Inclusive versus Exclusive Public Reason: Invitation to Comparative Political Philosophy or the Affirmation of “Liberal Hegemony”*

Abstract

The paper is an effort to reflect on the prospects of comparative political and social philosophy based on interaction with empirical and theoretical research in the social sciences and humanities. It consists of the following components:

1. Short presentation of the sources of the “comparative turn” and the fourth wave of the critique of Eurocentrism.
2. Reflection on the problem of “multiple modernities” (“new modernities”) as the consequence of the “comparative turn”, and a challenge for the idea of society and politics based on the concept of secular public reason.
3. Reference to a challenge to the classical notion of the public sphere (rooted in the ideal of public reason) which was developed by Nilüfer Göle while studying new “Islamic public visibility as a critique of a secular version of the public sphere” in Western Europe.

Keywords

Andrew F. March, Nilüfer Göle, comparative political philosophy, modernity/modernities, post-secularism, public reason, Islam in Europe

For several years the field of political and social theory, and social sciences and humanities in general, has been experiencing a significant increase in comparative research. It already became a serious and massive scholarship. In this context we can mention works by Roxanne Euben, Fred Dallmayr, Farah Godrej, and Anthony Parel, or book series such as Global Encounter: Studies in Comparative Political Theory published by Lexington Books.¹ The

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¹ A useful overview of literature in the field of comparative political theory was recently offered by Melissa S. Williams and Mark E. Warren (Williams, Warren 2014). One can mention in this context following publications: Parel, Keith 1992; Euben 1997; Euben 2006; Angle 2002; Dallmayr 1999; Dallmayr 2004; Freeden 2007; Freeden, Vincent 2013; March 2009; Jenco 2009; Jenco 2014; Godrej 2011. Williams and Warren signal interesting terminological problems linked to the attempts to provide a definition of comparative research in political ideas – whether the field should be called “comparative political theory”, “comparative political philosophy”, “comparative political thought” or more specifically and explicitly programmatic: “non-western [or non-American] political theory”. They prefer the label “intercultural [or transcultural] political theory” (Williams, Warren 2014: 49–50).
aim of those projects is to enlarge – as much as possible – the “geographical setting” of reflections about political life so that it encompasses global arena (March 2009a: 531–532). But the ambitions of comparative research in political theory extend beyond such a simply descriptive task. They also include normative dimension. They call into question the allegedly privileged nature of the political and social experience of the West or Europe (broadly and vaguely defined) as the core of leading scientific investigations concerning state, society, economy, law, culture or religion. According to March, comparative political theory is based on an assumption that “… we will be morally and epistemically transformed by encounters with our ‘others’.” (March 2012: 1)

But this postulate turned out to be very problematic, and carries with itself a need to provide answers for important questions: who is to be “transformed” in such a way? What type and scope of the transformation is required? Who is the “other”? Which others are important as sources of the transformative knowledge? Do we have in mind any specific others or their specific group(s) or kind(s)? What are the general objects of epistemic and moral knowledge to be learned from the others – “nature or essence of the others” or “some suppressed or concealed aspect of our own self and history”? What are the learning modes: face to face encounters or studying “alien texts” (March 2012: 1)? There is no space in the current context to talk even in general terms about possible answers and solutions to those challenges. According to March, they would require asking different questions – not about learning and “conversation”, but about a form of “conversion”. At the same time, he argues for the necessity to pay closer attention to the significance of religion and its influence on political doctrines and practices – as well as on cultural differences, variations, boundaries between societies (what is “ours” and what is “theirs” in the case of authors and texts) (March 2009a: 552–553; Godrej 2009). Instead I will discuss March’s specific recommendations concerning comparative political theory (and philosophy), and his treatment of the idea of the “inclusion of the other” not as an epistemological, methodological issue but mainly as a moral-practical one. He develops this issue distinguishing “engaged” and “scholarly” political theory (philosophy):

“[There] are exercises of political theory which seek to analyse some kind of data (political ideas, speech-acts, texts), the purpose of which is greater knowledge about the data itself (Plato’s Republic) or about some more general political phenomenon [e.g., how is imperialism defended]?. Scholarly political theory is primarily aimed at investigating whether we understand well enough a given text, practice, or phenomenon. It is likely to overlap with social science, history, and the humanities. Other exercises of political theory, using the variable methods, (…) (analytic argumentation, psychoanalysis, immanent critique, cultural or discourse analysis, etc.), are primarily aimed at revealing the value (however understood and appraised) of a given institutional scheme, theory, system, idea, value, practice, or conception. Engaged political theory is primarily aimed at investigating whether some set of ideas are the right ideas for us. It is likely to overlap with various types of philosophy.” (March 2009a: 534–535)

