The rapists’ progress: ethnicity, gender and violence

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The paper examines two cases of rape as politics where violence, gender, ethnicity intersected with tragic consequences. First, the Serbian media campaign against the Albanians as rapists in Kosovo in 1990 has been examined; secondly, the rape as politics of ethnic cleansing in the Serbian aggression in Bosnia in 1992-1993 was analyzed. It has been shown that Serbian media’s rape campaign against Kosovo Albanians as perpetrators has been prelude to the actual rapes by Serbian soldiers in Bosnia. In both cases, rape served as the special mean for defining the boundary of the Serbian ethnic niche in the Balkans.

Key words: ETHNIC BOUNDARY, ETHNIC POLITICS, VIOLENCE, GENDER, RAPE, DISCOURSE, ACTUAL RAPE, ETHNIC CLEANSING.

Introduction

In May 1990, I completed a paper on the discourse of rape in the Serbian-Albanian conflict in the Province of Kosovo, illustrating the uses and abuses of gender in ethnic conflicts. It pointed out how Serbian press and officials were using the "discourse of rape" in sharpening the boundary between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo (Mežnarić, 1990). From this campaign two developments ensued: Serbian criminal law was amended to include the incrimination of the "ethnic rape", and Kosovo ceased to exist as an autonomous multiethnic region. It rather became plural, deeply divided society, with Albanians discriminated against in vital areas of public life: in schooling, health services, public administration. The "rape campaign" succeeded thoroughly and realized the unspoken goal: to separate, by disseminating fear, two vital channels of interaction within the ethnic network in Kosovo. By the time the study was completed (Summer 1990), I did not envisage the possibility that the rape campaign would escalate into rape policy via ethnic cleansing.

It took only one year (Summer 1990-Summer 1991) for the first incidences of the inter-ethnic rape to appear during the Serbo-Croatian war; and it took only a few months for systematic inter-ethnic rape in Bosnia to become the world’s nightmare. According to one report: "All sides have committed abuses, but Muslim women have been the chief victims and the main perpetrators have been members of Serbian armed forces." (Amnesty International, 1993:3). The Serbian state which promulgated its criminal law "utterly the ethnic rape" article in it initially targeted at Kosovo Albanians was soon engaged in a war with the Muslim civilian population where its own soldiers or paratroopers engaged in massive and systematic rape as part of the ethnic cleansing strategy.1)

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1) "Zakon o izmenama i dopunama Krivičnog zakonika SR Srbije", Službeni glasnik SRS 39(1986): pp. 2739-2740. In a new article 61b, sexual assault or rape as an "ethnic crime" has been introduced. If perpetrator and victim were of different ethnic origin, the criminal law recognizes this fact as aggravating. In spite of criticisms from lawyers’ guild jurisprudence, the law passed in the Serbian parliament.
Prelude to Bosnia's Rapes: The Rape Campaign in Kosovo

There have been many attempts to analyze the causes behind the rapes in Bosnia. Some have suggested that rapes in Bosnia are messages of intimidation from the adversary to another; or that rape in war is a continuation of masculinist politics by other means. The Bosnian anthropologist Sokolović argues that rape of Muslim women in Bosnia is a "fateful consequence of the clash of two fundamentally different patriarchal cultures, and within that, a clash of two totally different approaches towards women." (Sokolović, 1993:8)

The analysis in this article rests firstly, on a developmental framework that includes socioeconomic and demographic variables, and secondly, on an explanation of the Balkans' patriarchal cultures in which "... violence was endowed with legitimacy, and legitimacy with violence." (Apter, 1987:237)

Within such a framework the relationship between gender, ethnicity and violence has been addressed by the concept of "controlled sociability" (Brownmiller, 1975; Brittan, 1982; Maynard, 1990).2) The fear of violence, it has been shown, limits women's freedom of movement. "It constrains what they can do, where they can go and with whom they can socialize. In other words, both the reality and the fear of violence act as a form of social control." (Maynard, 1990:270)

