Nationalism in a Transnational Context: 
Croatian Diaspora, Intimacy and 
Nationalist Imagination

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This paper contributes to existing debates on the significance of modern diasporas in the context of global politics. In particular, it examines how nationalism has adapted to the newly emerging transnational environment. The new type of nationalism, long-distance nationalism, utilises modern forms of communication and travel to sustain its potency and relevance. Long-distance nationalism is not a simple consequence of global and transnational communication, but involves complex cultural, political and symbolic processes and practices. The first part of this paper examines some theoretical issues pertaining to the intersection between nationalism and transnational environments. It shows how nationalism is not antithetical to globalising and transnationalising tendencies, but instead, that it is becoming adapted to these new social conditions. In order to move beyond a rather simple assertion that transnationalism and nationalism are safely co-existing, the paper argues that such cases of symbiosis are always concrete and ethnographically documentable. This paper grew out of the need to both assert the coexisting nature of nationalism and transnationalism and to provide a concrete example of nationalist sentiments in a modern transnational setting. This latter aim represents the core of the second part of the paper, which is based on research among second generation Croatians in Australia. It specifically explores the under-examined question of how nationalist sentiments inform and define people’s intimacy and marriage choices. The examination of this domain of intimacy is seen as an important test of the intensity of nationalist sentiments.

Key words: TRANSNATIONALISM, LONG-DISTANCE NATIONALISM, DIASPORA, SECOND GENERATION

Introduction

Transnationalism, globalisation and diasporas are integral elements in modern theorisations of the contemporary social condition. These tendencies are well-established, and the contemporary whirlwind they cause is indeed all encompassing. The grip of globalisation is today sufficiently strong to leave no aspect of social existence unchallenged and unperturbed.

This paper is an attempt to theorise this new social condition from the point of view of its impact on national identities and nationalism. A series of questions have emerged that represent a challenge to traditional understanding of the relations between territory, enduring nationalism and the emergence of new cosmopolitan sentiments. This paper seeks to contextualise these large-scale social changes within the setting of marriage and intimacy. The first part of this paper will discuss and elaborate on the idea that nationalism and ethnicity find considerable emancipatory potential in modern transnational frameworks.

But this paper also argues that we need to move beyond simple recognition of a symbiotic relationship between nationalism and transnationalism. This can most effectively be achieved through explorations of concrete manifestations of nationalism in a concrete transnational research setting. In order to achieve this, the second part of this paper shows how nationalism is an important and existing reality among the sample of second generation Cro-
atians in Australia. This case study is particularly interesting because it explores the existence of nationalist sentiments in the most personal location — the domain of intimacy and marriage and partnership choice. The existing scholarship tends to thematise links between gender and nationalism (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1989; Yuval-Davis, 1997; Mayer, 2000) or nationalism and so-called “productively oriented sexualities” (Parker, 1992:6), but there is a distinct lack of understanding of these relationships in a modern diaspora context. The case study is based on ethnographic research which, as Appadurai (1996) points out, is best suited to help us understand “the nature of locality as a lived experience in a globalized, deterritorialized world” (Appadurai, 1996:52).

Diasporas as Actors in the Global and Transnational Framework

Globalisation has considerable consequences for the way in which the social world is experienced both by individuals and ethnic groups and nations. Although migrations are a permanent feature of the human condition, never before in history have so many people traveled so often and so far away. The members of well established diasporas in the past had to rely on what could be best described as the transcendental notion of home and homeland, with little or no chance of visiting the ancestral land. Today, the imagery of homeland is only a fingertip or a phone call away and the actual visit is no longer beyond the realm of realistic possibility. The dramatic changes governing the frequency, cost and ease with which we utilise modern technologies to enable long-distance communication are relatively recent but they are nevertheless far reaching (Sheffer, 1995). The Internet technologies that are now accessible to a rather broad stratum of a population in the Western Hemisphere and beyond have only been massively introduced over the past decade. Similarly, it’s not just the ease but also the cost of communication that has made the interaction across long-distances much more accessible. For example, over the period of ten years since I have lived in Australia, the cost of a phone call to keep in touch with my family in Slovenia has decreased just a fraction less than four hundred per cent. The political and cultural implications of this shift towards easier transcendence of time and space are highly significant. This impressive drama of change and the experience of time-space compression invite us to think that technological and communication advancement represent the defining core of this change. It is easy to be tempted to jump on a bandwagon of technological reductionism. While communication and cultural technologies are indeed of central significance to these processes, they do not cause them in the final instance.

