The terraqueous globe is made up of spaces on which peoples, ethnic groups, races, and nations have carved out territories over which they form themselves into sovereign bodies politic, on which they can interact, through and across which they can pass with ease or difficulty, at the borders of which they can erect barriers or open the area to migrants and trade. Hence, I propose territoriality as the successor concept to social distance and as both a basic concept and a fundamental process in all of human life.

Keywords: TERRITORIALITY, TERRAQUEOUS GLOBE, SPHRAGISTICS, ERIKSTICS, SOCIAL DISTANCE, TOPYONYM, ANTHROPONYM

Territoriality. All forms of social organization find symbolic and/or substantive expression via spatialization*. Because the dynamic characteristics of this process had been developed by the early pioneers of human ecology (Hawley, 1968; Theodorson, 1961) and re-introduced into current sociological thought through an eponymous essay by Lyman and Scott (1967), as well as by Eriksen's (1980:56-78), Hall's (1966), Sommer's (1969, 1974), Bakker and Bakker-Rabdau's (1973:11-32) conceptual elaborations, and the findings in a number of subsequent empirical studies, it is sufficient here to expand the analysis to the global macroecological level. In 1966, Raymond Aron had taken note of the fact that "Every international order, down to our own day, has been essentially territorial . . ., an agreement among sovereignties, the compartmentalization of space" (1966:181). As Lyman and Scott (1967:34) pointed out, " . . . /M/icro sociological studies of territoriality . . . may be extrapolated /and applied in/ an analysis of macro-sociological inquiries, especially in the realm of international affairs."

Territoriality is not a "natural" phenomenon. In 1980, Herbert Blumer had criticized the biologistic perspective that had permitted the first American human ecologists to claim that territoriality had "its own inherent organization, moving along in fixed and regularized ways, strictly repetitive in a given class of cases, and functioning as a whole in definite patterned ways" (Blumer, 1980:xi). Blumer insisted that the ecological process is always to be understood as an application of human agency: "Human beings," he notes, "in locating themselves and their institutions on land surfaces, are . . . acting on the basis of their ideas and their feelings" (Blumer, 1980:xii). Moreover, "Human beings are involved in the ecological process not as mere implementers of that process but as /exerters of/ direction on that process" (Blumer, 1980:xii).
Various scenarios of these ecological processes have been enacted and re-enacted on the global stage throughout human history. Migrations, invasions, conquests, and successions are the principal but not the only forms of this human activity. Such territorial moves permit settlers, conquerors, and rulers to draw boundaries around portions of the earth's surfaces, to give names to these ecological niches, to mark them with their special seals and memorials, establish one or another form of political authority over them, define the sense of and qualifications for recognized peoplehood within them, to defend the now established area of dominance against invaders from without and subversives within, and, often enough, to utilize the space so organized as a base from which to launch attacks on other pieces of the earth's surface.

The designations "national" and "supranational" are perceivable as merely two possible outcomes of the many modes by which one or more peoplehoods becomes attached to a land surface. Not only are there intra- as well as inter-national kinds of ecological organization, there are other perhaps less well conceptualized forms of domination over, or collaboration with, bodies of land and water that operate below, beyond, and sometimes in opposition to the statist or suprastatist forms of domination that happen to prevail at any one time (Restivo, 1991:186-196; Ericksen, 1980:33). The apportioning and reapportioning of the earth's domain among peoples constitutes an action whereby unoccupied lands or weakly defended settlements come under the domination of an organized peoplehood.

Three territorial sub-processes are indicative of the manner of its formations: "domestication," "boundaried communication," and "territorialization of the body politic."

Domestication. Domestication is a process whereby uninhabited or undefended portions of the earth's surface are transformed into a particular and circumscribed geopolitical domain. The process entails conversion of a piece of land into a "home territory." Conversion practices include giving names to bounded space, legitimating a new toponym that simultaneously justifies sovereignty over the territory so denominated and authorizes and empowers those who are in a position to enforce the new name on others. In the event that there are subjugated aborigines, imported slaves, or aspiring immigrants to the newly established land, domestication works to subordinate the rights of the former, and exclude from the area altogether, those who will not accept, or cannot be accommodated by, the new sovereign power. The history of America in its dealings with "Indians," Africans, and Europeans provides one complex example of the workings of the toponymic and domestication processes.

