CROATIAN POLITICAL TURMOILS
IN THE DUSK OF AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN
MONARCHY

Jure KRIŠTO*

In 1867 the Habsburg Monarchy had been reorganised as a Dual Monarchy and became known as the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Pursuant to the so-called Ausgleich or Compromise, the Crown made concessions to the Hungarians in response to their constant threats to stage a new revolution. The Croats did not fare well as a result of the Compromise. The land considered to be their ethnic territory remained divided into various political and legal administrative units. Croatia-Slavonia, as “the lands of the holy Hungarian crown,” came under the rule of the Hungarian part of the Monarchy. The Hungarians also received Medimurje, a fertile plain between the Drava and Mura Rivers, as well as the port city of Rijeka. Croatia-Slavonia arranged its relations with the Hungarians in a separate agreement, or Nagodba, a year after the Ausgleich. Under the Nagodba, Croatia had its own Parliament (Sabor) and Croatian became the official language. But, the Hungarians remained in a position to control the political life in the territory. They had the right to nominate the Ban (Vice-roy or Royal Regent) and even more importantly, they controlled the finances of Croatia-Slavonia.1

Dalmatia came under the governmental and legal system of the Austrian part of the Monarchy. The same held true with Istria. They became “lands represented in the Emperor’s Council.” Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had been a constituent part of the Ottoman Empire until 1878, came under the rule of the joint Ministry of Finance of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy as a result of the decision of the Congress of Vienna, as compensation to the Monarchy for its loss of Venice and Lombardy. Both Dalmatia and Istria had their own parliaments while Bosnia and Herzegovina obtained a parliament only in 1910.

This situation determined to a large extent political life in the Monarchy and also the direction of the Croats’ political activities. Dualism became the rule and neither the Austrians nor the Hungarians dared to disrupt it. As a result, the interests of small nations within the Monarchy became even more neglected and repressed. Most Croat political parties and programmes during the 19th century and until World War I aimed at the unification of Croat

* Jure Krišto, Ph. D., Croatian Institute of History, Zagreb, Republic of Croatia.

lands, which also meant that they aspired to dissolve the Monarchy’s dual constitution.

Since all leading persons in all Croat lands saw Croatia-Slavonia as their motherland and Zagreb as the capital city of all Croats, unification would have meant the integration of all other Croat lands with it. The reason for this desire also lied in the fact that, through its Parliament and Ban, Croatia-Slavonia remained to a large degree autonomous in relation to Hungary. The presence of a Ban in Croatia-Slavonia led many to call it Banal Croatia.

In working toward their most important aspiration, the unification of all Croatian lands and the achievement of greater sovereignty, the Croats encountered the opposition of their stronger neighbours as well as certain inhabitants of the various Croatian lands. The latter included Croats who, because of their political programme, came to be known by various names. In Banal Croatia they obtained the title of the pro-Hungarians (Madaroni or Hungarezi), while in Dalmatia and Istria they became known as autonomists and pro-Italians. These Croats closely co-operated with representatives of minority ethnic groups who more or less openly advocated joining the areas they represented to their mother countries. Thus, the pro-Italians and the Italian minority openly promoted the interests of Italy against the larger local Croat population. The Irredentist association “Pro Patria” became active in Istria, replaced after authorities banned it by “Lega Nazionale.” Under the influence of the Serbian Orthodox Church and the independent Serbian state, a numerous Orthodox minority identified themselves with Serbian national aspirations, participated in spreading Greater-Serbian propaganda, and opposed the idea of Croatia’s sovereignty. In Dalmatia, Serbs collaborated with Dalmatian autonomists (pro-Italians) and in Banal Croatia with Hungarian interests.

One should also keep in mind that the majority of the Croatian population (more than 80%) lived in rural areas and that, due to various circumstances, these people could not live off of their land. Industry remained so scarce that it can be said that none existed. A few craftsmen, retail traders and workers lived in cities. In Dalmatia, Istria and the Croatian Littoral, a wine grape disease, phylloxera, broke out in the 1880s which contributed to the poverty of the population that lived off of wine production. The craft of traditional shipbuilding also declined rapidly as a result of the development of steamships, for whose production the local population had neither the technical skills nor the financial resources. Because of the above, many

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5 Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans, 58.
Croats, peasants, fishermen and seamen, emigrated in large numbers, especially to the United States of America. These Croatian emigrants gradually became economically stronger in their new countries and thus became an important political factor in the “old country.”

In the early 20th century, national rebellions and tensions characterized Croatian political life. In 1902, Croatian Serbs incited riots. Their newspaper, Srbobran, published in Zagreb, printed an article by Nikola Stojanović which insulted and threatened Croats by saying that conflict between Croats and Serbs would have to end in the extinguishment of one group or the other. The article led to protests in the streets of Zagreb.

The policies of Ban Károly Khuen-Hedérváry’s repressive regime (who ruled between 1883 and 1903) also gave rise to a large-scale rebellion in 1903 as a result of conflicts with the Hungarians. The rebellion, aimed at the financial independence of Banal Croatia, had as its immediate cause the posting of a Hungarian language sign in Zagreb’s railway station. The rebellion marked the end of Ban Khuen’s twenty-year authoritarian rule. Khuen had used all available means to protect Hungarian interests in Banal Croatia. The rebellion did not represent the immediate cause for Khuen’s departure from Croatia as he had been appointed the Hungarian Minister President; nevertheless, his resignation from the Banal seat and vacature from Croatia gave rise to the possibility of a new political beginning in Croatia.

