On the Meaning and Some Contexts of the Term ‘Autonomy’
A Conceptual Investigation

Abstract
The paper aims to analyse conceptually the meaning of the term ‘autonomy’ and to examine critically its relations with other ethical norms. The question posed is whether autonomy is a right, or an ability, or a capacity, or an achievement, and whether it ought to be distinguished from self-determination. It is shown that autonomy is an anthropological principle, and that self-determination as its manifestation is a human right. As to its relation with other ethical norms, it is shown that there are possible conflicts between a patient’s and his doctor’s autonomies, as well as between autonomy and the duty to protect life, and between autonomy and care, so that trust plays an important role. The author concludes that man is autonomous not if and only if he is able to determine himself, but rather that he has the right to determine himself because he is autonomous. This holds for everybody from their beginning to their end, irrespective of what they are able to do and the situation they may be in. Since every human being is autonomous, autonomy entails self-limitation, and so it does not mean independence, but interdependence. As to trust, autonomy is to be acknowledged, while trust is to be practised, since autonomy is of people, while trust is in people.

Key words
autonomy, self-determination, self-limitation, duty to protect life, care, trust

Introduction
The term ‘autonomy’ entails – particularly in the field of bio-medical ethics – two main problems: (i) it is understood in various ways, and (ii) it stands in different contexts in tension with other ethical norms.
Thus, both a conceptual analysis of the meaning of the term ‘autonomy’ and a critical reflection on its relation to other ethical norms are at stake.
In what follows, I shall, in Part one, dwell upon the notion of ‘autonomy’ as such, and, in Part two, inquire into the relation of this notion to other ethical norms. Finally, in Part three, I shall sum up my argument with seven theses on the meaning and some contexts of autonomy.1

1 For further details see: Jan P. Beckmann, Ethische Herausforderungen der modernen Medizin, Alber, Freiburg – Munich 2009, p. 13 et passim.
Part one. The notion of ‘autonomy’ and the variety of its interpretations

1. Autonomy – unrestricted self-determination of the individual?

‘Autonomy’ (henceforth referred to as ‘A’), from the Greek ‘auto-nomía’, means self-legislation and is the opposite of its contrary term ‘heteronomy’. ‘A’ is often understood to be an expression of the total emancipation of the individual from legal and/or moral traditions, in the sense of the limitless “being master in one’s own house” (cf. the slogan “My body is my own!”). Such an understanding of ‘A’ overlooks the double aspect of this notion or confounds the two aspects: ‘A’ as a status and ‘A’ as an application by an act, i.e., ‘A’ as a state of independence and ‘A’ manifested by an act of self-determination. That man2 is independent in the sense of selfhood is one thing, and that he can determine himself is another. There are situations in which a person knows himself to be independent of others, but feels unable to determine himself, as when, e.g., a patient knows that he is independent of doctors, but at the same time feels unable to decide for himself which therapy he wants. Or, vice versa, e.g., most employees may well determine themselves, but still remain dependent of their employers.

That independence and self-determination are not one and the same thing has both a formal and a material reason: formally, the two terms differ from each other – independence is a relation, while self-determination a reaction. Independence necessarily presupposes a relation with regard to which one is independent, while self-determination is always a way of responding to a specific challenge. Thus, it remains unclear whether the slogan “Man is master in his own house” is based upon the idea of independence, or upon the idea of self-determination, or upon both, or whether it confounds the two.

2. Autonomy – “revolt against paternalism”? 

Some authors take ‘A’ to be mainly a negative attitude or a kind of “revolt” against paternalism. Now, it goes without saying that the argumentative context in which the idea of ‘A’ in the field of medical ethics appears is the traditional attitude of doctors who “patronise” patients rather than acknowledge their will. However, opposing paternalism is not yet ‘A’, because opposing means an action, while ‘A’ is a status. One is autonomous, while one may act against paternalism by opposing it. Thus, the relationship between ‘A’ and paternalism is that of cause and effect. Accordingly, they necessarily differ from each other.