It is not surprising that over the past two decades sociologists, anthropologists and cultural studies theorists have began to focus on changes which the twin processes of relativisation of time and space and the interpenetration of local and global bring about. Holton (1998) captured this new tendency in a memorable metaphor about the death of geography. Instead of the world rigidly divided into nation-states and continents, a new transnational framework has slowly been emerging against their background. That does not mean that the world of nation-states is now obsolete and in the throes. Instead, Holton reminds us that alongside the process of increased interconnectedness we also witness “the continuing development of the nation-state and a revival of ethnicity” (Holton, 1998:7). A.D. Smith (1995:160) makes a similar point when he argues that both nationalism and the nation “remain indispensable elements of an interdependent world and a mass-communications culture.”

But while in complete agreement with these views, I believe that there is also little doubt that new, global and largely deterritorialised frames of reference, which allow for transcendence of nation-state frameworks, is now coming into being. We witness the emergence of what Appadurai (1996) has called global ethnoscapes that are no longer defined by fixities and stabilities but by an increasingly dynamic communities and transnational networks. The
The warp of former stability is now “everywhere shot through with the wool of human motion, as more persons and groups deal with the realities of having to move or the fantasies of wanting to move”. Most importantly, these massive movements of people are now played out on the global scale.

Diaspora communities of globally (forcibly and voluntarily) uprooted populations are becoming prominent actors in both international politics and in the context of host societies. Diasporas are therefore not simply an organisational form but they represent both the new “type of consciousness” (Vertovec, 1997) and symptoms of globalisation (McGrew, 1992). While I share Tölölyan’s (1996:8) view that the concept of diaspora is nowadays used far too loosely, there is little doubt that diaspora networks are becoming increasingly important players in transnational politics. They are indeed “the exemplary communities of the transnational moment” (Tölölyan, 1991:5). It is not surprising that in their classical account of transnationalism, Schiller, Basch and Blanc-Szanton (1992) define this phenomenon in clear juxtaposition to the idea that immigration evokes permanent rapture and uprootedness. Instead, they see transnational migrants and communities as a new form of consciousness. “Transmigrants develop and maintain multiple relations — familial, economic, social, organizational, religious, and political that span borders. Transmigrants take actions, make decisions, and feel concerns, and develop identities within social networks that connect them to two or more societies simultaneously” (Schiller et al., 1992:1—2). Diaspora individuals thus engage in constant negotiation of identities between different, but as far as they are concerned, equally significant aspects of lives, determined by homelands, cultures, identities — and not seldom — citizenships. This inter-connectivity is precisely what requires further understanding and analysis. What we understand well is that diasporas, migratory movements and globalising processes are closely aligned. What we lack, however, is a better understanding of the dynamics that these related processes produce. It seems that this is precisely where social theorising and our conceptual apparatus need to combine with specific ethnographic analyses.

**Long-distance Politics of Ethnicity and Nationalism: Negotiating Identities in a Transnational Framework**

Transnationalism has opened up a new space of action and communication. It added a new dimension to global identity politics which, in a world in which nation-ness is a norm, clearly involves ethnic and nationalist politics. In such a world, migrants and their offspring can not simply rationally sever their ties with the past and culture constitutive to their identities. The assimilationist ambitions of the past, according to which migrants should simply forget who they are and where they are coming from, are today perhaps still much desired but they can not be rendered as anything more than wishful fantasies. This is partly so because of the widespread recognition that contemporary borders are increasingly porous both in terms of communication and physical movement. If anything, the transnational negotiation of ethnic identities and nationalist sentiments is more likely today than at any other point in history. The homeland and diaspora settings have never been “closer” and communication between people inhabiting these spaces has never been more frequent and easier. We need to be reminded, however, that multiple relationships between these two settings are not only taking place in real space and time but also through the use of symbolic economies of memory and imagination.

