HEGEL’S DIALECTICS: LOGIC, CONSCIOUSNESS AND HISTORY – FOR GRAHAM PRIEST

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ABSTRACT

Graham Priest has brilliantly analyzed Hegel’s dialectics, as far as its logical and abstract ontological (metaphysical) structure goes, and has successfully related it to his own logically sophisticated dialethism. After briefly reminding the reader of his account, the paper turns to the other, not purely logical side of Hegel’s dialectics, and points to his strategy of bringing together ontological, anthropological and historical matters together with the logical structure, in a manner quite foreign to analytic tradition. It concludes with the proposal that Hegel’s way of directly connecting logical ontological, anthropological and historical matters has played the crucial role in the birth of what later became known as specifically “continental” philosophy. The paper concludes by raising the question of the relation between the two, the abstract logico-ontological approach, favored by Priest, and the rich, anthropologically and historically informed one found in all major works of Hegel.

Keywords: Graham Priest’s dialethics, Hegel’s dialectics

1. Introduction

We are all honored and happy to have had Graham here in Rijeka. I find a lot of his work personally interested and inspiring; for example, I have enjoyed a lot discussing with him his ideas about the past and the future of Asian philosophical tradition(s), and I am quite curious about his prophecy that Asian philosophy is going to be the mainstream philosophy in relatively near future. However, for this occasion I want to discuss matters other than Asian philosophy, about which I have to confess to my ignorance. Graham’s dialethics is related to dialectics (e.g. Priest 1989, 388–415), and he is himself ready to affiliate some of his thinking with Hegel’s. “Hegel is a dialethist”, he said in the discussion of this very paper. The connection with Hegel is going to be the topic of the present paper.

1Thanks go to professors Graham Priest, Ne nad Smokrović and Miomir Matulović, and to students David Grčki and Augustin Serdar.
Graham is not afraid of reading Hegel as a theorist of contradictions, in contrast to the mainstream analytic reading of Hegel these days; and I think he is right (and will not develop this further). I shall say a few words about how I tend to understand Hegel and his idea of dialectics, and raise a few questions for Graham. More precisely I shall be starting from conceptual contradictions (brilliantly analyzed by Graham), then briefly summarize his reconstruction of Hegel, end then quickly pass to a related Hegelian strategy of depicting the quasi-conceptual development as a temporal-historical one. I shall be raising a question for Graham and pointing to some problems and limitations of the temporal-historical strategy. (In the reminder of the paper I shall be using the family name “Priest” for our guest.)

2. Logic: Concepts and Contradictions

Let me start with Hegel’s methodology of logical analysis and very briefly propose a way of understanding it. Anyone who is in the business of analyzing concepts would proceed by picking up candidate truths concerning some \( X \), collating intuitions and organizing them. Usually, at early stages one will encounter inconsistencies, sometimes even straight contradictions. We all point out to our students that ordinary concept contain mutually contradictory elements, or elements that are hard to reconcile with each other. Some possible groupings will be more extreme, others less so.

Now, within the analytic tradition the familiar options include strictly separating several concepts-meanings of a word, picking up one of the extremes, and defending it, or picking up one of the extremes, and making it more moderate, enriching it with some items from the “middle ground”, and finally, looking at the middle ground, organizing it, and claiming that it represents the right concept of \( X \). If some elements form a group of mutually supporting element, others another group, the standard analytic technics include selecting some elements and pruning out others, or, in cases where elements are in tension but not literary contradictory, assigning greater weight to some, and lesser to others. Just a brief reminder and illustration. On the historical side think of Grice’s analysis of everyday expressions, like “no”, “if … then”, “or”; his problem is the link with the meaning of corresponding logical connectives, and the different behavior of the corresponding members of the two groups (“and” vs. “\( \wedge \)”). He then splits the “meaning” of the former, into strict meaning, that is compatible with the later, and mere conventional implicature that is supposed to account for the differences. On the contemporary side, the most popular strategy in recent decades has been the one put forward by F. Jackson, and developed by authors like Chalmers. Here is Jackson’s characterization:

We might call it the ‘network’ view of conceptual analysis. It breaks the analytical task into two parts. One consists in the assembling of
Jackson’s main examples, his analyses of mental and moral concepts, go in the direction of the third option above, namely, looking for a middle ground that would lead to reconciliation. But he does sometimes accept the option of simply splitting the analysandum:

I have occasionally come across people who resolutely resist the Gettier cases. Sometimes it has seemed right to accuse them of confusion—they haven’t properly understood the cases, or they haven’t seen the key similarities to other cases where they accept that subjects do not know, or the key differences from cases they accept as cases of knowledge—but sometimes it is clear that they are not confused; what we then learn from the stand-off is simply that they use the word ‘knowledge’ to cover different cases from most of us. (Jackson 1989: 32)

Hegel’s proposal is exactly the opposite of these strategies, and enjoins us to do the following:

1. When analyzing the concept of $X$ stress the extreme, mutually contradictory elements, and organize the relevant propositions into two or more mutually contrasting groups, $G_1, G_2, \ldots, G_n$ (or into a couple of mutually contradictory ones, $\langle G_1, \neg G_1 \rangle$)

2. organize the groups into a sequence: $G_1 \leadsto G_2 \leadsto \ldots \leadsto G_n$

3. describe the whole ordered by “$\leadsto$” as the development of the object itself, and then pass to something even more radical:

4. if possible, describe this development as something taking place in time (or at least, in time, as one of the possible media of development),

5. depict the development as having a historical counterpart in outside reality, and as being ultimately unified with it.

This logical-metaphysical strategy, enjoins the philosopher to look for contrasting standpoints concerning $X$, but then to ascribes the contrast and contradictions
to the very concept “X”, not to our fallible “conceptions” then, the tensions are ascribed to the X itself, where the account oscillates between the two, conflict and contradiction. Mere concepts are one-sided and we should take all the sides together.

Philosophy has to do with ideas or realized thoughts, and hence not with what we have been accustomed to call mere concepts. It has indeed to exhibit the onesidedness and untruth of these mere concepts, and to show that, while that which commonly bears the name “concept,” is only an abstract product of the understanding, the true concept alone has reality and gives this reality to itself. (Philosophy of Right, 2008: 17)

A famous example: the beginning of “The Science Of Logic” (Chapter 1 Being, §132, also mentioned by Graham Priest in his (1990)). Here, being will be equated with its contradictory concept, nothing or nonbeing.

Being, pure being, without any further determination. In its indeterminate immediacy it is equal only to itself. It is also not unequal relatively to an other; it has no diversity within itself nor any with a reference outwards. It would not be held fast in its purity if it contained any determination or content which could be distinguished in it or by which it could be distinguished from an other. It is pure indeterminateness and emptiness. There is nothing to be intuited in it, if one can speak here of intuiting; or, it is only this pure intuiting itself. Just as little is anything to be thought in it, or it is equally only this empty thinking. Being, the indeterminate immediate, is in fact nothing, and neither more nor less than nothing. (Logic, 2001:35)

The first conclusion follows in §134:

Pure Being and pure nothing are, therefore, the same. What is the truth is neither being nor nothing, but that being—does not pass over but has passed over—into nothing, and nothing into being. (Logic, 2001:36)

Now, what do we do with this contradiction? Hegel suggests that it is preserved-cum-abolished in the next stage:

But it is equally true that they are not undistinguished from each other, that, on the contrary, they are not the same, that they are absolutely distinct, and yet that they are unseparated and inseparable and that each
immediately vanishes in its opposite. Their truth is therefore, this move-
movement of the immediate vanishing of the one into the other: becoming,
a movement in which both are distinguished, but by a difference which
has equally immediately resolved itself. (Ibid.)

Priest (2014) sees the story as akin to his dialetheism, and indeed to its metaphysical
version. Indeed, the step 1. taken in isolation can ground the logical-metaphysical
strategy, favored by him:

...if one accepts an ontology of facts, fact-like structures, or something
of this kind, then metaphysical dialetheism makes sense. Note, moreover,
that if one accepts such an ontology, metaphysical dialetheism is a simple
corollary of dialetheism. Since there are true statements of the form $A$
and $\neg A$ then there are facts, or fact-like structures, corresponding to both
of these. (Priest 2014:17)

An example of Priest’s logico-metaphysical strategy is his analysis of motion, from
Priest, 2006 p. 175, which he connects immediately to Hegel:

As Hegel himself puts it, [M]otion itself is contradiction’s immediate
existence. Something moves not because at one moment of time it is here
and at another there, but because at one and the same moment it is here
and not here …(Hegel (1812), Priest 2006:175)