3. Autonomy – a capacity, an ability or an achievement of the individual?

A majority of authors take ‘A’ to be a human capacity or an achievement – i.e., the ability to choose and determine one’s own wishes. Now, human capacities and abilities vary both within the same person at different times and amongst different persons. If ‘A’ is taken to be a capacity or ability of people in specific contexts, then that means that those who do not have this capacity at their disposal or are unable to achieve it – are not autonomous. This means that, for instance, youngsters who are not yet able to decide on their own are not yet autonomous, that old people who may no longer be able to decide on their own have lost their previous autonomy, that the mentally disabled who are unable to decide for themselves throughout their lives can never be autonomous.
Even one and the same individual at times would lose his autonomy – for instance, while being narcotised during an operation. Accordingly, the understanding of ‘A’ as a human capacity or ability causes two problems: (i) it reduces man to his faculties, and (ii) in case of its deficiency, exposes him to grave ethical difficulties. But reducing man to his faculties discriminates against those who at times or throughout their lives lack these faculties; and nobody may be deprived of protection because of lack of the power to decide for themselves. To this some answer: A lack of ‘A’ is to be compensated for by care, which I shall come back to in Part two.

4. Autonomy – a human right?

In view of the aforesaid difficulties which result from making ‘A’ dependent on human faculties and circumstances, some say that ‘A’ is a right, i.e., the right to self-governance. Etymology seems to support this, given that ‘A’ is originally a legal term; but autonomía, taken in its original sense, means self-legislation, and not ‘self-governance’ as it is today often understood. The advantage of understanding ‘A’ as a right lies in the fact that any disrespect of ‘A’ would be a legal offence. The grave disadvantage, however, would be the consequence of over-juridification of the doctor–patient relationship: any infringement of respect for ‘A’ would eventually lead to a court case. Moreover, man is autonomous if he is granted the possibility to decide about his own wishes. But, if autonomy is something granted, the question is by whom? By an outside source? But that is heteronomy then. So, if autonomy is taken to be something granted, then it is a self-contradictory term.

5. The distinction between autonomy and self-determination – a way out of the aforesaid difficulties?

The aforesaid difficulties seem avoidable if one distinguishes between ‘A’ and self-determination: ‘A’ is then a status, and self-determination its manifestation.3 ‘A’ is a state-of-affairs which is proper to every human being from their beginning to their end, regardless of what their abilities and circumstances are. The advantage of this understanding lies in the fact that ‘A’ applies to everybody and that it does not allow for any grading of ‘A’ (i.e., “more or less ‘A’”) and, at the same time, allows the safeguarding of one remaining autonomous if one is unable to manifest ‘A’. It also allows for calling ‘A’ not a right, but an anthropological principle, i.e. a proprium of man, while its manifestation is a right, which like any right has to be respected, but may also be violated. Thus, nobody can take ‘A’ away from people, although one can disrespect it as a right to manifest ‘A’.

‘A’ and its manifestation by way of self-determination are to be distinguished, although they are not to be separated from each other. They are, in fact, two sides of the same coin. ‘A’ as an anthropological principle may be called the

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2 In what follows, masculine pronouns are used for both men and women for reasons of simplicity.

essential and its manifestation the functional side of ‘A’. Man is always, i.e., by necessity, autonomous, though he may not always be able to manifest this autonomy: as a baby because he is too young, as an elderly person because he may become demented, as a mentally disabled person because his disposition hinders his ability to utter his own wishes and will. The relation between ‘A’ and its manifestation through self-determination is such that the former is both logically and actually prior to the latter. Logically, man is autonomous not if and only if he is able to determine himself; it is rather the case that, because man is autonomous, he has the right to determine himself. Actually, ‘A’ belongs to those principles which apply to humans for their very own sake and not for their being young or old, healthy or sick, able or not.

6. Autonomy is an anthropological principle and not a right, while self-determination is a right

6.1. On the character of autonomy as a principle

Taken as a principle, ‘autonomy’ is formally a fundamental “first proposition” which can neither be derived from another proposition nor needs to be derivable. And it is a human proprium and, formally, an anthropological principle in that it concerns humans in all their different statuses – be they young or old, alert or demented, healthy or ill. ‘A’ is completely independent of any human faculty or accidental situation that a human being may find himself in.