Regarding the scholarly, descriptive approach to comparative political theory, A. March notices two paradoxes. On the one hand, Western political thought seems to always have included large portions of comparisons (from Plato’s and Aristotle’s analyses of different types of regimes to M. Foucault’s genealogical exposition of intersections between power and knowledge in different times and different places). Thus, for March, “Comparative methods are (…) already assumed to be part of the wide, variable, and diverse forms of activity that for disciplinary-organization purposes go under the name ‘political theory’.” (March 2009a: 537)
On the other hand, those scholars of the Western academia who work on “thought grounded in certain civilizations, or broad cultural traditions, from outside the West” in a comprehensive, systematic manner, actually do not conduct comparative research. They are interested in non-Western thinkers and thought traditions studied in their own terms, without applying the comparative perspective.

March formulates two general objections against exclusively scholarly-orientated comparative projects. Firstly, the search for a cross-cultural understanding is not enough because usually in the case of works which are based on this approach it is unclear what precisely is being compared. There is only a general intuition that such cross-cultural dialog enables us to gain some knowledge about other forms of social and political life. But March asks a question:

“If we might have as much to learn from Lao Tzu, Kautilya, Ibn Khaldun, or Gandhi as from Plato, Machiavelli, Milton, and Foucault, then why not go a step further and simply deny that these writers are alien to us?” (March, 2009a: 548)

Such treatment in fact eliminates completely the comparative dimension – non-Western author’s cultural religious and civilizational identity seems to be not important in itself. Instead of real dialogue, understanding, learning and all the hermeneutical values evoked for example by Fred Dallmayr, 2 we actually find ourselves reconstructing, refining and advancing the canon and debates which shape it. As a result, the Western canon is expanded and not put into “active and living dialogue” with other canons, experiences, authors and texts:

“Why should we relegate Ibn Khaldun, if he is the original and transcultural thinker some Western scholars believe him to be, to the canon of comparative political theory or Islamic political thought? We should study and teach him alongside Thucydides, Hobbes, and Weber.” (March 2009a: 548)

At the same time:

“Straussians have not read Farabi and Maimonides as part of a comparative Platonism or esotericism; they are part of their canon proper.” (March 2009a: 552)

From this observation March moves on to the second criticism about the comparative political theory based on a scholarly approach. He refers to an intuition shared by some representatives of this orientation, that studying non-Western ideas is an “act of recognition”, performed in the name of some intrinsic value (knowledge about the other social and political world is good and virtuous in itself). March doubts that this intuition is enough to establish and develop any substantive and methodologically solid research and submits that:

“If the interest in non-Western political thought is merely to decenter the canon or to frame cross-cultural dialogue, but without rigorous epistemic or normative standards, then it might be regarded as zoological, that is, a civic act rather than a theoretical or philosophical one.” (March 2009a: 550)

Such projects play important role, but serve mainly as an activity aimed at “zoological cataloguing of diversity”. They are “zoological” because they are

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2 Dallmayer writes about a need for “shunning monopolistic or monological gestures” in the study of politics: “[The] point of comparative political theory, in my view, is precisely to move toward a more genuine universalism, and beyond the spurious ‘universality’ traditionally claimed by the Western canon and by some recent intellectual movements.” (Dallmayer 2004:253)
limited to showing only parallels – though interesting in their own right – between

“… the Aristotelian politikos and the Confucian junzi, Indian dharma and the premorden Western notion of ‘natural justice,’ the Islamic prophet-legislator and the Platonic philosopher king.” (Parel 1992: 12)

But they must be criticized in the first place because they fail to treat thinkers and texts they analyse as “potential sources for first-order normative commitments on our part” (March 2009a: 549). Their research becomes a “wisdom literature” – example of scholarship criticized by Judith Shklar for being “wholly removed from the controversies of their world” (Shklar 1979: 549–550). They are unable to answer questions such as the one about how to refer to a suggestion that for example classical Islamic political thought included some crude ideas about constitutional government or rules based on consensus (and not on the arbitrary-authoritarian decisions of “theocratic” sovereign).3 What kind of argumentation should be offered in this case – the one which would focus on possible, “alternative” developments in the political history of the Muslim world (if the “democratic component” had a chance to “mature” there) or the one criticizing Western exceptionalism and triumphalism? (March 2009a: 550)

According to March, comparative political theory must be ready to accept the claim that “neglected voices contain first-order arguments or visions eligible for being adopted”, and as such it appears necessary for moral reconciliation in the more and more globalized era. Potential moral reconciliation must be preceded by value-conflict caused by differences and disagreements between Western and non-Western perspectives over specific issues: liberal values, imperialism, hegemony, pretensions to universalism etc. Such attitude leads to the more specific definition of the engaged comparative political theory understood as a study of “principled value-conflicts between more or less autonomous moral doctrines”. There are three crucial challenges for this discipline related to the argumentation about: why moral disagreement in the discussed case is challenging or troubling; why it amounts to a case of comparative political theory; how the moral conflict ought to be studied (March 2009a: 555–556).