The twin processes of domestication and toponymic domination are to be found everywhere. To give a few examples: The debates over what to call and where to draw the boundaries of the successor states to the land mass until recently overseen by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; map-makers' discussions of how cartographically to recognize the post-colonial state that has long been known as Burma but now wishes to be designated as Myanmar; distinguishing by name both the natives of the Czech Republic and those of newly seceded Slovakia and their respective sovereignized territories; the geopolitical entities that are emerging out of the dismemberment of Yugoslavia; the centuries-long conflict over what geo-polity is to enclose the Irish people inhabiting the uneasily United Kingdom of Great Britain.

The basic practices of toponymic domestication are liable to evoke opposition and resistance. These include (1) competition over ownership or control of the material symbols of a legitimating geocultural identity, (2) toponymic protests, (3) disputes over ethnonational heritage and collective anthroponymy, and (4) utilization of trade embargoes, international juridical in-
stitutions, and propaganda to establish or discredit a particular domestication of territory. A number of strategic research sites for investigating the toponymic features of the land domestication process have been revealed by the disputes dividing members of the NATO alliance in the aftermath of the Cold War. Two stand out — the instances of Macedonia and Kaliningrad. Each illuminates attempts to secure "home territorialization" over a portion of the earth’s surface.

In what since 1991 has come to be known as the "Macedonian" question, a region of the former federated republic of Yugoslavia — which in the interwar era had been designated as "South Serbia" — seceded from the crumbling federated multiethnic polity and redesignated itself as "Macedonia," a new sovereign state. Although the new state of Macedonia received a limiting toponymic recognition by most members of the Western alliance and by the United Nations, its very existence, and, more important, its name, has evoked an outcry from leaders of both the ruling and opposition parties of Greece. To the Greek leaders "Macedonia" is not only the name of a region of the Greek state that borders on the new republic, but also is the proper term of reference for the realm of Alexander the Great, (356-323 B.C.E.), king of Macedonia, conqueror of the Greek city-states and of the Persian Empire and an iconic figure from whom the Greeks claim at least a symbolic descent reinforcing their exclusive claim to a glorious Attic heritage. The leaders of the new republic of Macedonia have not yet succeeded in their attempt to achieve home territorialization.

A different aspect of home territorialization is illustrated in the issues arising over Kaliningrad, (formerly Königsberg), a city whose protem status as a national home territory is thematized in the famous "Königsberg bridge problem" — an arithmetic graph puzzle solved by the appropriately Swiss mathematician Leonhard Euler (1707-1783), who proved that one cannot cross in a continuous path all seven bridges of this erstwhile capital of East Prussia without recrossing any bridge. Birthplace of Kant, Königsberg, for over 700 years the major cultural as well as political center of East Prussia, was captured by the Soviet army in 1945, renamed Kaliningrad and held as a prize of war ever since. With the emancipation of Lithuania and Belarus and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, six hundred land miles and two new states separate Kaliningrad from its still enforced membership in Russia, the successor state to the U.S.S.R. At the same time, its once-proud German heritage is being reasserted not only by a migration of Russian Germans to the city and new trade relations with a recently reunified Germany, but also by the claims of those Germans who intermarried with Russians and now seek a place where some representation of both of the maritally espoused cultures can be realized and passed on to their offspring. "Here," said "Sergei," a Russian army officer who moved from Kazakhstan to Kaliningrad with his ethnic German wife, "there is a chance to have both cultures." However, these claims of biculturalism and a relationship to a former homeland are resisted by the Russian authorities in the city, whose predecessors, in 1945, had gone so far as to remove from the city streets all manhole covers bearing German emblems. In 1994, according to Raimar Neufeldt, director of the city's Russian-German House and Germany's official representative there, the older Russian inhabitants behave in a manner that indicates "a kind of ... allergy to any German presence." More ominously, the successors to the Soviet authorities in Moscow have dispatched approximately 200,000 of their own troops to the area to insure against what it regards as an increase in German cultural and economic hegemonism. "There is no Germanization of Kaliningrad," insists the city's Russian mayor, despite the fact that as one of Russia's newly created "free economic zones," the city is attracting German investors,

visitors, and increasing numbers of those who are seeking after or who hope to place the escutcheon of German culture on the city.

