ontological condition of ethics”. From this point of view, ethics is determined by politics for Foucault.

What is striking about Kelly’s book is how he forges Foucault’s works on power into a coherent theory by using philosopher’s own conceptions and reasoning. In particular, his emphasis on materialism is considerably important for discussions on Foucault’s thought. As a final remark, one may conclude that the hidden matrix of the book is the conceptualisation of the connections between Marxism and Foucault. Yet, Kelly never clarifies which Marxism he particularly refers to. Nevertheless, the most visible contribution of the book to Foucault studies is its original approach developed in the second and third chapters. Kelly succeeds in developing a new perspective from Foucault’s oeuvre by making use of a series of hints embedded in his works.


Under the editorial wisdom of Noël Carroll and John Gibson, The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Literature brings forward 40 newly commissioned essays dedicated to philosophical exploration of the wonderfully rich and excitingly intriguing phenomenon of literature. To my knowledge, this is one of the most encompassing books dedicated to analytic philosophy of literature, and the breadth of coverage testifies to the extent to which the discipline has grown and to the variety of problems it is concerned with. The outstanding selection of contributors (difficult as it was to make it, as the editors lament, given the amount of first rate philosophers who work on literature and literature-related issues), in itself indicates that this book is a must have/must read for everyone interested in and infatuated by literature.

Ranging from the forefathers of analytic philosophy of literature, to philosophers who have expanded the field by throwing light on not so often discussed specimens of literature such as popular fiction, poetry and screenplay, to people who helped deepen the field’s interest in certain themes, such as emotions, imagination, empathy and character, and people who have strengthen the field’s connection with other philosophical areas or have introduced literature to new areas of research such as neuroscience, the Companion brings together the most respected philosophers of art today, whose tireless work on philosophical challenges raised by our artistic practices is at the very foundation of contemporary philosophical approaches to art. Their contributions provide an excellent mapping of the ‘philosophy of literature terrain’ and give insightful summaries of the main positions, arguments and thesis. Consequently, this Companion is excellent
as a compendium of historical development of certain problems, positions and arguments, as a pointer on ‘who said what’ in philosophical debates on literature, and as a way mark on where to go next (most of the essays include a section ‘recommendations for further reading’). Due to the Companion’s immensely informative aspect, it is valuable to those who are taking up philosophical challenges of literature for the first time, to get an idea of what these problems are and to get oriented on the main discussants in debates, problems and claims. Those more engaged with literature will profit from having ‘all the eggs in one basket’, as there is hardly any topic pertinent to contemporary philosophy of literature that is not discussed here (with the exception of ‘philosophy in literature’). Given the depth and rigour of analyses, essays will be more than illuminating for philosophers of art generally, as there are many themes discussed that are relevant for other artistic practices.

The Companion is unique in several respects. First, it explains historical roots of philosophy of literature, showing how philosophers’ reflections on literature helped define philosophy of art and establish literature’s artistic status. Second, though each contributor is concerned with a distinctive issue, in many ways they engage with and challenge one another and, considered jointly, address some of the same problems, but do so from different perspectives. Thus, the Companion on the whole tackles literature from every philosophical angle, showing ways in which literature raises interesting questions and offers valuable insights for philosophy across the board. Third, the Companion gives space to some of the topics that have gone unmentioned in similar anthologies and textbooks. Among these, I take the relation between literature, neuroscience and theory of mind, especially from the perspective of evolution, to be particularly important. On the one hand, insights from these researches can prove immensely valuable for the longstanding discussions on the emotional engagement with literature, and, in particular, for the alleged cognitive benefits of literature (in terms of its potential indirect influence on and benefits for our cognitive economy, conceptual framework, inferential abilities, emotional and moral sensibility and the like). Although, as the contributors working on these points make clear, we are far from having conclusive evidence on whether or not literature can in fact aid us in becoming smarter, wiser and better at thinking, contemplating and understanding ourselves and others, the results of the research done so far, presented here, are already sufficiently rich to justify future interest in these topics and deeper probing of literature from these perspectives. Undoubtedly, whatever results we eventually come up with, will be of immense importance for arts generally, as well as for various humanistic sciences concerned with our cultural legacy. On the other hand, philosophical interest in literature was for a very long time influenced by the impact of Plato’s negative and Aristotle’s positive accounts of literature. Armed with researches done along the lines of neuroscience, psychology and evolution, we can re-evaluate those ancient arguments regarding the role of literature (and arts) within our societies, our education and our culture, as well as the impact of literature on our understanding of who we are as individuals and as society. Without neglecting or diminishing literature’s artistic value, the essays gathered in the Companion show how philosophical explorations of
literature matter for many of our other intellectual disciplines, such as psychology and anthropology. It is safe to say that the Companion will redefine not only our philosophically approaches to literature and the way we read, take pleasure in and appreciate literary works, but also the way we think of and understand our cognitive and aesthetic engagement with reality, mediated as it undoubtedly is, through literature.