Those challenges must be taken seriously, because relationships between value-conflicts and engaged comparative political theory are not simple and there is no automatic, quick passage, a translation between the awareness of conflict (with a need to criticize imperialist Western hegemony) and the fruitful engagement (intervention):

“Taking moral disagreement seriously as a problem for political theory (…) must not succumb to the relativist fallacy of viewing all opposition to a moral claim as raising equally serious doubts about that claim’s validity. While the simple fact of opposition to Western norms in non-Western contexts is often viewed as sufficient evidence for the particularity of those norms (and, thus, the imperialist or hegemonic nature of insisting on them, even on paper), it is clear that not all opposition is created equal in terms of raising normative doubt and thus warranting the attention of political theorists. [Again, sometimes we are merely opposing the hegemonic, imperialist imposition of norms without needing the local counter norms to be morally valid or compelling to us in a substantive way. We can argue against the forcible ‘democratization’ of Iraq within American public or academic circles without needing to say the slightest positive thing about Saddam Hussein’s mode of governance].” (March 2009a: 554)

March’s project is important as a whole – it is one of the most successful attempts to construe dialogical political philosophy. In his main work, the book *Islam and Liberal Citizenship* (2009b), he analyses in a detailed way relations
between liberalism and Islamic legal-political traditions in order to reaffirm the concept of liberal citizenship and overlapping consensus (public reason liberalism) in the context of specific religious comprehensive doctrines, and at the same time to argue about necessity to introduce religious convictions in the public sphere, because they are important part of civic culture. There is no space for an exhaustive, or even satisfactory presentation of his research. Instead I would like to move to a more general issue related to next necessary theoretical-practical field of research, highlighting the interdisciplinary, broader dimension of problems analysed in this paper.

Post-Eurocentric idea of modernity/modernities

I would like to offer an interpretation that the comparative turn in political studies and social sciences and humanities (including philosophy) in general can be considered to be the manifestation of the fourth wave (generation) of the critiques of Eurocentrism (Ramón Grosfoguel, Mustafa Emirbayer, Gurminder Bhambra, Walter Mignolo, Enrique Dussel, Couze Venn, Julian Go, Engin Isin). These are the most successful attempt so far to connect different disciplinary approaches which were formerly considered methodologically and epistemologically distinct (even hostile). The first generation was constituted by works of Marshall Hodgson, Anwar Abdel-Malek, Talal Asad and Edward Said (“founding fathers” of this orientation). The second generation was based on the perspective of world-system and world-history by Immanuel Wallerstein, Samir Amin, Giovanni Arrighi, Andre Gunder Frank, R. Bin Wong, Kenneth Pomeranz, Richard von Glahn, Wang Feng, Cameron Campbell, Dennis Flynn, Arturo Giraldez, James Lee, Robert Marks, Andre Gunder Frank, Jack Goody, James Blaut, and Janet Abu-Lughod. The third generation formed postcolonial studies (subaltern studies). The fourth generation of the critique of Eurocentrism should be particularly linked to previous discussions (of course not substituting them completely) on post-colonialism. Post-colonialism is understood here as a state and the series of processes taking place in the world (roughly from the mid-twentieth century, although its sources can be detected in the nineteenth century or possibly even earlier – in the eighteenth century) as the result of decolonization and transformation of the global distribution of power (declining Western/Northern hegemony). One aspect of these postcolonial processes is being evaluated within the framework of cultural studies. Another aspect is the subject of research by the world-system (or world-systems) “analysts”. Projects offered within the discussed paradigm are attempts to respond to a sense of suspension, incompleteness and lack, associated with the stage of development in post-colonial discourses (discourses of post-colonialism).

3 See for example: Feldman 2008; March 2009b.

4 Many of those authors are the representatives of post-colonial social theory. It is difficult to mention most representative texts for this new, growing orientation. Most of the works belonging to this current are journal articles and book chapters. More complex, multifaceted monographic publications include: Bhambra 2007 and Rodriguez; Boatcă; Costa 2010. The synthetic, bird-eye view of post-colonial social theory (and sociology in general) with a “walkthrough” of literature is offered by Go (2013).

