Globalisation or Journey into the Second Discovery of the Globe

DAVOR RODIN
Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb

Summary
The author claims that the globe was discovered by courageous adventurers and visionaries who had trust in geographical utopia that the Earth was round so they plunged into the unknown in their wretched sailboats. This stage ended in foundation of huge colonial empires but, eventually, this kind of violent colonization failed. What has been left from the first discovery of the globe? The most important reminder is discovery of identities of the former colonized peoples as well as the identity of their colonizers, the Europeans.

In that way globalisation begins where the revelation of other nation’s identities results in becoming cognizant of one’s own identity. Due to it, the western political theory as a precondition for the organization of a multicultural global community has to answer three vital questions: How to carry out non-violent changes in the global community? How to control power-holders by the check and balance system and verify that they have not been abusing their power? How can citizens of the world participate in power sharing?

Western rationalism brought into the new world, first of all, the western individualism of both individuals and states. This abstract concept or structure gradually destroyed traditional collectivism of new nations, the one that was based on their historical experience. Such experience-based communities disappeared in Europe as early as Plato and Aristotle era, and were replaced by abstract political communities such as polis, state or empire that were constituted upon written constitutions. Such a constructive rationalism in the field of politics made possible such universal organizations as the United Nations Organization. Globalisation has also been derived from the same constructivism. As has been shown by Aristotle, experience-based communities only divide people and nations because experience is not capable of abstractions; we cannot feel other people’s toothache however experienced we may be.

Key words: discovery, global community, globalisation, constructivism, identity, rationalism, UN

Mailing adress: Fakultet političkih znanosti, Lepušićeva 6, HR 10000 Zagreb, Croatia. E-mail: davor.rodin@zg.hinet.hr
The globe was discovered by intrepid adventurers and phantasts who came to believe into the geographical utopias that the Earth is round and consequently set out in their rickety sailboats on their voyage into the unknown. The first discoveries went hand in hand with violence, slave trade, looting, and forced Christianization of the “discovered nations”. That phase ended with the establishment of the great colonial empires; eventually, this type of forced colonialization collapsed in the process of decolonization. After World War Two, the colonial empires disintegrated, and the enslaved nations were emancipated.

Today, the globe as known by the adventurers of yore is observed from the first, the second or the third sky, or via the Internet. The trips around the world are now the province of athletes, while the contemporary people observe the world by “surfing”. What has remained from the initial discovery of the globe? The most pivotal vestiges are neither Christianity, Europeanism, science, technology, or capitalism but the recognition of European identity as the identity of the former colonial nations.

The moment that identification of Europe and the Third World had occurred, it was challenged with the new processes of *exterritorialization* and *extemporalization* that came as a surprise to the Third World and Europe; the surprise implied a paradigmatically different prospect for the globe’s interest division. Globalism begins where the recognition of one’s own identity by means of others’ identities and the mutual tolerance of cultural differences have become obsolete since an entirely different perspective of one’s own vital interests and resources has come into being.

Instead of a “benevolent”, tolerant appreciation of other identities in the evidently multicultural world, something untoward has happened. The European nations and the so-called Western world have felt that globalization is not solely a plan for a cooperative exploitation of other countries but also a threat to their own interests. The anti-globalization rallies first swept through the Western capitals. The question is how did those campaigners get the feeling of being endangered by globalization? Where did this resistance to a different perception of the world come from?

Politically, the issue how to graft the European democratic/liberal tradition onto the entire world of various cultural identities has become obsolete. The new issue is how to – together with such a multicultural world – resist the *exterritorialization* and *extemporalization of all traditions*. In other words, for the Western political theory the issue is whether it is rational at all to strive for the liberal/democratic organization of the multicultural global society at the time when the process of exterritorialization and extemporalization (Willke, 2001) has imperiled the Western national states. They are faced with the fact that the process of globalization has endangered the liberal democracy of European national states, previously advertised as a global political form. Ralf Dahrendorf (2001: 9), a veteran liberal, formulated his skepticism towards the global liberal democracy that brings into question even the probability of a liberal/democratic organization of the European Union. Dahrendorf wonders:

1. How can nonviolent changes be carried out in the global society?
2. How to control the global power-wielders by means of the system of checks and balances and to ensure that they do not abuse that power?

3. How can global citizens participate in the exercise of power?

4. Within the multicultural global framework, how to politically compile the list of collective goods, as well as the horizontal and vertical subsidiarity that could be democratically legitimized?

Dahrendorf’s skepticism concerns the EU as well, since it is also considered as lacking in democracy, a democratic deficit that is further increased by global processes.

Regardless of the fact that the Western world has given up on conquest, pillage, colonization, Christianization, and uniformization of nations and opted for the view that the differences among nations are an unalienable right of peoples and cultures, the question still remains how and if such a colorful world can be democratically organized at the time of the collapse of the traditional territorial/temporal structure of the global political boundaries, while the new medium-based division of the globe challenges European democratic states as the initiators of both the democratic government and these unexpected global processes.

In its first global campaign, Western rationalism introduced into the new world Western individualism, both of individuals and states. This Western political abstraction or rational construct has gradually eroded the traditional historical and empirical collectivism of the “discovered” nations that evolved from their historical experience of collective life.

In Europe, the mythological, religious, tribal communities disappeared at the time of Plato and Aristotle. It seems that globalism is detrimental for those rational solutions that, in contrast to the experiential communities, were promoted by Aristotle and actualized by the great modern constructivists, from Hobbes to Hegel. The national liberal/democratic state as the Western political model and an export commodity has suddenly become disputable even in Europe that used to advertise it throughout its first conquest of the world.

National states have steadily been replaced by *atopia* as a form of *exterritorialization* and *extemporalization* of the national state. The question is how to stage and legitimize the new political community within the altered medium-based redistribution of national and global territories as life sources without risking a confrontation between the conservative, nationalist, Eurosceptical forces, and the pro-European, Euro-optimistic political forces in Europe, a conflict that would bring into question the European Union.

---

1 Thomas Kuhn’s concept of paradigm change also includes the medium of writing that, at the time of its discovery, opened up an entirely different, *antiempirical* and *antimythological* worldview. Today the logic of writing has lost its privileged place as the truth-bearer. Other medium-based perspectives of establishing truth have emerged, which indicates that there is a plethora of venues for expressing the meaning of the world and the reality.
Our argument is that the contemporary theories of globalism have ascertained that globalism can be understood only after the territory and the time have been redefined as frames of reference that have enabled the individuation of traditional modern national states as political constructs or stagings. The discovery of the supra-empirical notion of territory and time is closely linked with the European culture of writing. This culture gave rise to the European logical/grammatical rationalism that has enabled the supra-empirical rational construction of political communities (Goody, 1990). As Anthony Giddens (Giddens, 1997: 28, 33, 218) shows, this typically European rationalist political culture, in its altered form, has spread globally with an unlooked-for effect that in turn has threatened the European political culture.

