This paper deals with the change of the ethnic structure of Petrinja and its causes that seem to be paradigmatic for ethnically mixed areas in Croatia. Petrinja was chosen due to its bipolar ethnic structure in which the Croats and Serbs constitute the greater part of the population but also owing to the fact that radical changes in the proportion of these groups took place in the 1945-1998 period. As late as 1948 Croats constituted slightly more than four fifths of the city population. In the year 1991 there were 40.96% of Croats, 45.14% of Serbs and 13.9% of "other and unknown" in the city of Petrinja. Thus in the city of Petrinja in four decades, the Croats lost their status of explicit majority with a tendency of decreasing in percentage. The causes of these processes are to be found in the formation of new mobilizational channels (negative selection of personnel, "nomen-clature" etc.) typical for the post-war communist regime. The power was based on the charisma of the local partisans and the members of the Communist Party in the political system with which (it seems) the local Serbs identified more than did the Croats. The scheme characterised by links between ideology and subethnic traditions (patriarchal modes, paternalism, ethnocentrism), family networks, the inclination of the undeveloped wider periphery (with Serbian majority) towards Petrinja resulted in selective migration and, consequently, in the changes in the ethnic structure. Dramatic changes in the ethnic structure took place in 1991 with the aggression against Croatia. The migration flows have not stabilised yet. Not until the next census (in 2001) the consequences on the ethnic structure of Petrinja left by the war and post-war happenings will be clearly shown.
A mere change can be of the kind observable in clouds or smoke rings: now they look like this, now like that. A concept of social change that does not distinguish clearly between changes that relate to the structure of a society and those that do not – and, further, between structural changes without a specific direction and those which follow a particular direction over many generations, e. g., toward greater or lesser complexity – is a very inadequate tool of sociological inquiry.

(Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process*)

Between the claim that "one cannot step into the same river twice" to the claim that "there is nothing new under the sun" sociological theory has woven a series of explanations of social changes and social structures.* These mutually complementary concepts indicate two traits of social life, on the one hand its mutability, and on the other its constancy, continuity. Namely, to identify social changes means to perceive changes in social structure. Numerous factors (which Giddens condensed into three groups: the environment, political organisation and cultural factors) influence social change most often in mutual interaction and often can only be studied and explained in such a framework (Giddens, 1990). War, new forms of administration and/or new ruling ideologies can influence social change. We shall attempt to relate precisely these processes and mechanisms with changes in the ethnic structure (of Petrinja) so as to explain the causes of the process. Likewise, our goal is to identify the traits of social changes that during the past decades, as shown by the relevant data, have brought about pronounced ethnically characterised mobility.

Petrinja, in the region of Banovina,1 has been selected due to a bipolar structure in which Croats and Serbs make up the great majority of the population, and also because of the fact that from 1945 to 1998 it has been the place of radical changes in the proportions of these ethnic groups the causes of which seem paradigmatic for the nationally mixed areas in Croatia. It is precisely the bipolar ethnic structure that implies an almost natural competitiveness between the two peoples who have during the long centuries shared the same space, but have not always had the same access to resources of power. The ethnic boundary between them (in Barth’s sense) has always existed and is visible right from the use of ethnonyms that summarise ethnic traits and sometimes also the relationship between ethnic groups.2 The differentiation between "us" and "them" is also aided by the spatial dispersion into ethnically mainly homogenous villages gravitating to Petrinja, as the common urban centre (see Figure 1).

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1 This paper was presented at the International Conference "Diasporas and Ethnic Migrants in 20th Century Europe", Berlin (Humboldt University), 20-23 May 1999.
Petrinja is the centre of a municipality of the same name which according to the former territorial organisation (in use until the census of 1991) covered an area of 390 km² with 57 settlements.

The census data from 1857 until 1991 show an unequal development of the number of inhabitants of the town of Petrinja and of the same-named municipality (Table 1).
In thirteen decades the number of inhabitants of the municipality of Petrinja has not yet doubled (with an index of change of 188.8). A comparison with the total population of Croatia (where the corresponding index is 218.2) shows that the region in question fell behind in its population dynamics.

It is interesting to compare the town and the group of the other settlements (all of which, with one exception, constitute small villages). Until 1948 both Petrinja and surrounding rural area had a similar trend of population development: growth – stagnation – reduction. The fall in the number of inhabitants was connected to the demographic losses in the Second World War.

After the Second World War there were important social changes and an acceleration of relevant processes. The post-war concept of general and regional development was based on the assumption that socialist society must become an industrialised society, and that collectivism and social economy should dominate in agriculture. Proceeding from this approach, the total accelerated post-war development was conducted in the sense of forced urban-based industrialisation (of the oligocentric type). This brought about a shift in spatial population gravitation and great changes in regional development. Larger cities became focal points in complex regional development and population polarities, whereas at the same time smaller urban centres in rural areas did not develop to a corresponding degree. The post-war decades were characterised by a dual society and a dual economy, in which the peasantry was an unequal and backward segment. In such circumstances Croatia experiences a strong deruralisation and spatial redistribution of population. The effects of this were, among other things, a quicker growth of urban population and exten-
sive depopulation of village (i.e. rural) settlements (out of a total of 5,800 rural settlements, as many as 88.4% had less inhabitants in 1981 than in 1953; Nejašmić, 1991: 157).

