Giambattista Vico’s “Anthropodicy”
between Ethics, Metaphysics, and History

Abstract

Insisting upon the differentiations of lemmas animus and anima in De antiquissima, we can attribute to Vico a theory able to reassess sense, memory, fantasy, and other faculties very closely related to animus immortale and foreign to the Cartesian conception which states the inferiority of those subordinate faculties to res cogitans. This is the starting point of a complex elaboration that in latter writings, the ones dedicated to the universal right, will allow theorizing of this sense of certum and auctoritas, distinct but not separated from the verum of human reason – which becomes history and stands at the very center of an universal human theodicy. This theodicy – far away from a classic ontological interpretation – could be defined as “anthropodicy”, hiding in its vis both assimilation and reassessment of the problem of Vichian time, seen through a Leibnizian matrix.

Keywords

Giambattista Vico, anima, animus, anthropology, philosophy, philology, history, metaphysics

1.

The recent anastatic reprint of the text De antiquissima italorum sapientia, and its related Italian translation,¹ bring back to the attentive reader’s mind the chapter named “De animi sede”, so very representative of both psychology and anthropology in Vico, but at the same time a cause of problems and translation issues for the variable uses of the lemmas animus and anima. We will take as a starting point page 92 of the editio princeps (1710), where it is ascertained that “animi sedem et domicilium antiqua Italiae philosophia cor esse opinata est”;² it has to be considered that, in a first translation, the one published by Silvestre di Milano in 1816, the subject of the chapter was rendered in the feminine: “L’antica filosofia italiana tenne la sede dell’anima essere il cuore”;³ a similar version was also given in the editions by Nicola


3 Giambattista Vico, Della antichissima sapienza degli italiani tratta da’ latini parlari. Opera di Giambattista Vico dalla latina nell’italiana favella recata, Silvestre, Milan 1816 (reprint, dalla tipografia di N. Pasca, Naples 1817), p. 82.
Corcia (1834) and by the Neapolitan publisher Jovene, in 1840. Then the translation changes in the text proposed in 1858 by Francesco Saverio Pomodoro, saying: “L’antica filosofia italiana fu d’opinione la sede e domicilio dell’animo essere il cuore”. The edition by Carlo Sarchi dated 1870 brings back this last version, later on also accepted by Fausto Nicolini in the well-known volume of 1953: “L’antica filosofia italica riteneva che sede e domicilio dell’animo fosse il cuore”. The ‘feminine’ translation is back again with Cristofolini, that in 1971 publishes a draft bound to condition all the hermeneutics of the soul and of its facultates: “L’antica filosofia italica ha ritenuto che il cuore sia la sede e la dimora dell’anima”. The margin note to the title translates the original saying (“An sedes animae in glandula pineali”) with “sede dell’animo sarà la glandola pineale?”. In 2005 the volume edited by Manuela Sanna retrieves Nicolini’s translation and it sticks to the Vichian text: *Animi sedem*. This double translation is surely inspired by some theoretical uncertainty documented by the choices of Vico himself, who, speaking of mind (*animo*) in three different places of the *De antiquissima*, alternates feminine and masculine gender. At page 93, in a marginal header, we find: *An sedes animae in glandula pineali*, but otherwise happens in the corresponding textual part: “Quare in glanula pineali animum humanum”. At page 97, the inconsistency occurs again: in the side header he writes *Mens anima*, and in the corresponding text *animi motum retulerint*. In the paragraph dedicated to the *facoltà* the saying is even trickier when, praising scholasticism philosophy, the Author begins observing that the *facoltà* belong to the soul. Two years later, commenting again upon faculties and venue of the soul in the *Risposta I* (1712) to the “Giornale de’ Letterati d’Italia”, he will feel the exigence of making clear that:

> “Ragionato della ‘sostanza distesa’ e del ‘moto’, passo alla ‘cogitante’, e tratto dell’anima’ o della vita, dell’‘animo’ o del senso, e dell’aria o etere, detta da’ latini ‘anima’; e pruvo che l’aere del sangue è il veicolo della vita, quel dei nervi del senso; e che non già (come ragguagliate) il moto dei nervi si debba al sangue, ma il moto del sangue a’ nervi, dovendosi al cuore, che è un intiero muscolo e un’opera reticolata, moltiforme d’innumerabili nervicciuoli. (…) Ragiono della sede dell’animo, cioè dove principalmente faccia i suoi uffici, e l’allogio nel cuore. (…) Come appendici di queste cose mi si offriscono le facoltà dell’animo; ed essendo la facoltà una prontezza di operare, ne raccolgo che l’animo con ciascuna facoltà si faccia il suo proprio soggetto: come i colori col vedere, gli odori col fiutare, i suoni con l’udire, e così delle altre.”

