Group size, power allocation, and change: 
Effects on conceptual representations of group interaction

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This study examined conceptual representations of interactions between stable and changed minority and majority factions within groups that allocated power either according to size (power = size) or randomly. In support of the hypothesized moderating effect of power allocation, it was found that both stable and changed minority and majority factions represented their interactions at low levels of inclusiveness when power was allocated according to size. When, however, power was not associated with size, stable majorities, but not stable minorities, represented group interactions at the inclusive level of a single group. Loss of the majority position significantly decreased this inclusive level of representation but gain of the majority position did not result in the corresponding increase. Nevertheless, the new majority in the random power condition represented its interaction with others at a significantly higher level of inclusiveness than did the new majority in the "power = size" condition. These results suggest that associating power with size invariably places interactions between the majority and the minority into the intergroup domain. Dissociating power from size, however, places such interactions within the intra-group domain for the stable majority and creates a potential for a similar socio-categorical structuring for the new majority (former minority).

Key words: majority, minority, social power, social change, conceptual representation, inclusiveness

Extending research on social change from the examination of antecedents to the examination of consequences, Prišlin and her colleagues have recently proposed a model that focuses on group dynamics in the aftermath of change in minority and majority positions within a group (Prišlin, Brewer, & Wilson, 2002; Prišlin & Christensen 2002; 2005; Prišlin, Limbert, & Wilson, 2000). The gain-loss asymmetry model of reactions to changes in minority and majority positions builds on the documented socio-psychological and economic ramifications of the minority and majority positions to explain the consequences of departures from these positions for group processes. The starting premise of the model is that the majority position in a group is valued more positively than the minority position. The presumed differing valuation is derived from the empirically well-documented discrepancy in the instrumentality of the two positions for the satisfaction of important goals (for review, see Prišlin & Christensen, in press). Because of its comparative advantages, changes away from the positively valued majority position presumably are experienced as losses and changes away from the negatively valued minority position presumably are experienced as gains. Responses to losses and comparable gains, however, are not symmetrical. The former are generally more intense than the latter, reflecting the loss-aversion effect whereby losses loom larger than corresponding gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky, 1994). Thus, changes away from the majority positions, which are experienced as losses, should elicit negative reactions that are stronger than positive reactions to changes away from the minority positions, which are experienced as gains.

To understand the processes that mediate these loss-aversion reactions to change within group contexts, the gain-loss asymmetry model draws on social identity and self-categorization theories (Tajfel, 1981; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). From this perspective, perceived similarity with others provides a basis for a shared in-group category. Individuals who find their opinions supported by others (majority) should assimilate with and positively value the in-group category. Because self-categorization at a so-
ciously inclusive level of in-group membership creates expectations of agreement and support (Turner & Oakes, 1989), disagreements are negatively valued. When disagreements amount to a level that changes one's position from majority to minority, the result should be a decrease in valuation and, ultimately, de-categorization from the group. Minorities, on the other hand, should be less likely to assimilate with and positively value the group from the very beginning due to a lack of similarity with those who dominate the group. Consequently, they should develop expectations for opposition and disagreement from the group. When such expectations are violated by former opponents who convert to their position, minorities should react cautiously, only mildly improving their reactions toward the group. In sum, change in majority and minority positions within a group should be associated with an overall decrease in identification with the group: Former majorities should disidentify from the group whereas former minorities should not show a comparable increase in identification with the group.

Empirical support for the hypothesized effect was obtained in a series of studies in which a participant and several confederates exchanged their opinions on relevant social issues (Prišlin, Brewer, & Wilson, 2002; Prišlin & Christensen, 2002; Prišlin, Limbert, & Bauer, 2000). In these studies, participants initially were placed either in a majority position, receiving support from most of the confederates, or in a minority position, being opposed by most of the confederates. Participants subsequently either remained in their initial position during the entire group interaction or moved to the opposite position (majority to minority or minority to majority) by virtue of confederates shifting from supporters to opponents or vice versa. As predicted, participants who moved from the majority to the minority showed a substantial decrease in identification with the group as indicated by reduced group-self similarity, group attraction, expectations for positive interactions with the group, and preferences for group membership. In sharp contrast, participants who moved from the minority to the majority showed only a small increase in identification with the group on these measures. Additional research has documented that this pattern of reactions to majority-minority change is a specifically group phenomenon (versus aggregates of individuals) and occurs when minority-majority reversals are generated by attitude change among existing group members (versus an influx of new members). New majorities can increase their identification with the group, but only under a circumscribed set of conditions that include receiving genuine and continual support for their position (Prišlin & Christensen, 2005; Prišlin, Levine, & Christensen, 2005).

