

UDK 339.5;656.6(453.1)“13/15”(093)
929 Barbadigo Agostino
Izvorni znanstveni rad
Primljeno: 10. srpnja 2003.
Prihvaćeno za tisak: 17. svibnja 2004.

Pro Honore et Commercio Nostris:
Some Aspects of Venetian Maritime Commerce Illustrated by the Late
Fifteenth Century Venetian Manuscript

Eugenia Anichenko
Institute of Russian History
7 Petrozavodskaya Str.
St. Petersburg 197110
Russia

In this article author analyses a manuscript entitled *Barbadigo Agostino, Dux Venetiarum / Instructiones Datae Angelo Gradenigo*, which is presently kept in the Russian National Library in Sankt Peterburg. On the basis of this manuscript, author tries to reconstruct mechanisms of Venetian maritime trade with the ports at Levant. The analysis showed that Venetian trade policy was closely connected with political and social trends that existed in late medieval and early modern Venice.

KEY WORDS: Venetian Republic, Venice, Agostino Barbarigo, maritime trade, late Middle Ages, early modern times, Levant, primary sources

Desponsamus te, mare, in signum veri perpetuique domini. “We wed you, O Sea, as a symbol of our absolute and everlasting supremacy.” This ceremonial proclamation, delivered by the doge of Venice on Ascension Day as he threw a wedding ring into the sea from the top deck of the state barge,¹ reflected both the spirit of the city of Venice and the very essence of its long-lasting socioeconomic well being. The unique geographical setting of the city implied, but did not preordain the maritime supremacy of the *Serenissima*. Venice owed a great deal of her commercial success to the efficiency of her authority and administrative mechanism. And it is the immensity of the state bureaucracy that makes the study of Venetian maritime history such a time consuming, though rewarding task. Only a relatively small part of the state papers are published,² leaving interested scholars with the seldom-lamented necessity to visit the City on the Lagoon. Perhaps the richness of Venetian archives coupled with the attraction of the city itself explains why scholars rarely use Venetian documents from collections outside of the

¹ Alvise Zorsi, *Venice 697-1797: A City, a Republic, an Empire* (1983; revised ed., New York, 2001), 28.

² See R. Cessi & P. Sambin, ed., *Le Deliberazione del Consiglio dei Rogati (Senato) serie Mixtorum* (Venice, 1960); George Martin Thomas, ed., *Diplomatarij Veneto-Levantinum, sive Ata et Diplomata Res Venetas, Graecas atque Levantis Illustrantia* (New York, 1966); R. Morozzo della Rocca and A. Lombardo, ed., *Documenti del Commercio Veneziano nei secoli XI-XIII* (Turin, 1940); V. I. Lamanskii, ed., *Secrets d'Etat de Venise: Documents, Extraits, Notices, et Etudes Servant a Eclairir les Rapport de la Fin du Xve et au XVIe Siecle* (New York, 1968).

city.³ In some instances, however, those documents kept abroad have escaped the fate of the collections lost to fires and other misfortunes, and valuable evidence has been preserved.

Such is the case of the manuscript Lat Q.V. II N12 from the collection of the Russian National Library, Saint Petersburg. Entitled *Barbadigo Agostino, Dux Venetiarum/Instructioes Datae AngeloGradenigo*, this manuscript of Venetian provenance contains several documents related to commercial voyages to Beirut and dates from the year 1499. As an important center of the trade in spice and other lucrative oriental commodities, Beirut always held a special place in Venetian commerce. For almost two hundred years, during which the city was one of the strongholds of the Crusaders' Kingdom of Jerusalem, the Europeans, and Venetians especially, obtained first hand knowledge of the commercial benefits the city had to offer. The capture of the city by the Mamluks in 1291 was a dreadful blow to the European commercial operations in the region. With time commerce, in which Venice was to play a leading role, revived, but became extremely susceptible to any perturbation of the complex relationship between the Christian and Muslim worlds. When in 1306 Venice entered into a league with Charles of Valois for the restoration of the Latin empire, all galley voyages eastward became subject to extensive governmental controls.⁴ Specific details about the routes, crews, and freight rates of these voyages up to the year 1569 were recorded in the papers of the Senate, and now can be found in the *Archivio di Stato di Venezia*.⁵ Interestingly, the records for the years 1499-1519, the period of the escalation of the military conflict between Venice and the Sublime Porte, are missing.⁶ This manuscript, therefore, fills some gaps in our knowledge regarding Venetian maritime operations at the time.

The Levantine fleet, which almost exclusively consisted of great galleys, was of crucial significance for these turbulent years of Venetian history. From their invention at the end of the thirteenth century, great galleys were subjects of special pride, the symbol of Venetian maritime power. With an average capacity of about 250 tons and the propelling power of both oarsmen and sails, great galleys were swift and well manned, which made them equally important as vessels of commerce and war. In peaceful times they carried the most precious trade commodities, such as spice. During naval battles they were placed at the front line of the formation, and entrusted with the crucial task of disrupting the enemy battle line.⁷ As some of the largest vessels of the time, great galleys were expensive both to build and to man. It is therefore not surprising that despite of the importance of this vessel type, the number of Venetian great galleys never exceeded twenty. Because of their speed and reliability, this modest number of galleys, however, contributed more than a third of the state's annual income. Naturally, the safety of the ships soon became a matter of great significance to the state.

Starting from the first decade of the fourteenth century, the republic's government gradually increased its control over commercial voyages of special economic importance. The first attempts to regulate private navigation on the most important trade routes were initiated by the desire to organize such voyages in protected convoys. The costs of such convoys, however,

³ Publication of Paul Kristeller's *Iter Italicum: a Finding List of Uncatalogued or Incompletely Catalogued Humanistic Manuscripts of the Renaissance in Italy and Other Libraries* (Leiden, 1990) is an important step in directing researchers' attention towards the Italian manuscripts preserved in manuscript depositories throughout Europe.

⁴ Frederick C. Lane, "Operation of Merchant Galleys", *Venice and History* (Baltimore, 1966), 203.