The appropriate state description for the Hegelean account will, of course,
be different, incorporating, as it does, the spread hypothesis. In accor-
dance with the hypothesis, there is an interval containing $t, \theta_t$ (which
may depend not only on $t$ but also on $f$) such that, in some sense, if
$t' \in \theta_t$, bs occupation of it’s location at $t'$ is reproduced at $t$. I suggest
that a plausible formal interpretation of this is the state description of
$b$ at $t$ is just the “superposition” of all the Russellean state descriptions,
$v_{t'}$, where $t' \in \theta_t$. More precisely, it is the evaluation, $v$, given by the conditions:

$\begin{align}
(2.1) \quad & 1 \in v_t(B_{r}) \text{ iff, for some } t' \in \theta_t, \quad r = f(t') \\
(2.2) \quad & 0 \in v_t(B_{r}) \text{ iff, for some } t' \in \theta_t, \quad r \neq f(t')
\end{align}$

Let us call this the Hegelean state description of the motion. Suppose we
write $\sum_t$ for the spread of all the points occupied at $t$, i.e., for $\{f(t') | t' \in \theta_t\}$. If $\sum_t$ is degenerate, that is if $\sum_t = f(t)$, then the Hegelean
state description is identical with the Russellean one. If it is not, then, as
may easily be seen, the condition on the righthand side of (2b) is satisfied
by all $r$, and we may depict the Hegelean state description as follows:
Priest finely places it in context. He notes its idealist background in Fichte, and its continuation in the “dialectical tradition” in Marxism. However as he mentions (Priest 1990: 391), it has been a popular move in Marxism to rather talk about contrast and conflicts in $X$ itself, than about conceptual contradictions. However, Hegel quickly brings in time and history and Priest notes this in the same paper:

The logical dialectic, though a development, is not a process in time. It is, however, connected with one that is. For spirit is embodied in nature, and, particularly, humankind and its social institutions; and these change in the historical dialectic. Each social institution, being a fragment of Geist reflects its properties to a certain extent. (Rather as the whole of an image is visible in any fragment of a hologram.) In particular, it is contradictory.

Perhaps the most famous example is the master-slave relation from Phenomenology. This relation is not a contradictory one, said Priest in the discussion, and I think he is right. But for Hegel, the link to history introduces more than just conceptual contradiction, it points to a new and different strategy to which we now turn.

3. From Logic to History

Let us step back, and note that history has been a popular topic in the time of early idealist philosophy in Germany. In Kant, the metaphysically basic matters are a-historical. But, the interest in history was alive in philosophers of Hegel’s time, and Herder is the author closest to Hegel. On the metaphysical side, we have Fichte; in his work the foundational role is played by Self (Ich), in tension with the world, the Non-self (Nicht-Ich). The interest in ethics, theory of right and justice and in history is very much alive, but in Fichte the ontological fundamentals, Self and its contrary are still ahistorical. But, there is just a step from pasting the three together. For instance, there is the original positing of Non-self by Self: when does it happen? One answer is a-temporal, but one is tempted to think of some original time of the grand event. Why not, after all; maybe the positing occurs...
in time, even in historical time. In contrast, young Hegel has been obsessed with history, encompassing religious, political, and then cultural history and history of philosophy. From the Protestant tradition he takes over the idea that great events around the life of Christ, birth, death, resurrection and the appearance of the Holy Spirit on Pentecost, are events that belong to the life of God himself. He makes a step further: the narrative shows that God in a way has a history, intertwined with human history. Next comes the interest in political history, with French revolution and Napoleonic wars in the focus. Now, how does one put together fundamental ontology, religious history of God himself and political events of one’s time? Well, declare that God and fundamental reality, which is, of course spiritual (we are at the peak of German idealism) are the same. If God has a history, then fundamental reality, the Spirit, has one too. And if the two are closely connected to human reality, then the human reality is closely connected to the ontologically fundamental history of God-Spirit.

The resulting, idealist story feature the idea of closeness, analogy and continuity between (a) human history, political, religious, and cultural, (b) history of the Absolute/Spirit (Geist) and (c) development of Concept/Ideas concerning metaphysical matters and human historical matters. First, human history, and the temporal dimension having to do with historical and anthropological (self-)consciousness related), matters, in particular tensions -conflicts -contradictions arising in relation to such matters: self-interest vs. social interest, family vs. state. These tensions and contradictions are the very driving force of the deepest and most spectacular development of the foundation of social reality. The tensions lead to progressively higher stages of social organization.