Party-related life in Croatia represented the general situation in Croatian society as a whole. In Banal Croatia, Khuen’s resignation brought to an end the People's Party (Narodna stranka) which had served as a tool for the implementation of his autocratic policy. The remnants of the former opposition Croatian Independent Party (Hrvatska nezavisna stranka), known also as Strossmayer’s Party, gathered around the Zagreb newspaper Obzor and as a result became known as the Obzoraši. Two Parties of Rights also existed. These Parties invoked the ideas of the founder of the initial Party of Rights, Ante Starčević (1823-1896). The two Parties had been established after the split of the Party of Rights in 1895. One group kept the name of Party of Rights, but also became known as the Domovinaši after the Party’s newspaper, Hrvatska domovina. The other took the title the Pure Party of Rights, but also became labeled as the Frankovci after the Party’s leader, Josip Frank. The Social Democratic Party of Croatia and Slavonia (founded in 1894) had the least followers in Banal Croatia. The Serbian Independent Party at the time represented the strongest Serb party in Banal Croatia.

Apart from political disturbances, turmoil in culture in a wider sense also existed. Some of the educated youth became dissatisfied with anything

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6 Hrvoje Matković, Mala ilustrirana hrvatska povijest (Zagreb: Naklada Pavičić, 2001).
7 Vaso Bogdanov, Hrvatski narodni pokret 1903/4 (Zagreb: Jugoslavenska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti, 1961); J. Grahovac, “Narodni pokret 1903. i njegov odraz u Dalmaciji,” Mogućnosti (Split, 1954), no. 3: 171-178
8 Hrvoje Matković, Mala ilustrirana hrvatska povijest, 57-63.
from the past (“old”). They knocked over “idols” and thumbed their noses at “authorities” while favouring everything modern (Croatian Modernism). Because of political protests (such as the burning of the Hungarian tricolour flag at the Ban Jelačić Square in Zagreb in 1895), authorities banned many students from continuing their education in Zagreb, and they went to study at other European universities, especially in Prague. After their return, particularly of those from Prague, where they had been strongly influenced by T. G. Masaryk, they cooperated with the “modernists” in the homeland to establish a group called the Progressive Youth (Napredna omladina), more popularly known as the Naprednjaci (Progressives). They favoured the natural rights of individuals and nations rather than the traditional doctrine prevalent in Croatia which had rested on national historical rights. Their program supported Serb political demands in Croatia and even explicitly called for such demands to be granted. As a result, the Progressive Youth’s political sword turned against the members of the Party of Rights and especially against the Frankovci. The younger generation of Croatian intellectuals also became the main promoters of Slavic mutuality and a “people’s church,” i.e., they sought the separation of the Catholic Church from Rome and its reorganisation into an institution similar to that of the Serbian Orthodox Church. They fiercely criticised the Catholic Church for its conservatism and, as they claimed, its strong influence on the social life of Croats which they saw as the cause of many of Croatia’s problems. The Socialists also critically viewed prior political policies in Croatia as well as what they claimed to be the exaggerated influence of the Church.

Official circles of the Catholic Church became more and more worried about the penetration of these ideas into Croatian society. Given the Catholic majority of the population, the Church strongly opposed such tendencies. The Bishop of Krk, Antun Mahnić, a Slovene by origin, led the Church in opposing such “liberalism” through the organisation of university youth based on principles from Catholic philosophy. This laid the seeds for what subsequently became known as the Croatian Catholic Movement.

The strengthening of Frank’s party represented one of the consequences of the previously mentioned 1902 anti-Serbian protests and the 1903 anti-Hungarian riots. Another consequence saw calls for the unification of

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the Party of Rights’ Domovinaši and the People’s Party’s Obzoraši. This idea became a reality in 1903 with their unification into the Croatian Party of Rights. The Party accepted the 1894 programme of the old Party of Rights which called for a trialist restructuring of the Monarchy pursuant to which all Croat lands would unite into a new third state entity in the Monarchy. The Naprednjaci and other young politicians joined them, including the Radić brothers, Ivan Lorković, Milan Heimerl, Milivoj Dežman, Šime Mazzura and others. Šandor Bresztyenszky, an ardent Catholic, became the first President of the Party, succeeded after his death in 1904 by the controversial Grga Tuškan. The Frankovci remained outside the group of the united Party of Rights, although they considered themselves to be a part of the opposition front.14

Two Croatian parties existed in Dalmatia as well: the People’s Croatian Party and the Party of Rights. Italians and local pro-Italians gathered in the Autonomist Party.15 In Istria, Croats united with Slovenes in order to more

14 Ivan Peršić, Kroničarski spisi, p. 140.
15 Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans, p. 57.
successfully oppose the Italians and pro-Italians. They formed the Croat-Slovene People’s Party, while the Italians formed the Italian National Liberal Party. Apart from their political parties, Istrian Croats also established the St. Cyril and Methodius Society (Družba sv. Ćirila i Metoda) for Istria, which collected money to establish and support Croatian schools, as well as for scholarships for Croat high-school students. Unlike older national leaders in Istria, who followed the ideology of Bishop J. J. Strossmayer, the younger ones, such as Vjekoslav Spinčić, Matko Mandić and Matko Laginja, accepted the political ideas of A. Starčević. Among the other Croat leaders in Istria, the best known included Dinko Vitezić and Viktor Car-Emin.16

Croats in Dalmatia, Istria and Bosnia and Herzegovina expressed their solidarity with the rebellion in Banal Croatia in 1903. Such expressions strengthened the awareness of the unity of the Croatian national body.17 This proved to be one reason why politicians from those regions, especially in Dalmatia, started to consider making changes to their political programme. After Dalmatian Vice-Governor Handel proposed a law which favoured the use of the German language, Ante Trumbić proposed the “new course” in the Dalmatian Parliament (Sabor) during its session from 19 October till 12 November 1903. The novelty of his political programme lied in the insistence that Croats, Serbs and Italians in Dalmatia should make common cause in a joint approach towards the Monarchy. In addition, he argued for political collaboration with the Hungarians. The “Serb Club” and the Italian representatives welcomed the “new course,”18 while Frano Supilo of Cavtat became one of the leading promoters of the “new course” through the newspaper Novi list which he edited and published in Rijeka. Other prominent Dalmatian Croats from this circle, apart from A. Trumbić, included Josip Smodlaka and Pero Čingrija.

