On Husserl's Early Logic of Intersubjectivity

DINO GALETTI
Faculty of Humanities, University of Johannesburg, Auckland Park (Kingsway Campus), South Africa
dgaletti@uj.ac.za

ABSTRACT: Our article seeks to demonstrate that Husserl’s approach to intersubjectivity in his First Investigation of 1901/1913 was rigorous rather than rash. To do so, it applies a combination of intentionality and whole-part logic that has been overlooked in Husserl study. It therefore starts from Husserl’s Prolegomena of 1901 to follow his normative phenomenology until it excludes knowledge of another’s consciousness, then unpacks how he does so by his “proofs” in his 1913 Third Investigation (also considering his 1901 version), to apply those results to his First Investigation. The outcomes might demonstrate an unexpected rigour in Husserl’s early address to intersubjectivity, and even support a novel logic that considers alterity.

KEYWORDS: Alterity, First Investigation, Husserl, intersubjectivity, Prolegomena, Third Investigation, whole-part.

It has been argued famously and often that Husserl’s treatment of indication in his First Investigation too-hastily excluded other consciousnesses. Yet maybe his rigour was barely appreciated, for a solid reason – he employed a logic that has largely gone unmapped. Notably, Husserl in 1913 stressed that the whole-part logic of his Third Investigation was an “essential presupposition” for his Logische Untersuchungen.¹ Yet until recently, readers of that Third Investigation considered it as mathematical, hence separate from consciousness, intentionality and even phenomenology.² We follow how an objective

¹ Cf. also Husserl’s Ideen I (henceforth ID) §15 35 fn. 1. Husserl’s works are referenced from the German, by abbreviation, page/line number and year of revision where relevant.
² Smith et al (1982); Fine (1995). As to phenomenologists, Sokolowski treated only “moments” as interesting (1968: 537); we first consider “pieces” too. Seebohm applies Husserl’s whole-part logic well to hermeneutics (2004: 169–177; 182); we also consider intentionality. V. our fn. 20 on Costello’s application to intersubjectivity.
and normative intentionality developed in Husserl’s *Prolegomena* intersects with hierarchical logic from his Third Investigation in the task that Husserl calls ‘phenomenology’ – and an important early collision is between the sign and intersubjectivity in the First Investigation. Husserl’s Third Investigation systematically combines with that progression, to render his treatment of intersubjectivity a rigorous result that defines the early path of phenomenology. That path will not be easy – but then, Husserl’s work was difficult, and he requested that it be engaged with in this fashion, and at this level.

**PROLEGOMENA**

i. Normativity without intersubjectivity

Husserl develops phenomenology from a “system” – by “interconnections” according to “law” – in linear fashion from his *Prolegomena* (*Prolegomena zur Reinen Logik* (henceforth *PR*), §6 30/30 ff.). He begins from certainty of content in consciousness. Evidence arises from insight into experience (*Erfahrung*) of empirical content (*PR* §24 86/16). Consciousness demands to know its object, to reject what “is not” in favor of what “is” (a basis for bivalence) (*PR* §6 28/17). It thus seeks knowledge of truth without a possibility of doubt, instilling a “necessity” to know a limit without “inadequacy”, which telos Husserl also called “absolute” (*PR* §2 14; §6 30/4). That necessity had its corresponding logical form “$S$ is $P$” (*PR* §6 30/3 ff.). “We” must first predicate of evident content prior to judgment of the logical subject ($S$). Yet evidence alone holds as “trivial”, providing no insight besides certainty. We require logical grounds to exceed evidence (*PR* §32/4–6, 18), which first require norms (*PR* §11 40/32 ff.; *PR* §14).

Notice Husserl’s “we”; from the outset, he uncritically assumed a certain intersubjectivity, without including it into his logic. Necessity began as not quite logical, correspondent to the logical form. Indeed, “should” (*sollen*) has both a normative and propositional sense, permitting a demand that propositions ground judgment, but not yet that they logically ground truth (cf. *PR* §39 139/10–12). Just so, “should” implies “must” (*müssen*). “$S$ is $P$” first takes the particular form “$A$ should be $B$”, or its equivalent “$A$ must be $B$”. As originary value judgments (a binary equi-valence) (*PR* §14 53/23), negative statements of the form “should not” ought not yet to be taken as negations in the form of denial, yet allow the exclusive disjunct. These allow bivalence.

---

3 Embree recently put it that Husserl proceeded from an uncritical intersubjective “we” to an egological reduction to “I”, then a primordial reduction, in turn restoring a reduced intersubjectivity (2010: 37–47). We begin from an uncritical “we”, to assess Husserl’s progress from 1900 to his consideration of intersubjectivity prior to his reductions.
prior to blind belief in truth or falsity (PR §7 §14 55/57 ff.). Progress toward the telos first has the form “A should or should not be B” (PR §14 54/27 ff.) (that bivalence will guide Husserl’s approach).

Indeed, consciousness of something with the “content” of a value gives rise to intentionality as normative (PR §14 56/16). The latter has its object of which it is conscious, a correlate of something. As that intentional object springs up as an originary correlate, the normative “must” moves toward epistemological necessity. Yet Husserl’s intentionality precludes psychological necessity – aligned with empiricism – which “felt compulsion” applies even when judgments are false. By that exclusion from bivalence, only logical necessity should let consciousness know the object absolutely in any case, without hinging upon (unabhängig) whether ’anyone’ demands it be so.4 Husserl avoids the requirement that a ground be psychological in anyone at all. His 1900 basis separated his logical and intentional approach from psychology, by beginning to avoid intersubjective foundation.

**ii. Logic without minds**

Having separated psychological subjective necessity from normative and subjective demand for a ground for judgment,5 Husserl distinguishes objectivity from a logical ground for truth (PR §39 139–140). Not yet requiring truth, the normative proposition has the right to demand a ground according to law (PR §39 139/27; 140/14). Law thus gains objective equivalence (Gleichwertigkeit), instilling a demand for truth from the proposition according to law. “It is necessary” keeps its “two-fold” concept as a (normative) demand for consciousness of the necessity of law (apodictic necessity) and an objective correlate (PR §39 140/19). Husserl makes the latter the objective “side” of normativity. As noted, even the object evolved from normative evidence and a value-content (thus not yet empirical). That allows demand for a ground for the truth of a “pure” logical proposition, provided that proposition has sense (Sinn) (PR §39 140/22–28).

Husserl thus considers laws pertaining to objective purity (PR §50 186/4 ff.), adding the general (Allgemeinen), aligned with law, particular (aligned with objective content), and individual (a particular content distinguished by an intention). Pure laws (e.g. Contradiction) hold in general, and their contents as objective are “pure” too, allowing pure logic. In turn, he con-

---

4 As to “the original sense [der ursprüngliche Sinn] of ‘shall’ or ‘should’ [Sollen] […] [a]s we speak in a wider sense of a demand, where there is no one who demands, and perhaps no one on whom demand is made, so we frequently speak of a ‘shall’ or a ‘should’ without dependence on [unabhängig] anyone’s [jemanden] wishing or willing” (PR §14/23–30, our emphasis).