Two important consequences follow from this:
(i) As an anthropological principle, the notion of ‘A’ does not allow for gradation. Statements (often heard in clinics or homes for the elderly) such as “The patient is – due to age and/or illness – limited with regard to his autonomy” are logically impossible. The logic of the notion of ‘autonomy’ does not allow for different intensities. A person cannot be said to be more autonomous or less autonomous.
(ii) ‘A’ in the sense of uninstrumentalisability-by-others is not a principle that isolates the individual from his fellow individuals. Popular expressions such as “My body is my own”, “I am my own master, and so I can do what I want” have nothing to do with ‘A’. Quite the contrary, ‘A’ understood to be undisposability-by-others is a relational principle. It means that all fellow humans are also undisposable. Thus, an individual’s ‘A’ is both grounded in as well as logically limited by the ‘A’ of a fellow individual. This is one of the reasons why Kant says that ‘A’ necessarily implies determination (‘Begrenzung’). The human individual is ‘autonomous’ if and only if he respects the ‘autonomy’ of every fellow human being. This is, so to speak, ‘A’ within the limits of the autonomy of fellow humans’. Thus, man is autonomous by himself, but not for himself. If he denounced the ‘A’ of others, he would denounce his own ‘A’.

6.2. Self-determination as manifestation of autonomy

With the notion of ‘determination’ we have arrived at a particularly important notion in this context. To determine oneself is to manifest one’s ‘A’. Unlike ‘A’, self-determination as the manifestation of ‘A’ is a right. Like other rights, it has to be respected, but can also be violated. And unlike ‘A’ which, logically speaking, does not allow for grades or different shades of intensity, self-determination of course does. A new-born, although autonomous, cannot yet claim
self-determination – due to biological limitations; while on the operating table and narcotised, one remains autonomous, but is unable to manifest his ‘A’; an old and demented person – although he does remain autonomous – may be able to manifest his ‘A’ only in a reduced way; and a severely mentally disabled person may never in his lifetime be able to do so, and yet he too remains autonomous.

7. Autonomy – a social characteristic relating all humans to each other

Because ‘A’, as has been argued so far, represents a necessary human proprium that applies to everybody irrespective of what they are able to do and the situation they may be in, any understanding of ‘A’ as limitless self-determination would overlook the fundamental social implication of this human proprium. As all people are autonomous, ‘A’ is not confined to the individual nor does it isolate the individual from his fellow humans. In this view, ‘A’ does not consist in everybody issuing their own laws without taking into account the right of fellow humans. On the contrary, ‘A’ necessarily implies respect of the ‘A’ of all fellow humans, because everybody is autonomous. ‘A’, thus, represents a state which unites all human beings. The notion of ‘A’ would entail an inner contradiction if one were to leave out its social dimension. The individual is autonomous in the sense of self-governance if and only if fellow humans are in the very same position, because the individual can set up “his” laws only under the condition that the same laws are valid for everyone else. Otherwise, it would not be ‘A’, but tyranny.

8. Excursus: Autonomy according to Kant

‘A’ necessarily implies, as has already been mentioned, self-limitation. This is closely connected with Kant’s categorical imperative. The basis for this is the central importance of ‘A’ which rests on being-a-moral-subject of one’s own doing. This status of subjecthood does not depend upon either any actual state or situation of the autonomous individual, or upon any abilities or capacities. To subject a person without or even against his will totally to the command of another person or group of persons is to deprive this person of his moral subjecthood and of his being an “end in itself, not merely a means”. For, like

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5 See footnote 4.

6 “Handle so, dass du die Menschheit, sowohl in deiner Person als in der Person eines jeden anderen, jederzeit zugleich als Zweck, niemals bloß als Mittel brauchest.” I. Kant, GMS, BA 67. According to Kant, the categorical imperative is the “principle of autonomy”; cf. ibid., BA 83.


8 I. Kant, GMS, 4.428; cf. the UN Charter from 26 June 1945, which, in the Preamble, speaks of the dignity and value of human person- hood.
human dignity, ‘A’ also has nothing to do with intellectual capacities or any abilities whatsoever.

Self-determination on the basis of subjective or individual wishes, inclinations, needs or decisions of will would, according to Kant, not count as a manifestation of ‘A’, but would, quite to the contrary, be an example of heteronomy due to a lack of freedom – freedom as the property of the will to release laws according to universalisable premises. This is Kant’s understanding of “the concept of every rational being that must consider itself as universally legislating through all the maxims of its will”. This is the effect of the categorical imperative. The moral value of an action is measured by good will, and the will is good if it goes along with the categorical imperative. Kant:

“Autonomy is the basis of human, and every rational, nature.”