⁵ For the years before 1440 these documents are in series *Senato Misti*, for 1440-1469 in *Senato Mar*, and after 1469 in a special series called "Senato, Deliberazioni, Incanti Galere", which continues up to 1569. See Frederic C. Lane, *Venetian Ships and Shipbuilders of the Renaissance* (Baltimore, 1934), 15.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 14-15.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 150.

were too high even for the government. At the same time very few, if any, of the Venetian merchants could afford to own a great galley. In an attempt to achieve an efficient balance of investment, and to ensure the state's firm grasp on this important naval asset, a new system called *incanti* was invented. According to this new mode of operation, the great galleys were communally built and owned. Every year the government auctioned a certain number of the galleys for the voyage to Beirut, Alexandria, the Black Sea, Barbary, or Flanders. After being authorized by the Senate or the *Maggior Consiglio*, the highest bidders became official masters of the ships, called *patroni*.⁸ Bound by specific conditions decided by the Venetian Senate, these patrons were then responsible for all expenses associated with preparation for the voyages. Initially, the *patroni* paid the lease after they returned to Venice, but starting from 1438 a deposit of 100 to 400 ducats was required.⁹ In return, the government often offered the patrons a loan for the manning of the ships. Patrons profited both from shipping their own goods and from leasing cargo space to other merchants. As long as the voyage was profitable, this system was advantageous for both private and state sectors of the Venetian economy. It eased the burden of the initial expenses for the merchants and yielded a stable income to the state, while delivering it from many tedious technicalities of manning and provisioning the ships. In addition, the communal ownership of the galleys was supposed to enable Venice to conduct swift and efficient mobilization of the war fleet, should the escalation of international conflict require it.¹⁰ The founding act of this state-controlled regulation, *Ordo galearum armatarum* of 1321, decreed that the government could exercise the right of requisition at any time.¹¹ It did not, however, mean that under such circumstances the conditions of the galley's lease had to be terminated. For one thing war, as well as commerce was viewed as a potential source of income;¹² for another, all Venetian noblemen were conventionally expected to prove their patriotism by direct physical and financial participation in matters of state defense.

The system of *incanti* was indeed a remarkably elegant solution, conceived with all the gusto of Venetian ambitions. According to an observant remark of Frederic Lane:

Communal ownership of galleys expressed the solidarity of the Venetian nobility and strengthened that solidarity. The system of annual auctions, combining advantages of private operation with communal control and ownership, was a vital element in giving to the Venetian government the efficiency and stability which distinguished it from so many other Italian city-states of the fourteenth century.¹³

Yet, by the second decade of the sixteenth century the system failed. Our manuscript, therefore, provides an opportunity to take a close look at this specific form of fleet organization in its waning years. It is especially interesting, because it covers years of both peaceful trade and military conflict.

The manuscript is written on parchment in accordance with the Venetian tradition of not trusting important state documents to the lower endurance of paper, which was significantly cheaper and widely available by that time. The codex contains two related documents: 1) the

⁸ Margaret M. Newett, *Canon Pietro Casola's Pilgrimage to Jerusalem in the year 1494*, (Manchester, 1907), 59.

⁹ G. Luzzatto. *I Prestiti della Repubblica di Venezia, Secoli XIII-XV*. (Padova, 1929), 19.

¹⁰ Susan Rose, *Medieval Naval Warfare 1000-1500* (London and New York, 2002), 114.

¹¹ Bernard Doumerc, "An Exemplary Maritime Republic: Venice at the End of the Middle Ages," *War at sea in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance*. (N.Y., 2003), 156.

¹² Frederic C. Lane, "National Wealth and protection Costs," *Venice and History*, 376.

¹³ Lane, "Operation of Merchant Galleys," *Ibid.*, 226.

instructions given by the Doge Agostino Barbarigo (Barbadigo in the manuscript) to Angelo Gradenigo, appointed the captain of the four-galley fleet, bound for Beirut on May 8, 1492,¹⁴ and 2) the deliberations of the Venetian Senate regarding the preparation and auction of four Beirut galleys dated May 19, 1499. The documents are written by different hands. The first folio of the second document is the last folio of the fifth quire, which reveals that the codex preserves its original composition as opposed to convoluted compendium.¹⁵ It is possible, however, that the second document was written on the blank pages of the codex later than the first one, perhaps according to their dates. Most of the text is written in Latin with the peculiar inclusion of certain Italianisms such as *viagio*. Starting with the folio 32 verso the Venetian dialect of Italian almost entirely replaces Latin in the text.

The Russian collector Peter Dubrowskii acquired the codex at the end of the eighteenth century, perhaps in Paris where he served at the Russian consulate. Dubrowskii's collection became the core of the manuscript department of the Russian Imperial Library, later the Russian National Library. The only information about the manuscript's previous history is that it originally belonged to the Gradenigo family, whose court of arms is depicted on the bottom of the manuscript's title page.¹⁶

Few families in Venice occupied a position so prominent and honorable as the old clan of Gradenigo. They make their first appearance on the pages of the Venetian chronicles in 976, when a certain Giovanni Gradenigo rescued the body of the unfortunate Doge Pietro Candiano IV, sent by rebels to the slaughterhouse, for a more appropriate burial.¹⁷ Since then the members of the family had many opportunities to serve the Republic in less dolorous ways, providing the *Serenissima* with three doges, several generals, and numerous merchants and sailors.

If there was a name of equal glory in Venice, it was that of the Barbarigo family. The succession of Agostino Barbarigo to the Doge's seat in 1486 immediately following his brother Marco, an "unheard-of occurrence,"¹⁸ demonstrates how powerful the family's position was in the city. The personal popularity of Doge Agostino Barbarigo (1486-1501), however, failed to match the high standards of his family reputation. The Senator Domenico Malipiero's remark that he was "a man who in a short time had gained much experience in the government of this country; but was very obstinate in holding to his own opinion"¹⁹ was by far the most complimentary expression of the feelings his fellow citizens had for the doge. Perhaps the most characteristic impression Agostino Barbarigo left of himself was the fact that immediately following his death three inquisitors were set to the task of investigating his transgressions and addressing charges laid against him.²⁰ The scale of Doge Barbarigo's corruption was apparently so frightening, that from then on such inquisitions became a routine exercised after every doge's death.²¹ It is hard to tell if the commission received by Angelo Gradenigo was encouraged by any financial means, but the study of operation of the Venetian merchant fleets of the time

¹⁴ Barbadigo Agostino, *Dux Venetiarum, Instructiones Datae Angelo Gradenigo* (Henceforth *Instructiones*) 2-43 verso.

¹⁵ The manuscript consists of six quires of ten folios each, if the codex was convoluted, the second part would start on folio 51 recto.

¹⁶ For the detailed codicological and paleographical description see E.V. Bernadskaia, *Italianskie gumanisty v sobranii rukopisei GPB* [Italian humanists in the manuscript collection of the State Public Library] (Leningrad, 1981) 112-114.

¹⁷ John J. Norwich, *A History of Venice* (New York, 1982), 42.

¹⁸ Domenico Malipiero, *Annali Veneti dall'anno 1457-1500* (Florence, 1843) I, 680.

¹⁹ *Ibid.* Citation is translated in Newett, *Canon Pietro Casola's Pilgrimage to Jerusalem*, 371.

²⁰ Norwich, *A History of Venice*, 389.