Whether symbols become substance and what effects this will have on geopolitics in Europe are examples of the kind of problems which a sociology attuned to the dynamics of home territorialization could address. Such a sociology invites reactivation and global application of the now nearly forgotten science of sphragistics, i.e., the discipline that took as its topic of investigation both the ideas and the praxes related to the use of seals and signet rings, and its synthesis with ekistics, the scientific study of human settlements. These and related phenomena are the stuff of home territorialization, the ways on which humans establish domiciliary claims on pieces of land carved out of the earth’s surfaces.

**Boundaried Communication: The Bridge, the Door, and the Theater of Strategic War.**
The earth’s surfaces, Raymond Aron once observed, might be characterized either as a natural environment, a stake in a contest, or as a theater of international relations (Aron, 1966:182). In an epistemological sense the latter conceptualization embraces the other two; for these relations are each instances of the drama of social reality (Lyman & Scott, 1975) — i.e., all players are engaged in one or another kind of interaction, much of which is strategic (Goffman, 1969:83-145), and all of which are bounded by territories of interaction. "Surrounding any interaction," Lyman and Scott observe, "is an invisible boundary, a kind of social membrane" (Lyman & Scott, 1989:25). At the macroecological level such membranes might appear as borders surrounding a homeland territory, and indeed be the markers that indicate that turf domestication has been, at least for the historical moment, secured. Precisely because such borders are both porous and movable, any senses of security that are gained from them are for the most part of doubtful permanence.

"The world," wrote the Swiss international jurisprudent Johann Caspar Bluntschli (1808-1881) in 1870, "should be split into as many states as humanity is divided into nations" (Lind, 1994:87). "The predominant principle in establishing . . . boundaries and /their attendant/ identities," Philippe C. Schmitter has observed, "is that of 'nationality'" (Schmitter, 1994:65-66). However, the researches of Walker Connor have shown that Bluntschli’s global ideal not only has not yet been attained, but that it is highly unlikely that it ever will (Connor, 1977). Most self-designated "nation-states" are multi-ethnic and multi-national in fact.

But even — or perhaps, we should say, especially — in cases of ethnonational unity around a piece of territory, a breakthrough of interactional border defenses is possible, because — if for no other reason, as Schmitter and so many others before him have noted — the very idea of nationality is fraught with definitional problems and praxeological difficulties (Greenfeld, 1992; Connor, 1993). Advancing "nationality" as the basis for an enclosure of interaction is usually attempted by means of appeals — to the unity that is supposed to be occasioned by the mystery of blood, to common linguistic symbols, to historical memories, or to future-oriented hopes — as well as by "residual elements of opportunistic choice and collective enthusiasm" (Schmitter, 1994:66). Encroachment on these fragile membranes is not only facilitated by advanced means of telecommunication, but also by a counter-concentration of appeals — to the values of diversity, to the greater efficiency obtained by adapting supranational linguistic signs and symbols to commerce and transportation, to a future-oriented multicultural harmony, or by invoking the near century-old warnings of William Graham Sumner against the pernicious effects of ethnocentrism. Networks of interaction need not and often do not form themselves along the lines drawn to mark nation-state borders on geopolitical maps. Such networks range from the personal to the professional and indicate elements of a burgeoning international civil and commercial society that transcends the boundaries and circumvents the defenses against interaction across state lines. As evidence of this trend, note that in her careful study of a century of demographic changes in Europe, Susan Cotts Watkins pointed out how "between 1870 and 1960, the scale of these interac-
tions expanded /as the/ expansion of markets from local to national extended personal networks" and, how incidentally, these in turn led to "an increase in the proportion of marriages in which one spouse was born in another province" (Watkins, 1991:270).

Advance in the sociological study of interactional territorialism on a global level ought to build on the elaboration of this phenomenon that was presented in Georg Simmel’s writings on the subject\(^5\). Here, I choose to emphasize the relationship of three of his observations to a transcendent geopolitical sociology: First, that "The boundary . . . is our means for finding direction in the infinite space of our worlds" (Simmel, 1971:353); second, that boundaries are both exclusive and inclusive; and third, that the fixing and unfixing of boundaries occur by no "natural" means; rather, such activities are attempts to limit social proximity or expand human sociation, and, thus understood, parts of a pure sociology of conduct with respect to spatialization. Hence, at the global level, interactional territories might be spatial but not necessarily cartographed on a geopolitical map. They are situses on which there occur specifications of the right to participate and encroachments on this right by migrants, invaders, emergent groups, minorities, and other kinds of "outsiders."