5 Debates on post-colonial and subaltern studies still continue, as evidenced for example by the recent publication of the synthetic-critical work by Vivek Chibber (2013), and enormous number of its reviews and debates that has followed the publication (Levien 2013; Brennan 2014).
According to the representatives of the fourth generation of post-colonial studies (the critique of Eurocentrism), the “ruins” of the colonial, imperial order (dominance of the metropolis/centre) has not led to a satisfactory reevaluation in the field of epistemology. There is a visible, radical split between research on economics and politics (historical sociology of world-systems), and critical theory (discourse analysis) (2nd and 3rd generations respectively). The split leads to the fundamental rupture, an incompatibility between the level of described, analysed facts and “events” (e.g. the eradication of formal colonial administration and control in the “Third World”), and discourses (symbolic level, level of imagination: ideological and symbolic strategies aimed at “preservation” of the racist culture of the modern, developed/colonial/Occidental world). As a consequence, dichotomy of political economy versus cultural studies (or political aesthetics) has been established. The unexpected, unintentional but at the same time unavoidable result of the above “epistemological deficiency” is the maintaining and sustaining of the myth of decolonization of the world, on which the still existing colonial order is based. The recipe for the de-legitimization and rejection of this myth, and the epistemology it involves, can be a combination of research perspectives, as argued for example by Encarnación Gutiérrez Rodríguez calling for a “decolonizing postcolonial rhetoric” or Ramón Grosfoguel developing – in reference to works by Walter Mignolo, Gloria Anzaldúa, Norma Alarcon José, David Saldiva and Aníbal Quijano – the perspective of postcoloniality and border-thinking (border epistemology) (Grosfoguel 2002). As in the case of A. F. March’s treatment of contemporary comparative turn in political theory (philosophy), there is no room for a detailed reconstruction of the fourth wave (generation) of post-colonial, anti-Europocentric discourses. However, this element of my presentation will not be totally abandoned further in the text.

Jan Nederveen Pieterse is the author of one of the most advanced and consciously, explicitly developed projects aimed at a critique of Eurocentrism, especially in social and economic history and in social theory. Nederveen Pieterse deals with the concept of “new modernities”, which can also be understood as a product of broad comparative turn in contemporary social sciences and humanities, and it should be linked to other concepts, invented to question “eurocentric modernity”: “alternative modernities”, “multiple modernities” or actually the very term “modernities” in plural.

Nederveen Pieterse notices that the notion of “new modernities” has become recognized and widely used for example in business media and in studies on economy and development. He refers at this point to the phenomenon of “oriental reorientation” (“reorientalization”):

“Westernization is gradually being overtaken by easternization, in its various meanings such as the spread of Japanese management techniques, the East Asian development model, Asian diaspora economies, the orientalization of everyday culture in the West, Malaysia’s Look East policy, and the emergence of China as a force in the world economy. The emerging economies are epicentres of economic growth and renewal. The world cities of the twenty-first century may no longer be New York and Tokyo but Changzhou and Beijing.” (Nederveen Pieterse 2010: 86)

At the same time sociology and social theory seems to stick to older, traditional ideas about strong connections between modernity as such and the West (according to this prevailing paradigm, sociology is the study of modern – Western, industrial, urban, secular – societies):

“… ‘modernity’ refers to modes of social life or organization which emerged in Europe from about the seventeenth century onwards and which subsequently became more or less worldwide in their influence.” (Giddens 1990: 1; cf. Therborn 2010: 71–72)
Criticizing the West seems to be at the same time an exceptionally difficult and complicated task. Western intellectual world has mastered an idea of reflexivity and self-reflexivity which also refers to this domain. For example, Allan Bloom in his The Closing of the American Mind notes that all cultures and societies are ethnocentric, but especially those non-Western:

“Only the Western nations, i.e., those influenced by Greek philosophy, is there some willingness to doubt the identification of the good with one’s own way.” (Bloom 1987: 36)

And he continues, accusing the contemporary Western Academia for publicizing the reverse:

“One should conclude from the study of non-Western cultures that not only to prefer one’s own way but to believe it best, superior to all others, is primary and even natural—exactly the opposite of what is intended by requiring students to study these cultures.” (Bloom 1987: 36)

Eisenstadt’s notion of multiple modernities and his version of the theory of modernization (modernizations?) is far more widespread in contemporary social sciences despite the presence of some “dissent” conceptions, like the one proposed by Sanjay Subrahmanyam:

“Having taken away so much from the societies of South Asia, it seems to be high time that social science at least gave them back what they had by the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries— their admittedly very ambiguous ‘early modernity’.” (Subrahmanyam 1998: 100, in Nederveen Pieterse 2010: 87)

Such dissent or revisionist voices can be regarded as the examples of the aforementioned “declaratory” stage of questioning the Western modernity (singular and linear) and not as a real alternative to it. Nederveen Pieterse, searching for possibility of such a new approach, which at the same time would serve as an essential substitution to, or at least as a serious correction of the previous paradigm, tries to classify the discourses and the theories of new plural modernities, distinguishing their strong and weak versions:

“The weak versions don’t dispute the western claims to precedence and present new modernities essentially as add-ons to modernity, variations on the theme. Strong arguments, in contrast, no longer privilege the West and critique or deconstruct modernity and western perspectives on modernity.” (Nederveen Pieterse 2010: 88)

At the same time, he tries to make a more general argument about perspectives of justification of discourses of modernities (in plural) as such. Strong argument for modernities results (or should result) in a truly new opening and departure from the previous paradigm. It argues not only about strong and significant presence of influences of non-European, non-Western cultures on the Western, European development and modernization. Very modernity and modernization are inconceivable without the other. For example, as Martin Bernal, C.L.R. James, Yıldız Atasoy and other authors tried to show:

“The prosperity and cultural efflorescence of the Renaissance in Italy and beyond was conditioned and inspired by the Levant trade and cultural flowering in the Islamic world. (…) (Growing) bourgeois prosperity in Bordeaux and Nantes was made possible by the wealth generated by the slave trade: without African slaves, no revolution in Europe and no ‘age of democratic

6 For example: Nederveen Pieterse 2006; 2010a; 2010b; 2012.

7 Nederveen Pieterse actually discusses a continuum of views located between weaker to stronger versions; explicitly and in more details he describes three such “stages” or “shades”.
revolution’. The emergence of the Westphalian interstate system in the seventeenth century was made possible by alliances between the Ottoman Empire and the Protestant powers, outflanking the Habsburgs and Rome: without the Ottomans, no Westphalia, no ‘modern interstate system’.” (Nederveen Pieterse 2010: 90)

Looking for the stronger version of discourses of modernities, Nederveen Pieterse refers to works by A.G. Frank, K. N. Chaudhuri, K. Pomeranz and J. Hobson, based on previous research by M. Hodgson, J. Abu-Lughod or F. Braudel. According to those authors:

“Most of the attributes we associate with modernity – market production and intensive and long-distance trade, high rates of economic growth and productivity growth, high rates of population growth, urban densities, extensive transnational divisions of labour, etc. – existed in China and South Asia centuries before they existed in Europe.” (Nederveen Pieterse 2010: 91)

The implication of the above observations for social sciences can be considered as their Reorientation, Reorientalization – arguments about oriental origins of science, technology, philosophy, as well as processes called urbanization and modernization:

“Most western social science has been concerned with explaining the lead of Europe and the backwardness of other regions, as in Marx’s Asian mode of production, Weber’s Protestant ethic, Wallerstein’s modern world-system, modernization theory, David Landes’ arguments, and so forth. But what if the task becomes, rather, to explain the backwardness of Europe, the precedence of Asia and the ramifications of the Afro-Eurasian world economy? (…) [Economic] path leads from the oriental bazaar and the Kasbah to the Arcades of Milan and Paris and thence to the department store. In science and technology, it leads from China and South Asia via Mesopotamia to Venice and European crafts and technologies (porcelain, paper, fireworks, etc.). In art, it leads from Ukiyo-e via displays of Japanese works in Paris salons to Japonisme to impressionism and beyond.” (Nederveen Pieterse 2010: 91)

Processes of interactions and encounters between modernities (described by Nederveen Pieterse as spatio-temporal alternation of easternization and westernization) lead to recentring of the general, main idea of modernity as conceived in the West and in the Western social sciences:

“Presumably, following Foucault, as the centre of power or hegemony shifts, so does the centre of truth. Reflecting on modernities invites a reassessment of modernity in the West, an undertaking that may be termed the deconstruction of modernity. If the centre of hegemony and truth shifts to Asia, in time this will hold implications for Asian modernities too. The significance of the theme of modernities is that it takes us beyond western social science and invites a global conversation on new terms.” (Nederveen Pieterse 2010: 100)

As it has been already argued, one of the implication of the transformation of Western modernity into a modernity is undermining universal character of certain “Western complexes” such as French laïcité and headscarves. They must be treated as the examples of historical particularities and not as intrinsic features of modernity per se (Nederveen Pieterse 2010: 98). In this context the relationship between the project of modernity (modernization) and the issue of secularism (secularization) becomes the single most important issue for discussions about the prospects of modernities (in plural).