“It is our hope” say Carroll and Gibson, “that we have presented enough of the field to inspire readers to discover the rest and to chart out new territories in their own research” (xxiii). I have no doubt that every reader of this amazing Companion will feel that this hope has been fulfilled.

In what follows, I present a very brief summary of each of the essays.

The Companion is divided in six parts. It opens with an overview of Historical Foundations of the philosophical probings of literature. Stephen Halliwell delivers an array of challenges that the greatest philosophers of the antiquity left to philosophy of literature. Plato’s is a well known challenge issued at poets who, in order to be readmitted into the perfect state, have to account for poetry’s value to the wellbeing of individuals and for the community. Aristotle left us with the task of explaining the gap between the intelligibility of the casual structure in the plot and the lack of such intelligibility with reference to our lives. Negative attitudes towards (philosophy of) literature are left behind by Epicureanism. With Seneca, the challenge becomes that of addressing the philosophical lessons found in literature. This challenge is further bolstered by Plutarch, whose application of philosophical agenda to interpretation of literature is indicative of the potential difficulty of finding the balance between imposing philosophy on a work, rather than extracting it from it. Paul Guyer analyzes developments in philosophy of literature in the 18th century and claims that, though the field itself did not officially exist, all the major aestheticians based their general theories of art on literature. Two main issues emerged at the time, that of experiencing pleasure in tragedy and the one concerning comparison between literature and painting. To provide background to how these issues were thought about, Guyer first discusses what the perceived goals of literature were. He meticulously explains the role that Locke’s theory of meaning and his theory of the association of ideas had in explaining the emotional impact of literature, before turning to the paradox of tragedy as problematized by Du Bos and David Hume. Du Bos’ views are also relevant for the ‘poetry versus painting debate’, which was concerned with accounting for different ways in which poetry, painting and music are sources of beauty. Allen Speight takes us back into the 19th century, which saw a clash between two dominant views on literature, that is, on poetry. The first one, idealist, inspired by Hegel, influenced Schelling, A.C. Bradley, T.S. Eliot, American New Critics and it is best understood along the lines that M. H. Abrams calls objectivist approach. The second one is traced back to J.S. Mill, whose views on poetry were influential for the romantic strain (Wordsworth, Tennyson, Carlyle, Wagner, Nietzsche) nowadays associated with lyric expressivism. Speight explains how each of these two approaches developed and analyzes the impact of each on the theories of literature and various literary genres in the 20th century. Although the 19th century views were temporarily shaded by structuralist, post-structuralist and ideologically grounded
approaches to theory, and (within analytic aesthetics), by Frege’s views on language, Speight claims that they are still visible in contemporary thinking about art, most notably in John Gibson’s elaboration of literature’s humanistic character and in the claim that literature presents other worlds of aesthetic creation. Three main theoretical approaches to literature in the 20th century, claims Kristin Gjesdal, have to be understood as a reflection on modernism. According to the Marxism and the Critical theory, what matters for literature is its relationship with the society and its potential political power to issue real social changes. The second approach, Phenomenology, centres on ontological questions — what is a work of art, what is literary meaning, how to understand the truth in the literary work — and ignores political dimension of literature. Finally, Existentialism sees literature as first and foremost a space of freedom. Gjesdal’s essay is informative in summarizing the main theoretical clashes of thinkers such as Lukas and Adorno, Heidegger and Gadamer and Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. Kristin Boyce illuminatingly explains development of the analytic philosophy of literature, marked as it was by a certain paradox of philosophy of literature: as objects of philosophical reflection, literature and arts have been marginalized and neglected, yet they had special methodological importance for philosophers from the early days of analytic tradition. Boyce sees this as a consequence of the attempts of analytic philosophy to establish itself as close to science, rather than to arts and the humanities. She discusses ways in which modernist literature and philosophy stand to one another, and is primarily focused on analyzing the relationship of both towards language. Henry James and Frege both share deep worries regarding the ordinary forms of expression and the way it fosters degeneration. Throughout the essay, Boyce discusses the relationship between New Criticism and Logical Positivism, and invites us to acknowledge the deep connection between modernist literature and philosophical enterprises.