The borders and border guard practices established by states are sometimes effective defenses of exclusive interactional turfs. But, the defenders of a beleaguered interactionally exclusive territory sometimes resort to even stronger measures: restrictions on egress or ingress, linguistic collusion, or insulation (Lyman & Scott, 1989:27-33) in the form of fortified and thus seemingly impenetrable barriers. (One example was the Berlin wall, which for 27 years stood sentinel against any but life-risking escapes from the German Democratic Republic, but which, as Nigerian Nobel Laureate Wole Soyinka would recall (Soyinka, 1993:199-215), could not prevent communication by voice and gesture across the fence). Whatever their intent, such barriers might become either "doors" or "bridges" — to use Simmel’s felicitous terms (Simmel, 1994:5-10) — enclosing behind them or opening up beyond them such interactions as are made possible by the ingenuity of humans determined to restrict or to expand their territories of interaction, to lengthen or to decrease the social distance separating one human group from another.

The Special Cases of Diplomacy and War

Interactional territorialism takes on a special character when the interactants are players in the drama of diplomacy or playwrights of the scenarios that take place in a theater of such military operations as war. The practice of diplomacy, according to Henry Kissinger, took to a new interactional style after the conclusion of the First World War, when Europe’s statesmen realizing that "there was no geopolitical basis for the Versailles order, . . . were driven to invoking their personal relationships as a means of maintaining it — a step none of their predecessors had ever taken" (Kissinger, 1994:276)\(^6\). However, since that era the new style, i.e., "the trend toward personalizing /diplomatic/ relations" (Kissinger, 1994:276), has been accelerated, and no doubt this contributed not a little to the style as well as the substance of negotiations bringing an end to the Cold War and seeking resolution in such ongoing disputes as that in the Middle East.

When diplomacy fails — or, when it is not given an opportunity to prove its worth — one likely outcome is war. Warfare, as a violent form of both symbolic and substantive interaction, is also limited in its territorialization. The advent of the nuclear age has had a paradoxically limiting effect on war, one, incidentally, that had been predicted by Lester F.

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\(^5\) See two seminal discussions: Lechner (1991) and Frisby (1992:98-117) For an interesting critique which despite its pointedness does not reduce the value of Simmel’s work for the present discussion, see Tester (1993:6-29).

\(^6\) For a detailed case study of the older style of diplomacy, see Hopkirk (1994).
Ward's disciple, James Quayle Dealey, in 1909: "Science and human ingenuity," he wrote, "if properly stimulated, could probably develop destructive implements of such power as to banish henceforth the possibility for war, for wars will more likely cease because of their destructiveness and cost than because of an altruistic objection to human slaughter" (Dealey, 1909:220-221). In fact, "the balance of terror" that prevailed during most of the Cold War era, while it restrained any decisive move toward total war by either the United States or the Soviet Union, tended to enhance the value of direct interactive diplomacy but also to permit "surrogate" regional wars to be fought in several areas.

The Clausewitzian and post-Clausewitzian scenarios of war as a form of strategic interaction took on an even greater significance as diplomacy assumed a style associated with interpersonal relations but always with an eye to the bipolarized territorial factors affecting both the "Cold" peace and war. The era beginning in the 1990s is as yet unclear with respect both to its appropriate mode of interaction and to the boundaries of its emerging interaction territories. However, one thing seems to be clear. Unlike the Cold War era, the emerging period is and will likely remain multipolar in terms of its interacting units (Aron, 1966:97-98). Although the territorialized state is likely to remain a basic form of polity, other modes of sociation — religion, race, peoplehood, nationality (Esman, 1977:371-390) — while bidding for or claiming territorial expression, will also participate in whatever complex interactional configurations that develop. Of these, the peoplehood that seeks to form an ethnonational state is perhaps most striking in that its claim usually involves a rearrangement of spatio-temporal priorities and interactions.

