly, and grand prefect of Zagreb County and also a member of the Provisional People’s Representation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Vladimir Nazor (1876-1949) died while serving as a high official of the Yugoslav communist regime, i.e., chairman of the Presidium of the Sabor (Parliament) of the People’s Republic of Croatia. Croatian political life would have been unthinkable without the Rightist men of letters such as Ante Kovačić

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Ivan Gundulić, Petar Zrinski, Fr. Filip Grabovac, Fr. Andrija Kačić Miošić and others speak clearly to this point. Even after the Second World War, Croatian writers assumed the role of defenders of the national interest, advocating them in their works or in the newspapers and magazines they edited. Among the most important phenomena of Croatian political history in 1945-1990 is undoubtedly the appearance of the “circle” generation in literature in the 1950s, the publication of periodicals Hrvatski književni list in 1968-1969 (launched and edited by writer Zlatko Tomičić), Kritika (edited by writer Vlatko Pavletić), Hrvatski tjednik (edited by writers Igor Zidić and Vlado Gotovac), etc.

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(1854-1899), August Harambašić (1861-1911) and Silvije Strahimir Kranjčević (1865-1908), and particularly without Antun Gustav Matoš (1873-1914) and the entire constellation of his admirers and literary descendents. Some of them would become ideologues of integral Yugoslavism, such as Vladimir Čerina and, briefly, Tin Ujević, while others – such as Mile Budak – assumed high posts in the Ustasha movement.

The leaders and ideologues of the Croatian Catholic movement were also writers (such as Petar Grgec), while on the opposite side the leading positions were again occupied by writers (such as Milan Marjanović). In something of a Croatian version of the Kulturkampf which was waged at the turn of the nineteenth into the twentieth century, known as a conflict between the “elderly” and “youth”, an exceptionally important role was played by one of the founders, and main ideologue, of the Croatian People’s Peasant Party, Antun Radić (1868-1919), as well as almost all of the authors mentioned in Bartulin’s own text.

To be sure, they are remembered much more for their aesthetic/philosophical and political views than their literature, but their literary output was an integral component of their ideological systems. Historian, politician and ideologue Milan Šuffl ay (1879-1931) wrote a number of literary works, even the first Croatian futurist novel. Ustasha leader Ante Pavelić also dabbled in literature (besides a number of sketches, he wrote a novel on the assassination of Yugoslav King Alexander in Marseille), wherein he was not considered untalented by literary critics. While he was later best known as the most vocal proponent of the Gothic origin of the Croats, Catholic priest Kerubin Šegvić (1867-1945) thundered against modernism and liberalism in literature and the arts (and based on similar positions, in 1933 he launched and initially edited the journal Hrvatska smotra). Literary novice Ivo Pilar (1874-1933) imposed himself as the ideologue of modernist trends with his study entitled Secesija. The promoters of modernist tendencies also included painter and writer Iso Kršnjavi (1845-1927), a deputy in the Croatian Parliament and departmental head of religion and education in the government of Ban Károly Khuen-Héderváry, and later a fierce Frankist who was retired soon after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

Besides expressing their own aesthetic, ethical and national-political views in their works, many of these writers also edited newspapers, magazines and reviews which played crucial role in forming Croatian public and political life. As a numerically small, relatively poor and unfree nation, until the most recent period in the history the Croats did not have separate scholarly journals, rather they published literary, popular and scholarly texts in the same publications.

I shall herein mention only a few of these magazines: Ante Starčević edited and contributed with a not insignificant amount to the pages of Never; in the period leading up to the First World War, Ante Tresić Pavičić edited Novi viek, Milivoj Dežman Ivanov launched Mladost, and then Život, while in 1903 he took over Vienac with Gjalski. Between the two World Wars he served as direc-
tor of Obzor, the most influential daily newspaper in Croatia. Branko Drechsler Vodnik edited Nova Hrvatska, Čerina edited Val and Vihor, while Branimir Livadić held the top post in Savremenik for roughly ten years. Karlo Häusler edited Sutla, Milan Marjanović Zvono, Jug and Književne novosti, Petar Grđec edited Hrvatska prosvjeta, Ljubomir Maraković edited Luč, Zvonimir Vukelić edited Hrvatska smotra, Mile Budak and Josip Matasović edited Mlada Hrvatska, while between the World Wars Budak also edited the bulletins of the Croatian Party of Rights (Hrvatska misao, Hrvatsko pravo). Kranjčević was the actual editor of the Sarajevo-based Nada, Krešimir Kovačić began editing Grabancijaš, Ljubo Wiesner edited Hrvatska mlada lirika, and then Grič. Miroslav Krleža and August Cesarec launched the Marxist (communist) Plamen in 1919. Several years later, Krleža headed Književna republika, while in 1934 he launched, together with Milan Bogdanović, Danas. On the eve of the Second World War, he launched Pečat with a group of adherents.