The history often goes from one extreme (one side in the tension) the other, and then to a higher arrangement reconciling both. To reiterate, there is a continuity between:

(a) the actual history of mankind,

(b) the self consciousness that mankind has of its history,

(c) philosopher’s “scientific account” of (a) and (b) connecting them to conceptual, logical and general ontological “developments”.

In fact, the account (c) is the culmination of (a) and (b). For Hegel, philosophy-
science itself bifurcates into the account of the more concrete and historical development and the more abstract logic-cum-general metaphysics.

Consciousness is spirit as a concrete knowing, a knowing too, in which externality is involved; but the development of this object, like the development of all natural and spiritual life, rests solely on the nature of the pure essentialities which constitute the content of logic. (Preface to Logic §10)

This idea of the unity of concrete history and the deepest ontological structure of reality will be one of the most persistent in continental tradition, re-emerging in various forms in central authors like Heidegger and Derrida; see the footnote 7. In short, Hegel has at least two strategies for a meaningful deployment of contradictions: first, the a-historical, “logical-metaphysical” one (“Science of Logic”), brilliantly captured by Priest. Second, the temporal-historical strategy: conceptual contradictions turn into stages of a development of (self-) consciousness which is essentially historical. We now turn to this second one. Further historical-political examples for it are fundamental political and historical items like state, nation, justice and the like.

The unity of visible existence and concept, of body and soul, is the idea. It is not a mere harmony of the two, but their complete interpenetration. There lives nothing, which is not in some way idea. The idea of right is freedom, which, if it is to be apprehended truly, must be known both in its concept and in the embodiment of the concept. (Philosophy of Right, Introduction, 2008:18)

In short, Hegel’s recipe for studying them is the following. Start from some given $X$, say family or nation. Consider $X$ as such; Hegel calls it “$X$-in itself”. Then pass to $X$ that knows itself, is aware of itself: a family that functions well, with full awareness of the common ties, a nation of the same sort; Hegel calls it “$X$-for itself”. For him, awareness of $X$ is somehow $X$’s self-awareness, as the background of idealism would suggest. Finally, the union of the two, $X$-in-and-for-itself is the final stage of the development of $X$. It is assumed that in general the awareness of $X$ is somehow $X$’s self-awareness.

Now, this works with Hegel’s primary examples from society and history. Take family, nation and the like. For Hegel, family is all about the unity, sustained by love, and the self-awareness of it. For nation, start from the group whose members are connected by some common objectively given properties (language,
origin, common history). At some point, the group becomes aware of the commonalities, stresses them, and the mutual knowledge of them becomes bases of the “self-awareness” of the group: what was in a sense a nation-in-itself thus becomes nation-for-itself. Later, this awareness of the commonalities becomes a routine matter. This syncretism of objective properties of $X$, awareness of them as (central part of the) self-awareness of $X$, and the interpenetration of the two seems to work for social kinds. Hegel goes much further, than isolated examples would suggest. He connects history immediately with the ontological foundation of the world, the Spirit:

the other aspect, however, in which spirit comes into being, history, is the process of becoming in terms of knowledge, a conscious self-mediating process–spirit externalized and emptied into time.

The goal, which is Absolute Knowledge or Spirit knowing itself as Spirit, finds its pathway in the recollection of spiritual forms (Geister). Their conservation, looked at from the side of their free existence appearing in the form of contingency, is specifically characterized by love, which is spirit’s feeling of its own unity. Hence in a family, one’s disposition is to have self-consciousness of one’s individuality within this unity as the essentiality that has being in and for itself, with the result that one is in it not as an independent person but as a member” (Hegel 2008:162).