Secularism and the genealogy of exclusive public sphere

Of course, it is not possible here to reconstruct in detail even selected points of the debate on secularization and modernization. Instead I would like to refer here to the one selected aspect of relations between religion and secular modernity and the process of secularization: problem of the “political religion” (for example the so-called “Political Islam” or “evangelical-capi-
talist machine” in the United States). This issue, in addition to the standard (re)considerations of the religion-politics dilemma, is an invitation to rethink the question of secularization and secularism, particularly in the political context. The idea of secularism in this perspective appears not so much as a set of postulates about theoretical and practical-institutional solutions how to avoid conflicts in the plural, political community (traditional liberal approach with religion and religiosity seen as the main causes of disturbance against social peace, cohesion and consensus), but rather as the manifestation of promotion and the realization of a particular vision of the world (ideology) (Calhoun 2011: 76). The point here is not merely to define the terms and conditions of “absence of religion” in the public sphere, but above all, to promote a particular concept of citizenship with its “political ontology” (ontology of the public domain). One of the main postulates of political secularism thus understood is a clear separation of private and public spaces. At the same time, it appears to be influenced strongly by more general, philosophical ideas about human condition, notion of reason and rationality and epistemological questions about the conditions of knowledge (conditions of knowing the self, the others and the world). It favours scientific materialism, nominalism and constructivism in the domain of values and norms (they exist only as an aspect of human relationship to the world, not independently, in the world itself), while rejecting at the same time the idea of transcendence and eternity as foundations and basis of decisions and action (responsibility, a sense of meaning in pursuing some goals and ideals) (Calhoun 2011: 75). At the core of this approach is a belief in the stable and cumulative (ceaselessly progressing) reduction of the role of religion in the lives of individuals and societies (the theory of modernization and secularization). All the mentioned main premises of the concept of secularism can be expressed in one sentence: religious arguments are to be excluded from politics and public sphere because they are irrational, whereas debates and arguments constitutive for the political must be grounded in the “public reason” (Calhoun 2011: 77–79).

At the end of the last century began the process of a gradual “dismantling” of the secularization paradigm in social and political theory (mainly thanks to the work of Rodney Stark, Peter Berger, José Casanova and Charles Taylor). This reconsideration is accompanied by questioning the political implications of the idea of secularism. Jürgen Habermas noticed that the necessary “translation” of religious arguments, so that they become “reasonable” according to the requirements of the public sphere and in accordance with the demands of modern liberalism (mainly the one inspired by the latter works of John Rawls) leads to exclusion and discrimination. Believers are confronted with a necessity to live according to two distinct principles and dimensions: private and public, as if they have two separate political “bodies” (“identities”) (Calhoun 2011: 77). At the same time radically secularized political culture appears to be devoid of one of the major sources and resources of emancipation and democratization, inherent in many religions and many forms of religiosity (Calhoun 2011: 80; cf. Žižek 2012: 63–75). According to Habermas ideas of political freedom, emancipation and liberation (as well as progress) are linked closely to religious language and religious experience. In this peculiar version...
of political theology (opposing and contradicting political theology developed by Carl Schmitt with his critique of democracy and defense of strictly hierarchical, authoritarian political order) religion (along with culture as such or deep moral convictions) appears to be one of the crucial components in the genealogy of the very idea of public reason (Calhoun 2011: 84). Limiting it by “liberal provisos” should be regarded as something artificial, superfluous – a consequence of focusing on only one selected aspect of tradition of European enlightenment: anti-religious, atheistic, rationalistic and openly confronting tradition for the transmission of superstitions – which nevertheless still is rooted in a specific, accepted partially in a pre-rational fashion (before the public reason “test”) epistemological and normative presuppositions (Calhoun 2011: 89, n. 7). Political secularism in this account appears to be very dangerous – it leads to the segregation of the public and civil sphere in accordance to various “ideological sectors” and democracy is reduced to sequential, purely procedural choices with present “Modus Vivendi” as the only preferred option (which usually favors interests of the most privileged and influential groups), without a sincere trust in authentic political community (not identical with uniformity, homogeneity and univocality of norms, convictions and world-views) – even in a possibility of establishing of such a community (Calhoun 2011: 87).

