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THE ANTINOMIES OF FOLKLORE VALUES

A paraphrastic transposition of Solar's "Antinomies of literary values" to the field of folklore studies is given in this paper. The core aim is to show the congruity of theoretical positions and the impact of the professor's critical thought within the small group of his former students, now folklorists at the Institute of Ethnology and Folklore Research in Zagreb. The first part of the text unveils some of the magic of Solar's interdisciplinary trickery, while the body of the text surveys the shifts in the approach to the study of folklore. In the conclusion, the author introduces a new dynamic concept of tradition as a possible value in folkloristics.

Keywords: folklore, literature, values, tradition

This text has been prompted and inspired by an article entitled "The antinomies of literary values" that Milivoj Solar published for the first time in his third book (Solar1976:139-147). My intention has not been to comment on or even develop Solar's analyses. I only wanted to demonstrate, on my own example, the congruity of theoretical positions in Croatian folkloristics and comparative literature, a congruity that we largely owe to the discreet (but productive) influence of the professor's critical thought on a small group of former students, who work today at the Institute of Ethnology and Folklore Research in Zagreb.

Autonomous literary values and oral literature

The notion of literary values does not appear often in folkloristics. Over recent decades, scholars dealing with oral literature have been preoccupied with the medium of orality and various levels of the context of oral literary performances. Autonomous literary values are never attributed to oral performances. Folklorists do perhaps tacitly tolerate the possibility of their existence by differentiation between gifted and poor narrators, but judgement of a performance's quality is not the same as judgement on the literary value of the text.
performed. It is only through a change in medium that published notations of oral works are subjected to literary evaluation and anthological selections. That becomes understandable to an extent if one accepts Solar's thinking in which "literary value" is actually a projection of the idea of the autonomy of literature. Oral literature is realised in the so-called original context in the comprehensive living experience of the community (of the performer and the public), where the dominant function of the performance need not be at all literary or artistic (aesthetic). The oral literary work is embedded in the life of the community, and the community has to accept it for it to be maintained in the communication chain (succession of performances), while the community does not demand individuality and originality in literary creativity. What the community does demand is the relative stability of the genre and variants of the familiar topic within the context prescribed by tradition. That would mean that the idea of the autonomy of literature cannot be applied to oral literature, and that only notation of the literary work – change from the oral into the written medium, and change in the context – confers upon it the legitimacy of literature. From that perspective, oral literature is only a precursor of literature, potential but not yet realised literature – in a word, pre-literature. I would say that such a claim would be equally devastating for the literary significance of oral literature just as for the idea of the autonomous literary values in written literature.

The experiment just carried out has shown that literature comes about from non-literature – at least sometimes – through a simple change in medium and context. Does that mean that literary value can be reduced to bare notation and change in the context of the verbal utterance? If yes, then literary values are not autonomous either.

The antinomy of literary values

The above experiment is in harmony with Solar's thinking: the concept of literary value that is in customary usage is helpful, although it is negatively defined logically – literature is neither science, nor philosophy, nor politics, literature is neither music, nor painting. However, the content of the literary value concept is only a relatively fruitful abstraction, suitable for the defence of literature from the dogmatism of absolute value systems. There are no generally accepted definitions of "autonomous literary structures" in the scholarship on literature. We successfully invoke literary values when we emphasise what literature is not – the problems start when we want to show what literature actually is.

Are we obliged to abandon the search for the literary in literature, do we have to give up the ideas of autonomy in the process of defining literature and search for the essential designations of the concept of literature in the non-literary? For example, should we satisfy ourselves with the definition of
literature that Vladimir Biti assigns in the *Pojmovnik suvremene književne teorije* [Glossary of Contemporary Literary Theory] to the empirical science of literature, the theory of the system, the new Historicism, cultural materialism and Marxist criticism that operates with the notion of the institution?

Common to all of them is the effort to comprehend literature as a more or less autonomous, but, in any case, differentiated system of the practices of production, consumption, and critical pedagogical and scholarly reproduction of texts, which infers a certain number of institutionalised techniques, roles and positions as the driving force of its own self-preservation. That system is not isolated but rather, through a lively relationship with other systems as the unstable environment that has been allocated to it, tries to preserve its diversity and to resist efforts at its subordination and instrumentalisation (Biti 1997:176).

I remember Kranjčević's verses:

... Do you know, my son, what a tear is? // "Yes, I know: firstly it contains water, // Sodium-chloride and phosphate. // Ah, my foolish mother // Walking with repugnance through the room, // While I tell her what a tear is!"