Although previous studies have provided solid evidence in support of the gain-loss asymmetry model, they have focused almost exclusively on the context that creates intangible advantages for majorities and, conversely, disadvantages for minorities. Specifically, in previous studies, being in the majority (minority) likely satisfied (undermined) participants’ needs for validation (Festinger, 1954), and acceptance or belonging (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Though satisfaction of these needs through others’ support is important (Prišlin & Wood, 2005), other, more tangible benefits are also associated with being in the majority position (Christensen, Prišlin, & Jacobs, 2005). Especially important among the tangible benefits is social power, considered one of the basic motivational domains of values (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987). Yet, power allocation has not been studied in previous tests of the gain-loss asymmetry model.

Early social psychological definitions of power tended to be ambiguous, suggesting the possibility of inducing forces of a certain magnitude on others (Lewin 1944/1951). Later conceptualizations specified the ability to control (Jones, 1972), influence (Cartwright, 1959; Dahl, 1957; French & Raven, 1959), or even coerce others (Moscovici, 1976; Weber, 1947). More contemporary approaches to power, adopted in the present study, emphasize control over resources and outcomes (Fiske, 2004; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003), for both oneself and others (Reicher & Levine, 1994). Common to these conceptualizations is the idea of asymmetrical interdependence between the powerful and the powerless, with the latter depending on the former but not vice versa (Ellemers, van Rijswijk, Bruins, & de Gilder, 1998; Fiske, Morling, & Stevens, 1996; Thibaut & Kelly, 1959). In many instances, this asymmetrical interdependence exists between the majority and the minority (Guinote, Judd, & Brauer, 2002; Sidanius & Veniegas, 2000). Although size is not synonymous with power, the majority wields power over the minority often enough to warrant further tests of the gain-loss asymmetry model under circumstances where size explicitly co-varies with power.

The goal of the present study is to examine reactions to stable and reversed majority and minority positions under circumstances in which power is either associated with size (power = size) or is unrelated to size of factions within the group. Specific reactions examined in this study include conceptual representations of interactions among participants. Interactions can be conceptualized at varying levels of inclusiveness (Allen, 1985), ranging from the unitary, one-group–level, through two-separate-groups–level, to separate-individuals–level (Dovidio, Gaertner, Isen, & Lowrance, 1995; Gaertner, Mann, Dovidio, Murrell, & Pomare, 1990). That is, an interaction with others can be represented as an interaction occurring within one inclusive group, between two factions within a group, or among separate individuals. Conceptualizations reflecting different levels of inclusiveness are associated with qualitatively different reactions toward interaction partners. In general, the more strongly an interaction is conceptualized as an exchange among members of a single (unitary) group, the more favorable the treatment of the included members (Dovidio et al., 1995; Gaertner et al., 1990; Gaertner, Rust, Dovidio, Bachman, & Anastasio, 1994). The movement away from an inclusive one-group conceptualization and toward the
opposite, less inclusive conceptualizations (Turner et al., 1987) is indicative of group disintegration. Thus, conceptual representations of group interaction provide a particularly relevant measure of dynamics within a group because they are diagnostic of the (dis)integrative forces operating among its members.

We expected conceptual representations of interaction at uniformly low levels of inclusiveness among members of majorities and minorities whose numerical size co-varies with power (i.e., majorities are powerful and minorities are powerless). Power, per definitionem, creates asymmetry in majority and minority relationships. Thus, the minority's dependence on the majority for relevant outcomes and the majority's ability to control those outcomes should highlight the differences between the factions and preclude representations at the inclusive level of one group. Rather, associating power with size should foster representations at non-inclusive levels, primarily at the level of two separate groups. Furthermore, the direct tangible outcomes of having power allocated by size should generate similar conceptualizations regardless of the stability or change of the minority and majority positions.