5 Bracketed Latin numerals denote cross-references within our essay.
siders psychological temporality by addressing Lange (2011), for whom contradiction has a “double status” between “normal laws” and “natural laws”. One might think Husserl’s normativity aligns with that stance, but he rejects Lange’s approach as it derives merely from “intuition of space” (Raumanschauung) (Lange 2011: 130; in PR §28 102). The Contradiction of pure logic, holding in general, pertains to individuals in “different times and acts”. It does not concern those judgments of contradiction of individuals in “one and the same time and act” (PR §28 106/16–19), which Husserl aligns to psychological affirmations of contradiction having empirical content. The latter concern

only normal individual minds; for everyday experience does not say anything [nichts ausagen] about abnormal minds (PR §28 104/35–37).

Nor do Husserl’s pure laws say anything about normal or abnormal minds either. They concern logical norms for judgment in consciousness, across different times and places, hence no longer via a psychological sense of the spatial. Husserl has allowed logic to address pure objective content without concern for empirical intersubjectivity, provided that it considers different logically temporal acts.

### iii. Phenomenology as task without intersubjectivity

Even so, one might suspect Husserl’s temporality still allows psychologism. He deems rather that his bases stay pure insofar as they proceed via the “same sort of process” of transformation applied to empirical cases, but as an “equivalent” and corresponding form (PR §5 186/4). Husserl makes his principle of correspondence obvious, which permits spatiality to correspond to extension (PR §40 147/25). Starting from a demand to judge of individuals across different times requires pure law to hold as logically a priori, without regard to psychological temporality in this here and now. Husserl thus requires empirical content to correspond to a pure content as temporal extension. He will only prove that in his Third Investigation (xii). We begin that systematic progression.

So far, that judgments and their psychological necessity in individual times can be false signals the necessity of timeless, general, and a priori logic, which laws hold as essentially teleological (PR §43 168/29–30). Husserl has developed his logical basis for essentialism. Such essences (Ideas) must be approached by “going back” to the ideal basis that must delimit the possibilities of the sense of propositions in general.

He stays on the side of judgment (also deemed “inner”), hence even the right to a ground requires a prior ground. It seeks “conditions of possibility”,
by which a ground is justified (berechtig) (PR §66 243/24). Such essences are
deducible “in front of” consciousness, in address to the concept. Such an
outer object would still be addressed as inner, allowing enquiry by means of
the objective content to go even further “back” to investigate the grounds of
the “origin” in consciousness of a priori essences. Such grounds hold as condi-
tions of possibility for pure and a priori law (PR §67 246/4ff.). That situates
even his “proposition” a priori. Implicitly, “$S$ is necessarily $P$” in its equivocal
senses (i) implies “$S$ is possibly $P$” (“possible” is a correlate of “can”). We thus
define a priori laws as laws that permit what propositions about an object must
and can have sense a priori. Should that sense be disqualified by law, a priori
laws permit the negation of necessity and possibility, thus the logical im-
possibility of sense a priori. To seek conditions for justification, intentionality can
make any content that has sense in front of it “objective”, even the pure object
and its correlative relations to pure law (the pure concept). Evidence of a con-
tent – i.e. a pure value content – as “object” requires the idea of an Object,
something requires Something, relation requires Relation, etc. Husserl calls
those his “objective categories” (PR §67 245/2ff.). As Husserl has moved to
his requirement for objective treatment of a priori categories, that concern is
deemed “epistemological”. He requires ground for the corresponding sense of
a priori truth) (cf. PR §65 240/10). The essential grounds (Wesensgründen) of
the origin of these categories must be investigated, so their content requires a
ground to permit their essences to be brought toward adequacy as truth with-
out doubt (absolute truth) (Logische Untersuchungen henceforth LU then
Investigation number), Einleitung, §2 9/31). Only at that juncture – in his
‘Einleitung’ to his Logische Untersuchungen – does Husserl deem such a telos
“phenomenological”, and his epistemological demand instils a
great task … [that of bringing] the Ideas of logic, the logical concepts and laws,
to epistemological clarity and definiteness. (Ib. Id.)

‘Phenomenology’ names that great task of finding grounds in propo-
sitions to clarify ‘a priori laws’ from objective categories. Husserl reaches
his First Investigation, which has been set its task: to prepare for phenome-
nology.

In doing so, he will disqualify the possibility and also the necessity of
intersubjectivity from the start. Why? We first summarise that disqualifica-

Initial address to the First Investigation

Famously, to that telos of phenomenology Husserl adds communication, the
“grammatical side” of logical experience, as signification. That too holds ac-
cording to a priori law, and to assess its “essential logical distinctions”, Hus-
serl explains that the sign has a “double sense”: indication and expression (LU 1 §1). Both have sense, yet only expressions can be meaningful (bedeutsamen) (LU 1 §1 31/6), whether intended to communicate to another person or not (LU 1 §5 37/21 ff.).

We consider introductory whole-part bases. First, Husserl makes any object into a ‘content’, corresponding to a predicate $P$. Just as an object appears as singular, it is correspondingly particular. So – as per above – a part is a correlate of an object, implying a pure and a priori part. Essentially, parts require to be ‘founded’ by wholes, so “Whole” is a category too. Yet one should be precise: whole-part logic could only arise after the advent of Husserl’s phenomenology as clarification of the a priori, hence after the objective approach in his Prolegomena. The “Whole” founds a pure part, so is no longer an ‘objective category’ (cf. PR §67). As a priori investigation alone, “no reference back to consciousness is therefore needed” (LU 1 §5 240/5). One should be cautious, however: objectification is still possible, so consciousness and intentionality are implicit, rather than set aside. Indeed, Husserl will define the whole “exactly” as a range of contents all “covered” (umspannt) by one foundation without further contents – but he has yet to work out that basis upon extension, and will do so via objects (xii) (LU 3 §21 282/8–10; LU 3 §§14; 13). So far, he divides pure parts into two sorts of a priori: non-independent (moments) or independent (pieces). Pure contents correspond to sensible contents as real (real) or actual (wirklich), respectively: predicated as having empirical sense, or also sense of existence in the natural world (LU 3 Einleitung 227/4–8). Those require insight into the evidence of their experience to be perceived, but also a ground for the truth of that perception. By formal law, a moment cannot exist as separate from its whole, it can only exist as an abstractum (colour is a moment of extension). Hence a moment cannot be varied without affecting its whole (varying colour affects the colour of the extension of the whole). Yet an independent part “often can exist” separately from its whole, as a ‘piece’ or concretum.6 As noted, temporality still needs to be justified (xii); so far, even statically a piece in some cases also can exist as a moment (a head can exist as a piece, or be a part of a body), a concretus can also be an abstractus, as only “relatively independent”. Hence a relatively independent part “in some other relation, could have been a case of non-independence”. Such a piece can also be “separated”, so can be differentiated from moments, and relatively independent relative to other wholes. A piece can thus be part of a second or more wholes, which are not the first whole (a head can be situated in my visual field even without a body, and my visual

---

6 Husserl adds in 1913, allowing for temporality: “[W]e can say, namely as to relationship of independent parts: a part often can exist without a whole whose part it is.” (LU 3 §11 257/21–22)
field is not a body. In such relation, a head is not founded by a Body). Finally, corresponding to Whole-Part hierarchy, Husserl hierarchises material content according to Genus and Species (for instance, ‘Colour’ and ‘Red’).

