Against Lepore and Stone’s Sceptic Account of Metaphorical Meaning

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In this paper, we discuss Lepore and Stone’s account of metaphor which is based on three of Davidson’s proposals: (i) the rejection of metaphorical meanings; (ii) the rejection of metaphors as conveying metaphorical propositional contents; and (iii) the defence of analogy as the key mechanism for understanding metaphors. Lepore and Stone defend these proposals because the non-sceptic strategy on metaphorical meanings, characterized in general by the negation of (i) and (ii), fails to come to grips with neither the power of metaphor nor the explanatory resources of traditional pragmatic theories. In this paper we show not only how our non-sceptic account of metaphorical meaning as a variety of ad hoc concept eliminates these difficulties but also how it can solve two related difficulties that appear in Lepore and Stone’s account. One of them is that Lepore and Stone’s account involves the possibility of interpreting all metaphorical utterances literally (metaphors only have one meaning, the ordinary meaning) as a criterion of metaphorical identification; the other is that their proposal is not suited for explaining how speakers can agree or disagree when they use metaphorical utterances.

Keywords: Metaphorical meaning, analogy, pragmatics, metaphorical identification, metaphorical interpretation.

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1. Introduction

In this paper we discuss the account of metaphor proposed by Ernie Lepore and Matthew Stone in chapter ten of their latest book *Imagination and Convention* (2015) titled “Perspective Taking: Metaphor” and in two of their previous publications, “Against Metaphorical Meaning” (2010) and “Philosophical Investigations into Figurative Speech Metaphor and Irony” (2014). Following the lead of Davidson (1978), Lepore and Stone do not recognize any role for metaphorical meanings in a theory of meaning and reject that the interpretive effects of metaphors are propositional in nature. Metaphorical usage does not carry a meaning its speaker is trying to communicate: there is no metaphorical communication. This is not our position and we sometimes feel the titanic challenge to convince the sceptic that metaphorical communication is possible and can be explained if we take into account that metaphorical utterances convey propositional contents, what is metaphorically said, that are explained appealing to metaphorical provisional meanings, a variety of *ad hoc* concepts. These propositional contents are directly communicated, not implicated, much less intimated, suggested, or merely caused (Romero and Soria 1997/98).

At first sight, our approach to metaphor is at the other theoretical end of Lepore and Stone’s scepticism towards metaphorical meanings but, far from what might be expected, we do not disagree on everything when dealing with their approach to metaphor. Thus, in the next section of this paper we focus on the points of agreement and on the differences related to our respective conceptions of metaphor. We agree on the crucial point about metaphor interpretation since we all defend the distinctiveness of metaphor and consider analogy as its key mechanism. Nevertheless, our main point of disagreement is on their claim that the result of metaphorical analogical thinking is not part of speaker meaning. We present this proposal and the way in which Lepore and Stone articulate it in the third section. Our disagreement with it leads us, in the fourth part of this paper, to provide the arguments for our defence of metaphorical meaning. To explain our proposal, which we argue is more explanatory, we first specify two conditions to identify a use of language as metaphorical: contextual abnormality and conceptual contrast. Second, we explain how the interpretation is achieved by means of a pragmatic process of context-shifting that affects the language parameter. The analogical mapping from source domain to target domain, which results in a metaphorical restructuring of a concept, permits us to construct provisional meanings for the words used metaphorically and thus the language parameter in that context changes. In this way, our pragmatic theory of metaphorical provisional meaning does not fail to come to grips with the power of metaphor since this meaning is conceivable only from the metaphorically restructured concept.
2. Points of Agreement and Disagreement

We agree with Lepore and Stone on several points. To begin with, we all defend the position that a theory of metaphor must specify the peculiar characteristics of metaphor\(^1\) and what is distinctive about metaphor is that it is related to a distinctive process of perspective taking. Perspective taking in metaphor, or as we usually call it “analogical reasoning” (Romero and Soria 2014), consists in using information about a domain to organize the information about another domain with which it is not previously related and this is done through an analogical correspondence (mapping). We then also agree that metaphor can issue in distinctive cognitive and discourse effects. As Lepore and Stone claim metaphorical interpretation involves a distinctive process of perspective taking. Metaphor invites us to organize our thinking about something through an analogical correspondence with something it is not not. (2015: 162)\(^2\)

Secondly, we also agree that metaphor recognition (identification) is essential to metaphorical interpretation. An account of metaphorical utterances must include the features of metaphorical identification. If (1) Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra and then suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night, the ice weasels come. (Example taken from the comedian Matt Groening as quoted by Lepore and Stone 2010: 165)

is a metaphor, (1) must be identified as such. This identification triggers its metaphorical interpretation. As Lepore and Stone claim “[w]e must recognize that (1) is a metaphor, and shape our psychological response accordingly.” (2010: 171).

For them, “the insights of metaphor and the distinctive import of words used metaphorically frequently go beyond the conventional rules of language.” (2015: 162). We agree that dead or conventional metaphors must be excluded from the study of the interpretation of active, creative metaphors (Romero and Soria 1998, 2005a, 2005b). Conventional metaphors, following Lakoff and Johnson (1980)’s characterization, are metaphorical utterances that include either expressions of

\(^1\) Not all theorists have defended the position that there are some peculiar characteristics of metaphor. For example, Sperber and Wilson have stated that “there is no mechanism specific to metaphors, and no interesting generalization that applies only to them” (2008: 84). According to them, metaphor is interpreted in the same way as other loose uses. The inferential process is guided by the Relevance Principle and results in the loosening or weakening of the lexical encoded concept by dropping part of its logical entry in the process of arriving at the intended interpretation (Sperber and Wilson 1986/95: 233–237). See our 2014 for critiques to this view on metaphor.

\(^2\) This distinctive process has been argued by Richards (1936), Black (1954), Davidson (1978), Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Kittay (1987), Romero and Soria (1997/98) and many others. Nevertheless, not all theorists argue for this process. For example, relevance theorists claim that the metaphorical mechanism is a case of loosening (see the previous footnote) and Stern argues for metaphor interpretation as a case of saturation of a metaphorical operator (Stern 2000).
the used part of a conventional metaphorical concept or expressions of marginal metaphorical concepts that must be interpreted literally (or conventionally). A normal utterance of (2)

(2) The foundations of my theory are sure.

includes a used part of the conventional metaphorical concept THEORIES AS BUILDINGS: ‘foundations’. The expression ‘the foot of the mountain’ in an utterance of (3)

(3) We reached the foot of the mountain.

is the only expression used from the marginal metaphorical concept MOUNTAIN AS PERSON.

The usual utterances of (2)–(3) are interpreted literally. They are called “metaphors” because they give expression to metaphorical concepts but they are “literal utterances” in the sense that they are identified as literal and must be interpreted literally.

For a literal proposition to be expressed, linguistic expressions must appear in normal linguistic and extralinguistic contexts. If we consider (4),

(4) [Sarah asks Marian where her pet is and she answers:] My cat is on the mat.

the context (linguistic and extralinguistic) of every word of the uttered sentence coincides with one of the potential contexts fixed for them in the linguistic competence of the speaker. In cases like this, a literal use of language is identified and the conventional interpretation is triggered. The same can be said about the so called “conventional metaphors”, about usual utterances of (2)–(3). They must be interpreted literally although they involve conventional metaphorical concepts. Thus, conventional metaphors must be excluded from an account of metaphorical interpretation.

