Enver Imamović (1999).  
*History of the Bosnian Army*  
Fojnica: Svjetlost pp. 323

History of the Bosnian Army, by Dr. Enver Imamović, was published in 1999 by Svjetlost, Fojnica, as part of the series »Bosnian Roots«, with a printing run of 1000 copies.

I deliberately use the term *publication* in order to avoid the words *novel*, *outline* or the even more inappropriate term *scientific study*, for this book is none of these. Although *History of the Bosnian Army* aspires to be an historical study, it is evident at first sight that this is incorrect. The book lists no references, and although the footnotes accompanying the text occasionally provide sources for data, they are rarely relevant scientific sources. As quotation sources, the reader finds few relevant documents, serious historical studies, or even the names of acknowledged historians who have researched the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its neighboring countries. Muslim authors are quoted predominantly. While one may forgive the author, a Bosnian Muslim, for his prejudices and reluctance to include books and historical studies written by acknowledged Croatian and Serbian historians, it is unacceptable to write about aspects of Bosnian history without referring to respected historical best-sellers such as *History of Bosnia* by Noel Malcolm, *Europe, a History* by Norman Davies or *The Times Guide to the Peoples of Europe*.

One thus concludes that the author is not interested in history, but only in its political reinterpretation. This is a publication whose purpose is political promotion; a pamphlet camouflaged within an historical outline. In the collection of his materials, the author has apparently chosen only those writers and works whose theses and data fit easily into one of the basic political and promotional goals of his book. The author then imposes upon the data and quotations his political and promotional interpretations and conclusions, and insinuates them into the text, which then attempts to interpret history along the lines of a fable.

We can and should approach this book with a dose of humor. However, the audience to which the book is directed - young people, especially members of the Bosnian Army - might well take seriously its theses. The bigger the fabrication, the easier for people to accept.

Two basic »historical« theses are presented as historical fact:

a. Since ancient times there has been a special »Bosnian« people (ethnically and religiously different than the neighboring peoples) on the territory of today’s Bosnia and Herzegovina. Its real representatives are Bosnian Muslims, original inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who until the acceptance of Islam had a special religion - Bogomilism. Other peoples living in Bosnia and Herzegovina are merely alienated parts of the »Bosnian« people who accepted Catholicism or Orthodoxism, or else are »newcomers« arriving in the early Middle Ages.

b. This special Bosnian people has a thousand-year-old military tradition. With their military and moral qualities, they are superior to all other entities in the area. They are more courageous and have a stronger fighting spirit than others, but have suffered throughout history because of their honesty, and due to
the conspiracies, schemes and betrayals of others (Croats and Serbs). They have always fought for others and have repeatedly been ungratefully deceived. The most prominent exponents of this military tradition are Bosnian aghas and beys, direct descendents of thousand-year-old noble families.

Rebuttals of these claims need not rely on Croatian historical literature. It is sufficient to cite historical outlines in English, intended for wider audiences. Here is what the well known Times Guide to the Peoples of Europe says about Bosnian Muslims:

Bosnian Muslims are Slavic Muslims, descendants of Serbs and Croatians who converted to Islam during the period that Bosnia was under Ottoman rule (1463-1878). The national consciousness of Bosnian Muslims is a recent phenomenon; only with the creation of the first Yugoslav state in 1918 did they begin to identify themselves as a nation. Muslims throughout Yugoslavia were recognized in 1971 by the Communist authorities as members of the »Yugoslav nation« and thereafter, many identified themselves in the official census as Muslims. From 1992 on, the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina contributed to a strengthening of the Muslim national consciousness. Prior to the war in BH and the program of ethnic cleansing, Muslims comprised 39% of the BH population. Because the Bosnian Muslims identify themselves primarily on a religious basis - their language and ethnicity are the same as the non-Muslim South Slavs - their national sentiments became stronger as a result of historical experience, especially after the fall of the Ottoman powers.

It is often claimed that Islam gained so many converts in BH because this territory was a refuge for the Bogomils (Christian heretics); however, the high rate of conversion cannot serve as proof of partial Christianization, since the Albanians, who emphasized their firm Catholicism, also converted in large numbers to Islam when they hegemonized by the Turks. As followers of Islam during the Ottoman Empire, the Muslims in BH were spared participation in the blood sacrifice (deversime), paid fewer taxes, and had a greater degree of self-administration than their Christian and Jewish neighbors. In 1878, Bosnia and Herzegovina came under the Austrian protectorate. The Austrian minister who administered Bosnia hoped to neutralize, or at least establish a balance between, Croatian and Serbian demands by promoting »Bosnianism« and especially the Bosnian nationality. In post-war Yugoslavia, Bosnia emphasized itself as the most enthusiastic and »most Yugoslav« republic. After the proclamations of Slovenian and Croatian independence, Izetbegovic, as president of Bosnia, proclaimed the independence of BH in 1992. The Yugoslav Army, under control of Serbia, initiated aggression against BH and armed the local Serbs, who then committed genocide on the Muslims (and Croatians). Parts of BH were »cleansed« of Muslims and they live today almost exclusively in Muslim-Croatian areas of the state.

(excerpt paraphrased from The Times Guide to the People of Europe, edited by Felipe Fernandez-Armesto, London, 1994, pp. 204-207)

If we compare this widely known and scientifically indisputable quotation about the Bosnian Muslims with what Enver Imamović has written, it is obvious that he is reinterpreting history for political pur-
poses in order to achieve the following goals:
1. Encourage belligerence and instill military pride in Bosniacs-Muslims.
2. Create a feeling of national superiority of Bosnian Muslims over the other peoples living in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the neighboring countries.
3. Convince Bosnian citizens of their ethnic homogeneity and indigenousness in order to implement the idea of a unitarian and mono-ethnic »greater Bosnia«.