Moreover, the proliferated transnational context is not to be held responsible for the invention of diaspora-homeland interaction. The connectivity of this rather intense and interesting kind has pre-dated jet travel and satellite communication networks although it is clear that the effectiveness of emotionally intense ethnic and nationalist attachments greatly benefit from these networks. For example, it was back in 1866, as Glazer and Moynihan
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(1965:242) tell us, that the Irish in America tried to liberate Ireland by attacking Canada. The rationale for this strategy may somewhat escape us but the scenario for global conduct of the nationalist struggle has clearly been present even in that era. The American Irish in the post-Second World War period have been no less staunch supporters of Irish “liberation” then their predecessors a century earlier but, instead of attacking the innocent neighbours, they have channelled their nationalist fantasies into the global arms market and busyng themselves by organising the arms shipments through rough states of the Middle East. These two generations of nationalists were fundamentally doing the same thing but they utilised different, historically conditioned technologies and channels. What ought to be remembered is that at the bottom of their endeavours is not technology, but the idea of national, ethnic and political imaginings for which technology is simply a medium of convenience (Anderson, 1994; Margolis, 1995; Naficy, 1991).

This increased intensification of “complex triadic relations” (Sheffer, 1986:1) between homelands, diasporas and host societies has recently became conceptualised in terms of the phenomenon that is today known as long-distance nationalism. According to this approach we need to look at contemporary nationalist struggles from the perspective of transnational framework and interconnectedness. In short, to understand Sri-Lankan conflict, one must understand the activities of Tamil Tigers in the Jaffna Peninsula, and the actions of their benefactors in Toronto, Melbourne and Zurich. Also, Kosovo Albanians would never have resisted the Serbs during the recent conflict as well as they did if it was not for Albanian migrants in Ljubljana, Frankfurt and Rome. And reportedly, the former Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu would never have come to power if it was not for the one US million dollar support of the Melbourne-based billionaire and Rabbi, Joe Gutnick.

These processes can be usefully interrogated through the use of the concept long-distance nationalism. This term was first used by Benedict Anderson (1992a, 1992b, 1994) in the context of charting new ways for explorations into the intersections of migration studies and nationalism. According to Anderson, the distinct feature of such nationalists is that they comfortably reside in a new country but their attachments to ancestral homelands may be far more intense than their technical loyalty to the new country of residence to which s/he might be bind with the act of citizenship. Moreover, such long-distance nationalists may feel no tension between their long-distance nationalist endeavours and fondness for their adopted country. One can be a respected Tamil lawyer in Canada but simultaneously also a generous financier of Jaffna-based Tamil Tigers. As Anderson rightly emphasises, such long-distance engagement in homeland politics is ethically questionable because long-distance nationalists may make a powerful impact on homeland developments by their radical imagination but they almost always abstain from having to pay the price for actions they undertake.

In my book on long-distance nationalism (Skrbiš, 1999) I tried to conceptualise long-distance nationalism as a process which is inextricably linked to the conditions of a modern global and transnational environment. To put it simply, it is that type of nationalism which crosses neighbouring states and/or continents and which is conditioned by a multitude of communication flows between diasporas and homelands. Even though such a definition has its own limitations, it nevertheless captures the main ideal-typical feature of long-distance nationalism.

Long-distance nationalism is a nationalism which is structurally embedded in a transnational network. It can be seen as manifesting itself as either elite or collective phenomenon. One does not need to go very far to find examples of such individual long-distance nationalists. For example, an American Lithuanian, Valdas Adamkus had his nationalist dreams fulfilled when he was elected president of Lithuania. The long-time leader of the Greek political scene, Andreas Papandreou, conveniently changed from a Greek to an American citizen only to pledge his utmost loyalties to his Greekness when opportunities arose. A wealthy
Serb, Milan Panić, one-time Prime Minister of Serbia, underwent a similar transition. Andrej Bajuk, a Slovene from Argentina, had his diasporic imagination fulfilled when he was briefly appointed the Prime Minister of Slovenia in 2000. Not to mention a whole stream of Israeli government ministers with a native American-English language proficiency. Last but not least, the successful career of Gojko Šušak, a Croatian migrant to Canada, should be mentioned in this context. After conducting a series of successful fund-raising campaigns to help the election victory of the Croatian Democratic Union in his homeland in 1990, he returned to Croatia in the same year, was promptly appointed the member of the Croatian government and was later entrusted with important ministerial portfolios. Šušak presented himself, and was portrayed by the official media as dedicating his life for his nation and ultimately dying for it. Appropriately, he has been reported to have concluded his life by uttering the following famous last words: “I do not regret dying, because I have experienced something that I never dreamed of!”, referring to Croatian independence (Ivanković, 1998:1).