It is clear that the external definition of literature as an institution does not solve the literary in literature and that it can be applied to absolutely all forms of literacy. The specific difference of literary values that separate "art(istic)" literature from literature in the broader sense is not encompassed thereby. The adjective "art(istic)" is of no help to us either, since Solar commented quite rightly that literary value was not simply a realisation of beauty identical to its realisation in other arts, while he also discarded consideration of the disparate interpretations of literary values as a category of poetics or aesthetics, and even philosophical discussions on the notion of value. His renouncement of aesthetics and axiology is, however, only declarative, since he tests Hartmann's axiological aesthetics method, treating the literary in literature as a value. From that perspective, literary value is attainable only through the act of "real reading" in direct contact with literature, which assumes experience and intuition – and is unattainable to the discursive thought of scholarly analysis. Experience is individual and subjective and literary values are also individual and subjective, while if we draw a consistent conclusion from that, then a literary work does not exist outside of its reception and it is re-created once again with each new experience of it. Literary criticism becomes irrelevant and loses all objectivity, making literary values only relative.

Solar responds to such a conclusion with the argumentation of Wellek and Warren: it is absurd to claim that poems do not exist outside of the reader because, in that case, one could not explain why the experience of one reader is better than the experience of another, and why is it possible to correct the interpretation of the second reader. Consequently, the reader does not create the literary values, he/she discovers them – perhaps critical judgement is
indeed relative, but it is not completely arbitrary. Some agreement on the literary values of recognised works in literature does nevertheless exist, and we can thus at least parley about literary values. And if literary values are not individual and subjective, then they are unavoidably general and objective and thus absolute – although our insight into the absolute value system is partial, and that means only relative.

Showing the antinomy in the analysis of literary values in this way, Solar observes that we lack the category of mediation. The notion of autonomous literary values is contradictory within itself, and it is not a category by which we can interpret literature as it is for us today.

**Values do not exist but are valid**

The "philosophical child's-play" has not been futile: the logical deductions are faultless, the antinomies are demonstrated, and the autonomous literary values are eliminated as a category of mediation in the interpretation of literature. Like a skilful illusionist, Solar works minimalistically, not revealing the process by which he attained his objective. He uses the interdisciplinary trick that his philosophical competence makes possible: the sore spot in philosophy becomes an advantageous one in literary theory. He conceals the secret with the claim that "and the notion of value itself is subject to interpretation within philosophic comprehensions that differ both in conclusions and in the questions that can be generally posed" (Solar 1976:141). The tangle of meanings of the concept of value is not, nevertheless, so very inextricable, although Solar leaves it in an entangled state so as not to threaten his own analysis of the notion of literary values as a positively defined concept in logical sense. He relies on the thousand-year-old disciplinary authority that logic has enjoyed in scholarly circles and does not want to dispute that authority by opening up a philosophical discussion on the concept of values. I shall explain that briefly, although the complexity of the issue would undoubtedly demand a more detailed analysis. I believe that it is essential for the comprehension of value to differentiate between the area of *being* (*Sein*) and *validity* (*Gelten*), a distinction already introduced by the founder of axiology, H. Lotze, at the mid-19th century. By that division, the area of *being* is left to the experiential sciences and reason (*intellectus*), while the area of *validity* is dealt with by the mind (*ratio*), which is sensitive to values. Through history, the hierarchical relationship between mind and reason (as the two cognitive powers) changed in philosophical thought.

While reason was usually given precedence over mind in Mediaeval philosophy, in the 18th century – and particularly from Kant onwards – mind was placed above reason. Solar conducts his search for a positively defined concept of literary values by logical deduction - thus in the sphere of *reason* – – while the values belong to the area of *validity*, the sphere of the *mind*. What
is actually in question is an attempt at definition, an unambiguous determination of the content of the concept of autonomous literary values. The antinomies are the consequence of inadequate reasonable treatment of the extra-reason categories that belong to the mind.

**Definition as a stylistic means of utterance**

Under definition, I am still thinking of the judgement (or utterance) by which the content of a concept is unambiguously determined, while, under concept, I mean thought about the essence of the subject in question. If autonomous literary values are the subject of my thinking, then the concept of autonomous literary values is actually my thinking about the essence of autonomous literary values. The content of the notion of autonomous literary values (that is, my thinking about the essence of autonomous literary values) is the set of essential indicators of the autonomous literary values concept, while those indicators are, once again, my thinking about the characteristics of autonomous literary values (see Petrović 1967: 23;24;137). What then would my definition of autonomous literary values be? It would be the utterance or statement by which I unambiguously define the set of essential thoughts on the characteristics of my own thinking about the essence of autonomous literary values. If autonomous literary values exist at all outside of my thinking, then it seems to me that my definition is hardly of any importance to them existentially. And if it is important to them, nonetheless, then they are not autonomous.