There also exists in the book a disproportion in the attention devoted to certain historical periods. The prehistoric and ancient periods are presented on 12 pages, the Middle Ages on 25, the period of the Turkish reign on 180 pages, and the period of the Austro-Hungarian reign on 70 pages. It is particularly striking that the period from the end of World War One until 1992 is not mentioned at all, and the period from 1992 until 1995 is described in only a few lines. The period of history in which Bosnia was part of the Ottoman Empire, i.e. the period during which the Muslim element was dominant, occupies a disproportionately large part of the book. This is by no means accidental; it indicates a tendency to associate »real Bosnians« with Islam.

Claims about »Bosniacs« or Bosnian Muslims being an indigenous people in what is today Bosnia and Herzegovina and parts of Croatia, and who are »superhumans« - invincible warriors - are not consistent with historical fact. By suggesting an earlier origin of the Bosnian Muslims than that of the other peoples in today’s Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, the author attempts to create for them a privileged position and promote their racial superiority over the »newcomers« of Slavic descent - Croats and Serbs, and strengthen their fighting spirit with the myth about »invincible warriors«. Politically, this could serve as an argument justifying a future reduction of the rights of all peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina other than Bosnian Muslims. The claims about the thousand-year-long continuous existence of Muslim bey families as direct descendants of the early Middle Age nobility, and consequently as holders of statehood, could well provide the basis for a future political elite within a unitarian Bosnia and Herzegovina.

After consideration of the theses and claims of this book, one may now wonder whether they might be the guiding principles for the creation of a great unitarian Bosnia, a Bosnia which would extend over the borders of today’s Bosnia and Herzegovina. If so, such political goals could easily generate new conflicts in a country whose continuance is guaranteed only by the constitutiveness and equality of the three peoples. Such conflicts may well be the end goal of this book.

Predrag Haramija

Fikret Muslimović (2000). War and Politics
Sarajevo: Bosančica-print
pp.295

As the title indicates, Muslimović’s book deals with war and politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1993 and 1996, from the point of view of one of the three constitutive peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina - the Bosniacs - Muslims, and
provides a review of the events in the region up until 2000.

The author was born on December 9, 1948, in the village of Rašlevo near Gračanica (Bosnia and Herzegovina). He graduated from the Military Academy in 1971, and from the High Military and Political School in Belgrade in 1980. In 1991, he left military school with the rank of lieutenant-colonel in the Yugoslav National Army (JNA), as a result of disagreements with the actions of the leadership in Serbia and the JNA.

Since the recognition of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina on April 8, 1992, he was head of security at the Territorial Defense Headquarters and advisor for military issues in the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1993, he became head of the Administration for Morale and, at the same time, was the leading Bosniac representative at the Joint Staff of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Croatian Defense Council.

From 1997 until 2000, he acted as Deputy Minister for Defense Preparations. On April 1, 2000, he was retired with the rank of Major General

Muslimovic has been a member of the Party of Democratic Action, and from 1994 until 1996, was a member of its central committee. He has published two books, How they lied to us, and Defense of the Republic and Aggression.

War and Politics comprises 295 pages and is divided into sixteen units, written chronologically and covering the years 1993-2000. Each of the units can be read separately, independent of the previous one. The book presents a collection of articles created in accordance with a particular strategic or current political issue.

Unit one

»Conception, strategy and the doctrine of defense« comprises fifty pages and is the only unit which lists a total of seventeen references. The author first defines terms such as defense conception, defense system, strategy and doctrine of defense.

Security and defense he defines as a function of state authorities, and then individually analyzes the conception of security and defense, the strategy of security and defense, and finally the doctrine and system of defense.

According to the author, »the conception of defense provides a solution to the issues of organization and engagement of internal potentials in the realization of particular political and defense-oriented goals«.

He views the security strategy as falling between the conception of security and the political goals to be achieved on the basis of appropriate conditions and directions,» while the defense strategy forms an integral part of the security strategy.«

The defense doctrine is »a system of acquired attitudes and views of the organization, preparation and use of armed forces, and conduct of armed battles as a fundamental and crucial form of war operations on the level of strategy, operativeness and tactics.«

The author further defines and analyzes nine »areas of operation of a military organization« where »the doctrine is oriented towards providing various solutions.« The defense system presents »the totality of factors in the state and society that have a defensive role, according to which tasks are defined for the armed forces, management and command, i.e., for the »defense sector.«

He further directs his attention to the defense system in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, »factors in the defense
system in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, »factor tasks« and »interactive connections among the defense factors in the Federation« in relation with Annex 4 of the Dayton Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

At the end of the unit, the author describes particular military and political organizations in their historical dimension (NATO and the Warsaw Pact), with special reference to the strategic role and significance of NATO.

Unit two
»Special characteristics of endangerment and defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina« comprises thirty pages and was written in Sarajevo in July 1996. The central issue of this unit is the defense of the Bosniac (Muslim) people, and seen in that light, the defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As the author himself states »the destruction of the Bosniac people and the destruction of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina are not the enemy’s goals in themselves, but are effects that are implicated if the final goal - the destruction of Islam - is achieved.«

He presents three elements which endanger Bosniacs: killing - genocide, urbicide, abuse; and assimilation. In his opinion, the failure to organize components of defense against the three afore-mentioned elements of endangerment of Bosniacs would be fatal. Islam occupies a central place as the source of Bosniac defense power. »A successful defense of Bosniacs as a people and Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state is only possible through a link of the Bosniac people, its consciousness and its behavior with its religion, Islam. Without this link the survival of Bosniacs in this region is impossible.«

The author concludes that »the defense interests and needs of Bosniacs do not contradict, but assist, the defense needs of Bosnian Serbs and Croats, and »the defense organization of Bosniacs is based on the Bosniac ideal of peace.«

Unit three
»Continuity of struggle for an integral Bosnian state«, comprising 14 pages, was written in Sarajevo in April 1997. It is a »content analysis of President Alija Izetbegović’s statements.« The issue pervading the entire analysis is why the Bosniac leadership, headed by President Izetbegović, has been accused of the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The analysis attempts to address this issue by presenting and explaining attitudes from some of President Izetbegović’s statements.