‘A’ and human dignity share two aspects which can be distinguished, but not separated: self-legislation and, through the latter, self-restriction. Both provide the basis for human dignity. Kant writes:

“A rational being […] belongs to the kingdom of ends as a member if it is universally legislating in it, but also itself subject to these laws.”

Thus, the dignity of man consists, according to Kant, in his “obeying no law other than that which at the same time he himself gives”. The notion of human dignity addresses both an actuality and a task. The human being possesses unimpeachable dignity (= actuality) because he is, by his very nature, a moral subject. Yet, in being this, he is, at the same time, responsible for the community of his fellow humans (= task). Human dignity is, therefore, not the result of an achievement, but a sign of man’s specific constitution (Verfasstheit in German), which is not a product of acknowledgement, but a sign of mutual estimation. Human dignity is violated if somebody is completely instrumentalised, i.e., if he is being made the pure object of actions by others.

The notion of ‘A’ is, thus, closely connected with human dignity. The two notions share the property of not being gradable – it is logically impossible to speak of ‘more’ or ‘less’ human dignity, much like the way we cannot speak of ‘greater’ or ‘less’ autonomy. In addition, both notions apply to man from his very beginning to his very end, i.e., to every moment or situation during his entire life.

Part two.

Autonomy in different contexts

1. Autonomy versus autonomy?

Take, for instance, the doctor–patient relationship. There is a natural asymmetry between the positions of the doctor and the patient. On the doctor’s side we have competent medical knowledge and abilities, and on the patient’s side the need for help and lack of (sufficient) medical knowledge. At the same time, the doctor depends on the patient’s (informed) consent to be treated, so, in a way, one can speak of a “symmetrical asymmetry”. This, however, is only possible if one realises that ‘A’ is not to be found only on one side, but on both sides: because the patient is autonomous, he can decide about his being treated by the doctor, who is, also because he is autonomous, entitled to
refuse a patient’s inappropriate wishes. Take the debate about *doctor-assisted suicide*: a patient wanting to commit suicide because of an *infaust* diagnosis may ground his wish on his ‘A’ and his right to self-determination. However, in asking for the doctor’s help, a suicidal patient cannot use in his argument the principle of the doctor’s duty to always help, because the doctor might feel instrumentalised by his patient – which would entail disrespect for the doctor’s ‘A’ and right to self-determination.

2. Autonomy versus protection of life?

Grave ethical difficulties are involved in situations when a patient whom the doctor could help refuses his help. This does not pose ethical problems in normal circumstances. An adult patient always has the right to refuse therapy and, to that extent, the doctor depends upon his patient’s wishes. But how about situations in which a patient’s refusal of medical help endangers his life? Some argue that, in this case, the principle of the protection of life outweighs the patient’s ‘A’ and right to determinate himself, so the doctor may treat the patient even against his will. The answer of traditional paternalism to this was the following: the patient does not have sufficient medical knowledge, and so the doctor’s ability to help prevails ethically (cf. the old slogan “Who cures is justified”). Today, some physicians are convinced that their duty to cure patients prevails over the patients’ ‘A’, following the motto: “*salus ae-groti supra-ma lex esto!*” (“the well-being of the patient shall be the most important law!”). On the other hand, there is also the following argument: since it is the *life* of the patient and not of anybody else, how can anyone force him against his will to continue a possible *vita minima*? This, it seems, would render man’s life an absolute duty. Apart from this, it may be argued that the patient’s well-being, which doctors are obliged to work towards, cannot be determined by third persons including doctors. Only the patient himself can do so, and therefore “*salus ex voluntate supra-ma lex esto!*” (“the well-being of the patient as determined by his will shall be the most important law!”).

This means the following. Medical, as well as nursing, measures presuppose – with the exception of emergency cases – the patient’s ‘A’ and right to manifest the same in the form of informed consent. In addition, everybody has the right to determine, by means of a living will, what he agrees to or refuses in the event of his becoming incompetent to decide, *even if irreversible damage ensues.*

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10 Cf. ibid., p. 447.
11 Ibid., p. 436.
12 Ibid., p. 433; cf. ibid., p. 440.
13 Ibid., p. 434.
14 Ibid., p. 436.
3. Autonomy versus care?

