POGLAVJE 1


2. On the ceremony held December 1st 2002 in Winnipeg, Manitoba, soldiers of the 2nd battalion Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (2PPCLI) have from the Governor General and the commander in Chief the Right honorable Adrienne Clarkson received Unit Commendation for their bravery shown at the Medak Pocket battle.

3. “Nation Post” July 4th 2002 – Chris Wattie “Heroism in Croatia” 1993 Canadian peacekeepers made history fighting Croatian army at the fiercest battles Canadians have engaged in since the Korean War.

4. Croatian weekly “Nacional” December 10th 2002, photocopy of the Croatian Ministry of Defense official press release issued and signed on December 6th 2002 by commissioner Dušan Viro “…we state that the members of Croatian military were not engaged in an armed combat with the Canadian battalion within UNPROFOR. Therefore there could not have been any casualties on either side.

5. Divoselo, (Lički) Čitluk, Počitelj – three villages under the Velebit mountains, south of Gospić, mainly Serb populated, surrounded by hamlets and smaller villages. During WW2 Divoselo was a known rebel place – it was the birthplace of many JNA generals (seven), it was a political (communist) and nationalistic (radical Serb) stronghold, which politically influenced the whole Lika region.

6. Medak, mostly Serb populated, important road junction and the train station on the Gospić-Gračac-Knin line, stronghold of Četniks, headquarters of Krajina Serb army. Janko Bobetko in his book “Sve moje bitke”, page 381: “…it is Četniks stronghold which was undefeated until the end of WW2. (Partisans weren’t able to take it – author’s note)… The Četniks were able to hold to Medak all the time.”

7. Velebit Mountains – “Croatia’s Spine” – the mountain which runs along the Croatian coastline from Senj, Vrtnik Pass to Obrovac, Zrmanja Canyon. It is 145 kilometers long (aerial longitude 135 kilometers). It is a marking point to divide Mediterranean from the continental interior, mythical Croatian mountain sung about in “Vila Velebita”, forbidden during communist Yugoslavia, important strategic point, difficult to cross, National Park under protection, maritime limestone from the south and thick wood from the northern, Lika’s side. Ideal for guerilla warfare.

8. «The Virovitica-Karlovec-Karlobag line» - the amputation line which was intended to come into being by the imposed Yugoslav king Alexander after the assassination of Croatian national tribune Stjepan Radić in 1928. The remains of this amputated Croatia “would be seen from the Zagreb Cathedral’s tower”. That line is also mentioned in Četniks’ plans during WW2 (Moljević, Draža Mihajlović), the line mentioned by Serb radical politicians (Šešelj) and by the JNA military strategists as the western border of “Greater Serbia”.

9. “Greater Serbia” is a project that would unite all the territories populated by Serbs and therefore realize a dream of a Serbian state whose ideator was at the begin-
ning of the 19th century the Serbian ideologist Ilija Garašanin, and whose followers were members of the terrorist organization “Crna Ruka” – Četniks, radicals, and Milošević’s socialists – advocates of Serbian medieval empire.

10. Masleničko Ždriło – narrow sea channel near Maslenica, entrance to the Novigrad’s sea, crossed by bridge on Adriatic highway near Zadar, which JNA destroyed in September 1991, and by doing so has cut the direct continental connection between Croatia’s north and south, an important strategic point.

11. “Sve moje bitke” by General Janko Bobetko, Zagreb, 1996, page 382: “…the battle for Velebit Mountains was won, that was the strategic issue. I repeat, who holds Velebit, holds half of Croatia. Who doesn’t control Velebit… there Croatia is cut in half.”


“The Medak Pocket has given to the world the first credible evidence that Serbia, though the most important, was not the only perpetrator of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans.”

13. Mark Arnold quotes Christopher Gunnes in the “Politics and Prejudices” BBC Radio program: “The thesis of a long standing ethnic strife in the Yugoslavia was kindled on purpose, so that British and other governments would find an excuse to firmly stand against Serb expansionism.” Quote taken from the S. Power book “A problem from Hell”.

14. Robert D. Kapplan “Balkan Ghosts: A journey through history”, First Vintage Departures edition, March 1994. “… (The Balkans history) is a historical quagmire into which one should enter…foreigners cannot do anything in the region so deeply immersed into ancient hatred…” (Foreword, XI/XII)


15. David Owen «The Balkan Odyssey» Zagreb 1998 «...the characteristic of fighting (in Yugoslavia) was callousness… History of the Balkans shows that it is a tradition to solve conflicts in arms…” Introduction, page 37.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, USA, Dick Cheney, CNN interview, Newsmaker Saturday, August 1st 1992 – “…It’s tragic but the Balkans have been a hotbed of conflicts…for centuries”.

16. New Republic, Rescue Bosnia, August 17th and 24th, 1992 – There have been too many platitudes about the responsibilities of “all factions”. This lazy language is an escape hatch through which outside powers flee their responsibilities” – quote taken from the book by S. Power “A problem from Hell”, page 276.

S. Powers “A problem from Hell” page 502. “Serbs had been the original aggressors in the wars in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo, but their local leaders had emphasized only their suffering.”

also became the title to her book, awarded by the Pulitzer Prize for 2002.  
President George Bush – August 6th 1992, briefing journalists in the White House – “...the war...a complex, convulsive conflict that grows out of age-old animosities and century old feuds” – quote taken from S. Powers book.

18. Evidence gathering in the Medak Pocket done by Canadian battalion – shows photos and videotapes, witnesses, medical reports, forensic reports, done by UNCIIPOL and pathology reports became the standard proceedings later to be used by UNPROFOR in former Yugoslavia and other war conflicts.  
David Owen “Balkanska Odiseja”, page 275 – “UN has relatively thoroughly documented the case of human rights violations in the Medak Pocket which (to Croatia) was rather harmful.”

19. Sean M. Maloney & John Llamias «Chances for peace, Canadian soldiers in the Balkans 1992 – 1995 – an oral history», Vanwell Publishing history, St. Catharine’s, Ontario, Copyright 2002 Sean M. Maloney – «Somewhere around the middle of September, there had been a lot of shelling at the Croatian town of Gospić by the Serbs, so the Croats decided that they were going to do another operation. Their assessment was that they bite away at the Krajinjas piece by piece and get away with it, incrementally... They launched an attack into this area», page 141. «Medak was a Serb area, but the Croatsians occupied it. » page 182.

20. David Owen “Balkanska Odiseja”, Zagreb 1998, Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada/Hrvatski institut za povijest – “Everything happened right under UNCIIPOL noses – that as their role considered, so we were told, to passively observe and report on local police and leadership activities and to have good relations with all the population... It was impossible to imagine how UN could be anything else but a laughing stock in Croatia, someone nobody liked or appreciated... UN wasn’t capable to return refugees to their homes until all of the Serbian paramilitaries were disarmed, and UN lacked the decisiveness or strength to achieve that by force. A stale-mate position continued.” Translated from Croatian, page 108.

21. Dayton tri-party peace accord on Bosnia and Herzegovina reached on November 22nd 1995 and signed in Paris on December 14th 1995 – “The general frame-agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina”

22. Kosovo – “a cradle of Serbian state” – annexed to Kingdom of Serbia in 1913 after the Second Balkans War, majority (90 percent) Albanian population that never recognized occupational forces. Albanians have been subjected to harsh repression during the monarchist and communist regimes in former Yugoslavia. After 1945 clashes in 1981 and 1989, and 1997 till 1999. After Yugoslav army withdrew under international protectorate. Serbia still considers Kosovo to be the constitutive part of Serbia and Montenegro; Albanians reject any liaison and want their independent Kosovo.

23. NATO started air strikes on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on March 24th 1999. On June 3rd 1999 Milošević “capitulated”. On June 9th 1999 an agreement on withdrawal from Kosovo was signed by the Yugoslav army. From that date on, international military forces (IFOR) are overseeing peace and security in that region.

24. Elections held in Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, October 2000 – democratic forces have won, downfall of Slobodan Milošević followed in November 2002 he was arrested and consequently deported to the Hague
25. Vjesnik, June 4th 2003 – HINA – report from the Hague and quote of the protected witness C-47 – “…our army (Serbian) was the aggressor on Croatian territory, it killed, destroyed, occupied villages and cities, has ethnically cleansed those areas…”

26. “The American agency CIA – its deputy director for intelligence John Gannon – has on August 8th 1995 reported that 90 percent of all war crimes during three and a half years long war (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia) were committed by Serb paramilitary and military forces.” Source: R. Holbrook “To end a war”, Random House 1998, New York.


28. Quotation, according to “Globus”, Goran Malić’s, August 8th 2003. – “From the documents I was able to see (P. Shrader) several units of Bosnian army were stationed in Ahmići… from Ahmići one could control and overrun central communications posts in Lašva Valley, which was vital for the Croatian enclave there, therefore Croatian defense council had to defend that post at any cost… unfortunately the price was a greater number of killed people… After the military victory, the revenge killing of civilians and prisoners followed. That phenomenon is not unknown – it happened to American soldiers in Vietnam in My Lai… I do not condone that mishap… But I understand why. Blaškić couldn’t sanction that unit… because he would lose the army… and consequently he would lose the war.”

