

The United States of America is found-
ing its national security and military strate-
gies on three groups of activities, called preparing, shaping and responding. Responding capability refers to current readiness of the armed forces to engage and successfully annihilate open threats to national security. That readiness was assessed during the nineties according to the military capability in successfully waging and winning two almost simultaneous major theater wars, like the one in Korea and in The Gulf. The preparing aspect of the strat-
ey refers to modernization, restructuring and continuous adaptations of the national security system, in order to maintain its high readiness and effectiveness against possible future challenges. The development, acquisition and exploitation cycle for major weapon systems lasts for twenty to thirty or more years. That is only one of the many reasons why today’s decisions have far-reaching consequences for the capabilities of the armed forces in the next decades. Environment shaping, sometimes called luck management, is also a way to prepare for the future. It consists of active engage-
ment in world affairs to prevent the develop-
ment of new major threats to American and international security.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall the only threat from the ‘A-list’ disappeared. The ‘A-
list’ contains the most dangerous threats to the existence of the USA and Western world. The former Soviet Union had the capability to destroy Western values and Western order, but such an enemy to the West no longer exists. The major part of US defense planning is now directed towards maintaining the capability to wage two major theater wars. Such regional contingencies might endanger American interests and security, but would not question the existence of the United States. Therefore, wars of this type can be categorized in belonging to the ‘B-list’ of threats. Public interest seems to be oriented mostly towards the activities that deal with the ‘C-
list’ of threats, like those in Bosnia-
Herzegovina or Kosovo. However, the ‘A-
list’ may not remain clear forever. One of the most important goals of the American security system is to keep the ‘A-list’ clear as long as possible. Dr Perry and Dr Carter argue that this is the essential element of the preventive defense strategy, which they theoretically developed at Harvard and Stanford universities and practically applied during their terms in the US gov-
ernment.

Questions such as How might the post-cold war era end? How can the United States prolong this period of peace and influence? How can we ensure that if it must end, it ends grace-
fully, without cataclysm? and What is the character of the era that will follow it? define the fundamental long-term strategic challenges of the post-cold war era. The authors have identified five chal-
lenges of that type, which might evolve into the ‘A-list’ of threats. They defined these dangers as follows:

- Russia might descend into chaos, iso-
lation, and aggression as Germany did after World War I;
- Russia and the other Soviet successor

Book Reviews A.B. Carter, W.J. Perry
states might lose control of the nuclear legacy of the former Soviet Union;
- China could grow hostile rather than becoming cooperatively engaged in the international system;
- Weapons of mass destruction will proliferate and present a direct military threat to the United States; and
- “Catastrophic terrorism” of unprecedented scope and intensity might occur on US territory.

If the US responds to these dangers in the right manner, it will be possible to realize George C. Marshall’s vision of the world not of threats to be deterred, but of a world “united in peace, freedom, and prosperity.” This is where the sixth key threat to American security lies. That threat lies in ignoring the previously identified five potential dangers because of temporarily advantageous power relations in the world.

Each chapter in the book is dedicated to one of the six security challenges. The chapters start with vivid and lively memories of Mr Perry at an event during his term as the Secretary of Defense, which is relevant to the topic. The main part of each chapter consists of the problem analysis, investigation of possible preventive strategies, description of already taken steps, and recommendations for future action. These discussions are case studies of preventive defense mechanisms. To be successful, preventive defense must combine all the instruments of foreign policy: political, economic and military. The exact type of actions and means used in a particular situation will depend on the circumstances, but because of the character of activities and capabilities of the American armed forces, preventive defense falls primarily into the military domain.

In the case of Russian and Central European stabilization, preventive defense requires fostering military-to-military cooperation, promotion of the Partnership for Peace Program, careful NATO enlargement, officer education, and appropriate economic assistance. In the case of preventing nuclear technology proliferation from the former USSR, the expert and economic assistance offered through the Nunn-Lugar program provided for denuclearization of the Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Intercontinental ballistic missiles are dismounted, nuclear material is centrally stored, and employment programs for nuclear scientists are launched. An important element of these efforts is arms control negotiations, which resulted in START treaties. These negotiations should be continued.

American relations with China are not sufficiently developed. Under the preventive defense agenda, direct military cooperation with China should be initiated, and China should be more actively involved in the search for solutions to global security issues. Preventive defense against weapons of mass destruction should rely not only on international anti-proliferation treaties, inspections and sanctions for those who do not obey prescribed norms of behavior. Active and passive defense measures must be developed, and unstable regions should be stabilized to decrease the incentive for proliferation and acquisition of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons.

Regarding the prevention of catastrophic terrorism, the intelligence collection system should be restructured, new analytical capabilities established, and new and more effective methods for tracking and prevention of that dangerous threat invented. Finally, preventive defense applied to the American armed forces is embodied in the preparing activities. The important role in that area is technological modernization coupled with appropriate
doctrine improvements and force restructuring (which together forms the revolution in military affairs). Equally important are the changes in management of defense assets (so called revolution in business affairs), and sustainment of personnel quality, training and motivation.

The book deserves careful reading, because the problems described do not only influence United States security, but the stability of the whole international community as well. The book will have significant impact because of the high-quality analysis provided and because of personal influence of its authors. Dr Perry and Dr Carter today jointly lead a research project at Harvard and Stanford universities on preventive defense. Apart from being distinguished professors, they share significant experience in public service, industry and academia. It should be mentioned that William Perry served as the US Secretary of Defense from 1994 to 1997, and that Dr Carter acted as Assistant Secretary for Defense Policy in the same term. It was the time when the first Quadrennial Defense Review was prepared, which defined preventive actions aimed at shaping security environment as one of the three pillars of national security strategy.

The book is also thought provoking for readers from a small country such as the Republic of Croatia. The book shows how a global power like the United States views its own and global security in the coming decades. Due to the power and influence of the United States in the international community, its positions often define the frame for political activities to other players. In that sense, the authors’ observations on NATO enlargement and the role of the Partnership for Peace are especially interesting. The authors pledge for the increased role of the PfP, which is too marginalized, and for the slower enlargement of NATO. In their view, that would help to avoid additional complications in relations with Russia, while at the same time provide some of the advantages that eastern European countries expect from gaining NATO membership.

However, a more profound lesson of the book may be in the method that the authors use to contemplate strategic problems of national security. Elements of this approach are: the classification of threats; focus on those threats that might cause the most serious consequences; the assessment of shaping options and means; analytical thinking; integration of all elements of national power; and long-term planning. Such an approach is applicable to improve the international and national security of many countries in different positions, and not only of a global power such as the United States.

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Blueprints for a House Divided: The Constitutional Logic of the Yugoslav Conflicts.


Robert M. Hayden’s Blueprints for a House Divided: The Constitutional Logic of the Yugoslav Conflicts sets out to analyse the logic of the collapse of the former Yugoslav federation and the causes of the ensuing war(s). Hayden identifies two sources of disintegration. Firstly, he suggests that the federation collapsed because of the triumph of central European nationalism and concepts such as the nation-state, pursued primarily by the Slovenes and Croats. Secondly, Hayden maintains that the disintegration of Yugoslavia followed a firm logic of constitutional proposals based on exclusionist, nationalist claims that undermined the authority of the federation and produced structures of instability. According to Hayden, the collapse of the former Yugoslavia and the structures of the resulting conflicts can all be explained as the logical consequence of the adoption of certain constitutional concepts.