Theoreticians classify the global era as an ongoing process of the new postcolonial discovery of the world either as a part of the contemporary post-modernism or as a utopian transfer into a distant future in line with the possibilities of the grammatical future tense which can numerically be stretched even further than the future perfect tense.

In its practical aspect, the motto “Forget modernism” means forget the constitution of the culturally/historically construed national state as an exclusive precondition for the viability of the political life of Europeans all the way from Aristotle’s Athens to the contemporary national state.

The originators of thus understood separation from the European metaphysically founded political rationalism, particularly its modernist variation – the national constitutional state – were critics of Hegel’s totalitarianism as modernism’s ultimate word: Husserl, Wittgenstein and Heidegger.

The first with his claim that the truth does not dwell in the logical proposition but in the unconditioned self-manifestation of phenomena; the second with his claim that in speech a non-speech element is elevated to the level of a word i.e. the very pre-speech essence, the third that speech is but a form of representing what lies outside speech not as an impersonal nothing but as a different form or a different medium, a different culture of manifesting the state of an object which speech only inadequately depicts. The theoretical/political application of these insights also characterizes the post-modern political theory.

2 In its theoretical aspect, this motto means forget the logic and the grammar of the phonetic writing as a haven for the preservation of the truth separate from any experience, i.e. forget the logic and the grammar of writing in the ontological function as a precondition for the possibility of revealing the truth.

3 These findings have undermined the credibility of the grand modernist meta-narrative, regardless of its grammatical stylization, since a narrative is the essence of the written speech which does not describe only what belongs to speech. A narrative unfolds in the past and the future tenses; the past and the future tenses are just grammatical forms by means of which the ongoing events are temporalized, or the memories and the perceptions of the future updated (reentry). Hegel's contention: “The essential definition of time is the past” concerns the essence of writing and not the essence of what writing reports. Same as the past and the future are the grammatical forms of the relocation of the present, or of the reality into the forms of speech and writing, so distance and vicinity are the grammatical forms of the dislocation of the place in which we are at this moment to any other spot. Here as the place in which we are right now can grammatically be dislocated
Another version of our argument is that globalism is a microelectronically provided new experience of the Earth, the globe, and the world in general. Each and every spot on the Earth is at any time directly accessible to anyone, everyone’s territory and time may be accessed from the first, the second or the third sky. Territory and time as territorial and historical borders do no longer provide protection or security to individuals who identify themselves as citizens of a territorially and temporally delimited state. Our home as our refuge of abode is also microelectronically transparent; thus, we have no privacy of home, as a place where our guests and we may safely dine and chat (Derrida, 1997).

The transparency of all places at all hours calls for immediate action and decision-making here and now, without the benefit of a grammatical caesura, without a pause between the cause and the effect, the purpose and the goal, since simultaneous events are not necessarily causally or purposely linked. Those who want to survive must act without delay, since the present moment is the only available framework of action.

By losing trust in the credibility of speech and writing, as established by Aristotle, people of the Western civilization have also lost the grammatical, medium-based distance from the events that concern them. The loss of that grammatical distance from events is globalism not as a theory or an ideology of interest social groups but as a hermeneutical situation, which we have stumbled upon, and which affects all groups. This condition creates permanent anxiety as the existential ambience of contemporary individuals. All good and bad things under the sun may happen here and now, and not tomorrow and yesterday; we all have to cope with this fact. Such a hermeneutical state of things beyond the grammatical distance from events’ time and territory, from their causes and effects, their purpose and means, is called risk, indeterminism, chaos, extraterritoriality and extemporality. In this world made by us, it is not known whether in the next sequence of the present we are to find ourselves in an abyss that makes up for the missed opportunities of the previous sequence. For example, a war in the Middle East might any time now open Hell’s gate and pitch us into it, and we would not be able to explain that calamity either with our past or our dreams of the future.

In thus defined global reality it is no longer possible to rely on any grammatically modified experience as a rational manual of functioning. Experience is no longer transferred from the grammar into the world, nor is the grammatical transcript of the world a safe reality; people function in accordance with the immediate understanding of the in-

Americans use satellites to monitor Iraq: every ant and every bird’s cry in that part of the world are recorded.

The globe is accessible to us not only in grammatical forms, but also in Gagarin’s and microelectronic present that we can directly access. There is no need to talk or read about Berlin or the dark side of the Moon: we can see these places any time anywhere.

For example, terrorism is a form of a postmodern, global war whose causes and purposes we cannot identify; it is not limited in time and territory, it is waged here and now.
formationally present situation i.e. according to the understanding of the structure of the situation and not in accordance with the practical perception or the structure of grammar and the logic of writing. Of course, the structure of the informationally presented situation or reality is not logically arranged; it resembles a jungle. We operate in the state of a chronic informational paralysis which forces us to decide how to go on based on the momentary creative differentiation, previously not part of the equation any more than a signpost in a jungle.

Rawls has termed blind acting in the area of judgment-making acting under the veil of ignorance, referring to the implementation of laws regardless of the multiplicity of the meanings of a situation in which one is involved. Naturally, in a jungle, the veil of ignorance is not envisaged as a precondition of the likelihood of a proper action, regardless of the situation, since the situation is realistically, and not hypothetically or preventively nontransparent. In global processes, what is invisible and consequently unpredictable? The structure of global reality in which we can no longer rely on logic and grammar as the means of orientation, since we know that the situation is not logically structured or there are too many “logics” to take them all into account. A probability is no longer a known potential that has not been tapped yet, but an immediate risk, chaos, nothing beyond 0 and, as Luhmann says, points to the unknown missed opportunities. A risky life can no longer rely on causality, logic and grammar as streamlined structures that are conducive to the expected effects of activities. Namely, today we know that the grammatical and logical presentation of the world and personal experience is not the truth of the world but a medium illusion or a special sort of selective blindness applicable to the logic but not to the multicultural, global world.

