Laura Elena Sibinescu

ABSTRACT This article examines how voters and politicians interact through social media to communicate salient issues in highly mobilising contexts, such as elections and protests. It analyses the case of Romania’s 2014 presidential elections, where voters played an active role in promoting themes that candidates had not initially addressed in their campaigns. Two topics emerged as particularly important from the voters’ perspective: systemic corruption and accusations of the government deliberately hindering the voting process in Romanian diaspora communities. A mixed approach of automated and manual content analysis of user comments and campaign materials on social media reveals that, while it is difficult to make precise causal claims, voter demands with regards to these topics had an active role in influencing changes in candidates’ campaign strategies.

KEY WORDS
POLITICAL COMMUNICATION, SOCIAL MEDIA, PROTEST, ELECTORAL CAMPAIGNS, TEXT MINING

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INTRODUCTION

On the evening of November 2, 2014 several thousand Romanian citizens were gathered in front of the Romanian Embassy in London, chanting ‘It’s our right to vote!’ Minutes earlier, the Embassy – an important polling station organised abroad for the ongoing presidential elections in Romania at the time – had closed its doors before many of those queueing up to cast their ballot were able to do so. Accusing bureaucratic hurdles and delays caused by insufficient staff in London, as well as Paris, Vienna, Munich and other European cities, spontaneous protests broke out among Romanian diaspora communities. They quickly took an anti-government turn, with allegations that presidential candidate and incumbent Prime Minister Victor Ponta deliberately hindered voting (Oşan et al., 2014). These protests, which participants documented extensively on social media, had far-reaching consequences: on November 8, a massive wave of demonstrations started in Romania in solidarity with diaspora communities, calling for a more efficient organisation of the runoff. In the two weeks leading up to the decisive round, both social-democrat Victor Ponta and his counter-candidate, liberal Klaus Iohannis, carried out active social media campaigns and participated in televised debates. A climate of hostility towards Ponta’s government remained in the diaspora until the runoff, which saw a repeat of the situation in the first round: while some bureaucratic obstacles had been removed, many Romanian citizens were once again unable to cast their vote. Despite this, overall turnout was significantly higher (64.1%) compared to the first round (53.2%) and more than twice as many votes were cast in the diaspora (BEC, 2014a). Victor Ponta lost to Klaus Iohannis with an 8.87% difference – the highest gap between runoff candidates in the history of post-communist elections in Romania. Most notably, Klaus Iohannis won 98.73% of the diaspora votes, compared to 46.17% in the first round (BEC, 2014b). The 2014 elections protests fit into a wave of civic unrest that started in Romania in 2011. However, they are unique as the first protests to make extensive use of social media, not just as a platform for documenting and organising protests, but also as a means to bring their concerns directly to the two presidential candidates.

In this article I argue that voters may be able to influence electoral campaign strategies through direct, low-cost, online interaction with candidates. Romania’s case illustrates this argument at the intersection of information technology and political communication in a climate of protest. Thus, I examine the coproduction of political communication through social media based on two assumptions. The first is that voter demands formulated in the highly mobilising context of presidential elections go hand in hand with the direction of communication. Coproduction implies that a transfer occurs between candidates’ programmes and voters’ demands as candidates respond by adapting their campaigns. The second assumption is that coproduction implies a certain degree of flexibility in the roles that voters and candidates assume. Typically, candidates are initiators and providers of communication, while voters take on a more passive role, acting as recipients. However, these roles may be reversed, shifting the process from a one-way exchange or a stream of information with limited feedback, to one where both sides take an active role.
The article’s aim is twofold: to examine how citizen demands can be extracted from unstructured textual data generated online, and to explore how voters may influence candidates’ campaign strategies in unplanned situations. In the following parts I give a brief overview of protests in post-communist Romania and the use of social media to support street demonstrations from 2012 on. I then examine the nature of coproduction of political communication and how it occurred in the 2014 elections by analysing textual data from candidates Victor Ponta and Klaus Iohannis, as well as voter comments on their respective campaign Facebook pages. And finally, I briefly address how this intersection of street protests and the direct social media engagement of politicians is situated in the ongoing wave of protests in Romania.