The region of Petrinja was not exempt from these processes. Village (rural) settlements had a continuous fall in population (index 1991/1948 = 86.0), while at the same time the town of Petrinja itself had a strong increase (index 358.3), especially during the period 1961-1971 (index 150.7). Comparison with the group including all the municipality centres in Croatia shows that this growth in population was above average. The index of population change for 1948-1971 was 232.8 for Petrinja and 188.1 for the entire group of municipality centres (Friganović, 1980: 84). The result of such a divergent demographic development was also a greater percentage of the Petrinja town population in the total population of the municipality: 17.1% in 1857, 18.9% in 1900, 21.0% in 1948 and 52.6% in 1991. An even clearer picture of the demographic development is given by the fact that out of a total of 57 settlements in the municipality as many as 51 had less inhabitants in 1991 than in 1948.

An even clearer picture of the demographic development is given by the fact that out of a total of 57 settlements in the municipality as many as 51 had less inhabitants in 1991 than in 1948.

The dynamics that we have shown in regard to the numerical development of the population indicate differential migration in the area observed. Petrinja and some of the surrounding settlements attracted immigrants, whereas the rural area was mainly characterised by emigration, or better said by exodus. This is confirmed by data on the net migration balance between 1961 and 1981, which was a period when the population of the town almost doubled.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Petrinja</td>
<td>2 240</td>
<td>10 305</td>
<td>15 778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other settlements</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>20 260</td>
<td>17 792</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Expected on the basis of the population in 1961 and natural growth during 1961-1981

Source: For the population data the same as in Table 1; for natural growth according to Tablo-grami o rodentima i umrtima po naseljima (Odjel statistike stanovništva), Državni zavod za statistiku, Zagreb.

The data shows that the total population growth in Petrinja during 1961-1981 (7,713 persons according to Table 1) is 71.0% the result of immigration and 29.0% the result of natural growth. On the other hand, the group of other settlements has had a pronounced negative migration balance; 2,468 more persons have emigrated than have immigrated (this accounts for 13.1% of the average population of the "other settlements" during the observed time period).
In conclusion it can be said that divergent demographic dynamics have been one of the basic population-settlement characteristics in the observed area. Petrinja itself became an ever more factor in accounting for the biological and socio-economic reproduction of the entire area, while the rural part of the municipality continued to depopulate and to structurally erode.

The war in Croatia (1991-1995) and the after-war phase provoked dramatic changes in the demographic, and especially in the ethnic structure of the observed area. The town of Petrinja and dozens of settlements with a Croat majority population fell into the hands of the rebelled Serbs. The vast majority of the Croats (and a smaller number of Serbs) became refugees, 112 civilians were killed and 9 would be registered as missing. In 1995, during and after the operation "Storm" conducted by the Croatian armed forces, the great majority of the Serbs left Croatia in an organised mode (about 500 remained on the territory of the municipality), while a part perished during the military action and after it (according to the estimates a few dozen). In this way Petrinja and the surrounding villages became a practically empty territory.

Very soon after the re-establishment of Croatian state administration wide-scale renovation began. Croat displaced persons gradually returned, Croat refugees from Bosnia arrived and settled in the region, and the return of Serbs also began. How many inhabitants does the area in question now have? We have at our disposal data on the size and structural traits of the population in 1998 – they relate to the former municipality of Petrinja, but according to the new territorial organisation (Table 3).

**TABLE 3**
The population of Petrinja and the surrounding area in 1998 in comparison with 1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>Index 1998/91</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Petrinja (urban area of the town)</td>
<td>15,324</td>
<td>18,706</td>
<td>81.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlements on the territory of the Petrinja Town*</td>
<td>5,734</td>
<td>10,364</td>
<td>55.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jabukovac municipality*</td>
<td>1,218</td>
<td>6,495</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>22,276</td>
<td>35,565</td>
<td>62.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* According to the new territorial organisation (from the beginning of 1993) the area of the former municipality was divided between two territorial administrative units: Petrinja Town, constituted by the urban settlement of Petrinja and 32 separate settlements and the municipality of Jabukovac, including 24 settlements.


On the territory of the former municipality of Petrinja (today the territory of Petrinja Town and the municipality of Jabukovac) in June 1998 there were 22,276 inhabitants, 37.4% less than had been registered in this area by the 1991 census (be-
fore the aggression against Croatia). Petrinja, as the central settlement, suffered the least loss in relation to 1991 (18.1%). This was also expected, since a large part of the returnees was settled in the town itself while expecting the renovation of their houses in the surrounding villages, and most of the Croat refugees from Bosnia were also situated in Petrinja. One and the other group together number about 3,500 persons.

The rural area, however, is being renovated significantly more slowly. Settlements on the territory of Petrinja Town (in which Croats were the majority population in 1991) have in total 5,734 inhabitants, which is only a bit over half of their population in 1991. Among these settlements, Mošćenica (a suburb of Petrinja) accounts for 3,211 inhabitants. This means that in all the other settlements together (numbering a total of 31) there are 2,523 inhabitants or in average 81, and this is only a third of the pre-war number (7,533 people lived in them in 1991). The least number of people live in the municipality of Jabukovac (which includes 24 settlements in which Serbs were formerly the majority population). It now has 1,218 inhabitants, or 19% of the pre-war number – on average 51 inhabitants per settlement.