According to Baron and Straus (1989: 61-146), in plural, deeply divided societies there are "early warning signs" of sexual violence becoming a way of social control. These are gender inequality, pornography, social disorganization, and legitimate violence. According to them, the cultural support for violence in plural societies may lead to its spillover to the area of sexual politics. The whole idea is based on the cultural spillover theory which assumes that "rape may be influenced by the implicit or explicit approval of violence in various areas of life such as education, the mass media, or sports. Cultural spillover theory predicts a carryover or diffusion to social contexts in which the use of violence is considered illegitimate or criminal." (Baron and Straus, 1989:147)

Another useful framework for understanding ethnic conflicts in the former Yugoslavia is provided by Barth, who argues that when groups compete over the same niche, the consequences may be either accommodation or displacement of one group by the other. (Barth, 1969:209) In Kosovo, for instance, historical accounts attest to the fact that for centuries the population developed a system of mutual adjustments. In spite of that, in the late seventies, displacement of the Serbian population took place. Migration began to upset the fragile ecological interdependence of both ethnic groups in Kosovo, especially when large numbers of Serbs began to migrate out of Kosovo in the 1980s, while Albanians had still a low degree of territorial mobility (68 percent of Albanians in Kosovo lived in their place of birth). In the period 1971-1981 Serbian emigration from Kosovo represented 84.1 percent of the overall negative net migration of Kosovo, while the Albanian share of it was only 2.7 percent. (Macura, 1988:399)

In 1981, the Yugoslav autonomous province of Kosovo constituted 4.2 percent of the Yugoslav territory and 7.8 percent of the Yugoslav population. Within Kosovo, the Albanian majority comprised 77.4 percent of the population. For both ethnic groups the crucial question was how to live in a region in which demographic and economic indicators of underdevelopment are overwhelming. The mortality rate of live-born infants in Kosovo was the highest in Europe (in 1987, 50.7 per 1000 live births), twice as high as in Yugoslavia as a whole and more than twice higher than in Serbia proper. Again, in 1987 the birth rate per 100 was 24.8, which in relation to 1950 decreased only 5.3 points, while in the whole

2) In Against Our Will (1975:15) Susan Brownmiller stressed that rape could possibly function as an instrument of social control. See also Baron, I. and Straus, A.L. (1989) and Brittain, A. (1989).
Yugoslavia the birth rate has decreased 11.1 points. In Kosovo, unlike anywhere else in Yugoslavia and probably anywhere else in Europe, the number of individuals per household grew in this century, from 5.71 per household in 1921 to 6.92 in 1981. Population density increased from 67.3 per square kilometer in 1948 to 163.3 per square kilometer in 1986. In 1988, 40 percent of all employed persons in the former Yugoslavia were women, whereas in Kosovo, only 22 percent were women. Only 9.6 percent of the female active population were employed in Kosovo, against 32.7 percent for the country as a whole. Albanian women were five times less active than Serbian women. (Maxharraj, 1988:184)

According to the World Bank, Kosovo in 1987 had a gross domestic product per capita of $800. As a result, Kosovo would be classified as at the bottom of semi-developed countries. (Mihajlović, 1989:172-178) Between 1948 and 1986, Kosovo underwent urbanization and industrialization, resulting in a decline of the farming population from 81 percent to 25 percent. In the same period, every 100 dinars of investments in the former Yugoslavia produced an average 15.2 dinars of GDP growth whereas in Kosovo it resulted in only 10 dinars. In 1987, 44 percent of the Federal Fund for the Underdeveloped Regions was channelled to Kosovo. According to economists, such distribution policies did not succeed in closing gap because they were not accompanied by development strategies. (Mihajlović, 1989:177); in 1987, GDP per capita in Kosovo only 28 percent of the Yugoslav average, the employment rate only 44 percent, and capital assets per capita 37 percent.

