Integration Processes of Migrants: Research Findings and Policy Challenges

SUMMARY

This contribution discusses the integration processes of immigrants and minorities with a recent immigrant background, and the policies related to the process of settlement of these newcomers in European societies at all relevant levels: from the local level of municipalities and cities, to the national level of states, and the international level of the European Union. Within this general approach, however, a strong emphasis is put on the local level, since that is the level where such policies have to be implemented and are primarily felt, both by the immigrants themselves and by those parts of society that are most affected by immigration. To describe the current state of integration research and policies, this paper will explore in the first section the nature of integration processes, their conceptualisation and lessons from empirical studies. The reason for devoting some space to these topics is the assertion that any integration policy should be based on a thorough, scientifically-based knowledge of the processes of integration and exclusion: if a policy wants to steer such a process, it should have a clear idea of what instruments it can use possibly to intervene, in which part of the process, and at what particular moment. Such knowledge is a solid starting point for policy-making, but it is not enough. Processes of policy-making and implementation follow their own set course, which do not necessarily run parallel to the process of integration. That is why, in the following section, the author attempts to explain some of these processes. At the end of this paper he returns to the core questions of immigration and integration policies on the one hand, and the relationship between local, national and international integration policies on the other.

KEY WORDS: immigration, integration, integration policy

1. Introduction

Integration of immigrants is a hotly debated topic nowadays, particularly in northwest European countries and cities. The background of this contentious debate is historically different in various countries (Penninx, Berger and Kraal, 2006). In some countries the debate started as a reaction to the perceived failure of integration policies: in The Netherlands, for example, a tradition of specific integration policies under the hea-
of minorities policies has been built up already since the beginning of 1980s, but these policies have come heavily under fire in a strongly politicized climate since 2000 (Bruquetas-Callejo et al., 2007). In other north-west European countries, such as Germany, the topic of immigration was politicized much earlier, preventing integration policies from coming into existence; a political compromise was reached in a new Law on Immigration and Integration only after a long political struggle (Süssmuth-report, 2001 and its political follow-up).

The ambiguous stance of most European countries on immigration and integration policies is reflected at the EU-level. There is a somewhat longer history of trying to establish a common immigration policy for EU-countries: the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, coming into force in May 1999, laid the legal foundation for a harmonization of asylum and communitarian immigration policies in the EU. The Tampere Summit in 1999 developed a political programme and a work plan gradually to build a harmonized, common immigration policy. The Communication on a Community Immigration Policy (22nd November 2000) has set the framework for such policies (EC, 2000) and in the first four years after the enactment of the Amsterdam Treaty, twenty-three binding regulations have been accepted; eleven of these twenty-three relate to borders and visa, six to illegal immigration and expulsion, five to asylum, and one to legal migration (Groenendijk and Minderhoud, 2004: 139 ff; see also Niessen, 2004; Selm and Tsolakis, 2004). The topics reflect the still dominant preoccupation with restrictive and control-oriented migration regulation at the EU-level.

It is exactly this ambivalent attitude of European countries towards immigration that has made integration policies problematic. In contradistinction to classical immigration countries such as Canada, Australia and the USA, European countries do not regard themselves as immigration countries, but in fact they are receiving large numbers of immigrants. That is why integration only appeared as a topic on the EU-agenda after mid-2003, when the Communication on Immigration, Integration and Employment of 3rd June (EC, 2003) was published. Under the Greek presidency at the Thessaloniki summit of June 2003 this document was accepted as a basis for developing an EU-integration policy. However, this was not conceived as a communitarian policy (such as an immigration policy), but as a Third Pillar-policy, which essentially meant that any common initiative could only be implemented by unanimous decisions of the Council of Ministers. A first step towards such a consensus policy was taken at the Ministerial Conference of Ministers responsible for Integration under the Dutch EU-presidency in November 2004, where eleven Common Basic Principles of integration policies were accepted.1

The topic of integration processes and policies has thus been neglected in the past and, at the same time, it is on its way to the top of the political agenda at the local, national and EU-level. In this contribution I would like to clear up some of the confusion in the debates about integration processes and policies by developing a concep-

tual framework and by drawing lessons from past experience. In so doing, I will focus on the policy aspects. I will do this by taking the following steps:

1. Firstly, I will make some basic observations on what I call the logic of the integration processes. I will explore the nature of such processes, its conceptualization and lessons from empirical research. The reason for this is based on the assumption that if a policy wants to steer such a process, it should have a thorough, science-based knowledge of processes of integration and exclusion, in order to decide with which instruments it can possibly intervene, in which parts of the process and at what particular junctures.

2. Such knowledge is a solid starting point for policy-making, but it is not enough. The process of policy-making and implementation has its own logic, which does not necessarily run parallel to the logic of integration processes. For this reason I will make some basic observations on the logic of policy-making as a second step.

3. In the third step I shall ask the question: do we have a sound knowledge of integration processes, and have we managed to formulate adequate policies to steer that process, who should implement the policies (actors) and at what level? How do policies at the local, national and EU-level relate to each other?

4. The fourth step is still more concrete: what strategies can or should be followed in implementing policies in order to ensure that they will be successful?

5. Lastly, in conclusion, I shall deduce from this overview what fundamentals are involved in integration policies and which dilemmas should be solved.

2. The logic of processes of integration and exclusion

2.1. Defining integration processes

A newcomer in a given society is often perceived as the classic “other”, who does not belong there. This observation has been the starting point of a long tradition of research initiated by early founders of sociology such as Simmel (1908), and refined by scholars such as Park and Burgess (1921) and Elias and Scotson (1965).

Constructions of the “other” or “stranger” may be based on various grounds: on legal status (aliens); on physical appearance (“race”); on (perceived) cultural and religious differences; on class characteristics or on any combination of these elements. Such constructions do not only have consequences for interpersonal relations, they also play out on the collective level, defining in-groups and out-groups. They may express themselves in discriminatory practices and lead to problematic interethnic relations and weakening of social cohesion in communities, cities and states. On the political level the “otherness” may also be exploited, for example by anti-immigrant movements or parties.

The moment immigrants settle they have to acquire a place in the new society, both in the physical sense (house, job and income, access to educational and health facilities, etc.), but also in the social and cultural sense. Particularly if newcomers see themselves as different and are perceived by the receiving society as physically, culturally and/or religiously different, they aspire to acquire also in these respects a re-
cognized place in that new society. From these observations I deduce a basic and at the same time comprehensive heuristic definition of integration: the process of becoming an accepted part of society.