²¹ Newett, *Canon Pietro Casola's Pilgrimage to Jerusalem*, 372.

suggests that the position offered relatively high social status. The captain-in-chief was the main representative of the state during the voyages, entrusted with the uneasy task of balancing the ever-changing private initiative with the state's stabilizing control. How this balance was achieved, what impact the dual character of the operation had on the crew, merchants, and passengers, what were the benefits of this system for private and state commerce - are some of the key questions that can be extrapolated from the text of *Insructiones Datae Angelo Gradenigo*.

The main purpose of the Instructions was to provide the newly appointed captain of the fleet with a description of his duties as well as with a concise codex of maritime law, which could be taken on board the ship. The date of the Instructions, May 1492, probably corresponds with the date of Angelo Gradenigo's appointment. Apart from the manuscript, the only known mention of Angelo Gradenigo as a captain-in-chief of the Beirut galleys known to me comes from the diary of the canon Pietro Casola, which he kept during his pilgrimage to Jerusalem. On Tuesday, September 9 1494, Casola wrote:

Very late in the day three galleys were sighted belonging to the Levant Trading Fleet, which were on their way from Venice. The captain-in-chief was Don Juliano²² Gradenigo, and they were called the Beyrout (sic) galleys. They had a stern wind, which was unfavorable for us. They recognized us immediately, and when they came near, the two largest lowered their sails in order not to pass us by. At the second hour of the night we were so very near one another, that there was general rejoicing on the one side and the other; the cannon were fired, and there was much shouting, as is the custom of sailors.

A small boat, or rather, as they say, a *campano*, was lowered into water from one of the Beyrout galleys, and many persons came to visit our captain, and many letters were brought to him from Venice. They told us the news of the West, especially about the movements of the King of France; and, amongst other things, a Franciscan friar, belonging to the Zorzi family, said, that in Venice, on the Vigil of Saint Lawrence, it was said publicly, that the King of France was expected at Milan on the 16th of August, and much other news.

They remained on board, and there was a great illumination for nearly an hour, and then, having taken leave of the friends, they returned to their galleys, which looked like the daughters of ours. We still remained with the wind contrary, and they went flying away with the wind in the stern.²³

Another source, the diary of Senator Marino Sanuto, indicates that at least starting from November of 1498 and until his death in January of 1499 Angelo (Anzelo) Gradenigo occupied the position of Venetian rector of Modon.²⁴

As a state employee, appointed by the doge and approved by the Senate, the captain-in-chief was not allowed to take any financial interest from the trade. Not only was he prohibited from having his own goods on board (with the exception of precious stones) or entering in any financial agreements, he was even not supposed to be seen in the vicinity of the market places or sleep on dry land.²⁵ Such limitations were perhaps imposed to make him a watchful guard of

²² Casola was a man in his seventies when he undertook the pilgrimage and he composed his diary several years later. This might explain why he failed to recall Gradenigo's first name correctly.

²³ Newett, *Canon Pietro Casola's Pilgrimage to Jerusalem*, 301-302.

²⁴ Marino Sanuto, *I Diarii* (Venice, 1879-1903) II, 372.

²⁵ "Nec potes habere partem in aliqua galea tibi comissa: nec facere mercationes ullo modo: non intellegendo de lapidibus et perils. Verum licitum est tibi habere super galeis de tuo: aliis mercatoribus recomendato: nec potes ire cum aliqua persona ad videndum mercationes nec dormire in terram." *Insructiones*, Capitula III, 1 verso. Note the

governmental regulations, not compromised by consideration of his own commercial benefits. The penalty for the violation of this law was an astronomical fee of one thousand ducats, a sum more eloquent than most verbose admonition.

The handsome salary of 180 ducats²⁶ was, however, not the only reward for the captain-in-chief's service. He also received one third of most of the penalties imposed by him during the voyage. The other two thirds went consequently to the *accusatory* (the person who brought the breaking of the law to the attention of the officials) and to the commune. This regulation probably reflects the medieval tradition of paying a judge's salary out of the fees or confiscations following his hearing of the case.

Keeping "the justice and good judgment according to the State regulations and his own fear and honesty"²⁷ was indeed one of the main functions of the captain-in-chief. In pursuing this mission he was to cooperate with state officials at any Venetian dominion, by turning over to them any person from the galleys accused of an offense against local law. If the ships were out of the port where the offence was committed, the captain either kept the offender under custody until he could turn him over to the Venetian rectors, or applied the punishment in accordance with the law of that place.²⁸ It is not clear which source for the local law the captain was supposed to use. Perhaps some recommendations were included in the instructions of the Levantine Office, given to him before departure from Venice.²⁹ Records of all penalties and punishments applied by the captain during the voyage were to be submitted to the Ducal Chancellery within eight days of the return to Venice.

Most issues on which the captain was instructed to keep his eye were related to the safety of the ships and people.³⁰ Experienced mariners, the Venetians knew the dangers of overloading and took precautions against it. Hulls of all ships in the service of the *Serenissima* had loading marks in the shape of a cross. The age of the ship was taken into consideration for calculating how low the ship was allowed to settle upon loading. For five years from the first day they set sail, ships of 200 *millarii*³¹ and more might be loaded two and a quarter feet above the cross, for the ship five to seven years old - two feet above the cross, more than seven years - one and a half feet above the cross.³² It was the direct responsibility of the fleet's captain-in-chief to examine each vessel and call the attention of the consuls of the merchants in Venice, or the governors of Venetian possessions elsewhere, to any violations.³³ According to chapter seven of the *Instructiones*, however, the captain could demand to move some merchandise from one

peculiar permission to carry on some profitable operations with the assistance of other merchants. See also S. P. Karpov, *Putiami Srednevekovuh Morehodov: Chernomorskaia Navigacija Venecijskoi Respubliki v XIII-XIV Vekah*. [The ways of the Medieval seafarers: Black Sea navigation of the Venetian Republic in the XII-XIV centuries] (Moscow, 1994) 87.

²⁶ *Instructiones*, 48 verso.

²⁷ "*Rationem et iustitiam facies inter gentes tibi comissas secundam nostra discretionem bona fide sine fraude*" *Instructiones*, Capit. VI, 2 verso.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ "*Tu capitaneus antequam de Venetiis recedes teneris accipere de officialibus Levantis ordines pertinentes dictis galeis: quos ipsi officials dare debent in scriptis.*" *Instructiones*, Capit. XI, 4.

³⁰ Chapter 14 represents him also as a defender of the good name of the people of Venice: if during the voyage he encountered somebody affronting the honor of the country, he was instructed to capture him and "apply a punishment" according to his social status. *Ibid.*, 4 verso.

³¹ 1000 Venetian pounds=approximately 477 kilograms.

³² Newett, *Canon Pietro Casola's Pilgrimage to Jerusalem*, 27.