Novel metaphors instead demand a creative and distinctive process of interpretation. They are metaphorical utterances that include either expressions of the imaginative uses of conventional metaphorical concepts or expressions of new metaphorical concepts. In an utterance of (5)

(5) His theory has thousands of little rooms.

‘thousands of little rooms’ is an instance of the unused part of a usual conventional metaphorical concept, THEORIES AS BUILDINGS. In an utterance of (6)

(6) These facts are the bricks of his theory.

‘bricks’ is an extension of one of the used parts of THEORIES AS BUILDINGS: ‘the outer shell’. Example (1) above is, according to Lepore and Stone (2015: 163), an unused part of a conventional metaphorical concept: LOVE AS A JOURNEY.3

3 The conventional metaphorical concept LOVE (AS A JOURNEY) inherits the structure of the conventional metaphorical concept LIFE (AS A JOURNEY). "What is special about the LOVE IS A JOURNEY metaphor, is that there are two lovers, who are travellers, and that the love relationship is a vehicle. The rest of the mapping is a consequence of
In addition, in an utterance of (7)

(7) Classical theories are patriarchs who father many children most of whom fight incessantly.

‘patriarchs who father many children most of whom fight incessantly’ calls forth the new metaphorical concept, CLASSICAL THEORIES AS PATRIARCHS WHO FATHER MANY CHILDREN MOST OF WHOM FIGHT INCESSANTLY, which represents a new way of thinking. Any use of this concept is imaginative.

Finally, we also coincide in arguing that the special kind of perspective taking that characterizes metaphorical conceptualization is not propositional in nature. We maintain that analogical thinking delivers metaphorical concepts rather than propositions, concepts analogically restructured by means of the content of another: a conceptualization of one thing as another. The imagery, the perspective we are taking on the subject-matter, as Lepore and Stone claim, does not proceed in many occasions constituent-by-constituent but across extended discourses. Understanding a metaphor involves improvising correspondences from properties and relationships of the source domain to corresponding ones in the target domain and the properties and relations of the source domain are often expressed by (simple or complex) expressions in clauses and may extend across a longer text showing cohesive ties. In any case, the metaphorical vehicle (the part of the metaphorical utterance that is metaphorically attributed to its topic) can, but does not have to, be a single word. This can easily be shown with (7) where the metaphorical vehicle is ‘patriarchs who father many children most of whom fight incessantly’. Similarly, in (1), the metaphorical vehicle of metaphor is ‘a snowmobile racing across the tundra and then suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night, the ice weasels come’.

But not all are agreements. We also disagree on several issues. Even if our disagreement does not entail a direct confrontation with their claim below,

[w]e are defenders of grammar, of meaning, and of common sense. We are exponents of the richness of human experience and the creativity of language. We believe in drawing useful and principled distinctions. (Lepore and Stone 2015: v)

their omission of pragmatics (based on inferential intention-attribution) is our main source of disagreement. We are not only defenders of grammar, of meaning, and of common sense, we are also defenders of inferential pragmatics. Furthermore, the introduction of inferential pragmatics in the agenda is, in our opinion, crucial to draw an account of how metaphorical meanings are conveyed as intended and thus of how communication through metaphor is possible. If we are right, the distinction between the metaphorical and non-metaphorical use of lan-

inheriting the LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor.” (Lakoff 1993: 223). As we can see in this quotation, for Lakoff and Johnson the term “metaphor” stands for the metaphorical concept or for the related expression rather than for the metaphorical utterance which is the one we favour.
guage does not depend on locating metaphor in the field of imagination and out of communication.

In the literature on metaphor, we often find a defence of the metaphorical mechanism as analogical mapping without denying a role for metaphorical meaning. Metaphorical meanings, if required for the correct explanation of the metaphorical use of language, have been considered as distinctive derived meanings that form a part of speaker meaning. Some theorists have considered that these derived or non-conventional meanings are involved in what is implicated, others have argued that they form part of what is said. According to the first position, the speaker makes as if to say one thing in order to mean another. According to the second, the speaker means what she metaphorically says. In both proposals, a pragmatic account of metaphorical meaning as a result or as a by-product of analogical thinking is possible.

Following the Gricean notion of implicature (Grice 1975/89) and Black’s (1954) interaction theory on metaphor, Kittay (1987) elaborates her perspectival theory on metaphor with which she explains how the inferential analogical process reaches second-order meanings that intervene in metaphorical implicatures. In contrast, we argue, following Indurkhya’s (1986) mapping approach, that metaphorical meanings are improvised from the analogical reconceptualization of a domain (target domain) by means of a partial mapping of information from a different unrelated domain (source domain). This metaphorical reconceptualization of the target constitutes a new context of interpretation that delivers what is metaphorically said. A propositional content that includes what can be called, in Lepore and Stone’s vein, “improvised” meanings or, in our terminology, “provisional” meanings (ad hoc concepts) for the expressions used abnormally (non-conventionally).

Lepore and Stone (2010) argue that, if the notion of speaker meaning were developed coherently, there would be no room for any communicated propositional meaning in the metaphorical interpretation of utterances. In their opinion, the view of the metaphorical mechanism...
as analogical thinking is compatible only with the rejection of metaphorical meaning (Lepore and Stone 2015: 170). The previous proposals on the distinctive cognitive value of metaphor do not agree on the role of metaphor in speaker meaning. It can be formulated on the basis of the rejection of metaphorical meaning or on the basis of the discussion of whether metaphorical meaning is involved in what is implicated or in what is said by an utterance. All these positions are currently defended, as we show in Figure 1, but the crucial issue of this debate is whether there are metaphorical meanings or not.

**Figure 1. Theories on the distinctive cognitive value of metaphor as analogy**

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<td>What is implicated</td>
<td>Kittay (1987)</td>
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<tr>
<td>What is said</td>
<td>Romero and Soria (1997/98, 2007 and 2013)</td>
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In our opinion, the notion of speaker meaning, rightly understood, can account for non-conventional uses of language at the explicit level since the speaker meaning may include metaphorical provisional meanings. To argue for that, we are going to focus on the rejection of two of Lepore and Stone’s claims of their sceptic account on metaphorical meaning:

i. “(...) our insights in metaphorical thinking are prompted just by the literal meanings of utterances.” (Stone and Lepore 2010: 175, our emphasis).

ii. The explanation of creative metaphorical meanings as a result of metaphorical thinking must be rejected because “this strategy fails to come to grips not only with the power of metaphor itself but also with the explanatory resources of traditional pragmatic theories” (Lepore and Stone 2015: 169).

To clarify why we disagree with these two points, we need to explain in more detail Lepore and Stone’s view against metaphorical meaning.

**3. Lepore and Stone’s views on metaphor**

Lepore and Stone say, quoting Emerson (1836: 34–35), that “Man is an analogist” (2015: 171n5). They, as many others, accept that the power of metaphor consists in using knowledge of one domain to give a perspective on something else.

Nevertheless, unlike those arguing that the application of this distinctive mechanism results in a peculiar propositional content for metaphorical utterances at the level of speaker meaning, Lepore and Stone claim that the recognition of the distinctive value of metaphor necessarily takes us to deny metaphorical meaning.