Faced with the fragmentation of political parties and aware that many parties relied on the financial support of the Catholic clergy, a group of clerics gathered around Obzor and prominent laymen, led by Frano Milobar and Josip Pazman, came to the conclusion that it would be more appropriate to establish a Catholic political party which would promote Croatian national interests and represent the Church’s position. In spring 1904 in Zagreb, they launched a daily newspaper, Hrvatsko, hoping that they would eventually establish a Catholic party. The newspaper’s tone, as stinging as that of its main opponent, the Progressives’ Hrvatski Pokret, did not bring them many followers so that the idea of a Catholic party died almost as soon as it had been born.19 Catholic circles had to be satisfied with attempts to build the

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16 Ivo Perić, Povijest Hrvata, pp. 196-197.
17 J. Grahovac, Narodni pokret 1903.
19 Jure Krišto, Prešućena povijest.
main ideals of Christian democracy into the existing Party of Rights’ programme, a programme they had mostly accepted.

In late 1904, political life in Banal Croatia became very lively. The Progressives no longer remained satisfied with being a part of the Croatian Party of Rights, nor with their status as they made efforts to promote certain “cultural issues.” In December, they founded the Progressive Party (Napredna stranka), whose most prominent members consisted of I. Lorković, M. Dežman and M. Heimerl. They continued to support the ideology of Slavic mutuality which they agreed would be realised in harmony with the Serbs. They also continued to be sharply anticlerical. They became natural allies of the followers of the Dalmatian “new course” which made that new political movement even more popular.

The brothers Ante and Stjepan Radić also decided to terminate their membership in the Croatian Party of Rights, but they did not want to join the Progressives either, although they remained very close to them ideologically. In December 1904 they founded the Croatian Popular Peasant Party (Hrvatska pučka seljačka stranka) (HPSS).20 The manifesto of the temporary committee of the new Party clearly shows the purpose of the Party to promote a kind of mental revolution: the village populace, the majority of the population, had to become the central point around which politics would revolve and politics would serve the needs of that population.21

In Dalmatia in April 1905 the fusion of the Croatian People’s Party and a large part of the Party of Rights resulted in another new party, the Croatian Party (Hrvatska stranka). The “new course” formed the basis of its programme. The Croatian Party of Rights from Banal Croatia thereafter expressed its agreement with that programme, leading to the signing of the Rijeka Resolution (Riječka rezolucija) on 3 October 1905. Pursuant to that Resolution, Croatian politicians from Dalmatia and Banal Croatia (except J. Frank and his followers) expressed their readiness for political co-operation and harmony with Croatia’s Serbs, and supported the Hungarian opposition of Ferencz Kossuth in its attempts to achieve Hungary’s full independence against the will of Vienna. In return, the signatories of the Resolution expected the equally unambiguous support of Hungarian political circles for the fulfillment of their aim - the unification of all Croat lands.22 Istrians, led by V. Spinčić, a Party of Rights sympathizer who gathered around Domovina, also adopted the tenets of the Rijeka Resolution.

On 17 October 1905, Serb representatives from Banal Croatia and Dalmatia signed the Zadar Resolution (Zadarska rezolucija) which approved the “new course” policy. But, in return they sought a considerable reciprocal favour for their support for Croat political goals: they wanted Serbs to be made equal in the national sense with Croats, meaning that they wanted

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22 Ibid., 273-274.
Serbs to be recognized as a “nation” in the Croat ethnic area instead of being treated as a mere ethnic group. Croat politicians accepted that condition. According to their understanding, the official name of the language used in Croatia would be Croatian or Serbian and Latin and Cyrillic scripts would be treated equally. Both Croatian and Serbian histories would be taught at schools while in municipalities where Serbs totaled only a third of the population the Serbian flag had to be displayed together with the Croatian one. Although from today's perspective this may seem modern and progressive, one could have already predicted at the time that the acceptance of such conditions would cause problems in the future. Such a political agreement, which recognised two “political nations” in one geographical area, promoted the formation of two national states which would eventually lead to confrontation between the two national groups.

Based on the Rijeka Resolution, on 11 December 1905 the Croato-Serbian Coalition in Banal Croatia presented its pre-election manifesto for the first time. The Coalition included the Croatian Party of Rights, the Croatian Progressive Party, the Serbian People’s Independent Party, the Serbian People’s Radical Party and, temporarily, the Social Democratic Party. Other than emphasising the political equality of the Serb ethnic body in Croatia with the Croatian nation, the Coalition programme represented a compilation of Croat political aspirations: the general right to vote and other civil rights, protection of peasant property, protection of workers’ rights, compensation for contractual breaches, financial independence and the unification of Croatia and Dalmatia.

The prominence the manifesto placed on the political equality of the Serb ethnic group with Croats represented a departure from traditional Croatian political positions. This already became evident in the political rhetoric used by the Coalition. The Coalition’s Manifesto did not include one word mentioning the Croatian nation, but only spoke of “our people of the Croatian and Serbian name.” As a result, Frank’s Pure Party of Rights in Banal Croatia and Ivo Prodan’s Party of Rights in Dalmatia neither accepted the “new course” policy nor joined the Croato-Serbian Coalition. They considered political co-operation with the Hungarians to be impossible and took the view that Serbs, imbued with the idea of Greater Serbia, sought to drag Croats into a Greater Serbia through their propaganda about unity and Yugoslavism.

S. Radić did not join the Coalition either; he stood against the spirit and the letter of the Rijeka Resolution and the policies arising from it. The Istrian Croats also did not join the Coalition because they believed that co-operation with the Italians in Istria would be impossible. The Frankovci manifested their disapproval with the Coalition’s policies by stirring up dis-

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content. A number of articles in Frank’s *Hrvatsko pravo*, appearing under a pseudonym *Argus*, claimed that the signatories of the Rijeka Resolution led by Frano Supilo had been hired by Serb propagandists. Such attacks explain the feeling Frank’s followers had about the scope of the policy resting on the Rijeka Resolution.  