³³ *Instructiones*, Capit. VIII, 3.

galley to another in order to even the loading of the ships.³⁴ This measure, hardly popular among the individual merchants, was intended to serve common good, for it increased the feasibility of the voyage and improved the general seaworthiness of the fleet.

Perhaps the most difficult, but clearly the important task in supervising the loading of the four ships, purchased and operated by different merchants, was to enforce the simultaneous completion necessary for on-time departure. *Muda*, the state specified time period within which the ships were allowed to load and leave the ports, was an efficient way to plan capital turnover and to protect ships sailing through unfriendly territories, but it also limited the freedom of commercial enterprise. The merchants often waited until the very last moment, hoping for a sudden price reduction or other commercial benefit. Very well aware of the profit-oriented character of their fellow - citizens, the Venetian legislators tightened the law regarding the violation of *muda*.

Chapter 60 of the *Instructiones* warned Gradenigo that any delay of departure from either Alexandria or Beirut would cost both the captain and the patron of the ship 500 ducats and the loss of all public positions for the five-year period.³⁵

Although the captain-in-chief was not directly involved in hiring the crew, crossbowmen and navigators were his responsibilities because of their importance for the safety of the voyage.³⁶ Both before and after the invention of firearms, crossbowmen (*balestrieri*) constituted the main armed force of the Venetian galleys.³⁷ They were recruited from the young Venetian men without distinction of caste upon the demonstration of their shooting skills. To go as *balestrieri* aboard a ship was considered a distinguished way of learning the skills of a mariner. To encourage the youngsters to advance in this career, targets for practicing were erected in various places in the city of Venice.³⁸

The manuscript has contradictory information regarding the number of *balestrieri* on board. Chapter 63 states that each galley had twenty-six of them,³⁹ while chapter four mentions only fifteen, of which three are noblemen. All of them received a salary of six ducats a month, and were prohibited to hold any other position except for the position of *balestrieri* under the penalty of 100 ducats. Neither patrons nor their representatives were allowed to participate in hiring, although it was they who paid the *balestrieris'* salary. This restriction most probably resulted from the corruption associated with distribution of these desirable positions.⁴⁰

The main burden of hiring, provisioning, and loading the ship was laid on the Patrons. The hiring process was called "*ponere bancum*," meaning literally to place a bench or table, because of the way the hiring was done. Shipmasters were accustomed to set up tables with money on them in front of the ducal palace, and give out advance wage payments to seamen who signed on.⁴¹ Such a procedure demanded sufficient capital, for the total number of people involved in

³⁴ " *Et quia frequenter contigit quod galee non onerantur equaliter tam eundo quam redeundo: Reliquimus in libertate tua pro adequando dictas galeas de faciendo accipi de una galea et poni in aliam: et super hoc imponendi penam sicut tibi videbitur*" Ibid., Capit. VII, 3.

³⁵ *Instructiones*, Capit. LX, 19 verso.

³⁶ Ibid., Capit XVII, 5 verso.

³⁷ *Balestrieri* were not the only armed men aboard. All sailors and caulkers were required to have weapons and to participate in military engagements.

³⁸ Newett, *Canon Pietro Casola's Pilgrimage to Jerusalem*, 375.

³⁹ *Instructiones*, LXIII, 20.

⁴⁰ Newett, *Canon Pietro Casola's Pilgrimage to Jerusalem*, 375-376.

⁴¹ Ibid., p.217.

the operation of a great galley exceeded two hundred. According to the manuscript, 226 persons should have been on board each Beirut galley, including a galley commander (*comitus*), a lawyer, two scribes, a caulker, eight hands, twenty-six *balestrieri*, one hundred eighty-one oarsmen, a cook, a freight collector, and a carpenter.⁴² All of them were free citizens of Venice or her dominions and were paid monthly by patrons at the fixed state rate. Since it was not incredibly rare that sailors signed up but did not appear for departure, upon approaching the city of Pola (Pula) the captains of each galley were advised to call all crew on deck and personally check the list of names. Vacant positions could then be filled in Pola.⁴³ After the galleys left this Istrian port, the captain-in-chief had to create a sort of auxiliary council on board each ship, choosing “the three most trustful merchants among those older than 35.”⁴⁴ The oldest was appointed the head of this “council of three.” This temporary body exercised the supervisory functions of the captain-in-chief, who of course, could not be physically present on all four galleys. The council also provided *vox populi galei* with legitimate power, which corresponded with the ancient maritime tradition of taking everyone’s opinion into consideration when important decisions were to be made.⁴⁵

Merchants’ participation in the voyages was regulated by their agreements with the Patrons, which were to be recorded by the ship scribes and signed in their presence. While there could be some minor variations in the conditions of payment and loading, most of the financial terms were again set by the State regulations. The patron was not supposed to charge more than fifty ducats per voyage per person, with the exception of state employees on business trips, who were to be delivered to the place of their destination free of charge.⁴⁶ The merchants were allowed to take on board only a few items of personal belongings: one chest, one mattress, and one night vase. For any servant or member of their family the voyage cost twenty-five ducats.⁴⁷ The personal weapons of all merchants were stored together. The cost of food was four grosses a day for an individual or two grosses for a member of a family.⁴⁸ Freight rates for most of the goods were also established.

With few exceptions⁴⁹ there were no state recommendations regarding what merchandise to buy or sell. There were, however, plenty of regulations regarding what and who were not welcome on board the Beirut galleys. The basic rule of the thumb was that goods that did not belong to Venetian citizens were not allowed on board, unless they were intended to be sold in Venice.⁵⁰ To check international competition, the presence of foreigners on board the Beirut galleys was restricted only to those who were approved by the Venetian officials and paid one hundred ducats in addition to all other usual fees and expenses.⁵¹ Any “assistance” to the

⁴² *Instructiones*, Capit. LXIII, 20.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, Capit. XI, 3 *verso*

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, Capit. XI, 3 *verso*.

⁴⁵ See M.A. Ashburner, *Rhodian Sea Law* (Oxford, 1909) cxli.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, Capit. XXXV, 9 *verso*.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, Capit. XIII, 4.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, Capit. V, 2.

⁴⁹ Such as encouragement to buy honey in Corona and Montona “without any limitations”. *Instructiones*, Capit. XXXV, 18 *verso*.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, Capit. XXXIII, 9.