**ETHNIC COMPOSITION**

According to the census (1991) the population of the town and municipality of Petrinja had a simple ethnic structure – 9/10 were Croats and Serbs, whereas among the other ethnic groups over a half were persons who had declared themselves as “Yugoslavs” (Table 4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic group*</th>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Petrinja (town)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>44.40</td>
<td>40.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonians</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenes</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>44.90</td>
<td>45.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Yugoslavs”</td>
<td>5.10</td>
<td>7.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others and undeclared</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>4.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>1.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Ethnic groups with over 0.1% are mentioned individually.


In retro perspective we may reduce the number of ethnic groups. We are interested, first of all, in the changes in the percentages of Croats and Serbs in the total population of the municipality (in relation to the territorial division of 1991) and the population of the (town) of Petrinja (Table 5).
The data given clearly shows the reduction in the proportion of Croats and the growth of the proportion of Serbs in the population of the municipality and the town. At the beginning of the 20th century Croats constituted the majority in the population of the municipality. In Petrinja itself the proportion of the two ethnic groups was even more expressively to the advantage of Croats – here they constituted 4/5 of the population.

The data from the first post-WWII census (1948) shows that the war and the events following immediately afterwards caused not only a population reduction (see Table 1), but also certain changes in the proportions of the individual ethnic groups in Petrinja municipality. Since we do not know the ethnic composition of the population during the inter-war period (the 1921 and 1931 census), we can only compare the data from 1910 (although it must be used with certain reserve). At any rate, during the period in question, the greatest difference in the proportions of Serbs and Croats on the territory of the municipality was registered in 1948: Croats 58.4%, Serbs 40.6%. There were various reasons for this effect. First, the Serbian population suffered relatively greater losses during World War II.3 Second, a relatively higher percentage of Serbs in the partisan units effected demographic changes also after the war. Namely, many peasants-partisan fighters remained in the army and police force, or were “recruited” into positions of authority in the economy and administration, thus permanently leaving their home regions. Furthermore, partisans and their families were given preference in the allocation of land and those also from the Petrinja region participated to a relatively higher proportion in planned migration (“colonisation” between 1945 and 1948) to Slavonia and Vojvodina (Maticka, 1990).

It should be stated, therefore, that at the beginning of the post-war period Croats constituted the majority of the popu-
lation in the municipality and a marked majority in Petrinja itself (as we have seen, over 4/5). Later census data showed a continuous and significant fall in the proportion of Croats in the population of the municipality (the 1991/1948 index of change amounted to 76.0), and a significant growth of the proportion of Serbs (an index of 110.6). Such divergent development brought about a practically equal proportion of Croats and Serbs in the municipality by 1991: 44.4% Croats, 44.9% Serbs and 10.7% "others and unknown". The data shows an unusual reduction of the proportions of Croats and Serbs in 1981. It should be said that in the interim period there was no large immigration of members of other ethnic groups, but simply persons of Croatian or Serb origin declared themselves as "Yugoslavs" (5,159 or 15.4% of the total population; in 1971 there were 567 and in 1991 1,814 such persons). The number of members of this group doubtlessly was dependent on political conditions.

In the same period there were two other marked changes in the settlement of Petrinja itself. The proportion of Croats was cut in half (the 1991/1948 index of change was 49.8), whereas the proportion of Serbs tripled (an index of 322.1). In this way during four decades Croats changed from being a pronounced majority people to being a minority (in 1991 there were 41.0% Croats, 45.1% Serbs and 13.9% "others and unknown") (see Figure 2).

We might take a look at some indicators of this post-WWII reversal. Comparison of the data from the 1948 census and the 1991 census (Table 6) shows that the number of Croats in the municipality increased only slightly (an index of 109.0) while at the same time there was a significant growth of the number of Serbs (158.5). In Petrinja itself, in which population tripled (an index of 358.3), a significant growth in the number
of Croats was registered (an index of 178.3), while the number of Serbs increased ten-fold (an index of 1,153.7). It should be said that in the rural environment, which was otherwise characterised by strong depopulation, the reduction in the number of Croats (an index of 79.7) and Serbs (80.5) was practically equal. The data presented shows that the reason for the observed change should be sought primarily in population migration, selective by ethnic affiliation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality (total)</th>
<th>Petrinja (town)</th>
<th>Other settlements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>14,491</td>
<td>15,790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>10,075</td>
<td>15,969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others* and unknown</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>3,806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>24,819</td>
<td>35,565</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* “Yugoslavs” constitute about a half. Source: Same as Table 5.

As well as changing the general demographic picture, the 1991-1995 war also changed the ethnic picture of Petrinja. Already at the beginning of the war, when Petrinja and the surrounding area was under Serb control, thorough “ethnic cleansing” of the non-Serbian population was carried out. During the military-police action of the Croatian forces, as mentioned above, an exodus of the Serbs occurred. After the return of Petrinja into the system of Croatian state authority the area was demographically revived. What is the most recent ethnic structure of the population? We can imagine it on the basis of available official data (for 1998) for individual population contingents:

a) returnees, almost all Croats, 13,568;
b) immigrants (refugees from Bosnia), also almost all Croats, 2,526;
c) returnees from the Croatian Danubian region and from Yugoslavia, mostly Serbs, 1,244;
d) inhabitants of villages on the territory of Petrinja Town who were not occupied during the war, mostly Croats, 4,938;
in total 22,276 people (same source as in Table 3).