The second part of the Companion, What is Literature, begins with M.W. Rowe’s essay on literature. Rowe first explains the special kind of aesthetic attention needed to attend to a work of art and explains how it leads to aesthetic pleasure. He then moves on to explicate literature’s capacity to convey knowledge. Unlike scientific knowledge, which is objective, literature offers humanistic knowledge, that is, subjective knowledge about how something seems to someone from a certain point of view. Literature gives knowledge through pleasure, but only provided that the reader is fully engrossed and absorbed in a work. Robert Chodat discusses novel and the way it intensifies the ancient quarrel between literature and philosophy. On his view, the novel is different from other literary forms (particularly epic) in that it does not present moral heroes but instead raises religious questions, pushing forward metaphysical agnosticism and challenging our moral duties. The novel, unlike works in philosophy, does not treat individual’s actions and decisions as isolated events but rather places them into the stream of life showing how particular decisions are made in particular circumstances. Anna Christina Soy Ribeiro defends poetry’s connection to truth, claiming that the language of knowledge used to be poetic — from poets and philosophers to scientist and mathematicians, all sorts of insights were delivered in poetic forms. This changed when the invention of press and similar tech-
nological achievements made the process of learning easier and diminished the need to memorize texts. If anything, Ribeiro claims, given how poetry makes various potentialities of language salient, such as phonetic, syntactic and semantic features, it enlarges our potentialities for thought, feeling and expression. Susan L. Feagin compares and contrasts two accounts of plays, the one which treats them as dramatic works that have to be read in order to be appreciated, and the one that sees them as scripts, i.e. works that need to be performed in order to be appreciated. Explaining the development of the modern theatre, she argues that, given that performances nowadays deviate from the scripts (as explained by James Hamilton’s model according to which scripts are but one ingredient in the production), they can no longer be taken as reliable access into works themselves. That however does not mean they cannot be enjoyed as performances. In fact, the reading of scripts and the viewing of performances are mutually supportive and we can appreciate both modes of gaining access to the work, since both are capable of offering new insights. Aaron Meskin provides an intriguing overview of the philosophical challenges put forward by popular fiction, showing that the distinction between literary fiction and popular fiction is a substantial one, non-reducible to art/non art or good fiction/bad fiction dichotomies, and, due to the complexities involved in defining, interpreting and evaluating it, deserving of and inviting more philosophical interest. Ted Nannicelli defends screenplays’s literary status by showing that the two most commonly held arguments against such status are wrong. According to the Ingredient hypothesis, screenplays are not independent, autonomous objects but constituent parts, belonging to a wider production context and ingredients in the motion pictures with which they are associated. According to the Incompleteness hypothesis, screenplays cannot stand as a work of art prior to the process of production and the creation of a motion picture associated with the given screenplay. Drawing on the discussion on the ontological status of theatrical scripts, offering an array of unfinished literary works, and showing how, for any given definition of literature, there are at least some screenplays that can satisfy it and therefore classify as literature, Nannicelli insightfully discards both hypotheses, urging philosophers to start taking screenplays seriously as literature. Steven Davies’ contribution to the Companion is a masterfully succinct and immensely informative summary of the varieties of views that count as evolutionary approaches to literature. Two main ones are evocriticism, i.e. the application of the theories of evolutionary psychology, socio-biology and the like to the interpretation of literature, and Literary Darwinism, which sees literary behaviour grounded in our evolved human nature either as adaptation or as a byproduct of some other adaptation. Davies pointedly reveals problems with these views, carefully delineating issues that are sometimes neglected by proponents of evolutionary approaches, but that need to be settled and further clarified if evolutionary approaches stand a chance as plausible explanation of our literary practices. Stein Haugom Olsen discusses concepts of canon and tradition and shows how they relate to each other, as well as to (the notion and practice of) literature itself. The origin of the concept of canon is to be explained with reference to sacred scripts, which reveals two of its main aspects: authenticity and authority. Within literary criticism and literary theory, the
notion of canon can be employed in three different senses, as writings of a secular author accepted as authentic, as a sanctioned or accepted group or body of related works and as equivalent to the concept of literature itself. Olsen is extremely meticulous in explaining differences in these three senses and the role that authenticity and authority play in each, particularly within the wider context of the value and definition of literature as such. Finally, he gives an account of literary tradition, explaining how it differs from the canon in virtue of being tied to a practice (understood as a way of doing things, a way of writing, painting and a way of reasoning that has built into it a set of standards and a notion of skill), of having a continuity, in being anonymous, in the sense that there is no authority responsible for its creation and development, and in being culturally embedded.