Thus as to the two senses of the sign (that they are senses henceforth holds implicitly), they are unified into the whole sense of a sign. In turn, an expression can be “separated” thus can be “differentiated” (unterschieden) from indications – so can also be a piece of Indication (LU 1 §5 37/13–14). The latter founding whole Husserl treats as a Genus (LU 1 §5 37/12). He thus treats expression as relatively independent. Hence, following his bivalence, insofar as the expression exists as different and thus distinct from the indication, indications do not hold as meaningful: “to mean is not a Genus of being a sign in the sense of Indication” (LU 1 §1, 30/24, our emphases).

It follows that expression can have further foundation. As a piece of the sign “Indication”, it also holds as a corresponding part of speech, thus founded by Speech:

- each instance or part of Speech [Redeteil], as also each sign that is essentially of the same sort, shall count as an expression (LU 1 §§ 37/21, our emphases).

Expressions as “instances” are contents founded by and thus moments of Speech, whereas indications are not. Expressions as moments cannot be altered without affecting speech, but as pieces they can be altered without affecting whether they communicate.

So too are any contents of expression that comprise a sign founded in that fashion (supra). We can consider intersubjectivity: for expressions might or might not be communicative, but involuntary signs such as facial movements in the visual field are not aimed to communicate, so they stay indications without meaning “in the pregnant sense” (which phrase expresses the perfect evidence that “S is P”, hence that an indication is truly founded on a whole). Such movements “mean” only as expressions in the sense of indicating (LU 1 §6 38/7).

So one might expect that expression, as part of Speech, must function as the only means to communicate to others. Yet it turns out that all expressions in communication function as indications (LU 1 §7 40/2). Husserl is averse to doubt, so his Prolegomena is indispensable. The hearer perceives the other speaker’s inner experiences as certain, and to that extent true. But certainty is not yet a ground for insight. Following his bivalence, Husserl applies negation. The hearer does not (nicht) experience the being of the speaker’s experiences in evidence, he “has no ‘inner’ but rather an ‘outer’ percept of them”.7 The latter, without meaning in a pregnant sense, renders merely inadequate presentation. It has to do merely with “a presumed being” of another, not yet

---

7 LU 1 §7 41/11–14. Husserl correctly avoids mentioning the countersensical “outer experience”.

real nor actual. Expressions have only an “intimating” function to serve as “signs” to the hearer (as inner). The “essential distinction” begins from experience as inner (Erlebnis), in a ‘unified inner life’, rather than experience of empirical content (Ehrfarung).

So far, whole-part summary has been illuminating, but seems to clamp “phenomenology” into inner experience. Were we to stop at such introductory examination, we would find little new for Husserl study.

1. THIRD INVESTIGATION

vi. Initial refinement

We thus consider Husserl’s multiple foundations, in order to go deeper, after which we will revisit the above. First, we take evidence to provide the normative ground for foundation, as source of teleology rather than foundation. Evidence could never be a part, for that would make phenomenology self-founding.

Husserl allowed three interrelated wholes: first, the sense of the sign. Second, Speech, to which an expression as “separate” and different holds as relatively independent (piece, or moment in some other relation). Third, inner experience, which requires to found both senses of the sign (for sense needs to be founded upon experience) (LU 1 §7 40/35; 41/1). He took one whole as trivial, foundation of words upon language in general. And he excluded one whole: outer experience of another, so an outer percept, does not have a content corresponding to a part, so nor to a whole. Henceforth, inner experience (Erlebnis) requires to found (holds as condition for) indication and expression – while some kind of interaction between certainty and negation needs to permit “outer perception”. These are quite inscrutable so far. Indeed, we do not yet even know why Husserl’s telos of epistemology required a grammatical side as “communication”. Crucially, one should avoid confusing his summary in his First Investigation with proof (xii).

vii. Two conditions

We address his Third Investigation, to find that a priori ‘proof’. Indeed, that Investigation makes its task to clarify objective and a priori laws from apodictic evidence (cf. LU 3 Einleitung, 227/6 (added 1913); LU 3 §7, 243/1–3), so the progress is far from mathematical, but is rather phenomenological. As no reference back to consciousness, so nor to judgment, is required, judgment would follow a ground. Yet Husserl also allowed the senses of the sign. So far, we have (at least) two pure contents that propositions can ground, the object or expression.
We consider two conditions, which guide what follows. The condition of epistemology is a ground for judgment that inner experience has an apodictic or adequate content of the existence of another’s intention in outer perception. The condition of communication is a ground for judgment that an inner percept is experience of the other’s expression.

To seek those grounds, we assess §14, often taken as the ‘core’ of Husserl’s approach (Fine 1995: 467), in which he symbolises six “propositions”. As intentionality still guides the logical possibilities, any symbol can be objectified – become an object – so be distinguished as an individual, and considered for its part and whole relations (cf. LU 4 §8 322/15–17). In language, Husserl denotes an individual part by “this”, one part of a range by “a”, and relevant essences by “the”. We adhere to his conventions.

Symbolisation

That noted, Husserl explains his symbols only in 1901 (hence those have been missed by his critics, who work from Findlay’s English translation of 1913). We work up through levels, from α, β… to a μ. At the lowest objectified level, Husserl explains that he renders the pure species by lowercase Greek letters, as variables α and β. Treated as individuals, these too are prefaced by “a” and “an” (an α, a β, a Γ…). Individuals correspond to pure species, so those considered as part of that pure hierarchy are called α and β “as such”. Such symbols of pure and general bases are treated as abstracta. As to concreta, Husserl explained that

the symbols G₁, G₂… Gₙ in general [become] different unity-forms of concreta. (LU 3 §12 261 fn. (1901))

Treated for the higher unity of its parts G₁, G₂… Gₙ, Husserl refers “to concreta of the form G overall [überhaupt]”, and when G is treated as without similarity, it has an “individual identity”.

---

8 For “this” (dieser) as expressing an individual v. LU 3 §12; for “this” as spatiotemporal spot v. ID §2, p.12/2–5. For “a” (ein), and “the” (e.g. “das A, in specie”) cf. PR §16 (c) 152/21–24.

9 Findlay’s translation of LU of 1913 employs upper and lower case modern letters in LU 3 §14, obscuring distinction of concreta from abstracta. Hence, for example, Simons employs α and β, making no reference to distinctions between abstracta and concreta (G, g), nor formalizations of their founding wholes (I). He uses t to treat of “an individual as such, in abstraction” (Simons 1982: 119), but Husserl uses t to refer to temporal stretches (LU 3 §13; also §12 of 1901), which have no role in Simon’s reading, nor does intentionality.

10 Husserl defines these too only in 1901: “the symbols α, β… must [müssen] have the value, in general, of different species of determinations” (LU 3 §12, 291 fn.).

11 LU 3 §12 261/262 fn. (1901), our emphasis. We treat identity as identity-synthesis in extension.
Thus, in general, abstracta – even as relatively non-independent, so which can in some other relation be concreta – can only be founded on $G$. Husserl symbolises the concrete founding whole of non-independent parts (an $\alpha$, a $\beta$ . . .) by $G$. Instances of $G$ as “different unity-forms” are symbolised by $g$.