[t]he information we get through a metaphor that comes from this process is not pragmatic, in the sense of not part of speaker meaning, not signaled by
the speaker or recognized by the hearer. It becomes an extension of the external world, a place where our perceptions and demonstrations can inform our thinking and interaction we do with one another, but not part of our communication, that is, not part of the communicative enterprise. (Lepore and Stone 2014: 83)

Their rejection of metaphor as part of the communicative enterprise is based on arguing that metaphorical utterances are used to draw the hearer’s attention to similarities. Speaker’s goal is to make the hearer see similarities not to assert them. The hearer understands the proposition literally expressed and this understanding prompts him to look for certain similarities (Lepore and Stone 2010: 170 and 2015: 164).

Speaker meaning definitions developed by Grice (1957/89 and 1969/89) or by Lewis (1969 and 1979) permit Lepore and Stone to show why they reject the alleged metaphorical meaning. The nature of speaker meaning is, according to Grice (1957/89), determined by a group of intentions aimed to produce certain effects by means of the recognition of speaker’s intention to produce them. The recognition of speaker’s intention to produce certain effects is a necessary condition for the audience and a reason to reach them. In positing metaphorical meaning, this must be identified as part of what a speaker intentionally means and this requires, if we consider Grice’s definition, an audience to recognize a specific content a speaker wants to get across. Grice’s notion of speaker meaning is of no use to explain metaphorical meaning because the hearer’s appreciation of the similarities is not achieved by means of the hearer’s recognition of that intention (they take this as a reason parallel to Grice’s reason to exclude Herod’s showing John’s head as an act with speaker meaning). The metaphorist has the intention that the audience appreciate certain similarities, but these are not reached by means of recognizing the speaker’s intention to get across a propositional content in which a metaphorical meaning is involved.

Taking into account Lewis’ characterization of speaker meaning does not change the situation. Lewis (1969) characterizes speaker meaning as the speaker’s intention to coordinate with an audience to update the conversational record. Lewis considers not just speaker’s intention but also the kinds of situation where agents face signaling problems. In his approach, the speaker means a propositional content by uttering a sentence if she intends to update the conversational record with that proposition by coordination. In positing metaphorical meaning, this must be a part of what a speaker intentionally means and this requires the signal of the metaphor to be used as the basis for the uptake of that content. Nevertheless, when a metaphorical utterance is produced by a speaker, her audience and she do not add a propositional content to the conversational record to satisfy their joint interests, including their interest in agreeing on the record. Once the utterance is recognized as a metaphor by means of the recognition of speaker’s literal meaning, they do not have a mutual expectation of agreeing on adding a metaphorical content to update the record, but of appreciating a similarity.
The goal of a metaphorical utterance is “not for specific information to be exchanged, and interlocutors do not coordinate on the information itself or derive it directly by intention recognition.” (Lepore and Stone 2010: 171). The speaker has a distinctive metaphorical thought but the hearer just gets the literal (absurd, irrational) linguistic meaning. If we reason from it, we would just rediscover the absurdity. The essential aspects of this activity cannot be characterized in terms of a communicative enterprise because although the literal proposition is made public, it cannot be considered as information to update the record. In their words:

metaphors can shape our responses and guide our thinking, because of the particular kind of perspective taking they involve, without conveying information in the usual sense. This, more than anything else, is why we think metaphors must be explained in a distinctive way. (2015: 169)

Meaning or information is, for them, public content that underwriters interlocutors’ joint inquiry into how things are. As there is “little evidence that metaphor ever contributes information in the sense of publicly accessible content that supports inquiry” (Lepore and Stone 2015: 170), they conclude metaphors do not contribute propositional content even if the speaker intended the hearer to focus on a series of similarities. These similarities are not part of any propositional content communicated by the speaker. Rather, they are part of the interpretive effects delivered by propositional content which is in no way special or metaphorical but literal. The literal meaning of the sentence uttered metaphorically prompts the similarity but does not underwrite interlocutors’ joint inquiry into how things are. The hearer is invited to explore the implications of seeing one thing as another by using his imagination.

To support the plausibility of this view of metaphor they resort to a parallelism between metaphors and jokes. Speaker’s goal to utter both jokes and metaphors is not to assert any propositional content it is rather to show some imagery. The comedian’s utterance provides us with a humorous imagery but does not deliver any information that contributes to inquiry. Correspondingly, the metaphorist’s utterance prompts the hearer’s perception of a similarity but he is not informed of anything to update the conversational record.

These and other cases of “imagination” are taken as evidence that there is no room for the sort of communication based on reasoning and intention recognition. They reject the Gricean intentional framework to characterize interpretation as they think (i) that interpretive reasoning is more diverse and (ii) that linguistic meaning is broader in scope than Grice envisioned (Lepore and Stone 2015: 6). In their view, any traditional pragmatic account involves a reduction of meaning to communicative intention. As this is incompatible with (i) and (ii), they reject any pragmatic account of metaphor. They admit that intention recognition is necessary for all collaboration but
interlocutors’ contributions to conversation—just like their contributions to practical activity—carry things forward according to a dynamic that is antecedent to their intentions, and independent of them. (Lepore and Stone 2015: 6)

They consider it a mistake, therefore, that “the theory of CIs [conversational implicatures] eliminates the need to describe linguistic conventions and imaginative mechanisms in detail.” (2015: 6). The inferential mechanisms recruited in language interpretation are quite diverse and eclectic and “it follows that overarching frameworks like the Cooperative Principle or the Principle of Relevance can’t be the whole story.” (2015: 83). A unitary account of all of the inferential mechanisms is not possible. They also claim that “the category of conversational implicature does no theoretical work. Pragmatics can be, at most, a theory of disambiguation; pragmatic reasoning never contributes content to utterances.” (2015: 83). Consequently, they have to reject any pragmatic account of metaphor interpretation. The explanatory resources of traditional pragmatic theories cannot explain the alleged metaphorical meaning although it goes beyond the conventional rules of language.

If any pragmatic reasoning is ruled out, they must find “a way of thinking about the inquiry that interlocutors pursue in conversation as completely governed by linguistic rules.” (2015: 6–7). Nevertheless, this is not bad news for them. They worry about the notion of meaning if we are too permissive with its use: “If we can locate metaphor elsewhere, it is good news for meaning.” (2010: 179).

4. A Defense of Pragmatically Derived Metaphorical Meanings

Even if we agree on widening the scope of linguistic conventions and advocate for the distinctive character of novel metaphor interpretation, we think Lepore and Stone (2015) do not succeed in locating metaphor out of speaker meaning. In what follows, we give a pragmatic account for metaphor starting in 4.1 by giving the identification conditions of metaphorical utterances. These conditions block the literal interpretation of metaphorical utterances and show that metaphorical utterances go beyond the conventional rules. Thus they are an argument against Stone and Lepore’s claim that our insights into metaphorical thinking are prompted just by the literal meanings of utterances.

We are aware that it is possible to accept our identification conditions and nevertheless hold that there is no metaphorical meaning. These conditions would merely prompt metaphorical thinking. Nevertheless, in our opinion, they can trigger the search for inferential information to solve the communication problem that arises from blocking the literal interpretation. Linguists often present examples that provide evidence that the inferential system does indeed generate content beyond the encoded meaning, and that its operation is grammatically constrained (Vicente 2010). Since semantic composition rules
drive the composition process, going beyond these rules triggers the search of content that eventually allows the composition, and it is the job of pragmatics to supply the specific conceptual addition or modulation. Modulation as required for metaphor will be considered in 4.2. In this section we expound how metaphorical thinking is a part of the interpretive context from which metaphorical provisional meanings are fixed. They are constructed by means of one type of the pragmatic sub-tasks typically involved in ad hoc concept construction: language-shifting. The language–shift involved in interpreting a metaphorical utterance constitutes a new context of interpretation that at least delivers metaphorical meanings (ad hoc concepts) for the expressions used abnormally (non-conventionally) in the metaphorical utterance. Metaphorical meanings cannot exist without the metaphorical thinking from which they are conceived and thus the power of metaphor is not lost in their elaboration. Taking into account these metaphorical meanings, metaphorical utterances can convey propositional contents to agree or disagree, they can provide information that interlocutors add to the record.