29. The Hague indictment of general Rahim Ademi on July 26th 2001, case number IT-112-46-1


31. Colonel Richard Herrick, American military attaché in Croatia from 1993 to 1997, specialist for the JNA and Yugoslav affairs, stationed in Yugoslavia in the 1980s, he prepared the military analysis of the Yugoslav military power, unbiased witness, professional and independent observer of all the major military operations in former Yugoslavia.

32. Minutes of conversation of staff general Janko Bobetko, held with American military attaché Richard Herrick on September 28th 1993 in the Croatian army HQ.

33. Vukovar – the far eastern city on the banks of the river Danube, the theater of fierce three-months long battle and heroic Croatian defense – the place that underwent the greatest destruction in Europe since the end of WW2, the place where, after the Serbian occupation, war crimes on a large scale were committed. The symbol of Croatian defense and martyrdom

34. See “Smrt oklopne brigade” by D. Marijan, “Sjećanje ratnika” by M. Špegelj, “Sve moje bite” by J. Bobetko, Kadijević, Jović, Sekulić, admiral Domazet’s “Hrvatska i veliko ratište”…

35. Dubrovnik – the Croatian Athens, situated at the very south of Croatia, fiercely attacked by JNA, Montenegro’s reservists, Serbian volunteers; a particularly vicious attack happened on December 6th 1991, which has drawn world’s attention on Serbia and Montenegro’s aggression on Croatia, marked the breaking point in perception of conflicts in former Yugoslavia and made the world public opinion change as far as war in Croatia is concerned.

36. The Old bridge in the city of Mostar, synonymous to be the link between the east
and west, Islam and Christianity, destroyed on November 11th 1993 under unclar-
ified data had been paid to destroy the bridge for three TV crews who were filming
it to have a breaking news story. The crew of the tank was identified, they were
indicted, the trial has started but it has never finished.
37. Ahmići and Stupni dol in Central Bosnia – places where Croats and the army of
Bosnia and Herzegovina clashed in the spring of 1993, where Croats committed
the alleged war crimes. The unclear role the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina
played in the ranks of the army were armed civilians and soldiers. In his book “The
Muslim-Croat war in Central Bosnia 1992 – 1994” that question was addressed by
Paul Shrader: “A student of the military history should at first glance notice the eerie
similarity of the position held by Croats on the floor of Lažva Valley with the fortified
French camp in Dien Bien Phu in 1954… the greatest similarity being in equal, tacti-
ically unfavorable position in which about 8,000 Croatian fighters at the valleys
floor were surrounded with multiple numbers of Muslim forces on the surrounding
hills… As was the case, Croats were defending their homes and families but the
French weren’t. One can hardly blame Croats for wanting to avoid similar fate
(French in Dien Bien Phu) and for the decisive action in order to secure the hills sur-
rrounding the Lažva valley from the Muslim forces.” P. Shrader in chapter
“Operational Milieu”.
38. “Bljesak” (The Blitz) – May 1st and 2nd 1995; Croatian military and police action
to liberate western Slavonija.
39. “Oluja” (The Storm) – August 4th – 8th, Croatian army and police operation
undertaken to liberate occupied territories of the Republic of Croatia (except east-
ern Slavonija which was peacefully reintegrated in 1998).
40. “Croatian aggression on Bosnia and Herzegovina” Jean Cot “Posljednji bALKANS-
ski rat”, Zagreb 1997, Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada/Hrvatski institut za povijest
“…it will also be said how Croats have reached the same result (ethnic cleansing)
by using similar if not the same methods in Herzegovina and Central Bosnia during
the war with Muslims in 1993” translated from Croatian, page 149.
David Owen “Balkanska Odiseja”, Zagreb 1998 “…Tuđman shouldn’t be allowed to
avoid the responsibility for spurring the idea of Herceg-Bosna. Mostar was an
ugly episode of ethnic cleansing…” translated from Croatian, page 225.
41. SAS – Special Air Service – according to the witnessing of Canadian soldiers in
the book “Tested Mettle”, page 163, one SAS team was with them in the bunker
during the Medak Pocket operation. During wars in former Yugoslavia there was a
notable presence of all main intelligence and security world services. Croatia at that
time was the center of a vivid intelligence activity.
42 Humanitarian organizations from Red Cross to UNHCR, Red Crescent, El
Haramain, Muwafaq… Islamic humanitarian organizations that channeled the
Mujahedin into Bosnia and Herzegovina, later in Kosovo and Macedonia also.
43. “foreign mercenaries, the dogs of war” – one UN Security Council report was
dedicated to the role of mercenaries participating on all sides in the former
Yugoslavia conflict.
44. Samantha Power “A problem from Hell” – “The United States and its European
allies are continuing to pay for their earlier neglect of the Balkans by having to grapple
with mounting violence that threatens the stability of southeastern Europe”, page
Brendan Simms “Unfinest hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia” – Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, London 2001 – David Owen in the USA to two senators answering to their criticism of Owen’s peace strategy “You do not have troops on that territory. I speak in the name of the country (Great Britain) that has troops on the ground” according to the Bosnian/Serbian/Croatian issue, The Bosnian Institute, London, 2003, page 119.

45. On January 2nd 1992 in Sarajevo a Ceasefire Plan was signed, which was implemented the next day, January 3rd 1992. UN Security Council resolution 727, dated January 8th 1992 “…welcomes the signing of the treaty to implement the Sarajevo signed agreement on the modalities how to unconditionally reach the ceasefire, agreed upon on December 23rd 1991”

46. On February 21st 1992, 743 UN Security Council resolution on establishing the UNPROFOR for Croatia with one-year mandate.

47. April 7th 1992 – 749 resolution about troops deployment to start in middle of May. UNPROFOR takes responsibility in Sector East and after it in the remaining three sectors; that is on the occupied Croatian territories.

48. On March 3rd 1992 Bosnia and Herzegovina government proclaimed their country’s independence. On April 7th USA recognized the new Bosnia and Herzegovina republic, which on May 22nd 1992 together with Slovenia and Croatia became a member of UN. On April 5th 1992 the Sarajevo siege began, marking the start of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

49. UN mandate enlargement to include Bosnia and Herzegovina. 752 Resolution on May 15th 1992.

50. 753 resolution on May 18th 1992. UN Security Council recommended Croatia should become the UN member. On May 22nd, the Republic of Croatia becomes a full member of the UN.

51. According to the official UN reports during the UNPROFOR mandate in Croatia, the so-called “Republika Srpska Krajina’s” artillery fire on civilian objects caused the death of about 600 Croatian civilians and the destruction of 210,000 houses outside the UNPA zones. The high commissioner for human rights report (UNHCR) session on November 11th 1993 E/CN.4/1994./47.

52. The UN implementation mandate – to re-integrate occupied Croatian territories. 762 resolution on June 30th 1992 – “Pink Zones” as temporary solution until the Croatian government full control over these areas should be achieved. 780 resolution on October 6th 1992 – “Import-Export and transit on the Republic of Croatia territory under UN protection (UNPA zones) can be done only with the Croatian government’s permission… except humanitarian and medical aid…”

53. The agreement on cooperation between Republika Srpska Krajina and Republika Srpska was reached on May 20th 1993 and the referendum about the annexation of RSK to RS was held on forming of an unified Serbian state west of Drina. The reference date was June 20th 1993. The question “Are you for the sovereignty of RSK, unification with RS and at a later date with the rest of the Serbian territories?” was answered with “Yes” by 98.6 percent of vote. Before that Serbian generals from Bosnia and Herzegovina and from Croatian occupied territories had signed an agreement on military cooperation in the case of an attack on any part of the “Western Serbia”. “The unified defense of the Bosanska Posavina corridor and
Republika Srpska’s army’s engagement in North Dalmatia and Lika defenses in the 1993 is the most valuable part of Serbian military krajina and Republika Srpska army’s relations” (translated from Serbian, M. Sekulić “Knin je pao u Beogradu”, Nidda verlag 2000, page 167.

54. 802 resolution on January 25th 1993 condemned the Croatian attack on Srpska Krajina – Maslenica operation

55. June 21st 1992 Miljevac plateau was liberated, so that Dalmatian cities (Šibenik, Skrad, Vodice, Biograd) would be spared from Serbian artillery attacks

56. On January 22nd 1993 the Maslenica operation enabled Croats to build a pontoon and later build the new Maslenica Bridge, the original being destroyed by Serbs in 1991 – the operation meant the end of Dalmatia’s transport and communication isolation

57. January 27th 1993 – liberation of Peruča dam, into which Serbian rebels planted explosives in order to cause downstream massive flooding – several dozen thousand civilian lives were endangered, and though the explosive was not activated, the swift Croatian army’s action defused the great ecological catastrophe.

58. 807 resolution on February 19th 1993 by which UN expresses its decisiveness to ensure UNPROFOR’s security.