Unit four
»The fighting morale of the defensive-liberation forces during the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina«, comprising a total of 54 pages, describes the main characteristics and the state of the fighting morale in the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1990 and 1995. This unit actually presents an analysis of the fighting morale of B&H Army units in the defensive-liberation war against the aggressor attacking the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and is a work product of the Administration for Morale, headed by the author of this book.

The analysis is divided in two parts. The first is entitled »Character, foundations, goals, organization of work aimed at development of the fighting morale in the defensive-liberation forces in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina«, and the other is »Characteristics of the state of fighting morale in the defensive-liberation war against the aggressor attacking the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.«
In the first part, characteristics of fighting morale are analyzed, as well as the foundations of the creation, goals, organization and work of experts in the development of the fighting morale in the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The second part analyzes the basic characteristics of the fighting morale in different periods (1990, from 1991 until early April 1992, from April 1992 until the end of 1992, from early 1993 until early 1994, and from early 1994 until the end of 1995). The above-mentioned periods refer to the time before the armed aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the initial period of the aggression, the time of activities against aggressive military potentials of the Republic of Croatia and military potentials of Serbia and Montenegro, and the period from the Washington Agreement up to the Dayton Agreement.

The state of the fighting morale in the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the author points out, was assessed on a daily and weekly basis at the Administration for Morale, and the results of the assessments were used by »the President of the Presidency and the Commander-in-Chief of the General Headquarters.«

The author particularly emphasizes the following influences on the fighting morale in the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina: loss of manpower, military and professional competence of commanders, influence of the state authorities on the morale of unit members, the attitudes of soldiers towards the system of management and command in the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the level of information acquired by the soldiers, emotional and rational attitude of soldiers towards the aggressor, behavior of soldiers, stimulative measures, motivation and readiness for participation in military operations, and faith and negative forms of behavior.

It should be pointed out that the development of the fighting morale in the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina was an integral part of functional responsibility for all management and command elements, from the lowest level of lance-corporal to the President of Bosnia and Herzegovina as the Supreme Commander.

Unit five

»Principal evidence of aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina« totals four pages and was written in Sarajevo on May 22, 1998. It lists eight facts which, according to the author, provide evidence of aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The facts are as follow: international recognition of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, direction of military activities on the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina from Belgrade, deployment of mobilized manpower from Serbia and Montenegro for the execution of military activities against the legal institutions of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, supremacy of the Serbian and Montenegrin people over the Bosnian Serb leadership, the »Tuđman - Milošević« agreement, ethnic cleansing, and political and military goals of Serbia and Montenegro for the accession of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Unit six

»Some strategic aspects of the position of the Bosnian liberation forces« consists of eight pages and was written in Sarajevo on June 3, 1995. It analyzes the position of Bosniacs as a constitutive people in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in relation to, the author states, (1) political and military potentials of the greater-Serbian aggression and (2) political motives and activities of the leadership of...
the Republic of Croatia, who want to use the political and military power of the legal Bosnian authorities for the creation of circumstances in which the political position of Bosniacs would be marginalized and eventual domination of Croats over Bosniacs would be ensured.«

At the end, the author offers the following solution: »A federation of non-national cantons within the internationally recognized borders of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is the formula for the most complete form of preservation of the Bosnian state, and the equality of its peoples and citizens.«

Unit seven

»The role of Bosnian Army officers and the significance of armed combat comprises four pages and was written in Sarajevo on June 29, 1995. Its goal is to raise the morale of officers in the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The entire unit was written in the spirit of the author’s initial thesis: »If we want to protect ourselves, if we want to save our families, if we want to save the people, especially Bosniacs, and if we want to save the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the only thing left is combat, armed combat against the enemy, against the aggressor.«

Unit eight

»Priorities in the strengthening of combat potentials of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina« comprises three pages, and was created in Sarajevo on July 27, 1995. It was written in the same vein as the previous unit - strengthening of the fighting morale. The following sentence speaks for itself: »... we are wondering how to survive ... the answer is ... simple: we need to fight.«

Unit nine

»Psychological propaganda of the aggression forces and information activities of the defensive-liberation forces during the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina« comprises 74 pages. It provides an account of the psychological propaganda used during the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, and opposed to it, the information activities of the defensive-liberation forces during the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina.«

In his account of the psychological propaganda during the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the author analyzes the characteristics of greater-Serbian and greater-Croatian propaganda.

His starting point, later elaborated through a series of units, is evident from the following sentences: »During the preparations for the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and at its beginnings, a danger from greater-Serbian propaganda was overtly manifested, while the greater-Croatian propaganda was during that period covert, mostly within regions that were being prepared for the perfidious greater-Croatian aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Together with the greater-Serbian propaganda, the second half of 1992 sees an escalation of an ever more overt greater-Croatian propaganda, intensified with the attack of the Croatian Army on the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was preceded by the organization of the Croatian Defense Council, as a form of mobilizing Bosnian Croats during the aggression.«

The author’s starting position in the description of »greater-Serbian and greater-Croatian« propaganda is that aggressors against the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina were Serbia, Montenegro and the Republic of Croatia. It is, therefore, necessary to point out some of his conclusions relating to greater-Serbian and greater-Croatian propaganda:

»Since the creators of greater-Serbian propaganda were aware that many Croats felt the same prejudices and hatred towards Bosniacs as did the Serbs, the entire greater-Croatian propaganda, which fulfilled both greater-Croatian and greater-Serbian strategic appetites towards the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was realized within the greater-Serbian propaganda on the basis of the Tuđman-Milošević agreement aimed at achieving greater-Serbian interests.«

»The greater-Croatian propaganda had the function of realizing greater-Serbian interests.«

»Because of the same goals (partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina and extermination of Bosniacs), the greater-Croatian and the greater-Serbian propaganda had the same characteristics with regard to conditions, substance, and methods of their realization.«

The author goes on to describe the goals and the scope of »information activities« that had »the purpose of exposing ... false claims, and proving that the aggressor states were violating generally accepted principles of international relations, by stating facts about the aggression of Serbia, Montenegro and Croatia against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.«

Finally, the author provides facts regarding the substance of »information activities« from the beginning of the armed aggression until the end of 1992, during 1993, 1994 and 1995 up until the beginning of peace negotiations in Dayton (November 2, 1995).

Unit ten

»Special operations against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina« comprises eleven pages and was written in Sarajevo in August, 1995. Here the author analyzes goals, sites, and scope of the special operations against Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosniac people. He pays particular attention to »the activities prior to the escalation of the greater-Serbian and greater-Croatian policies«, »special activities of the greater-Serbian and greater-Croatian policies in the period shortly preceding the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina« and »special activities during the armed aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina«. The author concludes that the »special activities« will continue with the same goal as in the past, »in order to destroy Bosniac political and statehood particularities.«

Unit eleven

»What ‘Yugoslavia’ means in the hands of greater-Serbian Nazis« comprises two pages and was written in Sarajevo on January 28, 1999. Using the example of Montenegro, the author indicates that the armed conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, those in Kosovo, and the potential ones in Montenegro, exhibit the characteristics of greater-Serbian aggression, rather than those of an internal conflict or civil war.

Unit thirteen

»The importance of the Dayton Agreement« comprises three pages and was written in Sarajevo on November 22, 1995. In this article, the author analyzes to what degree Bosniac interests were realized, and emphasizes that »the Agreement guarantees more than a minimum of necessary conditions for a successful perspec-
xiv

Unit fourteen

»The meaning of Tuđman’s state-
ments during the signing of the Paris
Agreement on December 14, 1995« is a
one-page article written in Sarajevo
on December 15, 1995. The author pro-
vides a critical analysis of late Presi-
dent Tuđman’s statement, considering
that it contains a series of mes-
sages arising from greater-Croatian
goals that deny Bosniacs as a people and
Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state.«

Unit fifteen

»An assessment of the current situation
regarding NATO’s use of military
forces against Milošević’s regime« com-
pri ses five pages and was written in
Sarajevo on April 1, 1999. The assess-
ment examines current results of
NATO air strikes directed at the
achievement of strategic goals; prob-
lumes created from the consequences
of NATO air strikes on targets in
Yugoslavia; and probable directions in
further development of the
situation in Kosovo and the entire
region. The author concludes that air
strike results are not sufficient, that
NATO should inflict more severe losses
to Yugoslav Army manpower, and that
a stable political and military
organization of Albanians is the only
way to achieve the defeat of greater-
Serbian politics.

Unit sixteen

»Strategic issues of security in
Southeastern Europe« is the last unit,
tot-
ing eighteen pages. In this article, the
author discusses the security aspects
of democracy and human rights, the
return of refugees, affirmation of co-
existence and the position of national
minorities as the most important
issue of security and peace, the
significance of education, and other
security issues related to the Stability
Pact for Southeastern Europe, the
Dayton Agreement, demilitarization,
the restoring of balance, and so forth.

The beginning thesis is that democracy
is the fundamental issue of peace and sta-
bility in Southeastern Europe. He
addresses the relationship between
democratic and
antidemocratic potential, and holds that
the connections among antidemocratic
forces in different countries are far
closer than connections among democratic
forces.« The author also stresses that
democratic forces in the Republic
of Croatia and Yugoslavia can contribute
most to lasting peace and stability in the
region.«

According to the author, the Stability
Pact for South Eastern Europe and the
consistent implementation of the Dayton
Agreement are the »path to peace and sta-
bility.«

He further analyzes the »new situation
characterized by the wish for Bosnia
and Herzegovina to access Partnership
for Peace and NATO,« and asks »whether
Bosnia and Herzegovina can maintain
two armies,« for »two armies in one
country is a source of instability, a
source for endanger-
ing peace.« The solution is seen in the inte-
gration of »the military dimension of the
Bosnian state.«

Demilitarization of Bosnia and
Herzegovina is not realistic in the current
state of affairs, for in the author’s opinion,
the Bosniac people would thus »remain
unprotected.« He maintains this to be a
good idea, but advocates a »rationalization
of military forces« and »maintaining of a
balance.«

The author sees the possibility for a
lasting peace and stability in the establish-
ment of a balance of military potentials,
the security policy of countries in
Southeastern Europe, »the balanced
position of national minorities« and »the balanced relations of
majority peoples towards their members in
Based upon the above, the following can be said about Muslimović’s book, *War and Politics*:

1) The author of *War and Politics* wishes to act as a witness to a difficult period in which the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was established and defended. Regardless of his wish to be an objective witness, the fact that he was an active participant directly affecting the development of events precludes this. The author offers his version of the truth between two sides—good and evil. Two units, the first and last, »Concept, strategy and the doctrine of defense« and »Strategic issues of security in South-Eastern Europe« respectively, differ from the others. All other units exhibit a common trait: the author’s fear that »the theses could be confused«, i.e. that an aggression was not committed against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and that the conflict was a civil war. Therefore, there is always an aggressor (Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Croatian Defense Council etc.) and a defender—the Bosniac people. In this part, the author often equates the destiny of the Bosniac people with the destiny of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