Since early eighties, the growing conflict between the Albanian majority and the Serbian and Montenegrin minorities in Kosovo split the labour market, and created divisions in the sphere of political powers and popular mobilization. The resulted frictions led to an emphasis on the need for renewed distinctness of Serbs and Albanians within the same niche. The processes of construction and identification of those objective markers which most effectively show "who is who", who belongs where, and what belongs to whom, began. So did the the rendering work on inventing traditions: both groups discovered ancient states and territorial rights, cradles of national identity, monuments, battles from the 15th century, friends and enemies dating from the Middle Ages... Customarily used ethnic identifiers such as language, dress, lifestyle, and housing, overt signals and signs for defining boundaries between ethnic groups, were revived, and schools, instruction, literature, history separated. Even so, boundaries were not sharp enough; they demanded additional, "ultimate" differentiation, which according to Barthes, can always be found in the field of the "standards of morality and excellence by which performance of persons is judged" (Barth, 1969:203). In Kosovo, the defining field of differentiation of the standards of moralities was found in the stigmatization of Albanian men as rapists of Serbian women (and men). By constructing ethnic difference on the basis of one group's cultural proclivity to violence and rape, the boundaries between the two groups became fixed by the fear of communication. This new ethnic differentiation was particularly compelling as an ethnic marker because it locates itself in the sphere of everyday life, where the "gatekeepers" of "everyday sociability" (Brittan, 1989), Albanian men and Serbian women, meet and interact. In order that boundaries between them be most sharply defined and maintained, they must be confined to the area that will register fear and hamper any future contact: this is the field of rape.

By the end of 1991, the province of Kosovo found itself under a state of special circumstances in which its public institutions and police authority were in the hands of the Republic of Serbia. Serbia's 1991 constitution exempted from Kosovo's competency important areas of autonomous rule, such as representative institutions, public administration, and police. The Serbian government, which assumed police control in the province, deployed various approaches to hamper communication between Albanians and Serbs. Some of these strategies, either "hard" or "soft" include the use of gender as a means to control communication and to sharpen the boundaries between two opposed ethnicities.
Sharpening the Ethnic Boundary: Media and Discourse of Rape

The culture of (the Balkan’s) violence, that is, explicit and implicit approval of violence towards women,\(^3\) allowed the Serbian newspapers to extend the discourse of rape in order to disseminate fear of communication among ethnicities. Moreover, socially approved legitimate violence within the family and within conjugal relations has been carried over to the broader social context: in the amended Criminal Code of the Republic of Serbia, two different kinds of "rape" appeared. "Ordinary rape" of more "domesticated" nature was distinguished from "political rape". The violence of "ordinary rape" was less severely punished because victims and perpetrators are presumably not of Serbian and Albanian nationality, whereas rape as a political act is penalized more severely.

The media campaign around rape in Kosovo emerged in 1986 and reached its peak in the summer of 1988. When the issue of rape first emerged, the views of both sides, Albanian and Serbian, could be expressed and heard. But when the rape crisis peaked in the summer of 1988, the Serbian press uniformly stigmatized Albanians as rapists. In 1986 a discussion emerged which sought a differentiation between attempted and actual rape within the criminal laws. An article in the Belgrade press offered the following information: "In the period from 1982 to 1986, the Kosovo police reported 114 arrests for criminal rape and 128 for attempted rate. The majority of cases were Albanian men raping Albanian women... fifteen rapes and fourteen attempted rapes were cases when Albanian men attacked Serbian women. Among Serbian and Montenegrin men there were fifteen rapes and nineteen attempted rapes on women of the same nationality. Montenegrin and Serbian men attempted rape on Albanian women in three cases, and one of the attempts was realized. This summer in Kosovo one rape and two attempted rapes of Serbian women have taken place." (Nešić and Rajh, 1986:5-9)

A discussion opened on the legal qualifications for rape, introduced by detailed analysis of attempted rape. After stating that "pressure of the hands, touching legs or breasts" can qualify as attempted rape according to local culture, the press accorded attempted rape the same status as actual rape. In 1987 legal qualification of attempted rape acquired the meaning of actual rape. In many cases, even before an investigation began, the press would publish details of the alleged rapist’s workplace and residence, including initials of names and family description of the mostly juvenile suspects, making it easy to identify the alleged rapists. Names of adult perpetrators, Serbs and Albanians alike, appeared in the press even before criminal charges were brought against them, let alone the sentence passed. In public meetings and ethnic rallies following news of attempted rape of Serbian women or girls, data on the family of the Albanian perpetrators were published. The press began to echo the rallies' demands; the qualification for attempted rape were no longer discussed and attempted and actual rape received the same treatment in public and criminal law. Public reaction in Kosovo and Serbia was beginning to be described as "lynching". According to one article, "several tumultuous meetings have been held recently in the village of M. (following the attempted rape of a 16-year-old girl of Serbian nationality)... at town meetings, in the presence of the commune leadership, the oppressive actions of juvenile XY (initials) was condemned unanimously and with great disgust. Also, the meeting condemned the attempts of his father, who is currently working in Switzerland, to bribe the police to conceal the whole matter... This and previous attempts to rape Serbian girls by young Albanian boys