The logic of disintegration according to Hayden followed the pattern of constitutional proposals by Slovenia and Croatia, initially in the form of amendments to the 1974 Constitution of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), and then through the proposals for the transformation of Yugoslavia as a confederation or alliance of sovereign states. The former he believes led to the deconstitution of the federation, while the latter was simply a ruse or a constitutional sham aimed at reducing the power of the centre. He then proceeds to critique the proposals for a new constitutional arrangement and territorial delimitation for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the auspices of the international peace conference. Hayden lucidly but one-sidedly examines the sequence from the European Community’s proposals for cantons, the Vance and Owen proposals for provinces, the Owen and Stoltenberg proposals for republics, and finally the Washington agreements and the Dayton accords that established entities and provisions for special parallel relations. Hayden’s discussion contains no distinction between the aggressor and the victim, or any critique of the Serbian imperative to use force to impose their will and a political solution in Croatia or Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The underlying basis of Hayden’s thesis is the belief that crosscutting ties made Yugoslavia a viable political community, exemplified mainly by interethnic marriages. Although Hayden dismisses the claim that the nations that constituted former Yugoslavia were afflicted with inherent incompatibilities that ultimately led to the disintegration of the federation, he does suggest the following:

What did prove to be incompatible were republics based on the principle of the sovereignty of the majority ethnic “nation” (narod), formulations of the essence of the state entered into the constitutional systems of these republics beginning in 1989.” (p. 3)

Hayden believes that a system of constitutional nationalism, underpinning constitutional amendments and proposals both at the level of the republic and the federation, institutionalised a division between those who are of the sovereign nation, ethnically defined, and those who are not.
Under such circumstances, the latter may hold citizenship but cannot aspire to equality. Constitutional nationalism is defined as a concept or process by which constitutional and legal structures privilege the members of one (ethnic) nation over those of any other resident in a particular state (p. 68). A state or republic, which adopts constitutional nationalism, envisions a state in which basic sovereignty resides with a particular nation (narod), the members of which are the ones who can decide fundamental questions of state form and identity. Of course, under Hayden’s analyses, the Slovenes and Croats are guilty of institutionalising constitutional nationalisms that ultimately led to the disintegration of the federation and produced systems of inequality and discrimination of minorities. Hayden uses Croatia as a case study to demonstrate how the Serbian minority was alienated and discriminated in the new Constitution (1990) and by the new democratic government. Indeed, the Croatian government may be accused of not doing enough, but the question is what could it have done to avoid the Serbian rebellion and Yugoslav army intervention? Too many Serbian leaders have stated that they did not want to live in an independent Croatian state, and that the symbolism of Croatia was not a factor, but an excuse. Indeed, Jovan Rašković had complained after the democratic elections that politics and society in Croatia were “Croatocentric.” This absurd proposition could not be understood except by the need to repress any manifestation of Croatian identity and national awareness that had been marginalized or criminalized under the previous regime as anti-state activity or hostile propaganda. Indeed, Hayden does not discuss the efforts of Croatia to bring the Serbian minority into parliamentary and local representation. And there is a huge gap in understanding the mechanisms adopted by Croatia to provide for local autonomy and human rights for all its minorities under the auspices of the Constitutional law on national minorities. Indeed, the entire negotiating process after the adoption of the Vance plan and the UN protected areas, the UNCRP mandate and the implementation of the UNTAES temporary authority is left out. Croatia’s position was that the Serbian minority could not secede from Croatia, and that they could aspire to greater political representation according to the 1991 census both at the national and local levels. To exhaust the omissions, Hayden does not examine the process that led to the Zagreb 4 (Z4) agreement, which in effect created a state within a state. Croatia only took this proposal as a basis for discussion, but it clearly was unworkable. It did, however, demonstrate the extent to which the Serbs (in the occupied areas) would go to rejecting peaceful integration and the level of autonomy that they would accept.

After reading Hayden’s analyses, one is left with the impression that the Western republics, namely Slovenia and Croatia, by pursuing their objectives in transforming the federation into a modern, confederation or alliance of sovereign states, set off an unstoppable process of disintegration. The book suffers from historical myopia, because there is no discussion of the history of Yugoslavia’s battle to define itself internally. There were protracted debates about whether the first Yugoslavia would be defined as a republic or a kingdom, or whether it would be the State or Kingdom of the Serbs, Slovenes and Croats, or just of Yugoslavia. And then the debates over the banovina, decentralisation and centralisation/unitarism, and the Croatian banovina. Hayden also fails to discuss the ZAVNOH and AVNOJ principles that con-
solidated the federal basis of post-war Yugoslavia. While his initial purpose may not be to write a history of constitutionalism in former Yugoslavia, eliding over these important debates and formulations seriously distorts the picture of a snap-shot of 1989 and beyond. At that point, and under the successive constitutions after the Second World War, the republics were defined under the republican and federal constitutions as states whose borders were unable to be changed without the ratification of the Parliaments of the republics.

Hayden also neglects the complex negotiations between Croatia and Slovenia over the formulation of the joint confederation proposal. And he also neglects to discuss the exhausting negotiations between the republican leaderships that worked towards articulating the extent to which they disagreed over the future of Yugoslavia. Indeed, the Presidency of the SFRY mandated the republics to present their visions of a new relationship, and special working groups were established to examine proposals for resolving the constitutional and political crisis that emerged after the collapse of communism.

It is interesting to note that Hayden spends too much time defending his scholarship and perspective. Indeed, three years in Belgrade does not equip one with any special understanding of the crisis, particularly not of the perspective as seen by Slovenes, Croats, Muslims qua Bosniacs, Macedonians or the Kosovo Albanians. And most fundamentally, Hayden does not ask the basic question about the axis of tensions and competing visions. Why are all, and now including the Montenegrins, the nations aspiring to their own political autonomy or independence from Serbia? By omitting to discuss the Serbian perspective and role in the disintegration of the federation (for example the influence over the military, incursions into Yugoslavia’s monetary system for exclusively Serbian purposes, unilateral abolition of the autonomy of Vojvodina and Kosovo, and failing to accept the Croatian delegate in the SFRY Presidency according to the principle of rotation, amongst others). Indeed, there is little or no discussion of the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Science and Arts, a document that is widely viewed as the blueprint for the destruction of Yugoslavia.

When Hayden discusses the constitutional proposals for the reorganisation of Yugoslavia, one is left wondering why the proposal for a modern federation submitted by Serbia and Montenegro is omitted. This proposal is interesting for many reasons, especially because it outlines Serbia’s position on a new Yugoslavia. For constitutional lawyers, it is interesting that Croatia and Slovenia proposed not ‘secession’, but disassociation and association as mechanisms for negotiating a confederation of sovereign states. The Serbian proposal, however, explicitly defines the republics as states which exercise some of their sovereign rights in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and are independent in discharging the rights and duties established in their constitutions and in organising state government of their territories. Under article 10 of the Serbian proposal, every “republic has the right, on the grounds of the will expressed by the citizens in a referendum, to decide to secede from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.” The proposal also spells out the mechanisms for secession, which is an odd provision as the official representatives of Serbia claim that they tried to save Yugoslavia from the ‘separatist’ Slovenes and Croats. Interesting enough, a special working group of experts formed by the Presidency of the SFRY at the end of February 1991,
prepared a draft document on the constitutional crisis, as well as a draft constitutional and legal procedure for secession from Yugoslavia. The latter document spelled out that the right of nations to self-determination is one of the universal rules of modern law that is also enshrined in the Yugoslav Constitution. However, the draft noted that the Constitution does not specify the rule or operational procedure for implementing the right of nations to secede from the SFRY. The draft suggested amendments to the Yugoslav Constitution, which included, inter alia, the following provisions:

The right of initiative for secession is vested in the Parliaments of the Republics.

The decision on an initiative will go to a referendum by all the citizens of the republic.

The referendum is valid if over half the total electorate has opted in its favour.

In the republics inhabited by members of several Yugoslav nations the necessary majority is likewise determined for each Yugoslav nation in particular. If one of the Yugoslav nations declares itself against, all settlements where this nation is in the majority, and which border on the other part of Yugoslav territory and may therefore constitute a compact territory, remain within the structure of the SFRY.

If the result of the referendum is negative, the same issue may be brought up again only after the expiry of a period of five years.

Under this procedure, the Federal Executive Council would draw up a balance of division of jointly created assets and properties of the federation, as well as draw up proposals for territorial delineation and determine the frontiers of the future states and other questions of importance to the determination of the act of secession.

These provisions for secession were clearly drawn up for Croatia with a view to parts of the republic seceding to remain in the federation. The big question was the future status of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which could also withdraw while parts of its population and territory join the Yugoslav federation. Ironically, the Bosnian Muslims and Serbs in July 1991 proposed the resolution of the crisis based on an “historical agreement.” The Muslims proposed to the Serbs—without informing or including the Croats—that they are “interested in a democratic solution to the status and rights of the Serbian nation in Croatia, and that we support their efforts for autonomy, as we support autonomy for the Muslim/Bosniac nation in Sandjak. To the extent that the Serbian nation expresses, and realises it legitimately, a desire not to live within the framework of a Croatian state, and expresses a desire for the Knin Krajina to join Bosnia and Herzegovina, we shall then raise the issue of enjoining both Sandjaks with Bosnia and Herzegovina.”