With the help of the indicated data and other material acquired in the field we might formulate the probable ethnic structure of the former municipality of Petrinja in mid-1998 (today for the territory of Petrinja Town and the municipality of Jabukovac): 86.5% Croats, 9.5% Serbs, 4% others and unknown. The ethnic structure for Petrinja itself would be as follows: 89.5% Croats, 5.5% Serbs, 5% others and unknown.
THE CAUSES FOR CHANGES IN THE ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE POPULATION

In fact we are looking for an answer to the question: what is the reason for the divergent development of the proportions of Croats and Serbs in the case of Petrinja during the period 1948-1991? It should be noted that something similar did not occur in the neighbouring municipalities with a mixed, but predominantly Serb population: Dvor, Glina, Kostajnica, Vojnić and Vrginmost (cf. Klemenčić and Orešić, 1991). We have seen that the number of inhabitants of Petrinja in the period 1948-1991 increased 3.5 times (Table 1), mainly due to immigration.

To provide a complete explanation for this development it is necessary to examine the data on natural growth. Average natural population growth in the municipality of Petrinja was 4.3‰ (1948-1991). We do not have data on natural growth according to ethnic affiliation, but we can with certainty assume that it was somewhat greater among Serbs than among Croats. Namely, relatively more Croats than Serbs lived in the town. Besides this, the differential rate was effected also by a strong immigration flow of Serbs from North-West Bosnia, a region characterised by "a higher norm" of the birth rate. It is estimated that the average yearly increment among Croats was about 4‰ and among Serbs about 4.7‰.

From this it can be deduced that according to natural growth in 1991 the municipality of Petrinja should have had 16,954 Croats, i.e. 17% or 2,463 more than in 1948, although the actual increase was 1,299 (9.0%). Taking into account the fact that some of the Croats declared themselves as "Yugoslavs" (knowing the circumstances prior to the 1991 census we could say that there were relatively few persons of "Croat origin" among the 1,814 "Yugoslavs"), we could conclude that the Croat contingent was more characterised by emigration, or more precisely by a negative migration balance. Among Serbs the situation was totally reversed. According to natural growth in 1991 there should have been 12,100 of them, i.e. 20% or 2,025 more than in 1948, but the actual increment amounted to 5,894 (58.5%). Hence, the strong growth of the number (and proportion) of Serbs in the municipality was above all the result of immigration; the positive migration balance amounted to 3,869 persons (the number would also be significantly higher if we take into consideration the fact that the contingent of "Yugoslavs" was to a large degree most probably generated by persons of Serb origin). We may conclude that Croats emigrated (as did, understandably, some Serbs), while Serbs immigrated, and provided, doubtlessly, a strong majority in the immigrant contingent.

In accord with the general processes mentioned, the town of Petrinja itself, being an important urban and industrial cen-
tre, attracted the great majority of persons who immigrated from other municipalities in Croatia and from the other republics in the former state, and among these persons Serbs constituted the great majority. It also attracted most of the population that emigrated from other settlements in the same municipality. The data given above (Table 6) shows that the proportions of both Croats and Croats in rural settlements in the municipality fell equally, but this does not mean that immigration into the municipal centre was relatively equal. The town of Petrinja was more attractive to Serbs than to Croats (the latter were more frequently attracted to other centres in Croatia – Zagreb, Sisak, etc.). This accounts for the abrupt growth of Petrinja itself and the change in the proportion of Croats and Serbs in the town.

The question may be posed: Where did the immigrants come from? Most came from other municipalities in Croatia (4/5). Since theory says that the strength of migration is inversely proportional to the distance between the departure and arrival points, we can say that it is highly probable that most of the immigrants came from neighbouring municipalities in Banovina and in Kordun (this is also indicated by the fact that these regions are areas of high depopulation). Among persons who immigrated from other republics in the former state, the majority came from Bosnia and Herzegovina (70%), mainly from the border areas in the North-West, where municipalities with Serb majorities are located (Bosanska Dubica, Bosanski Novi, etc.).

What caused such ethnic selectivity in the migration flows? What induced Serbs to immigrate and Croats to emigrate, and why to such a degree? Although we are aware of the mesh of numerous socio-economic factors (which as a rule derive from unequal regional development), and we have also kept in mind the spontaneity and other traits of migration (often developing via family and friendship channels), it is still difficult to eliminate the impression that there was also the effect of a "quite" planned migration (or colonisation).

Since the head-spinning changes in the ethnic composition of Petrinja began after the Second World War, it is necessary to return to the past, at least to that time. Instrumentalisation of the history of the war and post-war period had made it difficult to use the available literature in an analysis of inter-ethnic relations from that time. Nevertheless, it may be said that despite the participation of both peoples in the Anti-fascist resistance, among the Serbs selected (often generalised and instrumentalised) memories of the "Croat sin" of the Ustasha had their effect on the organisation of post-war life in Petrinja. Namely, after the creation of the "Independent State...
of Croatia” (1941) the centre of the regional Ustasha authorities was located in Petrinja (see Korać, 1981; Golec, 1993). From a regime allied with Nazi German and Fascist Italy many misfortunes befell mainly the Serbs. At the same time, the Petrinja communists (to a high degree Croats) participated in organising the Anti-Fascist resistance as well as the First partisan unit in Croatia (as well as in all former Yugoslavia). However the circumstances, different for Serbs and Croats, had an effect on the number of members of the two ethnic groups who were to become involved in the partisan movement in Banovina. A large number of Serbs in Banovina sought in the Anti-Fascist mobilisation an escape from the suffering that they faced from the Ustasha regime. This paved the way to their identification with the Communist party. This primarily influenced the post-war tendency of reducing the role of Croats in the partisan movement in Banovina, of distribution of power, and indirectly also the changes in the ethnic composition, which we are discussing.