Another approach to the problem of secularism and secularity – quite different to the one offered by Habermas – was taken by William Connolly (2011) who famously proclaimed in the title of the one of his book that he is “not a secularist” (Connolly 1999). Connolly problematizes secularization (secularity) linking it to the process of production of pure, abstract citizenship which used to be the Enlightenment and liberal ideal. From the very start of its appearance this ideal contained serious deficiencies. It was grounded in the postulate about the strict separation of private and public sphere. At the same time the liberal project was founded on a series of exclusions – especially of racial (race) and religious (secularism) characters. They accompanied (and to some extent supplemented) the obvious, most visible segregations, categorizations and exclusions in the socio-economic sphere (gender, class, status, consumption). One should notice in this context a special status of Islam and Muslim minorities in contemporary Europe. It substituted the one which was assigned to Jews before the Second World War (Connolly 2006: 289–292). Muslim identities are racialized and treated as barbaric, pre-modern, pre-Enlightenment, which is to a large extent an outcome of their social-economic inferiority as migrant, guest-working, low-wage, very often jobless (or on a welfare programs and using beneficiaries) population. Connolly’s argument is important both for the perspectives of comparative political theory (he tries to answer question about possible allowance of “external arguments” and the limits of expansion of existing canons – as well as speech-acts – because of the presence of the others) and for debates about the validity of public reason paradigm. What are the foundations of public sphere and political community? Is it translation (as in the case of Rawlsian liberalism) or reciprocity of expectations (as in the Habermasian and deliberative notion of democracy)? His approach is grounded in his more generally radical pluralist position, where acceptance of the other is required to question agonistically the received, given, ruling, hegemonic perspectives in social and political life (Connolly 1995; Connolly 2008; Campbell, Schoolman 2008). His stance differs not only from the one taken by Rawls, but also his idea about the “inclusion of the other” departs significantly from the habermasian approach (even if he shares with him a suggestion about a demand to broaden and deepen the political – insti-
tutional, legal, practical, procedural – domain by investigating its ontological, metaphysical foundations). He is not interested in finding common solutions in public debates and conflicts, he rejects any ecumenical faith or universal public reason as such. The very question of existence of political community seems to be problematic from this perspective. But rejecting this – communicative, communal, even if not communitarian – aspect of political life does not he seem to fall into radical liberal, maybe libertarian, individualistic, to some extent even anarchistic (nihilistic?), orientation? What are prospect for questions about society, social matters from this perspective? These general topics – important for example for the discussions about identity of leftist and other emancipatory projects – cannot be analyzed within the current presentation. In the last section of my paper I will try to identify one more way of their critical assessment, without providing however any tentative, let alone conclusive, answers.

The Western “public” and its Islamic “other”

In the concluding part of my presentation I would like to refer to the concrete example of analysing intersections between issues of secularization, the public sphere as “central device” in the process of democracy, and citizenship-formation and comparisons between various historical and structural experiences of modernity and modernization. All those problems are defined to a large extent by their connection to one common aspect concerning the role of religion in defining scope, depth, and character of the public sphere, and the political ontology in general. In this context we shouldn’t forget about their methodological, “epistemological” challenges – the question of the definition of “identities” and the limits of disciplines traditionally dealing with those dilemmas. Those problems are the basis of research by Nilüfer Göle (1997; 2002; 2006a; 2006b; 2010). She focuses on the phenomenon of the revival of religion studying especially the case of Islam in contemporary Europe. She claims that this process implies a serious challenge to contemporary social sciences (understood traditionally as studies of societies along the division line between the secular and the religious and on the basis of identification of modernity with secularization – the secular).

According to Göle (similar claim was made by authors such as J. Habermas and W. Connolly), the rebirth of Muslim religious identities and practices in today’s Europe should be regarded as an example of the Europeanization (indigenization and re-territorialisation) of Islam, and not as a spatial-temporal return to ancient (Arabic, Semitic) tradition (Göle 2010: 103). This process is accompanied and mirrored at the same time by transformation of contemporary Islamic studies which became a field for more than only theologians, Orientalists, and area studies specialists. We experience a deep transformation of research agenda in those traditional disciplines leading to the growing overall interdisciplinarisation (Göle 2010:113). Göle’s project concern the three aspects of the recent renewal of Islam in Europe: (i) its significance for the problem of globalization, (ii) its influence on European secular (secularized) public sphere, and (iii) the question of gender (Göle 2010: 106).

Analysing relations between contemporary Islamism and globalization, Göle relates to the fact that issues such as conflict and consensus can be no longer managed within the boundaries of the national and the local-political level. Public sphere is becoming more and more the part of global space, while political sphere is still limited to a nation-state (Göle 2010: 109). Islam is the part of the European public, but it challenges and confronts some of its aspects
One effect of this confrontation is both proximity between parties, participants in this “interpenetration” and the deepening cultural differences (“symbols, clichés, grotesque images”), with sexuality and the sacred as main motifs. Public sphere must be treated as a domain not of mediation (intercultural dialog, intellectual debated and understanding, shortening the distance etc.), but as circulation (of pictures, narrative etc.). Its character is figural, not textual, it is affective, sensorial, and scandalous, not rational and discursive. “Public staging of Islam” under such circumstances is also to a large extent more performative than discursive (Göle 2010: 109–110). Such manifestation of religious commitments challenges the classical, secular notion of the public sphere. According to Göle, Habermas, arguing about inclusions and exclusions as inevitable components of the public sphere, seems unaware of the special character of Islam in the new European Public. Inclusion of Islam means, on the one hand, broadening the already existing Western and European institutions and norms, but on the other hand, it leads to the exposure of existence of a “shared doxa” related to the European public (with ‘secular’ and ‘feminist’ as its main determinant) (Göle 2010: 110; Göle 1997).