4.1. Metaphorical Identification

As we have claimed in our first point of disagreement, we do not share the proposal that the analogical reasoning is triggered from the inadequacy of the literal meaning of the sentence as a whole when it is used metaphorically. For Lepore and Stone, the sentence used metaphorically has a literal meaning which is inadequate. For us, there is no need to get to that absurd interpretation because, among other things, many metaphorical utterances cannot be literally grasped.

According to Lepore, at least as it is explained in Cappelen and Lepore,

any utterance succeeds in expressing an indefinite number of propositions. One of these, the proposition semantically expressed, is easy to grasp. (2005: 206)

But, in our opinion, there is no proposition easy to grasp at least in the first part of an utterance of (1), (1a)

(1a) Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra.

For a proposition to be grasppable it must be intelligible. (1a) does not have the minimal level of meaningfulness to be propositional. Sub-propositional expressions in (1a), for example ‘a snowmobile racing across the tundra’, give access to semantic information such as

6 Different types of pragmatic processes are accepted in current pragmatic theories. For example, Recanati (2004) accepts, in addition to context-shifting, pragmatic processes of enrichment, loosening and transfer in what is said.
A snowmobile is a sport vehicle like a car on skis that you drive through the snow.

It’s fun; it’s exhilarating, and it gives a sense of adventure. A tundra is a frozen landscape with no trees, a place of relative safety. (Lepore and Stone 2014: 75)

Even the sub-propositional expression ‘the ice weasels’ in (1b), another sentence of (1),

(1b) At night the ice weasels come.

gives access to the semantic information also indicated by these authors: “Weasels are small predatory animals known for their fierceness and trickery.” (2014: 75). But no propositional information is achieved from the literal interpretation of (1a). We then strongly disagree with what Lepore and Stone add:

When you put this all together you imagine a prototypical course for a love affair, where it starts with a sense of adventure and excitement and then goes horribly wrong leaving you with a gnawing feelings of torture and pain. What seems to be doing the work here is our ability to understand the sentence as described; and then to draw an analogy between the experience of being in love and a certain kind of history that could happen. (2014: 75, our emphasis)

What is doing the work here is by no means our ability to understand the sentences included in (1) as described! What is literally grasped in (1a) is the meaning of the sub-sentential and linguistically meaningful complex expression ‘a snowmobile racing across the tundra’. Even the sentences that follow (1a) in (1) are also literally grasped and could be compositionally added to the meaning of this complex NP. However, (1a) is semantically or literally unintelligible.

What we claim is that in the interpretation of sentences such as (1a) semantic composition is not available. Although (1a) is syntactically well-formed it lacks semantic coordination. There is a semantic mismatch since our semantic knowledge of the words ‘snowmobile’ and ‘love’ tells us that the composition of meaning is mediated by a semantic restriction in the word ‘snowmobile’ to the effect that its encoded concept (that denotes concrete objects to go on snow) cannot be normally used to talk about a feeling. The predicate ‘is a snowmobile racing across the tundra’ cannot make its semantic contribution to the clause since its meaning typically needs a concrete entity to fill in the semantic role of its subject and there is no element in (1a) with the feature [+]concrete] to take such a role. As Asher says in relation to similar examples of semantic mismatch

These predications should be precluded by normal type constraints, and we know that there are no reference preserving maps (in this world) from goats to talking agents or from trees to talking agents. (Asher 2011: 284)

As the predication in (1a) is precluded by normal type constraints, no resulting meaning is available to obtain an acceptable literal proposition. Besides, if the proposition semantically expressed by (1a) has to be easy to grasp, there is no proposition semantically expressed by (1a).
We must recognize that (1a) is a metaphor but the literal meaning of the sentence uttered cannot be the way of recognizing that (1a) is a metaphor since it cannot be obtained from the linguistic meaning of the sentence. What we know, as competent speakers, is that the term ‘snowmobile’ is used in an abnormal way in (1a), it could be taken as a category mistake or a non-conventional use of the linguistic expression. We call this “contextual anomaly” (Romero and Soria 1997/98) or “contextual abnormality” (Romero and Soria 2005a, 2005b and 2007) and we define it as the use of an expression in an unusual linguistic or extra-linguistic context. This means that there are two different modes of appearance of it:

(a) As an oddity between the terms uttered (as in the previous examples of novel metaphors: (1) and (5)–(7)).

(b) As an oddity between the occurrence of an expression in the actual unusual context and the implicit context associated to a normal use of this expression.

Abnormality of mode (b) is due to the incompatibility of the context of the utterance and the context conventionally associated to the uttered expressions. Let’s change the context in (4)

(4) [Sarah asks Marian where her pet is and she answers:] My cat is on the mat.

to obtain (4’).

(4’) [Marian is reading at home, and her one-year-old son is playing on a mat with something he found on the floor. Sarah, a friend who knows the kid is a real mummy’s boy enters the room and asks her where her son is. Marian answers:] My cat is on the mat.

Now there is a tension between ‘cat’ and the context. (4’) is an utterance that concerns a boy rather than a cat. This tension blocks the literal interpretation. The composition between CAT and THE SPEAKER depends on any salient relation in the context. The only salient relation is the relation of motherhood that the speaker has with her one-year-old son. If the tension mentioned did not block the literal composition, we would get to an unintelligible result: THE CAT THE SPEAKER IS MOTHER OF. Now the proposition semantically expressed is not easy to grasp because (4’) is not an utterance that concerns a cat. In our approach, our linguistic knowledge just guides us to semantic information but this information does not always have to lead by itself to a proposition semantically expressed by a sentence or its utterance.

Contextual abnormality is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for metaphor. It is also present in metonymical utterances such as (8)

(8) [In a restaurant, a waiter asks a waitress what to do next and she answers:] The ham sandwich is waiting for his check.

An additional identification criterion for metaphor is needed: a conceptual contrast. Conceptual contrast is the recognition that the speaker...
is talking about a topic (target domain) using terms which normally describe another (source domain). This conceptual contrast occurs in (1a) but not in (8). In (1a) we detect as target domain the concept LOVE and as source domain the concept A SNOWMOBILE RACING ACROSS THE TUNDRA WHICH FLIPS OVER, PINS YOU UNDERNEATH AND LEAVES YOU EXPOSED TO ICE WEASELS AT NIGHT. In (4’), we detect as target domain the concept INFANT and as source domain the concept CAT.

Metaphorical identification achieved by both contextual abnormality and conceptual contrast blocks the literal interpretation to avoid a route that leads to no propositional content semantically expressed and triggers the metaphorical mechanism. Although a demand for pragmatic information is triggered by normal type constraints, the resolution of this situation cannot be treated as part of semantics. Nevertheless, this does not mean directly that no proposition can be conveyed by a metaphor as Lepore and Stone have argued (see section 3) and thus it is relevant to wonder if, by means of some conceptual adjustment in the interpretation of metaphorical utterances, some proposition can be expressed. Our positive answer depends on taking as input the evidence given by the speaker with her metaphorical utterance, which includes among other things the semantic information of sub-sentential expressions, to construct the analogical correspondences that are relevant to get as output the intended proposition. This proposition includes a metaphorical provisional meaning.