Causes for the changes in the ethnic composition can be divided into two basic groups. The first group involves systematic changes introduced by the new regime (industrialisation, urbanisation, new mobilisation channels). The second would include inherited traits of patriarchal society and ethnocentrism, which gradually were transformer from latent and veiled supra-ethnic ideologies to manifest forms, finally producing ethnic mobilisation and conflict. Although it is difficult to distinguish these two groups of factors, since they are intertwined, the causes of ethnic changes can to a certain degree be shown also chronologically. An inevitably simplified chronology of the causes would appear as follows (the first two causes occur simultaneously):

1. The new regime – new ideologies – new mobility channels. The centralised party state that had been "forged in war and revolution" relatively quickly abandoned the idea of democratic society and political pluralism, basing its authority on a "monism of intellect" which discarded all that was incompatible with the Bolshevik revolutionary project, and not recognising any individual initiative (Križan, 1991). The new regime introduced also its own criteria for advancement along the social ladder – among them the criterion of "political aptness" (which brought about negative selection of personnel and the phenomenon of "nomenclature"). The institution of "connections and protection" became a mobilisation channel, which was followed and used in as much as one's degree of power permitted it; an entire system of domination and subordination was developed, which affirmed paternalistic relations with the stratification of social roles. Despite modernisation ambi-

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Čačić-Kumpes, J., Nejašmić, I.: Social...
tions a strong sub-institutional tradition was preserved, which often acted against the institutional order, destroying it, with its values and patterns of behaviour that derived from patriarchal culture (Katunarić, 1982). Most workers "by their sociopsychological traits belong to the old, peasant system of life. Addressing one other as 'cousin' or 'countryman' often represents the highest level of social cohesion" (Kuvačić, 1970: 193). In such a newly established regime and in the system of values that it brought with it perhaps we could find elements pertaining to the causes for the emigration of a part of the Croats from Petrinja. The Croat urban dwellers born in town, as opposed to the newly arrived peasant, mainly Serb, population, most probably had – at least to a degree – formulated a system of values and industrial production: work, order, discipline, control, awareness of the value of knowledge and a competitive spirit as well as personal initiative. Individuals with such a formation are potentially more mobile. Besides this, a feeling on the part of the domestic population that stability relations are threatened would also act as push factor.

2. Sub-ethnic traditions – ethnocentrism. The power organisation of a state imbied with Communist ideology was duplicated to the local level via the technique of "democratic centralism". Between the liberation (1945) and the seventies Communist rule in Petrinja was based on the charisma of (Banovina) partisans and members of the Communist party. Revolutionary accomplishments, reduced mainly to the Banovina Serbs were transformed into the local structures of authority and the village-to-town migration flow. For this generation of politicians (usually also directors of the economy, since positions of authority were rotated according to the principle of the "social carrousel") it should be said that it is "heroic and conquering", that it is governed by "self-sacrifice, a collective spirit and faith in the future". It can be said that strong ties of solidarity are maintained, on the one hand, by "well-preserved primary groups, families, family networks, neighbourhoods and village communes" (Katunarić, 1982: 364), and on the other hand by homogenisation based on shared wartime experience. At the time of economic boom, renovation of the economy (industrialisation and often forced migration from the villages to towns), and formation of the new society the patriarchal and paternalistic style was carried over to personnel policy. The basis of evaluating people was first of all formed by blood, emotional and personal ties as well as estimation of political and wartime merits, and only then by work capabilities. "Local patriotism" and pressures to help family members and friends often were the main criteria in receiving employment. This social context in which family and friendship
ties multiplied had also a strong basis in ethnic solidarity. Thus changes in the ethnic structure of the population were also in a special type of correlation with the ethnic composition of persons of authority in Petrinja, among whom from 1945 onwards Serbs were over-represented. 11

3. System changes – the power of local authorities. The elementary nature and spontaneity of this form of ethnic solidarity that had the power to change the ethnic picture of a town 12 found support also in some system decisions. Namely, the Programme of the League of Yugoslav Communists (accepted in 1958) was imagined as a platform for long-term social development and an intensified process of de-statism that intended to give workers and work collectives the role of bearers of social development (cf. Bilandžić, 1985). In this way a good part of decision-making was transferred to the local level. In such circumstances, a platform for long-term development of Banovina was formulated during the sixties, which formally gave Petrinja the role of being a gravitation centre for the region (see Program razvoja Banije..., 1966). The population of undeveloped municipalities naturally and logically gravitated towards developed regional centres. From this time it gravitated to Petrinja also by plan. The authorities, in accord with their preferences and understanding of conditions, decided to tie the future of the town with its undeveloped hinterland and not with a more developed centre (Zagreb). If we link this to the fact that the population of the region oriented towards Petrinja is predominantly Serb, 13 to preferential treatment of Serbs in receiving employment, in distribution of housing, of building sites (some parts of Petrinja, new housing zones, were almost ethnically totally Serb) and of loans (especially those designated by the strange syntagm – ”repayment-free loans”), then we can understand why the mass immigration to the Petrinja area of persons of Serb ethnic affiliation acquired systematic characteristics. 14