Most of leading personalities in culture and propaganda during the time of the NDH were also writers and artists. The respected and influential writer Mile Budak, who was undoubtedly the best known leader of the Ustasha movement after Ante Pavelić, launched and edited the weekly newspaper Hrvatski narod in 1939, which became a daily during the time of the NDH. For a considerable period its editor was Matija Kovačić, who then became the director general of propaganda. During the interwar years, Kovačić edited the Osijek-based newspaper Hrvatski list, and he also tried his hand at literary and theatrical criticism. Writer Jure Pavičić (1906-1946) was the general manager of the Croatian State Printing Press. The editorial board of Hrvatski narod included the rather well-respected writer Ivo Lendić, earlier the editor of Hrvatska straža, as well as a series of lesser known prose writers. The editorial board of the Croatian encyclopaedia remained in the hands of writer and literary historian Mate Ujević, the former editor of Luč, and he also assumed the top post in HIBZ, the most powerful publishing company in the state. Dušan Žanko, the intendant of the Croatian State Theatre, served as editor Hrvatska smotra for a time just before the war. Croatian writer Alija Nametak (1906-1987) edited Novi behar, Glasnik Islamske vjerske zajednice and Kalendarr Narodne uzdanice before the war, and after the proclamation of the NDH he was appointed commissioner of the Croatian State Theatre in Sarajevo. That theatre’s intendant was writer Ahmed Muradbegović (1898-1972), who also contributed to the Sarajevo newspaper Hrvatska misao. After writer Blaž Jurišić, the post of editor of Hrvatska revija during the NDH was assumed by writers Marko Ćović, Branimir Livadić and Olinko Delorko, while the German-Croatian paper Suradnja was edited by writer Ljubo Wiesner...

In other words, without knowledge of Croatian literature, it is impossible to discuss not only Croatian culture, but also Croatian politics. For one cannot comprehend Rightist thought without Kumičić’s glorification of the cult of Zrinski and Frankopan, nor can one begin to grasp the Rightist attitude toward the Muslims without Kovačić’s parody Smrt babe Čengiškinje (The Death
of Granny Čengić) and the Rightist condemnation of this otherwise highly praised epic poem by Mažuranić, who was about as concerned with the historical truth as Bartulin, and who succeeded brilliantly not only because of his artistic skills, but also because of the traditional anti-Ottoman feeling which, primarily in Yugoslav-oriented circles, generally grew into an anti-Muslim animosity. Someone who is unfamiliar with the articles and feuilletons by Matoš cannot seriously write about Josip Frank, nor can one comprehend the factional splits among the Rightists without knowledge of Tin Ujević, Krešimir Kovačić and Vladimir Čerina on one side, and Budak on the other. The development of the Yugoslav communist movement cannot be analyzed without insight into the so-called conflict on the literary left, and so forth.

That Nevenko Bartulin thinks differently only demonstrates his very flexible definition of the term “intellectual” and the fact that he – with a considerable dose of smug self-assurance – considers himself a scholar. I sincerely pity those who share this opinion. However, as a Christian, I shall conclude on a note of mercy: those previously mentioned verses which I fear, with apparent good reason, Bartulin would recognize as echoing the works of Hitler and Rosenberg were written by Croatian poet Petar Preradović (1818-1872), and published in 1841, exactly one hundred years prior to the proclamation of the NDH. Bartulin, after all, says that he does “not claim expertise” on Croatian literature, so it is only Christian to point this out to him and spare him the trouble of building some new edifice. For his time is valuable, and the plains of La Mancha are vast. And there are so many of those windmills...