Kant’s and Hegel’s philosophy of world history and their philosophies of the state were the modernist meta-narratives or medium illusions in which all the distinctions between the writing and the reality, the reality and the logic, were obliterated in the logical structures of the universal reason that potentially contained the future reality, just like a grain of wheat contains the future ear. Their cosmopolitanism and the concept of the world history, taken seriously even by Karl Jaspers, were mere manifestations of the logical essence of the experience of the Western political culture as if it were the only genuine one just because it does not distinguish between the notion and the reality, since reality is the effectuated notion.

The existential situation labeled as globalism is characterized by a lack of trust in logic and grammar that in its political aspect used to guarantee to Europeans their identity in territory (home) and time (origin). The territory was homeland, the time ancestry. For some, the precondition of the likelihood of a separate existence was the control of their native land; for others on the other hand, it was the control of the origin in the sense of tradition and history as historical time.

With modernism, the two principles of identification were equated: The national state is a political unity of tradition and territory. The subject of that unity is the nation or, like for us in Central Europe, the nation whose attributes we are born into. We have been born as Germans or Croats in the same way in which kings and counts, eagles and lions are born. With the French, the British, and the Americans, who follow Locke’s principles, political identity does not stem from the origin of one’s forefathers, or the territory; one becomes an American constitutionally or on the basis of the universal rea-
son that in an impersonal way (*tabula rasa*) works in the same direction. We are born completely equal as human beings, and only later our experience turns us into Brits or Americans.

It seems that with globalism all three preconditions of identity – *traditional, territorial, and constitutional* – have been losing ground as medium illusions. People are no longer sure about their territory, their time, or the laws they live by. Neither the origin as a tradition, nor the delimited territory of the homeland, or the constitution and the laws, unconditionally guarantee existential security and identity. *Time, territory* and *laws* are no longer the unconditional preconditions of the viability of a separate existence, but have – like illusions – become questionable and cause embarrassment, anxiety, and finally aggressiveness.

In the global era, as Anthony Giddens shows, territory and time, *homeland* and *ancestry*, have become hollow dispositions into which – due to human rights – anyone can penetrate by means of capital, technology, information, infrastructure or the Internet. The major thinkers have exposed territory and time as mere grammatical, historical illusions, or as forms of representing the existing reality that do not correspond to the present; indeed, these structures of thought do not have the *ontological rank* that predetermines every activity and thus eliminates all risk. Likewise, it is no longer possible to legitimize the laws of a national state only by means of the democratic will of its members; that is why the national state must ensure a broader legitimacy by respecting the universal human rights and other exterritorial and extemporal obligations. The constitutions of national states have been looking for a broader legitimating base than the one offered by their own nation i.e. the international one. We in Croatia also waited with trepidation for the international community to recognize our state and were grateful to Iceland for having been the first to do it. A citizen of a state is a constitutional construct anyway, independent of the concrete experience of homeland and tradition, and skeptics wonder what has remained of the old European territorially and temporally constrained democracy if the place as *homeland* and the time as *origin* have become dispositions of the private and the global manipulation.7

The national state was established on a limited territory and a limited tradition; nowadays, when we talk about taking leave of the national state, the processes that break this temporal/territorial circumscription of the state are listed, but not in the direction of the eventual cosmopolitan finality of the globe as the place of residence for a unified humankind – as envisaged by Kant, Hegel, Marx or Jaspers – but in the direction of a *different structure* of the new boundaries that are being delineated *transversely* across the existing rivers and mountains, the religious and historical traditions of world nations. In order to make visible these new *invisible borders* that do not follow rivers and mountains, an array of medium-based distinctions should be introduced; their postmodernist feature is that their goal is not to achieve a higher dialectic unity without the old borders or to universalize their own European rationality, but by means of the former and present territorial and tradition boundaries of national states to establish themselves transversely, and avoid the instruments of the traditional state control of the

7 Everyone has the right to arbitrarily change their origin, the future, and the place of residence as their *private thing*, and enjoy a further protection of their natural and constitutionally guaranteed human rights.
aforementioned borders. At work, among other things, is a new migration of nations, not in saddles but by planes, not with bundles but with briefcases in their hands.

Different authors offer the indicators and symptoms of that new and different delimiting of the world. Thus Ralf Dahrendorf adds the process of localization (Dahrendorf, 2001) to the process of globalization, not in the sense of yearning for the native village, but in the sense of the construction of a new locality as an appropriate and streamlined haven for the territorial/temporal protection of a person from the media and from any other uncontrollable violation of privacy. Samuel Huntington talks about the clash of civilizations whose boundaries, of course, do not coincide with the borders of national states, but seep through them from times immemorial in some other semantic or communicational way. We read in the newspapers about the transnational boundaries of international multinational companies, about the borders between the rich and the poor, the educated and the uneducated, the innovative and the imitative societies, the strategic friends and enemies, religions and cultures. And finally, terrorism has an aspect of postmodern warfare without or across the old territorial borders. In a word, boundaries are not going to vanish; they are going to be recreated in different mediums, not solely territorially and temporally but informationally and communicationally. Contemporary theories of globalism have laid open to view this until recently invisible state of things: the new delimiting of life resources on the globe.

First we are going to mention three most widespread theories of globalism as an extension of modernism, i.e. the theories that do not want anything to do with globalism as a paradigmatically new redistribution of life preconditions, but rather view it as a modernism radicalized in a cosmopolitan way, and want to prove that the argument about the paradigm change does not hold water since the world is definitely going to be Europeanized.

3

Ad.1. The first theory is the Enlightenment’s and Hegel’s philosophy of world history, which saw in the Western grammatical/logical mind the unity of human race on which the cosmopolis would be based. Among the contemporary authors of the same orientation are Karl Jaspers (in his book *Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte*) and Karl Löwith (in his book *Weltgeschichte und Heiligeschehen*).

Jaspers advocates an existentialist/anthropological thesis that people, regardless of their historical differences, belong to the same species, and says: “If we do not want history to disintegrate into happenstance in headless and aimless appearances and disappearances in the labyrinth of numerous blind alleys, in that case the unity of history is unavoidable” (Jaspers, 1955: 249). Or: “This unity relies on the circumscription of our planet, whose territory and land can be mastered; also on the precision of chronology in the common, albeit abstract time, as well as on the unity of human roots, belonging to the same species; this biological fact links people through their common origin” (251). Jaspers uses the concept of paradigm change as he places the turning point of world history into the epoch of the last millennium B.C.; since then, history has been moving
forward in the direction of its unity (251), guaranteed by the humankind’s common ancestry.