Of all these people, Šušak was the most clear prototype of a long-distance nationalist because of his grassroots engagement with the Croatian nationalist struggle, exemplified in his much publicised smear campaigns against Tito’s communist regime (Graham, 1997/98). He was clearly in a position to imagine himself as a hero of the Croatian nationalist struggle and a hands-on liberator of his Croatian nation. Others, such as Bajuk and Vadamkus, could perhaps only see themselves as people whose mission was to help re-build and re-construct their respective homelands. In all these cases, however, we are dealing with individuals who imagined themselves as a crucial link to their nationalist ideals which their diaspora experiences helped to shape, fund and nurture.

This emphasis on well-known individuals, who draw their nationalist inspiration and political ambition from the comfortable distance of diaspora, is problematic for they are a part of a much larger and more complex picture. In other words, long-distance nationalism ought to be seen through a multitude of contexts and manifestations. At this point I wish to raise three issues that tend to be overlooked when discussing long-distance nationalism.

First, long-distance nationalism is not something that happens and stubbornly persists in well-known individuals only. Long-distance nationalism, no less than nationalism in general, can only be effective if it is conceived as a phenomenon that emerges out existing networks and out of the collective imagination of diaspora communities. In short, it is a group/community based phenomenon. For example, Fuglerud’s (1999) study on the Tamil diaspora in Norway clearly illustrates that long-distance nationalism requires an effective and functioning framework defined by diaspora community institutions, families and individuals. These three categories are then linked to political and nationalist ideals, culture and — very importantly — economic interests related to satisfaction of living standard, dowry, remittances and similar. Importantly, all these various aspects are inherently linked with each other.

Secondly, long-distance nationalism pervades both public and private spheres of life. There is plenty of evidence concerning public manifestations of long-distance nationalism. The famous long-distance nationalist individuals are acting out their roles in a distinctly public domain. Most nationalistically inspired protests and incidents in a diaspora context also fit this category. For example, the arrest of a Kurdish leader Abdullah Öcalan in Nairobi in 1999 was followed by almost instantaneous protests, co-ordinated via mobile phones and e-mail, of thousands of Kurds in all major capitals of the world. These public acts and actors, no matter how respectable or obscure, do not constitute the totality of long-distance nationalism. Such public displays of loyalty to nationalist struggle, if effective, spread beyond the public realm. As I argue below, the sentiments associated with long-distance nationalism are clearly discernible in a private world of individuals, influencing their friendship and intimacy choices.

And thirdly, while long-distance nationalism is often associated with unpopular public actions (e.g. public protests and military support for blood-stained pro-independence struggles),
it is often intertwined with a more basic problem of individuals to ascertain and maintain their ethnic distinctness in a host environment. While the process of maintenance of ethnic identity is not a form of long-distance nationalism, we can not understand the latter without appreciating the underlying significance of the former. In other words, ethnic identity maintenance in a diaspora context and long-distance nationalism often represent two stages on the same trajectory. This is not to say that there is some distinct mechanical correlation between the two phenomena: there is no reason why ethnic identity ought to culminate in nationalism.

What follows from all this is that long-distance nationalism comprises a broad spectrum of issues that are manifested in varied ways and contexts. I wish to argue that it is a phenomenon which is located somewhere within the spectrum defined by the following dichotomous extremes: elite vs. communal, public vs. private and ethnic vs. nationalist. What these three dichotomous spheres indicate is that our understanding of long-distance nationalism can only be effective if we explore it, not only through its most obvious and easily observable manifestations, but instead through the analysis of its contextual embeddedness.

The most interesting, under-explored and challenging questions that emerge from these dichotomies is whether or not nationalist sentiments can actually penetrate into the “private” sphere. This challenges the standard way of exploring nationalism by moving beyond the sphere of ethno-national stereotypy. This question is explored in the section below that provides an ethnographic account of how nationalism functions and manifests itself under the conditions of a transnational setting. In privileging the sphere of privacy, ie. intimacy, partnership and marriage choice, I exposed nationalism to perhaps most crucial test: can it be sufficiently strong to inform the conduct of intimate choices of diaspora individuals? The existing literature on marriage choices of migrants usually overlooks this possible dimension (Gordon, 1964; Blau, 1982; Crester and Leon, 1982; McCaa, 1993; Al-Rashed, 1993). By any measure, finding some evidence of nationalist sentiments in the private, intimate world of second generation individuals in diaspora would be a rather strong indication of nationalism’s capacity to persist across migrant generations in a transnational context.