27 Frank thought that the Crown would eventually have to realise that the failure to satisfy Croatian demands might be fatal for the Monarchy. This formed the basic reason for his attachment to Vienna. Unlike the Coalition members, Frank thought of Hungarians as incurable chauvinists and megalomaniacs and thus inappropriate political partners. The reason for his orientation towards military circles lied in his belief that only the General Staff could convince the Crown that the Monarchy needed to be reformed in keeping with Croatian requests. S. Radić also oriented his policies to Vienna rather than to Pest. But, unlike Radić, Frank believed neither in the ideology of brotherhood with Serbs nor in Slavic mutuality. He considered such ideas to be nebulous.  

28 When the Croato-Serbian Coalition won elections for the Croatian Parliament in July 1906 and assumed power, it became obvious that its whole programme did not have any basis in the real world. The Hungarian opposition, which entered the government in 1906, abandoned the demand for Hungarian independence and lost interest in the promises once given to Croatian politicians. What is more, the Hungarian government continued to manifest chauvinism, which in fact became even stronger. Using force and deceit, they enacted a law to introduce the Hungarian language throughout the rail network in Croatia.  

29 That the Coalition itself represented an alliance of interests of different groups with irreconcilable ideologies raised further questions concerning its continued viability.  

In 1907, Austrian political circles put more and more emphasis on the idea of trialism. As early as 1906, circles around Franz Ferdinand proposed to reorganise the Monarchy. Under their programme, Croatia would have the same legal status as the dual constituents, Austria and Hungary. The Viennese *Oesterreichische Rundschau* published in early April 1907 an article discussing such matters written by Baron Leopold Chlumetzky (1873-1940). The Coalition in Banal Croatia did not support such ideas. One reason must have been J. Frank’s approval of it, but the main reason focused on their determination not to offend Serb sensibilities in Croatia.  

In the late nineteenth century (1895), Croats represented a minority in Bosnia and Herzegovina with 21.3% of the population, compared to Serbs who made up 42.9% of the population and ethnically uncommitted Muslims who consisted of 34.9% of the population. The Administrator of Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1882 to 1903, Benjamin Kálláy, a Hungarian and a philo-

Serb, had been appointed to allay the feelings of Serbs both in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Serbia. During his rule, he prohibited the use of the Croatian name and made any political organising activities of Croats impossible. Still, Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina joined in their compatriot’s political developments in other Croatian lands. In 1902, they founded the cultural society Napredak with the purpose to financially support school and university students. The society had been formed by the merger of societies having similar programmes in Mostar and Sarajevo. In summer 1906 in Dolac near Travnik, the Croats of Bosnia and Herzegovina established the religious and cultural organisation Croatian National Community (Hrvatska narodna zajednica) (HNZ). The HNZ came about as a result of the support of Catholic Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the Archbishop of Vrhbosna (based in Sarajevo), Josip Stadler, and his clergy, Franciscan representatives, and the few Croat lay intellectuals in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The HNZ’s General Committee members only consisted of laymen: Nikola Mandić, Jozo Sunarić, Stjepan Kukrić, Ivo Pilar and Đuro Džamonja. At its inaugural meeting, they concluded that the Emperor, upon his arrival to Bosnia and Herzegovina for Army maneuvers, should be given a memorandum urging the annexation of the province to Croatia.30

Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina came under the strong influence of turmoils in Banal Croatia, Dalmatia and the rest of the Monarchy as well as in Serbia. Serbian agitation in Bosnia and Herzegovina became more intense after the crucial events in Serbia in June 1903 with the murder of King Milan Obrenović who upheld a pro-Austrian policy. The Karadordević Dynasty soon thereafter assumed power and it replaced Serbia’s pro-Austrian orientation with a pro-Russian one. Following this political switch in Serbia, the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina intensified their antimonarchical activities as well as their propaganda concerning Serbian domination of the province and the Serbian origin of the province’s Muslims. At the same time, they presented Catholic Croats as a reactionary element which could bring nothing good to the Muslims.

Splits began to appear shortly after the harmonious start of the HNZ. Dissatisfied with some provisions in the HNZ’s bylaws, Stadler refused to approve them in February 1908.31 It seems that the Archbishop opposed the establishment of “joint” Catholic-Muslim organizations and instead favoured separate religious and cultural organizations which would cooperate with one another at a later stage.

The Croatian political elite in Banal Croatia and in Dalmatia did not show much understanding for the position of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina and even less for the conduct and political opinions of the Archbishop of Vrhbosna. In response to an article in Pester Loyd which criticised B. Kálláy’s

pro-Serb policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina and argued that reliance should be placed on the Croats instead, Croatian “progressives” feared discontent would be stirred between Croats and Serbs in the province and called for the province’s autonomy. Politicians in the Coalition especially feared the strengthening of Austria’s position in the Balkans.

As a result of the Berlin Congress and related secret agreements, on 6 October 1908 Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. At first sight, nothing changed. Bosnia remained the “Emperor’s Land” governed by the joint Minister of Finance. But, something significant happened in the political geography: no hope existed for the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Banal Croatia. As one would have expected, each of the parties in the Coalition in Banal Croatia and Dalmatia took different position concerning the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Croat members of the Coalition, except Supilo and the “progressives,” still favoured the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as they hoped that the Monarchy would eventually have to join the province to Banal Croatia. The Serbs, together with the Croatian progressives, supported “harmony,” but also self-determination for the Serbs, Croats and Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, thus camouflaging their desire to see Serbia annex the province. Stjepan Zagorac, a priest and Party of Rights’ member, supported the break of all

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32 *Pokret*, 4 (1907), no. 185, 1.
33 *Obzor*, April 6 and 10, 1907.
ties between the Croatian Party of Rights (Hrvatska stranka prava) and the Serbian Independent Party (Srpska samostalna stranka), which would then lead to the disintegration of the Coalition. Since the Croatian Party of Rights decided to remain in the Coalition in late 1908, Zagorac and a group of priests left the Coalition (Antun Bauer, later the Archbishop of Zagreb, did the same soon thereafter).\textsuperscript{36}

The Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina first formed a coalition with the Serbs. This certainly resulted from their protest against the Catholic Croats, who supported the annexation of the province by the “Catholic” Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. But a Croatian-Muslim coalition, led by the Croat Nikola Mandić, won elections in spring 1908.\textsuperscript{37} Thereafter, Muslims usually cooperated with the Croats of the province.