The *anima* is life, the *animo* is sense; the *aria* is called by the Latins *anima* and it is vehicle of life, whereas nerves are moved by sense — whose movement is not due to blood, since nerves are the source of the motion of blood, and the heart itself is a device full of uncountable “nervicciuoli” therefore at the same time the venue, the place of the operating *facoltà dell’animo*. In the *Liber Metaphysicus* Vico had made clear that the *sede dell’animo* is in the heart and that the motion of blood is due to the nerves (which start from the heart); immortality is to be attributed to the *animo*, and not to the *anima*. A single and simple example makes clear how the seat of the *animo* is to be set in the heart:

> “Eppure è stato spesso volte osservato che uomini aventi lesioni cerebrali hanno continuato a vivere, a muoversi, a sentire ed a usare felicemente la ragione. Al contrario non sembra credibile e verosimile che l’animo risieda nella parte più grassa e più ottusa del corpo, essendovi più mucosa e meno sangue.”

In his autobiography the philosopher, many years later, will make a distinction between *animus* and *anima*: 

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C. Megale, Giambattista Vico’s “Anthropocy…

It is pretty clear how Italian translations might have had difficulties in managing the version – behind which the Vichian philosophy reveals itself – since, as commented by an acute man of letters of 1900 “the myth behind which


5 Cf. Giambattista Vico, Autobiografia; Della antichissima sapienza degli’ Italiani; Orazioni accademiche di Giambattista Vico (...). di Francesco Sav. Pomodoro, Stamperia de’ classici latini, Naples 1858, p. 114. See Benedetto Croce, Bibliografia vichiana (1904), re-print with a Promise by R. Franchini, Morano, Naples 1987, pp. 10–11.


7 Giambattista Vico, Opere filosofiche, pp. 107, 106.


Vico presents the metaphysics of the De antiquissima, this to say the analysis of the hidden knowledge of Ions and Etruscan is not to be taken seriously, and the implicit metaphysics of Latin language is of course the Vichian metaphysics”. 13 The translators who offered the feminine version wanted to tie, once more, the exegesis of Vico to the scholasticism stream, maybe because they were tricked by the praise coming directly from him: “Animae faculitates elegant in scholis dictae”. 14 In translating, as well as betraying the thought of Vico, the scholars to whom we have to tribute the translation of the word as feminine, made a real alteration of the original text – clearly saying “animi sedem”, and specifying that the faculties (facoltà) are of the mind (animo), never of the soul (anima), since “quod anima vivamus, animo sentiamus”. 15 Upon closer reading, it is self-evident how in scholasticism – and especially in the Thomistic reconstructions – there is no difference between animus and anima. In the Summa contra Gentiles, where Aquinas deals with the reading of the Aristotle’s De Anima, there is no mention whatsoever of a possible gender issue in the translation of the term, also because of the necessity of scholasticism to take distance from a pagan tradition, inherited since Epicure and appeared again in Lucretius (the latter being responsible, along with Vico’s thought, for the old distinction – traceable in the works of Accius, Verrone, Plautus e Catullus). Lucretius defined the animus as the base of rationality (sapere) and of the emotions (gaudere) – this marking a difference with Accius (in Accius the expression frui is an equivalent of gaudere). To the animus was attributed rational thought only, therefore the emotional life ended up in the lemma anima. Trying to reconcile his own gnoseological theory with Aristotle’s thought, Aquinas intended to demonstrate – against any Averroistic interpretations – the immortality of soul: “The agent’s intellect is not a separate substance, but potential of the Soul”. 16 And Vico – from his point of view – could have found in the metaphysics of Aquinas a doctrine to assimilate, for its aptitude to speak in terms of power of the soul. Paraphrasing Aristotle: “The soul as efficient cause, is the intellect where all things are done, therefore the agent intellect”. In common with Aquinas, he also had the conviction that “the souls of the brutish animals aren’t immortal” and the theory of the seed: “The seed and the fruit have life in potential, so to exclude the soul. This to say that they are deprived of soul; whereas the subject whose soul is the act, has virtue in potential, without excluding the soul”. 17 In the Liber Metaphysicus we read:

“La forma metafisica rassomiglia a quella del vasario, la forma fisica a quella del seme. La forma del seme, nel suo continuo sviluppo, muta e si perfeziona: sicché le forme fisiche sono formate dalle metafisiche.” 18

Here comes the theoretical need to address those who – like Aquinas – prospected the intellect as a faculty of the soul: “The agent intellect is not some separate substance, but a faculty of the soul.” 19 Aquinas represents for Vico the thinker who, in the frame of the querelle between Augustinians and Averroists, made a point not only by creating a new ontological ground, but also opening a particular reflection upon the data coming from experience:

“The basics of the Thomistic position are: spirituality and immortality of the individual soul as a principle of knowledge and freedom, therefore a basically personalistic position; but at the same time substantial unity of the soul with its body, whose the soul is form or first act; reconnection, therefore, to the soul, of any physical activity, and position of the intrinsic being one and individual of every single man.” 20

This exigence of interpreting physiological and psychological phenomena in the light of generic ontological principles was one of the basic reasons
for scholasticism to be quoted in the *De antiquissima*. Man, for Aquinas, is “rationalis naturae individuae substantia” where sensitive and passion activities are intertwined, both being intellectual and volitive dimension of the conscience, within an effective unity of the *persona*, combining reason and faith – the theologian willing to grant a privilege to faith. His radically optimistic position cannot be shared by Vico, who was animated by the will to understand how the human kind arrived to its determinations by going back, through the etymological analysis of the term *anima*, to the origins; showing how, in the ancient italic populations, could coexist two terms able to express what was later unified in just one word – *anima*, as vital principle of the body, and *animo*, as free principle of life. In the frame of such a dualistic conception, we can individuate two different streams: the hylozoic one of the Ionic schools taking place in a perspective where the prerogatives of the human soul cannot be separated from reality; the other, coming from the refusal to assimilate human nature to the natural reality and generating an anthropological conception:

“Epicureism is a clear restatement of the extraneousness of nature in front of the human aspirations to the sense – which ends in Lucretius’ work to an important terminological distinction between *animus e anima*: the first one is the superior rational part, sitting in the chest; the second one is irrational or not rational, and spread in all of the body.”

This Epicurean-Lucretian conception, presenting functional features and appointing an unprecedented relationship between the soul and the body, is very much a concern for the Neapolitan philosopher – still committed to his criticism to Descartes.

Insisting upon the differentiations of lemma, we can attribute to Vico a theory able to reassess sense, memory, fantasy and other faculties very closely related to the *animus immortale* and foreign to the Cartesian conception, stating the inferiority of those subordinate faculties to the *res cogitans*. For Descartes, the doctrine of the soul does not belong to the sciences of nature, but to an extra-sensitive reality. The nature of the soul founds the possibility of every science, permitting therefore to man to push his look beyond the limits of science itself, towards metaphysical problems. “The Cartesian layout also faces the problem of the dualism *anima/spirito* and matter, dualism which is purely declined in the light of the new theory of knowledge.”

In the *Discours de
la méthode, the French philosopher had faced the problem of the existence of God and of the human soul by asserting that the thinking substance is the one

“la cui essenza tutta, o natura, non sta che nel pensare e che, per essere, non necessita di luogo alcuno né dipende da alcuna cosa materiale. In tal modo questo io, cioè anima, per cui sono ciò che sono è assolutamente distinta dal corpo ed è anche più facile da conoscere di esso, e anche se il corpo non fosse, l’anima non cesserebbe di essere tutto quel che è.”23

It is therefore even more clear that the interpreters, willing to distort the translation, did it on the strength of the scholastic sources of the theory of the soul, with no consideration of the fact that – as a whole – the text De antiquissima is, first of all, a dispute with the predominant Cartesianism of the Neapolitan academies of 1600 and 1700, starting from the introduction of a new definition of the relations between verum and factum. This is the starting point of a complex elaboration that in latter writings, the ones dedicated to the universal right, will allow theorizing of this sense of certum and auctoritas, distinct but not separated from the verum of human reason – which becomes history and stands at the very center of an universal human theodicy. This theodicy – far away from a classic ontological interpretation – could be defined as “anthropodicy”, hiding in its vis both assimilation and reassessment of the problem of Vichian time, seen through a Leibnizian matrix:

“In senso lato anima è lo stesso di vita o principio vitale, cioè il principio dell’azione interna esistente nella sostanza semplice o monade, al quale corrisponde l’azione esterna. E questa corrispondenza di interno e di esterno (…) costituisce veramente la percezione. In questo senso l’anima sarà attribuita non solo agli animali ma a tutti gli esseri percepienti. In senso stretto l’anima è considerata come una specie di vita più nobile, o vita sensitiva, in cui non c’è la facoltà nuda di percepire, ma anche quella di sentire, allorché alla percezione si aggiunge percezione e memoria. Allo stesso modo la mente è la specie più nobile di anima, cioè la mente è anima razionale, in cui alla sensazione si aggiunge la ragione o consequenzialità della universalità dei veri. Come la mente è anima razionale, così l’anima è vita sensitiva e la vita è principio percettivo.”24