2) The remaining two chapters do not describe the past, but refer to the future through a consideration of a potential defense system in the Bosnian Federation and the type of balance needed in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to establish a lasting peace and stability. The greatest disadvantage of the book is its lack of connection among topics, and the variety of methodological approaches used in the analysis, induction, deduction, and description of problems. The book offers neither an introduction nor a preface, where the reader might find information about the topic of the book and its basic contribution. Therefore, we recommend this book only as a collection of the author’s views and a treatment of the work of the Administration for Morale regarding the political needs for the motivation of military units in the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina during the war, and his recollections on the conception, strategy and doctrine of defense in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The author’s central focus is epitomized by a judgment given at the end of the book that »the relation towards territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina is of the most vital importance for the security in Southeastern Europe.«

Simply put, the message of *War and Politics* is:

The destiny of security in Southeastern Europe depends on the destiny of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state. Therefore, security in Southeastern Europe depends on the position of Bosniacs as a people, and a state of Bosnia and Herzegovina tailored to fit the needs of the Bosniacs.

Miroslav Medimurec
Two recently released books, one by Mladen Ancic and the other by Dr. Muhamed Borogovac, present the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in widely divergent manners.

The first, written by Mladen Ancic, a young historian of Croatian background, utilizes a wide array of credible materials to provide an academic analysis, evaluation, and possible resolution of the difficult »Bosnian issue«. The second book attempts by means of unreliable evidence to superficially argue, repeat, and impose upon the readers the »theory of betrayal« as the only explanation for the failure of the concept of a unitary, indivisible, democratic and civil »Bosniac« Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Of course, the political and national standpoints of the two authors are in complete opposition. Ancic, a Croat, attempts valiantly to show that the only way to resolve and satisfy the desires of all three nations is to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina, while Borogovac, a Bosniac Muslim, considers this proposal a betrayal which would cause the dissolution of the state. Ancic draws his proofs from historical sources and from the development of the three national identities, while Borogovac finds his arguments in the newly created Bosnian myths about the »thousand year old Bosnian state, religion, and military«, and from the international recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Ancic’s evidence is not exclusionary; he speaks always of three nations. Borogovac, on the other hand, refers only to one nation which has a right to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Ancic attempts to understand and justify the desires of the Serbs, Muslims, and Croatians; he is more tolerant in the exchange of views than Dr. Borogovac, who is tolerant and democratic only toward those who agree with his views on a unitary Bosnia. Others he condemns and would punish for opposing the intolerance of a unitary state in which one nation would rule, based on its overwhelming numbers. Ancic is prepared to discuss. Borogovac is exclusionary and imposes his theses. There is a political willingness on Ancic’s part for a resolution which would guarantee all nations in Bosnia and Herzegovina constitutional equality. As an indication of this willingness, he points out, the Croatians have signed all resolutions presented thus far ensuring such equality. Borogovac calls into question all the signed agreements, as they prevent, in his view, the creation of a state in which one nation would rule the other two.

The most recent political developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially in the Federation, confirm that the crisis continues, and that there is wide opposition to the pressure of the international community and support for a lasting peace and a resolution which satisfies all three nations, unlike Borogovac, who in his book promotes a unitary state. These developments are a confirmation of Ancic’s bitter conclusion that political resolutions continue to be imposed, the free will of the nations is being ignored, and there is a lack of intelligent solutions for the crisis in the region.


Political publications - Osijek, Zagreb, Split. Pan Liber

Was it a war for the independence of three newly emergent states - Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina - against the aggression of the former Yugoslavia, or
was it a civil war? Mladen Ancic poses this fundamental question in his book. In his search for an answer, he considers the fact that the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina did not conclude with a victory or defeat for any of the three parties (which gives credence to all three interpretations), and attempts to come to a conclusion about who actually erred in Bosnia.

Ancic, a young Croatian historian - facts which are not insignificant in understanding his approach, methods, arguments and conclusions - tries to respond from a certain historical distance to the obvious fact that the Bosnian issue, in spite of the efforts of the entire world, is still not resolved, political responses to the crises were not successful, and efforts of world politicians were in vain.

By means of a thorough dissection in which he uses strong historical documentation, he shows the impossibility of the Dayton project and of any Bosnia based upon the principle of force and the predominance of only one of its nations. Ancic locates the roots of this Bosnian knot in the history of Bosnia, and in the omnipresent pejorative syntagma used by foreign politicians, experts, and journalists to explain an often incomprehensible and unresolvable issue, i.e.: "the centuries-long hatred" or "actions of the political elite which brought the nations into conflict."

Through a series of chapters which address and direct the basic question of his research - "Between history and politics", "civilization, history, and territory", "Era of the clash of civilizations", "Three Bosniacs", "Who Erred in Bosnia", "Croatian role in Bosnia", "How to Understand Bosnia", "History Repeats Itself as a Farce", "Legend of the Bogomils and Bosniak-Muslims", "In the fog of Bosnian myths and legends" - he investigates the historical dimension.

Ancic divides the issue into three areas: interpreting the legal-state status and formation of Bosnia-Herzegovina through history, the creation and articulation of collective identity and relations toward legal-state territory (two areas in which he feels he is most capable), and the third area, explanation of the national customs and traditions (about which he is less qualified; therefore, he does not enter into a more detailed discussion of this topic).

With the thoroughness of an historian, he collects historical facts with which he can successfully show how Bosnia is anchored by history to the past, and how it determines the present and the future. Today's political reality is rooted to the historical, psychological, sociological, religious, cultural, and political past of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and no type of force, artificial political theories, pressure, or political "engineering" can change this fact (just as the recent political developments in BH after the last elections confirm Ancic's basic thesis on the need to recognize reality; that is, create a political configuration of the state which validates the will of all three nations).