When, however, numerical size does not co-vary with power, we expected conceptual representations at the inclusive level of one group among members of stable majorities. Their dominance within the group should foster inclusiveness that encompasses even those few who diverge from the prevailing ideas. For members of minorities, however, inclusive representation should be less likely as they stand in opposition to the dominant ideas. Furthermore, change in position is expected to moderate reactions of majorities vs. minorities whose numerical size co-varies with power (i.e., majorities are powerful and minorities are powerless). Power, per definitionem, creates asymmetry in majority and minority relationships. Thus, the minority's dependence on the majority for relevant outcomes and the majority's ability to control those outcomes should highlight the differences between the factions and preclude representations at the inclusive level of one group. Rather, associating power with size should foster representations at non-inclusive levels, primarily at the level of two separate groups. Furthermore, the direct tangible outcomes of having power allocated by size should generate similar conceptualizations regardless of the stability or change of the minority and majority positions.

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These hypotheses were tested in an experiment in which participants expressed their opinions on a number of relevant social issues, trying to win support from five confederates who acted as voters in a mock political campaign. Participants were either initially supported by most confederates to be placed in the majority position or were opposed by most of confederates to be placed in the minority position. These positions either remained stable or were changed when several confederates converted from supporting (opposing) to opposing (supporting) the participant in the second half of the “campaign”. Half of the participants expected that power, operationalized as the ability to evaluate and financially reward others’ work, would be given to those who won the campaign (power = size), whereas another half expected that power would be assigned randomly (random power) in the second half of the experiment. Following the campaign and before an alleged second, decision-making part of the experiment, participants indicated whether they conceived of their interaction with others in the first, “political campaign” part of the experiment as occurring at the level of a single group, two separate groups, or separate individuals.

**METHOD**

**Participants and Design**

Of the 143 undergraduates who participated in exchange for partial fulfillment of a course requirement, 104 were women and 39 were men, average age $M = 21.40$ years ($SD = 3.98$). Racial/ethnic composition of the sample was as follows: 76 participants were White (non-Hispanic) American, 32 were Hispanic American, 13 were Asian American, 6 were African American, and 16 reported being of other racial/ethnic backgrounds. Participants were randomly assigned to the eight between-subjects cells in a 2 (initial position: majority vs. minority) × 2 (stability of initial position: stable vs. changed) × 2 (power allocation: associated with size vs. random) × 3 (conceptual representation: one group vs. two groups vs. separate individuals) mixed model design with conceptual representation measured as a within-subjects factor.

**Procedure**

When one participant and five confederates, arbitrarily selected from a pool of 15 confederates, gathered in the laboratory, the experimenter explained that the goal of the study was to examine group dynamics within political systems. The experimenter further explained that the first part of the experiment would focus on political campaigns and the second part on political decision-making. In the first part, a political candidate would attempt to win an election in a mock political campaign. The experimenter added that following the campaign, political decisions would be made either by the majority faction or by randomly choosing one of the two factions.

Using an ostensibly random procedure, the participant was always selected to play the role of the political candidate in the mock political campaign and the confederates took the part of the voters. The participant attempted to win support of voters, expressing his or her opinion on 10 socially relevant issues and offering a few of the strongest arguments for the expressed opinions. The “campaign” issues...
included term limits for politicians, crime victims’ families witnessing the execution of the criminal, financial assistance to third world countries, religious institutions paying taxes, increase in legal immigration, the death penalty, increased military spending, prosecuting adolescent murderers as adults, government regulation of health care costs, and parental consent for teenagers’ abortions. After the participant argued his or her position on an issue, each of the confederates responded by either agreeing or disagreeing verbally and then non-verbally by holding up a green (agree) or red (disagree) placard. These responses ostensibly were to provide feedback to the candidate much like it is provided in a real-world political campaign context. Following exchanges on the last issue, the voters decided whether to “elect” the candidate by a simple majority vote.