The most interesting aspects of Hayden’s examination is the role of essentially European concepts of the nation-state and the role of the international community in “imposing” from outside values, ideas and concepts that are foreign to the “locals.” However, Hayden does not deal with these issues with any depth or convincingly. Had he tried to grapple with these issues rather than place the blame with the Slovenes, Croats and Muslims in wanting to reorganise a failed state structure according to modern European democratic standards and processes, scholars of international relations and constitutional law would be better served in understanding the logics of disintegration of the former Yugoslav federation.

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Secrecy is for losers. For people who do not know how important the information really is. — Daniel P. Moynihan

In his book Secrecy, US Senator D.P. Moynihan sharply criticises the American government’s secrecy. Drawing on the history of this institution’s development, Moynihan attacks its legal framework and its function within the American political system, viewing it as one of the key characteristics of the governing methods of the executive. His work is a plea for abandoning the current situation, which he calls the “Culture of Secrecy”, and for the establishment and acceptance of the alternative, “Culture of Openness”.

However, Moynihan does not entirely discard the need for a certain degree of secrecy in a state’s affairs and claims his intention is not to abolish secrecy, which is indeed “sometimes legitimate and necessary”. Why then does Moynihan so forcefully attack and destructively criticize the institution of secrecy?

First, Moynihan does not attack the concept of secrecy as such, which would be in the least impractical. However, he does attack secrecy in its bureaucratised form and manifestations as the institution of a modern democratic state. Second, his harsh criticism, which arises in part from his general view on freedom and democracy as well as from the dubiousness of the relationship between secrecy and freedom, has one concrete practical dimension; namely, the expensive American bureaucratised secrecy system and the intelligence-security Leviathan which rests on it have not, according to Moynihan, fulfilled their only purpose in the second half of the twentieth century: correctly assessing the degree of threat to American national security from its main Cold War enemy, the USSR. Continual intelligence overestimates of Soviet strength and then being caught unprepared by its dissolution are the cardinal sins which lie in the most distorted aspect of the “Culture of Secrecy”; in other words, the withholding of information for reasons of scientific pretensions; that is to say, closed intelligence analyses and assessments which did not allow for expert dialogue and criticism. Moynihan, who is not only a politician but also a social scientist, shows us how contradictory secrecy is to the essence of scientific discourse.

Moynihan’s likeable style of describing various episodes from America’s most recent history helps to illustrate his basic arguments. The making of the modern American secrecy system during WW I; the extent of Soviet espionage before, during and after WW II; ominous complementarity of the concepts of secrecy, conspiracy and loyalty, and the expansion of the secrecy system with the onset of the nuclear age; the Pentagon Papers; the Iran-Contra affair are just a few of the elaborated themes. One of the most fascinating and, from the perspective of the American reception of Moynihan’s work, the most controversial parts of the book, is the author’s presentation of the current decline in the quality of
strategic analysis regarding the Soviet threat to American national security. Moynihan believes that George F. Kennan’s article, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct”, which was published in Foreign Affairs in July 1947, is the best insight of its kind or, rather, “the most prescient position paper in the history of modern American diplomacy.” Moynihan also covers various classified assessments inaccessible to expert criticism and discussions, assessments which have for decades served as a basis for political decision-making, and which vastly exaggerated the power of the USSR, until the final debacle: being caught unprepared by the breakdown of the Soviet empire.

Moynihan simultaneously follows two processes, illustrating them with numerous examples - on the one hand the process of establishing and developing an American secrecy system, and on the other hand, the parallel battle of the public and the parliament to restrain this institution; that is, to define the level of regulation which would serve to effectively resist an enemy, but which at the same time would not be used against one’s own citizens and their liberties, whether it be in the form of bureaucratic inertia or political misuse.

In places where Moynihan the social scientist argues for demolishing the “Culture of Secrecy” and developing a “Culture of Openness”, Moynihan the politician demands the establishment of a new, more stable model of decision-making in the area of national security. The old model, grounded on secrecy, with its legacy of intelligence failures and ill-conceived political moves, must yield to a new way of addressing the national security issue; that is, shifting the emphasis from secrecy to analysis. Because he has confidence in the beneficial effects of the “Information Age” in which we live, the civilizational foundation of a “Culture of Openness”, Moynihan is thus confident in the intelligence value of open sources.

He is of course practical and hence does not rely solely on invisible historical powers, but on the legislative activity of a democratic state as well: the manner in which one must restrain a “Culture of Secrecy” and allow for the development of a “Culture of Openness” is a law that would clearly define and limit the area of secrecy.

To be sure, we must allow for the possibility that there exist authors, mostly American, who would successfully oppose some of Moynihan’s arguments and show, on the basis of thorough analysis of intelligence assessments, that their history is not entirely comprised of dramatic failures.

However, a critical approach to Moynihan’s work, as well as to his lack of modesty (he presents his former scepticism in regard to the long-term survival of communist totalitarianism as one of the rare bright spots in the darkness of delusions about Soviet strength and invincibility) do not lessen the value of Moynihan’s other arguments, his support for a “Culture of Openness” and his strong, morally and intellectually principled stands in the defence of democracy and civil liberties.

Moynihan’s text is preceded by an excellent introduction by Richard Gid Powers, in which he sketches Moynihan’s political portrait and interprets the meaning of his efforts in light of critical consideration of the Cold War’s tangle of facts and illusions wrapped in a veil of secrecy, and the epochal clash of the two superpowers over the shortage of valid information-based hysterias - the right wing ideology of anti-communism and the left ideology of anti-anti-communism, as one of the main characteristics of modern American history.

However, even though he looks at secrecy from the perspective of an
“American experience”, Moynihan’s work is of exceptional value for the non-American readers too, especially those in the Central Eastern European “transitional laboratory”. Namely, while the American reader finds this book predominantly, although not solely, polemical and politically provocative, for this other group of potential readers the book is first of all didactic, since this is the area where there are deep structural changes being undertaken in all aspects of social life, and thus the reconsideration of the concept of national security and the reorganising of systems and mechanisms for its protection are underway. For all that, in areas where a fundamental breakdown of the old totalitarian system and a rejection of its methods in the area of national security are occurring (that is, in the best case scenario), some of the already existing models from the West are being accepted as an alternative, and the very fact that they are western models necessarily assumes the democratic legitimation of these models and methods. Moynihan’s work implicitly reminds us of the important historical lesson that when “human affairs” are in question, there are no ready-made and self-explanatory solutions; that when it is once achieved, democracy is not a self-maintaining “natural state” but rather needs continual nurturing, and, finally that any measure of freedom, regardless of the form it might take, should always be fought for. Therefore Moynihan’s concern for American democracy is a concern for democracy in general.

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**Compilation of Papers and Studies (1997). Geopolitical Reality of the Serb Nation.**


“Geopolitical Reality of the Serb Nation” is a compilation of essays and studies presented at the Round Table discussions entitled “The Serb Nation in the New Geopolitical Environment” held in Petrovaradin in January 1997, organized by the Institute for Geopolitical Studies. It contains 66 contributions written and/or presented by Serb philosophers, economists, sociologists, experts in political sciences, geography, demography, law, theology, ethics, and professional military personnel from FRY and Republika Srpska, and other academic institutions. Even though three years have passed since this symposium was held, the views expressed by Serb political and academics draw not only on the spirit of that time but also show the habitual thinking of the Serb political elite.

These works have been divided into the following four chapters: The influence of great powers on the position of the Serb nation; Positioning the Serb nation in relation to their direct geopolitical surroundings; Assessments relating to the influence of domestic factors on the overall Serb position; Serb responses to their geopolitical challenges.

In his introduction Radovan Radinović touches on the central thesis of these works - the view that Serbia is in its currently unfavourable position as a direct result of
America’s desire to dominate Europe and the Balkans. Radinović describes another geopolitical theory that the newly united Germany in its attempt to counteract the Turkish expansion towards Europe and the Balkans, is itself trying to expand its influence towards the Middle East. The authors are united in viewing Russia as the only Serb ally, but all agree that in its present form is too weak to resist Western powers. Radinović views the states surrounding Serbia, namely Albania, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as being anti-Serb orientated. For the majority of authors, the break up of the former Yugoslavia has resulted in the loss of “Serb ethnic territory”, and has thus reopened the Serb nationalist question. Furthermore, they conclude that the only answer to this question is the creation of a Serb national country. The disintegration of the former Yugoslavia for these authors does not represent the final step in the Balkanisation process, contending that geopolitical tailoring is still ongoing. According to the authors the process has not been completed due to the varying geopolitical concepts in the international community regarding the division of the Balkans. In addition, they note that each change in relations between these powers places the Balkans deeper into their “whirlwind of contradicting interests” (Smilja Avranov p. 49).