The Case Study: Croatian Diaspora and the Long-distance Nationalism Thesis

I put this question to the test in my book Long-distance Nationalism (Skrbiš, 1999) which is a comparative, ethnographic study of Slovenian and Croatian diasporas in Australia. For reasons of clarity, only the data on Croatian diaspora in Australia will be outlined here. The study conceptualised long-distance nationalism both as a form of practice and as an attitudinal disposition. While the purpose of the study was not to produce a definite account on Croatian identity in Australia, the results have indicated that elements of nationalist discourse have played a part at the level of everyday experiences, actions and contexts of individuals concerned.

The study utilised a pool of 31 second generation Croatians in Adelaide, obtained through random reference chains. The data was also obtained from several dozens of informants in Adelaide, Sydney and Melbourne. The bulk of research for the study was undertaken between 1991 and 1994 which was the time of the war in Croatia, following the break-up of the Yugoslavia. There is no denying that these events would have impacted on how the respondents viewed, experienced and related to their ethnic identity and national awareness. There are two relevant observations that need to be made at this point. Firstly, the effect which the developments in the homeland had on respondents empirically confirm the idea that ethnic and national identities are negotiated in a context of transnational movement of people, ideas and images. Secondly, and no less importantly, although the homeland developments strengthened the ethno-national identity and awareness of Croatian respondents, many statements and experiences described by respondents as being linked to nationalism related to their experiences prior to the conflict.
What the research found was that most second generation individuals held some degree of negative views regarding specific ethnic groups. The two categories specified by the Croatian respondents were Yugoslavs and Serbs. The Yugoslavs were seen as embodying the position of naïveté and indeterminacy. One Croatian respondent described it as a position of someone “who is sitting on the fence”. Furthermore, those who called themselves Yugoslav but were of Croatian ethnic ancestry were seen in a particularly negative light. Their use of a Yugoslav identification label was taken as a form of denial of their “true” identity. In fact, Serbs were far more acceptable to Croatian respondents than Yugoslavs. As one respondent illustrated his point:

I can tolerate Yugoslavs less than I can tolerate Serbs. A Serb is a Serb, he could call himself a Serb and I respect him for that. I always said I would respect a Serb, whereas a Yugoslav I can’t accept because to me they are ignorant.

But when quizzed specifically about Serbs, well above half of all respondents articulated anti-Serb prejudices. So, while there clearly was some degree of prejudice (and animosity in some cases) against people belonging to Yugoslav and Serb groups in Australia, I wanted to understand how internalised these sentiments were.

Nationalist sentiments and a private and intimate sphere of diaspora individuals

I was hoping to find an alternative and perhaps more definite test for the existence of nationalist sentiments in a second generation diaspora context. In order to do this, I asked the respondents about their choice of marriage and intimate partners and whether they would object to form intimate relations with ethno-nationally constructed others. I was initially alerted to the significance and hierarchical nature of the marriage market when one of the highest-ranking Croatians in the Australian-Croatian diaspora commented on his daughter’s choice of an “Australian” husband by establishing a hierarchy of ethno-racial preference:

Of course, my wife and I would prefer a Croatian. Nevertheless, the other day I spoke to a friend of mine who said: “And what if he was yellow, black or a Serbian?” And I said: “Well, if you wish to know I would prefer it if he was black or yellow than a Serb.”

This uninvited statement is indicative of his hierarchical classification of various potential competitors for his daughter’s marriage. It suggests a range between the acceptable and desired persons embodied in a Croatian, and unacceptable persons, embodied in a Serb. In between these two extremes is a grey area of racial otherness, which does not appear to be favoured or encouraged.