59. UN’s confidence in Croatian cooperativity – 908 resolution on March 31st 1994 in which UN Security Council “assures and confirms UNSC support of the Republic of Croatia territorial integrity and sovereignty… Peace processes are plausible” (in three instances Republic of Croatia is commended for its efforts)

60. Limited military and police operations which rebel Serbs called “mice bites” considering them a sign of Croatian army’s weakness, as it was not able to engage in the battle with the Serbian army – army of rebel Serbs in the Republic of Croatia could of course count on the “brotherly help” from Republika Srpska and Serbia/Montenegro

61. 762 resolution on July 30th 1992 which establishes “Pink Zones”, Serb occupied zones bordering UNPA zones, undisputed parts of Croatia that should be brought under Republic of Croatia’s jurisdiction as soon as possible

62. “Real threat strategy” or “the strategy of revenge” which was presented in Belgrade in August 1993 by lieutenant general Radovan Radinović, ex JNA military theoretician, head of the strategic studies and defense politics, department of the Federative Republic Yugoslavia Ministry of Defense – the strategy of military response using heavy artillery and rockets on civilian targets in Croatia. That strategy was devised as a final response to Croatia which was in the strategically impossible situation and therefore “doomed as a state to die after a prolonged agony” – R. Radinović quoted from his strategic situation analysis

63. The unification of “RSK” and “RS” armies up to 1995 the combined forces and direct intervention of “RSK” forces in “RS” during Bosanska Posavina battle in 1992, and battles waged around the town of Bihać in 1994/1995; the “RS” military have fought in Croatia – Lika, North Dalmatia and Western Slavonia.

64. 891 resolution on October 4th 1993 – three subordinated commands of UNPROFOR were established: HQ for Croatia, HQ for Bosnia and Herzegovina and HQ for Macedonia. The mandate for UNPROFOR was thus finally devised on three sovereign states

65. Erdut agreement – June 15th/16th 1993
66. UN document S/2633 – annex to the Erdut agreement on June 15th 1993, about Republic of Croatia’s military and police withdrawal from the territory liberated in Maslenica operation to be completed to July 31st 1993 the latest, when UN would take control
68. President Tudman’s peace plan proposed to the UN general assembly on September 28th 1993
69. International Conference for Former Yugoslavia – first presiding Cyrus Vance, later David Owen and together with him Thorvald Stoltenberg, special UNSC General Secretary’s envoy. The conference was found on August 26th/27th. Vance was the representative of the UN Secretary General. Later his role was taken by Thorvald Stoltenberg. David Owen was the EU Presidency representative. In Geneva ICFY should decide the framework for achieving an agreement in the spirit of the UN and EU political initiatives. 31 countries in its governing board.
70. David Owen “Balkanska Odiseja” Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada, Hrvatski institut za povijest, Zagreb, 1998, page 78. “Unfortunately UNPROFOR could never really undermine the power and the influence of the Serb paramilitary forces... Croatian refugees and people expelled never stood a chance to return to their homes which they have left during and after 1991 fighting... It was a clear Vance Plan violation, too long tolerated by UN and which was one of the factors that made President Tudman threaten to end the UN mandate...” (Translated from Croatian)
71. Brendan Simms “Unfinest Hour”, page 20, Bosnian/Serbian/Croatian edition “...UN sometimes felt that if they were to continue their mandate they had no choice but to adjust to the Serb prevailing force. Such was the case in Sector North, in Krajina (Croatia) held by Serbs, where UN soldiers soon started mingling with Serbs who on their hand despised them.” That is an old problem, said the UN official in Zagreb in December 1994. “...In Sector North Serbs are maltreating our people and these have fallen in love with them. They became aborigines” Ibid, page 114. “And really, when people in the Sandhurst Royal military Academy talked about not knowing the British officer that hasn’t sympathized Serbs, that was only a slight overstatement” Mark Almond, BBC Radio “The politics and the prejudices” – quoted in Vjesnik 1992 by Jasna Zanić Nardini – “...Great Britain and France especially had sentimental relations with Serbia... Serbs were perceived as natural allies.”
72. Ibid, page 244, Sunday Telegraph, Con Coughlin, July 1993 “Many a western government, especially the new American President, have preconceptions that Serbs are primordial villains, while in reality Croats are an equally guilty party” Ibid, page 20 – “MI6 anti-Muslim meddling was their constant game... they do it all the time”
73. 727 resolution on January 8th 1992
74. 743 resolution on February 21st 1992
75. 749 resolution on May 18th 1992
76. 762 resolution on June 30th 1992
77. The “Pink Zones” concept was ideated as a solution to occupied parts of Croatian territory that didn’t make UNPA zones. They were undisputed parts of Croatian territory and had to be returned under Croatian jurisdiction as soon as possible – all Croatian military and police actions, Miljević, Maslenica, Peruća, the Medak Pocket, were in those “Pink Zones” theatres, areas OUTSIDE UNPA ZONES, there-
fore actions that were legitimate and justified
78. 769 resolution on August 7th 1992
79. 779 resolution on October 6th 1992
81. Ibid, page 107
82. 802 resolution on January 25th 1993
83. 743 resolution on February 10th 1993
84. Ibid, page 107
85. Ibid, page 108
86. 807 resolution, March 19th 1993
87. Coordinators – co-presiding David Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg
89. Ibid., page 173
90. 827 resolution, May 27th 1993
91. 847 resolution on June 30th 1993
92. The area of operation of the future Medak pocket military/police action
94. Canadian Battalion 1 final report on Medak Pocket operations
95. M. Sekulić “Knin je pao u Beogradu”, Nidda Verlag 2000, page 69, translated from Serbian. “The readiness of volunteers to fight in North Dalmatia was visible... apart from it the unit from other corps were brought to North Dalmatia. So the number of Dalmatian corps soldiers has risen sharply to 27.984 men and officers... On January 25th, to that commanding area (Velika Bobija – Mala Bobija – Visoka Glava – Marune) Željko Ražnjatović Arkan and his men arrived. To the Benkovac theatre of operations, apart from Arkan’s men, 600 fighters from Lapac brigade also arrived (page 62).
96. “The vertical maneuver” in Maslenica action – the reinforcement troops, the 1st Division of the 3rd Slavonija Brigade was transported to the battlefield near Novigrad and Kašić by helicopters – the Serb counter attack was repelled and that marked the turning point in Croatian victory in that battle.
97. General Janko Bobetko’s interview to the “Večernji list” on January 29th 1994 – “Revealing the secrets when in a war an attack would start is punishable by death, and I did quite the opposite. Because of the situation we were in, I ordered the commander of UNPROFOR’s French Battalion to be informed when we were going to attack Četnik forces, and that they had an hour to leave. The French didn’t listen to me and didn’t withdraw... The French Battalion was deterring the Serbs to arm themselves with heavy weaponry, which was under a “double key”. The Serbs broke into ammunition depots and stole it.
M. Sekulić "Knin je pao u Beogradu", Nidda Verlag 2000 – “Unfortunately, that same UNPROFOR members have behaved like cowards and saboteurs during the Croatian army’s vicious acts in Maslenica and Ravni Kotari areas, taking care only about the security of their own men, and not executing those duties assigned to them in Dalmatia... UNPROFOR soldiers have rushed to the Serbian defense lines in order to paralyze them. In such a way they helped the Croatian side beyond any doubt” – page 65, translated from Serbian.
98. Liaison Office with the UN report on August 4th 1993, Karlovac – “…Two months
ago the major part of Krajina Serb army has returned from Bosnia. They were sent to Benkovac, Obrovac... every day a new obituary would appear... the major part of Serbs from Topusko do not want to take arms. In Topusko and Glina prisons 40 – 50 Serbs are incarcerated. The Red Cross and UNHCR help is used to feed the army and the police. Croatian villages are destroyed and burned, cemeteries desecrated..."

99. M. Sekulić (translated from Serbian) “Knin je pao u Beogradu”, Nidaa Verlag 2000 – “At that time Croatia wasn’t military able to defeat RSK Serbs... (Our duty was)...to establish and train the RSK army which would be able to wage war without any help and to oppose Croats successfully” (page 43) “…The deceit and falsehood continues, that of RSK defense being an co-effort of army of Krajina and Yugoslav army” (page 46).


101. Goran Hadžić, Eastern Slavonia Serb politician, leaning on Slobodan Milošević’s politics.

102. After their own decision to negotiate the Western Slavonia status with Zagreb, Serb politicians Džakula and Zelenika were apprehended (caught) and imprisoned in Glina prison.

103. Erdut agreement on June 15th/16th 1993 – the Croatian army was to withdraw from the areas liberated in Maslenica action, for them to be controlled by UNPROFOR.

104. M. Sekulić “Knin je pao u Beogradu”, page 74 “The number of requests to leave the brigade (Drniš Brigade, author’s note) is rising. They asked to be assigned civilian duties. The number of requests for sick leave have increased. 250 men in uniform took such a leave. Soldiers are leaving their units without authorization. 15 percent of soldiers of a brigade have run away... The fighters find it to rot in trenches and mud shelters to be unacceptable, while at the same time those fighters that have left the battlefield by their own will are seen in the streets of Knin, engaging in contraband. (translated from Serbian)

105. “Captain Dragan” – Sneden Daniel, an ex member of Australian army, born in Belgrade as Dragan Vasiljković, an emigrant with Australian citizenship, who in “Alfa” center in Bruška near Benkovac trained the so-called “Kninđa’s”; connected to the very top of FR Yugoslavia security services (Jovica Stanišić) and to Milošević himself.

106. The “Knindže” – “Captain Dragan” special forces, that combining the name “ninja” and “Knin” coined themselves a popular nickname. The RSK volunteers smaller number of them came from FR Yugoslavia territory, specialized in reconnaissance and combat – considered to be an elite unit.