In 1908 in Dalmatia, the Party of Rights (Stranka prava) had been founded through the merger of those Party of Rights groups from Dubrovnik, Šibenik (led by Mate Drinković) and Zadar (led by Ivo Prodan) which in 1905 did not join the Croatian Party. It seems that the main reason for their unification had been their disapproval of Frank's policy in Banal Croatia.\textsuperscript{38}

In 1908 in Banal Croatia a new Ban, Pavao Rauch (who ruled until 1910), had been installed. The Ban's programme sought to weaken the Coalition's policy taken in response to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As a result, he relied on J. Frank and his party.\textsuperscript{39} But soon, some other events occurred which redounded to the advantage of Rauch's policy. The Serbian anti-monarchical campaign reached such intensity that in March 1909 a high treason legal proceeding commenced in Zagreb against a large group of Serbian leaders. The trial ended on 5 October 1909 with the imposition of long prison sentences for thirty-three men. Although they soon received pardons, the charges against them had been well founded.\textsuperscript{40} In any case, Frank and other Party of Rights' politicians in Banal Croatia used the trial and other concurrent events to warn about the Serbs' intentions. But their efforts proved to be counterproductive because it became the main reason for the split within the Frankovci party. The newly established Starčević's Party of Rights (Starčevićeva Stranka prava), more widely known as Milinovci (after its leader, Milo Starčević, Ante Starčević’s nephew) supported the Coalition. The Pure Party of Rights (Frankovci) and the Radić brothers' HPSS remained wedded to their anti-Coalition positions.

In autumn 1909 in Dalmatia's Provincial Parliament the representatives of the Croatian, Italian and Serbian parties condemned the high treason trial in Banal Croatia and supported political co-operation with Serbs, which had been the basis of the Coalition's policies in Banal Croatia. With respect

\textsuperscript{36} J. Šidak et al., \textit{Povijest hrvatskog naroda}, p. 243.
\textsuperscript{37} M. Gross, Hrvatska politika u Bosni i Hercegovini, p. 30.
\textsuperscript{38} J. Šidak et al., \textit{Povijest hrvatskog naroda}, p. 244.
\textsuperscript{39} Trpimir Macan, \textit{Povijest hrvatskoga naroda}, p. 382.
\textsuperscript{40} Jere Jareb, \textit{Pola stoljeća hrvatske politike} (Buenos Aires: Knjižnica Hrvatske revije, 1960).
to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatian and Serbian political parties requested the introduction of a constitutional order in that province which would allow its people to decide their own future, together with other Croatian lands. On the other hand, the Party of Rights, while condemning the treason trials, remained critical towards the Serbs and the Party did not support the resolution of the Croatian and Serbian parties as regards Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Istria experienced turmoil similar to those in other Croatian lands. Young people, who more and more often had been going to Zagreb for studies, spread the idea of establishing consensus among political factors upon their return to Istria. Politically speaking, the Croatian-Slovene coalition weakened a bit. At elections for the Provincial Parliament in November 1908, the Italian Liberal Party strengthened its position by obtaining 24 mandates, while the Croatian-Slovenian Party received 18 mandates out of the 19 it had been expected to win under a new electoral law. But, calm spread over relations between the Croatian and Slovene representatives on one side, and Italian and pro-Italian representatives, on the other side. Nevertheless, that calm did not last long because the Italians refused to allow the Croatian and Slovene languages to be treated equally in the Istrian Parliament. Moreover, the Italians and pro-Italians wanted to politically separate the hinterland with its Croatian majority from the coastal towns where Italians predominated. In autumn 1910 this led to chaos in the Istrian Parliament which caused its dissolution. Another parliamentary election took place in 1914.

On 5 February 1910 Nikola Tomašić became the new Ban of Banal Croatia. He immediately tried to co-operate with the Coalition and it more than willingly accepted Tomašić’s moves as the Coalition wanted to remain in power. Supilo left the Coalition as a result of his disappointment with the Coalition’s policies and he advocated the adoption of a more radical policy. He sought support from nationalistic youth and the socialists, that is, from those circles not satisfied with the Coalition’s policy of compromise. In reality, Svetozar Pribićević, the leader of the Serbian Independent Party, forced Supilo out of the Coalition and thereafter he became the Coalition’s real leader. Pribićević viewed the mission of Croatian politics to support the creation of a Yugoslav constellation revolving around Serbia.

In elections in October 1910, the Coalition remained the strongest political group, but it did not enjoy the support it had enjoyed earlier. This marked the start of the separation between Ban Tomašić and the Coalition and led to the dissolution of their understanding, which ultimately had been short-lived. The strengthening of Radić’s Peasant Party proved to be significant, although its president, S. Radić, co-operated for some time with Tomašić.