The foundation in general of abstract species ($\alpha$, $\beta$) and concreta ($G$) is symbolized by $\Gamma$, and instances of $\Gamma$ are symbolised by $\gamma$. An instance of the foundation for “every whole” – even $\Gamma$ – is symbolised by a $\mu$ ($LU$ 3 §14 268/7).

That noted, Husserl only refers to $\mu$ as individual (a $\mu$), which foundation will remain obscure. The content $\kappa$ will also have undetermined foundation, while $t$ will symbolise a pure temporal moment in extension.

viii. P1

Husserl begins with pure phenomenology, thus from a normative teleology that requires to clarify a priori laws (supra), hence to clarify the sense of propositions about essential relations of contents as such.\(^{12}\) He puts forward six propositions (P1 to P6). As a part “requires to be” a whole, it requires to be “supplemented” by a content of that whole. Even that whole is objectified as a content, so correlatively a part as individual ($PR$ §67 245/25ff.). He founds the lowest upon the highest:

$P1$: If an $\alpha$ as such requires to be founded on a $\mu$, every whole having an $\alpha$, but not a $\mu$, as a part, requires a similar foundation. ($LU$ 3 §14 268/7)

Were requirement to be founded upon a $\mu$, that would permit generalization to “every whole”, P1 could apply to $\Gamma$ and its parts, so to non-independent or independent wholes or parts.

For brevity, we take it as implicit that symbols and material contents are correlates and that their hierarchies correspond. To seek epistemology first, we align an $\alpha$ as such to expression as such (founded on Indication), and a $\mu$ to a content of another’s consciousness. As all communicative expressions function as (intimating) indications, hence if an $\alpha$ as such requires foundation upon a $\mu$, both communicative expressions and Indication would require a content of another’s consciousness itself (communication). The latter conforms to P1, for it would require proof of a content of another’s consciousness in outer perception.

Yet the logic does not follow through, for the mysterious lack of foundation for a $\mu$ would render P1 invalid were it taken as a ground, and without

\(^{12}\) Fine deems Husserl’s “general difficulty” is that he moves from generic to objectual formulations without explaining “when the transition is made or how it is to be legitimated” (Fine 1995: 465). We suggest that transition is made by intentionality, legitimated since the Prolegomena. cf. ($PR$ §14 56/16, supra).
a foundation for every abstractum as such in the range \((\alpha, \beta, \ldots)\), we find no ground yet for epistemology, nor for communication.

**Disproof: Independence**

**ix. P2**

So we still require both conditions, but will find a disproof of epistemology alone from P2, P3, and P6. For Husserl, a “corollary” of P1 allows consideration of the non-independent part of superordinate independent wholes \((G)\).

So:

\[
P2: \text{A whole which includes a non-independent ‘moment’, without including, as its part, the supplement which that ‘moment’ demands, is likewise non-independent, and is so relatively to every superordinate independent whole in which that non-independent ‘moment’ is contained. (LU 3 §14, 268/7)}
\]

We align \(G\) to Indication and its moment, an expression insofar as it functions to communicate (an intimating indication). That would allow the pure possibility that all communicative expression can be a moment founded on indication. Hence P2 also applies to the required superordinate and independent whole of indication: experience. However, to communicate that experience requires a ground for expression. We henceforth require a content of the independent whole ‘outer perception’ in the independent whole, inner experience – an outer percept of expression in unified inner life. We need to consider hierarchies of pieces.

**ix. P3**

Husserl addresses these next as essential. P2 lets him begin considering the relatively independent part, which could in some other relation have been non-independent.

\[
P3: \text{If } G \text{ is an independent part of (and so also relatively to) } \Gamma, \text{ then every independent part } g \text{ of } G \text{ also is an independent part of } \Gamma. \text{ (LU 3 §14)}
\]

As to communication: if the essence of expression is an independent part \((G)\), it would be a piece of indication \((I)\). Then every instance of expression as a piece \((g)\), insofar as it is relative, is also a piece of indication. As noted, relative independence allows a moment to be treated as a piece. Yet Husserl above only considers it as independent and also relative, not yet assessing their relations.
We thus set aside expression until a ‘proof’ has been developed for relative independence and non-independence. First, we seek Husserl’s epistemological condition alone.

Parenthesis – avoiding psychologism

To that end, we elaborate on Husserl by his 1901 premises (supra) to foreshadow his next proposition. We treat the individual $G$ for its higher unity as $G$ overall, a transition permitted by intentionality. $G$ overall has its concreta $G_1$ and $G_2$, and their pieces $g_1$ and $g_2$ respectively. Our corollary follows:

**P3 (Corollary):** If $G_1$ and $G_2$ are independent parts of (and so also relatively to) $\Gamma$, then every independent part of $G_1$ and every independent part of $G_2$ is an independent part of $\Gamma$.

Suppose experience and perception are concreta. We align $\Gamma$, which founds $G_1$ and $G_2$, with a supposed “experience in general”, and align $G_1$ to “inner perception” and $G_2$ to “outer perception”, and $g_1$ and $g_2$ to “inner” and “outer” percepts respectively. Can one experience an inner percept of another’s intention as outer percept? To be so, $g_1$ and $g_2$ require supplementation by a “common” (gemeinsam) content of experience – as inner and outer experience $\gamma$.

Yet if $g_1$ and $g_2$ required supplementation by $\Gamma$, or any part of $\Gamma$, then $G_1$ and $G_2$ and $g_1$ and $g_2$ could not require supplementation by $\neg \Gamma$, which latter would be contradictory. By premise, the experience of another is not experience in general; such foundation would be contradictory.

Indeed, Husserl’s First Investigation allowed inner experience of another consciousness only as an outer percept. Yet our Corollary of P3 would be valid, so treating it as a ground for exclusion of the Prolegomena’s epistemology would mistake an empirical contradiction for phenomenological disproof. We have merely isolated the psychological – classical – problem of intersubjectivity.

x. P6 – essential contradiction

So our elaboration helps to situate phenomenology by a priori law. We reunite $G_1$ and $G_2$. From P3 (Corollary), $g_1$ and $g_2$ can no longer be absolutely independent and also require a common supplement $\gamma$. In turn, independent parts can found non-independent parts ($G$ founding $\alpha$, $\beta$ ...) and an independent part in some other relation can be non-independent ($g_1$ as $\alpha$, $g_2$ as $\beta$ ...).
We rejoin Husserl as he considers the sense of $\alpha$ and $\beta$ (rather than $g_1$ and $g_2$) as relatively independent of $G$. As an essential possibility of intentionality, as concreits they can be objectified relative to each other. Husserl puts it:

P6: If $\alpha$ and $\beta$ are independent parts of some whole $G$, they are also independent relatively to one another.

Yet, we note, Husserl’s justification relies on reductio, thus by hypothesizing $\alpha$ and $\beta$ as implicitly absolutely independent. An “absolute” in whole-part logic would be a whole without dependence on any other whole, so no longer relative but pregnant ($LU$ 3 §13 263/2, 16–18; cf. §21 282/8–10). Husserl goes on:

For if $\alpha$ required supplementation by $\beta$, or any part of $\beta$, there would be, in the range of parts determined by $G$, determined parts (those of $\beta$) in which $\alpha$ would be founded. $\alpha$ would therefore not [nicht] be independent relatively to its whole $G$. ($LU$ 3 269/6–39, our emphasis)

For our purposes, if an inner and outer percept are independent parts of perception, they are independent relatively to each other. Yet if an inner percept required supplementation from the range of an outer percept, there would be, in the range of parts determined by perception, inner percepts founded upon outer percepts. Inner experience would also not be independent relatively to perception.