All the souls, according to Leibniz, are “potential”; they are sensitive souls able to become human only if developed in that sense. In this way, the German philosopher can preserve the human corruption deriving from the original sin, and explain how human becoming – throughout the acquisition of the reason – can represent a kind of perfection, tending to redeem an original condition of scantiness. Even if he is not explicitly quoted in the De antiquissima, Leibniz is Vico’s auttore – involved in a personal re-elaboration of the thought of Malebranche. The philosopher of the “pre-established harmony”, rejoicing at the critical observation moved to Descartes and his fellows about the existing relations between the soul and the body, invites the French to go on that rough path.25 Vico shall dedicate to Malebranche a harsh criticism, all focused on his Cartesianism, and to what he thinks to be a contradiction of his thought:

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sianism, entered in his own right Neapolitan academies as well as scientific and cultural debates of the years of the Vico’s intellectual growth, with a particular reference to the experiences of human history. Of course, those interests are not meant to be set together necessarily, but the attention of the oratorio to the “analysis of the pagan mind” is not far from the interest of the Neapolitan philosopher for the history of the natural right of people, through both myths and primitive mentality.

This makes possible the study of man not with reference to God but to himself only, far from all the traditional issues of theology. Here is one of the reasons of Vico’s choice to distinguish the evolution of the sacred history from the pagan one, in harmony with the modern anthropology of Malebranche, focused on the analysis of the human mind, in order to study imagination, and along with it superstition, idolatry, and heresy from an entirely psychological point of view. This consents to modify the centre of gravity of the traditional anthropologies, preferring sensitivity as starting point of the search, and not an abstract reason. The mind is not an eternal present; it proceeds from sensitivity to imagination, and hence towards reason, provoking prejudices, beliefs, and superstitions changing from time and through time.27

“But the background of the thought of Malebranche, in comparison to the one of Vico – this has been made clear – shows a huge difference. In the first one, the image of the soul is still compressed, and finds its way in the aware presence of passion drives tying it to God, but staying free from a factual planning endeavor. For Vico, the top of the reason, the place of maximum union with God, is outside of the soul: and to be more precise – in its revelation. Here really occurs, together with the metaphysical universe, the end of a mystique reaching its final outcome when denying itself; in the failure of that passivity of the soul that was considered the very first instrument to nullify oneself in front of God, at this point giving free course to that history made by men supported by the providence itself.”28

A true via crucis where Vico, under the shield of a metafisica della mente coming from Malebranche, makes it in demonstrating how metaphysics, method and anthropology are connected under a sole voice: the man that “non conosce limiti alla tristezza dell’animo”.


26 Giambattista Vico, De antiquissima italorum sapientia con gli articoli del “Giornale de’ Letterati d’Italia” e le Risposte del Vico, pp. 189, 191.


29 Giambattista Vico, De antiquissima italorum sapientia con gli articoli del “Giornale de’ Letterati d’Italia” e le Risposte del Vico, p. 139.
2.

The figure of mens/anima is present in the Orazione I of 1699:

“Essa (anima) è la divina facoltà del pensiero (...) quanto varie diverse e molteplici sono le sue funzioni, quanto grande la sua duttilità e la sua forza creatrice.”

The soul – thus presented – has intellectual capacity and vital energy; it is a vis that, in the Orazione II, has to be controlled as source of passions as well, a soul somehow suspended between greatness and misery. The Orazione VI, exhorting to conquer knowledge, madre dell’umana felicità, will put together knowledge and soul assessing that “chi dunque non abbia indirizzato gli studi letterari al conseguimento della sapienza si libera forse delle pene del linguaggio o di quelle del pensiero, ma non si libera delle pene dell’anima”.

In the passage to the De ratione, the confusion between animus, anima, and mens does not appear to be solved yet, as shown by the text where eloquence is tied to the animo in opposition with the mente:

“Ma che farci, se l’eloquenza ha da fare tutta, non con la mente, ma con l’animo? La mente si lascia piegare dai sottili ragionamenti, ma l’animo non si lascia vincere né debellare se non da queste corpulentissime macchine oratorie.”

And right after he will not hesitate to admit that “il volgo è volto e travolto dalla bramosia, che è tumul tuosa e turbolenta, come un marchio dell’anima”.

If the mente is mislead by mistakes, the animo is torn by passions, generating any kind of unhappiness:

“Only two things drive towards a good use the unrest of the soul (woes of the interior man, all having birth from the appetite, as sole source): philosophy, moderating them in the men of knowledge so to turn them into virtue, and eloquence, cultivating them among people so to lead everyone towards the practice of virtue.”

When in 1720 Vico commissions to the publisher Felice Mosca the manuscript of the Latin work on the Diritto Universale, made in three books (De uno universi juris principio et fine uno, De Constantia jurisprudentis and Notae), “travaglia di stabilire un principio nel quale tutta l’erudizione divina e umana costi dimostrata”.