107. JNA war-plans “S1” and “S2” source D. Domazet “Hrvatska i veliko ratište”, Udruga S. Jura, Zagreb, 2002

108. Counterintelligence JNA service – KOS, the military counterintelligence service formed of the remnants of WW2 KNOJ, a military service to fight and identify foreign spies and internal enemies.

109. Cities in Lika where Medak operation was conducted (see map).

110. JNA has educated its officers in Great Britain, the military experts took courses on the College for special (psychological) warfare in England – such was general Vuk
Obradović – that applied the studied knowledge in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo wars – disinformation, indoctrination, artillery and air force attack threats, crimes, physical and psychological torture.

111. Lt. General Marijan Cad, the commander in chief of the 13th Rijeka corps, and the commanding officer of the area “covered” by the corps – in negotiations with the Croat side agreed on a peaceful retreat of his JNA troops from Rijeka. The corps was transported to the Boka Kotorska port in Montenegro by ships.

112. Major-General Trajčê Krstevski, taken custody in Gospić’s Kanjiža barracks, later released with his party; his vehicle and arms commandeered by the Croatian national guard union.

113. Mite Kosović’s interview, given to Robert Bajruši, “Nacional” on July 17th 2001 “...when talking about destructions we often forget that in 1991 at one occasion we tried to overtake Divoselo, but because of the peace talks we had to withdraw. But then also a couple of houses were destroyed, meaning that the major part of the village was already destroyed when the Medak Pocket action began.”

114. Đorde Bažović – Gîška, a criminal linked to Yugoslav secret services fight against “emigrant extremists”. The Serb paramilitary unit “Beli orlovi” leader, an armed Serb radical party’s wing, operated in Lika but also in the rest of Croatia (Slavonia, especially Vukovar), committed a number of war crimes, like the one in Vočin.


116. General Markač’s statement after talking to ICTY investigators to “Vjesnik” on March 5th 2003 “According to our intelligence sources, we gathered information that the other side (under UNPROFOR protection) made preparations to attack the wider Gospić area where strong Serb forces were concentrated” – the same in “Večernji list”, March 4th 2003 under the title “Serbs planned to attack from Medak Pocket” – “from the document seized in “Olujama” it is obvious that Serbs planned an attack on September 9th 1993, 15 (fifteen) minutes before the Croatian army and police attacked that area.”

117. The Document – 9th mobile brigade command; top-secret number 100-1552 dated August 26th 1993 – military top-secret.

118. The Document – 9th mobile brigade command; top-secret number 100-1632 dated September 3rd 1993 – military top-secret (the document in addition).


120. Ibid, page 367

121. Strategic peaks and Velebit Mountain ridges, addition – special map

122. The cruelty of Serb rebels at the beginning of their rebellion in 1941 is best described by an Italian commander quoted in Vladimir Mrkoci article “The people of Croatia’s rebellion on July 27th 1941” published in “Hrvatsko slovo” on August 15th 2003. “In that action Serbs wanted to capture Medak, they announced it to one of our (Italian – author’s note) patrols overseeing the railway line; they assured us they would spare the school in which the Italian detachment was stationed. And really they burned the Ustaša house, eliminating thus the small Croatian gendarme garrison without touching the mentioned detachment. The Italian commander forgot to mention that then some twenty alive Ustaša, their allies at the time, were burned alive.”

125. Southern Velebit Mountain peaks overseeing Obrovac and the Gračac-Obrovac-
Moslavina-Zadar main road.
126. The city on river Zmanja under Mali Alan pass, the junction of Zadar and
Benkovac-Šibenik-Split road, an important power plant is situated in its vicinity.
127. Colonel, later Major-General Mirko Norac, the founder and the commanding
officer of the 9th mobile brigade “Vukovi”, wounded in a mine explosion during the
Medak Pocket operation.
128. “Vukovi” – the 9th Lika mobile brigade – stationed in Gospić.
129. Lički Osik and Novi Lički Osik – cities in the vicinity of Gospić on Otočac-Brinje-
Josipdol-Zagreb road; where Serb rebels came the closest to that vital communica-
tion. In Novi Lički Osik an ammunition factory “Marko Orešković” produced Serb
ammunition up to the moment the “Oluj” operation started.
130. Perušić – a place in Lika on the same main road which underwent severe Serbian
forces attacks.
131. Gračac – mostly populated by Serbs, situated under the Mali Alan pass from the
Lika side of Velebit; the Knin junction and the road crossing Velebit Mountains con-
nect Zadar-Benkovac-Split and the Croatian South.
133. Ibid, page 379.
135. The Commander in Chief of the Croatian armed forces – under the Croatian
Constitution that function holds the President of the Republic of Croatia.
136. Ministry of Defense documents – map symbols differ from those in General
Bobetko’s book “Sve moje bitke”
138. Ministry of Defense documents again differ in labeling symbols
143. Ibid.
147. Ibid, page 383.
150. 103rd Lapac light brigade HQ, September 6th 1993.
152. 2nd mobile brigade HQ – defense order, issued on February 26th 1993.
153. Croatian army during the Medak Pocket operation confiscated those three can-
nons.
155. Attack on special forces (commandos) on the Velebit Mountains – “Slobodna
Dalmacija”, September 25th 1993, Tomislav Klauški – “…the Medak Pocket oper-
ation itself was triggered by the Serb killing and massacrating four members of
Croatian special police in the Velebit Mountains. A couple of days later the order to attack was given and Croatian special police were in the first echelons of it.”


158. 1/9th, 2/9th, 3/9th – military numerals of the battalions. The first number denotes the battalion, second denotes the brigade; e.g. 1/9th – 1st battalion of the 9th brigade.

159. From the interview with the special police forces’ member D. Jurendić, given to “Jutarnji list” on December 6th 2002 to Davor Butković under the title “The truth and lies about the Medak Pocket” – “…we (the antiterrorist police unit) have moved two hours earlier than others, we were supposed to outflank the enemy by sneaking from his flanks and back, and before the attack actually started, we had our policemen wounded in the minefield… Major V. M. had been wounded by the tripmine… it was quite an undertaking to bring a wounded man down the Velebit Mountains’ slopes.”

160. Ibid., “at 06:00 hours we continued advancing with the artillery backup…we had many wounded…the enemy forces were cut off at Divoselo…they tried to retreat to the wooded slopes of Velebit and over Debela Glava…”


162. "Jutarnji list", December 6th 2002, interview with D. Jurendić – “Serb Krajina Army HQ has given a warning order to the Lika corps under the Colonel Mile Šušuta command seven days before the operation started… They prepared themselves, the CIVILIANS WERE EVACUATED, women, children and elderly were sent to Udbina…”

163. Ibid., “…they crossed the rough terrain during the night in smaller groups. They knew that terrain intimately, a large number of them were successful in doing it…by day they used artillery fire to pound us, by night they would cross the terrain…”

164. The minutes of conversation with members of the 103rd Lapac brigade who pulled out of the “Ustaša” encirclement – Serbian Krajina army HQ on September 15th 1993.

165. Or(a)nice – map sign appearing with a vocal and without it – as in Ornice used in JNA maps.


175. Ibid., “…they raised the combat readiness of all “Serb Krajina” army… with their artillery and rockets they fired on Croatian forces…there were many casualties”
176. Ibid, page 381.
191. Croatian UN liaison office protest, dated February 10th 1993 to the UNPROFOR sector North’s command “…because of the volunteers from Serbia… in Vojnić 80 Russian volunteers are stationed.”
192. M. Sekulić “Knin je pao u Beogradu”, Nidda Verlag 2000 – “…the repeated scenario (the arrival of the volunteers during the Medak Pocket operation) with the volunteer didn’t give any results…”, page 78.
194. “Večernji list” September 27th 2002 – “General Stipetić states: General Bobetko has ordered me to, as a permanent member of Croatian delegation, to liaise with UNPROFOR, sign the agreement on withdrawal of Croatian forces. I argued that I am the Zagreb command post’s commanding officer, therefore I couldn’t do something for which Gospić commanding post was there, and I wasn’t briefed about the action. Bobetko has asked me to sign the agreement because it was so ordered by Commander in Chief, and when I did it (Bobetko) said: “I would never sign it myself.””
198. “Globus” October 22nd 1993, “Globusov ratni stožer” – “In the public opinion that action has compromised Croatia because of the alleged war crimes. It is necessary to point out that reports on the ground state that an eventual breach of international war law wasn’t planned and especially not ordered from higher instances.”
199. Davor Domazet – Lošo “Hrvatska i veliko ratište”, page 115 – “…it was an example of how military force is used to apply a strategic measurable relation, and which
would help to achieve the political objective…”


201. Brendan Simms, “Unfinest hour” – the Serbophyle fascination with JNA (page 144) – “…all in all British officers had very pro-Serb feelings and I think that strong anti-Muslim and anti-Catholic prejudices were present there.”

202. Ibid, page 144 – “Was that the contrast between the Serbian military “touch” and Bosnians dressed in various attire and wearing tennis shoes” (Warren Zimmermann) or Maud Beelman: “…the contrast being in Bosnian army soldiers wearing red tennis shoes and going to the battlefield with only one bullet…and therefore had acquired zero respect in military circles…”

203. Canadian and French have advanced quickly, and their APC’s have entered the minefield – “Tested mettle” page 140 – “Calvin was instrumental in forcing a road passage through to the pre-September 9th boundary. The haste of advance took its toll in the form of mine strikes – three French armored vehicles were disabled – but still Calvin pushed his force forward.”