This elementary definition of integration is – intentionally – open in two ways. Firstly, it emphasizes the process rather than defining an end situation. Secondly, it does not state the particular requirements for acceptance by the receiving society thereby leaving different temporal (in-between) and final outcomes open. (This is in contrast to the normative /assimilationist, multiculturalist or pluralist/ models that have been developed by political theorists: see for example Bauböck, 1994; Bauböck et al., 1996; Brubaker, 1989, 1992; Hammar, 1990; Kymlicka, 1995; Soysal, 1994; Young, 1990.) This makes the definition more useful for the empirical study of these processes, allowing us to capture more of its diversity.

2.2. Three dimensions of integration

This heuristic definition of integration covers at least three analytically distinct dimensions of becoming an accepted part of society: the legal/political, the socio-economic and the cultural/religious one.

The legal/political dimension refers to the basic question as to whether immigrants are regarded as fully-fledged members of the political community. The legal/political dimension is of special importance, because it conditions the other ones in two ways. Firstly, from the perspective of individual immigrants, the legal position and related rights allocated to them may have significant positive or negative consequences for their behaviour and their efforts to integrate. For example, long periods of uncertainty about the question of whether the migrant is allowed to stay legally in the case of temporary workers, or in the case of asylum seekers or temporarily protected refugees, will have negative implications for the migrant’s preparedness and efforts to integrate. Secondly, exclusion of legally residing immigrants from access to local and/or national political systems and decision-making is not conducive for participation and integration. Such excluding policies do not only signal basic perceptions of the receiving society that look at immigrants as “outsiders”, they are also not inviting to active policies in the socio-economic and cultural-religious domain. In general, such policies and attitudes will have negative effects on the integration processes of immigrants. Turning this reasoning around, there are solid indications that where the inclusion of immigrants in formal and informal channels of political participation does take place, this leads to (varying) forms of active policies in the socio-economic and cultural-religious domain. (For relevant empirical material on the level of cities see for example: Alexander, 2003, 2007; Bousetta, 1997; Fennema and Tillie, 1999, 2001; Moore, 2001; Penninx et al., 2004; Rogers and Tillie, 2001).

In practice, the question for alien immigrants is first of all: do they have secure residence rights? Secondly, how far do immigrants and ethnic minorities have formal political rights and duties that differ from those of natives? This also includes the question of whether newcomers may (easily or not) acquire national citizenship and thus gain access to the formal political system. Of course, it also includes the granting (or not) of
political rights to non-nationals, for example at the local level of cities. Less formal political participation, such as through consultative structures for immigrants, is also part of this dimension.

The socio-economic dimension refers to the social and economic position and rights of residents, irrespective of national citizenship; these include industrial rights and rights related to institutionalized facilities in the socio-economic sphere. Do immigrants have (equal) rights to accept work and to use institutional facilities to find it? Do they have the same rights as indigenous workers? Do they have access to work-related benefits, such as unemployment benefits and insurance, and to the State-provided social security facilities, such as social housing, social assistance and welfare and care facilities?

The third dimension pertains to the domain of cultural and religious rights of immigrants: do they have (equal) rights to organize and manifest themselves as cultural, ethnic or religious groups? Are they recognized, accepted and treated like other comparable groups and do they enjoy the same or comparable facilities?

2.3. Actors in integration processes

Having defined the concept of integration and its dimensions the next question is: who are the actors involved? There are basically two parties involved in integration processes: the immigrants with their characteristics, efforts and adaptation, and the receiving society and its characteristics and reactions to these newcomers. It is the interaction between these two that determines the direction and outcomes of the integration process. However, these two are fundamentally unequal partners in terms of (political) power and resources. The receiving society, its institutional structure and its reactions to newcomers, are much more decisive for the outcome of the process.

Integration policies are part of the institutional arrangements in a society, particularly since we should define such policies broadly as including both general policies and their effects for immigrants, and policies that carry the explicit flag of integration of immigrants. Such policies being defined politically by (majorities of) the receiving society, there is the inherent danger of their being lopsided, representing expectations and demands of this society, or dominant parts of it, rather than being based on participation, negotiation and agreement with immigrant groups themselves.

2.4. Three levels relevant for (measuring) integration

The section above indicates that processes of integration of immigrants are not – as is often supposed – only taking place at the level of the individual immigrant, but also at other levels. At the individual level, integration is generally measured in terms of the migrant’s housing, job and education, and his/her social and cultural adaptation to the new society.

Integration also takes place at a second level: the collective level of the immigrant group. Organisations of immigrants are the expression here of mobilized resources and ambitions, and they may either become an accepted part of civil society (and a potential partner for integration policies), or they may isolate themselves or may be excluded by the society of settlement.
Thirdly, integration also takes place at the level of institutions. (I use here the sociological concept of institution: a standardized, structured and common way of acting in a socio-cultural setting.) Two kinds of institutions are of particular relevance. The first are general public institutions of receiving societies (national or local), such as the educational system, institutional arrangements in the labour market or for public health, or the political system. Such general institutions are supposed to serve all citizens, and to do so equally. Laws, regulations and executive organisations, but also unwritten rules and practices are part of these institutions.

These general institutions, however, may hinder access or equal outcomes for immigrants and ethnic minorities in two ways. Firstly, they may formally exclude them, completely (as does the political system in most countries and cities with respect to alien immigrants) or partially (as when social security and welfare systems often offer only partial service to alien immigrants). Secondly, if access for all residents including immigrants is in principle guaranteed, such institutions may hinder access or equal outcomes for immigrants and ethnic minorities by their – historically and culturally determined – ways of operating, not taking into account specific characteristics of the migrants’ situation caused by their migration history, their cultural and religious background, or language. The functioning of these general public institutions (and their possible adjustment in view of growing diversity) is thus of paramount importance: it is particularly on this level that integration and exclusion are mirrored concepts (see Penninx, 2001 on social exclusion).

The second kinds of institutions that are of particular relevance for integration are specific institutions of and for immigrant groups, for example in the religious or cultural domain. The value and validity of such institutions, in contradistinction to general institutions, is limited to those who voluntarily choose and adhere to them. Although their place is primarily in the private sphere, such specific institutions may also manifest themselves in the public sphere as important actors of civil society, as the history of churches, trade unions, cultural, educational and leisure institutions and the institutions of professions in European cities and states has shown. Such specific migrant related institutions may become an accepted part of society on the same level as comparable institutions of native groups, or they may isolate themselves or remain unrecognized and be excluded.