Ancic addresses the responsibility held by outside factors in extending Bosnia's agony, and the stubborn efforts of the world to reject the facts which arise from the special historical-political development of this geographical area upon which three distinct national identities developed: Bosniak, Serbian, and Croatian. The obvious desire of these three nations for a guarantee of their biological security (from which flow all other national rights, freedoms, and obligations) and a state configuration which would grant them this freedom has been, subsequent to the recent actions during and after the elections, rejected, attacked, and characterized as "tribal, nationalistic, and exclusionary."

Ancic carefully and thoroughly discusses and interprets Bosnian history from the Middle Ages to the present day, and shows
how the Ottoman invasion interrupted the process of national identification and the consolidation of those areas of the state which were then known as the Bosnian kingdom.

Political development was thereby frozen for four centuries. Often cited is Srećko Džaja’s research “Confessionality and Nationality of Bosnia and Herzegovina: pre-Emancipation Phase, 1463-1804 (R. Oldenburg Verla, Munich, 1984, Sarajevo, 1993) in which he concludes that Bosnia, after 1463, ceased to exist as a unified political entity (though it was hardly that prior to the Turkish occupation). Four centuries of Turkish rule brought to a halt all processes of national emancipation until 1878. Only the Franciscans passed on their Catholicism, and the Orthodox church promulgated the mythical strength of Dusan’s empire.

The Bosnian Muslims, who resided on the edges of the empire, were entitled in the period when the Ottomans were the strongest, and when the Ottoman Empire disintegrated at the beginning of the 19th century, the Muslims, with their reawakened desire for national identity, become its most conservative element, and resisted reform by armed rebellion (Dragon of Bosnia).

The Congress of Berlin, like Dayton 120 years later, placed Bosnia under an Austrian protectorate. The consequence of this decision was that the Serbian and Croatian nations, thus far disenfranchised, allied themselves to their mother states of Serbia and Croatia, then a part of Austro-Hungary, while the Muslims rejected both these options, choosing to maintain the basic identity they have kept to the present day.

Austro-Hungary used the policy of “divide and conquer” to endorse the Muslims and impede the desire of the other two nations to unite with their mother states. Neither the first nor the second Yugoslavia was able to resolve this omnipresent issue of inequality of two nations and one religion. Tito finally resolved it by means of the 1974 Constitution, in which Muslims (on the basis of religion) are transformed into Muslims (on a basis of nationality) in order to put them between the Serbs and Croats and, by means of their equal status, attempt to save Yugoslavia (and at the same time, Bosnia and Herzegovina). With the reopening of the Bosnian Pandora’s box at the end of the 80s, the Yugoslav crisis, and the war in the first half of the 1990s, the suppressed national desires of the three nations, (war brought about the Muslim-Bosniak national identity), broke out, and all attempts to reach a final resolution failed. Two of the nations, the Serbs and the Croats, again sought assistance from their mother states, while the Bosniaks became the most fervent supporters of a Bosnian unitary state, as they saw in this a chance to reach their final goal: a state in which they would rule the other two nations by their predominant numbers. Bosniaks now attempted to overcome the historical discontinuity between Middle Ages Bosnia, which barely had the attributes of statehood, and modern Bosnia and Herzegovina by creating historical myths and legends - about the state and its Illyrian heritage, the existence of a continuous military history, language, culture, and religion (Bogomil). They hoped by this to create the historical foundations for a political resolution by which Bosnia and Herzegovina would function as an independent and autonomous state in which Bosniaks, the only legal successors, would predominate.

Since the final resolution - a military victory or defeat of one of the warring parties - would have been contrary to the principles of the new world order and the
strategic interests of the great powers on the territory of southeastern Europe, the war was brought to a halt in Dayton.

At the same time, all the processes of political affirmation of the three nations in conflict were stopped and put on hold, though they could peacefully have reached a solution which validated their individual political desires. In Ancic’s view, the most natural resolution would have been division and, finally, free elections and resolution.

It is the three nations in Bosnia and Herzegovina which are affected most by the delay and imposed political relations, and are the only factors truly interested in a lasting peace. Ancic, in the broadest chapter of his book, “Between history and politics” concludes that the war was a natural and almost unavoidable result of political events. In their delayed national identification, all three nations desired division and a consolidation of their own territory, as well as the setting of borders which would guarantee their security. Although some of the earlier proposals offered by the international community to resolve the crisis: three republics, national cantons, were closer to the wishes of the three nations, the Washington and Dayton Agreements ignored all of them.

The international factors attempted further to impose a unitary, multi-ethnic, civil Bosnia and Herzegovina, supporting in this way the Muslim idea of one, indivisible Bosnia and Herzegovina in which Bosniak-Muslims would dominate the others by the strength of their numbers. Thus the instability was prolonged, an instability which, according to Ancic, could be resolved, and he shows how by paraphrasing Cato’s saying about Carthage; that is, that it should be destroyed, but the verb “destroy” is replaced by the verb “divide”. His paraphrase goes thus: “Ceterum censeo Bosniam esse partiendam.”