Insofar as both directions ‘upward’ to $G$ and ‘across’ to $\beta$ are intended at once, an inner percept of an outer percept is essentially contradictory. Only an absolute unity would be without inadequacy. Treating P6 as absolutely independent – a pregnant whole – grounds the negation of the epistemological condition.

It seems that intersubjectivity would be excluded from phenomenology as epistemology, Husserl’s first condition alone. We will consider that in the First Investigation.

“Proof”: Relative Independence

xi. P4 and P5 – preparation for proof

However, a way holds toward what can be achieved. Husserl’s justification failed to consider relative independence, thus relative non-independence. We seek communication as a way toward Husserl’s solution. The way will be long, but the result will transform phenomenology.

To that end: P6 applied relative independence and non-independence, which we so far merely defined, and it relied on the sense of objectification and an implicit absolute. Husserl had prepared for those earlier. P3 treated $G$ and its parts as independent of $\Gamma$, letting Husserl treat $G$ as relatively inde-
ependent. $G$ and its parts can also be relatively non-independent of $\Gamma$, so $G$ has a (relatively) non-independent part $\gamma$. Hence:

\begin{eqnarray*}
\text{P4 If } \gamma \text{ is a non-independent part of a whole } G, \text{ it is also a non-independent part of every other whole of which } G \text{ is a part.}
\end{eqnarray*}

Thus, diverging from P2, relative independence at P4 pertains to a non-independent part of superordinate non-independent wholes. That permits $\gamma$ to be non-independent of $G$ and $G$'s founding wholes ($\Gamma$, corresponding to Extension).

$\gamma$ can be an abstractus or concretus. In turn, Husserl seems to explain relative independence in two corresponding steps.

Logically:

$\gamma$ can be independent relatively to a subordinate whole, we need only redraw its boundaries so that the required supplement $\mu$ (of the superordinate whole to $\Gamma$) is excluded therefrom (from the subordinate whole) (LU 3 §14 269/13–17).

Husserl has again aligned to P1 and a $\mu$ (instance of a superordinate whole to $\Gamma$). Hence $\gamma$, as instance of $\Gamma$, requires no similar supplement (a $\mu$) in the subordinate whole (i.e. is absolutely independent).

Formally, Husserl's second step aligns abstracta and concreta (founded by $\Gamma$) relative to a subordinate whole by content filling “extension”.

Thus, a piece is an appearing extended phenomenon in abstracto, taken as a moment, independent relative to this extension, which [piece] of itself is non-independent relative to the concrete wholes of the filled extension. (LU 3 269/13–20).

Notice the turn in extension to phenomena, away from math. To permit the conjunction of steps for phenomenology, Husserl switches to the sense of intentional objects, permitting any content to be objectified as individual or as correlate. Thus:

\begin{eqnarray*}
\text{P5. A relatively non-independent object also is absolutely non-independent, whereas a relatively independent object can [kann] be non-independent in an absolute sense. (LU 3 §14 269/13–16; cf. §13 269/16–20)}
\end{eqnarray*}

Husserl avoids negation in P5. Somehow, by means of the absolute, the senses of each of independence and non-independence of a piece can be objectified relative to the concrete wholes of a filled extension, without essential contradiction.

How? Husserl's propositions in §14 thoroughly fail to explain that. He continues:

For a proof [Beweis] see our previous section. (LU §14 269/28–32)
xi. Husserl’s unexamined section

Thus in §13 of his Third Investigation – unnoticed by critics so far – we find the “proof”, by relative non-independence and relative independence, upon which §14 hinges.\footnote{Fine sets aside “genus and species” (1995: 467, 468 ff.) as he deems they “muddy the conceptual waters”, then elides Husserl’s relative and absolute non-independence, so treating P5 “without its second part” (468). That lets him deem P5 an “analytic” consequence of his earlier definitions, rather than following Husserl’s instruction to look in \textit{LU} 3 §13 for a “proof” (\textit{LU} §14 269/28–32) – which section proceeds via genus and species (and temporality, omitted by Fine).}

First, object, sense, and extension let us clarify how non-independence, abstractus, and moment are synonyms: the sign “abstracta” expresses the sense of pure or material moments, separable only in propositions about a priori law (\textit{LU} 3 §17 273/21–23). Correspondingly, an abstractus has the sense of a certain object relative to a whole of which it is a non-independent part (\textit{LU} 3 §14 268/4–6, 11, cf. also 267/25). For instance – correspondingly – a “colour” is inseparable from its extension, and so from Extension. Hence, functionally, a non-independent part cannot be varied without altering the required supplement of its founding whole (for instance, a colour cannot be varied without affecting the colour of its extension) (Ibid.; cf. Sokolowski 1967: 541).

The negation of each of those propositions implies a concretus. So too, concreta require extension (\textit{LU} 3 §13 263/1–4; 264/8–14). Crucially, Husserl makes Extension his highest Genus in the ‘visual field’ (\textit{LU} §10 253/25–30, 254/1–5). Moreover, just as he supplies no foundation for \( \Gamma \) besides an objective \( \mu \), Extension “cannot be further described” (\textit{LU} 3 §10, 254/5–6, then §25 295/26–27). \textit{Husserl leaves his highest foundations opaque to law} and proceeds in extension as objective “quasi-spatiality”, corresponding, hierarchy and function.

Hence, to consider absolute and relative independence, Husserl needs to diverge from the sense of independence as absolute alone (P6). He starts by officially defining “absolute” independence as

\[ \text{a certain [\textit{eine gewisse} lack of dependence] of all interconnected contents: non-independence was its contradictory opposite, a corresponding dependence on at least one content. (\textit{LU} 3 §13)} \footnote{Husserl employs “absolute” on several occasions through his early part of \textit{LU} 3 of 1901 (\textit{LU} 3 §3 234/fn.; 239/fn.; 254/fn.), 262/fn.). These are all elided in 1913 until beginning \textit{LU} 3 §13 (263/1–4).} \]

He will no longer proceed by contradiction and negation but their lack. That process follows in four steps.
xii. From non-independence to temporality

a.

First, Husserl considers the sense of abstracta as non-independent. In abstracto, reference to G and g no longer apply. Husserl omits these symbols from §13, moving to α and β. The latter would still be founded upon Γ (e.g. Extension), so require supplementation by a content of Γ. Insofar as a μ has been included to Γ (supra), the senses of α and β hold as non-independent, thus relative to an independent Γ. Yet if the “required supplement” of a μ has been excluded from Γ, then α and β require no shared foundation with Γ (P1). By pure a priori law, α and β can only be absolutely independent of Γ. Husserl permits his first half of P5.

b.

The remaining half takes longer, and we follow its ‘proof’ before applying it in the First Investigation. Thus, second, Husserl considers that absolute via lack of independence from its foundation (Γ), along with its relative independence from an “inside”. Taken as absolute, α and β are separated from each other by pure a priori law, as β implies contradiction given α (P6).