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\(^3\) Bette Denich refers to the domestic violence as a norm of conjugal relations in these parts of the Balkans: "In all these societies women not behaving in the properly submissive manner are liable to beating by their husbands" (Denich, 1974: 255). For an account how women in the Balkans learned over the centuries how to deal with the culture of violence see the study of Slabšak, S.: "Ženska knjiga, žensko pismo, ženske studije" (1990: 220-230).
in village M. was characterized by the meeting of the village as a conscious and perfidious tactic of Albanian irredentists and separatists, with the aim of disturbing the consolidation of relationships between the Serbian and Albanian population of this area (Marković, 1986:5)

In 1986 an affair labelled by the press "Fadilgate" appeared. Fadil Hoxha, Albanian and prominent Kosovo politician, became a symbol of perversity of Albanian sexual culture ("rapist with the smile"). Allegedly, his solution to rape was "organized prostitution" in Kosovo. The Serbian press interpreted his idea as basically free entrepreneurship, where non-Muslim prostitutes would serve frustrated Albanian clients. According to the interpretation in the Serbian press, Fadil Hoxha's prescription for fighting rape was the following: "There are some examples of rape in Kosovo; I think that it is necessary to allow women from other parts of Yugoslavia to come to private coffee-houses in Kosovo so that those who would rape woman of other nationalities can indulge themselves. Albanian women won't do this but Serbian and other women would like to, so why not let them" (Živančević, 1987:17) Hoxha later apologized to non-Albanian women; nonetheless, an initiative began for criminal proceedings against him. Hoxha resigned his government post and was indicted for "expressing national, religious and race hatred, discord and intolerance".

The Rape Controversy: Data and Their Meaning

The rape campaign raised many voices: the most articulated were those of feminists and independent lawyers.

There were two fundamentally different feminist responses to rape in Kosovo, both of which derive from the culturalist discourse of rape. Sklevicky calls these two responses the "patriarchal" and the "pseudo-feminist" models of rape (Sklevicky, 1988:12). The patriarchal model explains rape on the basis of the statement that rape "damages the honor of a woman, that is, her strength, the faithfulness of her husband and her virginity". In this way the sacred society is tarnished, and the victim is the group - the ethnic group - and not the individual. The pseudo-feminist model explains rape by criticizing the patriarchal model, "but inconsistently" (Sklevicky, 1988:12). They insist on understanding rape as a political act, as a means of revenge between conflicting groups (of men), but only as an inter-ethnic one, when the rapist is Albanian... The act of rape is characterized in harmony with feminist analyses which are much wider than legal enactments and include every form of aggression of men against women. In this is included 'grabbing hand and breasts', love calls and profanity thrown from buses to the street or the fields... Stronger punishment is sought by feminists for "ethnic" rape than for the ordinary one (Sklevicky, 1988:12).

Sklevicky argued that feminists, and especially the most radical feminists who justifiably call for solidarity of "all women of Yugoslavia" against inter-ethnic rapes, miss the opportunity to denounce the manipulation of rape in an inter-ethnic conflict. Her critique of both models is that the patriarchal model "is buried in the contradictions of the logic of the functioning of the patriarchy itself, while the pseudo-feminist model selectively accepts radical theses" (Sklevicky, 1988:12).

Drakulić (1986:61), discussing the codification of rape in the Serbian legal system denounced it as "pure violence". Until the "rapes" in Kosovo, the rape was punishable with no reference to nationality, since the law treated all citizens equally. The incrimination of the ethnicity of the victim or perpetrator introduced the category of ethnicity as a possible aggravating circumstance in the occurrence of rape or attempted rape. Thus rape has become a political act. Taking into account the circumstances surrounding the codification of rape as a political act it can be safely assumed that the incrimination of the perpetrator was established with a particular ethnicity in mind. Political rape was introduced into the penal
code with Albanian men as presumed rapists and Serbian women and men as presumed victims. Rapes within ethnic communities are not treated as political acts by the legislator, and as such do not merit harsher sentences. From the point of view of the rape victim, however, Drakulic asks: "Could it be possible that political rapes are more offensive to women than an 'ordinary' rape - after all, for a woman being raped the fact that the rapist is a Serb, an Albanian, a Croat or a Bosnian makes no difference" (Drakulic, 1986:61).