4. Ideologisation – ethnic competition. The image of economic success with which the (as a whole former Yugoslav) society entered the seventies totally changed at the end of this decade. In such a way, the political crisis (conflicts within the Federation) from the beginning of the decade was to be sealed by the economic crisis. At the same time, new generations of potentates came to the scene that could not evoke their participation in the war and could not use their own charisma to reproduce their power. The new ruling elite in Petrinja, due to its incompetence, ignorance or inability to resolve in a productive manner the economic, cultural and political crisis in the municipality, took recourse to the use of repression and ideologised ”Real Socialist” rhetoric. 15 The elements through
which it reproduced its power were to be paternalism and ethnocentrism. Polarisation of ethnicity was continued, and the criterion for party aptness and ethnic affiliation that regulated access to resources took the form of a caricature. All criticism of such behaviour was eliminated by imposing ideology, and even persons that would possibly have dissonant opinions were demonised. The search for the "enemy" prevented control and criticism, while the label of being a "nationalist" was a last-instance accusation: when there was no legitimate way of dealing with an opponent he would be definitely marginalised by being labelled a "nationalist", which in an ideologised society no one could easily remove from himself. The victim could only retire into the private sphere or else leave. This process became more intense after the "Croatian Spring" and continued until the first democratic elections in 1990. The changes in the ethnic composition of the population assumed at this time also the aspect of antagonising ethnic groups. The black and white picture in supporting mainly members of one people and demonising members of the other was retouched by adding a layer of ideology (under which violations of human rights could be well seen) and of "Yugoslavism".

5. Ethnic mobilisation – conflict. After the Communist party lost the first multiparty elections in 1990 many Serb voters perceived this as their own defeat. For many of them this meant the loss of mobility channels to which they had been accustomed, and therefore also the loss of political resources. The nationalist rhetoric of the new Croatian authorities, and especially the "new Constitution and composition of the Parliament made clear to Serbs in Croatia that – since they would deport themselves as an electoral minority and no longer as a 'constitutive people' – they would be essentially limited in their political competitiveness. The old (political) resources, in other words, were lost, and new ones, which would be of the same rank, were mainly out of reach" (Štulhofer, 1993: 376). Systematic ethnic homogenisation that had begun in Serbia with the Kosovo crisis already in the mid-1980s, media propaganda which especially emphasized sufferings during the Second World War and spread ethnic stereotypes or constructions such as the stereotype of the "genocidal nature" of Croats, stimulated the discontent of Croatian Serbs. Orientation towards seeking help from the Yugoslav National Army, the distribution of arms to the Serb population (and disarming of the Croat population) provoked an induced conflict. Croatian (and Petrinja) Serbs were exploited (not for the first time) for the needs of Belgrade politics. In this context, most Petrinja Serbs, in one way or another found themselves on the side of the Serb rebels who, as in
other occupied areas, ethnically "cleansed" the territory, which they later – in 1995 – lost, and then left in a mass exodus.

Since the migration flows provoked by the recent war events have not yet stabilised, the ethnic composition of Petrinja will still experience changes. An exact and detailed demographic picture of the Petrinja region, especially of the effects of the war and post-war events on the ethnic structure, shall be possible to construct only after the next population census (in 2001).

IN LIEU OF A CONCLUSION

Petrinja is one of the ethnically mixed Croatian towns that has significantly and finally dramatically changed its ethnic structure. Similar processes took place also in other peripheral or semi-peripheral parts of Croatia. Especially illustrative are the towns of the North Dalmatian hinterland (Benkovac, Drniš, Knin, Obrovac) in which Croats were the majority in towns themselves and Serbs were the majority in the surrounding settlements (cf. Nejašmić, 1992). Petrinja is different in that its ethnic structure changed, although Croats were once the majority population both in the town and in the municipality. However, this transformation was not only the result of a simple redistribution within the framework of the municipality (from the villages to the town) and the region. It was primarily the result of selective immigration in which Serbs, much more than Croats, were stimulated by possibilities of easy and quick social promotion.

Despite several decades of an official ideology that spoke of equal rights of peoples, forbade and through the educational system suppressed ethnic prejudices20 "latent cultural transmission generated impressions of an unequal position and unfair treatment of individual peoples" (Katunarić, 1991: 132). For this reason political elites could usefully exploit ethnic groups as a basis for mass mobilisation. It was shown that the dichotomy of "us" and "them" survived through time and that in different political, economic and cultural conditions only the attributes changed which members of the groups attributed to one another (or to themselves). True, supra-ethnic ideologies influenced the formation of a feeling of "Yugoslavism" among some members of both ethnic groups. However, instability in the number of persons declaring themselves as "Yugoslavs" indicates that for many of them this was not a change of their identification framework, but rather an inclination to conform to the ruling ideology (see note 18). This example (i.e. the rise and later fall of the number of "Yugoslavs") shows that ideology in this case brought about only superficial "smoke ring" changes. Although conformism can be a way in which the social majority adapts to social changes, the sensitive tissue of
ethnic identity shows itself as being a resistant intimate sphere of human life that in constant interaction with its environment transforms its traits but maintains continuity of its singularity.