**PROTEST AND INTERNET-FACILITATED POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN ROMANIA**

There are two types of studies on the relationship between Internet use and political engagement. One examines the Internet, and social media especially, as a new form of public space encompassing political debate, participation and governance (McLeod et al., 1996; Krueger, 2006; Delli Carpini, 2000; Tichenor et al., 1970; Bonfadelli, 2002). The other emerged more recently, with the arrival of the Arab Spring in particular, and focuses on the role of the Internet in protest and crisis (Morozov, 2009; Wolfsfeld et al., 2013; Bohdanova, 2014; Khondker, 2011; Juris, 2012). The case of Romania’s presidential elections arguably fits into both of these types, using social media as an organising mechanism that fulfils a twofold function: a networking agent for organising protests and a window into the protest space (Segerberg and Bennet, 2011).

A look at the history of protest in post-communist Romania reveals a long spell of civic apathy: between 1990 and 2011 Romanians were significantly less engaged with their communities and less likely to protest compared to other, former communist countries such as Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland (Burean and Bădescu, 2013). Low engagement in public life can be explained by the lack of money, time and skill, in addition to low levels of trust in institutions and other citizens. As a consequence, Gabriel Bădescu et al. (2004) find that by the end of the 1990s less than 10% of Romanians were said to belong to at least one association. This is a low percentage in comparison to other countries in Eastern Europe, where in some cases participation in associations is easily comparable to Western Europe (for example 47% in Slovakia and 30% in the Czech Republic).

A wave of civic unrest has been ongoing in Romania since 2011. That year alone saw over twenty protests against austerity measures, layoffs, healthcare reforms and environmental issues. These were mainly organised by students and trade unions, but while covering a wide variety of topics, they saw relatively low participation overall (Domnișoru, 2011). Protests extended into 2012 and 2013, focusing on environmental issues – notably the Roșia Montană Gold Corporation mining project and Chevron’s plans to use hydraulic fracturing in shale gas extraction (Euronews, 2013).
While environmental protests were able to mobilise larger amounts of citizens compared to previous years, it was 2014 and 2015 that decisively broke the pattern of diffuse issues combined with low participation, and brought about large-scale, widespread and often spontaneous protests around concentrated issues. The 2014 presidential elections are one of the two prominent cases. The other occurred in November 2015, after a fire at the Colectiv night club in Bucharest killed over 60 people. Massive protests erupted under the slogan ‘Corupția ucide!’ (‘Corruption kills!’) accusing the local administration of allowing the club to operate without authorisation from the fire department (ProTV, 2015). Similar to the 2014 demonstrations, these also took an anti-governmental turn and led to Prime Minister Victor Ponta’s resignation shortly after the protests started.

The use of social media as a dedicated tool for protests is quite new in Romania, but has played an essential role in organising and documenting them. For example, 2013 saw the creation of an online community, Uniți Salvăm (United we save), which was established during the demonstrations against the Roșia Montană Gold Corporation mining project. Similar online communities, such as the Pungești Resistance Movement, were created around the same time to support the anti-fracking protests held against Chevron in the commune of Pungești. Camelia Cmeciu and Cristina Coman (2016) examine issue framing using data from these communities and find that the use of visual rather than verbal framing devices was prevalent. They identify five specific themes used to frame anti-fracking resistance: land struggle, conflict, solidarity, political opportunity and ecology.

Facebook emerged as the main online platform to organise, disseminate and document protests. This was possible thanks to its quickly growing user base in the country: between 2011 and 2015 the number of Romanians using Facebook nearly quadrupled, and in late 2014, at the time of the presidential elections, there were approximately 7.2 million Facebook users (36% of the total population). Among these, the 18-44 age group accounted for over 75%, almost half of which were aged between 25 and 34 (Facebrands, 2016). Politicians’ reach through social media in the 2014 elections was, however, more limited. By the end of the second round Klaus Iohannis’ campaign page had surpassed one million likes (making him, at the time, the most popular European politician on Facebook) while Victor Ponta had amassed a more modest 720,000 likes (Facebrands, 2014a, 2014b).

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:
THE COPRODUCTION OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION

How did the use of social media facilitate the coproduction of communication in Romania’s case? Electoral campaigns typically offer grounds for a one-way transfer of information to occur in the form of candidates communicating their programmes to voters. Judith Trent and Robert Freidenberg (2011: 65-67) identify three functions of electoral campaigning at the level of general elections. From a cognitive perspective campaigning should present voters with information about candidates. The second function refers to legitimisation, both of the political system (the campaign is proof that
the system works) and of candidates (by further strengthening their relationship with voters). Finally, electoral campaigns are meant to meet voters’ expectations. Trent and Freidenberg suggest that candidates who fail to fulfil this function in particular are more likely to face difficulties at the polls.