The authors also allege that the great powers, in their view had by the United States, are endeavouring to minimalize the geopolitical importance of Serbia. Radinović states that America is the main obstacle in establishing a Serb state and realizing their national interests. He lists the Dayton agreement, Croatia’s military operation “Storm” and western support of “Kosovo Albanian separatist ambitions” as arguments supporting this view. Radinović defines Bosnia and Herzegovina in this post-Dayton era as “an American multiethnic fixation” (p.29). Smilja Avranov describes the United States, France and Great Britain as new enemies of the Serb nation emerging from the newly strengthened ties between the United States and the Vatican. The United States and the Vatican, according to Avranov, are together decisively anti-communists coupled with the Vatican’s anti-Orthodox stand.

Mihail Marković describes the current global situation after the fall of the USSR as the “New World Order” (NWO), which has allowed the Americans to dominate, shape the world and exploit the world’s resources. In establishing the NWO the United States have attempted to create smaller states incapable of fending off political domination and economic exploitation. Drago Kalajić holds that Serb territory will eventually play the key role in determining the success of the NWO, in other words, the ruling of the “Third American Imperial” (p. 63). Text contributors criticise the South European Cooperation Initiative (SECI) as an attempt by the United States to separate South Eastern Europe and bring it closer to the demographically larger Turkey and the Islamic world (pp. 68-69). Marković also maintains that the United States is emphasising a “Hegemony” period due to their “painful losses in Vietnam as a leading world military power making them ill prepared to handle even the smallest loss of human life and thus, if the problem is not settled by bombing they retreat in front of a decisive resistance,” (p. 57).

Ratibor Grujić maintains that the “most painful point in Serb history is the resistance by the great powers towards united Serbs and their desire to form a united Serb state” (p. 72). Marko Marković claims that the aim of the NWO is to destroy Yugoslavia, Russia and other Orthodox countries and Orthodoxy as a
whole. This NWO would not allow European countries their independence because “American domination does not only mean death to a country’s independence but death to its rights and democracy,” (p. 86). Following the destabilisation of Russia, Marković predicts that the next stage involves the spread of “Pan-Islamism” to the rest of Europe. Rajko Gnjato believes that Russia is not only disoriented and lacking the power to stop the execution of NWO politics, but is also too weak to secure it’s own interest within the NWO.

According to Dragoljub R. Đivojinović, the Vatican is high on the list of Serb rivals, who have been striving to regain their dominant religious, political and social power in Europe since the fall of the USSR. When discussing international relations, the authors often stress the inferiority of the European countries in respect to the United States. Marko Marković deems that Europe no longer exists but is rather a group of nations under American control. Slobodan Samardžić emphasises that the European Union through bad arbitration has disqualified itself as a competent element in the Yugoslavia crisis. Contrary to Europe’s strategy, the “American military-political strategy is comprised of a mixture of ideological multiculturalism and real politics fuelling the (Yugoslav) crisis at low intensity.” Thus the United States holds state-territorial and international minority disputes in regions such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sandjak, Kosmet and western Macedonia as “principally unresolvable”.

Turkey’s influence in the Balkans has also significantly destabilised Serbia. Miloljub Jevtić describes “Pan-Turkism” as the concept of a Greater Turkey, where Turkey with the support of the United States, enters the Balkans, destabilizes first Serbia and then Europe. In this case Kosovo would serve as the primary foothold for “Pan-Turkism” while Albania would supply the second stepping stone, partly because of their historical ties to Turkey and partly due to the several million Turks of Albanian descent.

Yugoslavia’s neighboring countries are habitually seen as threats to the Serb state. Miloš Knežević states that the Serb nation has the historical fate of suffering “stress-generating geography”. Knežević further claims that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) has been forced into the only remaining portion of the Serb ethnic area located in the eastern part of the former Yugoslavia. The geopolitical insecurity of Serb territory lies, amongst other factors, in the their neighbor’s varied ultranationalist goals of revision, territorial demands and spiritual retaliation. These countries are viewed as Austro-Hungarian and Turkish political proxies.

Miloš Knežević states that the Serb question has not been addressed and that the division of former Yugoslav territory into secessionist new states has not been completed. (Unlike the Badinter Commission report which concluded that dissolution of former Yugoslavia as succession, the author claims that it is secession.) Knežević believes the emergence of smaller Balkan states is in the face of the two century old Serb geopolitical goal of reclaiming control of the “Serb ethnic area” (SEA). The SEA is wider, as constantly described in their papers, than the currently held territories of Serbia and Montenegro. “Thus today’s confused situation is not in accordance with the traditional Serb territories of FRY and Republika Srpska, and in this form geopolitically unnatural and in the long term unviable,” (p. 211). Knežević states that the Serb area has been reduced by Croatia (the so called Krajina) by 17,000 km² and by 10,000 km² in western Bosnia (p. 211). Knežević states that the SEA is incomplete because the Serb nation
lacks political integrity and strength.

The authors see Croatia in an inconvenient geopolitical position with characteristics of “being exposed and attractive for take-overs” (p. 231). In short they view Croatia as being unjustly interested in controlling the Danube right bank. They go on to term the Croatia’s Danube Region (which was peacefully integrated in 1996-1997 after the signing of the basic agreement in which the UNTAES aided) as the Srijem-Baranja region and treat it as a temporary neighbour. Drago M. Njegovan stresses the importance of the Danube right bank for the FRY, referring to it as part of the “Serb Danube Region”. According to Njegovan, the “Serb Danube Region” is wider by including the Danube bank in both Croatia and Romania (p. 334). The Serbs figured that in the event of Yugoslavia’s break up the Croatian Danube region would be included in Serbia, however this plan is temporarily unachievable. “The alternative would be to retain the status quo, which in the right circumstance would allow for the aforementioned plan.” The authors conclude that Serb weakness and powerlessness has resulted in Croatia’s superiority in the South Slav area.

Albania is defined as an “undesirable Balkan infant”, a “Balkan geopolitical neurotic”, and most expressively as the “Balkan Banana Republic”. The new Serb geopolitical enemy has emerged as a result of the separatist movement by the “unloyal Albanian minority” living on Serb territory. An additional problem is the fact that “Serbia was unable to create a state program that would adapt and include the Kosovar Albanians in the Serb national state” (p. 215). The problem according to the authors is not in international relations but rather highlighting the “Albanian” terrorist, criminal, mafia and political activities.

Macedonia is seen as a markedly weak state incapable of sustaining itself independently. In order to retain it’s own state, Macedonia would have to enter into a favorable alliance or succumb to the protection of a stronger state. Milovan Radaković claims that Albania and Macedonia are prospective for the strongest American military bases in Europe. From these bases the United States would have the capability of provoking low intensity conflicts if they assess that political, economic and military integration is not heading in a favourable direction, or if a united Europe starts to jeopardise American interests (p. 350).

The authors allege that Bosnia and Herzegovina does not have a foundation outside of Yugoslavia. According to Radinović, Bosnia is the “Balkan black hole” (p. 226) whose solution lies in a new military conflict and not a peaceful agreement where the Serbs would have to defend minimal national and state interests. Bosnian-Muslims are seen as temporary neighbors while Republika Srpska is seen as an apparent neighbor (p. 195). FRY-Republica Srpska relations are termed as an issue of domestic nature rather than foreign affairs. This question must be answered in such a way as to “name and confirm it as a complete national and state unity. The same nation resides in the FRY and Republica Srpska in this continuous Serb territory” (p. 226). From the Serb standpoint, according to Rajko Gnjata, Republica Srpska is the only bright outcome from the disintegration of Yugoslavia.

Problems in relations with neighbouring states lie primarily in defining the Serb ethnic area (SEA). Jovan Ilić claims that the SEA is constituted by the following border limits: Drač-Struga-Prilep-Veleška Klisura-Osogovskie mountains to the south the existing Bulgaria-Serbian border (Stara Planina)-Derdap; Černe gorge-Mureš near
Serbs in Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina “have to try to survive” until the FRY regains its strength to the point where they can influence the Serb people in those areas. However, until then, it is important to work on the return of refugees, “without whom all talks of Serb land and demands for it’s future are pointless” (p. 139-140).