The confederates responded to the participant’s advocacy in a pre-scripted manner to confer the majority or major-havm~ partlclpant.s mdlcate the extent t~, which oth~rs.m the to third world countries, religious institutions paying taxes, After answering the computer questionnaire that in-witnessing the execution of the criminal, financial assistance which would be “evaluators” with power.

 included measures of dependent variables, participants were probed for suspicion, thoroughly debriefed, and thanked for their participation.

**Measures**

Conceptual representations. Participants indicated the extent to which they felt that “the six of you” who participated in the study were a) one group, b) two separate groups, and c) separate individuals (Dovidio et al., 1995).

Manipulation checks. The effectiveness of the manipulations of the initial position and change were assessed by having participants indicate the extent to which others in the experimental session agreed with them “at the beginning of the session” and “at the end of the session,” respectively. The power manipulation was evaluated by assessing participants’ beliefs about their own faction’s power and their opponent faction’s power.

Several additional measures were taken that will not be discussed here. All variables were assessed on a 9-point scale ranging from –4 (not at all) to +4 (very much).

**RESULTS**

**Manipulation Checks**

Initial position. A 2 (initial position: majority vs. minority) x 2 (stability of initial position: stable vs. changed) x 2 (power allocation: associated with size vs. random) analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the estimates of others’ agreement with the participant at the beginning of the session yielded the expected main effect of initial position, $F(1, 135) = 382.57, p < .001$. Participants initially in the majority perceived that others initially agreed with them ($M = 2.39$) whereas participants initially in the minority perceived that others initially disagreed with them ($M = -2.43$).

Change. A significant Initial Position x Stability of Initial Position interaction effect on the estimates of agreement with the participant at the end of the session, $F(1, 135) = 374.19, p < .001$, indicated that the manipulation of change in the initial position was effective. Planned comparisons within the majority conditions revealed significantly higher estimates of agreement among participants in the stable ($M = 2.40$) than change condition ($M = -2.35$), $t(67) = 12.31, p < .001$. Conversely, within the minority conditions, estimates of the agreement were higher among participants in the change ($M = 2.05$) than stable condition ($M = -2.94$), $t(72) = 15.51, p < .001$. These findings indicate that, as intended, participants whose position moved away from the
majority perceived that they lost support and those whose position moved toward the majority perceived that they gained support for their opinions.

**Power.** A significant Initial Position x Stability of Initial Position interaction effect on estimates of power for one's own faction, $F(1, 135) = 280.34, p < .001$, was qualified by a Initial Position x Stability of Initial Position x Power Allocation interaction, $F(1, 135) = 216.20, p < .001$. Planned comparisons within the “power = size” conditions revealed significantly higher estimates of power for one’s own faction than changed majorities ($M = 3.61$) and changed minorities ($M = -2.35$), $t(33) = 11.76, p < .001$. In contrast, estimates in stable minorities ($M = -3.06$) were significantly lower than those given by changed majorities ($M = 3.44$), $t(33) = 16.77, p < .001$. As anticipated, none of the differences within the random power conditions was significant ($M = 0.47, M = 0.06, M = -0.11$, and $M = 0.29$, for the stable majorities, changed majorities, stable minorities, and changed minorities, respectively; all $p_s > .23$). Mirroring these findings, an ANOVA on estimates of the opponent faction’s power revealed a significant main effect of power, $F(1, 135) = 4.93, p < .05$, and an Initial Position x Stability of Initial Position interaction, $F(1, 135) = 125.47, p < .001$, which was qualified by an Initial Position x Stability of Initial Position x Power Allocation interaction, $F(1, 135) = 101.93, p < .001$. Planned comparisons within the “power = size” conditions revealed significantly lower estimates of power for the opponent faction in stable majorities ($M = -1.33$) than in changed majorities ($M = 3.35$), $t(33) = 6.73, p < .001$. Conversely, estimates of the opponent faction’s power given by stable minorities ($M = 3.41$) were significantly higher than those given by changed minorities ($M = -2.33$), $t(33) = 11.36, p < .001$. None of the differences within the random power conditions was significant ($M = 0.00, M = 0.17, M = 0.56$, and $M = 0.19$, for the stable majorities, changed majorities, stable minorities, and changed minorities, respectively; all $p_s > .29$). These findings indicate that, as intended, participants within the “power = size” conditions had higher estimates of power for their own faction and lower estimates for the opponent faction when they were in a stable rather than a changed majority position. The reverse was true for the stable and changed minority positions. As expected, within the random power conditions, no significant differences were observed.