The mechanisms working at the individual, the organizational and the institutional level are different, but the results are clearly interrelated. Institutional arrangements determine to a great extent the opportunities and scope for action of organisations. They may also exert a significant influence on the development and orientation of immigrant organisations, as Fennema and Tillie (2004) have shown. Institutions and organisations together, in their turn, create the structure of opportunities and limitations for individuals. The other way round, individuals may mobilize and change the landscape of organisations, and potentially contribute to significant changes in institutional arrangements. In view of the unevenness of power and resources mentioned before, however, such examples are scarce, though not completely absent.
I will illustrate the interconnectedness of integration processes on different levels by comparing the development of the position of Turkish Muslims in The Netherlands and in Germany (Penninx, 2000). These immigrants came in the same period, for the same reasons and with roughly the same characteristics, but policy reactions to Islam and the Turkish groups differed markedly in the two countries. The Netherlands introduced an ethnic minorities policy in the early 1980s, which implied, among other, an official recognition of Islam on the same footing as other religions, thus opening opportunities for its public manifestation (Rath et al., 2001). It also entailed recognition of organisations (as potential partners in integration policies), including religious ones. In turn, this implied ongoing relations and negotiations between these organisations and authorities both for the public regulation of specific facilities for Islam in The Netherlands (halal slaughtering, mosque building, public calls for prayer, public Islamic broadcasting, State-funded Islamic schools, etc.) and for integration activities by Islamic organisations for their rank and file. In contradistinction, Germany (although differently in the different Länder and cities, as is shown in the Berlin, Cologne and Frankfurt cases) has in general been much less engaging.

The result of these diverging policies relating to specific institutional arrangements for Islam and towards Islamic organisations is that attitudes towards the receiving country and towards integration on the individual level, particularly as measured among the young and second generation Turks in The Netherlands and Germany, seem to differ markedly. Heitmeyer’s research in Germany (Heitmeyer, Müller and Schröder, 1997) and a comparable survey done by Sunier in The Netherlands (Sunier, 1996 and 1999) illustrate this point. While the former study finds inward-oriented and even fundamentalist attitudes of Turkish youngsters on an alarming scale, the latter one signals a much more positive attitude towards integration, involvement and participation, particularly in local society. (Sunier’s observations in Rotterdam in the mid-1990 are confirmed by a recent study of Canatan, Oudijk and Ljamai /2003/ on the role of mosques in Rotterdam in the wider social context of the city and their integration activities.)

This goes together with more critical and independent views of youngsters on established Islamic umbrella organisations such as Milli Görüş, headquartered in Germany. At the level of organisations, the differential impact seems to be reflected in the liberal and independent course of the north-Netherlands Branch of the Milli Görüş headquartered at Amsterdam as compared to the reputation of Milli Görüş in Germany (see also for Germany: Karakasoglu, 1997; Karakasoglu and Koray, 1996; Oezbek and Koray, 1998; for The Netherlands see: Doomernik, 1991; Landman, 1992; Rath et al., 2001).

2.5. The long-term nature of integration processes

A further important element of the logic of integration processes needs highlighting: the time factor. Processes of integration of newcomers are long-term by their nature. At the individual level, an adult immigrant may adapt significantly in the cognitive dimension of his behaviour: it is both pragmatic and pays off rather immediately if you learn how things are done, by whom etc. Adaptation of adults in the aesthetic and
normative dimensions of their behaviour, however, tends to be less easy: knowledge may change, but feelings and likings, and evaluations of good and evil are pretty persistent within an individual’s lifetime. This is a general rule for mankind, but it becomes more manifest in those who change environments through migration.

The situation of the descendants of this first generation of migrants normally differs in this respect. Through primary relations within their family and the network of the immigrant community, they are familiarized with the immigrant community, and possibly with its background elsewhere. At the same time, however, they become thoroughly acquainted with the culture and language of the society of settlement through informal contacts in the neighbourhood from their early childhood, and particularly through their participation in general institutions, educational ones in the first place. If such a double process of socialization takes place under favourable conditions (in which policies play a major role), this second generation develops a way of life and lifestyle in which they combine the roles, identities and loyalties of these different worlds and situations. Ways to do this are manifold, which makes for more and more differentiation within the original immigrant group. At the group level, this means that the litmus test for integration, and for the success or failure of policies in this field, is the position of the second generation.

2.6. Plurality of outcomes, diversity of policies

If the integration process results from the interaction of two parties that takes place at different levels, as I have posited so far, and if we add the differentiating effect of time and generations, what can we expect in terms of outcomes? Comparative studies provide clear answers on this point, namely that plurality of outcomes is the rule.

A first category of studies compares the integration process of different immigrant groups in the same institutional and policy context of a nation or a city. Two major messages transpire from such studies. Firstly, long-term (historical) studies reveal that, as a general rule, immigrant groups disappear as specific groups after one or two generations, because they have become an accepted part of society (Lucassen and Penninx /1997/ for The Netherlands; Lequin /1988/ and Noiriel /1988/ for France; Bade /1987/, Herbert /1990/ and Hoerder /1985/ for Germany; Holmes /1988/ and Lunn /1985/ for the UK; Morelli /1992/, Deslé, Lesthaeghe and Witte /1993/ and Caestecker /1993/ for Belgium). Policies are by definition selective in that only those immigrants are defined as relevant groups that are not (yet) an accepted part of society. For the post-war period in The Netherlands, for example, this meant that the large group of Eurasians who were “repatriated” from the Dutch East Indies after 1945, were not included as target groups in the Ethnic Minorities policies of the early 1980s: they had obviously acquired an accepted place by then.

Secondly, studies reveal that immigrant groups follow different patterns of integration or incorporation. For the Dutch case, for example, Vermeulen and Penninx (2000) have shown that Moluccan, Surinamese, Antillean, Southern European, Turkish and Moroccan immigrants – all target groups of the Ethnic Minorities Policies – differ in the speed of their integration and in the tracks of social mobility they tend to follow.
The consequence of the design of such studies is that the explanations for such differences are found primarily in characteristics of the immigrant groups, simply because the (national or city) context in which they are being integrated is the same.

A second category of cross-national comparative studies looks at the integration of the same immigrant group in different national contexts. Such studies have exactly the opposite explanatory scheme: they also find differences in outcome, but these are primarily ascribed to the differential functioning of the context in which the group is integrated. Here, too, the differences turn out to be significant, as has already been shown in my earlier observations on Turkish Muslims in Germany and The Netherlands. This is additionally illustrated in a number of studies of the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies of the University of Amsterdam. The first one compares the institutionalization of Islam in The Netherlands, Belgium and the U.K. in the post-war period (Rath et al., 2001), and finds markedly different outcomes as a consequence of varying institutional arrangements and traditions of public acceptance of religions in these societies, and the subsequent difference in interaction.

Another example of such a study is one on the attitudes and actions of trade unions in relation to immigration and the position of immigrants in society in seven European countries (Penninx and Roosblad, 2000). Here also, remarkable differences become evident. For example, the high degree of trade union membership of Turkish immigrants in Sweden (above 90%) and the low degree of this same group in France (around 15%) turns out to be basically the consequence of how trade unions are organized and incorporated (or not) in socio-economic decision-making at the national level.