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42 Ivo Perić, Povijest Hrvata, p. 207.
43 Frano Supilo, Politika u Hrvatskoj (Zagreb: 1911); Josip Horvat, Politička povijest Hrvatske, pp. 304-306.
That year, the Progressives agreed to abandon their programme for the benefit of the members of the Party of Rights in the Coalition in order to help the Coalition survive. As a result, a new United Croatian Independent Party (*Ujedinjena hrvatska samostalna stranka*) had been created. It, together with the Serbian Independent Party, remained the only two parties in the Coalition. This new combined Progressive and Party of Rights party wanted to manifest its loyalty to the highest Austro-Hungarian authorities by stating its wish to have a strong Monarchy while at the same time demanding a “clean” agreement related to the position of the Croats in the Empire. They did not fully eliminate the possibility of trialism, which provoked fierce reactions from the Hungarians. By remaining in the Coalition, the Progressives lived to see their total political breakdown as their conduct caused great disappointment among young people. Ideas appeared among the latter that argued that only violence could solve national problems. The “nationalistic youth” formed as a result of these ideas.

When Milo Starčević and his supporters left Frank, the remaining “Frankovci” found themselves in deep political and financial crisis. They found salvation from the group of clerics and laymen who in 1904 had started the daily newspaper, *Hrvatstvo*. Their leaders, F. Milobar and Josip Pazman, agreed to discontinue publication of their newspaper for the benefit of *Hrvatsko pravo*, published by the *Frankovci*. As a result, they established the Christian-Social Party of Rights (*Kršćansko-socijalna stranka prava*). But, this party did not last long as Milobar and Pazman started to exert more efforts to reunite all Party of Rights fractions, not only in Banal Croatia but also in Dalmatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Istria. They planned to create, with the assistance of the Slovenes, a Party of Rights to counterbalance against the Croato-Serbian Coalition. The forced Milo Starčević to cooper-

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Josip Frank

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44 J. Šidak et al., *Povijest hrvatskog naroda*, p. 269.
ate in this endeavor after he received assurances that the *Frankovci* of the future united Party of Rights would not have any deciding say in the party. Moreover, Frank himself at the time had been on his deathbed. The leaders of the various fractions of the Party of Rights determined to extinguish their respective newspapers and to publish a new party paper called *Hrvatska*. On 4 October 1911, a united organisation had been established presided over by Milo Starčević, under the name the Party of Rights (*Stranka prava*).\(^{45}\) Thus united, the Party of Rights entered the second elections under the rule of Ban Tomašić, in late 1911 in which it won a majority of mandates.

By the end of the first decade of the 20\(^{th}\) century, the ideology of Yugoslavism and pro-Serbian enthusiasm became even stronger among Croatian intellectuals. This especially became evident in cultural matters. Painter Vlaho Bukovac, sculptor Ivan Meštrović and like-minded artists established the Medulić society and in 1910 arranged an exhibition in Zagreb under the title “Despite Unheroic Times” (“Nejunačkom vremenu uprkos”). The exhibition promoted the Kosovo myth, symbolised in Meštrović’s sculpture of Kraljević Marko, accompanied with mystifying prose soaked with enthusiasm for Serbian Emperor Lazar and the Yugoslav nationality.

These Yugoslav nationalists had a totally different tone than prior ones and on 1 October 1911 in Zagreb started to publish a newspaper called *Val* (the Wave). The leading people around the newspaper included its editor Vladimir Čerina, Oskar Tartaglia and Matej Košćina. As they themselves admitted, they viewed their “national feeling” as Croatian-Serb, and their “nationality as Serbian-Croatian.”\(^{46}\) Due to the differences with other progressives, the editorial offices of the paper later moved to Prague.

After the defeat of Tomašić’s supporters in the elections of 15 and 17 December 1911, Tomašić submitted his resignation. In January 1912, the united Party of Rights held a conference which adopted a memorandum addressed to the King and the heir to the throne which requested that the Croatian Parliament be called into session in Zagreb with representatives from all Croatian lands, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, to make decisions concerning the ties between Croatia and the Monarchy. Circles around Franz Ferdinand condemned the memorandum and thus showed that they did not care for the creation of a sovereign Croatian state, even in a trialist relationship with the Monarchy.

Instead of responding to the Party of Rights’ demands, on 20 January 1912 the authorities appointed Slavko pl. Cuvaj as the new Ban thus re-introducing absolutism in Croatia. Only a week after his appointment, the new Ban dissolved Parliament, which did not have any sessions during the following two years. He also started to close down newspapers and to generally apply other oppressive methods. This led to student protests which continued into February and then spread across Dalmatia and Istria. The youth of

\(^{45}\) J. Šidak et al., *Povijest hrvatskog naroda*, pp. 275-276.  
\(^{46}\) *Val*, October 1911
Sarajevo also organised protests expressing their solidarity with their colleagues in Croatia. At Zagreb University, students locked themselves inside the University’s buildings forcing the police to seize the school’s buildings. On 12 March 1912, riots spread among secondary school students forcing authorities to close down the schools for more than a month. Student disturbances continued as late as 3 April 1912 when an attempted assassination of Cuvaj caused authorities introduce a commissariat with Cuvaj as commissar.  

Events in Dalmatia in early 1912 focused on the arrival of a new governor, Austrian German Mario Attems (1911-1918), who succeeded the sole Dalmatian who served as governor, Niko Nardelli. The Dalmatian Parliament suspended its session on the same day when the dissolved Croatian Parliament had been scheduled to meet in a sign of solidarity with Banal Croatia. At the Vienna Parliament, Dalmatian representatives pleaded for the discontinuation of repression in Croatia. They received support from Czech and Slovene liberals - but not from the Christian Socialist politicians - as well as from German and Slovene clericals led by Šusterčić.  

In Dalmatia, the need for consensus among all parties again had been emphasised, especially among Croatian and Serbian representatives, and they sought the solution for the national problem in Yugoslavism.