Karl Löwith advances a similar assumption by showing that world religions are more universal unions of people than national states; hence, he sees the unity of history in the more general religious experience of redemption.

Ad. 2. This part refers to the Marx-inspired theories of economic i.e. capitalist integration of the world. Paradoxically, Karl Marx, a stringent critic of capitalism, has suddenly become a much loved partisan of Europeization and capitalization of the world, and the herald of the victory of the Western scientific/technical culture worldwide. Thus a Jash Tandon writes: “Globalization, then, as the contemporary expression of this broad movement of history, is capital’s final conquest of the rest of the world” (Tandon, 1997: 389). Another author, Jörg Meyer Stamer, claims that globalisation occurs in four areas: “On the financial market, on the commodities market, in entrepreneurship and the labour market, and in statistics” (Stamer, 1997: 378, 388). On the other hand, together with this conservative rehabilitation of Karl Marx, the old platitudes about socialism as a global process and proletarian internationalism as the seed of a world revolution that will result in the creation of the communist cosmopolis can still be heard. Advanced capitalism and communism thus represent the final word of European modernism.

The same kind of thinking can be found in political science, for example in Lynn H. Miller’s Global Order, that ends in typically modernist fantasies: “For the first time in human history, the possibilities for creating a globally integrated civilization seem to be within the grasp of those of us living on the earth today” (Miller, 1990: 235). Such economic and political science assumptions are today validated by across-the-board truisms such as this: “The implicit motto of the development strategy is no longer ‘We have made it and now we are going to show you how to do it’, but rather: ‘Together, we are going to look for an ecologically acceptable economic model’” (Willke, 2001).

Ad. 3. This refers to the expanded theories that derive their arguments in favour of a traditional, modern, cosmopolitan interpretation of globalism from the standpoint of the contemporary microelectronic revolution as a recent technical consequence of the so-called first modernism. In the meantime, this type of argumentation has mushroomed to the point of a jumble, but is structurally linked to the universalism of the first modernism. The authors of this orientation do not ask what microelectronics as the postindustrial universal technology is, but what can be done with it. That is why we are going to mention only Neil Postman, a competent critic of the consequences of the application of microelectronics in the reproduction of the contemporary American life, and his book Das Technopol (Postman, 1992). This book may be understood as an unequivocal outcry against the cozy feeling brought about by these useful technologies or as a passionate defense of the modern mind against its disempowerment by computational machines.

In order to undermine the argumentation of those who flippantly interpret technopoly as a mere continuation of modernism only with new means, we are going to list some of Neil Postman’s paradoxical warnings from the borderline between the old and the new paradigm. His concept of technopoly sociologically explains the interests of
totalitarian technocracy that possesses some cosmopolitan but not, in our opinion, global features: “...The milieu in which technopoly flourishes is one in which the tie between information and human purpose has been severed, i.e. information appears indiscriminately, directed at no-one in particular, in enormous volume and at high speeds, and disconnected from theory, meaning, or purpose. The purpose is not only to eliminate ignorance, superstition and human suffering, but also to adapt to the requirements of new technologies” (Postman, 1992: 79). “Under the rule of technopoly, we are forced to spend our life trying to gain ‘access’ to information” (70), which means that – as a word of caution for the advocates of modernism – we want to stick to the unaccomplished purpose of modernism with accomplished means.

At the end of his book, Neil Postman poses three questions to those who want to pursue the same unaccomplished purposes using the state-of-the-art science and technology. Postman mentions three grand social experiments that have caused quite a stir in the US and all over the world. The first experimental question is: “Can a nation guarantee to its citizens the biggest imaginable political and religious freedom and yet preserve its identity and purpose?” The second experimental question is: “Can a nation preserve its unity and sense of belonging if it opens its doors to people from all over the world?” The third question is: “Can a nation preserve its history, originality and humanity if it resigns itself entirely to the dominance of technological thinking?” (196). At the end of his appraisal of the future of United States, Postman pleads for offering resistance to American technopoly. In fact, Postman’s approach to the American example is cosmopolitan since he makes an analogy of United States as a cosmopolis. He hopes that it is possible to maintain a distance in relation to the totalitarianizing project of modernism worldwide. One can take issue with Postman by saying that microelectronic revolution and technopoly as its economic/social offspring are not totalitarian but universal. Technopoly does not dispense with cultural and other differences among people and peoples; on the contrary, it fosters them by creating new boundaries and different cultural divisions. It does not threaten the human race and the United States by stamping out all differences but – through an uncontrolled flood of differences – by creating chaos similar to a prehistoric jungle, which requires forms of orientation different from the traditional ones. In a word, Postman interprets the postmodernist phenomena by means of the traditional modern critical awareness. He is critical of neocapitalism, but fails to notice that the ongoing scientific/technological revolution has undermined capitalism, both nationally and globally.

The three above mentioned traditional cosmopolitan theories – the philosophy of history, the theory of capital and the theory of technopoly – endanger the modern national state as the political project of modernism by pointing to the failure of its principles, which are not the principles of globalization. These authors think that the universalization of liberal democracy, capital and technopoly, is going to blur the difference between Europe and the rest of the world. The human race will be Europeanized, while Europe is in cosmopolis going to lose its temporal/territorial identity and will consequently be dubbed the Cosmopolis, the Globe, the Earth, or the World. In line with the modern philosophy of history, and the theories of capital and technopoly, the cosmopolis would
be an unavoidable consequence of the global universalization of European cultural and political history. Is that really so?

The contemporary, postmodernist counterargument to this apparently failed project of cosmopolis is multiculturalism, the society of risks, chaos and globalism. Can these labels of the contemporary state of things be considered as proofs that a new postmodernist paradigm of staging the global political community has emerged? This could be claimed only after the new boundaries of the distribution of world resources have been drawn, cutting across the territorial and temporal borders of the traditional bourgeois national state: across its history, geographical borders, and its constitutionally guaranteed common resources.