A third example concerns the comparative studies of the second generation immigrants in European countries. In their overview of research on this topic Crul and Vermeulen (2003: 983) conclude “that national contexts have a considerable impact on the paths of integration that second generation Turks are following in the various countries”.

The empirical research project on “Multicultural Policies and Modes of Citizenship” (MPMC) in 17 European cities shows the heterogeneity of both immigrants and the receiving local societies on an even more intensive scale (Rogers and Tillie, 2001; Penninx et al., 2004). Looking at the immigrants first, the background of their migration is very diverse, both in time and space. Part of the migration movements towards Europe’s cities has a background of colonial relations with the country of destination, clearly visible in cities like Amsterdam, Birmingham, Lisbon and Marseille. Another part goes back to – very selective – demand-driven migration of mainly low-skilled workers, some of it with a long history as in Swiss, Belgian and French cities, others of a more recent origin in the post-war decades. And all countries and cities received a varying share of the mixed immigrant flows over the last three decades: significant supply-driven movements of refugees, asylum seekers and undocumented immigrants, often along with highly skilled cosmopolitan professionals and company linked migrants. The total picture emerging from this is not only a significant growth in diversity of origin (from mainly European, and nowadays, to the increasingly global), but also of
marked differences in social and cultural capital that the immigrants bring with them and/or have developed during their stay.

Variability is also strong when we turn our attention to the other partner: the receiving cities. The 17 cities show great variety in their institutional settings and their policies and reactions to immigrants (see Alexander, 2003, 2007). Some of this variance can be explained by differences in the national institutional systems in which cities are embedded, but there are also a great many local factors and circumstances that add to more variability of local reactions and policies: local political constellations and coalitions that may work for inclusion or exclusion; the physical layout of the city and its relation with the neighbouring area (compare Paris which gentrified its centre and remitted poor immigrants to the banlieus, and Berlin before 1991 that had to accommodate immigrants within the narrow boundaries of the city /see Mahnig, 2004/); the historical experience with earlier immigration and diversity; the concrete instruments and resources available to local policy makers to steer processes in the vital domains of (social) housing and urban regeneration, the labour market and entrepreneurship, education and health, et cetera.

3. The logic of politics and policy-making

Policies intend to steer processes in society; in this case the integration processes of immigrants in society. As stated in the introduction, we need not only a thorough insight into the logic of integration processes in order to formulate and implement effective policies, we also have to ensure that such policies are politically approved and supported. The logic of politics and policy-making, however, is one of a different kind and is often problematic in relation to immigrants.

3.1. Majority-minority relations and political participation

As explained above, a key condition for effective policies is that long-term-residence should be expressed in an adequate legal position and in adequate opportunities to participate in politics and policy-making, especially in policies that affect the situation of migrants. Here I should add the observation that the existing political system often blocks such a condition. The long political struggle on the Süssmuth-report (2001) in Germany is an outstanding example, but surely not the only one. This also plays for local policies as is aptly shown by Mahnig (2004) in his comparison of the cities of Berlin, Paris and Zurich. The conundrum here is that decisions on integration policies and their content and orientation are taken in a political system in which the majority vote decides. In such a system, majority-minority relations and the actual or perceived clash of interests connected to them are played out. This happens both on the national level and in cities. This may lead to outright exclusion of some immigrants (as aliens) from the formal political system, or it may in case they are (partially) included – marginalize their voice. The way immigrants are perceived by the receiving society turns out to be important in such a process, often more than facts. This is all the more so if the issues of immigration and the position of immigrants become politicized questions. This mechanism leads either to the absence of integration policies and avoidance of is-
sues related to immigrants, or to lopsided and patronizing policies reflecting mainly majority interests and disregarding the needs and voices of immigrants.

Although this has been the rule in Europe, exceptions exist both at the local and at the national level. Some of the British cities may serve as local examples. Most of their immigrants being of ex-colonial origin and having UK-citizenship, the political system is basically open to them from the beginning. This does not prevent significant polarization of majority-minority relations as a wealth of literature in the UK and the case study of Garbaye (2004) on Birmingham testifies. But, over the course of time, the significant concentration of immigrants in certain districts, combined with political coalitions with powerful parties, may lead to substantive political participation in cities. Crises in such cities have reinforced this process. Thus cities may play a prominent role in establishing new practices of political participation and integration.

A different trajectory towards more political participation and inclusive integration policies is shown by Swedish and Dutch societies and their cities. In both these countries, rather comprehensive integration policies were introduced at the national level in a period in which immigration and immigrant integration was much less politicized: in Sweden in the mid-1970s and in The Netherlands at the beginning of the 1980s. In both cases there was also an active and fruitful relation between research and policy in this field. These conditions have promoted the early establishment of liberal and inclusive measures and policies in these countries, leading, among other things, to the early introduction of local voting rights for aliens (Sweden in 1976, The Netherlands 1985) and easier access to naturalisation. Such novelties (at that time) were introduced with the conviction and awareness that forces within migrant groups need to be mobilized to have policies accepted and implemented and cohesion created. Naturalisation and local voting rights were seen as a means to promote integration, rather than as final testimony of acquired integration.

However, the trajectories and achievements described above for cities in the UK, Sweden and The Netherlands do seem to be exceptional rather than the standard pattern. In most other cases of the cities of the MPMC-project, the stimulating factors mentioned above have been absent. The question of when, and what kind of policies are developed in these cities seems to be closely related to the urgency of the situation. In practice, crisis situations often lead to actions and policies that strongly and lopsidedly reflect the perceptions and interests of locally dominant groups.

3.2. Democratic impatience

If integration policies are accepted, an additional aspect of the logic of policy-making emerges. In contradistinction to the long-term nature of the integration processes discussed above, political mechanisms in democratic societies require policies to bear fruit within much shorter – in between election – terms. Unrealistic promises and demands derived from such “democratic impatience” (Vermeulen and Penninx, 1994) – that is, the political desire to have quick solutions for problems and processes of a long-term character – often leads to backlashes. The vigorous debate on the (supposed) failure of integration policies in The Netherlands since 2000 is a shining example.
More difficult than democratic impatience, however, is the situation in which the political climate (of anti-immigration and anti-immigrant sentiments, translated into political movements and politicization of the topics of immigration and integration) prevents well-argued policy proposals from being accepted. Unfortunately, this has become the case in several European countries and cities, the Zurich example as described by Mahnig (2004) being an extreme example of this. It means that much more attention should be given to the question of how to frame immigration and integration policies politically in such a way that these are acceptable and accepted by the ruling political system, political parties and their rank and file.