Croatian youth, frustrated by the introduction of the commissariat, in late April 1912 went for an excursion - to Serbia. The group consisted of an unusual gathering of nationalists, progressives, Party of Rights’ members and “clericals.” It represented the first Croatian visit of its kind to Serbia since 1904 when S. Radić led Croatian youth to greet the young Serbian King Petar Karadorđević as the “Yugoslav king.” The 1912 visit proved to be charged with emotions and expressions of sympathies for Serbia even more than the previous one. By this time, the youth had already accepted the ideas of the “nationalistic youth” and the use of force to resolve political problems. They had also accepted the “nationalistic youth’s” political aim - the creation of a Yugoslav republic. The revolutionary and Yugoslav unitarianist mood became especially pronounced in Dalmatia. Led by Vladimir Čerina and Oskar Tartaglia, a group of young people seceded from the nationalistic youth and on 4 October 1912 established the United Nationalistic Youth (Ujedinjena nacionalistička omladina) which supported unitarianist nationalism, that is, the national unity of Croats, Serbs and Slovenes under the slogan “liberate by uniting.”

In early October 1912, Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece and Montenegro allied to commence the First Balkan War against Turkey. That War sparked addi-

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47 J. Šidak et al., Povijest hrvatskog naroda, pp. 276-277; Josip Horvat, Politička povijest Hrvatske, pp. 314-316.
48 J. Šidak et. al., Povijest hrvatskog naroda, p. 278.
tional flames in Croatia, especially among young people.\(^{50}\) The wider spread of the ideals of Yugoslavism and the increase in activities of the nationalistic youth as the main promoter of such ideals directly resulted from the Slavic allies' victory in the Balkan War. Starting in 1912, even Catholic circles started accepting the Yugoslav ideology held by their former key opponents. Rudolf Eckert and Petar Rogulja played a decisive role in this new direction of organised Catholicism, especially through the newspaper \textit{Riječke novine} which first appeared in late 1912.\(^{51}\)

In early 1913, some differences appeared among Croatian, Dalmatian and Bosnian and Herzegovinian Party of Rights members, and consequently the Party of Rights fell apart. Interestingly, one of the important reasons for the disintegration of the Party had been the response towards the victory of the Balkan allies. The \textit{Frankovci} and “clericals” thought that the victory should serve as an encouragement to Croats and Slovenes to give stronger support to the policy of Croatian national rights. Therefore, they condemned those youth who had abandoned the idea of Croatia’s independence within the Monarchy, framed in the Party of Rights’ 1894 programme. However, they had to admit that they represented the last generation of those who sought the solution of the national issue within the Monarchy; the majority had already opted for a new unity based on Yugoslavism. The latter included Kerubin Šegvić, a priest, and Ivan Peršić, a layman, the two pillars of the Party of Rights’ newspaper \textit{Hrvatska}. Both lost their positions on the editorial board and, subsequently, the \textit{Frankovci} and “clericals” went in one direction, and \textit{Milinovci} in another.

In December 1913, the authorities dissolved the commissariat and appointed Nikola Skerlecz as Ban. In new elections, the last held before World War I, the Coalition again won an absolute majority, while the Party of Rights’ members, divided into \textit{Milinovci} and \textit{Frankovci} (with the “clericals”), suffered a further diminishment in their standing in political life.\(^{52}\) Radić’s party also saw a decrease in the number of its representatives, from eight to only three. All this became reflected in parliamentary sessions, which commenced on 27 December 1913. The Coalition majority continued to advocate the ideology of “national unity,” an ideology that aimed, as Pribičević put it, at achieving much more than just co-operation.\(^{53}\) The Pure Party of Rights opposed these ideas. One of its members, Ivo Frank, Josip Frank’s son, warned that the main purpose of the ideology of “national unity” remained the promotion of Serbian interests.\(^{54}\)

\(^{50}\) \textit{Hrvatska}, 1/1913.

\(^{51}\) Jure Krišto, \textit{Prešućena povijest}.


\(^{54}\) SZHS, vol. II., p. 1242.
At the time of the visit of the Austrian heir to the throne, Franz Ferdinand, to Sarajevo, a member of *Mlada Bosna*, a terrorist organisation under direct Serbian influence, assassinated him and his wife on 28 June 1914. The assassination provoked the Monarchy to declare war against the Kingdom of Serbia.

World War I represented a conflict of interests between the countries of the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austro-Hungary and Italy) and the Allied powers (Great Britain, France and Russia). As soon as the War broke out, Italy declared its neutrality and entered into the secret Treaty of London with the Allied powers on 26 April 1915. Pursuant to the Treaty, Italy agreed to take part in the War on the Allied side in return for which it obtained the promise that it would receive South Tyrol, Gorizia, Gradisca, Trieste, Istria and a larger part of Dalmatia. During the War, Croats thus fought on three fronts: the Balkan front against Serbia, the Eastern front against Russia, and the Soča (Isonzo) front against Italy.

The authorities did not call the Istrian and Dalmatian Parliaments into session during the War, while the Croatian Parliament in Zagreb held regular sessions. The *Reichsrat* in Vienna convened only in 1917. During the latter’s sessions, representatives from Croatian (Dalmatia and Istria) and Slovene lands founded a joint club of representatives called the Yugoslav Club. They issued a manifesto in the *Reichsrat* on 30 May 1917, known as the May Declaration, which demanded the unification of the lands populated by Slovenes, Croats and Serbs within the Monarchy. The Declaration came

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*Ivo Perić, Povijest Hrvata, p. 209.
under strong criticism in Croatian lands, especially among Catholic circles. Among others, those surrounding Archbishop Josip Stadler distanced themselves from the Declaration.57

The most active group with the strongest international connections became the Yugoslav Committee, founded in 1915 by a group of South Slav emigrants.58 Its most prominent members included Ante Trumbić, Frano Supilo, Ivan Meštrović and Hinko Hinković. These Croats called for the disintegration of Austro-Hungary and for the creation of a new South-Slavic state consisting of equal nations. They of course opposed the cessation of Croatian and Slovene regions to Italy as arranged in the Treaty of London. It seems that Supilo had been the first to have discovered the contents of the secret Treaty, but he also learned about the intentions of the Kingdom of Serbia, with Nikola Pašić in the forefront, to expand Serbia across Croatian lands, except those that had not been promised to Italy. As a result, he sought either to clarify the proposed relationship between Croatian lands and Serbia or, alternatively, to establish a separate state for South Slavs within the Monarchy. Other members of the Yugoslav Committee did not support Supilo. He therefore left the Committee and died in 1917.