On the basic question of who erred in Bosnia in the conflict between Croats and Muslims, Ancic analyzes data from both sides and concludes how the conflict could have arisen. Alija Izetbegovic, and the Muslims (who later became “Bosniaks”) refused to directly acknowledge the Serb-Croatian conflict, and resisted joining forces with the side which was under attack. When they themselves were brutally attacked and found themselves unprepared, faced with defeat and biological extinction, they then assumed the role of victim-nation. They began to emphasize their national, religious, and cultural tolerance, and their civil and democratic orientation, values which were acceptable and understandable to the West. Croats were characterized at every opportunity as their opposite, nationally intolerant, prepared to destroy the unitary state and form pacts with the enemy. The only step which would have freed Croats from the label of “separatist” would have been their acceptance of Muslim domination under the auspices of a civil state. The thesis of Croats as the guilty party in the conflict with the Muslims is rejected firmly by Ancic: “the only agreement with the Muslim partners which could have been reached in the first war years (1991-1992) would have been the complete surrender of the Croatian side. And nothing else”

Ancic also touches upon Huntington’s thesis of the clash of civilizations. Ancic sees a confirmation of Huntington’s thesis in the example of Bosnia, and particularly the failed American policies which supported the “victim” based on their principles of idealism, morality, siding with the good, resisting evil and therefore “de facto” assisting in the creation of an Islamic state in Europe. He asserts that ignoring the latent
danger from Islamic radicalism on the borders of Croatia was extremely dangerous, and the rejection of the Croats and the uncritical assistance to and enabling of a possible Islamization of the Bosnian state were strategically and politically incomprehensible.

Ancic believes the only means for resolving the current political "pat position" in Bosnia and Herzegovina is a "revision and adjustment of the Washington and Dayton Agreements, on the basis of equality of all three nations. This means that... if the Serbs have a right to Republika Srpska, then the same right applies to the Muslims and the Croatians." The precondition for this, according to Ancic, is a "redefinition of existing territorial arrangements, creating a balance between two basic demands: a) separate economic and defense capabilities; and b) territorial and geographical conditionality."

Both conditions require territorial exchanges which would mean an unavoidable transfer of populations. Ancic holds that this resolution is less costly than new bloodshed, and that it will be reached either by a new round of negotiations or a new war. Ancic concludes bitterly that "the wise person would opt for the former, but experience shows that intelligence was never the predominant factor here."

This book will certainly not appeal to the creators of the current political projects in Bosnia and Herzegovina, who will categorize it as a nationalistic interpretation and justification for Croatian policies toward Bosnia and Herzegovina. The serious reader, however, will not reject the book, because he will utilize history to evaluate and attempt to resolve the issue of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and can find therein sufficient facts, figures, and connections to reach a richer understanding of the Bosnian "dark land". Ancic's historical arguments foresaw today's political developments. It is difficult to oppose his proposals for the resolution of the Bosnian crisis and reject his identification of those responsible for its prolongation. Due to inflexible political facts, there is continuing opposition to the current imposed political resolutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the refusal to submit deepens the continuing instability, and delays the entry of Bosnia and Herzegovina and surrounding countries into the family of European nations.

Dr. Muhamed Borogovac (2000).
War in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Political Aspects
Zadar, Narodni list

"It's high time to come to the aid of the patriotic forces fighting against the forces of betrayal and division of Bosnia... I am writing this book in haste, before it is too late, while it is still possible to say NO! to the division of our homeland...."

Quote from the introduction to Dr. Muhamed Borogovac's book.

In a number of books which have appeared in recent years about the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, its causes, goals, resolutions, and perpetrators, the Bosniaks, including Dr. Muhamed Borogovac, have created facts, distorted reality, and "invented myths and legends", according to Mladen Ancic (author of Who is to blame for Bosnia), in order to legalize their political desires for their own state. In the event that this goal should prove unattainable, they attempt to accuse others of treason and of dividing the state."
This book represents another of the hastily prepared interpretations of the recent political history of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and its goal is to convince the readers that a conspiracy and sellout of Bosnian interests exist. It is written in a superficial manner, is poorly documented, and lacks credibility. The author's use of crass language seems intended to cater to the tastes of the «lower classes». The book is a consequence of the political battle between various Muslim political groups struggling for power and position in a future state of Bosnia. Dr. Borogovac is a member of an opposition group operating on a different continent, and his political activities directed against his country’s government appear tailored to please the host country, and not to persuade his readers. The book sets the goal of proving the thesis that conspirators and traitors are endangering a unitary and sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina. The role of chief conspirator and traitor is played by the present, charismatic president of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic. Facts and events are either invented or analyzed on the basis of invalidated theses. The proofs offered are impossible to verify, perceptions are highly subjective, personal military experiences are rarely provided, and experiences of others are related second-hand. The book is intended as testimony, but lacks an academic, persuasive explanation of the war, and neglects the historical-political influences. It follows the current mode of books on the Bosnian issue, written by native and foreign authors, who wish to use their short-lived experiences and engagements on former Yugoslav territory to form evaluations, offer advice, and share their feelings about a war which is incomprehensible to them and thus can only be explained in very general terms (most consider it a noble struggle based on atavistic passions).

Dr. Borogovac’s book reveals itself in its intentions, language, and structure as a book which has been written «on orders», as it indefatigably repeats certain basic ideas about indivisibility, sovereignty, historical opportunity, and so on. The Bosniacs are represented as the only nation that opposes the division of the state, the only nation capable of democracy and building a civil society. Borogovac further states that, along with the two main enemies, Serbs and Croatians, Alija Izetbegovic and his cohorts have transformed victories into defeats by signing treasonous capitulation treaties and agreements, dividing and giving away parts of the state, and therefore depriving the Bosniacs of their state, which belongs to them based on God’s (Allah’s) decree and historical rights.