Although scholars often define unclear terms by paraphrasing them in more familiar vocabulary, the act of definition is not any sort of scholarly activity – it belongs more to lexicography. The definition merely confirms the relation of synonymity that preceded the report: it rests on the given synonymity that it does not, in fact, explain (van Ormand Quine 1987:72-73).

I would say that the scholarly reputation of the definition is disproportionate to its cognitive contribution: it appears after the fact and aids, more in style, the clarity and persuasiveness of the scholarly report, and less in understanding the essence of the subject. Moreover, consensus has never been reached among logicians on the subject of the definition: is it the essence of things, the content of the concept or the meaning of the words? In any case, if my definition serves to express what autonomous literary values are, do I have previously to comprehend their essence? And what, in fact, is the essence of the subject? That is Aristotle's internal cause, the essence that gives something the possibility of existence – the notion of the internal cause of a thing is expressed by a definition (see *Metaphysics* VII, 4, 1030 a5).

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1 I have paraphrased the discussion about definition as a stylistic means according to my own article "Tekstom o terenu" [Text about the field] (Lozica 2006).
Aristotle's teaching that things possess essence (internal causes) is a foundation of the philosophy of the West right up until Heidegger, and it is on that teaching that the exaggerated scholarly authority of definition rests. The primacy of essence (the internal cause) over existence (the survival of things) is a reign of terror from the past over the present. The existence or presence of something that is, something by which something is at all (that is, the existence of a certain being) is observed unilaterally on the temporal horizon of the past. Aristotle's idea of essence is also incorporated in the contemporary idea of intention or meaning. When one separates essence (the internal cause) from the subject of reference and pools it with the word, one obtains meaning (van Ormand Quine 1987:70).

It is difficult to believe today in the essence of static autonomous literary values that would precede all literature. The history of literature teaches us "how each period draws attention to its specific literary values" (Solar 1976:145). However, if literary values do not exist outside of human beings, that does not have to mean that they are completely arbitrary and individual. They can still be valid/have values in some particular period and in some particular human community – otherwise, we would not notice their changes.

It may seem to the reader that my argumentation is actually a critique of Solar's. That is not so. With this paper (I hope) that I have only revealed subsequently some of the details passed over in silence in the master's interdisciplinary illusionist trick – but you can check for yourselves: the convincing and elegant magic of the "Antinomije književnih vrijednosti" loses none of its power thereby.

The folkloric in folklore

If literary value is "a certain projection of the idea of autonomous literature" (Solar 1976:139), then we could analogously posit the thesis that the question of values in folklore, too, is linked with the question of the independence of folklore as a separate sphere of creativity. If that is so, this undoubtedly involves key questions regarding the definition of folklore as the subject matter of the folkloristic sphere, questions that include even the one about the justification of folklore research as a distinct profession. In other words, it seems to me that folkloristics is defined more by the subject field than by its own methods (Lozica 1979:44), and that the subject field is comprehended in a twofold manner, at least. Folkloristics in the narrow sense is identified with the notation and study of verbal folklore, that is, oral literature, while, in the broader sense, it also encompasses the fields of ethnomusicology, ethnochoreology, ethnotheatrolgy, and research into visual folklore arts and traditional architecture. In everyday utilisation, that field sometimes spreads further afield also to cover the ways of life in traditional culture, that is, to themes that have otherwise been encompassed by ethnology.
We can interpret a literary (or any other art) work in diverse ways: against a social, ideational or mythological backdrop, but we can also persevere with the internal structure of the work. If we approach folklore as a "folk art", it could be said that here, too, similar interpretations are possible; but in the case of folklore the issue is still further complicated by the fact that it is not always easy to separate a work as an independent category in the folklore process. Here we are confused by the changeable aesthetic function (which is not always dominant), the synchronic performative character and the variable nature of folklore phenomena, the "poetics of sameness" (see Lotman 1976: 369-373), the special ways of transmission and the complex relations between creation and reception – relations that differ considerably from the relations to which we have become accustomed in the set of established artistic activities. Further, it needs to be admitted that folklore has never been unequivocally defined as "folk art" – the term has had multiple meanings from the very beginning and it seems that, by its scope and range, the notion of folklore also relates to extra-aesthetic, non-artistic phenomena and processes.

