Introduction

The papers in this volume were presented at the conference Philosophy of Linguistics and Language held at the IUC in Dubrovnik, September 2015. A day of the conference was dedicated to the discussion of Ernie Lepore and Matthew Stone’s book Convention and Imagination thus the first three contributions directly address different points in the mentioned book.

First Ernie Lepore and Matthew Stone give their “Précis of Imagination and Convention” where they give an overview of the arguments presented in their book and explain how ideas from the book continue to inform their ongoing work. One theme that they stress is the challenge of fully accounting for the linguistic rules that guide interpretation. They do this by attending to principles of discourse coherence and the many aspects of meaning that are linguistically encoded but are not truth-conditional in nature. Thus they argue that they get a much more constrained picture of context sensitivity in language than philosophers have typically assumed. The other theme is the heterogeneous nature of interpretive processes where they propose that the connotations of an utterance are often best explained in terms of the hearer’s experiential engagement with language, without appeal to propositional content that the speaker somehow signals either semantically or pragmatically.

In their article “Against Lepore and Stone’s Sceptic Account of Metaphorical Meaning” Esther Romero and Belén Soria discuss and critically assess Lepore and Stone’s account of metaphor. They claim that this account is based on three of Davidson’s proposals: (i) the rejection of metaphorical meanings; (ii) the rejection of metaphors as conveying metaphorical propositional contents; and (iii) the defence of analogy as the key mechanism for understanding metaphors. Lepore and Stone defend these proposals because of the non-sceptic strategy on metaphorical meanings while Romero and Soria show not only how their non-sceptic account of metaphorical meaning as a variety of ad hoc concept eliminates difficulties but also how it can solve related difficulties in Lepore and Stone’s approach.

Daniel Harris in his paper “Intentionalism versus The New Conventionalism” asks the question: Are the properties of communicative acts grounded in the intentions with which they are performed, or in the conventions that govern them? Ernie Lepore and Matthew Stone argue that much more of communication is conventional than we thought, and that the rest is not really communication, but merely the initiation of open-ended imaginative thought. Harris argues that although Lepore
and Stone may be right about many of the specific cases they discuss, conventionalist conclusions do not necessarily follow.

Marilynn Johnson’s paper “Cooperation With Multiple Audiences” is not the direct discussion of Lepore and Stone’s book. She critically approaches Steven Pinker’s proposal of a game-theoretic framework to help explain the use of veiled speech in contexts where the ultimate aims of the speaker and hearer may diverge—such as a case of bribing a police officer to get out of a ticket. Pinker’s proposal is a seeming failure in H. P. Grice’s influential theory of meaning to recognize that speakers and hearers are not always cooperating. Johnson argues that Pinker mischaracterizes Grice’s views on cooperation and then argues that the cases Pinker presents are best treated by recognizing that in each instance the utterance is formulated with two intentions towards two different audiences. Johnson then goes on to detail a resulting revision to Pinker’s game-theoretic framework that reflects this proposal.

Jessica Keiser in her paper “Coordinating with Language” looks into the idea that linguistic meaning is determined by use pointing to the fact that this claim marks the point where metasemantic inquiry begins rather than where it ends. It sets an agenda for the metasemantic project: to distinguish, in a principled and explanatory way, those uses that determine linguistic meaning from those that do not. The prevailing view (along with its various refinements), which privileges assertion, suffers from being at once overly liberal and overly idealized. By parsing the most prominent aims we use language to achieve, noting their relations of dependence and the specific type of uses they involve, she arrives at a novel metasemantic account: facts of linguistic meaning are determined by locutionary action.

Marco Ruffino’s contribution “Superficially and Deeply Contingent A Priori Truths” reviews some standard approaches to the cases of contingent a priori truths that emerge from Kripke’s (1980) discussion of proper names and Kaplan’s (1989) theory of indexicals. In particular, he discusses Evans’ (1979) distinction between superficially and deeply contingent truths. He raises doubts about Evans’ strategy in general, and also about the roots and meaningfulness of the distinction.

DUNJA JUTRONIĆ