204. Bobetko – Cot talks – Cot spoke of “scorched earth”, press release of UNPROFOR spokeswoman on September 19th 1993 “The Force Commander General Jean Cot has today been in Sector South and the Medak Pocket assessing UNPROFOR operation… “I have found no sign of human or animal life in the several villages we passed through…””

205. During the press conference on September 26th 1993 Shannon Boyd quoted general Cot: “UNPROFOR would finish its report on Medak in the next couple of days… for UN peacekeepers there is no excuse for attacks on those who we came to help.”

206. “Tested Mettle”, page 142 – “The UN commanders and the Canadian operations cell knew that the 2PPCLI battle group was playing out a dangerous bluff with the Croats in order to establish UN Protection force as a credible deterrent. There was no point in calling media attention to a situation that might easily backfire into a costly blunder.”

207. David Owen, “Balkanska Odiseja”, page 297 – “Washington Post reported on January 11th about strenuous relationships between Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali and UN force commander for the Balkans French general Jean Cot, who according to that newspaper several times ignored or questioned the authority of civilians in the UN who were superiors.”


210. Samantha Power, “A problem from Hell”.

211. ICTY doesn’t question the legality of the Medak Pocket operation, but concentrates on the way which the military action was conducted, and during which war crimes were committed – said talking to the Voice of America David Scheffer, former American ambassador in charge for war crimes.

212. Janko Bobetko – minutes from the HQ meeting on September 22nd 1993


214. The data about the number of Serbs killed during war operations in Croatia from 1991 to the “Oluja” in 1995, including the data on the number of killed/disappeared in the Medak Pocket – seized in the “Oluja” operation.
216. Swedish General Lars-Eric Wahlgren, UN forces second commander from 1992 – 1993 (held that position for five months), has accused France and Great Britain to use their soldiers to carry out their political countries’ interests on the ground and not to apply the UN Security Council resolutions; after Wahlgren left all the UNPROFOR commanders were either French or British (Cot, Lapresle, Janvier, Morillon, Rose, Smith and Canadian Lewis MacKenzie).
217. Wahlgren has claimed that UN operations were not directed from UN but from Paris or London, these two cities and not the UNPROFOR commander had direct access to intelligence information. When Wahlgren got the intelligence reports, those were already processed and selected as those who had gathered them suit-
ed.
219. Ibid.
221. Ibid.
222. M. Sekulić “Knin je pao u Beogradu”, page 77 “In Medak Pocket fighting Lapac light brigade has left their battle positions on their own will and returned to Donji Lapac. Because of such behavior the paramilitary and “vojvoda” David Rastović, the Lika corps commander will issue an order to prevent desertions of the subordinate units in the theater of operation.”
224. Ibid.
225. The data from the President of the Republic cabinet’s chief, dr. Ivica Kostović
228. List of killed Serb soldiers in RSK up to “Oluja” operation – data confiscated during the “Oluja” operation.
230. Ibid.
231. “Večernji list”, September 21st 1993, M. Č.
233. “Arena” weekly, No. 2216, on June 5th 2003
235. The minutes from General Bobetko meeting with the department commanders of the main HQ staff on September 22nd 1993.
236. “Večernji list”, September 27th 2002 – “Stipetić warned Bobetko that Croatian forces couldn’t pull out on September 15th because it is too short a time for such an operation, therefore he made a deal with UNPROFOR for withdrawal to last another two days.”
237. “Slobodna Dalmacija”, September 13th 2002, Tomislav Klauški – “Domazet’s report could additionally accuse General Bobetko” – the alleged Domazet’s report to the President of the Republic and the chief command HQ.
238. The minutes from General Bobetko meeting with the department commanders of the main HQ staff on September 22nd 1993.
239. Ibid.
240. Sean M. Maloney & John Llabias “Chances for peace”, Vanwell Publishing Ltd., St. Catharine’s, Ontario, 2002 – page 183 – “There was a sort of a ceasefire, because we were there. I guess one night Serb or Croatian patrol bumped into the section up on the hill and there was a huge firefight all around them. They were just dug in and they could hear the patrol in the woods calling “Hey, UNPROFOR! Hey, UNPROFOR!” and from the other direction they could hear others coming and all hell broke loose but no bodies were found. You could see flashes, and it was like a platoon encounter.”

241. The minutes from General Bobetko meeting with the department commanders of the main HQ staff on September 22nd 1993.

242. Ibid.

243. VONS – Vijeće Obrane i Nacionalne Sigurnosti – the Defense and National Security Council transcript as published in the American weekly “Harper’s magazine”, December 2001 issue, quoting General Bobetko as saying in the minutes on September 12th and 19th 1993: “We have handed in 52, so to say, identifiable Serb corpses, and the rest were disposed of. There were some 50 to 60 bodies left in the woods because it was difficult to transport them from that position. But it may have been that they (UNPROFOR) entered the theater too soon. They couldn’t have found anything there, at least I think so.”

244. “Globus”, October 15th 1993, Davor Butković – “Why has General Ademi, the man who successfully defended Šibenik, been relieved of his duties? Brigadier Drago Krpina has representing the Ministry of Defense political department signed the decision to relieve General Rahim Ademi of the duty of the commander of the Gospić commanding area, and also he signed the decision to relieve the 12th homeguard battalion Captain Mile Kosović – because of the most objective investigation about some breaches of the international war law conduct that might have been committed during the Croatian army counteroffensive in the Gospić area to be done.”

245. The anonymous witness from the Ministry of Defense, an ex MP member.

246. The witness being the author of this case study himself, then (in 1993) I held the position of the Ministry of Defense SIS department chief.

247. The minutes from General Bobetko meeting with the department commanders of the main HQ staff on September 22nd 1993.

248. The FR Yugoslavia Constitution voted on Žabljak in Montenegro on April 27th 1992. The so-called “Žabljak Constitution” which marked the end of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, and a new Social Republic of Yugoslavia was formed, including Serbia, Vojvodina, Kosovo and Montenegro; The decision to proclaim the constitutional charter of the union of Serbia and Montenegro od January 1st 2003 caused the name of that state to change into the Serbia and Montenegro.


250. “The Vancouver sun”, “MP’s listen in awe to story of battle”, Ottawa, April 28th 1998, Jim Calvin’s presentation in the Canadian parliament and also Rod Dearing witnessing in “Tested Mettle”, pages 135 to 137.

251. The UN called for a ceasefire on September 14th 1993 (addition): “The Security Council expresses its profound concern at the reports from the Secretariat of recent military hostilities in Croatia, in particular the escalation of the means employed, and the grave threat they pose to the peace process in Geneva and overall stabil-
ity in the former Yugoslavia. The Council reaffirms its respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia and calls both sides to accept UNPROFOR’s proposal of an immediate ceasefire. It calls on the Croatian Government to withdraw its armed forces to positions occupied before September 9th 1993, on the basis of that proposal, and calls on the Serbian forces to halt all provocative military actions”, UN Security Council document marked S/26436.

252. The liaison office for the UN and EU reports, Zagreb, September 21st 1993, about Serbs firing from the CANBAT positions and bringing the Četnik reinforcements. “12 Četniks have at 12:15 hours embarked east of Medovača” – the attempt to enter the demilitarized zone, the patrols clashes as described in “Chances for peace”.

253. UNPROFOR, Sector South, September 15th 1993 – “The situation is tense and likely to deteriorate by the 16th…if the recent Serb reinforcement is anything to go by…then the immediate scenario is going to be…Serb military action to regain lost ground…”

254. The UN inefficiency… more than 600 civilians killed during their mandate, the material goods being destroyed… - Adalbert Rebić, the Chief of Government office for the killed, missing and displaced persons report.

255. The UN (New York) warning to refrain from all further actions – “…the UNPROFOR ceasefire framework to be accepted recommendation” – UN Security Council document S/26436.

256. “Chances for peace”, page 153 – Captain David MacKillop “…the Serbs and Croatians would exchange fire. There was a Serbian position with their mortars, there were Serbians intermingled with our forces…” – the report about Serb commandos trying to enter the demilitarized area behind Canadian positions.

257. CANBAT 1 Final report on Medak Pocket operation, September 30th 1993 – “The cause of the Croatian fire in some cases could have been attributed to Serbian force sniping at Croatian positions and using UN forces as a shield.”

258. “By the end of the battle” Darah Hansen “Richmond news” December 12th 2002, “Bravery in Croatia” July 4th 2002 – “…in a battle that was largest since the Korean war”; “The Medak massacre: Canada’s trial by fire” The Sunday (Toronto) star, November 1st 1998 – “Canada’s role in the battle of the Medak Pocket”; RCMP News release, December 2nd 2002 – “…the little-known battle for which these soldiers were recognized…”

259. “Nacional”, December 12th 2002 “Canadian citation for the inexistent battle they waged with Croatian army” Robert Bajrušić/Edvard Šoštarić – the title itself speaks of the Canadian myth (the battle) which according to all available facts never happened, and never caused 27 Croats to be killed…but was the simple firefight by which CANBAT broke the ceasefire.”