The authors such as Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens or Martin Albrow tend to interpret globalism as a farewell to the European political rationalism or as a modification of the modern universal political paradigm. Their postmodernist argumentation is primarily directed against the modern principle of the homogenization of citizens under the common denominator of the universal reason, less so against the historically shaped national temporal/territorial identities organized into national states. They primarily criticize the theory of the modern mind as the universal principle of global political uniformity and homogenization, since that universal principle eliminates all the differences among different cultures, because all of them originated from the mind and necessarily return to the mind. They reject the foundations of modern cosmopolitanism that were understood by the classical thinkers of modernism as the return of humankind from a self-distorted historical rift to the mediated unity of all rational beings. These authors see the limits of modernism in the inability of the modern theory of politics to overcome the new political differences or the new divisions by its grasp of the original unity, be it called paradise, communism or cosmopolis. In a word, they claim that the modern theories of politics seek in vain a higher unity of opposites, since cultural differences among nations are incommensurable and cannot be overcome by a modern concept of the universal reason. Since there is no universal reason, there is no cosmopolis, so there remain the existing national states as cultural/political subjects confronted with the imperative of a global communicational or semantic cooperation. That communicational cooperation among cultures and nations is indispensable since contemporary societies have given rise to differences that can no longer be surmounted either within the borders of national states or in higher dialectical unities.

We are going to mention a series of such opposites or differences that can no longer be overcome by a higher dialectic unity of the mind or cosmopolis, contrary to what the theoreticians of modernism thought; hence these opposites strive for either a new form of cooperation of the existing national states and a new structural connection among them as the mentioned authors propose, or it seems that a different, global staging of the political and the new identification of collective goods outside the model of the national liberal/democratic state is at work here. Here are the differences: (a) separation of the workplace and the home; (b) separation of the use value and the exchange value; (c) separation of the civil society and the state; (d) separation of the social relations and the territory; (e) separation of the origin and the career; (f) separation of the news and the event; (g) separation of the state and the nation; (h) separation of the communication and the traffic; (i) separation of the medium and the form; (j) separation of speech and
writing; (k) deontologization of space, time, causality, teleology, form, matter, etc. In other words: "The global society rests not on an agreement among national states but on the links that cross their borders" (Albrow, 1998: 259). Albrow, a proponent of this concept, does not see, however, that each time the old temporal/territorial borders are overstepped, different, new boundaries are established: not the temporal/territorial ones, but the medium-based ones.

If the mentioned differences do not ensue from the primal unity of the reason and hence cannot be dispensed with in the mediated unity of the reason as Hegel and Jaspers thought, this means that – since they are incommensurate – there must be some other links among them. We claim these are semantic or communicational. Semantic stimuli and semantic differentiations do not depend on the territorial/temporal ones. They do not know for territorial/temporal boundaries. The meaning is not predetermined by territory or time; territory and time are the semantic i.e. logical/grammatical distinctions. Or, in other words: territory and time were semantically constitutive for the national state. There used to be young and old, big and small states. However, the meaning changed or differentiated, and found another bearer of political meaning. The question is: is the extemporal and exterritorial globalism a foray into new political distinctions and delimitations? Nietzsche was aware of that. In his work Menschliches, Allzumenschliches he wrote: "Who still feels forced to tie themselves and their progeny to one place? … Such a new era gains meaning by the fact that in it a variety of worldviews, customs, and cultures can be compared, and that due to such proximity they permeate each other, which was not possible in the localized domination of each culture, since all artistic styles are rooted in some territory and time." Today, cultures are no longer anchored in territory and time, they do not wear national costumes only where they historically originated; jeans, women’s bare bellies, sombreros, tattoos, are a common sight everywhere, while Mozart is played all over the world, outside his Vienna.

We are not going to advance our own theory of globalism. Our goal is more modest: we would like to draw attention to the missed opportunities of the existing theories of globalisation. If the idea of globalism does not coincide with the modern idea of world history, cosmopolis, world capitalism, and technopoly, and is something more, or something different from the already familiar concepts, then we should answer the question: what is it? Namely, if capitalism produced the disastrous global poverty, if the technopoly has made Westerners incompetent to lead their own lives, and if the different Western narratives about world history are solely anthropological or theological fairy tales told for the sake of deceiving or Europeanizing the Third World, is globalism in that case a way out the blind Western alley whose tenants finally allowed for the possibility that their street is not the only path of global rescue? Beyond the territorial/temporal habitat of Westerners, there are numerous cultures and life forms; they, it has turned out, cannot be overcome, assimilated and homogenized by means of capitalism, technopoly, and the Western interpretations of history since cultures are incommensurate and in that sense all of them are equally viable.\(^8\) Instead of enslavement,

\(^8\) The logical/grammatical rationality of the Western tradition is not the only form of rationality.
colonization, capitalization, and Christianization of all cultures in the world, the Western world has to a certain extent come to terms with the fact that other cultures have developed their own forms of rationality and survival. That insight is a result of translating the speech of one culture into the speech of another culture, i.e. of the semantic or communicational irritation of different cultures. Such translation establishes a different link among peoples and cultures from the one established by the free market, the technopoly or the eschatological philosophy of history as coercive forms of intervention into other cultures. It is obvious now that other cultures had lived differently from Westerners and did not come up with the capitalist production and the universal philosophy of history that did not serve only to resolve vital European issues, but transmogrified into an ideology of enslaving the entire world under the untenable assumption that the entire world is identical to the European world. It seemed that the English language was to become the world language, just like Hebrew was at the time of Adam and Eve, the language in which – as Umberto Ecco thinks – God addressed the first couple. However, what does translating one culture into another imply? Not only the translation of one speech to another (though this should not be disregarded), but also the translation of lifestyles and life- and environment-sustaining cultures. Although – just like scientific theories – world cultures are incommensurate, this does not mean that they do not irritate each other. Western scientific/technical and capitalist culture of life reproduction immensely irritated the rest of the world; this irritation demonstrated huge variations among world cultures. Today we do not talk only about the European and the American capitalism, but about the Japanese and the Asian capitalism as well. Until recently, there was the Soviet and the Yugoslav Marxism, the ascetic and the epicurean socialism. Capitalism and socialism, considering themselves to be global processes, in the meantime found out that the world has embraced them in their own way, by no means identical to the European models. Other cultures have proved immune to the Western culture and have not vanished under its sway; they have processed the European semantic stimuli in line with the capacities and structures of their own cultures of living.

Some authors think that the expansionist capacities of European postmodernism have been internally used up and that globalism is an answer to this depletion, just like imperialism and colonialism were an answer to the internal exhaustion of the classic capitalist industrialism that ended with the first colonization of the globe. If this is so, then some thought should be given to the quintessence of such an answer.