Analysing the problem of interrelations between the European notion of public sphere, secularization, religion (Islam), and gender, Göle notices similarities between “new Islam” and feminism in the context of European historical, political, social and cultural experience: both are treated as intimate, personal, private, and at the same time both are political. Muslims express their religious identity by “examples that inscribe a religious imprint in the European public spaces” such as: religious symbols worn in public schools, building of mosques with or without minarets as the signs of presence of Islam in Europe, regimes concerning food, holidays, places for prayer in offices etc. (Göle 1997: 76–77; 2010: 110). At the same time, this public expression is intimate, private, and personal. To describe this strong bond between external space and personal body-parts (intimacy), Göle employs a term “modern-mahrem” – based on Arabic word mahrem signifying “the interior, sacred, gendered space which is both spatial and corporeal” (Göle 2010: 111; 2002: 188).² On this basis she refers to differences between classical feminist ideas and Islamic veiling (understood as discovery and manifestation of agency). Both approaches are based on divergent attitudes towards the public appearing of femininity and sexuality. In the case of Islamism, there are highlighted and enhanced differences between sexes with modesty as a main feminine sexual value. In contrast, European feminism tends to blur the borders between sexes with the idea and practice of disposition and openness for sexual interactions (Göle 2010: 111). One can also notice an aesthetical dimension of Islamic veiling leading to the redefinition of fashion in the context of relations between beauty, femininity, and sexuality.

Sexuality has become the central field of controversies about Islam and Europe because late modernity is an age of sexual equality (emancipation) and the public presence of body. Islam is tread in this context as a reminder of (and caution against) pre-feminist past. Göle, however, remarks that veiling “returns” thanks to young, educated, conscious, middle-class women who question their traditional roles ascribed to them by males. Body “entered” European publics thanks to 1968 feminism (the stage of “liberated body” which at the same was an object of the process of secularization). Göle argues that for such feminism the central motif was the care for oneself, which expresses its liberal, libertarian dimension (personal liberty understood as the domain of individualism and choice-based agency) central to European modernity which is continued in classical feminism:
“… the Enlightenment project can be read as an incessant displacement of the frontiers between nature and culture, progressively displacing the realm of religion, reproduction and nature into the domain of the cultural and thus turning religion into a matter of individual choice (…). Yesterday’s rights to contraception and abortion and today’s ‘genetic engineering’ have displaced the realm of reproduction from the universe of natural constraints to that of personal choice, thereby shifting the cursor from nature towards culture. This process is an undeniable sign of a larger personal liberty and plurality of options of choice in life, but also opens up significant questioning in moral and ethical terms.” (Göle 2010: 112)

In the case of Muslim women, the renewal of Islam is an expression of the act of submission, but in this context this act is at the same time directed against neoliberal paradigm – Muslim women give up omnipotent agency “offered” to them by this paradigm. In this way they perform the critique of the logic of extreme emancipation, and show obedience to the divine order with the awareness of the limits of possible scope of changes, innovations and aesthetic pleasures at disposal (with consumerist liberties treated as the form of idolatry). Controlling and training of the nafs – natural instincts and passions – becomes central motif for this type of new feminism (Göle 2010: 113). Muslim veil seems to be situated in-between: it is the manifestation of both the separation from the public sphere and of presence within it (in the relation of particular to general, personal to impersonal, and subjective to inter-subjective). In this sense Muslim women show, by elaborating consciously on both proximity and distance, that their alterity, determined by modesty, can be regarded the new way of emancipation which subverts traditional feminist notion of aesthetical sexuality and subjectivity or subjectivity through sexuality (Göle 2010: 113).

Perhaps surprising and unexpected prospects of the reorientation of social criticism, thanks to the global, public, and feminist dimensions of contemporary Islam, and the methodological aspect of Islamic studies (subversion of traditional social sciences) together lead to the “rereading” of the West and Europe. This can be treated as one of the most interesting and challenging examples of consequences of the comparative turn in social and political philosophy.

References


9 The issue of recreation of the borders of the sexual self in Islam is developed fully by Göle in another monography (1996). The title of its Turkish translation is Modern Mahrem (Göle 2002: 188).


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Uključiv versus isključiv javni um: poziv na komparativnu političku filozofiju ili afirmaciju »liberalne hegemonije«

Zusammenfassung

Schlüsselwörter
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Mariusz Turowski

**Raison publique inclusive versus raison publique exclusive : invitation à une politique comparée ou à une « hégémonie libérale »**

**Résumé**


**Mots-clés**

Andrew F. March, Nilüfer Göle, philosophie politique comparée, modernité, modernités, post-sécularisme, raison publique, Islam en Europe.