260. The visa regime in which Canada asks Croatians to fill in forms, asking about details considered in all civilized countries to be a military secret – like, whether part in the Homeland war, in which war were, what was the commanding officer’s name etc.

261. “Chances for peace”, page 219 – “…got to do patrols, foot patrols, they called it “hunting Croatians””.

262. Sources speaking of Croatian “ethnic cleansing”: “Tested Mettle”, “Chances for peace”, UN documents – Mazowiecki, Bassoumi reports
263. “Tested Mettle”, page 46 – “Hey, welcome to fucking Croatia”, page 165 – “…we’ve been humiliated and threatened long enough by these bastards” (Croats and others).

264. “Chances for peace”, page 145 – Major Tony Kaduck – “…Are we doing any good? I thin we are (in Croatia)... the fact that we are roped into a humanitarian support mission without the ability to defend ourselves effectively means that we are hostages to fate. We’ve had to make all kinds of deals with the devil just to get the food through. I question whether that mission has achieved anything, but there is no question in my mind that the mission in Croatia has achieved something.”

265. Momo Kapor – granny Danica, the story about the old woman armed with mortar and a machinegun, originally from Divoselo, published couple of days before the Medak Pocket operation has started in the monthly “Vojka Krajine” number 6 for September 1993 – “…in the military blouse, which reached her knees, in the skirt – and the touchiest detail of them all – wearing her slippers, the “pantofles”, and manning her machinegun, she didn’t have time to chat. Her gaze was locked to the bush and hedge way where the enemy could appear…” quote from “Vojka Krajine”, April 27th 2001 – “Novi list” December 13th 2002, Marin Smolčić – “Danica Obrodović…Browning 12.7 millimeter and her 82 millimeter mortar she endearingly called “the Četnik”.

266. “Većernji list”, March 4th 2003 “Serbs planned to attack from the Medak Pocket” – “General Markač has to the ICTY given the documents according to which Serbs have planned an attack on the Medak Pocket, and the Croat forces have beaten them to it for only 15 minutes… according to these documents it is visible that soldiers (Serbs – author’s remark) in the Medak Pocket were mingled with civilians” – same in the Canadian sources (“Tested Mettle”, “Chances for peace”)


268. The Canadian soldiers to regain their credibility – Lee A. Windsor’s conclusion.

269. Military history: 1945 to present – Peacekeeping: Yugoslavia

www.lermuseum.org/ler/mh/1945topresent/yugoslavia

270. Ibid.

271. Lee A. Windsor “Professionalism under fire: Canadian implementation of the Medak Pocket agreement”, The Ottawa citizen/Novi list – “On September 15th in the Medak Pocket battle 1000 Canadians and 1120 French fought. Although Croatian army used artillery, it had to ask for a ceasefire only two days after the battle started…this battle is a textbook example of the peace imposing operation.”

272. The incident involving Canadian soldiers and Croatian policemen in Garešnica – “Tested Mettle”, page 85 – “Garešnica was technically outside UNPA, it boasted the best watering hole in the vicinity...barroom brawl...five Canadians and two dozens of Croats...four APC’s and heavily armed troops roared into Croatian national territory – they had no authority to cross into Croatia...that had practically sparked a major international incident.”

273. Lee A. Windsor, “Professionalism under fire”.

274. UN Security Council appeal to reach a ceasefire of September 14th 1993.

275. “Chances for peace” Sean M. Maloney & John Llambias, page 129, Lt.Colonel Jim Calvin – “In my mind it was unique operation in that it was almost like an offen-
sive operation.”
276. Military history: 1945 to present.
“Yeah, in my experience the Serbs dealt better with us.” – “Tested Mettle”, pages 85-86.
278. Ibid, page 141-142, Major Tony Kaduck’s account.
279. “Richmond news”, online edition, December 12th 2002 – “UN soldiers pinned as heroes” Darah Hansen – reserve soldier Marc Lundie account – “The Croats were trying to stop us by force of arms.”
280. “Chances for peace”, page 131 – “Even at the end when we had gone through this thing with the Croats, they were not our enemy. Our guys were able to sit there and determine the fact that yes, they were shooting at us and they tried to kill us. They were the enemy and we were going to try to tune them before they tuned us. But as soon as that was done and we sat up our checkpoints, the Croats were no longer the enemy. We didn’t like them but we were now a professional army doing a professional job.”
282. Ibid, page 140.
283. Jim Calvin’s disposition in the Canadian Parliament.
286. SITREP on September 16th 1993, signed by Colonel Maisonneuve – “Croatian attitude is constructive and appears genuine… Croatian forces showed good level of cooperation…”
287. Admiral D. Domazet – Lošo “Hrvatska i veliko ratište”, page 154 – the French and the British meddling in how to conduct UN operations was visible – “When General Wahlgren claimed that these operations were not guided by UN in New York but its operational bases were Paris and London.”
288. “Tested Mettle”, pages 125-126 – “There had been a lot of bad blood generated between the Serb local population and the French UN troops earlier that year. During the January Croat offensive, the French prevented the Serbs from rearming themselves with their own stockpiled weapons. At the same time, the French had failed to provide any physical deterrent to the attacking Croats. By the time reinforcements, rushed up from the rear, had stabilized the line, hundreds of UNARMED local Serb militia had been captured or killed… With the replacement of the French by the Canadians, it was hoped that this situation would improve.”
289. VOPP – Vance-Owen Peace Plan for former Yugoslavia, the most part of it dedicated to Bosnia and Herzegovina.
290. General Cot flew to Gračac to meet Calvin on September 15th in the morning – “Chances for peace” page 121 – “Thank God General Cot came down to visit. He came to the town of Medak and for the next hour and a half or two hours we wandered up and down the streets and he and I had a little commander-to-commander chat.”
291. “Chances for peace” page 122-123 – quote of General Cot’s disposition – “…how important it was for the UN to have a successful mission in Medak… it was imperative that the international agency retain a degree of credibility as a deterrent
to aggressors.”

292. “Chances for peace” page 123 – “...and they moved ahead of the Serbs between 13:30 and 14:00. And just about immediately, C Company in particular but to a lesser extent the French company came under fire. It started off with small arms.”


296. Minefield incidents on September 19th and 26th 1993 – the Generals’ Cot and Bobetko correspondence.

“Tested Mettle”, page 140 – “The haste of advance took it’s toll in the form of mine-strikes – three French APC’s were disabled but still Calvin pushed his force forward.”

297. “Chances for peace” page 153-154 – “There was a Serbian position with their mortars, there were Serbs intermingled with our forces... So from the Croatian point of view it looks like the UN has moved in right beside the Serbs who had been fighting. All day there had been exchanges of small arms fire between the Serbians and the Croatians. We were no more than 50 meters away from them, and they were exchanging fire... I (Capt. David MacKillop) intensified my negotiations on the ground to get these Serbsians to pull back.”

298. Military history,...

299. “Chances for peace” page 142, Major Tony Kaduck – “…economic sanctions (against Croatians). This would be death for the Croatians as they are essentially not under economic sanctions, which boggles my mind. You have to look at the Zagreb-Vienna-Berlin axis to understand that one.” (sic!)

300. Bonnie Korzenevski, MP, Provinces Parliamentary Legislative Council member

301. “Nedjeljna Dalmacija”, Mirko Galić, October 25th 1996 – “UNPROFOR wounded in Serb minefields” – “In the immediate aftermath of Croatian army’s victory (in the Medak Pocket) the “blue helmets” have in September 1993, been in a great hurry to divide the Croatian and the Serb forces. This is how the French APC’s entered a field littered by mines, but there was NO BATTLE WAGED, NOT TO SPEAK OF THE ALLEGED UNPROFOR’S VICTORY OVER THE CROATIAN ARMY.”


303. The official Croatian data of 10 killed and 84 wounded in the action from September 9th to September 17th 1993.

304. The Institute for forensic Pathology at the Rijeka Medical faculty report, signed by doctors Renata Dobi-Bakić, Petar Kalinić, Alan Bosnar (they did the autopsy on killed Serb and probably Croatian soldiers also).

305. Sean M. Maloney “Canadian national values”.

306. “Chances for peace”, page 123, Lt.Colonel Calvin – “…as the soldiers had just won the ground at a price, and soldiers don’t like to be told by their bosses that they are going to give up ground that they’ve just taken over...”

307. “Večernji list” September 27th 2002 – General Stipetić – “My task was not to control the retreat. But as an responsible officer I wanted to see how that task was done on the ground. My such intent was prevented, I was threatened to be liquidated, therefore I gave up...”

up at the school. The digs themselves were cozy enough (boasting with wine cellar)… but UN post was located just 200 meters from the Serbian brigade HQ. Green’s fears were proved well-founded when the first morning in Medak they were awakened by a Croat barrage raining down on the schoolhouse… Green found the suitable house 100 meters away in the village, and instructed Sgt. Tronholm to occupy it with his section… around their brigade HQ a motley collection of “home-guard” Serb militia men assembled…the retiring soldiers began drinking heavily… as the tensions began to mount between the two Serb units, first shouts, then shots rang out… the main part of the commotion was just in front of Green’s schoolhouse HQ, but armed groups milled all about the darkened village… About 10 PM… one of the celebrants drunkenly fired a rifle grenade at the crowd of milling homeguards’ men. Screams echoed, the blast followed by an eerie silence… just then a series of shots rang out at Trenholm’s location… a short burst of C-6 machinegun fire from the school rooftop were fired by private Trenalis into the front of the Serb HQ… other Canadian soldiers in the school began to open fire. Approximately six (Serb) gunmen in a rough semi-circle had began firing on the peacekeepers. Back at the schoolhouse the few bursts fired had also been enough to dissuade Serbs from furthering the hostilities.”