Changes of the ethnic structure, however, influenced in multiple ways the economic and socio-cultural image of the town. Life in a town with a baroque nucleus, amiable nature and a rich cultural-educational tradition gradually adapted to the force of settled newcomers. In part this can be attributed to the general reductionism of "Real Socialist" society and the relationship of the elite to tradition. As a result of eradication of the urban spirit, the native population lost not only its motivation to remain in the town, but also the possibility to employ its educated members. Due to this, the town no longer attracted young and educated people (we saw that immigrants mostly came from the villages), while it repulsed its original urban population. Under the guise of Communist ideology and the plans of its political elite, old values (patriarchalism, paternalism, ethnocentrism) continued to sizzle. They slowed down and transformed the modernisation ambitions of the state authorities and the system of values that these authorities intended to establish.

Finally, one result of the last war is that during the nineties the town has existed without a large part of its former inhabitants, alternatively without one or without the other ethnic group. Intolerance, bitterness and many other negative emotions filled the space between the two opposed ethnic groups. Reconciliation still has to be achieved. It would be good if it would come out of an awareness, clearly shown in the history of Petrinja, that prosperity in an ethnically mixed area can only stem from real equality between the ethnic groups, i.e. from equality in rights and in actual accessibility to political, economic, cultural and other resources.

NOTES

1 Petrinja is the main urban and economic centre of Banovina, a region in the South part of Central Croatia. Mediaeval (old) Petrinja was first mentioned in 1240 in a charter in which the Slavonian prince, duke Koloman (the brother of the Croatian and Hungarian king Bela IV), conferred privileges on the town. The beginnings of modern Petrinja, however, date from the victory over the Ottoman Turks (1595). The Turks had erected a fortress on the site of the present town (1592). After expulsion of the Ottomans, Petrinja became part of the Military Frontier (a zone in Croatia along the border with the Ottomans which had a special administrative status under Habsburg centralistic rule). It gradually developed into a town centre. Between 1809 and 1813 the town was under French administration, as part of Napoleon’s Illyrian provinces. Afterwards it was again included in the Military Frontier, until 1881 when this zone was
In the year 1752 Petrinja had 511 Catholic households and 5 households of other confessions (Golec, 1993). From the second part of the 18th century and more Eastern Orthodox immigrants moved into the town. However, the Eastern Orthodox population (called “Vlahs”) had begun to flee from the Turkish lands to Banovina in the early 16th century (the name of the region is derived from Banskabrajina, i.e. the Ban’s borderland, since this part of the Military Frontier had been under the jurisdiction of the Ban of Croatia). The sojourn of the Habsburg army and the organisation of life in the multiethnic Habsburg Empire left a trace in the ethnic structure of the town. Apart from the predominant Croats and Serbs, the population had also included groups of Germans, Czechs, Slovaks and Italians. Likewise, the military past left a mark on the town – various armies rotated through the Petrinja barracks, influencing the life of the townspeople.

2 Renata Jambrešić, in her analysis of the ethnonymic polarisation of Banovina speaks of three types of ethnonyms (based on manuscript collections from the 1950s and recordings from the 1990s): the legitimate type of ethnonym (Croats and Serbs), the alternative type (Šokić, Bunjevci, Vlasi, Kranjci) that speak more of a feeling of difference, one’s own/somebody else’s feeling of the other or different identity, rather than identifying clearly separate and homogeneous ethnic groups, and the third type of ethnonym, the substitute type (Muži, Žabari, Krđani, Orthodox, Catholic) in which emphasis is placed on ethnic (self)identification which these names in many cases express (Jambrešić, 1993: 82).

3 The ethnically Croat population in Croatia suffered a loss of 3.5% during the war, while the Serb population lost 17.1% of its members, as calculated in relation to the expected population in 1948 (according to Žerjavić, 1989: 39, 154).

4 Since the 1991 census was taken already at a time of intensifying ethnic mobilisation and the beginning of conflicts there is some suspicion that the local authorities through their unconscientious census takers manipulated the census questionnaire in regard to the question on ethnic affiliation (according to Golec, 1993).

5 As much as 82% of the territory of the municipality of Petrinja was occupied. From this area, according to statistics of the Croatian government’s Office for displaced persons and refugees, a total of 11,041 persons were in exile in 1992 (9,817 Croats, 820 Serbs and 404 others). In 1994 12,871 displaced persons were registered (Popis i preregistracija..., 1994). It should be added that a part of the expellees, primarily those that found refuge abroad, was never registered (this includes also a part of the Serbs, who at the beginning of the war left for Serbia).

6 According to the results of fieldwork carried on in 1989 on the level of Croatia as a whole, Serbs declared themselves as “Yugoslavs” relatively much more often than did Croats (Lazić, 1991).