In general, the idea of a marriage market is of great potential significance in attempting to understand diaspora cultures. Parents may see a marriage with a “suitable” partner of the same ethnic background as an insurance policy against their own social and cultural isolation in a host environment. Or perhaps marriage may be used for reinforcing traditional or patriarchal values. Regardless, the preference for in-marriage may also be coloured with nationalist undertones. In interviews with second generation individuals I also found that even those second generation Croatians who advocated libertarian approaches to issues of marriage and sexuality, have retained a strongly negative position on marriages with their nationalist antagonists. This finding is perhaps best expressed in the sentence by a university educated Croatian male from Adelaide in his late 20s who, when asked if he could imagine marrying a Serbian woman, bluntly responded: “Love might be blind but it can’t be stupid”. The Serb, according to Croatian nationalist imagining, represents the sum of negativity.

It is important to recognise that in-marriage per se in diaspora setting is not necessarily an indication of the nationalist bias of ethnic group members because it may stem from other social and situational factors. Nevertheless, although the frequency of in-marriage in migrant
settings is not a direct index of nationalism, one would expect that diaspora groups which discourage the "contamination" of their imagined ethnic purity for cultural or political reasons will more or less aggressively promote in-marriage. This would imply that individuals are encouraged to seek marriage and relationship partners from what I called a privileged marriage market.

In order to understand this process better I have constructed a list of ideal-typical “marriage markets” which allow for the identification of location of nationalist sentiments:

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As far as the three “marriage markets” on the “most preferred” side are concerned there is nothing particularly unique about them — they represent trends that are readily observable among many different migrant groups in Australia. I will outline their feature below, but in terms of my interest, I was particularly focusing on the anathema market.

**Privileged Marriage Market**

The privileged marriage market consists of members of the opposite sex from within the same ethnic group. Class and status are obviously considerations, but ethnic identity appears as the main determining factor. The arranged marriage, this most traditional and radical means of supply of partners from the privileged market is not what makes the privileged market in the Australian-Croatian context a functioning reality. Instead, the privileged market is constituted through parental articulations of ideal preferences to their children. These ideas bear fruit only if they are internalised by their children and if the availability of such partners is sufficient. The idea of a privileged marriage market is rather typical among diaspora groups and one can find it to be a functioning reality in the context of Greek, Italian, Vietnamese and Chinese ethnic communities in Australia.

**Privileged Marriage Sub-market**

The privileged marriage sub-markets usually contain some, but not all, of the privileged market’s characteristics (e.g. religion, language, similarities in cultures). In the case of Croats, religion was often seen as an important substitute and compensatory factor for ethnicity. The following quotation by a second generation Croatian in Adelaide best illustrates this position:

… I would prefer to marry a Croatian woman. There is also a notion of calling in life, having a Catholic-Christian faith. I believe that one is called into a particular way of life and I’d like to think that I would be called into such a life with a Croatian woman.

In practical terms, an Italian Catholic partner would be seen as an acceptable substitute for a Croatian because of the similarities in culture and religion. Importantly, a privileged sub-market always functions as a second preference to the privileged market.

**Deprivileged Marriage Market**

Between the privileged sub-market and the anathema market there exists the deprivileged market. Access to this market is not forbidden and yet it is looked upon with considerable scepticism and distrust. The respondents often constructed “Anglo-Australians” as befitting this category. It may be possible that what is perceived as a deprivileged market
by first generation migrants could is simultaneously perceived as a privileged market or privileged sub-market by second generation individuals. Likewise, what is perceived as an anathema market in the diaspora setting could well function as (at least) a privileged sub-market in the homeland.

**Anathema Market**

This segment of the marriage market is particularly important for the present discussion. The anathema market represents a stigmatised, discouraged and even forbidden option. The more articulate the notion of an anathema market among ethnic group members the more likely it is that it will impose demands on individuals. The membership of the anathema market is usually and strictly defined according to ethno-national (e.g. the Serbs, Yugoslavs) characteristics. Let me provide two quotes which perhaps best indicate the nature of this market:

[My parents] never drummed into me that I have to marry a Croatian, although they said that it would be the best for me. I know when it comes to the crunch: it can’t be a Serb.

You are joking! If I had a Serbian girlfriend I would definitely need to find new parents! That’s true. My parents couldn’t event think of me not marrying a Croatian. They couldn’t event think of an Australian wife.

In my research I have noted a very high degree of internalisation of awareness and significance of this marriage-market by second generation individuals. In fact, in the sample of 31 Australian-Croatian second generation respondents obtained through the snow-balling technique, every single one identified the existence of the anathema market and internalised an awareness of its forbidden nature.