Belgrade feminist L. Mladenovic correctly noted that "in Serbia, rape acquired race, nationality, and history" (Mladenovic, 1986:61). She founded that in Serbia, "violent sex underlines the social organization; passion is based on violence that women have to suffer" (Mladenovic, 1988:61). In a research study conducted by the feminist group Zena i društvo (Woman and Society) in Belgrade, March 1988, 35 percent of women "explicitly talked about being forced to make love against their will and when asked if they had ever been hit by a man, only 17 percent of the interviewees answered negatively. Sexual violence, then, is just one form of violence that a majority of women have to bear in order to survive" (Mladenovic, 1988:61).

How the women in Kosovo and Serbia reacted to such a use of their bodies is largely undocumented; only the protests of Serbian women against "Fadilgate" have been made public. There was little or no data available on protests of Albanian men or women; accounts of these were most likely confined to their inner walls or their private communications. The remaining majority, Serbian men and women, were silent. Or would their opinion - as Slapšak (Slapšak, 1990) would have it analyzing Serbian women's role in Serbia's oral history - eventually emerge as subtle protest in new national myths or even in an epic form?


The report disclosed the findings that there were no reliable data on the nationality of those committing criminal acts in Yugoslavia in general and in Kosovo in particular. Moreover, rape which has been considered a separate criminal act is hidden under an act "against the human survival and morals" (Popović, S., Jančar, D., Petovar, T., 1990: 27-59). The disclosed findings of the Commission were based on examination of police data about reported rape and attempted rape committed by Albanians on Serbs and Montenegrins. For the period 1979-1988 they disclosed the following figures: there are 2.5 times fewer rapes in Kosovo than in Yugoslavia as a whole. Moreover, the proportion of Albanians who perpetuate rape is less than their proportion in the total Yugoslav population; Serbs and Muslims perpetrate a greater share of total rapes than their share in the total population. (For example, Albanians in Kosovo were seven percent of the total Yugoslav population; Albanians convicted of rape made six percent of the total of convicted rapists in Yugoslavia). Of the total number of criminal proceedings in Kosovo for rape and attempted rape in the years between 1982 and 1988 (N=323), 9.6 percent or 31 rapes were committed by Albanians on Serbs.

From 1982 the trend falls, and in the three years from 1987 to 1989 there was not one case of rape of a Serb by an Albanian. The report argues that the almost non-existent inter-ethnic rape in Kosovo could be a sign of the total breakdown in communication between ethnic groups. The data show that intra-ethnic rape is over-represented and all inter-ethnic indices are negative (see Table 1). The index of association for Albanian-Serbian rate (-22.8) means that the ethnic factor "acts in the direction opposite to that proliferated in public opinion and political propaganda" (Popović, Jančar, Petovar, 1990: 46).
Table 1 Perpetrators and Victims of Rape in Kosovo by Nationality (1982-1989); Indices of Association

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Victims: Women, by Nationality</th>
<th>Perpetrators</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albanians</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>-24.4</td>
<td>-9.1</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>-22.8</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>-10.7</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>373</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Popović et al. (1990), p. 45

Less than a year after the rape controversy in Kosovo, the multiethnic fabric of the former Yugoslavia unraveled. Central to this process was gender violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

**Bosnia-Herzegovina: the Pre-war Development and Ethnic Canopy**

Economic and demographic findings for Bosnia and Herzegovina in late eighties disclosed ever wider developmental gap between specific regions. Key variables in such analysis have been: net-migration, population dynamics and participation of local communes in GDP of the republic. Impasses found in regional or communal development could be hardly explained solely by national or ethnic diversity: there were well-to-do local communities and regions with highly diversified ethnic composition, and there were ethnically homogeneous communes almost depopulated and living at the edge of survival. Nonetheless, data suggest at least one rather well established assumption: that in last two decades, ethnic or national diversity was associated with higher migration rates (Mežnarić, 1993:21-27).