However, are people not responsible for each other? And is a patient whose life is at stake but is saveable by a well-established medical therapy not overburdened by ‘A’? Is claiming “‘A’ always prevails” not an excessive demand? Alain Ehrenberg, for instance, speaks of a “culture of autonomy” featuring the thesis that the idea of ‘A’ is to exhaust man’s striving to become himself an independent being. Moreover, how free is an individual in life-threatening situations? There are, it seems, good reasons to let ‘A’, if threatened, be compensated for by care. Thus, there are more than just a few who say that lack of ‘A’ is to be compensated for by care. Just as it can often be heard in clinics or in homes for the elderly that “the patient, due to age and/or illness, is ‘reduced’ in his ‘A’, so doctors and nurses have to compensate for this lack and take over the decision-making”.

There are, however, three grave difficulties with the said:
(i) this can lead to the opposite of ‘A’, namely to heteronomy,
(ii) ‘A’ is mistakenly taken to be gradable, which, as we have seen, would dissolve ‘A’ as an anthropological status proper to every human being from his beginning to his end, and
(iii) care cannot, logically speaking, compensate for ‘A’ because care presupposes ‘A’. To take care of a person presupposes the person’s consent – even if the person is, at a given moment, unable to manifest his will. A patient may appear to be reduced in – or even deprived of – autarchy due to age and/or illness because he has lost self-sufficiency and, accordingly, needs the help of others. But, as has already been said, he can never “lose” ‘A’ because, unlike autarchy, ‘A’ is not a potential, but a necessary state which cannot be separated from the individual.

4. Autonomy versus trust?

One of the early criticisms of the idea of the importance of patient ‘A’ is that it would evince distrust of medicine in general and of doctors in particular. So, taking a closer look at the relation between ‘A’ and trust seems worthy of inspection. The English term ‘trust’ belongs to the large semantic field of confidentiality and reliability, as well as to that of security and safety, but also to the field of comfort and consolation (cf. its etymological kinship with the German term ‘Trost’). According to the Oxford English Dictionary, intransitive and transitive uses of the verb ‘trust’ are to be distinguished. (i) Intransitively used, ‘trust’ is to have faith or confidence in somebody or something, while (ii) transitive used, it is to rely on somebody. In addition, the noun ‘trust’ can be of three different kinds: (i) over against oneself, which presupposes self-knowledge; (ii) over against others, which presupposes community with and knowledge of others; and (iii) over against something (reasons, proofs, traditions, practices, institutions, etc.), which presupposes knowledge of facts.

For our purposes, the following is of importance:
(i) ‘Trust’ is, in bioethical contexts, neither a principle nor a right, but an action or an attitude of a person towards another person or towards an institution. Thus, ‘trust’ is formally relational.
(ii) ‘Trust’ always entails a motive, be it a wish or an expectation, etc. Thus, ‘trust’ is intentional.
(iii) ‘Trust’ always has a reason: need, help. Thus, ‘trust’ is causal.
Thus, trust and ‘A’ share the state of being relational terms, but are different with regard to their categorical level. ‘A’, as we have seen, belongs to the categorical level of principles, while trust belongs to the category of attitudes. Can the two, in spite of this categorical difference, be interlinked in bioethical analysis?

They cannot be interlinked if their formal difference has been overlooked. This could be the case if one of the two notions were to be understood to be possibly compensating for a lack of the other one. A principle cannot, by its very nature, compensate for an attitude.

However, the two notions can in bioethical analyses be linked with each other if their formal difference is observed. This, for instance, is the case in the doctor–patient relationship. A patient’s trust in his doctor denotes his confidence that something desired will be achieved:

(i) The patient entrusts himself to the doctor (in German: “Der Patient vertraut sich dem Doktor an”) = relational aspect.

(ii) This puts the doctor in a position of trust = intentional aspect.

(iii) ‘Trust’, in this case, means that the patient gives credit to his doctor for goods to be achieved = causal aspect.

Although any help provided by doctors needs the patients’ informed consent – which is the manifestation of their autonomy by an act of self-determination – patients need to trust doctors in view of the insecurity and risks of any kind of medical treatment and therapeutic options made available by the rapid developments of modern medicine. Thus, ‘A’ is to be acknowledged, and trust is to be practiced.