Niklas Luhmann answers to this question within the framework of his system theory, walking on the edge of the reinforced theory of modernism and globalism as a new paradigm. Here is a sample of his thinking: “Weakening of territorial boundaries is furthered by the fact that global communication hardly requires time, since it is carried out by means of telecommunication. Information is no longer transported like goods and people. The global communication system enables the concurrence of all operations and events and hence cannot be controlled any more; however, in this uncontrolled way it has become efficient. We might call this a new immediacy or even a new sentience. Thus, as already mentioned, we have no other choice but to envisage the complete frui-

---

9 The paradigm that would no longer be exclusively expansionist and aggressive in its relation towards other lifestyles.
tion of a global society” (Luhmann, 1997: 809). An attitude is paradoxical if, in line with Luhmann, we understand this paradox as an afterthought. The notion of a global society speaks in favour of the reinforced European cosmopolitan modernism. However, the concurrence of all events and the efficacy of uncontrolled processes works in favour of globalism as a paradigmatically different distribution of life resources and as a paradigm that requires different means of orientation when making decisions in the chaos of assorted concurrent information. The allure of globalism versus the entire European modernism and the national state as its political model lies in its uncontrollable efficacy. Globalism is encouraged by those supranational social and political forces of the contemporary world that have discovered the efficiency of the processes which cannot be controlled by the system of the existing national states.

What, then, cannot be controlled by means of capitalism, technopoly and the European philosophy of history and therefore requires a different approach and handling? What cannot be controlled lies beyond experience and any rational apriorism as developed by modern transcendentalism: it predetermined the conditions for the emergence of the unknown. Today such pretensions sound preposterous. Simply said, what cannot be controlled is not subject to any rules, not even to the rules of ontologized grammar, which allows us to say whatever we want, but only in a grammatically correct way. What cannot be controlled is outside the framework of the grammatical, logical, capitalist, technopolistic systems, with their clearly defined preconditions of functioning and communicating with their surroundings. Globalism differs from the traditional communicational forms that used to selectively control and enable communication; it operates where these forms fail, as an unpredictable communicational a priori sui generis. In a word, it has a different communicational a priori. Unlike modernism and its forms of structural control and the monopolization of communication, globalism does not control the preconditions of communication but generates information that can be controlled only a posteriori, as they appear at the same time in different places and because they are original in relation to any a priori, i.e. different from anything previously known or familiar. The globe is a closed space without the past or the future, everything happens simultaneously and is only later located into the grammatical or some other forms of narration and representation. You have to know how to get your bearings in this concurrence of a myriad of events and information. Globalism “exploits” the creativity capable of directly linking concurrent events and the simultaneous unpredictable information. Economists call the extra profit from this type of creativity the rent seeking society. In that system, profits are gained by means of innovation, risk and finding your way in chaos.

Unlike cosmopolitanism (which uses the human race as its ultimate anthropologically preconditioned social base), globalism does not erase all differences among people but generates new and different ones, which means that it does not dispense with borders but creates new and different ones in place of the geographical and cultural borders that have been constitutive for modern national states. Globalism is a process of structurally new delimiting of world’s human traditions and resources, a new redistribution of unpredictable and constantly new and changeable resources, and not of a finite and closed space. In order to reassure traditionalists, we are all going to remain on our respective territories and live in accordance with our traditions, but these values will not be considered as the source of existence and, consequently, will not trigger off existen-
tial conflicts, intolerance, and ethnic hatred. Needless to say, the process of thus understood globalisation is fraught with huge dangers for life on Earth. Its proponents are innovative social forces, challenged by the other, tradition-rooted, conservative social forces, as can be witnessed daily. An audacious political strategy is called for if a cataclysmic clash between the progressive and the conservative social groups is to be avoided.

Contemporary postmodernist theory looks into the origin of those other distinctions, the origin of innovation and information, if by information or innovation we understand a difference that makes a difference (Luhmann, 1996). George Spencer Brown claims that differences stem from marking the unmarked places, i.e. not from the relationship of two incommensurate theories or cultures with their own structures that enable them to function independently and also communicate, but from the relationship of each and every structure and form, every theory and culture of life with the unmarked place lying in wait beyond each form.10

In the global era there is no a priori structural or medium-based unity of the world and humankind as modern rationalists before Hegel thought. Also, historical processes in different cultures do not converge according to a preconceived unity of the human race, which would imply that all cultural variations among peoples are only a pathological deviation from such an a priori and unitary humanity. On the contrary, each medium and each form, each national culture in which the world is manifested to people do not only interact, nor is their central problem how, though different, to put up with each other; every culture is open not only to itself and to another cultural form as its environment, but also to an unspecified external side of its medium and its form: what finds expression in speech is not only something spoken but also something that was not in speech before and what no speech could have predicted would ever enter speech.

The unity of humankind is not preset as a precondition for the possibility of achieving solidarity, unity and homogeneity of all people in the distant future in which all differences are to vanish; on the contrary, differences among people precede any political unity as a historically transient political setting of unity that has not been beforehand or unequivocally guaranteed by some universal logical reason.

It has turned out that the key feature of the political history of Europe have been the preparations of people to free themselves from the repressive republican reduction of all differences among citizens to the postulated common good, equally good to all, since everybody is structurally the same. What is globalism in the light of this novel understanding of the logical/grammatical selective blindness?

Certainly not the result of the implementation and implantation of capitalism, technopoly or the universal enlightenment philosophy on the entire globe, but rather the discovery of the differences by means of which different cultures deal with the threatening and at the same time life-saving unmarked places that lurk in the wings beyond every cultural form and every intercultural relation. Globalism, it seems, is an unspeci-

10 With the nothing not marked as 0. The innovative society has cracked the code knowledge-ignorance. What stands opposite innovation is complete uncertainty that cannot be decisively captured by any transcendental forms. This uncertainty is manifested suddenly and unpredictably.
fied yet always possible way out from the selective blindness of one’s own lifestyle, and in that sense it is a method of preserving one’s own life form by means of other or newly discovered life forms (Spencer-Brown, 1997).

Greek polities came into being via the unification of different kins by means of encroaching on the inherited borders. On the other hand, the poleis found possibilities for a more efficient protection of their own life objectives not only in relation to other poleis nor by the internal autopoietic processing of external irritations, but by marking the unmarked places as an unpredictable source of innovation of its own structures. At the height of the Persian threat, the oracle advised Athenians to defend themselves behind wooden walls. Themistocles’ interpretation of the oracle’s words represented a departure from the formulaic understanding of the syntagm “the wooden wall”.