The most worrisome issues for the author’s are Serbia’s domestic problems. Popović specifies the 700,000 refugees in Serbia over the Drina and the additional problem of 200,000 military draftees who fled to the West, as further worsening the geopolitical position of the FRY. Milena Spasovski claims that Serbia’s natural growth is almost all attributed to Muslim residents (Muslim, Albanians, Gypsies, and Turks). The Serbs who have settled between 1991 - 1995 have only a short-term influence and in the long run they would not significantly improve the currently negative demographic development trends.

Miloš Knežević states that FRY is lacking in political, ideological, national, party and geopolitical consensus regarding important issues for their future. The Serb political pseudoelite, instead of representing Serb integrity, represent “A Serb based Yugoslav integrity” (p.197). Dragoljub Kojčić suppresses that the most important goal is to strengthen their Serb national sovereignty and consequently establish a Serb national state (p. 271). Đeljko Poznanović stresses the importance of the Serb Orthodox Church as a vital internal-integral Serb leader. Poznanović maintains that their religious belief cannot be separated from the national, and thus the Serb nation receives “Godly dimensions through the national auto cephalic church” (p. 305-306). Petar Stojić holds Kosovo and Sandak as priceless to the FRY and that they must be maintained at all costs, even if that means war. He suggests that they are
threatening war in light of the direct ties between the ever increasing aggressive Islam and “Albanian” terrorism.

The FRY when speaking of Kosovo and Sandžak must not allow itself to succumb to the demands of the international community because that would mark the end of its national and state politics. Kosta Čavoški sees the role of the international community in Kosovo as supporting Albanians in their aim of achieving political autonomy and separation from the FRY, and not as protecting human rights. The Serb political corpus is deeply divided and shattered according to Andrej Miletić (p. 371).

Radovan Radinović sees their goal of defining the SEA as the greatest challenge confronting Serbs. Their aim is to create a unique area of Serb land and then stabilising social development, demographic revitalisation and spiritual renewal. It also improved integral security system whose new doctrine includes the capability of offensive responses against all aggressors, and even against multinational powers with the support of a strong ally. Radinović feels that the first step is to clear up the question of the SEA borders and the Serb state. The mentioned area has external pressures that “refer to it in different terms, but the area has to be seen as a unique ethnic area, with mutual territorial connections, and entirety with clear aspirations that would one day be included in the unique Serb state” (p. 488). Radinović asserts that minorities in this state would not have the right to claim their own national state nor political autonomy. Forcefully taken and abducted, Serb territory must be viewed as a temporary loss and thus Serbs must continue to base their hopes on their historical rights and demand the return of these areas from the international community when the moment becomes visible for favorable Serb strategic moves.

The authors hope that Russia will remain/become a military ally of the FRY and secure a guarantee for their smallest strategic interests (p. 497). “Alliance with Russia is a necessary requisite for avoiding a most unfavorable military situation of a multinational military NATO or WEU intervention” (p. 497). Without this kind of alliance the FRY would be lost in such a military conflict, having to deal with a large number of casualties, material losses and destruction (p. 497). In 1999, FRY leaders obviously did not heed this warning.

Branislav Đorđević summarizes that the Serb state is surrounded by hostile countries, of which the Republic of Croatia would always play the role of mediator in a war of great powers against the FRY. However, Albania is viewed as the next Serb opponent. Serb countries outside of the FRY must serve the role of vital subsystems for the defence of the FRY and vice versa.

The Yugoslav Army (JA) must be capable of starting and concluding a war, and also be prepared for war activities in neighboring territories who are conducting armed aggression on the FRY (p. 496). The military doctrine should allocate means for devastating attacks to all vital facilities of neighboring countries if the Serb nation is threatened. The JA must be prepared to attack all vital facilities of the aggressor and facilities of neighboring countries involved. The FRY must have a suitable ally derived from perhaps the Balkan Alliance, Partnership for Peace or the Alliance of Orthodox countries in Eastern Europe (p. 571).

Most of this compilation is persuaded dominated by theories of American conspiracy sparsed with German and Vatican activities directed against the Serb people. Their feelings of endangerment are heightened by Russia’s weakness. The authors maintain that the Serb people are victims
due to their geopolitical, transit and religious uniqueness, which subjects them to the bullying of great powers. Almost all of their neighbors are now controlling at least some section of the SEA, while the national minority in FRY is attempting to divide the remaining areas and annex them to their base states. The Serb political elite is obviously still dealing with the after consequences of the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia and the fact that this state has shrunk in size. However, their aspirations of constructing a united Serbia using a somewhat smaller area of the former Yugoslavia still exists. Regardless of their embitterment towards a number of member countries of the international community, the Serbs feel that it is important to obtain support from the world’s central power because it is the only “just solution to the Serb national question” (p. 430). Even though the actualization of a new Serb state uniting the SEA territory (returning parts of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Albania, etc.) is not possible right now in their new geopolitical state, this idea must still remain the key geopolitical aim of the Serb political elite and therefore their efforts must be directed towards this objective.

Josip Esterajher, Zagreb, Croatia

Blaskovich J. Anatomy of Deceit. An American Physician’s First-hand Encounter with the Realities of the War in Croatia.


During the last couple of years, several books on the war in former Yugoslavia were published in the United States. However, all those books offered only one-sided descriptions of the war. Blaskovich’s book is the first one to present the other side of the story.

Dr Jerry Blaskovich was born in Chicago, Illinois. In 1960, he started studying medicine at the Zagreb University School of Medicine. He specialized dermatology in the United States where he also got his master’s degree, but in a completely different field – the history of Islamic art. Until 1994, he lectured on dermatology at the University of Southern California. He is a veteran of the Korean War and the field of his special interest is chemical warfare. Since the beginning of the conflict in former Yugoslavia, he visited combat zones several times, evaluating the medical services, visiting the refugee camps, and talking to the victims of rape. He wrote numerous letters and articles on the war in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which were published in American journals and newspapers, and he held many lectures. On the basis of his own experience, he wrote a book “Anatomy of Deceit – An American Physician’s First Hand Encounter with the Realities of the War in Croatia”, published in the United States in July 1997.
“Anatomy of Deceit” is divided in fourteen chapters, and the Croatian edition has a special preface written by Prof. Andrija Hebrang, MD, PhD, Minister of Health during the war. It is written for an American reader – short, straightforward, “CNN-look-a-like”. However, the Croatian reader will find it interesting, too. It shows how facts about the war in Croatia can be stated in a simple and well-documented way, and discloses some, previously unpublished, facts about the work of international community.

In the introductory chapter, “My Rude Awakening: December 15, 1991,” Blaskovich remembers his first “war-time” visit to the homeland of his parents (although the first few paragraphs are too dramatic). Blaskovich was invited by Foreign Press Bureau to evaluate the work of medical services and to investigate the rumors about the use of chemical weapons. He reviews the news on the situation on the territory of former Yugoslavia those days, as well as the situation in Zagreb – the first air raids, sniper fire, bombing of the Banški dvori (Office of the President).

At the beginning of the following chapter, “Legend-Induced Paranoia of the Serbs and the Hits and Myths of the Croats,” Blaskovich criticizes the lack of well-designed media promotion of Croatia. Croatia’s politicians wasted a lot of energy retelling the Croatian history to the foreigners “from the seventh century”, instead of answering the simple question: “What can we do?” or “What would you like us to do?” Since the book was written for the American audience, Blaskovich summarizes historical facts, crucial for the understanding of events in former Yugoslavia, as well as the development of the idea of “Greater Serbia” from Garašanin’s “Načertanije”, through murder in Parliament, up to the SANU Memorandum (“the Serbian equivalent of Mein Kempf”).

The third chapter, “The Road to Voćin”, describes Tito’s Yugoslavia with special focus on the late 1980s and the beginning of 1990s. Blaskovich criticizes the blindness of the international community, and especially the Bush administration which, believing in the survival of Yugoslavia, reacted mildly on the conflict in Slovenia and the foundation of the Serbian Autonomous District in Croatia. One part of this chapter is dedicated to the siege of Dubrovnik in October 1991, when the media started asking questions on the motivation of the Serbian military activities.

The following two chapters, “What Happened in Voćin” and “Post Mortems of Slaughter: The Autopsies,” deal with the best forensically documented crime perpetrated on the territory of former Yugoslavia. On December 13, 1991, the members of “Beli Orlovi,” Serbian para-military troops, destroyed the eight centuries old church of Our Lady in Voćin and massacred the civilians. The post-mortal remains (I choose not to use the word “body”) of 58 victims were found, while the remains of many others, including children, were missing. Blaskovich’s description of autopsies begins with the statement that “even the toughest pathologist is on his knees when he deals with burned victims.” The summaries of the forensic reports are given. Tomislav Martinković, Katica Martinković, Marija Šimić, Ivan Šimić, Marija and Franjo Matančić, and Stojan Nenadović (a Serb!) were horrendously tortured before they were burned alive. The only comfort is the fact that the tragedy in Voćin was the first massacre noticed by the media, after four dozen previous slaughters were ignored.