Matthew Kieran’s insightful essay on creativity introduces the third part of the Companion, Aesthetics and Appreciation. Pointing to the numerous examples of genre fiction, Kieran shows how authors can be creative without thereby being original, thus refuting the traditional views, according to which the conditions of creativity are novelty and value. He discusses the views of Margaret Boden, Berys Gaut, Noël Carroll and David Novitz and confronts these to the Coleridge-inspired view according to which creativity is related to irrationality. Particularly intriguing part of the essay concerns Kieran’s take on the empirical data regarding the connections between creativity and mental disorders. Kieran concludes by outlining and defending the view of creativity as a virtue. Paisley Livingston surveys three dominant accounts of authorship. According to the causal conception, authorship amounts to performing certain kinds of actions (writing, composing) and deciding that the work has been completed. On this conception, authorship is reducible to the actions that proximately cause a work to be created. Attributionist conception, defended by Foucault and Barthes and criticized by analytic philosophers, is premised on the claim that writer’s or composer’s action do not suffice for authorship, as a system of authorial attributions is also required. Finally, on the fictionalist conception of authorship, the actual author does not matter for the interpretation and appreciation of a text, as it might be the case that readers find the text more interesting when they focus on the implied author, i.e. an author based on the features of the text that does not have to correspond to the actual author. Peter Lamarque brings together two views on poetic expression, the Romantic view, according to which poem expresses author’s personal emotions and experiences, and the Modernist view, which grounds the autonomy conception of poetry by divorcing author’s intentions, emotions, experiences and attitudes from the writing itself. Lamarque analyses an array of views on poetry and expression and concludes by offering an account which professes evidence of convergence of the two views. In his immensely informative essay, Wolfgang Huemer discusses theoretical approaches to style (style as choice, style as signature, style as expression of the author’s personality) explaining how each of these figures in the way we think of literature. The choice is to think of style as identical to some features of a text, or to see it as pertaining to the actions performed by the writers and account for it in psychological terms. However, all of these theories discuss style in descriptive sense, which, Huemer claims, fails to do justice to the style as an
aesthetic category. As Huemer sees it, style ‘distinguishes’, it grounds aesthetic value and gives rise to the evaluative judgments we make in reference to literary works. He concludes by claiming that a reflection on style can be fruitful for the way we think of and analyze questions regarding the cognitive value of literature, the role of emotions in fiction and various others issues that sometimes do not take into consideration aesthetic dimension of literature. *Eileen John* discusses theme. Themes articulate what literary works are significantly or importantly about, and this relates to the operation of a theme within the work, where it emerges from the work’s subject as that which unites and structures the work, and to the operation of a theme within overall human concerns, which relates to the fact that literature is often seen as a source of humanly important issues. With reference to the operation of a theme within a literary work, questions emerge regarding the recognition of a theme and the ways it can be expressed. Themes also serve to ground the cross-textual reference, given that different works can share the same theme. Because themes are not fictional, but relate to general human concerns, questions arise regarding the cognitive value of literature. *Garry L. Hagberg* brings together Aristotle’s theory of character (from *Nicomachean ethics*), Raimond Gaita’s doctrine of ‘truth as a need of the soul’ and Bernard Williams’ views on the process of making sense of oneself, of events and actions, in order to explicate the notion of a character. His main idea is that the process of understanding one’s own, and other people’s character is the same as the process of understanding fictional characters, and both arise from our desire to know the truth, i.e. to know what is true, real and genuine, and what is fake, counterfeit and false. Against the background of *Othello*, Hagberg shows how the fact that both, our ethical deliberations (in the widest sense of the word) and literature use language to articulate things, is to be taken as illuminating on the fact that literature can help us come to terms with our true selves. Life and literature are connected, and the insights we gain from literature are applicable to our lives, with the patterns of influence going the other way as well. We can make sense of fictional characters because we recognize in them real people. *John Gibson* ‘s contribution is on empathy. As he defines it, empathy is a form of imaginative, essentially other-directed perspective taking which makes possible an especially intimate and powerful form of identification with another human being, where one comes to identify oneself with the object of empathy. Gibson first explains the relation between empathy and sympathy and proceeds to explain his own account, which is deeper and more encompassing than the accounts currently at disposal (the simulation theory or ‘in your shoes’ theory). Central to his account are imagination and narrative, which work together in order to enable one to achieve the target’s first person perspective, that is, to feel ‘as and because’ another person does. In the second part of the essay, Gibson explains how theoretical insights regarding empathy matter to philosophical inquiries about literature, appreciation and the reading experiences. Two areas of overlap are prominent: first, empathy is relevant for our capacity to emotionally connect to the characters, particularly those which are morally dubious. Second, the notion of empathy matters for the way we think about literature’s cognitive value. It is widely held that literature offers knowledge about the possible