The idea is quite common, and continues in our time. Here is Gelner’s definition of the sameness of nation:

(a) two people are of the same nation if and only if they share the same culture, where culture in turn means a system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and communicating. (b) two people are of the same nation if and only if they recognize each other as belonging to the same nation ... the nations are the artefacts of men’s convictions and loyalties and solidarities. (1983: 7)

The most worked out version, committed to the reality of nations comes from David Miller, and it also fits well with Hegel’s tripartite scheme. He claims that “national communities are constituted by belief” : it is essential that their members recognize one another as compatriots, and that they believe they share characteristics of the relevant kind” (Miller 1995, 22). The author also introduces important belief independent traits, e.g. that national identity embodies historical continuity. Further, national identity has to do with doing things together and achieving results, and with connection to territory. However, the author leaves open the possibility that the traits are not real; it seems that what is important is that they are believed to exist (Miller 1995, 23ff.). Here is shorter version:

Nations are groups of people who feel they belong together and have a common public culture; further, their members recognize special obligations to one another, regard the continuous existence of the nation as a valuable good and aspire for their group to be politically self-determining. (Miller 2007: 124–126)
History; looked at from the side of their intellectually comprehended organization, it is the Science of the ways in which knowledge appears. A big problem for the account is the non-human nature: our consciousness of plants is simply not plant’s self-consciousness. A possible reply is that nature is somehow part of human history (= strongly anthropomorphic, either idealist or realist), or of a super-human plus human one, involving the Geist and thereby God).

This gives at least three parallel stories (e.g. $X =$freedom, $X =$justice):

Consider the central and rightmost column: historical and anthropological (= (self-)consciousness related) matters, in particular tensions-conflicts-contradictions omnipresent in them.

5Let me quote the famous conclusion of the Phenomenology which explicitly mentions the two lines, historical and scientific-conceptual:

The goal, which is Absolute Knowledge or Spirit knowing itself as Spirit, finds its pathway in the recollection of spiritual forms (Geister) as they are in themselves and as they accomplish the organization of their spiritual kingdom. Their conservation, looked at from the side of their free existence appearing in the form of contingency, is History; looked at from the side of their intellectually comprehended organization, it is the Science of the ways in which knowledge appears. Both together, or History (intellectually comprehended (begriffen), form at once the recollection and the Golgotha of Absolute Spirit, the reality, the truth, the certainty of its throne, without which it were lifeless, solitary, and alone. Only

The chalice of this realm of spirits
Foams forth to God His own Infinitude
(G. W. F. Hegel 1807. The Phenomenology of Mind. Translated by J. B. Baillie. Blackmask Online)

6Perhaps the young Marx and some Marxist Hegelians stuck to the nature—human history schema and to strongly anthropomorphic realism.
There are several levels of deeply logico-metaphysical relevance of such tensions. First, they are logical contradictions in the very concept (a nonsubjective one) of a given historical matter (e.g. justice, state, freedom). Second, they are tensions in the very metaphysical nature of such matters, serving as the driving force of the development of each, and of the cluster into which they are connected. Third, and most dramatically, the central historical and anthropological matters are (next to final or final) stages in the development of the very foundation of reality (Spirit, God, Being). Their tensions and contradictions are the very driving force of the deepest and most spectacular development of the foundation of reality.

Thus we arrive at the formulation of an important principle: the central historical and anthropological (=self-)consciousness related, matters are in fact stages in the development of the very foundation of reality, of Spirit/God and the like. Let me call it Anthropo-historico ontological (AHO) principle:

(AHO): The anthropological and historical is deeply ontological.

The idea is that human life, language and history (politics included) belong to the fundamental level of reality, not to a higher-level of supervenient additions and embellishments. The historical configurations from our the actual history of mankind, together with the corresponding forms of their (self-)understanding, the self-consciousness that mankind has of its history give one “History (intellectually) comprehended (begriffen)”, writes Hegel in the famous poetically formulated conclusion of the Phenomenology of the Spirit. He then wraps up his message and claims that the two taken “…/together, or, form at once the recollection and the Golgotha of Absolute Spirit, the reality, the truth, the certainty of its throne, without which it were lifeless, solitary, and alone” (Phenomenology, 2001: 296).

7In my opinion, which I cannot argue here for, the AHO is Hegel’s crucial contribution to the birth of clearly continental tradition; it is fundamental in high-profile tradition (the one which stays in clear contrast with analytic philosophy), changing from the original idealistic version to non-idealistic one in Heidegger, where the history of Being is presented as intertwined with our, human history. Heidegger speaks about the happening of truth as essential for the history of Being: truth sets itself into a work of art, or it occurs through “the act that founds a political state”, then in the act of sacrifice, and finally in the thinker’s questioning:

One essential way in which truth establishes itself in the beings it has opened up is truth setting itself into work. Another way in which truth occurs is the act that founds a political state. Still another way in which truth comes into shine forth is the nearness of that which is not simply a being, but the being that is most of all. Still another way in which truth grounds itself is the essential sacrifice. Still another way in which truth becomes is the thinker’s questioning, which, as the thinking of Being, names Being in its question-worthiness. (Heidegger 1971:160)

So the painting of a picture, say of Mona Lisa, or founding of a state, belong to essential events in the history of Being and truth.