What one journalist calls a manifestation of "Balkan ghosts" (Kaplan, 1994) provides a pertinent example of a spatio-temporal reconfiguration that is the occasion for the building of new nations, polities, and bodies politic on the ruins of the short-lived state known as Yugoslavia. What is involved is the mobilization of collective memory emphasizing a present meaning that is to be given to specific events drawn from the annals of Balkan history. The events chosen — e.g., the Ustasha-ordered killings of Jews, Serbs, Gypsies, and Muslims during World War II; or the Turkish massacre of the Serbian knights at Kossovo Polje on June 28, 1389 — are not treated as history as that discipline is conceived by professional historians. Rather, they are dredged up and separated out from the welter of happenings that also occurred and made to speak to the contemporary collective consciousness — indeed to be the ding an sich of that consciousness. What occurs is that an interactional membrane is drawn around the eventful memory and the people who regard it as such. That membrane shuts out alternative interpretations of the event and in so doing enhances the action program that the memorialistic demagogue — (for it is he or she who is the charismatic agent of these developments) — has proposed. Thus, to give one pertinent illustration: On June 28, 1987, five-hundred-ninety-eight years to the day after Serbian prince Knez Lazar was martyred at Kossovo Polje, the Serbian communist party leader Slobodan Milosevic addressed a crowd gathered to memorialize the event. Pointing his finger into the distance, he made a promise: "They'll never do this to you again. Never again will anyone defeat you" (Kaplan, 1994:39). Thus was the revolt in behalf of an independent and "Greater Serbia" begun. Memory of a momentous event had been rendered as the referent incident out of which a peoplehood would be reborn in vengeance and in what came to be known as "ethnic cleansing." An interactional territory that overjumped 600 years of history had become the basis for establishing — or, to the Serbians, reconstituting — a homeland.

Territorialization of the Body Politic.

Like the epidermis of the human body, the surfaces of the body politic are subjectable to symbolic "anatomic" markings. There is, in effect, a territorialization of the collective
body. It is exemplified in one of the several forms of world building now taking place in the post-Cold War era. At the global level, such tattooings are fundamental features of group assertion and the claim for legitimation and recognition. Creative artistry, nostalgic portraits, degrading graffiti, and other innovative identity tags may be inscribed with consent or by force, figuratively or literally, on to human collectivities as much as onto individuals.

The process whereby a body politic becomes territorialized entails a pressing of the claims of a single peoplehood for sovereignty over a particular piece of the earth's surface. Johann Gottfried Herder's (1744-1803) conception of an ontological Volk whose sovereignty might be territorialized, and Friedrich Schleiermacher's (1768-1834) linkage of knowledge to linguistic practices and of both to a common spatial location were moves adumbrating the constitutive construction of a specific geographically bounded body politic (Wagner, 1994:48-50). When completed, such actions signify the merger of anthroponymy with toponymy — for example, "the German people" and "Germany," or, more ominously, "the Aryan nation," the "German Volk," and a territorialized Volksgemeinschaft. Whether the peoplehood is marked in one or another of the usable fictions — e.g., "blood," heritage, tradition, history, or religion, or some combination thereof, — is less significant for the formation of a modern (but not necessarily pre- or post-modern) body politic than the fact (or desire) that it is claimed as justification for establishing sovereignty over and on terra firma. Another example is provided by Talcott Parsons's conceptualization of four ideal-typical social systems — viz., the universalist-achievement, universalist ascriptive, particularist achievement, and particularist ascriptive. As Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato have recently pointed out (Cohen & Arato, 1992:124-142), each system is couched in reference to an already established body politic that has as its habitus a territorial unit. That unit both circumscribes a societal community and defines and prescribes the mode of sovereignty over the peoplehood within it, i.e., the so-called "nation."

The Selfhood of the Body Politic

"What is the sociology of the body?" asks Anthony Synnott. He answers, "It is the study of the self as embodied, and of the various attributes, organs, processes and senses that constitute our being embodied . . .; it is the study of the body as a symbolic system and a semiotic process . . ." (Synnott, 1993:262). Analogously, we inquire here, what is the sociology of the body politic? And, like Synnott, we propose that it is the study of a peoplehood as an embodied collective self, and of the characteristics and processes whereby such a body comes to recognize itself as such, sovereignizes itself, and makes claims to recognition and territory to epitomize itself. Such a body, to paraphrase Synnott, is at the heart of collective life and social and intercultural interaction and provides one possible source for personal identity as well (Synnott, 1993:262).