In chapter 6, “The Devastation of Osijek and the Smoldering Ashes of Vukovar,” Blaskovich remembers his visit to West Slavonia. He witnessed the fight for Osijek, and the heroic work of the staff in
the Osijek General Hospital. Four fifths of the hospital as ruined and the staff was moved to the cellar. However, they managed to maintain the rate of secondary wound infections below 1.7%. Perhaps the most tragical fact is that the Yugoslav People’s Army severely devastated the hospital during the siege of fire (sic!) in September 1991, bombarding from the neighboring base.

Blaskovich reconstructs the siege of Vukovar, the turning point of the war, on the basis of his conversations with eyewitnesses. He describes the work in the basement of the Vukovar General Hospital. I would like to point out two, almost unbelievable, acts of enemy troops: artillery attacks to the central sterilization facility (guided by the “insiders”), and the attacks on the vehicles which were taking away the dead to the cemetery! Part of the chapter describes forensic work on the identification of the corpses of the wounded who were taken to the concentration camps after the fall of Vukovar. Many of them didn’t survive the torture.

Chapter 7, “The Media Deception,” deals with the role of the media in the war in Croatia. We can learn that the authors of numerous articles on the war in the Balkans, published between 1990 and 1995, were “in love” both with former Yugoslavia and everything it represented. Press agencies used those articles as a basis for a number of their reports published in the early 1990s. In addition, Blaskovich describes the excellent work of Serbian propaganda including hiring many independent public-relations companies. For example, General Lewis MacKenzie, the highest ranking United Nations officer on the territory of former Yugoslavia, was donated USD 150,000 by SerbNet, the official Serbian lobby association in the United States, during his talks with the representatives of the United States Congress.

In the eighth chapter, Blaskovich tries to answer the question from his introduction: “Who committed a greater crime – the one who actually did it or the one who ignored it?” Trying to expose different lies published in foreign press, Blaskovich visited many medical institutions in Croatia. He describes his experience in working with refugees and displaced persons. The crucial part of the chapter is the testimony of Fadila, a woman from Brčko, about the destruction of that Bosnian city and the massacre of civilians in Brčko carried out by the Serbian troops.

“The Infant Democracy’s First Steps” is the title of chapter 9. Here, Blaskovich deals with the confusion of the Croatian press in 1990 and 1991, and with the work of the Foreign Press Bureau – “the only bright spot” in Croatia those days. Although the Foreign Press Bureau contributed significantly in fighting prejudices against Croatia that were present in the media, it became the victim of the conflict of interests of Croatia’s officials. After that, Blaskovich describes the work of Croatian associations in the United States whose differences eventually led to the loss of both resources and energy in the fight for domination.

Chapter 10, “Physicians, Leaders by Default”, deals with physicians and their role in the war in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is very unusual that in such a short period several physicians made it to the top of Croatia’s politics. For example: Zdenko Škrabalo, Branimir Jakšić, Ivica Kostović, Andrija Hebrang, Mate Granić, Goran Dodig, Juraj Njavro, Ivica Kračun, Franjo Golem … It is unbelievable coincidence that, at the same time, some leaders in other parts of Yugoslavia were physicians too: Milan Panić, Milan Babić, Radovan Karadžić … Moreover, Lord David Owen is
a physician himself. But, one must agree with Blaskovich that Owen and Karadžić must have been absent when it was time to take the Hippocratic oath.

Chapter 11, “Conflicts of Interest”, contains some facts not so known in Croatia. Lawrence Eagleburger, former United States Minister of Foreign Affairs, was very intimate with Yugoslav financial circles. Lord Peter Carrington became manager and representative of “Kissinger and Associates,” which transferred hundreds of millions of American investments in Yugoslavia. However, neither of them thought that their financial interests would interfere with their ability to make objective judgments about former Yugoslavia. Blaskovich explains the basis of the embargo on the import of weapons to Croatia and characterizes it as one of the most pervert political decisions during the war in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. He also describes the economic sanctions against Yugoslavia imposed by the United Nations, as well as Russia breaking the sanctions and shameless role of Russian peacekeeping forces in Croatia. One of their most profitable actions was smuggling oil. The United Nations ignored the smuggling, afraid that the Russians might withdraw from the forces. While talking about the United Nations, Blaskovich describes the slaughter of Muslims in Goražde, the center of the UN security zone. He cites the article from the Los Angeles Times, describing how the UN gave the Serbs UN uniforms and vehicles. Disguised as UN soldiers, the Serbs caught Muslims hiding in the woods after they fled from Srebrenica. All those refugees were executed!

In the 12th chapter, “Croatia’s Growing Pains,” Blaskovich analyzes the failure of the UNPROFOR mandate in Croatia and the Z–4 Plan. He analyzes events in 1995, the military actions “Flash” and “Storm”, which brought down the Serbian autonomous district “Krajina,” and the importance of the failure of the siege of Bihać as well as Croatia’s involvement in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In introductory paragraphs, he reviews the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina, “the small Yugoslavia.” He deals with the blindness of the Bosnian state politics and its total unpreparedness for the conflict. Although he is not trying to minimize the sufferings of Muslims during the war, he explains why the Croats are the main losers in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He also analyzes the reasons Muslims turned against the Croats. At the end of the chapter, all the sufferings of the people of Bosnia are summarized in poem by Enes Kišević, “Hava’s Plea”.

In the final, fourteenth chapter, “Dayton: Peace for Our Time?” Blaskovich describes the Dayton Peace Agreement. He characterizes the Agreement as a requiem for Bosnia and Herzegovina, and defines Serbs as the only winners. He accuses the international community and the West for horrors committed on the territory of former Yugoslavia.

Although it is written for the American audience, I can recommend “Anatomy of Deceit” to the readers from Croatia and neighboring countries. It is simple, but interesting. Blaskovich dissects the way politics and media can manipulate the information. He discloses all the hypocrisy of the international community which didn’t stop the war, although it was able to, because it was partly seduced by the ancient myths about the Serbian military glory and partly corrupted with Serbian money.

Ivan Krešimir Lukić
Croatian Medical Journal

Book Reviews J. Blaskovich


/Croatian edition:

“Unfinished Peace” is the title of a study, or rather a Report, published by the International Commission for the Balkans, which comprises of a group of eminent authors. The Report was issued in the Croatian language in 1997 in Zagreb by the Croatian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights FOD B-H. The original Report was published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996, Washington.

The Report claims to be an analysis of the situation and suggests its own kind of integral strategy for the international community toward the area which it calls the “Balkans”, which incorporates Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Macedonia, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey. However, Montenegro and Romania are hardly mentioned in the Report. Some countries mentioned in the Report are discussed in elaborate detail as opposed to others because those countries represent the two epicentres of conflict in the Balkans. The first is considered as “being in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which incorporates wider Croatian-Serbian relations,” and the other being in Kosovo, which is “directly related to Serbia, Albania and Macedonia... and potentially incorporates Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey.”

The Report also gives 57 recommendations relating to the conduct of the above mentioned countries with respect to the activity of the UN, NATO members, the US, various bodies of the European Union and international non-government organizations. The declared wish of the authors of the Report is for their recommendations to be completely realized, bringing lasting peace and prosperity to the Balkans.


Annexed to the Report are easy-to-survey maps, a supplement about the study mission and encounters by the International Commission for the Balkans, and the epilogue by Ivo Banac contained in the Croatian edition.