4.2. A pragmatic account of metaphorical meanings

If we accept metaphorical meanings, we have to take into account several features in our proposal of speaker meaning. First, we cannot forget that speaker meaning is an occasion-meaning that, according to Grice at least, fixes the occasion-meaning of the utterance and this may be non-conventional, as we argue metaphorical meaning is. Second, non-conventional meanings can be considered ad hoc concepts. These are ubiquitous in human cognition and can be constructed literally and non-literally. Third, pragmatic theories admit different types of pragmatic processes in deriving the proposition expressed and one of them, the language-shift, permits us to get the metaphorical meaning without losing the cognitive power of metaphor.

As Grice (1957/89, 1968/89 and 1969/89) shows, speaker meaning is an occasion-meaning. In addition, it is the basic semiotic concept, the concept from which the semiotic concept of the occasion-meaning of the utterance-type can be defined. This occasion-meaning of the utterance-type can coincide or not with one of its timeless meanings. If we consider Grice’s example,

(9) If I shall then be helping the grass to grow, I shall have no time for reading.

we can point out that the timeless meaning of this “complete” utterance-type could be specified as 'If I shall then be assisting the kind of
thing of which lawns are composed to mature, I shall have no time for reading’ or as ‘If I shall then be assisting the marijuana to mature, I shall have no time for reading’. The word ‘grass’ means ‘lawn-material’ or ‘marijuana’. But the speaker does not always mean by (9) one of these two timeless meanings. He could use (9) to mean ‘If I am then dead, I shall not know what is going on in the world’ and, in addition, ‘one advantage of being dead will be that I shall be protected from the horrors of the world’. Nevertheless, the words ‘I shall be helping the grass to grow’ neither mean nor mean here ‘I shall be dead’. In this case the utterer’s occasion-meaning fixes an occasion-meaning of an utterance-type that does not coincide with one of the two timeless meaning of the words used (Grice 1969/89: 89–90). This means that occasion-meaning does not have to be a timeless or a conventional meaning. Arbitrary conventions are very useful in communication, especially in verbal communication, but reducing verbal communication to the linguistic meaning or timeless meaning is simply unacceptable both on empirical and theoretical grounds. Since Grice’s use of the terms “occasion-meaning” or “speaker meaning”, which by now have become conventional, we can no longer claim that conventional meaning is the only kind of meaning we can speak of.

The nature of metaphorical meaning can be accounted for if, in the theory of meaning, it is accepted that there are non-conventional uses of words which may acquire provisional non-conventional meanings. In the case of metaphorical utterances, words mean what they conventionally mean but speakers by using them convey propositions that involve new meanings for these words that are active only on the occasion of the utterance; they are merely provisional and explainable as the result of a productive and systematic mechanism: analogical reasoning. Although it is usual to understand, following Grice (1975/89), that these new metaphorical meanings form a part of conversational implicatures, not even Grice has always kept that claim. If we attend to his distinction between formality and dictiveness (Grice 1987/89: 361–362), we can recognize that there are cases of dictiveness without formality. Formality lets us know when the evaluated content belongs to the conventional part of the meaning of an expression while dictiveness discerns when a part of the content belongs to what is said. Grice exemplifies this with two examples, one of them being a metaphor.

Suppose someone, in a suitable context, says ‘Heigh Ho’. It is possible that he might thereby mean something like “Well that’s the way the world goes”. Or again, if someone were to say “He’s just an evangelist”, he might mean, perhaps, “He is a sanctimonious, hypocritical, racist, reactionary, money-grubber”. If in each case his meaning were as suggested, it might well be claimed that what he meant was in fact what his words said; in which case his words would be dictive but their dictive content would be nonformal and not part of the conventional meaning of the words used. We should thus find dictiveness without formality. (Grice 1987/89: 361)
If someone utters ‘He’s an evangelist’, what she means depends on what the words help us to say, although this does not coincide with its linguistic meaning, or part of its linguistic meaning. “Evangelist” does not conventionally mean ‘sanctimonious, hypocritical, racist, reactionary, money-grubber’ and in using this word, the speaker changes its meaning provisionally.

A provisional meaning or an ad hoc concept is, according to Barsalou (1983), one that is made up on the spot for a particular purpose and it contrasts with a ready-made concept. Ready-made concepts are associated with familiar words and well-established categories. They produce organized and easily recoverable knowledge which resides in long term memory. But not all the concepts that a speaker can represent mentally are ready-made and it is plausible to suppose that entities can be categorized differently to achieve some relevant aim. Our ready-made categorizations and conceptualizations can give way to ad hoc categorizations and conceptualizations (Barsalou 1983 and 1985). In fact, ad hoc concepts are ubiquitous in human cognition. They are non-lexicalized concepts and include knowledge associated to categories created for the occasion of the utterance, which does not reside in long term memory.

There are some varieties of ad hoc concepts and they can be represented linguistically either literally where the words of a complex expression interact by compositional semantics or non-literally by means of a pragmatic adjustment of a concept (expressed by a lexicalized expression or by a complex expression). The ad hoc concept good things to stand on to change a light bulb may be expressed literally by means of a complex phrase ‘good things to stand on to change a light bulb’. In the same way, complex expressions such as ‘a snowmobile racing across the tundra and then suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come’ express a literal ad hoc concept: a snowmobile racing across the tundra which flips over, pins you underneath and leaves you exposed to ice weasels at night. These concepts are “literal” in the sense that the words representing them keep their encoded meaning in the composition of the meaning of the phrase or extended text. But not all ad hoc concepts are literal, many of them can be constructed non-literally by a pragmatic adjustment of a literal concept (Romero and Soria 2010). The inputs of metaphorical adjustments are concepts in general (lexicalized or ad hoc). Sometimes, as in (4’), a lexicalized concept, CAT, is the point of departure for an ad hoc metaphorical concept or metaphorical provisional meaning but, other times, as in (1), a literal ad hoc complex concept is the point of departure. In each case, the metaphorical adjustment results in an ad hoc concept with a complete different denotation which is one of the constituents of the proposition expressed by the metaphorical utterance. But how is this meaning obtained?

We normally interpret utterances with respect to the context, \( k \), in which they take place. But it is not always appropriate for us to inter-
pret them with respect to that context. On certain occasions we have to interpret them with respect to a context $k'$ distinct from the context in which it is actually uttered. Context-shift, from $k$ to $k'$, is a pragmatic process and can be produced in several different ways, according to what aspect of context is shifted. If we represent a context, following Lewis (1980), as consisting of three parameters, a language, a situation, and a circumstance of evaluation, a context can be shifted by modifying one of these parameters. A context $k$ is therefore analysed as a triple $<L, s, c>$ where $L$ is a language, $s$ is a situation of utterance comprising a number of parameters corresponding to the situation of utterance (speaker, hearer, time, place, etc.), and $c$ a circumstance of evaluation or a possible world.

There are examples of context-shifting which involve a situation-shift, a world-shift, or a language-shift, but, given the aims of this article, we will focus only on a case of language-shift such as (10)

$$(10) \quad [\text{It is mutually known to the speaker and his addressee that Paul is wrong about the use of ‘paper session’ that he understands with the meaning of ‘poster session’. The speaker says:}]$$

Paul says he’s due to present his work in the ‘paper session’.