Folklore creativity is similar to art, but we lack the specific difference from the artistic sphere and would have to define what it is that is folkloric in folklore. What is it that links oral literature, folk dance, and folk music etc. into the entirety of folklore, and, at the same time, differentiates that entirety from the artistic sphere? If those links do not exist, could not the parts of that false whole, that so-called folklore, be studied within the fields of scholarship on the arts, within the spheres of literature, musicology, choreology, and theatreology? What’s the point of folkloristics? As early as Thoms’ definition from 1846, the term folklore designates "more a Lore than a Literature" and the "manners, customs, observances, superstitions, ballads, proverbs etc., of the olden time". On the one hand, Thoms writes about folklore as a branch of literature while, on the other, he also includes "the Lore of the People", manners and customs (Thoms 1965:4-5). That very multiplicity of meaning and indefiniteness has permitted the "variations in meaning that life imposes on scholarly terms as on other words" (Saintyves 1935:29) and has maintained the term in use up until the present day. If we ask ourselves what would be folkloric in folklore according to the first definition, all that remains as the specific difference is the attribute “folk” and its positioning in the past – unclear indications about the producer and the time of the emergence of definiendum. Those two vague features are key in the building of the notion of folklore as a remnant of the idealised image of the national past; they accompanied the conception of folklore in scholarship right up until the mid-20th century (having been in public and everyday usage right up until the present.

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2 I wrote about this in my article entitled "Metateorija u folkloristici i filozofija umjetnosti" [Metatheory in folkloristics and the philosophy of Art] (Lozica 1979:35).
day), playing an important political role in the creation of the cultural identity of the national civil states, but also in individual and group psychotherapy – providing a safe haven in the flight from the repression of contemporary everyday life. The literary in literature and the folkloric in folklore are equally idealised Utopian projections. Both are out of reach in reality, both incognisable to reason and negatively defined logically in relation to everything else – both to autonomous literary values and to the visionary folklore treasure chest. If we wanted to draw up a list of contents of that chest, we would discover that it is temporally, spatially and even individually relative. We would take out this and that – which would not be any surprise to us, since the diversity of national treasure is implicit – but we would not find the connection between all of that treasure, that which is folkloric in folklore, in that chest. The good news is that literature and folklore do, presumably, exist as human activities, but the questions of how to approach them in a scholarly way and how to interpret them arise again and again.

The existence mode of a work and change in perspective

An essential shift away from concentration on the past and the question of genesis in folklore research was achieved only with the work of Jakobson and Bogatyrev in 1929 in the article "Folklor kao naročit oblik stvaralaštva" [Folklore as a specific form of creativity] (Jakobson and Bogatirjov 1971). They found that the difference between (verbal) folklore and (written) literature lay in the mode of existence of a work, starting out from the structuralist linguistic division into language (langue) and speech (parole). Similarly to language, a folklore literary work – unlike works of written literature – exists only potentially, outside of the individual, as a set of norms and stimuli from living tradition. It is actualised (as speech) only at the moment of performance.

M. Bošković-Stulli was on that track in Croatian folklore research during the 1970s when she rejected the terms narodna poezija (folk poetry) and narodna književnost (folk literature) and – under the twofold influence of the Russian folklorist K.V. Čistov and American communication-oriented contextual folkloristics – introduced the term usmena književnost (oral literature), which she gave to literature that is communicated orally in direct contact communication and is disseminated traditionally. The term pučka književnost (popular literature) encompasses literary products within written literature that are intended for the broad social strata (Bošković-Stulli 1973). Bošković-Stulli even rejected the potential existence of a folklore work outside of its performance; to her, it lasts as long as its performance and each performance is also a new creation. Bošković-Stulli nonetheless retains the possibility of interpreting notations from the past (Bošković-Stulli 1978), differentiating
between the three levels of analysis of verbal folklore – texture, text and context according to Dundes.

Comprehending oral literature as direct oral communication is only part of the criticism of the notion of the folk and the struggle against conservatism. Folklore is redefined as "artistic communication in small groups" (or as "artistic contact communication"). In both the folkloristic and ethnological research of the late 1970s, the question was raised on the justification for juxtaposing the village and the town, and on the first and the second existence of folklore, emphasising that research into the changes in form and content were the correct orientation in understanding both their former and current meaning. Research began into urban folklore, stories about life, and the narrations of children. That was a shift from the diachronic to the synchronic, from the historical to the contemporary – undoubtedly under the influence of structuralism. Still, it should be said the major influences on Croatian folkloristics were Russian formalism and Prague functionalism – in combination with American contextual folkloristics – and, for that reason (but also in keeping with previous field experience) the exclusivity of the synchronic approach was avoided to an extent, while the ear for the changes in folklore throughout history was retained.