Dr. Borogovac is an educated mathematician, who participated at the onset of the war in the formation of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Tuzla. Later he fled in fear and uncertainty to Croatia, and then to the United States, where he teaches college mathematics and is active as a member of the Bosnian Congress, which operates outside Bosnia. He is an opponent of Alija Izetbegovic and his policies, which led to the Dayton Agreement and the current blueprint for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Borogovac considers Dayton and all other signed agreements a form of capitulation, leading to the disappearance of the state in which apparently only one nation resides: Bosniacs. He holds that the interests and existence of the »thousand year long state and Bosnian nation« (sic) have been betrayed, and unsystematically utilizes alleged «evidence» to reveal the pro-Serbian politics of Alija Izetbegovic, which expose him as a false Muslim believer, a declared Serb, and a Bosnian traitor. The main basis for the right of the Bosniacs to a state is, in his view, the international recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina: if...
the world has recognized the state, then it
exists as one state, one nation, language,
history, and culture. He considers the
desires of the Serbs and Croats for equali-
ty nationalistic, because their civil equality
in Bosnia and Herzegovina is ensured by
Bosnian tolerance and openness.
Borogovac further argues that Bosnia and
Herzegovina, because of Dayton and
other actions of Izetbegovic, has been
divided and no longer exists. Republika
Srpska is only a temporary entity; when the
right moment for secession arrives, it will
first sede from Bosnia and Herzegovina
and then join with the Serbian Republic of
Yugoslavia. He finds the causes for the war
in the past, in the Second World War, when
Bosnia and Herzegovina was a victim of
nationalistic incursions.

The same themes are constantly
repeated: one state (unitary), in which the
most populous nation (Bosniacs), rules.
His goal is to appeal to the emotions of the
Bosniacs by means of the most simplistic
political messages, and to encourage them
to be exclusionary and radical as well. All
agreements and discussions on a state
framework satisfactory to all three constitu-
tionally protected nations are considered
traitorous and in violation of the interna-
tional principles prohibiting change of bor-
ders. The only solution, therefore, is a
Bosnian civil state in which one citizen has
one vote. All the agreements, Washington
and Dayton and others, are capitulations
and invalid. Everything should begin anew,
from the moment of recognition of Bosnia
and Herzegovina by the international com-
community, as this represented complete free-
dom to create a Bosnian (Muslim) state.
Such a simplistic interpretation of the his-
torical-political situation in Bosnia and
Herzegovina cannot be considered a seri-
ous analysis of more current Bosnia-
Herzegovinian history, but only as a super-
ficial, reader-friendly pamphlet in service of
political goals. The Bosnian Congress and
its members participated in the last elec-
tions and have joined the Alliance for
Change bloc. Borogovac’s book has
apparently served as election propaganda
material and not as a serious academic
investigation of the continuing burning
issue of Bosnia.

Miroslav Međimorec

Stjepan Šiber (2000).
Deceptions, delusions, the
truth 1992 war diary

Sarajevo: RABIC Publishing Co.
pp. 348

Šiber’s 348 page book was published
by the Sarajevo-based RABIC publishing
company in the fall of 2000. It discusses
prewar events, the beginning and course of
the war in Sarajevo and Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and provides a summary of
the author’s role in these events. An
account is also given of the complex rela-
tions between the defenders of the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who were of
different religious and national back-
grounds, and the reasons for the creation
of the Croatian Defense Council, the
Patriot League, the Croatian Liberation
Forces (HOS), and the Army of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The author also tries to iden-
tify reasons for the confrontation, and later
the restricted (but cruel) armed conflict
between members of the B&H Army and
the Croatian Defense Council. Various
documents, reports, and maps appended
at the end of the book serve as evidence of
authenticity and enhance the book’s docu-
mentary quality.

The book is based on authentic entries

Book Reviews M. Bogorovac
from the diary of Stjepan Šiber, M.A. in military science, who in 1992 placed himself at the disposal of the presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the defense against the aggression being perpetrated on Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He served as Chief of Staff of the B&H Territorial Defense, Deputy Commander of the Territorial Defense, and later Deputy Commander of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The author relates his personal evaluations of the reasons for and course of the aggression of the so-called Yugoslav National Army against the sovereign Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, describing the huge and sometimes insurmountable difficulties encountered in the defense of individual and national freedoms of citizens, and in gaining the independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He also identifies and emphasizes his own and other people’s delusions during the struggle for the survival of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which were often caused by deceptions to which he himself had fallen victim.

In his book, the author has made an ambitious attempt to write the truth about the “agonized, betrayed and deceived people, people of different religions, political and cultural orientations.” This quote from the introductory part of the book identifies Šiber as a man who believed in and defended a united, civil Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a man to whom chauvinism and extremism were foreign.

One must interpret the author’s introductory address to the reader in the same context, where he describes the deceptions and delusions as “a shameful betrayal, a shameful history of sub-humans and inhumanity which needs to be severely condemned, but never forgotten.”

The book provides numerous excerpts from the author’s conversations on the crucial issues of the country’s defense and future, as well as his impressions of his interlocutors and individuals from the political, religious, military and civil segments of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. For instance, he relates conversations and gives evaluations of specific actions of Alija Izetbegović, Cardinal Vinko Puljić, Ejup Ganić, Alija Demustafić, Mate Boban, Stjepan Ključić, Mile Akmadžić, Jovan Divjak, Sefer Halilović, Jerko Doka, Tihomir Blaškić, Dario Kordić, Zlatko Lagumdžija, Avdo Hebib, JNA Generals, Kukanjac and Gver, Ismet Bajramović-Cela, Juko Prazina and others.

Particularly interesting are conversations, negotiations, and agreements with UNPROFOR representatives deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Generals Nambijar, McKenzie, Razek, Morlion, Simpson and others.

Despite the fact that the author sometimes loses objectivity in his approach to the resolution of problems on military cooperation between the B&H Army and the Croatian Defense Council, I recommend this book to the readers, because it provides an understanding of the goals and significant events which occurred in the defense of freedom and sovereignty of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Even though these political and military events took place only recently, one can observe that the author’s approach to the defense of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was never implemented, as the Dayton Agreement divided the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina into Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, based on exclusively national criteria.