In (10), the context-shift can be described by a language-shift because the speaker of (10) does not use the expression ‘paper session’ in its normal sense but in the sense that expression has in Paul’s idiolect, where it means the same as ‘poster session’ in its normal sense. Paul makes a deviant use of the phrase ‘paper session’. The expression within the quotation marks, in this example, is not used with its standard meaning and so (10) has truth-conditions that differ completely from the truth-conditions of the utterance of the sentence when it does not include a quoted expression.

As we have argued, in metaphor there is also a language–shift (Romero and Soria 2007). This, in contrast to the one required for interpreting (10), is triggered by means of metaphorical identification and is guided by the metaphorical mechanism, by the development of an analogical thinking or, as we have understood it following Indurkhya (1986), by a coherent partial mapping of a set of features from source domain to target domain to obtain a metaphorically restructured target domain. Some properties of the source domain (only those relevant to get information for the characterization of the subject matter) are used as a source of information to describe the target. As Lepore and Stone claim “Metaphorical thinking often requires us to find many analogical correspondences simultaneously.” (2015: 166).

Let’s see an example of a mapping to interpret (4'). The metaphorical mechanism links two separate cognitive domains in order to see one as the other: INFANT AS CAT. This link can be specified with a mapping $M$, from the source domain, CAT, to the target domain, INFANT. A domain can be represented by both a set of terms which make up its vocabulary and a set of structural constraints which specify how these terms are
related to the information associated with the concept as we can see for CAT and for INFANT in Figure 2.

**Figure 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAT</th>
<th>INFANT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( D_s = \langle V_s, S_s \rangle )</td>
<td>( D_t = \langle V_t, S_t \rangle )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( V_s = { \text{‘cats’, ‘feline’, ‘walk’, ‘leg’, ‘pet’, ‘play’, etc.} } )</td>
<td>( V_t = { \text{‘infant’, ‘human being’, ‘play’, etc.} } )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( S_s = )</td>
<td>( S_t = )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[1.] Cats are small domesticated feline mammals,</td>
<td>[1.] Infants are young human beings,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[2.] Cats have soft fur,</td>
<td>[2.] Infants play with anything available,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[3.] The colour of the fur of each breed of cats varies greatly,</td>
<td>[3.] Infants need feeding and care,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[4.] Cats play with anything available,</td>
<td>[4.] Infants are often unfriendly with the unknown,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[5.] Cats are pets,</td>
<td>[5.] At a certain stage, infants go on all fours,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[6.] Pets need feeding and care,</td>
<td>[6.] Infants are at their early stage of their lives, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[7.] Cats walk on four legs,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[8.] Cats scrutinise things carefully,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[9.] Cats are aloof with the unknown,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[10.] Cats are often used to catch mice, etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The interpretation of (4’) entails finding a structural alignment between these domains. This alignment of consistent one-to-one correspondences allows the selection and partial mapping from a set of structural constraints from the source to the target domain. It is composed of a partial admissible function \( F \) from terms belonging to the source domain, arguments of the function, to terms that belong or will belong to the target domain. To continue with our example, \( F \) could be formed with the pairs: \((\text{cat} \rightarrow \text{infant}), (\text{walk on four legs} \rightarrow \text{go on all fours}), (\text{pet} \rightarrow \text{infant}), (\text{aloof} \rightarrow \text{unfriendly})\). The mapping is also composed of a subset of structural constraints of the source domain, \( S \), which is coherently transformable by \( F \) to information associated with the target domain. In the example, \( S \) could be formed by structural constraints such as [4s], [6s], [7s], [8s], [9s] as we can see in the left column of Figure 3. These are transformable by \( F \) if each of its terms either belongs to the arguments of the admissible partial function \( F \) or belongs to the vocabulary of target domain directly. On transforming these structural constraints, we come across other structural constraints only in terms of target domain as we can see in the right column of Figure 3.
E. Romero, B. Soria, Against Lepore and Stone’s Sceptic Account 163

Figure 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAT</th>
<th>INFANT\textsuperscript{M} or INFANT (AS CAT)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S =</td>
<td>[2\textsuperscript{M}] Infants play with anything available, (highlights 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[4] Cats play with anything available,</td>
<td>[3\textsuperscript{M}] Infants need feeding and care, (highlights 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[6] Pets need feeding and care,</td>
<td>[4\textsuperscript{M}] Infants are unfriendly with the unknown (highlights 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[7] Cats walk on four legs,</td>
<td>[5\textsuperscript{M}] Infants go on all fours, (highlights 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[8] Cats scrutinise things carefully,</td>
<td>[8\textsuperscript{M}] Infants scrutinise things carefully (new, coming from 8s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[9] Cats are aloof with the unknown.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If the union of the transformation of $S$ with part of the information of the target domain is consistent, that is to say, if this union is true under at least one model, then the structural constraints of $S$ have been coherently transformed by means of $F$ in structural constraints of the target domain. Coherence is an inferential requirement for mappings: we can only transport the transformed information of the source domain that does not make our conception of target domain incoherent. The mapping $M$ for (4') generates a metaphorically restructured conception of INFANT, INFANT\textsuperscript{M} or INFANT (AS CAT) characterized by the structural constraints in the right column of Figure 3. With [2\textsuperscript{M}], [3\textsuperscript{M}], [4\textsuperscript{M}], [5\textsuperscript{M}], nothing new is added to the target domain from the source domain but this target domain information is selected and reinforced by the relational similarities revealed by their alignment with the selected features in the source domain. As the information in [1\textsuperscript{t}], [6\textsuperscript{t}] (see the right column of Figure 2), is not selected, it is downplayed. In addition, when the description of the actual target domain is not aligned to the source domain in every feature, new information could be added to the target domain as it happens with [8\textsuperscript{M}]. Some similarities are created with metaphor.\footnote{Black (1954), Indurkhya (1986), Romero and Soria (1997/98) and Bowdle and Gentner (2005) have argued for this proposal.} In metaphorical interpretation, the target concept is described by means of some source concept-like relational properties which strengthen some properties that the concept already had and, in the more creative cases, by means of new properties that are added as a result of the analogical adjustment.

The mapping is shaped guided by the search of the properties that will enable the hearer to obtain the intended interpretive effects. The hearer does not explore the implications of seeing one thing as another just guided by his imagination. Rather, he is guided by his attempt to recognize what correspondences the speaker is intending him to make. This is not by magic, of course. The speaker must choose her words in such a way that her utterance makes her intention recognizable under the circumstances. The hearer conceptualizes the target as intended on
the basis of the contextual evidence available, including the evidence provided by the speaker (both linguistic and non-linguistic), his previous world knowledge and personal experience, the specific situation, etc. Given the circumstances in (4'), Sarah can infer the analogical correspondences intended by Marian. The mapping is guided by inferential requirements (coherence, contextual relevance and intention recognition on the basis of the evidence provided) so that the target domain is provisionally restructured in the way the speaker envisioned and the parameter of language of the context of interpretation is shifted to \( k' \) as intended by the speaker. In \( k' \) new meanings are produced at least for the arguments of the function \( F \) where the metaphorical vehicle has to be included. \textsc{infant (as cat)} generates a new context of interpretation for (4') where the word ‘cat’ stands for an improvised meaning; this ad hoc meaning is sufficiently clear for the purposes of the conversation. The metaphorical provisional meaning of ‘cat’, the vehicle of metaphor, is the metaphorical provisional concept associated to ‘infant’ in that metaphorically restructured target domain, \textsc{infant (as cat)}. The mapping approach allows us to know how certain words can change their meanings and what meanings they take on. This mechanism is used to produce non-conventional meanings in a systematic way, meanings or conceptions that are not lexicalized in the linguistic competence of the speakers of a linguistic community at that moment in the language. The cognitive power of metaphor often allows knowledge change (Gentner and Wolf 2000) and an increase of effability. We can entertain new concepts and express meanings not yet available in the system of the language and metaphorical utterances provide us with that expression.