The ability to respond to voters’ expectations was the main drive behind the coproduction of communication established during the Romanian presidential elections. In relation to this function, I treat candidates as the supply-side of electoral communication, while voters represent the demand-side. This is a fairly straightforward relationship that integrates well with Sally McMillan’s model for cyber-interactivity (2002), where the direction of communication and the receiver’s degree of control over it determine different types of information flows. Mutual discourse, where senders and receivers are both active participants with interchangeable roles, describes the case examined in this article. One particular characteristic here is that the direction of online communication and participants’ roles in controlling the content of the message went hand in hand. Prior to the first round of elections, communication took place in the form of a monologue controlled by candidates, while content was transmitted through electoral programmes. However, the climate of protest turned voters into the supply-side of communication by giving them the ability to promote certain concerns that had not initially been part of the candidates’ programmes.

Thus, a two-way channel was established, with a high degree of asymmetry in favour of voters’ control over the process. However, due to the nature of social media platforms and the atomised character of the supply-side, this mutual dialogue was more constrained in practice than McMillan’s definition suggests. For instance, while both Iohannis and Ponta were active online between rounds, they did not (and indeed could not) respond directly to individual comments. Their responses addressed the broad forms of the issues raised by dissatisfied voters. Therefore, this type of voter-candidate interaction is best characterised as a form of coproduction of political communication that takes into account limitations specific to social media.

With this in mind I suggest that, while McMillan’s dimensions of direction and control are useful for identifying types of communication, they do not allow us to examine the full repertoire of actions undertaken during the elections’ protests, and how control over content shifted when the supply and demand side switched places. Two additional factors are useful for this purpose: the costs of participation and the target of communication. People are more likely to become active participants if these costs are low (Krueger, 2006; Norris, 2000). Since Internet use has a positive impact on reducing participation costs, online actions in this model are understood to have low participation costs, while offline actions are characterised by high participation costs. The target of communication is important from the perspective of Trent and Freidenberg’s expectation function of electoral communication. When voters address their expectations regarding candidates’ behaviour and reactions directly to the candidates in question, we may expect candidates to adapt their behaviour if they are aware that to do otherwise will cost them at the polls. Thus, I distinguish between direct (specifically targeting candidates) and indirect (the
untargeted statement of issues) communication. Based on these two dimensions, several types of voter action can be identified, as detailed in Table 1.

Table 1. Types of communicative actions in Romania’s 2014 presidential elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participation Costs</th>
<th>Targeting</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indirect</td>
<td>Signing petitions, participating in discussion groups, low-engagement</td>
<td>Street protests, including documenting street protests online</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Direct</td>
<td>Direct online engagement of candidates through comments</td>
<td>Direct offline engagement of candidates (e.g. addressing questions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>on their Facebook campaign pages</td>
<td>during televised presidential debates)</td>
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Events taking place between rounds (November 3 – November 15) included actions from the indirect-low cost, direct-low cost and indirect-high cost categories. The protests that broke out in the diaspora were documented on Facebook, which triggered immediate low-cost actions, both in the form of discussions and petitions, and directly addressing candidates on their Facebook campaign pages. These were followed by several waves of organised protests in Romania, supported by the constant, direct online engagement of candidates. Finally, the runoff was thoroughly documented on Facebook, both in Romania and in the diaspora. The repeated failure to ensure that all citizens queuing at the polls would be able to vote on time triggered another wave of protests which continued until the preliminary election results were made public.

I suggest that, while examining the nature and content of protests may give valuable insight into issues of mobilisation and participation in Romania, focusing on voters’ direct-low cost actions is more worthwhile. People are more likely to be politically active in an environment where they do not incur large costs in terms of time, information seeking or personal safety. True enough, cost reduction is not a guarantee that the Internet’s mobilising effect will extend beyond citizens who are already pre-disposed to action (Norris, 2000). However, we must consider the fact that these events are taking place within the already mobilising context of elections. Furthermore, the targeted nature of direct online engagement will give us a better account of voters’ own demands in the elections.