In the post-Cold War world, a number of new and revived bodies politic are emerging (Nye, 1992:83-96). These bid fair to define the international structure, but also to defy moves toward a supranational order (Robertson, 1992). In some cases, notably in that area of the globe that, until the disintegration of the Soviet Union, had been called the "Third World" (Worsley, 1985), the bodies politic that are nascent seem more like tribes with flags than nationalities (Vidich, 1979; Wagner, 1994:48-51; Moore, 1994:74-134); in other areas, old "blood"-based ethnonationalities are seeking territorialized national self-determination (Legters, 1992:63-610;646-656; Ignatieff, 1993); while in still others, localized ethnoracial collectivities agonize over choosing between the pull of acculturation, assimilation, and amalgamation or the push of independent existence, group autonomy, and endogamy (Sando, 1992; Krupat, 1992).
What Erving Goffman tells us about the territories of the self is applicable to the territories of the body politic (Goffman, 1971:28-61). Like the self, the body politic has its "central markers" that make claim to a territory; its "boundary markers" that determine where the former claim begins and ends and who may proceed across or into it and with what rights, duties, and privileges; and its "system of reference" indicating what ideographic and nomothetic understandings are to be associated with it. And, elaborating on Goffman's discussion of the matter, a body politic may be violated by profanation of its symbols, encroachments on its territory, invasion of its lands, and forced surrender of its identity and sovereignty. Long ago, Lester Ward coined the term "social karyokinesis" (Ward, 1970:205-220) to refer to the more volatile dynamics of this process — a process that, often violent in character and sometimes destructive of whole peoplehoods in result, provided for an irregular reconstruction of territorialized regimes in the world; a process, despite Ward's assertion to the contrary, that had no definite nor determining telos (Vidich & Lyman, 1985:20-35).

At present, both statesmen and soldiers are contributing their efforts to the shape of things to come, but neither has a clearly formed template for the new world order. At the same time, scholars and social scientists are either seeking to refurbish the shabby paradigms of yesterday or announcing the death of any possibility of knowledge in the postmodern age. The situation of the 1990s and beyond seems not unlike that presented in 1906 by William Graham Sumner. He had stared into the political, social, and cultural abyss created by the failure of Americans to have constructed a just and coherent set of mores — on the basis of which they might have developed a new social order in the decades immediately following that nation's Civil War: "We are like spectators at a great natural convulsion. The results will be such as the facts and forces call for. We cannot foresee them... The mores which once were are a memory. Those which anyone thinks ought to be are a dream" (Sumner, 1940:78). However, such a moment need not give rise only to reaction or despair. Rather, the political and epistemological events of our time ought to remind us that the prospects for a scientific breakthrough are greatest at moments when the windows out of which we look at the Lebenswelt seem about to be shattered.

Conclusion

In the present paper, the focus has been on a sociology that would take the entire globe as its topos and seek to organize a systematic approach to its processes of formation and reformation. The conceptual center of the thesis presented here is territoriality and its role in human group expression.

A synthetic sociology emphasizing the interplay of ekistics with sphragistics, i.e., of human settlements with the emblematic markings on persons and lands, could illuminate the manifold ways by which the terraqueous globe has become an object of and for human sociopolitical realization.

The discourse of modernity may be joined to that of postmodernity in the quest for a social-territorial perspective for a new global sociology. Postmodernity has much to say about "texts" and their "disprivileged" status. However, much of its observations are couched in terms relating to the academy and to epistemology as such. The praxeological "texts" of global reconstruction are being "written" performatively by those who seek and sometimes succeed in maintaining, establishing, or replacing a partial or total sovereignty of a population segment over a portion of the earth's surface, or in carving out a niche of free interactional territory within a sovereignized area, or in recalling and reviving moments of a claimed past in order to advance a claim to a long lost home territory. The processes and projects whereby such activities occur tell us that these "texts" are not disprivilegeable merely by being so
labelled, but rather are the basic stuff from which a postmodern global sociology could
discover how some texts become legitimated while others are marginalized.