309. Gospić press conference on September 14th 1993, Brigadier Drago Krpina mentioned the documents found on Serb volunteers’ bodies’ recovered in Medak Pocket; the statement of M. Sekulić about arrests and punishments taking place after Serbs were defeated at the Medak Pocket.

310. Gospić, September 16th 1993, at the Gospić commanding area during Calvin and Ademi talks, mediated by General Stipetić, the prolongement of the scheduled deployment of Canadian and French forces in the Medak Pocket was agreed upon. The late hour when the agreement was reached could have caused the Croatian forces to be uninformed and caused possible consequent misunderstanding.

311. “News release”, Land force Western area training centre, November 25th 2002, Lt. Colonel Bryan Bailey – “This operation once again proved the toughness and the fighting spirits of Canadian soldiers…”

312. Ibid.

313. “Chances for peace”, page 150 – “…there was a bunch of Serb M-84 tanks back here. There were four of them… We knew they were operational because we knew they were moving around.”

314. “Večernje novosti”, September 13th 1993 – “Warning rocket attack – the so-called RSK PM’s statement after the Zagreb suburb was rocketed.” – “Radio Beograd”, the news on September 14th 1993 – “Our Petrinja correspondent reports that in early hours the Croatian air force has bombarded civilian targets in Kordun and the wider Vrgin most area… the Serb Krajina Army anti-aircraft defense units have shot down the Croatian MIG-21. The killed pilot’s name was Miroslav Perić.” – translated from Serbian.

315. UNPROFOR SITREPORT on September 16th 1993, 23:59 – “Most of Croatian army units are withdrawn from these lines (Lički Ribnik-Divoselo) with expectations that all Croatian army forces will withdraw all their positions in Medak region. After starting of shelling at 22:15 hrs is quiet in this area at 23:45 hrs.”


317. News release Land force Western area Training centre, September 25th 2002,
Lt. Colonel Bryan Bailey.

318. The ex “rotating” president of SR Yugoslavia Miroslav Lilić’s testimony at the ICTY Milošević trial as reported in “Jutarnji list”, June 18th/19th 2002, by the Hague correspondent Augustin Palokaj: “Milošević made all the important decisions during the war in Croatia himself. At the supreme defense council meeting in 1993 Milošević spoke about the RSK and RS situation... “using peaceful means we should de facto accomplish what we have already achieved on the ground”.”

319. Lt. Colonel Calvin’s disposition in the Canadian Parliament.


322. The Medak UN official investigation about the Medak Pocket events, based on CANBAT report and the detailed report of the special review group “Operation Harmony”


325. Ibid.

326. The Croatian Ministry of Defense liaison office with the UN/EU Lika, Otočac, September 26th 1993, by Brigadier Mezić: “Last night at 22:00 hours we were informed an incident happened when CANBAT foot patrol encountered an anti-infantry landmine which wounded two soldiers. Later the Canadian APC, which was to help the wounded, hit a tripwire mine and two more soldiers were wounded. We have rushed our ambulance to that position and enabled them to evacuate passing Podklisa.”

327. General Jean Cot was relieved of his duties – UN SC Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali was not satisfied with Cot’s avoiding UN civil affairs representative Cedric Thornberry in Zagreb, and trying to, using French and British connections, directly influence the UN SC decisions.


329. “Chances for peace” page 123 – commander-to-commander chat about the importance of a successful outcome and returning the credibility to UNPROFOR.


332. Ibid.

333. Ibid.


336. Ibid.

337. Detailed report of the special review group “Operation Harmony” on June 16th 2000 – Coffee tampering incident – “…allegation that soldiers serving under former warrant officer (retired) Matt Stopford had attempted to poison him… a number of soldiers in the platoon felt that his aggressive leadership style could endanger their safety…”

338. Ibid.
339. Ibid. ("Tested Mettle") page 130.
340. Ibid. ("Tested Mettle") page 131.
341. Documents seized in Medak, as presented on Brigadier Krpina’s press conference in Gospic, September 13th 1993.
342. Ibid. ("Tested Mettle") page 132.
343. “Arena” weekly, June 12th 2003 – the General Mile Mrkšić photocopied warning order on the necessity of civilian evacuation to be prepared. These preparations started immediately after the Medak Pocket operation in 1993.
347. Lee A. Windsor “Professionalism under fire: Canadian implementation of the Medak Pocket agreement”
348. Ibid.
349. Ibid.
350. Ibid.
352. The Sunday (Toronto) sun.
354. “Chances for peace”, page 151 “The Serbans were a little antsy with what I (Captain MacKillop) was doing…this was the basis of a lot of arguing and discontent between me and Serbs over the next twenty-four hours…”
358. Ibid.
359. “The Sunday (Toronto) sun”/“Tested Mettle”
360. The transcript of talks held to implement the agreement – Jeannie Peterson, Civil Affairs, Zagreb HQ, September 16th 1993 – “Drew:…we’ve got to do is ensure that Serb forces do not infiltrate in behind the Croatian forces when they withdraw… Q: Back in Ribnik the Croats were insisting that as soon as you got here on the ground you turned your guns around towards the Serbian side. What’s their concern? Drew: They don’t want to leave this area without being covered to the South. And of course the Serbans are to the South.”
361. The transcript of negotiations about UNPROFOR re-deployment, Jeannie Peterson, Civil Affairs, Zagreb HQ, September 16th 1993. Rogulj: After taking over each position, just to turn your weapons in the Serb direction. Calvin: Yes. These weapons will all be facing the Serb side, all of them. Rogulj: If they are not facing the Serb side, I’m bringing back my tanks.”
362. UNPROFOR SITREP September 17th 1993, 19:50 hours – report signed by Major Bignon. “CO CANBAT 1 reports that CA forces delayed advance of CANBAT both days while systematic and thorough destruction of villages… was carried out… Buildings not damaged in previous fighting were flattened and livestock destroyed.”
363. UN SITREP, September 17th 1993, 19:50 hours – report signed by Major Bignon
“Seven bodies were discovered on initial sweeps and handed over to local civil auth
in Medak... Three Serb soldiers... presented themselves to CANBAT tps... were handed over to Serb 9 BDG HQ at Medak... an estimate 100 Serb soldiers are still cut off in this area...”

364. “The Sunday (Toronto) star”/“Tested Mettle”

365. Ministry of Defense Main Staff HQ, September 28th 1993 – from the letter General Bobetko wrote to General Cot: “…there are various interpretations in the press of how the incidents in the Medak Pocket happened, as well as the allegations that Croatian army had been shooting on UNPROFOR members... we propose a joint commission to be formed in order to establish the facts of what exactly happened.” From Bobetko’s letter to Cot on September 27th 1993 – “…when your soldiers entered the minefield and were consequently wounded, Croatian soldiers in order to be noticed have shot a couple of warning shots in the air and lit the area with flares... And concluded that wounded were your soldiers... they offered them their help... everything was agreed on at once and the Croatian army administered the necessary help.”


367. CANBAT 1 Final Report on Medak Pocket Operations, October 7th 1993


369. Ibid.

370. SAS – Special Air Service, the renowned British special operations unit.

371. The bunker mentioned in “Tested Mettle” on page 163 – “There had always been a modest number of British SAS and SBS teams operating in the former Yugoslavia. (A SECTION OF THEM HAD SHARED A BUNKER WITH MAJOR DREW AND WARRANT STOPFORD DURING THE MEDAK Bombardment).”

372. “Tested Mettle”, pages 162 – 163. General Sir Michael Rose introduced “special force” squads in the region – “…once Rose took command, he had given his former compatriots a much freer rein. True to nature of this caliber of troops, they had immediately made their presence felt throughout the region.”


376. Brendan Simms, “Unfinest Hour”, page 149. “The air strike would for sure convey Mladić a message – the catastrophic message of first air strikes not being taken against the main aggressors the Serbs, but against the Croatian scavengers.”


379. “Chances for peace” page 107 – Major Pat Stogran account – “Originally I wasn’t in the plan to go in (Goražde) with them but I had established good relations with the SAS soldiers, who were super soldiers and great guys.”

380. “Tested Mettle”, page 125 – “At the same time he (Major Dan Drew) passed along an UN intelligence report which said that the area should be very quiet over the next few days... with the forecast for relative calm...”