Husserl needs to relate α to β relatively – so one should again be cautious. Relation of a “content to another content” requires to go via foundation. Moreover, one should avoid assuming the senses of α and β are in one moment relatively non-independent, and in the next relatively independent. That would indeed avoid contradiction – however, Husserl has not yet allowed for temporality, only extension.

Rather, α and β must be made hierarchical. Husserl treats them ‘as such’, to address the sense of their Genus, and correlative specific contents as individuals (he seeks the range in its specific extension). He considers α as the part requiring to be founded on the whole β. Moreover, note that “connections” permit relations that can have sense by a priori law. Hence an α requires to be supplemented by a content of the essence β, so “joined with connected instances” from β’s range (an α to a β). Thus Husserl allows for the “relative non-independence” of α and β according to pure law. He explains:

A content α is relatively independent of a content β, if in the essential genera α, β, a grounded law exists, whereby a priori contents of the pure Genus α can exist only in or connected to contents through the determined total range of pure contents of β. (LU 3 §13 264/8–14)\footnote{15 Husserl added the second “pure” in 1913.}
Relative non-independence can only hold when (according to a grounded pure law), a content $\alpha$ can exist only in or connected to the total range, i.e. a unity intended as the genus $\beta$. That leaves only the connection of $\alpha$ to the genus $\beta$ as relatively independent to be accounted for. Husserl continues:

Lacking [mangel] such a law, we say that $\alpha$ is relatively independent in regard to $\beta$. (LU 3 §13 264/17–21)

Husserl’s Third Investigation “proves” relative independence merely by allowing for “lack” of law, rather than Contradiction (P6). Even from 1901, his logic respected the form of ‘alterity’ to essence. He merely summarises that “the being of an $\alpha$ is relatively independent or non-independent in regard to the Genus $\beta$” (LU 3 §13 264/30–32).

c.

How would such lack and disjunction be justified? Those connections had been addressed earlier in Husserl’s Investigation. Notably, “correlates” (co-related parts or wholes) correspond to each other rather than upward to the Genus (LU 3 §13 264/6–7). So

[i]f a certain $\alpha$ is in a certain relation to a certain $\beta$, this same $\beta$ stands in a certain corresponding [entsprechenden] relation to that $\alpha$ (LU 3 §11 258/23).

The relations are certain, of course. Yet they logically correlate “only with formal indefiniteness [formaler Unbestimmtheit]” (LU 3 §11 258/23–25). Formal indefiniteness precludes opposition or negation, so precludes lawful relation – notably, by conjunction and contradiction (that “the being of an $\alpha$ is relatively independent and not independent”). Husserl’s introduction of formal indefiniteness in his 1913 Third Investigation prepared for “proof” of “relative independence or non-independence”.

d.

Yet that disjunct would still lead to contradiction were both arms included at the same time; Husserl requires the extensional form of temporality corresponding to logic. Moreover, so far, insofar as relation holds from pure genera to certain content, yet can lack law, pure law provides no necessary connection, hence Husserl seeks the sense of relations made possible by law.

Thus fourth – and a fortiori – only at this juncture in his Third Investigation (1913) does Husserl add temporal wholes, as “relation” to extension in time. He addresses that a piece “often can exist as separate”, an a priori and pure possibility (and correspondingly, a material possibility for a piece hav-
ing sensible content). In pure law, that would occur in the next “hic et nunc” (ii). So \( \beta \) as a founding whole of \( \alpha \) can be taken as a “temporal whole”. An \( \alpha \) thus requires to be “joined” to instances in the total range of \( \beta \) (supra). The temporal parts align with the range of contents of \( \beta \) as “time-stretches”. That joining permits the next time-stretch in the range, hence the pure progress of time according to foundation by relative independence. \(^{16}\)

Hence, logically, Husserl allows for compound objective contents in formal relation by his implicit premise of intentionality as “many-rayed”. He symbolises a new content \( \kappa \), also without its foundation (\( LU \) §3 256/7). Hence a \( \kappa \) of \( \beta \) can include a content of a time determination \( t_0 \). That time-stretch can progress from \( t_1 = t_0 + \Delta \), where \( \Delta \) stands for temporal change away from \( \kappa \). One ought to be precise: Husserl avoids mentioning in \( LU \) §3 13 that such movement from \( t_1 \) to \( t_0 \) would be from \( \kappa \) to \( \kappa_1 \) – which would separate a pure “piece” as a temporal stretch of an extended whole – however, he defines pieces “exactly” so later (\( LU \) §17, 273–4/27–2). That evolution to temporality in pure law allows for the progress of relatively non-independent or independent abstracta as temporal stretches, i.e. from one moment to the next. Husserl has at last justified temporality in his static extension, and “moment” accepts its temporal meaning.

So, an \( \alpha \) can thus be relatively non-independent of a content of \( \beta \). That would be an absolute non-independence, without a pure law connecting it to \( \Gamma \) (first half of the proof of P5). Yet, in extension, an \( \alpha \) “often can” be relatively independent of \( \beta \), then non-independent of \( \beta \), which progress “taken absolutely, or in some other relation, could have been a case of non-independence” (\( LU \) §13, 263/16–18).

Husserl has allowed his second part of P5 that “a relatively independent object can [kann] be non-independent in an absolute sense”. He has developed his “proof”. In so doing, he allowed more complex “interweaving” than his propositions alone (\( LU \) §3 264/20–24).

Indeed, he allows a “system”. Notably, he has justified his rejection in his Prolegomena of propositions in “one and the same time and act” (ii) as a psychological temporality. His temporality holds as essential, formal, and logical, provided that it derives from extension in his Third Investigation, and proof about whole-part propositions. His Third Investigation grounds his sequence from Prolegomena to phenomenology in his First Investigation.

\(^{16}\) Husserl’s first mention of time as contemporaneous (or rather “like-timeous” (gleichzeitig) as formal sense of a time-unity) occurs at \( LU \) §8 248/11, in which concreta are made continuous and undifferentiated (thus abstracta); although how that can occur has not yet been explained. In 1901, that progress from \( \alpha \) to \( \beta \) in temporality had occurred in \( LU \) §11. Husserl replaced that section in 1913 to emphasize a priori synthesis. His ‘proof’ in 1913 occurs in \( LU \) §13.
2. REVISITING THE FIRST INVESTIGATION

Thus we revisit Husserl’s First Investigation to consider his two conditions – epistemology and communication – and begin from certainty (LU 1 §7). Husserl accepts the certainty of an outer percept (iii), which implies the necessity and possibility of existence of its object as content (LU 1 §2 32/19–21). Yet mere certainty provides only formal indefiniteness of corresponding contents (xii.c). Such lack of logical relation precludes logical necessity; allowing only felt necessity, which Husserl had equated since 1900 with psychologistic approach to intersubjectivity (i), excluding a logical ground from psychology (cf. x).