In summary, results indicated that all three independent variables: initial position, stability of the initial position, and power allocation were successfully manipulated.

**Conceptual Representations of the Interaction**

Our hypotheses predict differential effects of the independent variables on conceptual representations of interaction among participants in this study. To test these hypotheses, we conducted a $2 \times 2 \times 2 \times 3$ (initial position x stability of initial position x power allocation x conceptual representation) mixed model ANOVA with conceptual representation measured as a within-subjects factor. A significant Conceptual Representation main effect, $F(1, 135) = 78.13, p < .001$, an Initial Position x Conceptual Representation interaction, $F(1, 135) = 5.54, p < .05$, a Power Allocation x Conceptual Representation interaction, $F(1, 135) = 5.24, p < .05$, and an Initial Position x Stability of Initial Position x Conceptual Representation interaction, $F(1, 135) = 11.37, p < .001$, were qualified by an Initial Position x Stability of Initial Position x Power Allocation x Conceptual Representation interaction, $F(1, 135) = 11.31, p < .001$. To examine the effects of the independent variables on each of the three levels of conceptual representations, we next conducted separate $2 \times 2 \times 2$ (initial position x stability of initial position x power allocation) ANOVAs on participants’ representations of the interaction at the level of (a) one group, (b) two separate groups, and (c) separate individuals. Following our hypotheses, significant 3-way interactions were further decomposed within each level of the power allocation factor. Specifically, we compared the stable and changed conditions within each of the two initial position conditions and the initial majority and minority conditions within the two change conditions. These planned comparisons were performed using the Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons on slightly correlated dependent variables.

**One group representation.** Significant main effects of initial position, $F(1, 135) = 12.85, p < .001$, change, $F(1, 135) = 20.29, p < .001$, power allocation, $F(1, 135) = 18.40, p < .001$, Initial Position x Change in Initial Position interaction, $F(1, 135) = 12.85, p < .001$, and Initial Position x Power Allocation interaction, $F(1, 135) = 5.53, p < .05$, were qualified by an Initial Position x Change in Initial Position x Power Allocation interaction, $F(1, 135) = 7.64, p < .01$ (see Table 1, row 1). Planned comparisons within the “power = size” conditions revealed significantly weaker one group conceptualization in changed than stable majorities, $t(33) = 4.22, p < .01$. No other difference within the “power = size” conditions was statistically significant, all $t_s < 2.11, nS$. Planned comparisons within the random power conditions revealed significantly weaker one group conceptualization in changed than stable majorities, $t(32) = 4.48, p < .01$. Moreover, this conceptualization was significantly stronger in stable majorities than stable minorities, $t(33) = -2.80, p < .01$. As would be expected from postulates of the self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987), conceptualization of the interaction at the inclusive level of one group was negatively related to a less inclusive conceptualization of interaction at the level of two separate groups ($r = -.28$). Yet, contrary to a presumed exclusiveness of the one group conceptualization and separate individuals conceptualization (Turner et al., 1987), our data indicate no association between the two conceptualizations ($r = .04$). This finding adds to the growing body of evidence that the two levels of conceptualizations need not be mutually exclusive (Priflin & Christensen, 2005; Simon, Auferheide, & Hastedt, 2000). Finally, the two group conceptualization and separate individuals conceptualization were mildly negatively related ($r = -1.13$).

### Table 1
Conceptual Representations of Group Interaction as a Function of Power Assignment, Initial Position, and Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Power = Size</th>
<th>Random Power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Majority</td>
<td>Minority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No Change (n = 18)</td>
<td>Change (n = 17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One group</td>
<td>M  -1.22</td>
<td>-2.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD  1.26</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two Groups</td>
<td>M  1.72</td>
<td>2.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD  2.69</td>
<td>1.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separate Individuals</td>
<td>M  1.50</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD  1.82</td>
<td>1.84</td>
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</table>

Note. Higher numbers indicate stronger representations.