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**BARTULINS KAMPF GEGEN WINDMÜHLEN: MANIPULATION ALS HISTORIOGRAPHISCHE METHODE**

**Zusammenfassung**

In seiner polemischen Antwort auf die in diesem Heft veröffentlichte Replik des Nevenko Bartulin auf seine kurze Notiz die im Jahr 2010 erschien, behauptet der Autor, dass Bartulin und seine Beiträge sehr schwerlich als wissenschaftlich zu bezeichnen sind. Sie sind mehr ein Versuch, eine neue Version der kroatischen Geschichte im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, ohne Rücksicht...

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238 “...Ovdje divlje čete smrvi / Rod naš čil i zdrav, / Hrvatskom se ovdje krvi / Spasi Zapad sav” (“...Here our people vigorous and strong / Pulverized the wild hordes, / By the blood of Croats / The entire West is saved”) (Petar Preradović, “Na Grobniku”. Djela Petra Preradovića. Prvo potpuno i kritično izdanje, I. knjiga. Compiled by Branko Vodnik (Zagreb, 1918), pp. 146-148.)
auf Tatsachen und Quellen, auf politisch korrekte Weise zu formulieren und
den abstrakten postmodernen, in Wirklichkeit aber erkennbaren ideologi-
schen Modellen anzupassen, die von den selbsternannten, fast ausschliesslich
ausländischen Experten ausgebaut sind, die die politische und kulturelle Ge-
schichte des kroatischen und der Nachbarvölkern nur oberflächenlich kennen.
Seine Behauptung, Bartulin hat gleich wie seine Vorbilder eine sehr ausgepräg-
te Neigung die Faktographie zu ignorieren, illustriert der Autor mit einer do-
kumentierten Liste von mehr als sechzig Fehler die sein polemischer Gegner
auf etwa 19 Seiten seines Beitrags gemacht hat. Daraus schliesst er, dass die
historiographische Interpretation des Nevenko Bartulin, der durchschnittlich
drei faktographische Fehler pro einer Textseite macht, ist selbstverständlich
nicht zu ernst zu nehmen.

Dazu kommt, dass Bartulin auch in seiner Replik die Abhandlung über die
Kernfragen des Disputs vermeidet: seine Abneigung gegenüber Urkunden und
gleichzeitig seine Neigung, die anderen historischen Quellen zu fragmentieren
und die selektiv gewählten Bruchstücken ausser dem historischen Kontext zu
betrachten, weiterhin die seit langem festgestellten und dokumentierten Tatsa-
chen zu ignorieren und gleichzeitig dem Andersdenkenden die Gedanken und
Thesen zu imputieren, die dieser weder gesagt noch geschrieben hat, um gegen
diesen ersonnenen Konstruktionen ähnlich wie Don Quijote gegen Wind-
mühlen stürmen zu können. Solche erdachte Vorwürfe zeigen aber, dass ihr
Erfinder sehr mangelhafte Kenntnisse über die kroatische kulturelle und politi-
sche Geschichte hat. Dadurch kann man erklären, dass Bartulin immer wieder
die gleichen Thesen recyclet und die gleichen Fussnoten und Anmerkungen
wiederholt. Das ist leicht festzustellen, wenn man seinen Artikel aus dem Jahr
2009, der mit dieser Polemik nichts zu tun hat, mit seiner hiesigen Replik ver-
gleicht.

Obwohl das Verhältniss der kroatischen Intelligenz aus dem 19. and der
ersten Hälfte der 20. Jahrhunderts gegenüber Rassenlehre in Autors Notiz über
Bartulins Beitrag überhaupt nicht erwähnt war, nimmt der Autor in seiner
Antwort die Herausforderung an. Er behauptet, dass die Ideologen des kroati-
schen Nationalismus dieser Zeit selbstverständlich in Berührung mit diesen
Themen gekommen sind, da über sie das ganze Europa debattiert hat. Jedoch
hatten die Rassenlehre, Eugenik und Sozialdarwinismus keine wichtige Rolle
bei Gestaltung der Ideologie des kroatischen Nationalismus, da alle seine rele-
vante Vorkämpfer nicht nur die kroatische Nation sondern das kroatische Volk
selbst als eine politische und nicht als eine rassische oder religiöse Formation
betrachteten. Im Gegensatz zu denen machten die jugoslawisch orientierte
Ideologen viel mehr Gebrauch von der Rassenlehre, da Jugoslawismus nicht
nur ein Rassenkonzept beinhaltet sondern in Wirklichkeit eine rassistische
Grundlage hatte.