3.3. Implementing policy: context and contents

All the foregoing observations relate to the political process that may or may not lead to the establishment of explicit integration policies or block such a route. I will add here some observations on the form and content of such policies, where they have been established.

First of all, as indicated above, integration policies are by necessity context bound. It is implicated in the answer to the question: into what are immigrants supposed to integrate? At the state-level, the differences between countries in the ideologies and practical models through which they incorporate (alien) immigrants have received rather systematic attention (see a.o. Bauböck et al., 1996; Brubaker, 1992; Castles and Miller, 1998; Favell, 2000; Freeman, 1995; Guiraudon, 1998; Hammar, 1985; Soysal, 1994).

This context-bound nature is illustrated by Vermeulen (1997) who compares immigrant policies in five European countries since the 1960s, specifically relating to: a) integration and labour market policies; b) policies relating to immigrant languages, and c) policies in relation to religious systems introduced by immigrants. His study shows that the actual content of integration policies is to a great extent dependent on, or inspired by, the pre-existing institutional arrangements in these domains within the different countries. For a country that traditionally had differing, recognized languages within its territory (or religions for that matter), it is easier in principle to make additional provisions for newcomers in this domain. In the same vein, Vermeulen and Slijper (2003) analyse the practice of multicultural policies in Canada, Australia and the USA. The multiculturalism of these countries differs not only in terms of its historical development; the practice of it turns out to be clearly context-bound. Both these examples pertain to the national level of states, but the same rule holds for the level of cities, as the MPMC-study (Penninx et al., 2004) and the comparative analysis of city policies of Michael Alexander (2003, 2007) have shown.

3.4. Three prototypical models of integration policies

Local variations in institutional arrangements and in opportunities for integration policies and participation of immigrants may be explained to a significant extent by diverging national policies, institutional settings and their underlying conceptions, as the body of cross-national research suggests. Embedded as cities are in their national contexts, they necessarily reflect national policies and conceptions. I will demonstrate
this by comparing political “problem definitions” of immigrants and their integration at the national level, and the ensuing strategies to be applied in these policies.

A first prototypical definition is the one that defines the immigrant principally as an alien and outsider. That society is emphatically not defining itself as an immigration country and migrants are therefore temporary “guests”. At best, measures may be taken to make that temporary stay comfortable and profitable for both parties and to facilitate their anticipated return; there is no logical ground for inclusive policies that would incorporate these immigrants as full citizens or political actors. Such an exclusionary definition leads to the kind of policies that Michael Alexander (2003, 2007) in his typology calls either non-policy or guestworker policy. Forms and instruments of such policies are variant and accidental, being mostly ad-hoc reactions to concrete problems.

In contrast to such exclusionary policies, we also find definitions that in principle include immigrants in the course of time, in the way their inclusion is envisaged. However, two distinct political definitions of immigrants and their integration can be discerned. The first one is prototypically formulated in the French, Republican vision. As a consequence of this vision of the State, its relation to citizens, and the ensuing political system and institutional arrangements in the public sphere, the distinction between citizens and aliens is crucial. Alien immigrants should preferably become citizens and thus become recognized as individual political actors. Immigrant collectivities are not recognized as such. French Republican terminology avoids notions like ethnicity, ethnic minorities and multiculturalism that suggest collectiveness and institutionalized difference of any sort, be it origin, culture, religion or class. Formal equality on the individual level is the overriding political principle. In this sense, this definition principally depoliticizes the issue of immigrants and their integration (which does not prevent immigration becoming an overriding issue for established parties).

The second prototypical inclusionary vision is the Anglo-American one, in which immigrants are also supposed to take up citizenship individually, but having done so, the political system leaves much room for collective manifestation and action of immigrants. Ethnicity and ethnic minorities are perceived as relevant notions, even to the extent that the total population in censuses for example, is officially registered as such. Although equality is also an important principle in this political vision, there is the additional notion that substantive equality may in practice be related to membership of cultural, ethnic, immigrant or disadvantaged groups. Political struggle between groups on issues of multiculturalism is thus an explicit part of politics (irrespective of the outcomes of such political struggles).

The internal logic of these prototypical inclusive visions leads to different strategies employed in integration policies. The French Republican system leads principally to strategies that give priority to general policies such as equality within the given system. There is avoidance of designating fixed target groups and there is non-recognition of collective manifestations and organisations as important actors. The inherent problem of such a definition is that of mobilizing and engaging forces from within immigrant groups (which are feared as counteracting integration) in the implementation of policies.

The second vision tends to be more inclined to designate target groups and formulate group-specific policies, even to the extent that positive discrimination or affir-
mative action may be part of such policies; it is more prone to recognize, if not stimulate, forms of representation of such groups, for example by extending subsidies directly to immigrant organisations, or indirectly by subsidizing certain activities of such groups; this vision is also more inclined to combine equality with cultural difference, implying recognition of cultural and religious aspects of integration processes.

We have outlined these two models of inclusion intentionally as prototypical contrasting ones in order to illustrate their internal logic. In practice, we see many variations and eclectic mixing between elements of both visions in the definitions and instruments of policies. This is the case both on the national and the city level (see Penninx et al., 2004). The elements of this mixing, moreover, may also change in the course of time.

3.5. Divergence versus convergence

The preceding section argues that differences in (national and local) contexts lead to divergence and to integration policies in plurality. But how does the picture look if we bring together evidence and arguments for convergence?

Several cross-national studies indicate forms of convergence, be they hesitant or partial. Vermeulen (1997: 150–152) listed a number of issues that show at least some convergence. Firstly, in immigration policy, particularly concerning the residential status regulations for immigrants of non EU-countries, the European Commission has issued a number of directives in recent years that partially harmonize member state policies.

Furthermore, some convergence has also occurred in naturalisation policies. For example, the wide disparities between French and German legislation and practice in this field have narrowed; in German legislation the jus sanguinis element is being relaxed and the jus soli principle has been introduced to enable children of immigrants to gain citizenship more easily, while in France the jus soli principle has lost ground in recent years. The studies of Weil (2001) and Hansen and Weil (2001) on methods of adjudicating nationality to aliens confirm the convergence tendency on a European scale.

Recently, Bauböck et al. (2006a, b) and Bauböck, Perchinig and Sievers (2007) confirmed this trend in a detailed comparison of practice of acquisition and loss of nationality in EU member states, although there is no clear linearity in developments.

Vermeulen also sees some convergence in the use of a common terminology that is particularly encouraged by supranational organisations. He warns, however, that such common vocabulary of “integration” and “multiculturalism” may be deceptive: “Using the same words does not necessarily mean people agree in their ideas. It could even serve to create the illusion of agreement” (Vermeulen, 1997: 152).