experiences, and via empathy, we can come to learn something about what it feels like to undergo these experiences. In this context, Gibson adds another layer: empathy enables us to connect not only to the characters who undergo these experiences, but with what he dubs the perspective of a work itself. He ends by discussing potential problems with his theory. Damien Freeman’s essay deals with the paradox of fiction. Freeman’s approach is original in that, after briefly explaining the paradox and charting the main theoretical reactions to it (those offered by Walton, Lamarque, Carroll and Smith, and what he calls, pseudo-Coleridge), and the problems these theories face, Freeman concentrates on the notions of paradox, emotion, response and fiction, and even offers a succinct but informative survey of the philosophical theories of emotions. In addition, Freeman shows how the point of the paradox changes, depending on the approach taken. Aristotle’s was a practical approach, in that in Poetics, he gives prescriptions on how to write tragedy so as to enable the audience to experience those emotions considered appropriate for tragedy. With Hume, the problem becomes psychological, given that he was primarily concerned with explaining why human psychological set up is such that we take pleasure in tragedy. Colin Radford’s approach is logical, since, what is really at stake on his view is a contradiction. The problem of fictional reactions to fiction is pressed even further by E. M. Dadlez, whose focus is on the paradox of tragic pleasure. Not only tragedy, but genres such as horror, melodrama and suspense give rise to pity, fear and distress, prompting the question of why we enjoy these genres, that is, why do we willingly subject ourselves to painful emotions. Tracing the problem back to its origins in Aristotle, Dadlez compares and contrasts two main approaches to the paradox. First, to eliminate charges of incoherent emotional reactions, some philosophers claimed that pleasurable and painful emotions are directed towards different objects. The second approach, originating in Hume, is centred around the claim about the causal dependence of the positive emotion on the negative one. Dadlez concludes that neither conceptual nor causal account can alone provide the full explanation for the unique ability of these genres to arouse negative and positive emotions. Therefore, rather than focusing on shortcomings of these approaches, we should recognize ways in which they demonstrate the potential of literature to enrich our lives. William P. Seeley turns to neuroscience to explain our engagement with literature, particularly our capacity to understand narrative stories, formulate expectations about what will happen, construct fictional world beyond the outline provided by narration, come up with moral evaluation of the characters and their events and experience emotional appraisals of what we read. The introduction of neuroscientific research into domain of art is relatively recent, but Seeley offers abundant evidence to support his claim that philosophy of literature can only profit from opening itself up to insights from this field. As it turns out, our capacity to understand stories is underlined by the same recognitional mechanism that enables us to understand events and people in the real world. Seeley explains how the knowledge and familiarity with the genre and conventions guides our engagement with works of art.

The first essay in the fourth part of the Companion, Meaning and Interpretation, is Noël Carroll’s, who provides an account of what is distinctive of
narratives as opposed to other types of representations, fictional and non-fictional, such as state and event descriptions, series, annals, and chronicles. Carroll defends a causal account of narratives, according to which something is a narrative if it is a representation, in a temporally perspicuous, forward oriented ordering, of at least two events and/or states of affairs concerning the career of at least one unified subject where the earlier events in the representation are portrayed as causal contributions to the later events. To shed lights on a much debated question of causality as a criterion for narrative, Carroll introduces the notion of a narrative connection, and claims that in order for something to count as narrative, it has to exhibit this kind of connection, which comes in degrees and depends on the genre. Narrative is also the focus of Daniel D. Hutto, who discusses narrative understanding. Contrasting it with theoretical and logico-scientific understanding, Hutto claims that narrative understanding is a sui generis type of understanding, achieved by making sense of happenings and their significance by situating them within a wider range of possibilities. Narrative understanding is not reducible to a causal account, it is primarily and distinctively concerned with particulars, contextualizing them and casting them in a certain light, revealing personal perspectives taken towards them. Therefore, narrative understanding is closely connected to our everyday practice of making sense of a people’s actions in terms of reasons. Hutto’s essay is immensely informative on the contemporary debates on narrative understanding, theories of mind and folk psychology. An array of issues connected to interpretation is displayed in another of Noël Carroll’s essays. Carroll starts off by providing a role for interpretation in literary criticism, evaluation and appreciation, and proceeds to discuss more contentious issues: is there one single right interpretation or are there multiple, perhaps even contradictory, acceptable ones, the status of interpretive claims, constructivism with reference to the objects of interpretation etc. The question of the relevance of authorial intentions is at the centre of Carroll’s essay. Defending actual intentionalism against the value-maximizing approach to interpretation and hypothetical interpretation, Carroll ends by masterfully summarizing arguments for and against each of these theories. Stephanie Ross discusses the role of criticism in literary practice. Taking the practice of restaurant and movie recommendation as instances of good criticism, Ross starts by asking what resources are available to a reader wondering what works of literature to consume. She first offers summary accounts of the four most discussed views on criticism. First, taxonomies developed by Monroe Beardsley, and in more recent times, Noël Carroll, who both share the idea that via various critical activities (on Beardsley’s account, these include explication, elucidation and interpretation, on Carroll’s, description, classification, contextualization, elucidation, interpretation and analysis), critics provide a reasoned, summary evaluation of a work. On Isenberg and Sibley's accounts, critics’ task is to help appreciators detect the aesthetic qualities. Wollheim’s ‘criticism as retrieval’ sees the goal of criticism as a reconstruction of creative process that lead to the creation of a work. Finally Hume’s account is focused not on the practice and process of criticism but on the persona of an ideal critic. Ross ends by offering her neo-Humean account which unites insights from all the theories examined,