In the 42 years between 1948 and 1991 the total population of BiH grew by over 71%; this substantial growth is due mainly to the high levels of natural increase of the population as the large cohorts borne in the "compensation periods" in fifties are still producing children. Thus, the population growth still remains well above the replacement level (Vincent and Mudrovčić, 1991: 265). Otherwise, Bosnia and Herzegovina has had the great decline in the rate of fertility and natural increase (the latter declined from 14.3 in 1970 to 8.1 in 1980; see Sterc, 1991:17), combined with a constantly negative net migration (-271,243 in the same period). This downward trend has been more dramatic and took shorter period of time than in other republics. Hence in the late eighties demographers were arguing that some serious turbulences occurred in the population reproduction in BiH (Grebo, 1986).

Part of them were differences in birthrates found (1981) among national groups in BiH; rates were 15.8 for Croats, 14.8 for Serbs, and 21.0 for Muslims. Consequently, "nationality" structure of newborn babies in 1981 was significantly different from the structure of the total population. In 1981, BiH had 106 administrative units (communes); in 67 of them population diminished, in some of them drastically - over 30% in the period between 1963-1981. Majority of them were communes with Serbian majority, part of today's "Krajina" and Eastern Herzegovina. Such a shrinking of local populations diminished their fertile and productive segments; akin disposition revealed specifically in communes with Croatian majority.

Pre-war analysis (Kamenica, 1986; Sparavalo, 1987)) which combined population dynamics in communes (population is growing/declining) and their participation in republic's GDP (going up/down) between 1963-1981, suggested four types of communal development in pre-war BiH: communes where both population and participation in the republic's GDP were going up (Type 1), communes where population was growing while their GDP participation was going down (Type 2), communes where population was declining and their par-
icipation in the republic's GNP was going up (Type 3) and communes where both population and their participation in the republic's GNP were declining (Type 4).

Among 67 communes where population shrunk, only seven increased their participation in republic's GNP. All of them were ethnically mixed; five of them were in, what is nowadays "Serbian corridor" in Krajina and two of them were in the "Croatian corridor" in Western Hercegovina. Four of these communes (Bijeljina, Bosanska Gradiška, Čelinac i Derventa) where among the first targets of Serbian aggression and ethnic cleansing. Central Bosnia presents the type of development which has combined substantial population growth and considerably decreased participation in republican GNP (Sparavalo, 1987: 799). These were communes of Zenica and Tuzla (highly industrialized, ecologically destroyed and densely populated), Kakanj and Vitez.

The ethnic composition of BiH has been rather stable, although in comparing ethnic groups one should bear in mind administrative changes and changes in categories (such as the statistical introduction of dummies like "nationality not declared", "Muslims as an ethnic group", or "Yugoslavs"). According to one survey[^4] a typical citizen of Bosnia and Hercegovina, irrespective of whether she/he was Croat, Šerb or Muslim, was young (50% under 31 years; Šerbs were slightly older than others), married to a spouse of the same lot (curiously enough, even Yugoslavs marry "Yugoslav"); had mostly up to 8 years of education (though for women, fully 38 percent had less than 4 years of education); owned a house or an apartment or shared one with her/his parents; was not living on a farm and had no arable land; and did not move anywhere during her/his lifespan; lived in a rural or semi-rural area, in a settlement with a population less than 2,000 inhabitants (58 percent of respondents).[Mežnarić, 1993:24] In the ethnic canopy of pre-war Bosnia one could find an equal distribution of conservatism, ethnocentrism, and authoritarianism throughout the population; Croats, Muslims and Šerbs view changes more or less cautiously. They were equally for a strong government and central decision making. The majority were "egalitarianists" ("same needs - same earnings") and they tended to prefer a "strong hand" government (Šerbs more than others). Attitudes towards mixed-marriages have at least two interesting features: first, the decisive negative: "No, I would not even think about marrying an Albanian...", expressed by the fifty percent of the total population; opposition to marriage with other national groups (Croat, Muslim, Šerb) was around 21 percent. Secondly, those opposed to varied significantly across particular groups; thus Muslims were significantly against choosing a Croat as a spouse; Croats and Šerbs had the same feelings about Muslims. In short, regarding marital preferences, the cleavages between Muslims and others seem much deeper than those between Šerbs and Croats. If these preferences are taken as indicators of the processes of exclusion/inclusion in particular ethnic communities we might say that, judging from our data, in pre-war Bosnia such processes mainly concerned Muslim community. Apart from these differences, there is scarce evidence that, at the brink of the war, three ethnic groups were different to such an extent that current clash would have been expected.