Apart from these convergence tendencies that stem from national or even supranational levels of policy action, there are specific forces at work at the local level that lead to convergence. It seems that the strong local character of the settlement process of immigrants itself acts as a major force towards convergence of policies. Whatever the institutional arrangements are, local authorities have to find answers to the same questions, such as how to provide immigrants with adequate housing and jobs, how to make
educational and health facilities available for them, but also how to react to their demands to fulfil religious obligations or facilities to use and teach their mother tongues.

They also have to deal with very similar reactions from the native population to immigrants, and processes of discrimination and social exclusion. Neglecting and avoiding these questions is easier at the more distant level of national policies, but in cities these questions make themselves concretely felt, the more so if the number of immigrants and their concentration in certain parts of the city increase. If city authorities do not address such questions on their own initiative, they may be forced to do so by emerging crises. “Inner city riots” as they are often called in the UK, or the banlieu-problème in France are illustrations of triggers that may lead to (new) policies for and of cities. In this sense such crises may be seen as “bottom-up” forces for convergence.

A logical consequence of such area-specific manifestations as triggers for policies is that such policies are often framed as space-specific policies in which housing, concentration and segregation are central issues. The “Inner City Policies” in the UK since 1968 and the “Politique de la Ville” in France since the 1990s illustrate this.

Such forces do not only stimulate the emergence of policies and influence their content, in their implementation they also tend in the end to encourage similar strategies. In some cases, consultation with immigrants and engagement of individuals and organisations in implementation is part of policies from the beginning, as the Manchester case described by Moore (2004) illustrates. If this is not the case, however, it often soon becomes clear that it is impossible effectively to implement immigrant policies without linking into the immigrant groups themselves, and engaging these in the formulation and implementation. Moore’s (2004) Marseille and Toulouse cases illustrate adequately how the city authorities there have found informal ways of linking into immigrant groups by recruiting mediators from them. The Oeiras case – a suburb of Lisbon – shows another solution to the same problem: while not recognizing immigrant status or ethnicity as a relevant criterion, the Town Hall simply uses existing neighbourhood, sport and leisure organisations that happen to be mainly immigrant organisations (Marques and Santos, 2004). These and other examples suggest that conditions for effective implementation lead to a certain convergence in the strategy used, although the forms may differ.

4. Levels of integration policies and actors involved

Integration processes from the point of view of immigrants themselves are taking place primarily at a local level, and since circumstances there may vary significantly, local policies for integration should have the highest priority. Additionally, from the perspective of the city, there is a priority argument: the city receives newcomers of all sorts and of different origins who bring with them different cultures, religions and lifestyles. Their integration into the social embroidery of the city is not a natural process: social segregation, social exclusion and marginalization of (certain of these) immigrant groups is luring, threatening the social cohesion in these cities. The cities and their neighbourhoods are the places where important things happen that affect the daily lives
of all residents, including immigrants. It is also the level where loyalty of newcomers and old residents can be gained, or for that matter, lost.

If we follow this evidence-based starting point, it also follows that such local policies should be given instruments and room to act in locally adequate ways. National policies, and, by implication, also European integration policies, should primarily facilitate local actors, both governmental and civil society actors, by setting general frameworks, rules and instruments.

4.1. National and local policies

In practice, relations between national and local levels of policy are not always smooth and complementary. In the European context, tensions between the national arena and the local one have developed according to two different patterns. The first patterns are in countries such as Switzerland, Germany and Austria, where national integration policies have been piecemeal or absent completely, and where pressures to formulate adequate policies and claims for competence and resources have come from their big cities. The cities of Zurich, Bern and Basel in Switzerland, for example – in the complete absence of such policies at the national level – took the initiative of developing local policies (Leitbilder: D’Amato and Gerber, 2005) in the late 1990s, while Berlin, Frankfurt and Vienna developed such policies earlier under the same conditions of absence of national policies and resources.

In countries where integration policies have started rather early, on the national level, such as The Netherlands and Sweden, such tensions take a different form. The major cities in these countries have been confronted with immigration on a quite different scale than the average in the country, expressing itself in high pressure on essential institutions such as the housing system (segregation and degeneration of neighbourhoods), the labour market (disproportionate unemployment, high levels of social benefit costs) and the educational system (concentration of pupils of immigrant origin in certain sectors and spaces) and public order (racial harassment, crime and tensions between groups). In view of such developments, these big cities have joined forces to claim more executive power and resources from the national government to cope with such problems. In these two countries, general policies for urban areas and integration policies for immigrants were brought together – at least in the formal sense – in one framework in recent years, creating in principle new and more comprehensive possibilities.

Common to all these cases is that such tensions often lead to a critical dialogue between big cities and national governments on topics where national and local policies become contradictory. Cities will not always win these battles on principle. At the same time, however, city authorities may use their discretionary power to gain more room to manoeuvre in favour of (certain) immigrants. What such examples make clear – and this is the broader message – is that the interests at stake in integration policies and their practice at the local level of cities may be substantially different, or perceived differently, at the local and national level. At the city level, the confrontation with the day-to-day consequences of immigration is much more direct. If any serious attempt to cope with these problems is taken at that level, or – in a positive formulation – efforts are
made to get the best gains out of the presence of newcomers, this will place pressure on
the higher and more abstract national level.

4.2. What to expect from EU-integration policies

What can be expected from EU-policies in view of the ideal division of tasks
outlined above and taking into account the political will of the European Commission
in the field of EU integration policies as expressed in the *Communication* (2003), the
results of the Thessaloniki Summit (June 2003) and the Ministerial Conference of No-
vember 2004 and its Common Basic Principles for Integration? What special tasks
could the EU and the European Commission (EC) take on in favour of policies at the
national and local level? In my view these can be listed briefly as follows.

The first task of the EU is *frame-setting*. The EC could frame both (im-)migration
and integration, and the nexus between the two, in a different way to how this is cur-
rently and predominantly done at the national level in most EU-countries. There could
be a move from defensive and mainly control-centered policies to a pro-active, future-
oriented, comprehensive approach to immigration; towards a balanced approach bet-
ween (realistic) problem-orientation and the possible present and future gains of immi-
gration, thus furthering acceptance of immigration; accentuating the necessity for com-
mon action in both the immigration and integration domain. The EC is in principle in a
position to orient negative competition and “burden shifting” practices among EU-member
states towards an approach that focuses on common interests.