By means of a language-shift, we can explain how the speaker can succeed in denoting when he uses the expression ‘my cat’ in (4’) to denote the speaker’s cat-like infant. The speaker in (4’) can convey the information that her infant (conceptualized as a cat, for example, as an infant who is on all fours and scrutinizes things carefully) is on the mat by composing that content from, among other things, the sub-propositional metaphorical meaning. This meaning permits us to determine what is metaphorically said by (4’). She coordinates with the hearer about the information that her infant (conceptualized as a cat) is on the mat. Thus, the ad hoc concept \textsc{infant (as cat)} in \( k' \) can contribute information to the proposition that updates the conversational record. Sarah gets an answer to her question about her friend’s son, she gets accessible information about how things are. The metaphorical conceptualization of one of the constituents of this proposition does not preclude the communication of a propositional content. What speaker and hearer cannot do is to coordinate on something her utterance does not concern, an imaginary cat and an imaginary mat, because when the hearer interprets an utterance such as (4’), both interlocutors know that the utterance concerns a real mat and a real boy.
This is very different from what happens in an utterance of a joke. Let us see a joke about cats.

(11) A policeman in the big city stops a man in a car with a Siberian Lynx in the front seat. ‘What are you doing with that Siberian Lynx?’ He exclaimed, ‘You should take it to the zoo.’ The following week, the same policeman sees the same man with the cat again in the front seat, with both of them wearing sunglasses. The policeman pulls him over. ‘I thought you were going to take that cat to the zoo!’ The man replied, ‘I did. We had such a good time we are going to the beach this weekend!’

If we compare the uses of the expression ‘cat’ in (4′) and in the joke (11), we see that the joke does not concern a situation that includes any denotatum, it is a fictional situation with humorous intent. The hearer does not add to the record the information that a particular driver is going to the beach with his cat. The speaker is joking by exploiting the ambiguity of the linguistic expression ‘taking someone to the zoo’. In jokes, we are presented with an idea or situation that is followed by an ambiguity or a twist, resolved in a clever way, simply to produce amusement while metaphorical utterances can and often do support inquiry. In (4′), we do have a particular boy denoted metaphorically by ‘my cat’ and a particular mat denoted literally by ‘the mat’.

We would readily accept Lepore and Stone’s (2010: 171) claim that in certain jokes, the sentences that the speaker uses mean that \( p \) but the point of the speaker is not to contribute information seriously to their interaction. However, to explain metaphor in this way is highly misleading. We do not think that the main point of the metaphorist is not to contribute information seriously to the conversation. Lepore and Stone can show a similarity between metaphor and jokes with (1) because this example is a humorous utterance by a comedian. In (1) the twist is presented and cleverly resolved by metaphorical propositions. Love is metaphorically described as a very positive and exciting experience (something that is widely accepted), however, it turns out to be a very negative and distressful one at the end of the sentence. In this case, the main point of the utterance is to produce amusement by the twist of the unexpected view of love in those negative terms. If taken as a joke, the speaker of (1) is not contributing the metaphorical proposition seriously. The joke is metaphorically told. If we did not get the mapping as intended, we would not get the metaphorical propositions and the humorous effect. We do not think, however, that metaphorical jokes should be the type of discourse selected if we want to find out whether the metaphorist can contribute information that supports inquiry. If that is the goal, it would be better to consider if the speaker can seriously use metaphorical utterances to answer questions, if she can agree or disagree about something that matters to the interlocu-

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*Example taken from a google search: [http://www.jokes4us.com/animaljokes/catjokes.html](http://www.jokes4us.com/animaljokes/catjokes.html).*
tors, since these are examples of utterances that typically support inquiry. With metaphorical utterances interlocutors can seriously answer questions as in (4'). With a joke, by contrast, interlocutors do not identify questions that matter to them and they do not work to reach agreement about the answers.

Metaphorical utterances provide us with a content that can be negated while it would be absurd to negate a joke. Lepore and Stone’s view of metaphor as just showing similarities is of no use to explain the difference between the interpretive effects of a metaphorical utterance and its negation. In metaphor, content is provided in an unusual way. But this is by no means a reason to reject that it is publicly accessible. Interpreting Donne’s metaphor (12)

(12) No man is an island entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main.

involves triggering new interpretations for ‘island’ and ‘continent’. This does not miss the breadth and interconnections of Donne’s imagery because the new meanings for ‘island’ and ‘continent’ depend on the metaphorical concept PEOPLE AS GEOGRAPHICAL PLACES and more particularly on HUMAN CONNECTIONS AS GEOGRAPHICAL CONNECTIONS, metaphorical concepts that act as part of the metaphorical context for the interpretation of (12). Without this new context of interpretation, characterized by a new conception of the target domain, it is not possible to conceive the metaphorical meanings for ‘island’ and ‘continent’. The propositions that no man is an island and that every man is a piece of the continent are only conceivable from this new context. These propositions have truth-conditions. They indicate what the world must be like for the metaphorical propositions conveyed by (12) to be true. The former is true if and only if no object within the extension of the concept MAN belongs to the extension of the concept MAN (AS ISLAND). The latter is true if and only if every object within the extension of the concept MAN, also belongs to the extension of the concept MAN (AS CONTINENT). And speakers

9 The role of metaphor in science, a clear case of speakers supporting inquiry, is well known to metaphor theorists. Gentner and Wolf (2000) explain how in the history of the scientific account of the atom, several metaphorical models have restructured the concept of atom: Wilson’s plum-pudding model and Nagaoka’s Saturnian-disk model guided Rutherford’s research and finally led to incorporation of orbits as in the Rutherford-Bohr’s solar-system model of the atom. Metaphorical content is publicly available, it is communicated and has an important role in knowledge change. This conceptualization of the atom allows utterances such as ‘electrons travel in circular orbits around the nucleus’ which include terms (‘travel’, ‘orbit’) of the source domain SOLAR SYSTEM with a transferred meaning and which makes it possible to “seriously” communicate the metaphorical proposition intended by the scientist. At Bohr’s time, when the term ‘orbit’ was used to talk about the earth, it did not mean the same as when it was used to talk about the atom. The term ‘orbit’ contributes to the proposition with the metaphorical provisional meaning that was constructed for the utterance in the target domain ATOM (AS SOLAR SYSTEM). In this way, the speaker can convey propositions about the structure of the atom conceptualized as a solar system.
can agree or disagree with respect to these metaphorical propositions directly communicated by (12) as we can see in (13), an excerpt from the very beginning of the film About a boy, where we find the opinion of Will, the main character, expressed in the following way:

(13) If I may say so, [that no man is an island is] a complete load of bollocks.