Furthermore, globalism is a form of abandoning apparently failed projects such as cosmopolitanism, Eurocentrism, global capitalism and socialism. Globalism is a passage from the Western universalism to the shadow world (Plato), a kind of a rehabilita-

doxa (Husserl) or methodic neonominalism (Holger van den Boom), a reentry of primitivism.12

Globalism is a process in which a new world is not emerging from Yahweh’s grammatically structured words but by marking those places which neither Yahweh nor we have previously been aware of. That world is not like a gradual realization of a preconceived ontological plan but rather an array of pseudoontological episodes that ensue from one another since each episode resolves the suddenly noticed missed opportunities of the previous episode.13

Of course, globalism is not a pre-existing primordial jungle which we are born into, but a produced jungle, and people today have been trying to make its structures – or woodpaths (Holzwege) – visible to facilitate orientation. Today people know that they were the ones who created this jungle. By turning the invisible internal structures of this jungle visible is perhaps the way out of this current self-distorted informational paralysis. Modern logos or the universal grammatical reason is no longer a signpost in that jungle or chaos, since globalism on the one hand is the extemporal and exterritorial presence of various manifestations of a multi-layered reality and, on the other, a process

11 The radical contention on the incommensurability of different life cultures is today alleviated by the concept of reentry. It denotes a process that allows the history of a political community and its dreams of future to enter, or reenter, the present of any political community any time. This also applies to alien life forms and cultures that may enter our own, for example acupuncture or the abolishment of death penalty in China and Japan, not because of the structural unity of all cultures but as a way out from our own helplessness in relation to as yet undefined other side of our life form.

12 Women in the streets of Western cities, in search of identity no longer provided by the Western fashion to a satisfying degree of originality, show off their belly buttons as was customary once upon a time in the jungle.

13 In that sense Europe has been emerging through contracts, each solving the problems that have arisen in the previous one. A European constitution that would in advance stipulate its functioning is not likely. Europe is uniting episodically rather than structurally and in an organized manner.
subject to the uncertainties and obscurities of unmarked places as the other side of every system as a medium and a form.

It might be said that globalism is Europe’s postmodern response to the issues that have popped up in the Western postindustrial society. The first modernism knew in advance what it was looking for. Defining itself as the cause of itself – *causa sui* – it could not imagine a world different from its own, and did everything it could to shape the globe in line with its own understanding of the mind. However, it has turned out that the world does not – contrary to what Hegel and Jaspers thought – possess a universal structure. Such a structure does not exist nor can it be conceived. There are various cultures and life forms as special definitions of humanity. These differences are an asset in the sense that just because we belong to one culture, we are capable of observing another. It is precisely because a map *is not identical to* the area it outlines that we can use it for finding our way; or, it is precisely because we are selectively blind that we are not completely blind (Spencer-Brown, 1997: 193). The history of Europe so far has been a preparation for eradicating Europeans’ prejudice about the universal human race based on the European model. Is not this discovery what we call globalism? This second discovery of the world as a globe proves that it contains a variety of cultures which cannot be wiped out or overcome with our European culture as a higher amalgamation of all other cultures. Therefore, *globalism* is not an application of capitalism, technopoly and liberal-democratic state to the entire world, but a parallel discovery of new boundaries that fragment the globe in other ways and in other mediums, discovering in it the resources which are not bound to any territory or time. Instead of the old territorial and temporal boundaries new ones are emerging via the process of *medium-based redistribution of new life resources*. These new boundaries are being established transversely across the old ones that can no longer withstand the force of events. Thus globalism is an unexpected response both to the xenophobic idea of the incommensurability of different cultures and the colonizing universalism of European modernism that used to tout itself as the destiny of the entire world. In between these two extremes globalism is rising as of yet an *unexplored source of life* and a new type of selective blindness.

6

Certain political and social forces that *encourage* and *control* innovative processes that cannot be controlled at the level of the closed national state facilitate the process of globalisation.14 These forces are challenged by those political forces worldwide which champion the world’s existing territorial/temporal structure, i.e. the borders of national states that have within such a territorial/temporal framework stabilized the distribution of the global space as the dominant existential resource. As yet unallocated are the Antarctica, the big seas and the space: the fourth, the fifth, the sixth and the seventh sky (Schmitt, 1988). *The first three skies have already been divided.*

---

14 Even national security can no longer be controlled at the level of the national state; hence the alliances such as NATO.
From the political standpoint, the open question is what is the attitude of the pro and counter globalist forces towards democracy as a form of legitimation and of power control?

In line with our conclusions, the question is: if a cosmopolis is not possible, is global democracy? Also, how and does globalisation endanger democracy in the existing national states?

It has been shown that globalisation redistributes the control of global resources by establishing new, medium-based boundaries. Does this redistribution of control jeopardize the existing national-state-based distribution of territory and consequently democracy itself? In a word, is democracy pivotally bound to the national state to the extent that it cannot exist outside its framework or can democracy outlast the national state?

Helmut Willke turns the argument on its head: can democracy survive at the level of the national state? If because of human rights every inhabitant of the Earth is entitled to join any collective – state, religious, sport, scientific, linguistic, insurance – then it is dubious whether the national state can enjoy any significant advantage in the circumstances of such freedom of choice (Willke, 2001: 53).

Europe’s political history has known four basic types of democracy: direct democracy of the polis, the medieval estate democracy, the representative democracy of the modern bourgeois state and the subsidiary democracy with its vertical and horizontal component. An example of the horizontal subsidiarity is a democratically legitimized intervention into a critical area, e.g. unemployment, while the vertical subsidiarity in the new circumstances of the universal equality of all citizens preserves the hierarchical traditions of the Middle Ages by means of the agencies that have the final say. Are there any prospects for global democracy, i.e. democratic decision-making on global collective goods in both the horizontal and the vertical sense?

Different sorts of democratically legitimized policies do not presuppose only the homogeneity of citizenry in the sense of Meier’s and Tyler’s conservative question: How much homogeneity democracy needs? On the contrary, every democracy generates un-homogeneity as well i.e. different forms of democratic exclusion of citizens or their special qualities from the process of nonviolent decision-making. Who and what is going to be excluded or included from/in the process of decision-making and power control varies depending on the type of democracy in which different censuses are used: sometimes the religious or national affiliation is the criterion for the exclusion of citizens from decision-making, or private property, or gender (women), or electoral and traditional minorities. Eventually, decisions are made not by majorities but by their minority democratically elected representatives. These various forms of democratic exclusion or inclusion of people and their special traits from or into the process of decision-making in political communities, as well as the forms of exclusion, are not commensurable nor they follow from each other. In this sense, none of the mentioned European forms (the democracy of the poleis, the hierarchical estate society, the democracy of the national state and the subsidiary democracy) of democratic exclusion from or inclusion in the process of political decision-making has become obsolete or antiquated. They still exist and will go on existing either separately or collectively. Contemporary philosophy of
politics no longer aspires to the role of the third level that might eliminate these differences as the degrees of its own teleological structure.