In order to advance the complex project of merging philosophy and philology, he needed to deepen the inquiry of the nature of humanity provided in the biblical texts. And it is in this investigation – which shall find its articulations in the history of the four punishments: chasteness, infamy, curiosity and hard work – that the philosopher will again come across the pair animus and mens:

“La mente è stata ingannata dagli errori e l’animo dilaniato dalle passioni; dagli errori della mente nascono le passioni dell’animo ed entrambi generano ogni tipo di infelicità all’uomo. Anche nell’uomo corrotto è tuttavia presente il conato della mente intesa al vero. Ma poiché è da una chiara conoscenza del vero che nasce la volontà di giustizia, ciò equivale a dire che la verità della mente reca seco rettitudine d’animo.”

Ten years after the De antiquissima, the need of redefining the nature of the animus and mens is back: if in 1710 they resulted to be the same thing (Mens animi, mind of the animo, l’animus is God thinking in me), in the De Constantia jurisprudentis, they are separated in intellect (mens) and will (animus), and the animus is subjected to the mens, the sight and seat of the eternal truths: “Animus sit humanae mentis subiectum, et mens humana sit aeterno- rum verorum domicilium et sedes”. Vico’s adherence to the Platonic doctrine of immortality of the mind is frankly expressed in this work in order to demonstrate how much Platonism can get along with Christian religion. This posi-
tion finds an evolution in the second part (De Constantia philologiae), where, in the new anthropology, the mind is subjected to the *animus*. Introducing the theme of *pudore*, to which the origin of humanity is reconnected, Vico overcomes not only Platonism, but also, and once for all, Cartesianism with the primacy of the *animus* over the *mens* and body, stating that “Dio ottimo massimo attribuì all’uomo, dall’animo, il conato (che abbiamo già dimostrato essere proprio dell’animo) perché una volta caduto, l’uomo potesse tuttavia sentire questa forza dell’animo, affinché l’animo potesse avere imperio sulla mente e sul corpo.”35 It looks more evident, at this point, the reason pushing him to write the *Aggiunta* to the autobiography, the one Muratori asked for: we are in 1731 and the Neapolitan philosopher has already published the *Scienza Nuova* of 1725, and he is working to the *Correzioni, Miglioramenti e Aggiunte* of the work:

“Gli dispiacciono i libri del *Diritto universale*, perché in quelli dalla mente di Platone ed altri chiari filosofi tentava di scendere nelle menti balorde e scempie degli autori della gentilità, quando doveva tener il cammino tutto contrario; onde ivi prese errore in alquante materie. Nella *Scienza nuova prima*, se non nelle materie, errò certamente nell’ordine, perché trattò de’ principi dell’idee divisamente da’ principi delle lingue, ch’erano per natura tra lor uniti, e pur divisamente dagli uni e dagli altri ragionò del metodo con cui si conducessero le materie di questa Scienza, le quali, con altro metodo, dovevano fil filo uscire da entrambi i detti principii: onde vi avvennero molti errori nell’ordine.”36

The “Anthropodicy” of Vico develops in the years of intense, “*continova*” and “*aspra*” meditation, going on between the *Liber Metaphysicus* and the *Diritto Universale*. The contradiction in the relation *animus*–*mens* is present in two parts of the *Diritto Universale* (in the *De Constantia jurisprudentis*, where he declares himself as Platonic. Vico gives a privilege to the position/function of the *mens*; in the *De Constantia philologiae* and in the *Aggiunta* of 1731, he raises the *animus* to the level of a protagonist), and can be made clear just from the *De antiquissima* that once more appears, more than like a transition text, the true turning point of his works. The transition from a “metafisica commissi-

31 Ibid., *Oratio VI*, p. 207.
rata alla debolezza del pensiero umano" to a “pudore suscitatore di virtù” is so small that we are allowed to formulate an interpretative hypothesis: all we look for in Vico, we can find in an expression of 1710 – *libido*, the faculty of desiring. The *animus/mens* for Vico cannot be separated from its own *natura* – which is action, desire, ingeniousness, celebration of humanity.

3.