but is only useful provided readers only seek recommendations from critics whose taste they share. Accordingly, on Ross’s account, Hume’s trained, sensible, experienced, prejudice-free critic (who also posses emotional responsiveness and imaginative fluency) is best suited to recognize and alert readers to value-making properties, to conduct interpretive activities and reconstruct artworld influences. Ernie Lepore and Matthew Stone bring the resources of the philosophy of language to clarify the status of poetry in a broader account of speakers’ knowledge of language and their linguistic practices. Crucial in their account is the notion of poetic imagination, which they define as a specific kind of interpretive engagement that poetry demands. Lepore and Stone compare poetry with quotations, claiming that both privilege and problematize linguistic form in relationship to meaning. Once an utterance is understood as poetic (which, on their view, is a matter of employing distinctive kind of interpretative practices), one’s attention is turned to how the poem is articulated, i.e. to the formal organization of the poem itself. Understanding the difference between interpretive practices is important for understanding the distinctive experience of poetry within philosophy of language. The main argument in the essay concerns the special kind of insights that poems deliver, insights which are not to be understood as the contents of any level of linguistic meaning, including pragmatic level of meaning, and are prompted by our focusing on the form and content of a poem. Elisabeth Camp’s essay, though primarily focused on metaphors, is much wider in scope and concerns more general questions having to do with deciphering and understanding the meaning of a literary work, the relation of author and readers mediated via text and the potentials of literature to deliver cognitive benefits to readers, primarily when a literary work is seen as showing a distinctive perspective towards the world. Camp claims that metaphors in literature do not differ from metaphors in other contexts, and briefly describes how various schools of criticism treated the problem of interpreting metaphors. According to her account, metaphors are one among three poetic rhetorical devices used to present perspectivally laden contents (other two are exemplifications, which include telling details and stories, and thick terms, such as stereotypes and slurs) which are often open-ended, evocative, experiential and/or imagistic. Metaphors differ from other tropes in that there is typically no explicitly available content which the author endorses, since the metaphor’s proffered content is available only indirectly, and in their twofoldedness, which includes an experiential awareness of the representing frame and the represented subject. The notion of twofoldedness is given a more detailed explication, as Camp sees it as having both, cognitive and aesthetic consequences.

Part five, Metaphysics and Epistemology brings first Amie L. Thomasson’s essay on the ontology of literary works. Separating ontological issues –those concerning existence, survival, identity conditions and modal properties of literary works – from issues regarding the definition of literature and evaluative questions concerning good vs. bad literature, Thomasson informatively summarizes leading views on the ontological status of literature, giving pros and cons of each. She discusses theories put forward by Roman Ingarden, Richard Wollheim, Nelson Goodman, Nicholas Wolterstorff and Guy Rohrbaugh, to show difficulties involved in explaining
whether a literary work is a material object to be identified or equated with some specific copy of a work, or some kind of mental entity related either to
author’s or reader’s mental states. The so-called action-centered theories, primarily Gregory Currie and David Davies’, associate a work with types of
actions or individual token actions, but Thomasson offers reasons to doubt
these theories. With her discussion of Peter Lamarque’s theory, questions
concerning the ontology of literature are expanded to include cultural con-
texts within which works are created. In the second part of the essay, Thom-
asson discusses more general, methodological issues relating to ontology of
art generally and even some meta-ontological discussions concerning the
status, aim and appropriateness of philosophical discussions of ontology. In
his third contribution, Noël Carroll discusses fiction and the multiple ways
in which fiction is distinguished from nonfiction. Among others, these in-
clude identifying fiction via formal devices employed in fictional narratives
(such as free indirect discourse, where authors provide us with information
that is, in any other contexts, unavailable to us, such as reports of the char-
acter’s state of mind and thoughts), via the content (fiction is about possible
world, nonfiction about the actual) or via the relation to truth (fiction does
not aspire to be true while nonfiction does). However, none of these devices
is exclusively employed in fiction, which shows that a distinction between
fiction and nonfiction cannot be grounded in any of them. Another set of
suggestions on how to distinguish the two is inspired by pragmatist ac-
counts. These include Searle’s pretended speech act theory and Beardsley’s
fiction as imitation of illocutionary speech acts, which were criticized by,
among others, Ken Walton, who offers his ‘fiction as make-believe’ theory.