ONLINE COPRODUCTION IN THE CASE OF ROMANIA’S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Data and method

This study is conducted in three stages and uses two types of material, as detailed in Table 2. The overall outcome is a comparison between candidates’ electoral programmes prior to and after protests, to determine how citizen demands transferred into candidates’ campaign strategies.
Table 2. Stages of analysis, data and outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
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<tr>
<td>Stage 1: Electoral campaign prior to first round (October 3 – November 1)</td>
<td>Candidates’ electoral programmes and content of Facebook campaigns</td>
<td>First version of candidates’ electoral programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 2: Electoral campaign between rounds from voters’ perspective (November 3 – November 15)</td>
<td>Voters’ comments on candidates’ Facebook campaign pages</td>
<td>Voters’ demands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 3: Electoral campaign between rounds from candidates’ perspective (November 3 – November 15)</td>
<td>New content on candidates’ Facebook campaign pages</td>
<td>Modified version of candidates’ electoral programme after voter demands</td>
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</table>

All material used in this study is text-based, comprising of Facebook posts and user comments, and transcripts from campaign clips posted to candidates’ pages. In the first stage, I examine the electoral programmes of candidates Klaus Iohannis and Victor Ponta in order to identify the main topics they propose. I also analyse the content of their Facebook campaign pages prior to the first round of elections to find additional themes that may appear. In the second stage, I look at user comments posted to candidates’ Facebook pages between rounds in order to find topics and issues that were directly communicated by voters. Finally, in the third stage I examine the candidates’ online campaign materials in the period between rounds and compare them against the voters’ demands to determine how they were addressed.

The methodological approach combines automated and manual content analysis. In the first stage I apply text mining, an interdisciplinary approach that combines techniques from linguistics, statistics and computer science to extract information from large, unstructured amounts of text (Bergman et al., 2013; Clark, 2013; Dyas-Correia and Alexopoulus, 2014). The three main units examined in text mining are words, documents (defined as a collection of words) and corpora (defined as a collection of documents). Text mining has multiple applications, such as information retrieval, sentiment analysis or document summarisation (Hashimi et al., 2015), but here I use it to extract key terms which are then manually grouped into more general topics. For the analysis I use the R package ‘tm’ (Feinerer and Hornik, 2015).

In the preparatory stage I collect all available campaign material and user comments, and then group them into six separate document corpora (electoral programmes, voter comments and post-protest campaign materials for Iohannis and Ponta respectively). Editing the corpora for analysis requires reducing the amount of ‘noise’ in the text by eliminating numbers, punctuation and stop words. The next step is to create a document term matrix, which maps out the frequency of words inside each document in the corpus. The document term matrix is usually very sparse, which requires that we reduce it before proceeding further. To do this, a new document term matrix is created using a weighing method called TF-IDF (term frequency-inverse document frequency) which
counts the total frequency of each word in each document offset by its overall frequency in the corpus. The aim of this step is to further reduce the number of terms that appear frequently in general and extract the ones relevant to the research question.

Once these terms are obtained, I group them together into topics manually instead of applying statistical clustering methods, in part because the number of terms is relatively small and, as detailed below, because I am interested in particular types of terms. In the following sections I discuss the main topics emerging from the corpora and how they may have influenced candidates’ campaign strategies.

### Analysis of candidates’ programmes

Unsurprisingly, topics between the two candidates are similar, but vary in proportion and the attention given to several individual terms, as shown in Figure 1.

![Figure 1. Percentage of topics in candidates’ electoral programmes](image)

Over one third of Iohannis’ programme is focused on socio-economic issues, compared to a little over one quarter of Ponta’s. One notable difference here is that Ponta explicitly addresses issues of poverty and unemployment, which are absent from Iohannis’ programme. The candidates also have different approaches to the ‘Domestic politics’ topic: Iohannis includes mentions of corruption, albeit to a limited degree, whereas Ponta does not. On the other hand, Ponta’s programme mentions a few politicians by name, most importantly then-incumbent President Traian Băsescu. Victor Ponta’s conflictual relationship with Băsescu is a recurrent theme reflected both in the content of Facebook user comments and Ponta’s online campaign between rounds. This is related to how the candidates describe politicians’ interactions with each other. Iohannis frames this in terms...
of debates, while Ponta uses words such as ‘scandal’, ‘conflict’ and, less frequently, ‘dialog’ to describe the current political scene in Romania and how he proposes to change it. With regards to the ‘Institutions’ topic, one important difference is that Iohannis focuses more on aspects related to justice (rule of law, courts, judicial independence). This, along with his brief mention of corruption, transfers further into the content of his Facebook campaign, both in user comments and campaign materials. Finally, the order of the two remaining topics, ‘International politics’ and ‘Future projects’ is reversed, with Ponta giving more attention to the idea that the presidential mandate should make explicit a coherent strategy and vision. On the other hand, Iohannis focuses more on aspects of international politics, particularly Romania’s relationship with NATO and the EU, and its role as a security provider in the region. Overall the most significant differences among the two programmes lie in approach rather than content. The take-away points here are Iohannis’ strong focus on socio-economic issues and his, albeit limited, attention to justice and corruption; and Ponta’s proposals for improving the ways politicians collaborate to reduce conflictual relations, along with the idea that the head of state should have long-term coherent strategies to fulfil his duties.