It is in the chapter of the *De antiquissima* dedicated to the study of the difference between *animus* and *anima*, that grows a new “metaffisica commisura-rata alla debolezza del pensiero umano” and that the elaboration is carried on by the theoretical relations between metaphysics and history; prodromes to the idea of the new concept of history shaped in the *Principi di una Scienza nuova intorno alla natura delle nazioni per la quale si ritruovano i principi di altro sistema del Diritto naturale delle Genti* (1725). Through this, a path is designed – betraying at the origins the Vico’s awareness of an intrinsic impossible knowledge of the *animo*. And even if the chapter *De Animo, et Anima* has been properly considered the anthropological section of the *De antiquissima*, a “holistic” vision of the Vichian thought cannot be avoided. Not randomly, in the *Liber Metaphysicus*, the distinction *animus/anima*, far from being only a revival of the mainstream Neapolitan Epicureanism, expresses, above all, the final departure from scholasticism, emphasized, and not by chance, in the autobiographical reconstruction. This brave anti-dogmatic theoretical position is explicitly confirmed by the “Risposta II” to the *Giornale de’ Letterati* where Vico explains his sharing of Herbert of Cherbury’s thesis, whose *De Veritate* was in the index in 1707: “Che è la via che tien l’Herberto nella sua *Ricerca della verità*, che veramente altro non è che una topica trasportata agli usi dei fisici sperimentali”. This quick and effective judgment is the expression of an intellectual Titanism that shall consent, according to the Neapolitan philosopher, to overcome the materialism of the *De rerum natura* in order to support, instead, through the immortality of the *animo*, the theme of freedom. The *animo* moves around freely, desires the infinite, and therefore immortality: “Quia libere animus movetur, infinitum desiderat, ac proinde immortalitatem”. Niccola Badaloni, wanting to underline how Herbertistic were Vico’s intuitions, saw in the *De antiquissima* a clear resemblance between those two philosophers: “The thesis is very close to the one of Herbert, and one shouldn’t be tricked by the fact that the Latins, speaking of brutish animals, defined them ‘immobile’, conferring this meaning to the brutish expression”. Hence, the search of themes and problems about the freedom of the soul, as “technological genius”, considering the descriptions that Vico himself gives of the blood circulation, in order to prove – against Descartes – that the seat of the *animo* would be in the heart, and not in the brains. Far from wanting to consider the chapter dedicated to the soul, within Vico’s discourse, it is necessary to detect the *continuum* in relation with previous problems in physics. *Punto* and *conato* are, of course, metaphysical virtues of the nature. If the “conatus enim inter quietem & motum east medius”, Vico puts it at the centre of his all human metaphysics. The non-existent reference to Zeno and his fellows, besides underlining the continuous controversy with Descartes and the choice of the Euclidean geometry in contrast to the analytical one of the French, is a renewed position of anti-dogmatism: “Zenone, che meditò sul mondo delle solide cose reali creato da Dio, appoggiandosi su quel
C. Megale, Giambattista Vico’s “Anthropo-dicy” between Ethics, Metaphysics…

Vico’s problem is basically the will to deal with metaphysics by rejecting traditional (Aristotle) and modern (Descartes) metaphysics, without risks of ruptures. His project is identification of a “structure,” able to query the modern individual-universal, expressing itself, not surprisingly, in the history of nations. Hence, the task of questioning the human being as human being and, together, combining physical, human, and divine power, at the same time confuting the ontological proof (Anselm and Descartes) and analytic geometry, despite any theoretical complications which the philosopher himself is not always able to solve. For sure, if punto and conato are the esse, this to say the virtutes of physical nature, the soul is the essenza of the body; the anima virtus is tied and grows from the animo, at his own time realized in the mens. The anima, at the same time physical (animam quoque aerem appellasse), biological (vitae vehiculum), and psychological (sensus autem vehiculum), is mortal – but materializes in an immortal animus, whose seat is in the heart. First question: how can a virtue be mortal? Second question: “Animi sedem e domicilium cor est” – is the mind, for Vico, located in the heart? We face three terms – animus, anima, and mens – and the need to establish a middle term between individual and universal, a place of critical foundation, far from modules and the classical schemes of the historia magistra vitae:

“Vico – Piovani writes – is very sensitive to the problem. One of the more solid foundations of his speculative greatness is to be found in the ways he addressed the issue of historicizing of the reason.”

And it is in the Liber Metaphysicus, the turning point of Vico’s philosophy, that the need to humanize metaphysics is most evident; which is finally satisfied in the Scienza Nuova, where the path of humanization will turn into historicizing. There the author, animated by the desire to understand how human race has come to its determinations, theorizes a teologia civile ragionata.

37 Giambattista Vico, De antiquissima italorum sapientia con gli articoli del “Giornale de’ Letterati d’Italia” e le Risposte del Vico, p. 251.


40 Giambattista Vico, Vita di Giambattista Vico scritta da se medesimo, p. 43.

With the *De antiquissima*, we happen to be in the process of humanization, exploration of nature and man, in search of that essence that distinguishes man from the brute, and willing to define metaphysics as something entirely human, since “tratta dell’indubitabile verità, perché esamina una questione della quale l’uomo acquista certezza anche se dubita, anche se erra e sbaglia”.\(^48\) Thus, “la libido, cioè la facoltà di desiderare è per ciascuno una propria divinità”\(^49\), the seat of the *animus* is in the heart, and it is the *mens*, for its being desire and appetite. Vico’s God is the metaphysical essence of a deficient man that does not match the metaphysics of the *eternal and unchanging*, and does not betray the *Affetti di un disperato*: “Non conosco limiti alla tristezza dell’animo cognizione questa indefinita e come tale degna dell’uomo”\(^50\).