Pragmatist account also includes theories inspired by Grice’s account of
meaning and communication. The last two theories Carroll scrutinizes are
Derek Matravers and Stacie Friend’s. David Davies discusses the role that
fictional truth plays in our engagement with fiction. One way in which the
notion of fictional truth is central to our engagement with fiction concerns
the problem of figuring out what is true in fiction. While understanding
what is going on in a fictional narrative is continuous to our ability to un-
derstand nonfictional narratives, being clear on what is true in the fictional
narrative is not straightforward. Not only are narrators sometimes unreli-
able, deceptive or ignorant, they can also use various techniques, such as
metaphors or irony, that can harden our ability to track fictional truth. An-
other set of worries relates to factors that determine what is properly taken
as unstated background, given that fictional narratives are not delineated
by what is true in the actual world. Even more, fictional narratives are often
incomplete, in that we are not told, and have no way of discovering, all the
relevant information. In discussing these issues, Davies summarizes theo-
ries which deal with this problem, namely David Lewis’ possible world anal-
ysis and Gregory Currie’s idea that it is the beliefs of ‘fictional authors’ that
determine what is true in the story. The second sense in which fictional
truth is problematic concerns the much discussed issue of whether we can
learn truth and gain nontrivial knowledge about the world through fiction.
Those who claim that we can, literary cognitivists, claim that various kinds
of knowledge are available through fiction (knowledge of particular facts,
general principles, categorical understanding, affective knowledge) but Da-
vies exposes a wide range of issues that cast doubt on literary cognitivism and ends by analyzing in more details one particular way of trying to salvage cognitivist intuition, namely the claim that fiction is analogous to thought experiments. Literary cognitivism is discussed in more details in James Harold’s essay. Harold first explains the relevance of the main idea behind literary cognitivism (the claim that literature is a source of knowledge) for the liberal humanistic education and proceeds to discuss various views that all fall under literary cognitivism. On its strong formulation, literature is a source of propositional knowledge, and those who defend this claim have to first explain how readers deduce relevant propositions from a given work, and then show what makes literature epistemically reliable. On the weaker reading, literature is a source of nonpropositional knowledge, such as experiential and perspectival knowledge. With this interpretation, the problem is to explain how these kinds of cognitive benefits add up to truth and knowledge. Harold expands discussion of literary cognitivism to questions regarding the nature of knowledge itself, the meta-ethical status of ethical claims (since the dominant tendency of cognitivists is to claim that literature is a source of ethical knowledge and that engaging with literature is beneficial for our moral development), the concept of literary value (in order to see whether literature’s capacity to insert knowledge adds up to or is neutral toward the value that literature has), and the psychology of reading (to analyze whether reading can in fact potentially be morally corruptive). Jonathan Gilmore discusses the role of imagination and kindred phenomena (pretense, make-believe and simulation) in our engagement with and experience of literature. He starts off by discussing similarities between our imaginings and our beliefs, particularly when it comes to figuring out what is true in fiction. Similarities include the fact that our imaginings, like our beliefs, aim at consistency and are dependent on our background knowledge. A distinction between imaginings and beliefs is most evident in the fact that we generally do not tend to act on the basis of what we imagine. In the second part of the essay, Gilmore explains how our imaginings are connected to our emotional reactions to fiction and presents theories on our empathic reactions to characters and the phenomenon of imaginative resistance. This phenomenon is given a profoundly rich treatment in Tamar Szabó Gendler and Shel-Yi Liao’s essay, who offer not only a probing analysis of what imaginative resistance consists in, but provide us with a detailed overview of the development of philosophical approaches to this problem. As they make evident, there is a great variety of disagreements surrounding the phenomenon, regarding its scope, the mechanisms for evoking it, over its psychological components and over its nature. Gendler and Liao summarize three main approaches to imaginative resistance, describing their development as the first wave of philosophers’ tackling imaginative resistance. On Cantian theories, imaginative resistance should be understood as a breakdown of authorial authority, as one simply can’t imagine as one has been invited to. On Wontian theories, one will not imagine the relevant content, and on Eliminativists theories, there is no such thing as imaginative resistance per se. The second wave, beginning in 2010, is characterized by the turn towards questioning substantive and methodological assumptions of the first wave’s theories. In the second part of the essay, authors
describe the relevance of imaginative resistance for moral psychology and meta-ethics, for the questions of fiction’s capacity to morally educate and for the ethical criticism of art, for our cognitive architecture and for modal epistemology. Gregory Currie closes this section by explaining the connection between literature and the theory of mind, i.e. our capacity to think about, manage, monitor, manipulate and take into consideration other people’s mental states (beliefs, desires, emotions). Currie refers to this capacity as mentalising and claims that it is a central feature of our social and ethical life, as well as a central feature of literature. His main argument is that literary works are for the most part concerned with mentalising activities people engage in on an everyday basis (he sees *Gilgamesh* as the only exception to this). Currie’s discussion is set against a wider background of evolutionary approaches to literature, as he is concerned with accounting for the enjoyment readers take in the literary representations of mentalising. He discusses several potential explanations (we enjoy mentalising fiction because it portrays characters similar to us, there are adaptive advantages conferred by a taste for fictions which represent mentalising, fiction improves mentalising and capacities which depend on it, enjoyment we take in mentalising fiction is a by product of some other adaptive development, preference for mentalising fiction was selected for but it is no longer an advantage) and concludes that more research is needed to support the traditional humanistic belief into fiction’s capacities to influence, improve and refine our cognitive capacities, particularly those pertaining to the theory of mind.