⁵¹ This probably refers to those foreigners who wished to go on pilgrimage to the Holy Land. Although Venice had specially chartered pilgrim galleys, some pilgrims made their voyage on board merchant galleys bound to Beirut or Alexandria.

foreign trade in the Levant, especially that of Flanders, was prohibited under the penalty of losing all positions and offices for two years.⁵² Slaves were the only good explicitly prohibited on board.⁵³ Despite the fact that transportation of slaves on merchant galleys was banned in the middle of the fifteenth century,⁵⁴ rich slave markets on the Rhodian Islands and in Beirut itself proved to be a strong temptation. Chapter 50 of the manuscript delivers a complaint from the Knights of Rhodes that Beirut galleys frequently captured and carried away slaves and servants of both genders, a violation that the captain-in-chief was instructed to check as soon as it was discovered. The culprit was then to pay fifty ducats penalty, while the slave was set free and dispatched from the ship "in the place considered most appropriate by the Captain."⁵⁵

The *Instructiones* bear only fragmentary information regarding the route of the voyage. Having been sailing the same way for several hundred years, the Venetians probably saw little sense in describing it in detail. The fleet often sailed within the sight of land to refer to the land-marks for their orientation. It is peculiar that on the return trip the fleet was not allowed to spend nights on the open sea, either sailing or laying at anchor after Ragusa (Dubrovnik), which was likely considered the frontier of the Republic.⁵⁶ A special mention is made regarding the necessity to stop at Corfu "for the convenience of our beloved citizens."⁵⁷ The recommendations regarding conduct and behavior while in port did not distinguish between Christian and Muslim lands. The captain was to make sure that people descended on land unarmed "for the sake of any scandal's prevention."⁵⁸ Equally in Venetian, foreign, and Muslim ports all taxes had to be paid in a prompt and timely manner. Port tax was one of very few expenses paid by the Venetian state, for which purposes the captains of every galley were provided with one hundred ducats.⁵⁹

Even from this cursory outlook at the organization of the so-called private operation of the communally owned vessels it is apparent that despite the name, the state played by far a more distinct role in the voyage operation than the individual merchants. Moreover, the patron of the ship emerges as a very marginal figure burdened with obligations, almost without any rights or means to have any impact on the proceeding of this commercial enterprise. With all wages, fees, freights, and prices being fixed, and routes, stops, periods of buying and selling, loading and unloading being established, his ability to carry on a profitable operations by using the convenience of time and changing conditions of the market was extremely limited. So was his freedom. According to the *Instructiones*, in Beirut he was not allowed to leave his galley for a long time or spend nights on land,⁶⁰ and only a severe health problem would excuse him from returning with the galley to Venice.⁶¹ In addition, the state could cancel the voyage any time the international situation or its own interests demanded it. Yet, with all that said the enterprise should still have been a profitable one. For one thing it was the only way to carry

⁵² Ibid., Capit.XXXX, 11 verso.

⁵³ Ibid., Capit. L-LI, 15.

⁵⁴ Senato Misti, reg.49, f 114. See Lane, *Venice and History*, 7.

⁵⁵ *Instructiones*, Capit.L, 15.

⁵⁶ Ibid., Capit. LI, 15 verso. The fact that after passing Ragusa on the way to Beirut, the captain had to read aloud several important regulations to all "people of the galleys" supports this impression.

⁵⁷ Ibid., Capit. XXXXII, 12.

⁵⁸ Ibid., Capit.II, 1 verso.

⁵⁹ Ibid., Capit.68.

⁶⁰ Ibid., Capit.43.

⁶¹ Ibid., 31.

on trade with the East after the second half of the fourteenth century. Then the same state imposed routine, which might interfere with the innovative commercial approaches, offered certain guarantees of market stability. And finally being the patron of the communally owned ship was above all an honorable and visible social position.

The people who benefited most from this form of commercial organization were the most probably the merchants. They had much less obligation and fewer concerns than either patrons or the captain-in-chief. At the same time, state participation gave them a sense of protection, while the presence of the patron's goods on board the same vessel insured better care for the other merchandise.

Instructiones datae Angelo Gradenigo is obviously a compiled document. Probably very few if any, of the chapters were specifically written for the codex. Rather, they were selected from various sources of maritime law, which were in use in Venice during this period. The republic witnessed several attempts of codification of her various legal practices, none of which was ever officially abandoned. The first Venetian maritime statutes were issued under the Doge Pietro Ziani in 1227.⁶² The code was almost exclusively devoted to the issue of the ballast and cargo disposition. It also contained the first description of the above-mentioned system of overloading control with use of the mark on the ship's exterior. Only a few years later the more comprehensive measures of the Doge Jacopo Tiepolo added several statutes regarding the roles and obligations of different participants of the voyage. In 1255, the maritime statutes of the Doge Rainiero Zeno repeated what had been enacted by his predecessors but in fuller details with some new provisions. For many years his statutes remained the main official maritime legislation. The code, however, did not always meet the needs of the growing and changing maritime power of Venice. Starting at the beginning of the fourteenth century, the Senate and *Maggior Consiglio* made all necessary modifications to the maritime law. Doubtless, they were the product of Venetian legislative thought, but as attempts to accommodate existent maritime practices, they often carried the legacy of older legislation, such as Rhodian Sea-Law and the Law of the Consulate of the Sea. Only a few chapters of the *Insrucciones* have references to their sources, all of which are deliberations of the Senate and *Maggior Consiglio* passed between 1457 and 1475.⁶³ The sources of others, although not as easy to identify without access to unpublished collections of Venetian maritime law, probably belong to the same group.

The second document in the manuscript is also a product of the Senate. It contains the deliberations regarding the preparation and auction of four galleys bound to Beirut, dated May 19, 1499. The relatively short period between the dates of composition of the first and second documents saw radical turnover in Venetian politics. In 1495 Venice entered the Holy League against the *Grande Turko*. By the beginning of this year spies of the *Serenissima* in Constantinople warned the Republic that the sultan's arsenal was actively involved in building a great armada. The purpose of this fleet was unclear. The Porte carried out military actions on several fronts, and potential targets could be the Black Sea, the Island of Rhodes, or the Venetian colonies in the Aegean Sea.⁶⁴ The Republic, alarmed by these preparations, initiated the organization of its own naval assets. By April 1499 Venice began clearing the sea, detaining ships in the lagoon and Adriatic colonies.⁶⁵ Later the same month a captain general of the sea, one Antonio Grimani, was appointed to coordinate the efforts.

⁶² See Lane, *Venice and History*, 227-253; Newett, *Canon Pietro Casola's Pilgrimage to Jerusalem*, 23-24.

⁶³ See *Instructiones*, Capit. LVIII, 19; Capit. LXXX, 33; Capit. C, 34v; Capit. CI, 35).

⁶⁴ Frederic C. Lane, "Naval actions and fleet organization, 1499-1502," *Renaissance Venice* (Totowa, N.J., 1973), 148.

⁶⁵ Sanuto, *I Diarii*, I, 780.