5.56, p < .01. No other difference within the random power conditions was statistically significant, all ts < .49, ns.

Additional analyses compared each of the four conditions within the “power = size” level of the power allocation variable with the corresponding conditions within the random power level of the same variable. These comparisons revealed that stable majorities and changed majorities (new majorities) had significantly stronger one group conceptualization in the random power condition than in the “power = size” condition of the power allocation variable, both ts > 3.14, ps < .05.

**Two groups representation.** Representations of the interaction as two groups were significantly affected by an Initial Position x Change in Initial Position x Power Allocation interaction, $F(1, 135) = 4.73, p < .05$ (see Table 1, row 3). Planned comparisons revealed no significant difference within the “power = size” or random power conditions, ts < 2.38, ns. However, comparisons across the two power allocation conditions revealed that changed majorities (new majorities) had significantly weaker two group conceptualization in the random power condition than in the “power = size” condition, $t(37) = 2.86, p < .05$.

**Separate individuals representation.** A significant Initial Position x Power Allocation interaction, $F(1, 135) = 4.50, p < .05$, was qualified by an Initial Position x Change in Initial Position x Power Allocation interaction, $F(1, 135) = 4.18, p < .05$ (see Table 1, row 5). Planned comparisons revealed no significant differences within the “power = size” conditions. Within the random power conditions, however, changed majorities (new majorities) had significantly stronger separate individuals representation than stable majorities, $t(37) = 3.46, p < .01$. No other difference emerged significant, ts < .22, ns.

**DISCUSSION**

The present findings provide support for the hypothesis that power moderates representations of interactions among members of stable and changed minority and majority factions within a group. Power affected all three levels of representation: one-group, two separate groups, and separate individuals; however, its moderating effect was especially salient with respect to the one-group representation. As anticipated, when power was allocated according to size, none of the numerical factions represented the interaction as occurring at the level of a single group. Thus, majority and minority factions who disagreed on social issues agreed that they were not parts of a unitary social category. This was true irrespective of the stability or change in initial majority and minority position. If anything, change intensified this refusal of a common group identity among those who lost their initial majority position. Apparently, becoming a new minority within a group where power to evaluate and reward others’ work was given to the majority deepened an already existing rejection of a common group identity. Coupled with virtually no movement toward the common identity in a new majority, this finding indicates that social change within a group where power is allocated according to size cements a unison refusal of an inclusive social categorization.

Divorcing power from numerical size appeared to create a more complex social categorization. Stable majority factions that did not expect an automatic climb to power because of its numerical supremacy did exhibit a considerable sense of inclusiveness. They conceived of themselves and others, including a minority faction, as a single group. Interestingly, their numerically inferior counterpart (stable minority) did not reciprocate such an inclusive categorization. The latter result corroborates previous findings about
a smaller faction’s reluctance to share membership in the superior social category that also includes a larger faction (Brewer, 1979; Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992; but see Dovidio et al., 1995). Thus, in a group with stable majority and minority factions that do not associate their size with power, the dominant faction appears to develop a sense of “groupness” that is resisted by the minority. Yet, as predicted, upon losing their majority position, the new minority dramatically lowered its sense of groupness, agreeing with the new majority that they did not constitute a single group.

Although social change appeared to have equated groups within both power conditions in that neither had a unifying faction in the aftermath of change, it was not quite the case. Direct comparisons of the one-group representation in the two power allocation conditions revealed two significant differences: In comparison to the “power = size” condition, in the random power allocation condition, both the stable majority and new majority (former minority) had stronger one-group representations. The observed stronger sense of inclusiveness in the new majority (former minority) might be especially important because of the faction’s newly won dominance within the group. Thus, a new majority that is not automatically given power within a group might emerge as a unifying force, especially if its inclusiveness intensifies over time. This possibility is suggested by our previous findings that new majorities improve their reactions toward the group as their newly won position within the group stabilizes over time (Prišlin & Christensen, 2005).