The last part of the *Companion, Ethics and Political Theory*, offers first A.W. Eaton’s essay on the ways in which literature and ethics are related. Eaton focuses on two main topics that figure in this context within the Anglophone philosophy of art: literature’s morally relevant influences and the relationship between moral and aesthetic value. Regarding literature’s capacity to morally influence readers, the core question is what makes literary works the proper object of moral judgment. Eaton offers an array of theories designed to explain literature’s impact on readers (the catharsis model, the imitation model, the conditioning model and the literary moral cognitivism) and concludes by showing how this discussion is further complicated, relative to whether one takes the empirical-casual (i.e. descriptive) or interpretative-teleological (i.e. normative) take on it. Regarding the much debated question of the connection between a work’s moral and aesthetic value, Eaton compares and contrasts dominant views (moralism, ethicism, moderate moralism, immoralism, cognitive immoralism, robust immoralism) underlying the main arguments adduced in support of each. Espen Hammer discusses the Marxist literary criticism, explaining its origin in the ideas of Karl Marx, and tracing its influence on the subsequent literary theories, particularly those developed by Althusser, Lukacs, Hauser, Adorno, Bloch, Sartre, Barthes, Foucault, and Jameson. Hammer’s key claim is that Marxist literary criticism offers powerful and relevant tools for reflecting on the relation between literature and society. As he explains, a dominant tension in Marxist approaches to literature is a dual function attributed to a literary work: it is understood as an ideological representation of the ruling class’s interest, and a reflection upon the society and therefore a source of
significant moral critique. Given Marxist belief that art originates within a certain socio-historical background, they reject the idea that literature expresses universal human concerns and values, and instead argue that the proper understanding and interpretation of literary works is only possible if one is familiar with the culture in which the work was produced. Paul C. Taylor develops a framework within which to consider the overlap of philosophical interest in literature and in race. Though seemingly literature and race have little in common and are rarely brought together under the same philosophical umbrella, Taylor shows just how immensely valuable insights are gained when these two fields are scrutinized jointly, insights having to do with literature, formation of canon, evaluative judgments, culture, peoples, race and race-related sets of problems, both theoretical and practical (the part of the essay where Taylor summarizes philosophical race theory is particularly insightful for these matters, as it helps to situate philosophical approaches to race and racialism into a wider social and political context). Mostly however, Taylor's analysis probes into the very foundation of race, and how we come to think of, and judge, different races and their artistic achievements, making us reconsider the connection between literature and civilization, civilization and barbarism, humanity and non-humanity when the notion of being human is judged from the perspective of one dominant culture. The essay is wider in scope than issues regarding colonial and post-colonial literature reveal, as Taylor discerningly brings together an array of questions that are relevant for the literature-race nexus, questions concerning the racialized meanings of literacy, the availability of particular linguistic resources across racial boundaries, questions about whether and how to open previously closed traditions to each other, how to change the literary cannon so as to insert capital works from other cultures, questions having to do with interpretations of works from other cultures, ethical dimension of literature that is or contains racists elements, etc. The final essay in the Companion is Mary Bittner Wiseman's discussion of literature and gender. Focused primarily on the female perspective, Wiseman is concerned with two notions: the experience of reading and the distinctive ways in which, via engaging with literature, women can come to recognize different possibilities for who they can be. She starts off by claiming that literature has the power to change readers' beliefs, including those beliefs pertaining to the role that gender plays in one's sense of the self, and dedicates the first part of the essay to the analysis of the words' meaning and the meaning-making practices embedded in Saussure's tradition and developed in the Barthes' idea that full engagement with the work is possible only if one reads it as a producer of, rather than as a consumer of meaning. With this in mind, Wiseman proceeds to her account of the female reader, and, drawing upon her own reading experiences, describes ways of engagement with literature women can embrace in order to create their own meanings. Because there is a sense in which reading implies taking the perspective of a man, paying close attention to what words could mean and becoming active producer of these meanings enables women to imaginatively discover all that women have been, felt and done.

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