The first chapter, metaphorically titled “Balkan Troubles,” considers the causes of the recent war, or rather a review of the historical development of the state of affairs in the countries of the former Yugoslavia which led to war. As for the historical review of the events in the Balkans up until the Second World War given in that chapter, we cannot help but feel that the Report is subject to prejudices similar to those that we come across in literature such as “Grey Falcon and White Lamb” by Rebecca West. As for the analysis of the causes for the
recent war in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina given in the same chapter, the Report does not consider the relevant foreign factors for its outbreak, and all the more categorically states that “the causes of this war were not outside of the Balkans, rather inside of it.” The main culprits for the war, according to the Report, were old “inherited hatreds”, which due to changing international surroundings, given the disintegration of communist systems, brought about crude nationalism. The Report rejects the thesis about a “conflict of civilizations,” and accepts that nationalist politicians skilfully used, rather abused, the Church and religious symbols for their own aims. According to this, the Serbs and Croats were ascribed to as being nationalistic politicians, whilst the Moslems “despite all their shortcomings and mistakes, came the closest to addressing European principles of tolerance and open societies from those who, in the name of Christian Europe, endeavoured to exterminate them,” (p. 22). The authors of the Report do not mention nor attempt to explain the phenomena that during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina the Moslems fled in the hundreds of thousands to those “who endeavored to exterminate them,” i.e., Croatia, which unselfishly sheltered them. We believe that the failure to mention this is not accidental as it questions Croatia’s tolerance and openness.

The second chapter, entitled “The War and the Reactions of the International Community,” analyses the course of the war in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and the endeavours of the international community to end it. It is telling that the aggression in Croatia is depicted very briefly and bleakly, without mention of the destruction (apart from Vukovar and Dubrovnik), while the number of killed (only 2,000 dead in Vukovar is mentioned) and exiled (only 247,000 is mentioned) Croats is decreased. Particularly unrealistic and biased is the part of the Report about the operations that liberated the occupied regions of the Republic of Croatia, which the Report describes as “attacks on Krajina” that was followed by “a campaign of ethnic cleansing” (p. 41). Most space and statistics in this chapter of the Report is dedicated to the military conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As a whole, given the way in which the Report presents the course of the war, it is hard not to think that this part of the Report more intensely blames the Croats for the fighting in Bosnia and Herzegovina, while it marginalizes the contribution of the Croatian Army in liberating Bihać and parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the Serbian aggressors, which were the preconditions for the Dayton Accords.

The description of the international community’s efforts is reasonably objective, and at times even overtly critical of Western countries. The events in Slovenia that preceded the aggression in Croatia are lucidly assessed as being the intentions of the Serbian politicians in allowing the independence of Slovenia, in relation to the nature of the 1991 Brioni Declaration as a means for gaining time for the deployment of the Yugoslav Army in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, i.e. preparing for an aggressive war and the European Community’s failure to recognize the nature of the problems. An objective but brief depiction is given of the endeavours of the United Nations between 1992 and 1994 in Croatia, i.e. during the period of the so-called Vance Plan (the UN Secretary General’s envoy, former US State Secretary, Cyrus Vance), rather the origins of the Z-4 plan (the draft agreement on Knin, southern Baranja and western Srijem) which the Serbian side rejected.

The war and participation of the international community in Bosnia and
Herzegovina is discussed much more widely and is given much more importance, which is best evidenced in the statement, “the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina provoked the most serious crisis in trans-Atlantic relations since the Suez crisis...” (p. 55). With geographical maps, all initiatives were reviewed, from the Vance-Owen plan from January 1993, the Owen-Stoltenberg plan from July 1993, the Contact Group plan from July 1994, to the Dayton Accord from November of 1995. Nevertheless, the entire chapter leaves the perception of a greater contribution by NATO compared to the inefficiency of the EU, rather the EC. Significant criticism is given of western countries in not recognizing the aggression, the indecisiveness and use of force and generally for inaction in preventing the conflict. Criticism for belated action in light of defending safe areas is clear but remains fairly unclear in light of the statement given in the Report; “no attention was directed toward constructive ideas for transforming Yugoslavia from a communist federation to a democratic one...” (p. 56) and even the hypothesis that Croatia was recognized prematurely as “recognition excluded from play the important lever with which Croatia could have been restrained in its conduct toward the Serbs in Krajina” (p. 60). Does this mean that the authors of the Report consider that Yugoslavia could have been, with more determined participation from the West, safeguarded from disintegration?

It is particularly worth highlighting the lack of recognising the decisive role of the Croatian Army operation in 1995 in achieving the Dayton Accord. This most likely stems from not knowing the principle facts, for how can one explain formulations such as “the successful offensive of Bosnian and Croatian forces in Western Slavonia” (p. 73).

The third chapter, “The Situation in the Countries, Trends and Recommendations”, together with the fourth chapter, “The Region Conclusions and Recommendations”, are the most important and most pretentious parts to the Report. These chapters, along with an analysis of the situation and detailed explanations, give 57 explicit recommendations concerning the function of the UN, NATO, the US, and various bodies of the European Union, international non-government organizations and the countries in the “region” themselves. All the recommendations in the Report can be organized in a number of groups; security, reconstruction and development, democracy (civil society and media), inter-ethnic relations and conduct toward minorities, and regional cooperation. The recommendations in the third chapter are directed individually toward the countries in the region, while the recommendations in the fourth chapter are mainly directed toward the region as a whole. It is interesting that, judging by the number and content of the recommendations given in the third chapter, the Report considers Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia as being the most problematic countries.

Ten recommendations directly concern Bosnia and Herzegovina. In stating that in the Dayton solution “there exists a hidden contradiction” as it “accepts the ethnic division of Bosnia and Herzegovina which was achieved with the help of military force” and at the same time wishes to “protect and reintegrate the pre-war multiethnic Bosnia” (p. 78), the Report also reveals the meaning of some recommendations as being a means for supplementing, rather redefining, Dayton. The final aim of the recommendations is the entire reconstruction of multiethnic Bosnia, i.e. avoiding the possibility of separating the three sides in
Bosnia and Herzegovina into three separate states. With this end in mind, the Report recommends the military presence of the international community, supporting joint institutions, i.e. non-government organizations, complying to the obligations of the tribunal in The Hague, freedom of the media, the economic reconstruction of the country, strengthening the civil aspect of the West’s presence, achieving the right of refugees for return, etc.

Five recommendations relate to the Republic of Croatia. Following a very critical exposition on Croatia, broad assessments and inaccurate consternations, the Report concludes how “much more stringent measures must be applied to this country” (p. 106). The recommendations suggest that the US Government demand(s) of the Republic of Croatia an improvement in its relations toward minorities, the return of refugee Serbs, the complete freedom of the media, decentralization and regionalism, and dissolving Herceg-Bosna along with “taking a share of the economic recovery of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”

Serbia is termed as the “most important state in South-eastern Europe” and is given surprisingly little recommendation. The Report suggests the implementation of the Dayton Accords, extraditing war criminals, accepting the draft agreement on succession, freedom of the media, and devising the western strategy for recognizing a new Yugoslavia and its inclusion in international institutions.

Four recommendations are dedicated to Kosovo. They encompass the return of autonomy, abstaining from independence and a start to negotiations, and the return of normal civil life through the work of non-government organizations.

Three recommendations pertain to Albania: pro-western orientation, the building of infrastructure and joining with the Balkans and not Islamic countries.

Macedonia must increase the proportion of Albanians in its government, decentralize, and retain UNPREDEP so as to decrease the tensions around the university in Tetovo.

As for Montenegro, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey, there are no particular recommendations. Romania is not at all mentioned.

It can be concluded that in its review of the situation in individual countries in the region, i.e. before drafting the recommendations, the Commission acted with bias and impartially. How else can the considerably more critical stance toward some countries in comparison to others be explained, that is passing over in silence the evident violations of human rights perpetrated by some and magnified in others. Why is it that for some countries, where even laymen can perceive great problems, no recommendations are given at all?

The 28th recommendation given in the fourth chapter is dedicated to the region as a whole. It relates to the problems of regional cooperation, economic cooperation, reconstruction and development, democracy in relation to civil society and the media, multi-ethnic relations and conduct toward minorities, and security, i.e. the control of armaments. All imply the importance of creating a regional framework for resolving potentially dangerous issues and controversies, i.e. the need to strengthen the role of non-government organizations in the region.

Concerning the abovementioned recommendations, from today’s perspective, four years after the first Report was issued, importance is drawn to the fact that nevertheless the conduct of the international community toward the countries encompassed in the Report coincide in some elements with the recommendations given in
this Report. Realized in particular are recommendations concerning the reinforce-
ment of “civil society,” that is the role of non-government organizations. This indi-
cates that the recommendations of the Commission are taken seriously. We won’t
dwell on the question why this is so. What are the consequences of the moves taken
under those recommendations provokes another question.