8Interestingly, Hegel stays away from some other proposals characteristic for high-profile continental
These are then the further developments of dialectical framework in Hegel’s work; Priest was clear in the discussion that he would not follow Hegel along this way. His proposal is a cautious one: look at particular proposals in Hegel’s work more than at the system and the big picture.

philosophy. My own proposal (Miščević, in References) for a short list of them encompasses the following: First, an a-rationalist thesis, composed of two sub-theses. The first is about the forces at work in human mind:

(A-RAT-mind) The central element of human mind is a-rational, it is either will, desire or affect. This a-rationalizing might take several forms. Typically it involves setting aside pure cognitive(epistemic) rationality. Often one ends up by replacing it with practical one, for instance in some Marxist, Pragmatist(Rorty) and neo-Heideggerian authors (like Dreyfuss). Hume and Rousseau would have subscribed to (A-RAT-mind) as would later Schopenhauer and Maine de Biran. However, in the wake of German idealism, the arationalist thesis is combined with general anti-realism. Human mind creates or co-creates reality, and the geography of the human mind s at the same time the cosmography of the whole of being. If not the human mind, then an absolute, mind-like entity. But, if mind creates reality, and the mind is a-rational, then a-rational forces create reality. If the human and historical are directly ontological, then the fierce passions ruling our heart and our political conflicts govern, or co-govern the very Being itself, or are just identical to it. The world is the will, as Schopenhauer proclaimed, it is an artifact of the will-to-power, as Nietzsche claimed. Let me encapsulate the idea and give them names:

(A-RAT-world) The basic reality of the world is akin to the a-rational element of human mind.

After Schopenhauer, with the late Schelling (A-RAT-mind) and (A-RAT-world) enter the scene of the late German Idealism, in the three initial decades of the nineteenth century. Of course, Hegel has been a staunch critic of a-rationalism, and the defenders of A-RAT often present it in polemics with Hegel’s views. Second, Exemplification Constraint, EC for short:

(Continental End-of-philosophy Thesis): Philosophers should abandon the traditional philosophical reflection in favour of participating in more concrete theoretical-cultural practices, possibly marked by strong political engagement.

The thesis was born as a reaction to Hegel; it started its life in the hyper-politicized young Hegelians’ reflection on Hegel’s idea of the end of philosophy (and history). According to the idea, the the history of philosophy, and thereby the history of Geist, the Absolute itself, has ended in Hegel’s times.
4. Conclusion

Graham Priest has brilliantly analyzed Hegel’s dialectics, as far as its logical and abstract ontological (metaphysical) structure goes, and has successfully related it to his own logically sophisticated dialethism. After briefly reminding the reader of his account, we have turned to the not purely logical side of Hegel’s dialectics, and have pointed to his strategy of bringing together ontological, anthropological and historical matters together with the logical structure, in a manner quite foreign to analytic tradition. We argued that Hegel has at least two interconnected methodologies for a meaningful deployment of contradictions, first, the a-historical, logico-metaphysical. The first has been skilfully captured in a more contemporary form by Priest. However, the second, the temporal-historical one in a way organizes the whole of Hegel’s work, and has been immensely influential in continental philosophy, up to the present time.

Let me mention my impression from recent Anglo-American literature on Hegel (Stern, Knowles, Pippin, Westphal, Guyer, Brandom, McDowell, and others; see References). The authors that are interested in the temporal-historical and anthropological side of Hegel’s philosophy avoid stressing the role of contradictions (in the strong and literary sense of the word) in Hegel; on the opposite side we have Priest and the dialethicians who happily accept the dynamics of contradiction(s) at the conceptual, logical and general ontological level, but wisely avoid presenting it as being intimately connected to human culture and history.

However, Hegel’s way of directly connecting logical ontological, anthropological and historical matters has played the crucial role in the birth of what later became known as specifically “continental” philosophy. Unfortunately, the methodology is not adequate for a global ontological account, unless one implausibly assumes that nature is somehow part of (super-)human history.
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