Hence – to respect alterity – Husserl in his First Investigation employs his term “association” (Assoziation), unused in his Third Investigation. Mere association of certainties avoids connection (Verknüpfung) by a priori law. He aligns association of certainties with merely felt context (fühlbarer Zusammenhang) (LU 1 §4 35–6/33–21). Such felt context arises still as “experienced” (erlebt) – yet, without pure law, certainty does not yet have insight into evidence (LU 1 §2 32/8). Husserl has allowed for experience that lacks founding (a priori) law from evidence, failing to provide a logical ground. So intentional “experiences” still proceed according to the propositional form of sensible content (A and B, rather than phenomenology’s α and β):

If A summons B into consciousness, […] usually a felt connection would impose itself (LU 1 §4, 36/14–18)

Yet judgments “hic et nunc” of felt necessity are contingent (iii; xv.d) (cf. PR §28 106/16–19, LU 1 §3 33/7; 33/16; only pure law could allow a subjective yet logical ground for truth, thus proof (i) (LU 1 §3 33/3–5; 9–11). Of course, that allows for certain (gewisse) experience of contents of outer perception, so “even of other people’s inner experience” (LU 1 §7 40/35; 41/1; 41/12). Yet without a law they do not yet allow adequacy or apodicticity of outer perception (LU 1 §7 41/16). Such foundation on inner experience can only be that of the speaker by the hearer, according to the sign’s double sense (LU 1 §7 40/8–9).

Husserl’s Third Investigation supplies justification. By pure law, judging upon an outer percept of a content of another consciousness requires a content to be common yet an absolutely independent part. Essential contradiction, thus negation, of foundation by an absolutely independent part excludes a supplement from the range of outer perception of another consciousness as inner percept (P6).

17 Findlay translates both “Verknüpfung” and “Assoziation” as “association” (cf. LU 1 §4 186; LU 1 §4 35–6/33–21; LI 1 §10 18; LU 3 §10 255/17).
So inner perception aligns with the content of pure and essential law (α and β). The latter parts are relatively independent, not the outer percept of another consciousness (v). Husserl continued in the First Investigation:

The hearer perceives that the speaker conveys certain psychic experiences, and to that extent perceives these experiences as true, but he himself does not [nicht] experience them, he has no ‘inner’ but rather an ‘outer’ percept of them. (LU1 §7 41/11–14)

As to proof by alterity: a content as “inner” experience common to outer perception aligns with an α as relatively independent or non-independent of β. So a pure law is lacking that could ground judgment on moments of genera, i.e. upon the hearer’s certain experience of the speaker’s psychic experiences. As Husserl restores reference to consciousness, so to intentionality, wholes are constituted in extension as ‘unity-forms’. These are negated in such cases, so do not have their necessary, law-determined ground in the experienced contents themselves, nor in the generic forms of their abstract moments [abstrakte Momente] (LU1 §4 36/12–14, our emphases)

In turn, Husserl’s “proof” of P5 set aside necessary connection to generic forms of another consciousness upon the inside. Such connections remain inadequate, without a ground for “mutual” comprehension (LU1 §7 41/17) – mutual foundation or correlation. Indeed, Husserl goes on in the First Investigation, “no truth corresponds” to them. Outer and inner perception (Wahrnemung) of intersubjective content have been precluded. Husserl lawfully – phenomenologically – sets aside intersubjectivity from epistemology alone, the task of his Prolegomena.

He did so by rigorous logical result, rather than hasty supposition of an inability to perceive other minds.

xiv. Phenomenology as speech

Yet Husserl still seeks his teloi, and we follow what he did attain. Following the above, judgment is objectified in its pure form in extension. Experience is thus made co-extensive with “judgments of experience” (Urteilerlebnisse), and Husserl seeks to justify inner experience of communication via the double sense of the sign. As to indication, its distinctions (pertinent are facial movements and expressions) do not impede its “essential unity” (LU1 §2 31/33–34).

In whole-part terms, those indication-unities correspond to concreta $G_1$, $G_2$, . . ., having an overall form of $G$. As concreta, however, indications conform to a disjunct in inner experience. They can have the sense characteristic of objects, or can be “produced” (erzeugt) artificially (LU1 §2 31/25; 31/16).
Hence they can be justifiable (a right can be provided to judgment of their corresponding truth) or unjustifiable and merely “motivate” judgments that can be false. Husserl seeks the absolute, so he sets aside foundation of indication upon judgment-experience (LU 1 §3 34/29; 33/13). No justifiable law (pure or even empirical) should permit the adequacy or apodicticity of indication.

That result begins to support communication. For no ground would thus be found for indication alone – thus not the second sense of the sign, holding as a part of indication. That second sense, of course, Husserl calls “expression”, which he considers as “a certain [einen gewissen] sequence of conscious experiences [Erlebnissen]” (corresponding to ‘an α, a β…’) (LU 1 §6 38/14). Hence indication seems to apply “more widely” in extension, and Husserl sets aside the basis of expression as a content of the genus indication (which would found an α upon β, rather than a concretus G) (LU 1 §1 30/22–23). Their essential distinctions must (müssen) be assessed more closely (LU 1 §6 34–35). Indeed, expressions hold as at least relatively independent of Indications (v). Husserl explains:

From the indicative signs we differentiate [unterscheiden] the meaningful, the expressions. (LU 1 §5 37/13–14)

As an expression is differentiated “from indication” it does require foundation upon indication as a concretus. Husserl treats expression and indication as “concepts” to also allow for bringing the part under its whole (e.g. an α as such). In turn, an expression requires to be founded upon Indication, yet can also be different from Indication. It can be supplemented by an instance of a founding whole that is not an indication (LU 6 §6 39/3–4). That whole, which has a content of expression as its part, can indeed be Speech: “each instance or part of Speech [Redeteil] […] will be an expression”, although “in the case of an indication there is no speech” (LU 1 §5 37/20–21; LU 1 3 33/25).

In turn, speech is intended to communicate; as in the case of indication there is no speech, indication (pertinently, facial movement (say, G1)) is not intended to communicate (LU 1 §5 37/23). Husserl’s famous choices are conforming to his logical bases.

Moreover, as parts, expressions too can have such a founding sense on indication. Indeed, an expression (an α) holds so far as a relatively non-independent part of speech (β), and is distinguished as a relatively independent part of an indication (for our purposes a facial movement G1). Phenomenology still seeks its telos, thus such relative expressions are excluded; they have no content founded in Speech (so we still align “expression” to α) (LU 1 §5 37/28). Insofar as its sense is relatively independent of indication in an absolute sense, only an expression can have meaning (Bedeutung), i.e. as a part
of Speech. As speech is not indication, only meaning can allow adequacy according to ideal law (LU 1 §5 37/13–14). We arrive at a privilege of meaning over the truth of sense.

Husserl thus can make the meaning of Speech “phenomenally one” with experience – co-extensive with judgments of experience – which founding unity (as concretus) we take as implicit (LU 1 §5 37/29–31). Yet outer perception as absolutely independent has been negated, and Speech holds as inner alone (founded upon I). It follows that speech communicates first as the unity of inner experience, thus without separation (so implicitly without difference from consciousness (v)). On this subjective and “inner” side of meaning (iii), Husserl makes speech too an act of judgment (as Urteilerlebnisse) (LU 1 §7 40/19–20).