Will disagrees with Donne’s claim in (12). He denies that no man is an island, he denies that no object within the extension of the concept MAN belongs to the extension of the concept MAN (AS ISLAND). If the purpose of metaphorical utterance were, as Lepore and Stone claim, just to see the analogies created by PEOPLE AS GEOGRAPHICAL PLACES, how can the interpretive effects of the similarity be negated? We do not know how negative metaphors such as no man is an island can be explained from their account as it is quite absurd to negate that there is not a similarity that you have already entertained. With Lepore and Stone’s view of metaphor as an invitation to see one thing as another and nothing more, it is not possible to explain the difference between what Donne and Will say respectively.10

With (12) and (13), the same metaphorical concept MAN (AS ISLAND) is prompted. The difference of their interpretive effects is merely that one asserts what the other denies. From our standpoint, we can say that we can interpret both (12) and (13) from the same metaphorical context and thus their speakers “metaphorically say” the opposite.

The opinion of Will is not exhausted by (13) and he adds (14).

(14) a. In my opinion, all men are islands.  
b. And what’s more, now’s the time to be one.  
   This is an island age.  
   A hundred years ago, you had to depend on other people.  
   No one had TV or CDs or DVDs or videos...  
   ...or home espresso makers.  
   As a matter of fact, they didn’t have anything cool.  
   Whereas now, you see...  
   ...you can make yourself a little island paradise.  
   With the right supplies and the right attitude...  
   ...you can be sun-drenched, tropical, a magnet...  
   ...for young Swedish tourists.  
   (...)  
   And I like to think that perhaps I am that kind of island.  
   I like to think I’m pretty cool.  
   I like to think I’m Ibiza.

He starts with (14a), a metaphorical utterance that expresses the proposition that all men are islands. This is true if and only if every object

10 We are aware that, being a case of fiction, Will is not a real speaker, and the speaker meaning is really the meaning intended by the script author. However, we would like to use the example as if it were a real speaker. After all, this is what we usually do when we exemplify a proposal on speaker meaning.
Within the extension of the concept MAN also belongs to the extension of MAN (AS ISLAND). He does not only deny (12) with (14a) but he also goes further saying that all men are islands. In addition, to interpret (14b), where the expressions in bold letters represent terms that come from the vocabulary of the source domain, involves a progressive alignment to elaborate a new mapping that results in the metaphorically restructured concept WILL (AS THAT KIND OF ISLAND). The source domain has become a more specific ad hoc concept AN ISLAND THAT IS SUN-DRENCHED, TROPICAL, A MAGNET... FOR YOUNG SWEDISH TOURISTS and the target is a specific man, WILL. This idea of progressive alignment of more specific aspects in the domains allows us to provide an explanation of extended novel metaphors that other pragmatic approaches cannot provide. In addition, it permits us to argue that the similarity the metaphorist invites us to construct depends on the recognition of his intention to get across the intended effects from a certain set of specific analogical correlations within the domains. He acts in a way that helps the audience to know what analogous properties of ISLAND will serve to describe a specific MAN.

The script writer of the film presents the fiction as an example of how a man can be a metaphorical island. The whole film is a metaphorical argument to show disagreement with Donne’s metaphorical proposition that no man is an island. By showing Will’s life, the script writer is providing an example of a MAN (AS ISLAND) with its peculiar characteristic as an individual, WILL (AS THAT KIND OF ISLAND). Interlocutors in the film identify a metaphorical question that matters to them and work to reach agreement about the answers.

When later on in the film, someone tells Will ‘you can’t shut life out. No man is an island’, another friend exclaims: ‘She’s right, you know. Yeah, she is’, and Will replies:

\[(15)\] No, she’s not! She’s wrong!
Some men are islands. I’m a bloody island!
I’m bloody Ibiza!

Will is insisting on his disagreement with a metaphorical proposition rather than making us perceive a similarity that we already had. Metaphorical propositions contribute to the conversational record. They contribute information in the sense of public content that underwriters interlocutors’ joint inquiry into how things are.

When Lepore and Stone metaphorically defend that metaphor should not be on the scoreboard we understand what they mean and we disagree. In their book, the concept to build their central claim about what constitutes propositional content is metaphorically constructed. By doing this they have constructed a view of what is communicated as what can be registered in a (baseball) scoreboard and this metaphorical conceptualization of the conversational record can be part of the propositional contents they convey in their subsequent inquiry about communication. We understand their proposal, among other things,
from the analogical construction of the ad hoc concept, **CONVERSATIONAL RECORD (AS A BASEBALL SCOREBOARD)**, in the way intended by them. The metaphorical concept is a part of the propositions conveyed. Metaphorical communication is successful only if we map the right features from source to target as intended by the speakers. In their works, ‘scoreboard’ is used with a metaphorical provisional meaning. Meaning that is possible in the new shifted context that its mapping provides and that can contribute to the propositions intended by the speakers (philosophers in search of truth rather than poets or comedians).

In this way, our position eliminates the difficulties that, according to Lepore and Stone, any non-sceptic account on metaphorical meaning share. In addition, our position provides both an effective proposal on metaphorical identification that appeals to sub-propositional conditions and a proposal about how to obtain metaphorical propositions that, without losing the power of metaphor, permits us to explain the speakers’ agreements or disagreements when metaphorical utterances are involved. If we have a systematic metaphorical mechanism to combine encoded meaning and contextual information, our communication system is more powerful (increases the scope of generativity) and plausible (in terms of language acquisition and language change). Thus, we do not see in what sense, locating metaphor elsewhere can be “good news for meaning”. As long as we stand clear about encoded meaning, linguistic composition rules and the linguistic constraints in relation to the demands of contextual information, we see no offense to semantics in talking about metaphorical propositional contents as part of speaker meaning (conceived as a combination of linguistically encoded, semantically constrained and contextually inferred information). As we acknowledge the important role of semantic constraints on the demand of contextual information marked in our metaphorical identification, our view coincides with Lepore and Stone’ defense of a wider effect of linguistic rules on speaker meaning but this does not lead us to a sceptic approach to metaphorical meaning.

5. **Conclusion**

In this paper we have challenged Lepore and Stone’s sceptic account on metaphor. We argue for metaphorical meaning as a variety of provisional meanings (ad hoc concepts) constructed by an analogical mapping and triggered by sub-propositional identification conditions.

By rejecting their claim that the metaphorical use of language is related, as any other, just to the literal meaning, our position provides an explanatory proposal on metaphorical identification which appeals to sub-propositional conditions: contextual abnormality and conceptual contrast. Utterances that are identified as metaphorical block the literal meaning of the sentence and trigger a pragmatic mechanism used to generate new conceptions of concepts (target concepts) resorting to conceptual mappings. The production and interpretation of metaphorical
utterances is not exhausted simply by entertaining the metaphorical concept (seeing one concept as another). These new conceptions change the interpretation context of the utterance in the language parameter. From this new interpretation context, provisional metaphorical meanings are determined for words, phrases or even extended discourses used as metaphorical vehicles in the utterance: they are the meaning of their counterparts in the metaphorically restructured target domain. These meanings, since they are determined in the new context of interpretation generated by the analogical thinking, are constituents of what is explicitly communicated to get the metaphorical propositional content communicated by the metaphor. What is asserted by the speaker is a propositional content in a new context. Thus the power of metaphor, its capacity to prompt the hearer to see one thing as another, is not lost.

In addition, our position provides a pragmatic account of how to obtain metaphorical propositions that permits us to explain the speakers’ agreements or disagreements when metaphorical utterances are involved. In doing this, a theory of meaning needs to take into account something more than simply conventional meaning.

References