In bioethical analysis this means that trust presupposes respect for ‘A’ and not vice versa. In order to trust people, one has to be aware of both one’s own and of other peoples’ ‘A’ and of their right to self-determination. In a word, ‘A’ is of people, while trust is in people. The connection between trust and ‘A’ shows once more the relational (not relative!) implications of ‘A’. Thus, living wills as expressions of ‘A’ are not isolated documents, but need to be integrated into communicative structures (e.g., “advance care planning”, cf. recent developments in the United States).

I have tried to show that ‘A’ denotes a human proprium and an anthropological principle which is to be distinguished from ‘self-determination’ as its manifestation, and that ‘trust’ signifies both a relation and an intention. Although each notion stands on a different categorical level, they can fruitfully be used in bioethical analysis, following the maxim “Away from the practice of distrust, and towards a culture of trust!”

Part three.

Autonomy: seven theses

In the foregoing two parts, I have tried to develop the following theses:

1. ‘Autonomy’ is an anthropological principle or human proprium, and not a right. However, self-determination is a right. Man is autonomous not if and only if he is able to determine himself; it is rather the case that he has the right to determine himself because he is autonomous. Thus, the distinction
between autonomy and self-determination is as essential as the priority of the former over the latter.

2. As a principle, autonomy does not depend upon any of man’s abilities or faculties, and particularly not upon his ability to manifest autonomy. As a human *proprium*, autonomy belongs to everybody *from their beginning to their end*, irrespective of what they are able to do and the situation they may be in.

3. As a human *proprium*, autonomy means that the individual is to be kept free from becoming totally instrumentalised by others. For the same reason, autonomy does not allow for gradation.

4. Both autonomy and self-determination are bound within the limits of acknowledging the autonomy and the right to self-determination of all fellow humans. Thus, autonomy does not mean independence but *interdependence*, while self-determination means *self-limitation*.

5. Autonomy is *relational* (not *relative!*). Thus, a living will as a manifestation of autonomy is no isolated document, but is to be integrated into communicative structures.

6. Formally, autonomy and trust stand on different categorical levels. Trust is a human attitude, and not a moral norm, although it does have moral implications. Autonomy is to be acknowledged, while trust is to be practised. Autonomy is of people, trust is in people.

7. Away from the practice of distrust, and towards a culture of trust. Or, modifying one of Kant’s famous sayings: Medical treatment without respect for the patient’s autonomy and his right to self-determination would ethically be unjustifiable; however, without the patient’s trust in his doctor, it would be impracticable.
Jan P. Beckmann

Zur Bedeutung und einigen Kontexten des Terminus 'Autonomie'

Eine Begriffsuntersuchung

Zusammenfassung


Schlüsselwörter

Autonomie, Selbstbestimmung, Selbstbegrenzung, Lebensschutzpflicht, Fürsorge, Vertrauen

Jan P. Beckmann

De la signification et de certains contextes du terme « autonomie »

Recherche conceptuelle

Résumé

Cet article tente d’analyser de manière conceptuelle la signification du terme d’autonomie et de questionner ses rapports avec d’autres normes éthiques. La question est de savoir si l’autonomie est un droit, une faculté ou une possibilité, et s’il faut la différencier de l’autodétermination. Il est montré que l’autonomie est un principe anthropologique et que l’autodétermination, qui en est sa manifestation, est un droit humain. En ce qui concerne ses rapports avec d’autres normes éthiques, il est montré que d’autres conflits sont possibles, des conflits entre l’autonomie du patient et l’autonomie du médecin, entre l’autonomie et les devoirs de protection de la vie, mais aussi entre l’autonomie et les soins. Ainsi, un rôle important revient à la confiance. L’auteur conclut que l’homme n’est pas autonome, si et seulement si, il est capable d’autodétermination, mais c’est bien parce qu’il a un droit à l’autodétermination qu’il est autonome. Cela vaut pour chacun depuis ses débuts jusqu’à ses fins, indépendamment de ce qu’il est capable de faire et de la situation dans laquelle il peut se trouver. Étant donné que chaque être humain est autonome, l’autonomie entraîne à ses côtés l’autolimitation, de telle manière qu’il ne s’agit pas d’independance mais d’interdépendance. En ce qui concerne la confiance, l’autonomie doit être reconnue, et la confiance doit être pratiquée, car ce dont il s’agit c’est d’autonomie des personnes, et c’est bien en la personne que l’on a confiance.

Mots-clés

autonomie, autodétermination, autorlimitation, devoir de protection de vies humaines, sollicitude, confiance