A supranational sociology could be built around the application of a broadened con­ceptualization of "territoriality" to global processes (Lyman & Scott, 1989:22-34). Enlarged
to embrace the social processes entailed in peoples’ efforts to create, sustain, and in some
cases expand a habitus on the terraqueous globe, the forms taken by these territorializations
in fact go beyond those described by the geopolitical. They include patterns of migration,
dispersal, diasporic and imperialist domain-establishing settlements (Castles & Miller, 1993;
Blaut, 1993; Kaplan & Pease, 1993) inclusive and exclusive interactional territories —
embracing among other things the yet-to-be-created techno-communicative "superhighway" —
whereon people may readily communicate with one another; and territorialization of the
many and varied bodies politic that exist in some degree of unacculturated formations within
an established state, or that live in voluntary, enforced, or unrecognized diasporic distance
from a "homeland."

A sociologist who takes territorialization as a global sociological concept ought to heed
Roland Robertson’s admonition that any "attempt to theorize the general field of globaliza­
tion must lay the grounds for relatively patterned discussion of the politics of the global
human condition, by attempting to indicate the structure of any viable discourse about the
shape and 'meaning' of the world-as-a-whole" (Robertson, 1990:17-18). Territoriality is a key
to such a discourse. Territoriality, employed as a dynamic sociological concept, would em­
phasize that the forms which any human habitus takes are subject to Simmel’s observations
about fixation and fluidity: "These forms are frameworks for the creative life which, however
soon transcends them. . . . The bounded forms acquire fixed identities, a logic and lawfulness
of their own; this new rigidity inevitably places them at a distance from the spiritual dynamic
which created them and which makes them independent"9.

Of all these forms, the state, and its self-proclaimed identity as the sovereignized habitat
of the nation, has been most prominent in the study and praxis of international relations.
However, a postmodernized sociology must take account of both supra- and infra-state for­
mations and of the relations among each and countenance the possibility of the exhaustion
of geopolitical form in the policies and ideologies of the actors involved (Weinstein & Wein­

Territorialized everyday life consists in the Lebenswelt10 that surrounds a human habitat.
Such habitats are situses for a science that recognizes catastrophism as a contingency. A
human habitat can become the object of an "intrusion"11 so great as to generate a "crisis"12
in its very raison d'etre. A series of such occurrences can undo an established territorial
order and open up thought and action pursuant to the formulation of yet another one
(Lyman, 1990:76-84). The dynamics of ordering and reordering the world occur as territorial
effects that incursions on a Lebenswelt have on any particular life-world.

Such incursions as well as the responses to them are products of human agency. Hence,
a new sociological worldview (Restivo, 1991:175-196) will have to recognize both the actuality
and the constraints on human endeavor, the realities as well as the praxeologies of social
distance and social proximity. The postmodern liberation of human agency from its impris­
onment in positivist, deterministic, and teleological paradigms — and the freeing of con­
tingency to assume a central place in human action — are simultaneously causes for cele­

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9 See also the discussion in Tester (1993:6-29).
10 The concept of the Lebenswelt has been developed by Aron Gurwitsch (1966:120-121;151;163;172;406-447).
11 For the concept of intrusion see Teggart (1925:82-86;107-149;180-194).
12 For the concept of crisis, see Thomas (1909:13-26) and Schutz (1966:116-132).
brating the emancipation of the human spirit and sounding the alarm over how that spirit might wittingly or accidentally express itself. The ethic of whatever new epistemology arises will have to be developed and applied to all those who have hitherto been treated as "the Other." As Zygmunt Bauman observes, "In a postmodern ethics, the Other would be no more he who, at best, is the prey on which the self can feed to replenish its life-juices, and — at worst — thwarts and sabotages the self's constitution. Instead, he will be the gatekeeper of moral life" (Bauman, 1993:85). A golden rule is here reconstituted. The self, the group, and the proximate and distant spaces — their interactions on earth, in the air, on or under water, with or without fire, — are elements of a global sociology that, like Yeats's undescrivable rough beast is slouching toward Bethlehem, waiting to be born.

References


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**TERITORIJALNOST KAO GLOBALNA KONCEPCIJA**

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**Kopneni i vodeni svijet sačinjen je od prostora na kojima su akteri, etničke skupine, rase i nacije izgradili teritorije te se ondje uspostavili kao suverena politička tijela. Teritoriji su prostori interakcije, uspješnog ili manje uspješnog igraju uloga — prostori na čijim se granicama podižu prepreke ili otvaraju vrata migrantima i trgovini. Autor stoga, predlaže koncept teritorijalnosti kao nasljednicu pojma socijalna distanca te kao temeljnu kategoriju i, ujedno, fundamentalni proces društvenog života.**