It is particularly important to emphasize the relatively mild judgements and small
demands made upon the Serbs in compar-
ison to the very sharp judgment of Croatia.
In this light it would be very revealing, in a
separate study, to compare the first Report of the International Commission for the
Balkans of the Carnegie Foundation from 1914 with the events that transpired later in
the “Balkan” region in the context of the First and Second World Wars. The authors
themselves in the introduction to this Report recognize the fact that the views of the first
and second Commissions are similar.
The first Report from 1914 and this one
published in 1996 are equally concerned
and have the justified conclusion (and their
lack of will) of the urgency for the timely
engagement of Europe and the US in
resolving problems in the Balkans.

Unfortunately, those who share consid-
eration of the civilizational superiority,
rather intellectual arrogance, prevent an
objective, empathetic perception of the
problems in the countries of the region.
What to say about the first Report which
states that the “civilization layer is very thin
and that the liberation of the beast in man
is always possible when force turns patriot-
ism into crime and heroism into savagery,”
but that they were prophetic, not only in the
relations in the Balkans but in the relations
of all participating countries of the First and
Second World Wars. The objective percep-
tion of the Balkan issues can only be
shaped by a commission that accepts the
“thin civilizational layer” as inherent in
every man in every country in the world,
even (as was shown by the events during
the two world wars) in the developed West.

In any case, the individual moves made by the international community after
1996, intentional or accidental, coincide
with the recommendations in the Report. At
the same time, some important moves by
the international community, such as the
bombing of Serbia because of the events in
Kosovo, are not at all predicted nor sug-
gested in the Report.

Generally viewed, the Report is super-
ficial where the Republic of Croatia is con-
cerned. For example, the Report correctly
concludes that “leading international pow-
ers, up until the summer of 1995, were not
prepared to convincingly threaten force so
as to enforce a solution”, that is that they
were late. However, the aforementioned is
written in the context of the killings in
Srebrenica, whilst it does not mention the
recent war crimes during the aggression
against Croatia. Already in this approach
to the problem, it is evident that Croatia is
considered within a welter of Balkan events
and whose politics primarily bring about the
consequences in the Balkans, in com-
parison to Slovenia (which is altogether not
mentioned in the Report). Croatia is not
considered as a country that has powerful
roots and powerful contacts in the Central
European region. Croatia is not perceived
as a bridge between Europe and the
Balkans, rather only as an integral part of
the Balkans. This sort of consideration
about Croatia does not give the true pic-
ture and does not find a useful solution, not
only for Croatia, but also for the entire
Balkans and the Central European region.

In considering the reasons as to what
prompted the establishment of this study, by
all means assuming the commendable
desire to assist the region, the thesis on the possible influence of fighting in the region and the events in other countries in Eastern Europe and the former USSR mentioned in the introductory summary of the Report itself must also be taken into consideration: “The worsening multi-ethnic relations and the ever worsening situation for national minorities in the Balkans would have negative consequences in other parts of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, where demography does not coincide with political borders. Moreover, the fate of the Muslims – their political integration or isolation – could become an acid test of relations between Europe and the Islamic world.” Not disputing the justification of this argument, it is nonetheless difficult, four years after the end to the serious fighting in the region and writing of this Report, to note a more serious link between the events in Bosnia and Herzegovina and current events in Chechnya.

In any case, most likely the important reason for writing the Report lies also in the concern for possible implications of the events in Bosnia and Herzegovina with an important NATO member – Turkey. The Report itself states that the “Bosnian issue has become the powerful weapon in the hands of Turkish Islamists who at present have the position of presidency in the government and, who have achieved success upon success on the domestic political stage, which is without precedence in Turkish contemporary history” (cit. summary XXVI).

Numerous incorrect citations in the Report are most likely the fruit of a number of previously shaped strong stances, so strong that they have become the prejudgment and limit the scope, and inhibit the freedom and innovation, of the recommendations themselves.

The first is the strong beliefs in the inca-pability of the countries in the region to solve their mutual problems on their own, that is the belief that they cannot solve those problems without various forms, including military, of western intervention. The Report even directly suggests the “uninterrupted and consistent military arrangement of NATO” up until the establishment of the “Balkan Partnership for Peace association.” This stance is expressed at the very beginning of the Report, already in the second paragraph of the summarised review in the introduction. Namely, the statement that, “this Commission believes that, if we pretend that we do not see the problems in the Balkans, it will be shown that it will be the equally successful recipe for a catastrophe at the end to the twentieth century as it was at its start. Foreign sponsors and even the factors which forcefully impose peace will have to remain in that region for a long time,” clearly shows that the Commission does not wish to recognise that the main cause of the problems in the region even prior to the outbreak of World War One was not only the historical inheritance of the peoples in the region, rather the “Balkan ethnic conflicts,” but that to a large extent was the interests of factors outside the region, primarily the Ottoman and Austrian empires and up until the present day, which obstructs free individualization and development of the countries in the region.

The Report foresees that almost all the conflicts in the region were quickly initiated, primarily at the times of confrontation of the great powers in this region. In that context it is completely correct to state that this region is an eternal battleground for the interests of the great powers, and when these battles come ablaze they remind us of Samuel P. Huntington’s “conflict of civilizations”. As opposed to that, the Report relativises the aforementioned by stating
that “renewed nationalistic conflicts reflect the ambitions of the great powers to re-instate their sphere of influence in the Balkans,” merely as an “attitude in which many in the Balkans believe.” At the same time the theory that “the issue deals with a resurgence of ancient hatred and a resurgence of repressed nations” is given as an “interpretation that is widespread in the West.”

Subsequently the authors of the Report synthesize the aforementioned by stating, “there is some truth to all of this and nobody should underestimate the importance of history in the Balkans. However, the main reasons for this war were that the sparks of aggressive nationalism were stirred by those political leaders of the Yugoslav federation who, in their desire to realize their own nationalistic aims, appealed to ancient hatreds and who intentionally set in motion their own propaganda machinery…” (cit. summary p. XVI).

The second prejudice emanates from the first, which is the belief in equal guilt for the fighting in the region. One would have to be truly blind not to be able to differentiate between the aggressor (Serbia) and the victims (Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina), or not be able to recognize which of the countries of the former Yugoslavia had the necessary means for aggression (armament) at the beginning of the nineties and the aspiration for domination over others (the ideology of Greater Serbia). There is no differentiation between the negative aggressive nationalism that was based on a desire to conquer and dominate over others, and nationalism as a defensive reaction to protect one’s own existence from the aggression of the other.

The third prejudice is the belief that the synthesis, rather various forms of linking and integration as opposed to the sovereignty of states in the region, automatically contributes to solving the problem. History tells us otherwise; the bloodiest conflicts originated directly from the downfall of old or the formation of new – either forcefully or artificially created – ‘integration’ entities in this region (Ottoman Empire, Austro-Hungary, both Yugoslav states).

Nonetheless, in regards to regional cooperation the Commission recommends, but also doubts, in the “possibility of maintaining an international conference on security in the Balkans, and even an ambitious conferences that would have the aim of creating a south-Balkan confederation,” (p. 140). The Commission recommends the formation of “free trade zones” as being the most realistic and economically most useful solution, which would in the end become a part of CEFTA.

It is even more uncertain of how they plan on implementing one of the key proposals in the Report in regards to creating “a Partnership for Peace Balkan association” and its “linking to the broader structures of NATO,” (recommendation No. 53, p. 170).

Instead of the conclusion, let’s return to the beginning, the title; “Report of the Commission for the Balkans.”

When we state “Report” we ask – for whom? Normally, for those who paid. In this case, among others, the Carnegie Foundation and the Open Society Institute. Neither is a government organization or institute, which opens a series of interesting questions on the mutual relations of the mentioned non-government organizations and the governments of specific countries, and even the possible influences of these organizations on the governments themselves.

When we state “commission” we ask – what kind? This one is comprised of undoubtedly eminent experts, intellectuals and politicians (Leo Tindemans - President, Lloyd Cutler, Bronislaw Geremek, John Roper, Theo Sommer, Simone Veil, David
Anderson). Our questions in an atmosphere of support for multiculturalism, equality and objectivity are: why is it that not one of the seven members of the Commission on the Balkans does not originate from the Balkans, and why is it that only one of the Commission’s 21 advisors originates from the countries of the former Yugoslavia?

When we state “Balkans” we ask — what is it and where is it? This Report does not even attempt to differentiate between where Asia begins and where the Balkans ends, but it does suggest that Europe ends and the Balkans begins at the Slovenian-Croatian border. This is an assertion with which numerous Croats would not agree, and which could evoke antagonism toward the Report, regardless of the value of the work of the Commission and the usefulness of individual recommendations, notwithstanding a certain intellectual arrogance within the Commission.

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