Despite these actions, war did not seem to be imminent, thus the government faced a dilemma as to whether the Levantine galleys, traditionally auctioned in May, should be offered this year. Reassured of "Signor Turco's" peaceful intentions, and perhaps urged on by the desire to make up for the naval expenses, the Senate decided to proceed with the auctions.⁶⁶ Bearing in mind the importance of the great galleys as warships, one can naturally expect that the instructions given to the Levantine merchant fleet on the verge of potential outbreak of hostility should be a promising source of information regarding the transition from the commercial to the naval mode of operation.

The document opens with the list of ships. Two of them, *La Contarina* and *La Capitania*, were constructed in Aigues Mort. *La Marina* originated from Alexandria, and *La Galia Capitanea* was built in Beirut.⁶⁷ All ships were relatively old: the youngest had challenged the sea for eleven years, while the oldest had been in service for almost two decades. The age of the ships, and the fact that all of them were built abroad are not the only surprising elements of these deliberations. Perhaps the most unexpected feature of the document is that there is nothing unusual in it. After the specific conditions of the loan (besides the initial payment, one hundred ducats were to be paid upon the beginning of loading the ship in Venice, six hundred after the ships' return from Beirut, and two hundred from each patron at any time they can pay),⁶⁸ the deliberations essentially repeat in condensed form the recommendations given in the *Instructions*. It is concerned with the commercial rights and privileges of different crew members,⁶⁹ loading and unloading,⁷⁰ limitations of the personal belongings of the sailors,⁷¹ regulation of the captain's relationship with the patrons,⁷² free transportation of Venetian officials, prevention of illegal trade, and other considerations of exclusively commercial character. No essential alterations were made in the itinerary of the ships because of the contingency of war: they should follow the same route followed by Beirut galleys since 1481. There is also no sign of any extra attention towards the armament of the galleys.

In the eleven folios of the deliberations, published only two months before the fatal engagement with the Sublime Porte at Sapienza, there is not the slightest allusion to the potential change in the mode of galleys' operation. Signing this document on May 19, 1499,⁷³ four patrons entered into commercial agreement according to which the invested capital should be directed into trade. Perhaps in hopes that the Turkish threat would keep the competition away from the eastern spice markets, the patrons paid a deposit that was almost twice as much as the lease of Beirut galleys in the previous year. Any anticipation of commercial gain, however, faded by the first days of June. By that time the first Venetian squadron left for Morea, and the captain general of the sea demanded all of the great galleys for his fleet.

Despite the official right of the commune to withdraw the galleys from the commercial operations for the defense of the Republic, neither patrons nor Arsenal officials rushed to obey the order. The first did not want to lose their investments; the latter were justly concerned with the

⁶⁶ It is worth mentioning at this point that our manuscript disagrees with the main source for Venetian history of the period, the diaries of Marino Sanuto, both regarding the date of the auction and the names of patrons.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 49.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 49.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 54 verso.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 54.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 53.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 51 verso.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 60 verso.

safety of the ships.⁷⁴ The patrons' reluctance to admit the legitimacy of the governmental demand does not seem to be so unusual given that most of them had recently signed the agreement which contained no mention of this possibility. The *Ordo galearum armatarum* was a document of the previous century, with which the Venetian merchants were not likely familiar. Thus most patrons, feeling cheated, expressed their dissatisfaction first by demanding great compensation and then by slowing down the hiring process (the patrons of the Beirut galleys, for example, signed people up, but refused to make the traditional advance payment)⁷⁵, and then by open disobedience. When on June 17 an official representative of *savii agli ordini*,⁷⁶ Andrea Zantani, requisitioned eleven merchant galleys originally intended for the voyages to Beirut, Alexandria and Flanders, the merchants revolted.⁷⁷ To pacify the investors, the doge himself made a public address confirming the necessity of such action in view of current international affairs.⁷⁸ It did not, however, have the desired effect. Trying to sooth the anger of the patrons, most of whom belonged to prominent Venetian families, the Senate appointed two inspectors to supervise the activity of *savii*. This maneuver escalated the conflict even further, moving it into the heart of the Senate, where two different offices started to accuse each other of abuse of their authority. The crews demanded a 30 percent raise and were hard to find even at this fabulous rate.⁷⁹ Overcoming these and other difficulties, Venetians, however, succeeded in putting together "the most formidable armada which had ever up to that time been collected under the flag of St. Mark's winged lion."⁸⁰ Yet the opposing Turkish fleet was even bigger.

Although Grimani was outnumbered in both men and ship, he believed in the victorious outcome of the engagement, placing his hope on the performance of his great galleys and big round ships.⁸¹ The very first engagement between the two armadas proved him wrong. In the battle of Zonchio on July 24, 1499, great galleys proved to be one of the weakest links of the Venetian fleet. For four hours the opposing units exchanged gunfire, and it seemed, according to the chief commander of great galleys that "if only all seventeen of them interfered, the victory would be a matter of minutes."⁸² Instead, they took a very passive position. One of the great galleys sank a lighter Turkish vessel and then withdrew from the heart of the battle. Many others followed this example, breaking ranks and leaving lighter vessels unprotected against the Ottomans' guns of. There was not much room for the interpretation of such behavior. Disgusted by such disgrace and cowardice, the sailors shouted "Hang them, hang them!"⁸³ Bernardo Soligo, an experienced and brave warrior who happened to be on one of those great galleys, commented on the decision of the galley's captain: "I would like to believe that it was cowardice, but I would rather call it rebellion."⁸⁴ To avoid uncomfortable meditation over the

⁷⁴ Sanuto, *I Diarii*, II, 502, 825, 862.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, II, 732.

⁷⁶ Five members of the Collegio, elected by the Senate to six-month terms, who were responsible for maritime affairs. See Robert Finlay, *Politics in Renaissance Venice* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1980), xvi.

⁷⁷ Malipiero, *Annali Veneti*, 166.

⁷⁸ Bernard Doumerc, "De L'Incompetence a la Trahison: les Commndants de Galeres Venetiens Face aux Turcs (1499-1500)," *Felonie, Trahison, Reniements aux Moyen Age* (Montpellier, 1997), 616.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰ Lane, *Naval Actiones*, 149.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 150-151.

⁸² Sanuto II, 1237.

⁸³ For the account on the Battle of Zonchio see Sanuto, *I Diarii*, II, 1290-1294; Malipiero, *Annali Veneti*, 175-9; Girolamo Priuli, *Diarii* (Bologna, 1912-1938), I, 181-5.

⁸⁴ Sanuto, *I Diarii*, II, 1258.

very system of naval organization, the Venetians preferred to call the Zonchio fiasco “treason.” Some patrons of the “cowardly galleys” were brought to the trial; others were interviewed by state officials. One of these patrons, expressing perhaps the secret thoughts of majority, responded to the accusations “it is one thing to be a merchant and an entirely different one to conduct the matters of state importance, or participate in the war.”⁸⁵

Zonchio was not the only disgraceful incident signaling the impotence of the great galleys' naval organization. Several months later the patrons again refused to fight with the Turks at the besieged port of Modon, leading to the loss of the city.⁸⁶ Naturally, not all of the patrons were inexperienced cowards. Rather they felt cheated by the state, and perhaps, both morally and technically unprepared for participation in naval operations.