Among the Croatian respondents, the very idea of intermarriage with a partner from an anathema market was seen as commensurate with treason to the family name as well as the nation. A case in point is a father of two Croatian respondents who called his children Janičari, the Janissarys, because they have married non-Croatian partners. The respondent reported that her father would always tell the “story of how the Turks came in and took the children to another land and they then came back and killed their own families.” Undeniably, this is a very powerful allusion and clearly is a description of the situation where one has been “stabbed in the back” — a dishonourable and unacceptable mode of conduct. However, one should bear in mind that the respondent concerned did not even marry a Serb or a Yugoslav, the representatives of the anathema market.

Croatian respondents often said that parents simply would not allow them to marry a Serb or Yugoslav if such a situation arose. As one parent put it poignantly when discussing a daughter’s marriage choices: “When you get married, make sure you bring me home a Croatian. Don’t bring me home a Serbian, first of all, Australac [Australian], Englishman or a Jew”.

It is little wonder that the reaction of second generation individuals to the existence and prescription of an anathema market is usually self-protective and consists of the simple avoidance of situations which could lead to potentially intimate relationships. Marriages between Croatians and Serbs in Australia are not common and are seen as unacceptable by the respective diaspora settings. In marriages of this kind, couples often live their own lives, isolated from the diaspora organisations.

Only one second generation respondent explained that he had a relationship with a Serbian woman but this was not something he shared with his friends from the Croatian Club. He explained his involvement in this relationship as an act of naïveté and recognised that he would be totally rejected by the Croatian community if found out. The pressures of the dias-
pora setting and parental expectations (as stated earlier in the interview) were two crucial elements which subsequently led to the break-up of the relationship. It could be said that the respondent saw no possibility of compromising his standing in the Croatian Club, her Orthodox religion ("There is no way that I would go to the Serbian Orthodox Church.") and his and her parental expectations.

Most commonly, respondents claimed there is really no possibility for them to get involved with a Serbian person on an intimate level. An individual might be attractive, but he/she is “first a Serb” and this is what takes away all attraction:

No, no, no! I wouldn’t do that. That wouldn’t happen. Not with a Serbian. If it was anyone else...

I am not against mixed marriages, neither are my parents. However, they will not allow me to marry a Serbian or Yugoslav. This doesn’t bother me because I wouldn’t even think about marrying them.

You are joking! If [I had a Serbian girlfriend] I would definitely need to find new parents! That’s true. My parents couldn’t even think of me not marrying a Croatian. They couldn’t even think of an Australian wife.

The anathema market is thus constructed as a zone that is not to be experimented with because the standard expected price to be paid for forming relationships with the constructed national enemy is symbolic exclusion and the denial of diaspora membership rights. This anathema market is a taboo and effective prevention of recruitment of partners from that market amounts to the idea of keeping the nation free of symbolic pollutants.

**Conclusion**

What lessons can be drawn from this case study material? Although not claiming that the findings can be generalised across the Croatian diaspora globally we may nevertheless draw some important conclusions from these findings. The material in relation to “marriage markets” provides a rather solid indication that collective norms defined and underpinned by Croatian nationalist sentiment, inform the thinking and acting of diaspora individuals. The reality of these sentiments jumping the generational barrier is perhaps a particularly interesting indication of the intensity of these feelings.

The exploration of the marriage market helps us to move a great deal beyond most standard understandings of nationalism in a diaspora context. Explored through the prism of marriage and partnership choices we become aware that nationalism is a far more potent reality of a transnational context than generally assumed. The various ethno-national stereotypes that can be relatively easy to understand and explained away somehow pale away when the intense impact of nationalist sentiments on people’s intimacy is taken into account. In other words, when discussing nationalism in a diaspora setting we must bear in mind that it is to a great extent hidden from the inquisitive public eye. It happens in diaspora organisations, over the phone, fax and the internet and in circles of friends. And, far from transnational information frameworks, its impact if to be profoundly felt in the notionally private world in which people construct and conduct their intimacy. Nationalism of today is finally free from the constraints of localities.