381. “Chances for peace”, page 142 – “…This would be death for the Croats as they are essentially not under economic sanctions, which boggles my mind. You have to look at the Zagreb-Vienna-Berlin axis to understand that one.”
382. “Tested Mettle”, page 130 – “Croat special forces and dismounted infantry launched a lightning pincer advance, rolling up the surprised Serb pockets in a series of deadly, one-sided fire-fights… (Canadians) watched retreating Serb soldiers and terrified refugees streaming through Medak…”

383. Lee A. Windsor, “Professionalism under fire”

384. Ibid.

385. Ibid.

386. Ibid.

387. UN analysis – artillery activity 1994, UN SC S/1994/674 document, May 27th 1994, pages 44 – 46 – “The Serb forces have, therefore, concentrated their efforts on weakening the city (Sarajevo) through constant bombardment from surrounding hillsides… city has been relentlessly shelled… random process of shelling throughout the civilian areas of the city… has a terror-inspiring effect on the civilian population…”

388. Lee A. Windsor “Professionalism under fire”


390. Lee A. Windsor “Professionalism under fire”

391. Ibid.

392. Ibid.

393. “Chances for peace”, page 156 – “Captain David MacKillop: “We suspected that there were Serbian infiltration groups all over the place. So my warrant had sort of negotiated for us. We have to move around. If we are going to move around, we Canadians will mutter in English, and you the Serbs will mutter in Serbian, and if anybody out there is moving around and is stupid enough to mutter, then obviously it’s either Serbian or Canadian. If somebody is out there not muttering, we the UN are not going to shoot them. You, the Serbs, well, we advise that you don’t shoot them either. Good deal!”

394. The author was a Croatian army’s volunteer on the battlefield of Sunja in 1991/1992.

395. Lee A. Windsor “Professionalism under fire”

396. “Tested Mettle”, page 142 – “… Came the news of Capt. Jim Decoste’s death… had been killed in a head-on vehicle collision with a Serb truck (on September 17th 1993)… Decoste’s body has been looted by the Serb soldiers and that the two other Canadians in the vehicle were similarly violated as they lay injured in the road…” (sic!?)

397. Lee A. Windsor “Professionalism under fire”

398. Ibid.

399. Ibid.

400. General MacInnis, second in UNPROFOR command’s order, issued on September 18th 1993 about upholding the agreement and that UNPROFOR forces are not to enter the Medak Pocket before designated time – the document is in possession of Ministry of Defense liaison office with the UN/EU – “…the immediate CANBAT halt on their present positions is commanded. Negotiations with Croatian army to start is ordered in order to establish whether CANBAT has surpassed the
(agreed upon) lines and to establish the damage done by bulldozing our (Croatian) lines."

401. Ibid
403. Lee A. Windsor “Professionalism under fire”
404. Ibid., page 139.
405. Lee A. Windsor “Professionalism under fire”
406. Samantha Power “A problem from hell”, NY 2002 – “…western diplomats had at last come to the slow realization that they were negotiating not with the gentleman (Slobodan Milošević) but with evil. MILITARY FORCE WAS THE ONLY ANSWER.”
407. Samantha Power/New Republic “Rescue Bosnia”, August 17th and 24th 1992 – “…there have been too many platitudes about the responsibility of “all factions” for the war. This lazy language is an escape hatch through which outside powers flee their responsibilities…”
409. Lee A. Windsor “Professionalism under fire” / Oehringer.
410. S. Power “A problem from hell”, page 507 – “Milošević saw that he had got away with the brutal suppression of an independence movement in Croatia and reasoned he would pay no price for committing genocide in Bosnia and Kosovo…”
411. Lee A. Windsor “Professionalism under fire”
412. Ibid.
413. Macleans Magazine, September 2nd 2002 – Michael Snider with Sean M. Maloney – “Firefight at the Medak Pocket”
415. The Ministry of Defense liaison office for the UN/EU report from Karlovac about the transit of the Canadian column through Turanj, June 26th and 27th. “…the CANBAT on its way to Knin passed through Turanj. Column of 167 vehicles.”
416. “Chances for peace”, page 116 – Lt. Col. Jim Calvin – “…I did a 550 kilometer road move from Sector West with about 150 APC’s and in 36 hours we arrived in Sector South…we arrived ready to do our job and General Cot couldn’t believe it. He just about kissed me.”
417. “Chances for peace”, page 171 – Corporal Andrew Opatowski “A Serbian army guy walked by with an AK-47 and shot our dog, Buddy. He just walked by, locked and loaded and shot the dog… There were other incidents with the Serbs…a mortar struck about 50 meters away…”
417. UN SITREPORT for September 15th 1993 document with the chronology of the September 6th to 19th 1993 events, which General Jean Cot sent to the Croatian army main staff HQ chief General Janko Bobetko on September 22nd 1993 – “22:15 CROATIAN ARMY ENGAGED CDN BATTALION WHO RETURNED FIRE.”
418. Mr. Milisav Sekulić “Knin je pao u Beogradu”, Nidda Verlag GmbH, Bad Vilbel, 2000
419. Major-General Milisav Sekulić, born November 11th 1935 in Trbušnica, Serbia. Graduated at the military academy, JNA’s political school, higher military academy, territorial defense school and liberal arts faculty (philosophy). Master of war sciences, specialty: operational HQ operations. Published more than 200 professional and scientific works. Wrote “Jugoslaviju niko nije branio, a Vrhovna komanda je

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izdalo” (Yugoslavia wasn’t defended by anyone, and its military brass betrayed it) (Nidda Verlag, 1997). Since the war started he was appointed a duty in the JNA main staff HQ. After his colleagues, who already were fighting in 1993 invited him, he joins them in Knin; takes the duty of the head of the operational and educational department, and is promoted to Major General. The first hand witness of what went on in Srpska Krajina army, that decided its fate, its relations with the political RSK leadership and with Yugoslav army’s main staff HQ.


421. M. Sekulić “Knin je pao u Beogradu”, page 73 – “…Among combatants there is the dissatisfaction prevailing, because the rotation troops didn’t really arrive to relieve them being on the frontline for four months. Therefore the combatants demand for their shift to come within ten days the latest. If that is not done, they have threatened to leave their positions and to come to Knin to picket the core command and Krajina main staff HQ” (translated from Serbian) – the 7th Dalmatian corps command’s report to the Srpska Krajina army main staff HQ in the second half of May.

422. Ibid, page 74.

423. The command for assuming full combat readiness to the 9th mobile brigade HQ – top secret no. 100-1632 dated September 3rd 1993; The 9th mobile brigade HQ order top secret no. 100-1697 dated September 8th 1993.


425. Ibid, page 75.

426. Ibid, page 75.

427. Ibid, page 75.

428. Serbian Krajina army HQ – September 8th 1993 – Information to subordinate units.

429. Ibid, page 75.

430. 9th mobile brigade HQ command – top secret no. 100-230, Medak, September 15th 1993.

431. Ibid, page 75.

432. Ibid, page 76.

433. Ibid, page 77.


436. Ibid, page 77.

437. Ibid, page 77.

438. Ibid, page 78.

439. Ibid, page 78.


441. RSK, Serbian army HQ, top secret no. 38-788/1, September 18th 1993, the commission to establish military losses – report to the commander in chief of the Serbian Krajina army, top secret.

442. Ibid.


444. Ibid.

445. Ibid.
446. Ibid.

447. Ibid.

448. Ibid.

449. RSK, parliamentary commission, report on September 8th 1993 events on the Divoselo, Čitluk and Počitelj area, presented in Knin on October 15th 1993 – the members of the commission Mile Paspalj, Nedo Mandić, Rade Leskovac and Rade Ćubrić.


452. Ibid


456. TV Banja Luka, September 13th 1993.


458. “Tested Mettle”, page 134 – “As they rolled slowly forward, Green’s men realized just how close the Serbs had been to losing the town of Medak itself. The battle debris and bodies indicated that at one point the Croats had even managed to establish a foothold in the northernmost buildings before being beaten.”

459. Savo Štrbac - “We are working as their (the Hague’s) particular service, because we connected their investigators with the witnesses…” “Slobodna Dalmacija”, March 27th 2002.


463. Ibid.


465. Ibid.


467. TV Banja Luka, September 28th 1993.

468. Ibid.

469. Ibid.


474. Indictment YU/SC-780-92/DOC-4/Sl-177


477. The Blewitt recommendation of “Veritas” (in addition): “Letter of Endorsement concerning Centre for collecting documents and information “Veritas”, March 2nd
2000” – Graham T. Blewit, deputy prosecutor.
478. Savo Štrbac, after the General Gotovina indictment: “The Ante Gotovina indict-ment redefines the history, or as Račan likes to say “criminalizes the Homeland war”. In the point 37 of that indictment RSK is recognized as being a state, and not being called “so-called state” which had an army. In the indictments point 39 the five attacks done on the RSK, the territory under UN protection, therefore Croatia, an UN member has for five times done an aggression on UN. That opens a wide perspective! Because if in the Hague the guilt of the commander of the main Croatian military operation is established, and to what we are working on, then such commanders would be war criminals, and those actions they commanded would be war crimes. The war in which war crimes were committed was not a homeland and not a defensive war, but the criminal act and an aggression. The state established therefore on such a war cannot exist and its constitution should be redefined. That is a chance for us Serbs to, by using legitimate and legal means, win the right for the Republika Srpska Krajina’s statehood” – Belgrade media reports.
479. International witnesses – it possibly concerns ex civilian and military UNPROFOR members (such as General MacKenzie), “foreign mercenaries”, journalists, human-itarian workers...
481. Though Stoltenberg’s declaration refers to the Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is also applicable to the situation in the Republic of Croatia.