Moreover, as instances of such expressions are parts of Speech, that speech might or might not be intended to communicate meaning to others (LU 1 §5 37/21–24). One devolves to expression, as relatively independent or non-independent, both of which intend to communicate meaning. Such signification holds for a functional purpose (communication), inseparable from an expression as speaking and hearing. Phenomenology as teleology evolves to functionalism (v). Indeed, by this juncture for Husserl, hearing too holds without distance from experience, so he treats the meaning of speaking and hearing as non-independent parts of speech. Upon the inside, certain contents of speech and hearing are thus “mutually correlated”. For Husserl, that allows intimating of an outer percept of another consciousness as communicating (LU 1 §7 39/28–30).

Husserl arrives at his solution in 1901 as to how to treat intersubjectivity, so how to approach phenomenology. He considers the “wider” and “narrower” senses of intimation in extension – the wider covers “all acts that a hearer might attribute to the speaker” (LU 1 §7 40/10–14), so indication and speech. Insofar as an intimating expression functions as non-independent of indication then relatively non-independent of speech, it is absolutely non-independent. An expression is a moment of speech in every case – a content of indication is also found in the range of speech as meaningful. Thus “all expressions in communicative speech function as indications” (LU 1 §7 40/2–3).

However, Husserl united the concretus Speech with experience, hence the expression permits even speaking of outer perception upon the inside. As to the “narrow” sense, insofar as intimating expression is relatively independent of indication, thus internal to experience, which latter holds as (inner) judgment, its boundaries can be “redrawn” (P4). That permits the intimat-

---

18 LU 1 §8 43/15–17. Implicitly, instead of occurring “at one and the same time and act” (ii), in a psychology, speech would avoid contradiction by its progression in time-stretches. Husserl investigates static extension.
ing “judgment experience” in expression to cover speech alone (LU 1 §7 40/20–22). Thus:

[t]he act of perception is [...] intimated in the wider sense, the judgment built on intimating in the narrower sense. (LU 3 §1 40/19–20)

Husserl's telos since the Prolegomena – to find a ground on the subjective side of judgment for pure and a priori law – has at least been permitted by that narrow sense, provided that it considers Speech as its foundation! Communication becomes the single task of phenomenology.

Hence, upon this inner and subjective side, Husserl divides speech as judgment again. Implicitly, speech occurs in words. In soliloquy (inner speech without separation from myself), I can speak to myself without intending to communicate to others, by phantasy-presentations as moments (xi). In imaginary production, I am unconcerned with the sense of an objective content’s existence or non-existence. Imaginary variation of moments no longer affects how outer pieces function (LU 1 §8 42/35–36). However, to function as communicative, speech requires to impart meaning in expressions by its intimating function in communicative acts.

Husserl has allowed for real content corresponding to essential distinctions, which can only exist as actual in communication. Upon this inside, that imparting of meaning “is only possible in actual [wirklichen] speaking and hearing” (LU 3 §8 43 1–5).

The Prolegomena’s epistemology has been transmuted. Henceforth a ground must permit meaning as intimation, therefore judgment – inseparable from expression – about grammatical identities. Husserl never did set aside intersubjectivity; rather the demand to experience another’s consciousness as true has been rigorously transformed into the necessity and possibility of communication. Thus began the great task of phenomenology by which we demand to know.

3. THE TASK OF SCHOLARSHIP

Our aim has been explanation, so we have not yet dared critique (for example, why does Husserl never allow the physical side of “hearing” as origin of meaning?) (cf. LU1 §7 39/26–29). Indeed, he never considered his treatment of intersubjectivity to be perfect; our assessment thus provides a basis to assess his evolution. As is known, Husserl went on to wrestle with intersubjectivity in his manuscripts, and the lectures collected in Experience and Judgment

which set out his genetic turn from about 1918 – made whole-part logic basal to their progress. Husserl only revisited intersubjectivity in published work in his *Cartesian Meditations* in 1931. It has indeed been recently explained that Husserl’s approach to intersubjectivity in that work proceeded rigorously, and by a whole-part logic that evolved from his Third Investigation (and that Husserl had been treated as a straw man, as we noted *en route*). Such approach is innovative, welcome, and bears marked similarities in its results about Husserl in 1931 to ours about 1901/1913 (v. our footnote below) – however, given the importance of proceeding via the manuscripts, an opportunity might offers itself to Husserl scholarship – to work slowly forward in Husserl’s work from 1901 to demonstrate his progress and refine such scholarly alignments. So far, that Husserl’s Third Investigation was so interrelated to the advent of phenomenology, and so systematic, that his approach to intersubjectivity applied its bases so rigorously, and that even in 1901 he *logically* respected the ‘alterity’ that has been aligned with intersubjectivity might be helpful, and unsuspected by many scholars. Indeed, we hope that exploration of such issues might allow novel approaches to intersubjectivity, new ways to appreciate Husserl’s rigour, and also those approaches to alterity that adapted or evolved from his work. How that would occur remains to be assessed; henceforth, though, such a task should be feasible, and we hope it will be fruitful.20

20 V. Costello (2012) and Taipale’s review (2014). Costello aims to apply *LU* 3 (1913) to intersubjectivity as “pairing” in *CM* of 1931 (we considered intersubjectivity in 1901/1913). He explains that Husserl ‘layers’ subjectivity as also wholes (5 ff.). After interrelating subject, predicate, and evidences, his whole-part crux begins from Husserl’s explanation that it is an ‘analytic’ proposition that “pieces considered in relation to the whole whose pieces they are, cannot be founded on each other” (*LU* 3 §25), which for Costello would mean there “could not be the same part that combined itself in an immediate (covering) and mediate (combinatory) way with another (similar) part that was present in both relations” (149). So Costello moves to moments, and treats intersubjectivity as experience of my subjectivity as “at the same time” piece and moment, although a piece is not a moment. So too did we, by such negation. Yet that treatment “sets up no contradiction” – which avoidance we followed in 1901 – provided that the relationship is between “one and the same part (oneself or the other person)” appearing “both as ‘interpenetrating’ [moments] and as ‘combining with’ similar parts of the same whole [foundation of moments]” (150).

Thus, as to Costello’s movement from a proposition about pieces to moments and foundation at the same time, without contradiction, we followed how Husserl prefigured that in 1901 by moving from absolute to relative independence (of moments, and genus as such, without pieces), then to his ‘proof’ that such relation avoids contradiction in extension. However, we add, in 1901/1913, Husserl first had to justify temporal extension (by *LU* 3 §13), and had not yet developed the whole-part relations of inner time-consciousness. Costello – correctly – takes *LU* 3 §25 to be crucial: a section that Husserl in 1913 amended to emphasize temporal progress in infinitum. In turn, Costello explains that “pairing” is awareness of oneself as at the same time both moment and piece (p. 150), which – implicitly – *LU* 3 fails to encapsulate, and leads to an ethical responsibility. Our results align to that discovery; we
References


began with normativity, and Husserl’s Propositions and proof in 1901/1913 precisely kept piece and moment at the same time from unity… as did Husserl’s First Investigation do so of intersubjectivity. To demonstrate that, we also adopted Husserl’s notation, which we hope will be helpful; that noted, one should also allow for variation in such results. How Husserl could later apply Costello’s whole-part changes to intersubjectivity, and their divergence from his *First* Investigation’s results, would be important to consider (Costello locates a promising site in distinguishing noematic self-evidence from noetic evidence in which self-evidence appears as true (142)). How our approaches might interrelate in more detail, to augment a turn in Husserl study, would need to be considered in further work.