The frame-setting task is one that has to be done in the first place within the po-
itical and bureaucratic setting of the EU/EC and between “Brussels” and the national
authorities and policy makers, which implies tough and long negotiations. But using
Sarah Spencer’s formulation, the EC/EU should also take “active responsibility for
leading a balanced, informed, public debate about the reasons migrants are in Europe
by putting into the public domain information about the contribution they make and
barriers they experience, acknowledging public fears, and correcting misinformation”
(Spencer, 2003: 2). This wider task is of great importance because it prepares the
ground for policy making in civil society and among the population at large and mobi-
lizes a counterforce against populist anti-immigrant political exploitation. Communica-
tions such as the ones mentioned earlier can be regarded as important first steps in the
efforts of the European Commission to set a sound frame for policy action.

The second function or task that follows from frame-setting is *norm-setting*. The
abovementioned general frame should be worked out in a number of norm-setting reg-
ulations, directives, or even laws that pinpoint basic starting points for integration po-
licies. Such norms pertain to:

a) The definition of the target group of integration policies. Important norm-setting re-
gulations could be developed, among others, relating to the following questions:

- Which immigrants are regarded, and at what particular point in time, as residents,
  for whom comprehensive integration policies are applicable? (Here again immi-
  gration/admission policies and integration policies should be clearly coordi-
  nated.)
- How should admission policies distinguish between temporary migrants and long-term residents, and if migrants are initially admitted temporarily, when does “temporariness” end?

- What status should be accorded to family members and marriage partners of established immigrants?

b) The scope of integration policies. If the ultimate aim would be in principle full access of long-term residents to all public institutions and facilities of the society of settlement, then in the course of time a system of norms could be developed systematically (through political negotiation) for the three basic dimensions of citizenship: the socio-economic, the legal-political, and the cultural/religious dimension.

c) Anti-discrimination policies. In fact this is the negative corollary of positive norm-setting. It is a necessary element in policies, but it also has severe limitations. I have explained elsewhere (Penninx, 2000) in a paper on Social Exclusion that any anti-discrimination norm assumes a positive norm-setting in the first place, against which some are being discriminated. Since, and as long as, positive norm-setting differs in national contexts, the practical use of anti-discrimination norms also differs between countries.

Thirdly, apart from frame-setting and norm-setting, the EC in practice has instruments to promote activities related to the development of integration policies. Specific budget lines of General Directorates in charge of certain policy domains (Justice and Home Affairs for immigration, asylum and reception of asylum seekers and refugees; Social Affairs and Employment for integration and anti-discrimination) can be used to mobilize forces, for example, to set up systems for systematically collecting information (both internally and externally), to have certain policy questions researched externally, et cetera.

Furthermore, a special fund has been created to involve non-governmental agencies in the reception of asylum seekers and refugees (European Refugee Fund). In 2003, a programme to promote integration projects and the dissemination of their good practices was started: the INTI (Integration of Third Country Nationals) programme. The expectation that this INTI-programme would expand significantly has recently been realized by a decision of the Council in 2007 to establish a substantial and specific Integration Fund that has Euros 825 Million available for the 2007–2013 period.

The significance of such EC-financing activity for the development of integration policies can be high if such activities enable local actors in integration policies to develop and implement strategic projects, if successful pilot projects are analysed and reported systematically, and their results disseminated as examples of good practices.

5. Strategies and instruments for local policies

Evaluations of local policies point to a number of important strategic and tactical aspects of such policies. In the first place, in order to become effective, such policies have to engage partners in the integration process at different levels: immigrants in the first place at the individual level, the level of their organisations and the institutional level. Too much policy conception is “top-down”, addressing individual immigrants,
while, to be successful, much of the policy implementation has to rely on mobilizing forces within immigrant groups. A number of good examples of using the potential within groups have been developed and are developing: for example, mentor-projects of immigrant students who monitor younger co-ethnics during their secondary education; immigrant organisations mobilizing their rank and file for training and language courses, or for labour market projects; participation of women immigrants, etc.

Local policies should involve important players in the receiving society as well: institutional actors, such as churches, trade unions, employers’ organisations, political parties, media, that is, civil society in general. Such non-governmental partners are important in two ways. Firstly, as direct partners in the implementation of policies. But they may be even more important as political actors. They may influence the political climate and contribute to framing the policy questions in such a way that adequate policies are accepted. They may be important agents in combating exclusion, discrimination and xenophobia. In the Swiss case, for example, institutional agents such as churches, trade unions and employers’ organisations have often helped to avert the danger of anti-immigrant referenda being accepted. In the German case, trade unions and churches have been – in the absence of governmental integration policies – the most important actors and promoters of the integration process of foreign workers.

Local integration policies should define clear priorities for action in a number of domains of integration. For long-term immigrants, priority should be given to domains in which local authorities have effective and generally accepted instruments to promote integration (and prevent exclusion): the economic domain of work and the social domain, particularly education and housing. Policies in the political and cultural domain (including religion) are indispensable to integrate immigrants over the long term. The forms that policies in the latter domains initially may take depend to a great extent on the existing institutional arrangements in receiving societies and cities. In the long term, however, gradual changes towards more inclusive policies are indispensable.

On the more concrete level of strategic instruments, evaluations suggest that an important strategy is that of monitoring outcomes both of general public institutions and of specific integration policies. Monitoring is a device for developing awareness, to establish an empirically based diagnosis and thereby an instrument for steering policies. The basic assumption involved here is that the position of newcomers in a society is determined to a great extent by the (mostly unintended) differential impact of general public institutions. Because of their socio-economic status, their immigration-related characteristics, and, sometimes, their cultural/religious characteristics, the outcomes for immigrants may be unequal. Such unintended outcomes can be higher unemployment and thus (if access is permitted) over-representation in social welfare or benefit regulations for the disabled, as is the case in The Netherlands; or lower educational attainments of immigrant children; or concentration/segregation through housing policies and regulations. Turning this reasoning around means that monitoring outcomes leads to awareness of the functioning of general public institutions for immigrants, and when the procedures through which the unequal outcomes are scrutinized, it will lead to a clear diagnosis. (On the level of the EU, the Thessaloniki Summit in June 2003 decided
that the Annual Report of states should have this same function as an instrument for progressive policy-making. So far, however, the quality and depth of these annual reports has been meagre.)

A second important element for local policies is to provide newcomers with the basic tools needed to acquire a place in society independently: a toolkit of training in the language of the society of settlement, basic knowledge of that society, civic training, etc. The idea here, which also draws on the lessons learnt from earlier policies relating to temporary migrants and guest workers, is that immigrants should be given the necessary tools to find a place in the new society; tools that prepare them for full participation. Several countries and cities are developing policies in this field. It is important, however, to look at such efforts as primarily facilitating the beginning of an integration process (and thus avoid normative claims of adaptation or assimilation). Such activities should preferably take place in connection with trajectories for the labour market or further education.