Further indicating that the moderating effect of power reflects reactions of new majorities were findings about the representation of interactions at the level of two separate groups. Only new majorities in the two power allocation conditions differed in the extent to which they represented the interaction as occurring at the level of two groups. The new majority that did not expect power to come automatically with their position had significantly weaker two separate groups representation than did the new majority expecting to be powerful. Together with the findings about the one-group representation, this result indicates that the new majority is less likely to reject the inclusive level of categorization when their newly won position is not automatically associated with power. Power assignment made explicitly according to size may have ipso facto led to increased perceptions of two factions within a group, at the expense of a more inclusive level of categorization.

Interestingly, new majorities in the two power conditions did not differ in their representations of interaction at the level of separate individuals. Rather, the critical difference emerged within the random power condition only. When power was dissociated from size, the newly established majority (former minority) developed a significantly stronger separate individuals representation of interaction than did the stable minority. Recall that new majority (former minority) and stable minority did not differ in their rejection of the single group representation or in their acceptance of the two separate groups representation of interaction. Taken together, these findings suggest an interesting possibility: Before re-categorizing their initial representations of the interaction (from two separate groups to a single group), new majorities might first deconstruct the interaction to the level of separate individuals. Representing the interaction as occurring at the level of separate individuals strips away the usual meaning and preferential valuation of the majority position over the minority position (Prišlin et al., 2002). Thus, eliminating differential meanings of the two positions via individuation may be an intermediary step toward inclusiveness that the new – but not automatically powerful – majority may later develop. This speculation, however, calls for future studies that should examine conceptual representations of the new majority over a period of time (see Prišlin & Christensen, 2005).

If indeed the new majority that does not associate its size with power becomes gradually more inclusive, it would suggest that the initial detrimental effects of social change might eventually be overcome. The importance of inclusive representations in this process stems from research linking levels of representation to tolerance (e.g., Gaertner et al., 1993), and procedural and distributive justice (e.g., Wenzel, 2000). An inclusive level of categorization, a hallmark of the common in-group identity model (Gaertner et al., 1993), is associated with favorable evaluation (Gaertner et al., 1990; Dovidio et al., 1995), and helpfulness toward the included group members (Dovidio, Gaertner, Validzic, Matoka, Johnson, & Frazier, 1997). Inclusiveness is considered important, though not sufficient condition for tolerance (Waldzus, Mummendey, Wenzel, & Weber, 2002). Moreover, the level of inclusiveness determines the boundaries of justice concerns in that it defines potential recipients of procedural and distributive entitlements (Wenzel, 2004). Thus, individuals derive meanings and behavioral guidance from their conceptual representations of their interaction with others in terms of social categories.

In conclusion, the present study demonstrates that the socio-categorical structuring of interactions between stable and changed minority and majority factions is strongly affected by the allocation of power. Our results indicate that associating power with numerical size invariably places interactions between the majority and the minority into the inter-group arena. Under no condition examined in this study did either faction conceptualize their interaction as occurring within an over-arching, one-group categorization. Social change only intensifies such a conceptualization, moving factions even further away from a common identity. When, however, power is not associated with size, interactions for stable majorities occur in the intra-group arena. Though stable minorities do not share their view, the finding that the prevailing faction within the group subscribes to the common identity carries important implications. Because the inclusive, one-group level of conceptualization is associated with favorable treatment of all members assumed to
share common identity, it should contribute to less frictional if not more tolerant interactions between the stable majority and the stable minority. Importantly, new majorities (former minorities), do not immediately subscribe to the one-group conceptualization. Rather, they decrease their conceptualization of interactions with others as occurring at the level of two separate groups and increase their perception that they interact with others as separate individuals. This would suggest that new majorities may become inclusive gradually: First abandoning their divisive two-group categorization and then replacing it with a more individuated level of conceptualization. Eventually, they may develop the inclusive, one-group conceptualization, especially if their newly won position remains stable over a period of time (Pršlin & Christensen, 2005).

REFERENCES