**Analysis of Facebook user comments**

According to Figure 2, seven major topics can be extracted from comments posted by voters on the candidates’ Facebook pages. One interesting thing to note here is the concentration of demands in these corpora compared to terms indicating opinions, values and feelings: less than 40% of the content is covered by voter demands (36.06% and 39.22% for Iohannis and Ponta respectively). This is not entirely surprising considering that comments made in the context of an electoral campaign tend to be either strongly supportive or strongly critical of candidates. Furthermore, we must keep in mind that we are not dealing with a coherent text in terms of content and, perhaps more importantly, that there is no explicit, coordinated intention from voters to put forward their demands.

Both user comment corpora yield similar results in terms of the nature of each topic and their order. While topics such as ‘Socio-Economic issues’, ‘Institutions’ and ‘International politics’ largely reflect the candidates’ electoral programmes, voters also introduce new topics that merit attention.

‘Corruption’ is the most prominent among both Ponta and Iohannis’ user comments, with a higher proportion in Ponta’s case. I grouped three mid-level terms under the topic of corruption: ‘Acts of corruption/corrupted individuals’ comprises of words such as ‘steal’, ‘fraud’ and ‘mafia’. The term ‘legal measures’ encompasses words such as ‘prosecuted’, ‘(criminal) record’ and ‘indicted’. Finally, ‘Legal consequences’ refers to the outcome of these legal measures, including words such as ‘prison’ and ‘convicted’. Corruption is strongly related to the second topic, ‘Parties and politicians’. This is most evident in the case of viral comments circulating lists of indicted politicians associated with the parties backing Iohannis (ACL – The Christian-Liberal Alliance) and Ponta (PSD – The Social-Democratic Party).
Finally, ‘Elections’ is one of the most significant points of contention among commenters. However, its low position on the list is a consequence of excluding very general terms, such as ‘vote’ and ‘elections’, which would have placed the topic much higher in both cases, but without adding any relevant information. Instead I chose to focus on two more important aspects: campaign organisation and diaspora voting. Concerns related to the latter include the insufficient number of polling stations abroad and complaints that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is deliberately hindering the voting process abroad. Another issue extensively discussed in the comments is the organisation of a presidential debate between rounds. Initially Iohannis and Ponta failed to agree on a set of rules for holding a televised debate and declined invitations from several TV channels, questioning their neutrality. Both candidates expressed these complaints on their campaign pages between rounds, but eventually agreed to participate in two televised debates.

**Analysis of candidates’ post-protest campaigns**

Interestingly, in both cases, the newly introduced voter demands – corruption, politicians and elections – make up more than half of the overall topics in user comments. It is of course difficult to make precise causal claims about the impact of these topics on campaign strategies, but due to their strong prevalence, we must examine the changes they may have impacted. Figure 3 below shows the themes present in the candidates’ Facebook campaign in the wake of the protests.
The most significant change occurs in Iohannis’ campaign strategy, which was previously based on encouraging a young, urban electorate to start grass-root initiatives of support and promotion for Iohannis and complement his image as a reserved and private individual (Vasile, 2014). However, in this final stage of the campaign Iohannis presents himself as an active supporter of protesters and diaspora voters and explicitly adopts two of the three new topics they introduced. His main focus is on elections, with particular attention being given to diaspora voting and, to a lesser degree, the presidential debate. Relatedly, he addresses the topic of corruption from the electoral fraud angle, calling for Victor Ponta to address the accusations of hindering diaspora voting.