Despite their dual character, from the very beginning the great galleys were much more actively involved in trade than in naval operations. The precise conditions of the founding act slipped into oblivion, while the annual commercial voyages set the social-economic rhythm of the entire city for one hundred and seventy years. The merchants of Venice learned to perceive of the great galleys as one of their major financial assets. Thus the rapid and chaotic requisition of the ships in 1499 was interpreted as a violation of their rights. Without an efficient legal or administrative mechanism, the success of the transition to the military mode of operation depended heavily on the patrons' financial motivation and patriotic ardor. The first was the case when the galleys were deployed in the *guerre de course*; the second was largely an illusory matter of both ideological tradition and state propaganda. An unpopular doge and no anticipation of any financial gain significantly affected the great galleys' mobilization and their way of naval conduct.

The Turkish wars of 1499-1503 demanded almost constant participation from all the great galleys. The merchants expressed growing mistrust of the government and reluctance to invest in operations, that were unlikely to bring any capital return. The Republic's Levantine spice trade suffered more from this increasingly anachronistic system of organization than from the discovery of new spice routes by the Portuguese. It is not surprising, therefore, that almost immediately after the peace with Ottomans was signed the system of private operation of communally owned galleys came to an end. When in 1514 the Venetian Senate abolished the commercial monopolies of the state owned galleys and permitted private round ships to load spices in Alexandria and Beirut, the great galleys were completely discarded as merchantmen.⁸⁷ The republic of Venice, on the other hand, continued building galleys, which now gained new importance as warships. According to the observation of Frederic Lane, “the same development of artillery which rendered them less impregnable as carriers of precious merchandise also made it possible for them to become more formidable additions to the Mediterranean war fleets which were mainly composed of even more exposed light galleys.”⁸⁸

The organization of the Venetian fleet of great galleys in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries is an interesting example of an attempt to create a universal maritime unit, which was supposed to combine commercial and naval characteristics and represent both private and state segments of Venetian economy. Ambitious and demanding, this system in some way reflected more than mere development of administrative thought. It captured the ideal image of the powerful maritime state, in which all social and economic elements were harmoniously balanced, an image that clashed with reality.

⁸⁵ Doumerc, “De l'incompétence”, 619.

⁸⁶ Doumerc, “An Exemplary Maritime Republic,” 165.

⁸⁷ Lane, *Venetian Ships*, 29.

⁸⁸ *Ibid*, 31.

Annotated Bibliography

Unpublished Primary Sources

Lat Q.v. II N 12, Barbarigo Agostino, *Dux Venetiarum. Instructiones datae Angelo Gradenigo*, Russian National Library, St. Petersburg

— This unpublished manuscript provides valuable information for the Venetian maritime history at the end of the fifteenth century.

Primary Sources

Ashburner, Walter. *The Rhodian Sea-Law*. Oxford, 1909.

This is a study of one of the oldest Mediterranean Sea laws and its reflection in the maritime statutes of the medieval and renaissance Mediterranean states.

Dolfin, Pietro. *Annalium Venetorum (pars quarto)*, edited by Roberto Cessi and Paolo Sambin. Venice, 1943

A galley captain and a participant of many battles between the Venetians and Ottomans, Dolfin wrote a chronicle of Venice from its origin until the beginning of the sixteenth century.

Dotson, John E, ed. and trans. *Merchant Culture in Fourteenth Century Venice: the diary of Zibaldone da Canal*. Binghamton, New York: Medieval and Renaissance texts and studies, 1994.

A reference book of the fourteenth century Venetian merchant, this is an explicit account on the Venetian art of trade.

Lopez, Robert S., and Irving W. Raymond. *Medieval Trade in the Mediterranean World: Illustrative Documents Translated with Introductions and Notes*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955.

This collection of translated documents with introductory notes provides a background in medieval commerce and helped with translation of some terms.

Malipiero, Domenico. "Annali Veneti, 1475-1500" edited by T. Gar and A. Sagredo. In *Archivio Storico Italiano*, Vol. VII, 1843.

A chronicle of the events witnessed by the author, the book gives an account of different events in social and economic life of Venice at the period. The record of the arrival and departure of different fleets is not consistent. Venetian preparations for a war with the Porte are described the details. Malipiero participated in the battle at Zonchio and described his experience.

Newett, Margaret M. *Canon Pietro Casola's Pilgrimage to Jerusalem in the Year 1494*. Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1907.

This is a translation of the diary of a prominent Milanese clergyman who went to the Holy Land on one of the Venetian pilgrim galleys. The diary is a valuable source of information regarding late fifteenth century Venice, travel on a galley, and the countries that Casola saw on the way. An introduction and notes contain an excellent study of the various aspects Venetian commerce and law related with the pilgrims.

Jados, Stanley S. *Consulate of the Sea and Related Documents*. Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1975.

This is a translation of the thirteenth century Catalonian Sea-Law, which largely influenced development of maritime legislation in Venice and elsewhere. The introduction is noticeably weak, especially in comparison with the excellent translation.

Girolamo Priuli, *I Diarii*. Rerum Italicorum Scriptores, vol.24. Bologna, 1912-1938.

An offspring of a prominent Venetian family, Girolamo Priuli started his secret diary in 1498 and continued until 1512. Intended to be published only after the author's death, Priuli's diary is full of criticism of governmental actions. Priuli participated in many naval actions of the period and left a vivid, although not analytical description of them.

Sanuto, Marino, *I Diarii*. Venice, 1879-1903.

A prominent state figure of the late fifteenth century, Marino Sanuto left 75 volumes of diaries, most of which deal with different aspects of the Venetian Commerce. Volume II contains the list of the great galleys compiled most probably in the course of preparation for battle with the Ottomans.

Secondary Literature

Bernadskaya, E.V. *Italianskie Gumanisty v Sobranii Rukopisei GPB*. [Italian Humanists in the Collection of the Manuscripts of the Russian National Library] Leningrad: Izdatelstvo GPB, 1981.

This catalog of the Italian manuscripts from the fourteenth through the late sixteenth centuries provides an essential paleographical and codicological information as well as bibliographical references.

Dotson, John E., "A problem of Cotton and Lead in Medieval Italian Shipping" *Speculum*, 57(1), January 1982, pp 52-62.

The article examines the medieval Italian solution for the problem of different ratio of weight to volumes for different goods and their freight rates. Dotson emphasizes the difference between the Eastern and Western approach to the problem and offers some explanation.