6. Policy fundamentals and dilemmas

There are many lessons to be drawn from the foregoing general observations on integration processes and policies relating to these processes. In reformulating these lessons, there are three fundamental points, which may sometimes present themselves for policy-makers as dilemmas, derived from the logic of integration processes:

The first is that a key condition for effective integration policies is transparency of immigrant admission and their residential and legal status (the immigration-integration nexus). Expectations of, and actual long-term-residence, should be expressed in an adequate legal position and opportunities to participate in politics and policy-making, especially in policies that affect their position. In this legal-political domain, local policies are to a great extent dependent on immigration, integration and naturalization policies at the national level, but not completely. First of all, they have discretionary power in the implementation of national regulations and, furthermore, they may develop effective alternative channels for participation, thereby creating a city-related form of inclusion and citizenship as was shown in the MPMC-project (Penninx et al., 2004).

Secondly, integration policies should be comprehensive in the dimensions and domains covered, thereby signifying that they not only represent concerns of the native majority, but are also built on needs as defined by the immigrants. The economic and the social domains, particularly the labour market, education, housing and health, are priority domains. However, policies in the political and cultural domain (including religion) are indispensable for integration over the long term. The forms that such policies may take depend very much in practice on the existing institutional arrangements in receiving societies and cities, and on the political willingness to change these to become gradually more inclusive.

Thirdly, local integration policies should follow strategies and tactics that engage the partners in the integration process at different levels. It should combine “top down” activation elements with “bottom up” mobilization. It should define the process of inte-
migration as “open”, within the rules of liberal-democratic societies, leaving room for a more diverse, but cohesive society as a result.

The preceding observations on the logic of policy-making give rise to some additional fundamentals or dilemmas. The first is that, to get policies established, we not only need a solid scientific knowledge of the logic of integration processes, but also an adequate political definition that makes such policies politically acceptable and endorsed. What is needed is a balanced framework which does not hide problems to be solved, but primarily stresses the common interest of all. There is much to be gained here: not only avoiding crises that experience has shown to be inevitable if problems are consistently neglected, but also restoring and promoting cohesiveness in cities and states that makes it possible to reap the potential fruits of immigration and immigrants. Acceptance of immigrants and their active participation is an essential condition in such a framework. Negotiated new forms of diversity will result from it. On this front, there is still much work to be done by all the actors, but primarily by politicians.

A second lesson is that the viability of integration policies in the long term depends heavily on setting realistic targets to be attained and on having an adequate analysis of the institutional setting and its possibilities upon which such policies are constructed. Such a – less ideology-driven – practical approach, combined with active participation of immigrants and their organizations, will not only avoid backlash effects among the majority population, it will also result in a practice in which immigrants are involved and feel recognized.

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INTEGRACIJSKI PROCESI MIGRANATA: NALAZI ISTRAŽIVANJA I IZAZOVI ZA JAVNE POLITIKE

SAŽETAK

U radu se raspravlja o integracijskim procesima imigranata i manjina skorašnjeg imigrantskog porijekla kao i o javnim politikama koje se odnose na naseljavanje tih pridošlica u europska društva na svim relevantnim razinama: od lokalne razine općina i gradova do nacionalne razine država i međunarodne razine Europske unije. Ipak, unutar tog općeg pristupa, jako se naglašava lokalna razina jer se te javne politike trebaju provesti na njoj i prvenstveno se na njoj zamjećuju, a osjećaju ih kako sami migranti tako i oni dijelovi društva koje imigracija najviše pogađa. Kako bi se prikazalo sadašnje stanje istraživanja integracije i integracijskih politika, u prvom dijelu rada istražuje se prirodna integracijskih procesa, njihova konceptualizacija i pouke empirijskih istraživanja. Razlog bavljenja tim temama je tvrđnja da se svaka integracijska politika treba zasnovati na iscrplnom, znan-
stveno utemeljeno znanju o procesima integracije i isključivanja: ako javna politika želi upravljati takvim procesom, treba imati jasnu ideju o tome koje instrumente može upotrijebiti u slučaju moguće intervencije, u kojem dijelu procesa i u kojem posebnom trenutku. Takvo jestanje čvrsta polazna točka za kreiranje javne politike, ali to nije dovoljno. Procesi kreiranja javne politike i njegove provedbe imaju svoj vlastiti određeni tijek, ali oni se ne moraju odvijati usporedno s integracijskim procesom. Zbog toga u nastavku autor nastoji objasniti neke od tih procesa. Na kraju rada vraća se bitnim pitanjima – imigraciji i integracijskim politikama s jedne strane, a s druge odnosu između lokalnih, nacionalnih i međunarodnih integracijskih politika.

KLJUČNE RIJEČI: imigracija, integracija, integracijska politika

Rinus Penninx
PROCESSUS D'INTÉGRATION DES MIGRANTS: RÉSULTATS DE RECHERCHES ET DÉFIS POLITIQUES PUBLIQUES

RÉSUMÉ

Cet article traite des processus d'intégration des immigrants et des minorités récemment immégrées, ainsi que des politiques publiques concernant ces nouveaux venus dans les sociétés européennes, à tous les niveaux concernés, depuis le niveau municipal local jusqu’au niveau national de l’État et au niveau international de l’Union européenne. L’auteur se penche plus particulièrement sur le niveau local, car c’est à ce niveau que ces politiques sont censées être mises en œuvre et que qu’elles sont directement sensibles, tant pour les immigrants eux-mêmes que pour les segments de la société qui sont le plus touchés par l’immigration. Afin de montrer l’état actuel des recherches sur l’intégration et les politiques d’intégration, l’article étudie dans sa première partie la nature des processus d’intégration, leur conceptualisation et les enseignements des études empiriques. La raison de l’intérêt consacré à ces thèmes réside dans l’affirmation selon laquelle chaque politique d’intégration doit se baser sur une connaissance exhaustive et scientifiquement fondée des processus d’intégration et d’exclusion : si une politique publique veut gérer ces processus, elle doit avoir une idée claire des instruments qu’elle peut utiliser pour intervenir, dans quel segment du processus et à quel moment précis. De telles connaissances livrent un solide point de départ pour l’élaboration d’une politique publique, mais elles ne sont pas suffisantes. Les processus de création et de mise en œuvre d’une politique publique suivent un cours qui leur est propre, et ne coïncident pas nécessairement avec le processus d’intégration. C’est pourquoi dans la deuxième partie de l’article l’auteur s’efforce d’expliquer certains de ces processus. Dans la troisième partie il revient sur les questions essentielles: l'immigration et les politiques d'intégration d'une part, les rapports entre politiques d'intégration locales, nationales et internationales d'autre part.

MOTS CLÉS : immigration, intégration, politique d'intégration