The direct democracy of the polis excluded from political decision-making all those who belonged to 
*eukos*, and applied only to the free and equal male representatives of the kins. Such practice, in its Christian variant, was continued in the feudal, class and hierarchically organized Europe. Representative democracy respects the principle of universal legal/political equality of all citizens as creatures of reason, while it excludes from decision-making their special – both acquired and inherent – attributes such as property, religious convictions, political convictions, gender, national affiliation, education, race, and alike. These traits are on the list of the protection of human and civil rights.\(^{15}\)

Since neither theological nor enlightenment philosophy of history are no longer valid, one must always count on the reentry of the direct democracy\(^{16}\) into the representative/liberal democracy. Fascism and communism were two forms of the ideologically implanted direct democracy. They dealt with the issues that liberal democracy had excluded from the process of political decision-making, e.g. political and religious convictions, national affiliation and private property.

Fascism and communism as well as some other *politica christiana* have succeeded only within national states. World communism, world fascism or world Christianity as political forms failed in global terms since they required too much homogeneity both in the multinational Europe and in the multicultural world, consequently generating a surplus of *unhomogeneity* they could not absorb, which they tried to eradicate by systematic state crime. Neither the *proletariat* nor the *Aryan race* are the grounds for the global democratic legitimacy of governance; neither are the European *rationalism* nor *cosmopolitanism* as its political outcomes.

*The difference between representative and totalitarian or plebiscite democracy depends on who and what is excluded from the process of democratic decision-making.*

It seems that a supranational, European or global democracy might be even more selective regarding the exclusion/inclusion from/in the process of decision-making and legitimizing of political systems. It might legitimize only the decisions on the issues that cannot be resolved, directly or plebiscitary, at the level of small local communities or at the level of national representative parliaments.

It is generally known that democratic politics defines the collective goods of a political community. As it is obvious that national politicians can no longer decide on the use of collective goods within their territorial restrictions, it is understandable – according to Willke – that we can count on the establishment of global democracy (and especially within the EU) (Willke, 2001: 54).

Global politics will have to decide what can be democratically decided in the globalized world. *Global democracy will operate within different global borders than those of*
national states. In some aspects it will be more limited than the existing forms of democracy, in others perhaps broader in its scope; somewhere it will be subsidiary while elsewhere, and due to localization, it will be direct. The political setting of global democracy regardless of its base – networked society, informational society, innovative society, neoprimitive, neomythological, scientific society – will have to provide a different answer to the question what may and what may not be politically decided in a democratically legitimate manner. Some issues will be open to democratic decision-making, while others will hide behind the democratic façade as the uncontrolled, undemocratic, nontransparent sources of decision-making efficiency.17

We have to bear in mind that democracy as the abiding grounds for legitimizing all political communities, even those emerging in the contemporary medium-based distribution of global life sources does not exclude from democratic decision-making those collective goods that global politics is going to come up with and which, tentatively, might be listed as follows: nonviolent democratic change of regimes, control of institutionalized political power, citizens’ participation in political decision-making, protection of human rights, protection of the environment, climate and animal species.

We do not have to fear for democracy, but for its political forms and whether they are going to allow for more or less democracy in these or those questions regarding the collective goods that impinge on the domain of political decision-making and management. Political restrictions of democracy and democratic restrictions of politics are the future problems of a possible global politics and global democracy, of course within the new post-territorial/temporal distribution of global life sources. An era of global conflicts is at the door; from them but not without them, a new order and a new distribution of global resources, undoubtedly different from the one bequeathed to national capitals by the great explorers, will emerge. Nowadays, what is interesting are not coal deposits or cheap labour but the modified, innovative uses of these resources.

The decision on too little or too much democracy hovers between totalitarianism, which does away with everything different by force, and the legal system that treats all differences equally and by this does injustice legally. Political forces of globalism must squeeze through this strait; they have to decode the global collective goods about which it will be possible to democratically decide within the structurally new global boundaries.

If globalism as a concept and practice were complete today as a democratically legitimized global political system, then it would be as meaningless as the map identical to the area it maps out. What global politics, the theories of globalization and global practice have been striving at, will be revealed unexpectedly in an entirely different guise, because the human race is not capable of divine creation. Humankind creates its world not knowing in advance what this creation is going to look like. Parting ways with the old political models, the human race nowadays knows that the reason for this is the fact that people do not create their world out of their heads or on the basis of an ontological blueprint. They know that the other side of every innovation can be found on the invisi-

17 Political intervention into some non-political area e.g. economy, health care or security always requires a special democratic legitimation.
ble and unmarked side not only of the traditional code knowledge/ignorance but also on the unmarked side of any transcendental structure that might impose preconditions for the manner in which knowledge occurs. A new political paradigm is nothing more but the realization that human beings are adventurers and wanderers who cannot return to the point of departure since it constantly shifts and is only an illusion or fiction that is continually dispelled in epiphanies (Ereigniss) of what has not been known before.

References
Albrow, Martin, 1998: Abschied vom Nationalstaat, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M.
Barber, Benjamin, 1984: Strong Democracy, University of California Press, California
Derrida, Jacques, 1997: Von der Gastfreundschaft, Pasagen Verlag, Vienna
Giddens, Anthony, 1997: Konsequenzen der Moderne, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M.
Goody, Jack 1990: Die Logik der Schrift und die Organisation von Gesellschaft, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M.
Jaspers, Karl, 1955: Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte, Fischer Verlag, Frankfurt/M.
Luhmann, Niklas, 1997: Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft, Suhrkamp Frankfurt/M.
Luhmann, Niklas, 1996: Die Realität der Massenmedien, Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen
Meyer Stamer, Jörg, 1997: Standortkonkurrenz, Globalisierung und Entwicklungspolitik, Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, 4
Postman, Neil, 1991: Das Technopol, Fischer Verlag, Frankfurt/M.
Schmitt, Carl, 1988: Nomos der Erde, Duncker/Humblot, Berlin
Spencer-Brown, George, 1997: Laws of Form, Bohmeier Verlag, Lübeck
Tandon, Jash, 1997: Globalization and the South: The Logic of Exploitation, Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, 4
Willke, Helmut, 2001: Atopia, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M.