**War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: The Rapists' Pinnacle**

Although it is true that in the Balkans, rape was always a part of military campaigns (Dedijer, V. and Miletić, A.: 1990: 214), events in Bosnia appear to be unprecedented in that mass rape reached its pinnacle; according to numerous observers, it became the key strategy in ethnic cleansing. Yet, data and sources are not reliable; for the time being all we

could do is to trust scarce surveys’ estimations and professional data evaluations (Čačić-Kumpes, 1992). Comparing information from various sources and by checking the statements of victims and witnesses, Jadranka Čačić-Kumpes concluded that at the time she compiled data (November 1992), somewhere between twenty to fifty thousand women had been raped (Čačić-Kumpes, 1992:98). This estimation comes fairly close to the one made by the European Community’s Investigative Mission and close even to the data about rape mentioned by Nikolaj, the Serbian Orthodox bishop of Bosnia (Čačić-Kumpes, 1992:98). Our estimation, based on the survey made in refugee shelters in Croatia in the early Spring of 1994 is that the most probable figure would be close to 16,000 of actual rapes and approximately trippled figure of heavy sexual assaults.

In Bosnia the earlier war of words over inter-ethnic rape in Kosovo in the late 1980s dissolved into systematic actual rape. This time, actors changed ethnic labels: victims were mostly Muslim women, and majority of perpetrators were seemingly Serbian men. The victims, under rebus si stantibus, would hardly reach any kind of protection and justice; in the international arena, rape is still not recognized as a war crime. Ironically enough, the national legislation, in this case Serbian one, which promulgated its amended criminal code with the "ethnic rape" article in it, would hardly be applicable to Serbian perpetrators: for, part of them were (or are) Bosnian citizens, and even if they were from Serbia, the "inter-ethnic" rape occurred on Bosnian territory. Under such circumstances, it would be extremely hard to pinpoint the alleged perpetrators' liability.

Conclusions

This article has examined the complex relations between identity politics, gender violence and war escalation in the former Yugoslavia. In particular, I have tried to show that gender is an ethno-marker in boundary maintenance and in conflicts between ethnic groups. In Kosovo, the discourse of rape blocked interaction and solidified the boundaries between two ethnic groups. In Serbian media campaigns, a new category of rape emerged - "inter-ethnic rape with political consequences" and this aided the mobilization of Serbs against Albanians. The manipulation of rape for political ends, and the construction of Albanian men as rapists, created fear among both Albanian and Serbian men and women, shrank their public visibility and relegated to some undetermined future the time when they would have the ability to come out as citizens.

The discourse of rape in the case of Kosovo evolved into practice of rape in Bosnia. In both cases, rape was embedded in the dynamics of ethnic male rivalry and identity formation. In Kosovo, the discourse of rape installed fear of communication and ended up in divided society; in Bosnia, the actual rapists caused flight and succeeded in cleansing, not only dividing society.

The rapists’ progress so far remains unchallenged; the strategy of rape in Bosnia war surfaced a new, yet familiar map of experiencing gender as an ethno-marker. Only this time, the boundaries on this map are not the object of any negotiations; whatsmore, they seem to be relegated to the internationally supported silence. One can only agree with the analyst of rape in the Balkans, late Lydia Sklevicky (1988:11), that: "As long as women cannot find their own voice to express their own experiences of 'little' and 'big' everyday rape, they will remain pawns in political conflicts whose actors use women's experience for their own aims."

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5) In a screening of refugee camps in Croatia (April 1994), made by The Humanitarian Expert Group - Data base, it appeared that nearly 0.8% of the screened population has been raped; by the same token, 3.2% of refugees were eyewitnesses of rape. If parameters of representativeness could have been controlled, one could estimate that among one million of refugees from BiH there are at least 8,000 persons with actual experience of being raped and 32,000 persons who witnessed the rape.
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USPON SILOVATELJA: ETNICITET, ROD I NASILJE

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