The problem that Vico individuates in *libido* presents its core issue also in *Orazione VI*. When presenting the question of theodicy, he tries to explain it by introducing a *libido– voluptas* issue, strictly tied to human nature. This might generate some misunderstandings – for instance, taking for good something that is bad. Later Badaloni jumped in with the interpretation of a pantheist Vico:

“God, therefore nature, not only draws, but draws *voluptate*, this means that the man, for his being immersed in a nature-God, is not immersed in woe. The goodness of nature is not demonstrated by the fact that God doesn’t want to draw us there where nature wants to draw us (...) and the whole identity between God and Nature is therefore re-stated.”\(^51\)

The *Introduzione a G.B. Vico* gives an interpretation of the plurality of reasons and sources reconstructing the route as frantic search of an *ordine*, providing some degree of internalization of the nature. Tying *libido* to deity, as in *De antiquissima*, opens up a possibility of double reading. Following Badaloni, we need to admit a form of pantheistic naturalism and a Platonic path in Vico, confirmed by the theories of the *punti metafisici* and of the *conato*, so as by the *facultates animi* which, in the frame of the verum-factum, do reinforce the capacity of the *facere* and it makes man like God, as well as the full integration of the *mind in nature*. That same scholar has to deal with the *fantasia*, which is for Vico “risalto di reminescenza”, just as the *ingegno* would be “lavoro d’intorno a cose che si ricordano”. Just the same would happen for spontaneity, which makes you ask if

“... philosophy of the mind doesn’t mean philosophy of spontaneity, and through it philosophy of the unconscious? (...) And the revelation of the rational base of the epoque of the sense and of the one of the fantasy isn’t actually submerged by the unconscious nature of rationality”?\(^52\)

Right after, he takes the time to list the points where “the main theme of the unconscious jumps away”,\(^53\) as a proof of the fact that the aim would be pushing Vico towards Spinoza, insisting on some metaphysics of the *mind* beyond any comparison with history.

“Perfino in cospetto di una ragione tutta spiegata nella *Scienza Nuova*, – as Piovani read – questa interpretazione è tentata di mettersi a scavare per trovare ‘una teoria delle idee, o delle forme plastae analoga a quella del *De antiquissima*’ (p. XLIX): tentazione che fa pensare al proposito di chi volesse radicare una querizia per trovare le irripetibili remote linfe che ne alimentano le radici.”\(^54\)

This perspective is confirmed in the essay that Piovani significantly entitled *Vico e la filosofia senza natura*, showing Vico’s philosophy as a first attempt to understand the connate tension of any human being, tending through an effort to fill the essence of its *inessential existence*. In Vico’s philosophy Pio-
vani can see the foundations of a genuine, renewed reflection upon existence, able to permanently break up with any philosophy of nature: “One of the most solid bases of his greatness has to be found in the ways he faced the issue of historicization of the reason.”

Trying to analyse Vico’s thought internally, and trying to combine his speculative path with the historical context in Naples at the time, fully aware of the behaviour role imposed to avoid both heterodoxy and the danger of censorship, we cannot evade the possible existence – behind a metaphysical discourse – of a sort of anthropological interest, free from any ‘ontologization’ of philosophy. Moreover, the same Vico, in delivering copies of his writings to friends and correspondents, did not hesitate to make corrections or to omit pieces of text, often eliminating the references to censored authors. It should be borne in mind that the Neapolitan culture, initially dominated by literary, philosophical, theological, religious, artistic, and astrological interests and medicine – after the revolt of Masaniello and the plague of 1656 – made a very fortunate change of track towards mathematical sciences, physics, and botany and then, in the eighteenth century, historical studies and legal matter, most probably due to an accentuation of the controversy between the church and the state. In the evident urgency of a greater openness to European news, a strong cultural renewal was promoted by the Academies of Investiganti and Palatine as well as in the private rooms of Joseph Valletta and in his library – the places of discussion and debate. Yet, despite the censorship was much milder in Naples than in other Italian and European cities, many texts of the Illuminismo failed to avoid prescriptive lists of banned books, as evidenced by the fury of the Inquisition against Pietro Giannone’s *Historia civile del Regno di Napoli*, dated 1723. All this worried Vico, that at the beginning of the twenties had published the *Diritto Universale* and had been concerned for the *Scienza Nuova* due to a process of censorship, which stopped thanks to the judgment of Padre Fortunato Tamburin. According to him, “another edition of the *Scienza Nuova* could not be prevented”. In the light of this context, it is necessary more than ever to free the *De antiquissi-