-----"Foundations of Venetian Naval Strategy from Pietro II Orseolo to the Battle of Zonchio" *Viator* 32, 2001.

A concise, but comprehensive outline of five hundred years of the Venetian maritime history

Doumerc, Bernard "An Exemplary Maritime Republic: Venice at the End of the Middle Ages," *War at Sea in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance*, N.Y.: Boydell Press, 2003

Doumerc provides analytical description of social, economic and political mechanisms that made Venice a leading maritime power in the Mediterranean in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

-----"De l'Incompétence à la Trahison: les Commandants de Galères Venitiens face aux Turcs (1499-1500) *Fâelonie, Trahison, Reniements au Moyen Âge: Actes du troisième Colloque International de Montpellier*. Montpellier: Université Paul-Valéry, 1997.

Detailed account of the naval engagements between Venetians and Ottomans in 1499-1500 with emphasis on the role of various individuals in the development of events.

Finlay, Robert *Politics in Renaissance Venice*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1980.

Very important study of the Venetian political life, its myth and reality.

Karpov, Sergei P. *Putiami Srednevekovuh Morehodov : Chernomorskaia Navigacija Venecijskoi Respubliki v XIII-XIV Vekah*. [The Ways of the Medieval Seafarers: Black Sea Navigation of the Venetian Republic in the XII-XIV centuries] Moscow: Nauka, 1994.

The book provides interesting material for the comparison of the conditions of navigation in Black Sea and Levant.

Kristeller, Paul Oskar. *Iter Italicum: a Finding List of Uncatalogued or Incompletely Catalogued Humanistic Manuscripts of the Renaissance in Italian and Other Libraries* London: The Warburg Institute, 1990.

A useful tool for locating Renaissance manuscripts and archival documents throughout Europe and the United States.

Lane, Frederic C. *Venetian Ships and Shipbuilders of the Renaissance*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1934.

A great source of the valuable details regarding the Venetian ships, derived from primary sources during the author's extensive work in Venetian archives.

-----*Venice and History*, Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1966.

Collection of papers by one of the most famous Venetian historians. One of the most important references for my research.

-----*Andrea Barbarigo, Merchant of Venice 1418-1449*. New York: Octagon Books, 1967.

A detailed study of the life and commerce of a Venetian merchant in the middle of the fifteenth century, based on his unpublished business records. Lane's main focus is *homo economicus*, the individual as a means of interpreting certain institutions of his time.

-----"Naval actions and fleet organization, 1499-1502", *Renaissance Venice*,
 Edited by J.R. Hale. Totowa, 1973, 146-174.

Probably the most important work written on the organization of the Venetian navy in the fifteenth century. Lane believes that the main reason of the decline of the Venetian maritime power at the time was not the crises within the Republic, but the advance of Habsburg and Ottoman empires.

-----*Venice: A Maritime Republic*. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973.

In this book Lane focuses on the development of social, political and economic mechanisms that contributed to the overall success of the republic of Venice.

Lewis, Archibald R. "The Islamic World and the Latin West, 1350-1500." *Speculum*, 65 (October 1990): 833-44

An outline of the political, economical and cultural interactions between the Islamic World and Latin West. Economic ties, especially important for my purposes, are touched briefly, but the bibliographical appendix provided me with several good references.

Malett, Michael E. *The Florentine Galleys in the Fifteenth Century, with the Diary of Luca di Maso degli Albizzi, Captain of the Galleys 1429-1430*. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1967.

A good study of Florentine Galleys, that provides excellent material for comparison with Venetian galleys. The diary is not translated.

Norwich, John J. *A History of Venice*. New York: Vintage books, 1989.

A classic reference for the history of Venice from its founding until the fall of the Republic.

Rose, Susan. *Medieval Naval Warfare 1000-1500*, London and New York:Routledge, 2002.

A concise analytical account of the medieval European naval warfare. Chapter 6 "Venetians, Genoese and Turks: The Mediterranean 1300-1500" provides historical background and analysis of several aspects of the situation in the Mediterranean, including a comparison of Venetian and Genoese naval strategies and the emergence of Ottoman naval power.

Setton, Kenneth M., *The Papacy and the Levant (1204-1571)*. Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1978) V. II.

Classic study of one of the major themes of the medieval and renaissance European politics.

Sottas, Jules. *Les Messageries Maritimes de Venise aux XIV et XV siecles*. Paris, 1938.

Sottas focuses on the various types of Venetian seafaring, such as commerce, travel, pilgrimage, and exploration. The chapter about the lanes of Venetian maritime commerce is helpful for building a comprehensive background in the field.

Zorzi, Alvise. *Venice 697-1797: A City, a Republic, an Empire*. Woodstock and New York: The Overlook Press, 2001.

An interesting combination of tourist guide-book and good scholarship. Numerous illustrations allow one a sense of virtual orientation in the city.

Pro Honore et Commercio Nostris

Jedan mletački rukopis iz kasnog 15. stoljeća kao prilog poznavanju mletačke pomorske trgovine

Eugenia Anichenko
Institut za rusku povijest
7 Petrozavodskaya Str.
St. Petersburg 197110
Rusija

Rukopis Lat Q.v. II N12 koji se čuva u Nacionalnoj knjižnici u St. Petersburgu sastoji se od dva dokumenta. Prvi dokument su upute koje je mletački dužd Agostino Barbarigo dao Angelu Gradenigu, koji je 1492. imenovan zapovjednikom beirutske flote. Drugi dokument sadrži razmatranja mletačkog Senata u vezi s prodajom četiriju velikih galija i datiran je s 18. svibnjem 1499. Beirut je uvijek imao poseban položaj u mletačkoj trgovini, jer je bio važno trgovačko središte začina i drugih unosnih roba koje su dolazile s istoka. U tom turbulentnom razdoblju povijesti republike Sv. Marka njezina levantska flota imala je ključnu važnost, a činile su je gotovo isključivo velike galije. One su djelovale pod mješovitom upravom Republike i privatnika, a bile su veliki brodovi, dobrih plovnih sposobnosti i s iskusnim posadama. Zato su galije bile podjednako važne i za trgovinu i kao ratni brodovi. Rukopis daje podatke o organizaciji bejrutske flote, kako u razdobljima mirnodopske trgovine, tako i za vrijeme eskalacije sukoba s Turcima. Članak uglavnom govori o odnosima republike Sv. Marka i privatnika u vezi s upravljanjem galijama, koje su bile važno pomorsko sredstvo. Osim toga, dani su i podaci o mletačkom pomorskom pravu i povijesti Mediterana.

KLJUČNE RIJEČI: Mletačka Republika, Venecija, Agostino Barbarigo, pomorstvo, kasni srednji vijek, rani novi vijek, Levant, izvorna građa