7 The events during the Second World War certainly had their origins in earlier happenings. However, since our goal is not to explain the totality of relations between Croats and Serbs in the area in question, but rather only changes in the ethnic composition during the post-WWII period, we shall focus on this period.
It should be noted, however, that the race laws in the "Independent State of Croatia" (introduced after the model in Nazi Germany) technically did not apply to the Serb population, but to Jews and Gypsies. Rather, the Serb population was affected by an ideology that denied the right of non-Croats to have any say in the state and by legal measures formally for state defence that permitted wide scale "reprisals" against it. "Who is a Serb has Serbia to go to, that is his homeland" – stated one high Ustasha official. Some attempts were made to turn the Serbs into Croats, but there was systematic discrimination against the Serbs, and instances of participation in Chetnik (i.e. Serb nationalist) or Partisan activity fueled the reprisals (see, for example, Matković, 1994: 154-164).

Immediately after the war Serbs accounted for almost a half of all Communist party members in Croatia (Roksandić, 1991).

Research on the social structure in the mid-1980s revealed that political functionaries were those who in the questionnaire showed the highest degree of attachment to their regions, i.e. to the region in which they were born. The feeling of local attachment is one of the forms of expressing ethnic awareness and as "an indicator it measures ethnocentrism better than answers received on the basis of questions regarding the nation or nationalism" (Katunarić, 1986: 82). The results of this research can also be easily brought into relation with earlier periods.

The meat processing enterprise "Gavrilović" was between 1945 and 1991 the largest employer in Petrinja. In 1986 the number of its employees was close to 5,000 (see 150 godina..., s.a.; 165 godina..., 1986). It seems important to emphasize that a majority of Serbs dominated (also) in the directorial elite of "Gavrilović", in a town that otherwise had had a Croat majority for a long time. The situation was similar in other enterprises as well (see Petrinjski obzor, 1991, no. 7).

In the period between the 1948 and 1961 census the number of Serbs in the town of Petrinja tripled (an index of 295.1), and the number of Croats increased slightly (an index of 126.9).

Included are the municipalities of Dvor, Gлина and Kostajnica. According to the 1961 data the proportions of Serbs and Croats in all of Banovina (including Petrinja) was 62.4% (Serbs) and 36.1% (Croats). If we exclude Petrinja itself, the ethnic composition in the undeveloped municipalities in Banovina would be: 70.2% (Serbs) to 29.2% (Croats) (cf. Klemenčić and Orešić, 1991). It should again be noted that the largest number of immigrants arrived to Petrinja precisely from these municipalities (and from neighbouring municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was also part of regional projection envisioned in the platform of long-term development of Banovina).

The Law on Nationalisation of Buildings for Rent and Building Sites from 1958 (and its later revisions) confiscated land from the domestic population and thus created the conditions for its allocation to new arrivals. Although studies on the level of Croatia as a whole indicate an equal material status of Serbs and Croats it also clearly shows that Serbs, more often than Croats, received housing from their work collectives/enterprises (Stojković, 1991).

The term ruling elite can be used here only conditionally, since it would imply the existence of a group of people (the authorities). However, from the end of the seventies and during the eighties the entire
life of Petrinja was subject to the self-will of one local politician (of Serb origin) who was connected with the party centre in Belgrade (for more details see, for example, Petrinjski obzor, vol. 1990 and 1991).

16 We might mention that the proportion of Croats employed in the meat processing enterprise "Gavrilović", which in 1970 (56%) still conformed to their proportion in the town population (in 1971 55.8%), later fell to 38%. Between 1978 and 1989, 20 functionary positions were held by persons of Serb ethnic affiliation and only seven by Croats. In 1987, for example, 74% of all allocated land plots were given to persons of Serb ethnicity, and this was similar in the following two years (Petrinjski obzor, 1991, nos 7 and 8).

17 The "Croatian Spring" is a term for the political, cultural and economic movement that was violently suppressed in 1971. The movement had three main goals: economic reform in the direction of market economy, democratisation of the political system and reform of the Federation. The echoes of the 'Croatian Spring' in Petrinja were most apparent in the greater activity of Matica hrvatska (Matrix Croatica). Reputable citizens of Petrinja who had been involved with Matica hrvatska, or who had even been suspected of being its members, were expelled, fired from their jobs or given "party" punishments. This was a time of much politically motivated migration from the town (Golec, 1993).

18 The change in the number of people who declared themselves as "Yugoslavs" indicates the degree to which such an identification was dependent on political conditions and the influence of ideology. Between the 1971 and 1981 census in all of Croatia the number of "Yugoslavs" increased (the 1981/1971 index being 450.6). In Petrinja it increased nine-fold. In 1981 "Yugoslavs" became the third "ethnic group" in the town (24.7% of the population), but in the next census, at the time of ethnic homogenisation, this number was to be three fold less. At this time the proportion of "Yugoslavs" in Petrinja fell to 7.1%.

19 Serbs more often than Croats made use of the party-functional channel for their vertical social mobility, whereas Croats more often used the educational channel. In one study this was explained by different starting positions: Croats were more educated, while Serbs were more firmly tied to the Communist party and the partisan movement. Since Serbs had in the meantime overcome their back-lag in education it was assumed that the inter-ethnic difference in patterns of mobilisation would be erased (Lazić, 1991).

20 Even in the late 1980s respondents in sociological surveys (on the level of Croatia) did not wish to express ethnocentric standpoints. According to Vjeran Katunarić this indicated a high degree of adaptability in attitudes in regard to external pressures. Expression of ethnocentrism was relatively weak, because it had been for a long time forbidden (Katunarić, 1986; 1991).

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