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48 Giambattista Vico, *De antiquissima italorum sapientia con gli articoli del “Giornale de’ Letterati d’Italia” e le Risposte del Vico*, pp. 101, 197.
49 Ibid., pp. 97, 189.
50 Ibid., pp. 72, 139.
53 Ibid., p. XLIV.
ma from all those practices that the Inquisition would have imposed, helping to land at the shores of existence where nature and spirit can finally merge in history: “In the relation between animo and anima it is celebrated that magical match between nature and spirit, nature and psyche, unconscious and conscience”;

The one contained in the Liber Metaphysicus is a reflection upon the mystery of the “existence that is metaphysical just because it is never concluded”, with a virtus, this to say energy, libido, tension towards an ordo, which shall no longer proceed in view of the theodicy, because of its openness to a new “Anthropodicy” where all “le cose dal nulla vengono realmente all’esistenza, e per cui tanto le piccolissime quanto le grandi distano ugualmente dal nulla”.

Claudia Megale

“Antropodiceja” Giambattista Vica između etike, metafizike i povijesti

Sažetak

Inzistirajući na razlikovanju lema animus i anima u djelu De antiquissima, Vico možemo pripisati teoriju koja je u mogućnosti razmotriti osjet, memoriju, fantaziju, te druge sposobnosti blisko vezane uz animus immortale i koje su strane kartažianskoj koncepciji koja tvrdi da su te sposobnosti podređene res cogitansu. Ovo je polazišna točka kompleksne elaboracije koja će u kasnijim radovima, posvećena univerzalnom pravu, omogućiti teoritiziranje tog smisla pojma certum i auctoritas, koji su različiti no i odvojeni od veruma ljudskog uma – što postaje poviješću i stoji u samom središtu univerzalne ljudske teodiceje. Ova teodiceja – daleko od neke klasične ontološke interpretacije – može se definirati kao »antropodiceja«, koja u svojemu visu skriva i preispitivanje problema vikovskog vremena, promatrano kroz lajbnicovsku matricu.

Ključne riječi

Giambattista Vico, anima, animus, antropologija, filozofija, filologija, povijest, metafizika

Claudia Megale

Giambattista Vicos „Anthropodizee“ zwischen Ethik, Metaphysik und Geschichte

Zusammenfassung

Indem wir auf Differenzierungen zwischen den Lemmata Animus und Anima in De antiquissima beharren, können wir Vico die Theorie zuschreiben, die in der Lage ist, Sinn, Gedächtnis, Fantasie neu zu bewerten, sowie andere, mit dem Animus immortale sehr eng verwandte Fähigkeiten, die der kartésianischen Vorstellung fremd sind, welche die Inferiorität dieser untergeordneten Fähigkeiten gegenüber der Res cogitans zum Ausdruck bringen. Dies ist der Ansatzpunkt einer komplexen Ausarbeitung, die in späteren, dem universellen Recht gewidmeten Schriften, die Theoretisierung dieses Sinns von certum et auctoritas ermöglichen wird, die unterschiedlich, jedoch vom verum der menschlichen Vernunft nicht getrennt sind – was zur Geschichte wird und direkt im Zentrum einer universellen menschlichen Theodizee steht. Diese Theodizee – weit entfernt von der klassischen ontologischen Interpretation – könnte als „Anthropodizee“ definiert werden, die in ihrer vis Asimilation wie auch Neubewertung des Problems der vicoschen Zeit verbirgt, betrachtet durch die liebnizsche Matrix.

Schlüsselwörter

Giambattista Vico, Anima, Animus, Anthropologie, Philosophie, Philologie, Geschichte, Metaphysik
Claudia Megale

L’« anthropodicée » de Giambattista Vico entre éthique, métaphysique et histoire

Résumé
En insistant sur les différenciations des lèmes animus et anima dans l’oeuvre De antiquissima, nous pouvons attribuer à Vico une théorie capable de reconsidérer les sens, la mémoire, l’imagination et d’autres facultés étroitement liées à l’animus immortale, facultés étrangères à la conception carléssienne selon laquelle elles sont inférieures et subordonnées aux facultés du res congritans. C’est le point de départ d’une élaboration complexe, qui, dans les écrits tardifs consacrés au droit universel, permettra la théorisiation du sens des concepts certum i auctoritas, distincts et non séparés du verum de la raison humaine – le verum qui devient l’histoire et se situe au centre même d’une théodicée universelle humaine. Cette théodicée – éloignée de certaines interprétations classiques ontologiques – peut se définir comme une « anthropodicée » qui cache dans son vis l’assimilation mais aussi la réévaluation du problème du temps chez Vico, considéré à travers la matrice leibnizienne.

Mots-clés
Giambattista Vico, anima, animus, anthropologie, philosophie, philologie, histoire, métaphysique


Ibid., p. VI.

Giambattista Vico, De antiquissima italorum sapientia con gli articoli del “Giornale de’ Letterati d’Italia” e le Risposte del Vico, p. 131.