Other Croats made different attempts to determine Croatia’s destiny after the war. These included some prominent men from a Catholic circle called the Seniorat. In their 1915 memorandum addressed to the Pope (known as the Rijeka Memorial), these Catholics called for the establishment of a state of Croats and Slovenes within the Monarchy, or in case of its disintegration, they demanded the option of making a free decision on their destiny. But, like the members of the Yugoslav Club, they also hoped that South Slavs would unite politically.59

On 20 July 1917, Pašić and Trumbić signed the Corfu Declaration calling for the unification of Croats, Serbs and Slovenes into one state. Due to haggling over its contents, the document remained incomplete with respect to many points, but it at least declaratively stood for the equality of each of the nations to be united into the new state. But, the Declaration did not receive any welcome in Croatia. S. Radić especially condemned its contents. Pašić, on the other hand, never even meant to respect the spirit or the letter of the Declaration.60

The War brought ever more complex problems to Croatian lands. In the interior, numerous deserters (called the “green cadre”) caused chaos and incited a revolutionary mood among the populace. In coastal regions and ports, especially in Pula, Šibenik and Kotor, riots broke out in the Navy. It became clear that the Monarchy would not survive.

Immediately before the end of the War, on 5-6 October 1918, the National Council of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs came into being in Zagreb. The Croato-

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57 Ibid.; Jure Krišto, Prešućena povijest.
58 M. Paulova, Jugoslavenski odbor (Povijest jugoslavenske emigracije za svjetskog rata 1914.-1918.) (Zagreb: Prosvjetna nakladna zadruga, 1925).
59 Zlatko Matijević, Slom politike katoličkog jugoslovenstva; Jure Krišto, Prešućena povijest.
60 Trpimir Macan, Povijest hrvatskoga naroda, 387.
Serbian Coalition entered the Council and gained predominance over it. The Council elected Slovene Anton Korošec as its president and the Croat Ante Pavelić, Sr. and Croatian Serb Svetozar Pribićević as its vice-presidents. Four land governments also became established in each of Banal Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dalmatia, and Slovenia. The National Council did not accept Emperor Karl’s manifesto on the reorganisation of the Monarchy into a federation of independent nations. Instead, on 29 October 1918 the Croatian Parliament ended all ties between the Croatian nation and Hungary and Austria, and transferred its authority to the National Council. The Parliament also declared the creation of a new state community - the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs.

Following the signing of the Armistice and under Allied pressure, representatives of the Kingdom of Serbia, a National Council delegation representing the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, and representatives of the Yugoslav Committee signed the Geneva Declaration on 9 November 1918 which defined the foundation of the unification of the two states into a new federation. However, the Serbian government determined not to support the Geneva Declaration and decided to negotiate with Zagreb directly through

61 Not to be confused with the future leader of the Independent State of Croatia with whom Ante Pavelić, Sr. had not been related.
62 Šišić and others, Povijest hrvatskog naroda, pp. 179-180; Trpimir Macan, Povijest hrvatskoga naroda, p. 388
their agent, S. Pribičević.\textsuperscript{63} Taking advantage of fears caused by the provisions of the secret Treaty of London and the actual Italian occupation of Croatian and Slovene territories following the Armistice, Pribičević invited the Serbian Army into Croatia to maintain peace and security even before an agreement on unification had been reached. This created additional pressure to complete the unification process as soon as possible, helped along by Dalmatian representatives who threatened to unite Dalmatia with Serbia and Montenegro regardless of the actions taken by the rest of Croatia.\textsuperscript{64}

Despite warnings of some rare individuals (S. Radić being the most vocal) who argued that the Croatian people wanted unity which would ensure equality for them and the preservation of a Croatian state within a federation, the National Council’s Central Committee decided to go to Belgrade to complete unification with Serbia. At a night session between 23 and 24 November 1918, the Committee supported the joinder of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs with the Kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro into a single state, and charged a delegation to go to Belgrade to reach an agreement on the organisation of the new state.\textsuperscript{65} The delegation received instructions on conditions which had to be fulfilled before a declaration of unification could be issued. Though Serbia’s representatives did not accept any of the conditions, the leader of the delegation, S. Pribičević, urged the proclamation of unification even without their fulfillment. Ante Pavelić, Sr. read the National Council’s address on unification and the Serbian regent and heir to the throne, Aleksandar Karadorđević, in response declared the establishment of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes on 1 December 1918. The new Kingdom which comprised the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, the Kingdom of Serbia and the Kingdom of Montenegro. The Croatian Parliament never ratified this unification.\textsuperscript{66}

\textit{Translated by Ida Jurković}

\textsuperscript{63} Trpimir Macan, \textit{Povijest hrvatskoga naroda}, p. 389.
\textsuperscript{65} Trpimir Macan, \textit{Povijest hrvatskoga naroda}, p. 390.
Kroatische politische Unruhen im Angesicht des Zerfalls der Österreich-Ungarischen Monarchie

Zusammenfassung


Da Kroatien-Slawonien im Bewusstsein der führenden politischen Persönlichkeiten in allen kroatischen Ländern das Mutterland und Zagreb die Metropole aller Kroaten darstellten, sollten sich der Vereinigung auch alle restlichen kroatischen Länder anschließen. Im Gefüge der Österreich-Ungarischen Monarchie hatten Dalmatien und Istrien eigene Landesparlamente, während Bosnien und Herzegowina erst im Jahre 1910 ein Parlament gründete.


Das Augenmerk ist auf politische Geschehnisse im Laufe des Ersten Weltkrieges und Versuche der Monarchiereform gerichtet, aber auch auf die Bildung des südslawischen Staates. Es siegte die Option des südslawischen Staates, die zum integralen Jugoslawismus neigte.