On the other hand, Ponta’s campaign strategy does not undergo any significant changes. While he does pick up the topic of elections, it is much lower on the list compared to topics that carried over from his original electoral programme. Here, he focuses more on the presidential debate and less on diaspora voting. Unlike Iohannis, however, Ponta does bring up the topic of politicians, once again in reference to his opposition to Traian Băsescu. Most importantly, he overlooks the topic of corruption altogether, including the failure to respond to the accusations of fraud put forward by his counter-candidate.
CONCLUSIONS

This article addressed two issues – the extraction of coherent voter demands from a body of text that lacks both thematic unity and the explicit intention of communicating such demands, and their impact on campaign strategies in a climate of protest. With regards to the first issue, I have shown that a list of demands can indeed be identified, with two caveats. Firstly, when dealing with data originating from social media content, we must keep in mind that the ‘noise’ in the text can include terms and topics that may be relevant to the subject matter, but are better suited for other types of research, such as sentiment analysis. The aim of this study was to uncover a list of topics that are similar in form to candidates’ electoral programmes in order to examine how they reflect one another.

The second caveat refers to the fact that it is not possible to make confident causal claims about the relationship between voter demands and changes in candidates’ campaign strategies. This relates to the other issue posed in this paper: overall Victor Ponta and Klaus Iohannis’ campaign strategies went in different directions in the runoff. Initially their electoral programmes were similar both in the content of topics and the relative importance given to each of these, but differed in approach, emphasising certain issues over others. In the runoff Iohannis changed his strategy to explicitly adopt new topics promoted by voters, while Ponta maintained his original strategy and only addressed voters’ concerns to a limited extent. While these observations are convincing, it is nevertheless difficult to claim that Iohannis’ victory in the elections was a direct consequence of adapting his strategy to reflect voters’ issues. However, the fact that he did so to a significant degree, with one third of the corpus covering the topics of elections and corruption, compared to less than 10% in Ponta’s case, is evidence that his capacity to adapt worked in his favour. Thus, the higher degree of responsiveness shown in Iohannis’ campaign strategy feeds back into the function of political communication that relates to meeting voters’ expectations and being rewarded with success at the polls (Trent and Freidenberg, 2011).

Finally, it is worth noting that the types of communicative action used by citizens in 2014 (direct-low cost, indirect-low cost and indirect-high cost) also occurred in subsequent protests in Romania. A similar mechanism of promoting specific citizen demands using a combination of street protests and social media as a platform for communicating directly with politicians was used effectively in 2015, following the Colectiv night club fire. In this case protesters compiled several lists of demands and addressed them to President Klaus Iohannis, calling for political reform and anti-corruption measures, such as reducing the number of MPs, eliminating politicians’ special immunity from criminal investigation while in office, and a new Prime Minister from outside the current political elite (Mixich, 2015). The latter in particular proved successful when Victor Ponta’s cabinet was replaced by a government of technocrats shortly after.

Overall, this article highlights the mechanisms and effects of citizens and politicians co-producing political communication in the mobilising context of protest. In particular, it
shows how two-way communication takes place when the roles of senders and receivers are reversed: voters may promote salient issues that politicians overlook or give little attention to. In turn, politicians’ responsiveness to these issues may have important consequences on their success or failure in high stakes political events, such as elections.

References


PROSVJED, UKLJUČIVANJE GRAĐANA I SUKREIRANJE POLITIČKE KOMUNIKACIJE: SLUČAJ PREDSJEDNIČKIH IZBORA U RUMUNJSKOJ 2014.

Laura Elena Sibinescu

SAŽETAK U ovom se članku istražuje kako birači i političari putem društvenih medija komuniciraju o važnim temama u situacijama koje mobiliziraju veći broj ljudi, kao što su izbori i prosvjedi. U radu se analizira slučaj predsjedničkih izbora u Rumunjskoj 2014. godine, kada su birači imali aktivnu ulogu u promoviranju tema koje kandidati u početku nisu spominjali u svojim kampanjama. Dvije su teme proizile kao osobito važne iz perspektive birača: sustavna korupcija i optužbe da vlada namjerno ometa proces glasovanja u zajednicama rumunjske dijaspore. Automatska i ručna analiza sadržaja korisničkih komentara i materijala iz kampanje u društvenim medijima otkriva, iako je teško precizno dokazati kauzalnu povezanost, da su zahtjevi birača koji se tiču spomenutih tema imali aktivnu ulogu u promjeni strategija kampanja kandidata.

KLJUČNE RIJEČI politička komunikacija, društveni mediji, prosvjed, izborne kampanje, analiza i pretraživanje teksta

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