There is no denying that some of the respondents’ answers were coloured and perhaps even intensified by the military conflict unfolding in Croatia at the time of research. This only shows the extent to which nationalism is embedded in a transnationalist context. But there is also plenty of evidence showing that these sentiments did not constitute a simple knee-jerk reaction to the conflict overseas. The responses which borrow heavily from nationalist vocabulary and practice are the end result of conflation of two realities. The first is the reality of existing transnational frameworks which enabled respondents to “keep in touch”
with their ethnic homelands. These networks were helped by a whole array of devices, sustaining these contacts: telephones, TVs and videos, newspapers, emails and transnational plane routes. But equally important is the second factor: the functioning diaspora community. As I demonstrated elsewhere (Skrbiš, 1999) the diaspora community has the proven ability to disseminate pre-selected information, news, ideas and prejudices among its members. Only the combination of the two factors, the transnational framework and the functioning diaspora community, make the success of long-distance nationalism possible.

The nationalism of today is paradoxically still determined through its links with the territory but is simultaneously also profoundly de-territorialised. An analysis of long-distance nationalist processes must explore multiple locations, none of which acts as an exclusive repository of nationalist action and sentimentality. The homeland, diaspora and cyberspace — to name but a few — are all equally valid locations of long-distance nationalist politics. The study of long-distance nationalism involves not only the study of ethnic phenomena in conflict, but also an investigation of diaspora settings, an analysis of migrant policies of host countries, an exploration of new cultural technologies etc. The politics of contemporary nationalism is profoundly global but also local. What we witness today is a profound elimination of privileged locations of nationalist politics.

In sum, the long-distance nationalist politics can hardly be seen as inconsequential. It results in votes for foreign governments, funds to support overseas political parties, funds for the purchase of military equipment and — to a much lesser extent, I dare to say — financial assistance for refugee populations. As I argue elsewhere, there is an important ethical dimension to long-distance nationalist politics and its consequences are seldomly inconsequential. Most long-distance nationalists, including a number of respondents included in this research, believe that their politics is the right kind and that what they do is precisely what they should be doing. They invariably believe in the righteousness of their cause, in injustice experienced by their people in the past and at present and seek historical foundations for their ethno-national stereotypes. The illusion and rigidity of this stand becomes clear when one studies their opponents. They, too, believe in the righteousness of their cause.

Long-distance nationalism should be seen as part and parcel of the contemporary transnational world. It represents a logical extension of the marriage between the politics of identity and an advent of technologically assisted communication. The most important task of research into long-distance nationalism is to contextualise our knowledge about processes related to migrations, globalisation, ethnicity, technology, national identity and — consequently — social order, social identities and social justice. And there is — as we all know — no escaping these issues.
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Ovaj članak prilog je postojećim raspravama o značaju modernih dija­spora u kontekstu globalne politike. U njemu se istražuje način na koji se na­cionalizam prilagođao novostajućem transnacionalnom okruženju. Novi tip nacionalizma, long-distance nacionalizam, iskorištava moderne oblike komu­nikacije i putovanja da bi održao svoju snagu i relevantnost. Long-distance nacionalizam nije jednostavno posljedica globalne i transnacionalne komuni­kacije već uključuje i kompleksne kulturne, političke i simboličke procese i prakse.

Prvi dio članka istražuje neke teorijske pretpostavke koje se odnose na presijecanje nacionalizma i transnacionalnog okruženja. On pokazuje kako nacionalizam nije oprečan globalizirajućim i transnacionalizirajućim tenden­cijama, nego se prilagođuje ovim novim socijalnim uvjetima. Zato da bi na­dišao jednostavnu tvrdnju kako transnacionalizam i nacionalizam koegzisti­raju u miru, članak dokazuje da su takvi slučajevi simbioze uvijek konkretni te da se mogu etnografski dokumentirati. Članak je osnovan na potrebi da se naglasiti činjenica kako nacionalizam i transnacionalizam koegzistiraju te da se predstavi konkretni primjer nacionalističkih sentimenta u modernom trans­nacionalnom okruženju. Ovaj drugi cilj predstavlja srž drugog dijela članka koji je baziran na istraživanju druge generacije Hrvata u Australiji. On poseb­no istražuje zapostavljeno pitanje kako nacionalistički sentimenti oblikuju i definiraju ljudsku intimnost i bračni izbor. Istraživanje ovog područja intim­nosti autor smatra važnim testom intenziteta nacionalističkih sentimenta.

Ključne riječi: TRANSNACIONALIZAM, LONG-DISTANCE NA­CIONALIZAM, DIJASPORA, DRUGA GENERACIJA MIGRANATA