However, the opposition of an oral vs. a written piece of work cannot be applied to the non-verbal forms of folklore. I experienced this personally doing research into the folk drama: each drama performance is oral, while the notion of theatre also includes non-verbal codes and performances. Casting aside uncritical use of the literary division, I saved myself by a sudden change of perspective. I started out from performing as a sphere of human activity in which theatre is only one of the institutionalised types. I introduced the differentiation between the theatrical behaviour/performing of the individual in everyday life, theatraible (theatre-like) performing of groups, and "actual" theatre performances. I researched the types of performing on the level of texture, text and context (which also includes the notion of tradition). I solved the issue of the unstable artistic dimension of performing by relying on the dynamism of J. Mukařovský’s functional aesthetics (see Lozica 1990). I justified this new perspective by ethnotheatrological treatment of all theatre, and brought research of the folk drama nearer to performative and theatre anthropology, but I admit that I did not thereby contribute to the defining of folklore.

The question of the folkloric in folklore continues to remain an open one. Definition of folklore as a direct (contact) artistic communication in small groups can be applied to all and any direct artistic communication in small groups outside of the folklore context. In any case, the definitions of
folklore from the 1970s were problematic at that time, too (Lozica 1979:46-47; Bošković-Stulli 1981:37-52).³

**Resemantisation of folklore**

Interest in the extra-literary aspects of verbal folklore existed in Croatian folklore research as early as in the 1970s and the 1980s, but the turning away from exclusive research into oral literature towards the entirety of oral tradition – that is, oral non-literary forms also – was announced explicitly only in the 1990s.⁴ However, the shift in folkloristic interests did not stop at oral tradition as an expanded field of research.

The new generation of folklorists became involved on an equal footing in the development of post-modern Croatian theoretical thought, creatively expanding and critically judging the attainments of their predecessors. We were participants during the 1990s in the open post-modern confrontation between theoretical concepts and the emergence of new (interdisciplinary, humanistic) scientific paradigms that sought to transcend the dichotomy (and dualism) of folkloristics and ethnology by post-modern writing of ethnography. In that vein, M. Veličić approached autobiographic prose and oral narrations about life in an intertextual manner (Veličić 1991); the statements of internally displaced persons from Slavonia were collected under the circumstances of war and published;⁵ and the book *Fear, Death and Resistance, an Ethnography of War, Croatia 1991-1992* (Čale Feldman, Prica, Senjković 1993) unified earlier research into everyday life with an ear for contemporary anthropological thought. With their content, the notations of those oral statements, narrations and testimony penetrated through the genological patterns of literary scholarship, but also historiographic and ethnological analysis, demanding a new pragmatic and semantic approach. The work done by Renata Jambrešić Kirin was directly stimulated by narrative mediation of personal experience in war. Examination of the consequences of drawing those stories into the scholarly discourse is at the foundation of researching war stories, while it often happens during the process that the testimony is depersonalised and instrumentalised. At that time, Lada Čale Feldman wrote about political rituals as a theatralisation of reality, of the performative aspects of anti-war drives and about the role of the art theatre in political events, while she oriented herself at the middle of the

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³ The problem associated with the adjective "artistic" in those definitions has also been mentioned in more recent works by the same authors (Lozica 1995:286-287; Bošković-Stulli 1997:161-163).

⁴ Partly under the influence of performative anthropology, Bahtin's theory of verbal genres and Bausinger's division into formulae and forms (Lozica 1990; 1990a; Endstrasser 1997).

1990s towards research into the lay theatre and the interpretation of both folk drama and Croatian artistic drama in the methodological aura of so-called “gender-studies”, or, in other words, study of the symbolic valency of gender roles in culture. The scholarly interest of her books covers theatrology, ethnotheatrology and theatre anthropology.

Poststructuralist approaches to the literary text were important for the Croatian folkloristics of the 1990s, conditioned by a change in the comprehension of language that broke through the structuralistic border between text and context. A return of sorts to semantic interpretation in the light of literary anthropology was characteristic to the Croatian folkloristics of the 1990s, bringing folkloristic works closer to anthropological research into cultural values. Through challenging of the *texture-text-context* triad (Jambrešić Kirin 1997:72), the (already vulnerable) position of the immanent approach to the notation as a piece of literary art (on the level of texture and text) was weakened even further. Jambrešić Kirin concluded that artistic forms of folklore had been favoured over the last two centuries, emphasising that instances of judging phenomena as being artistic folklore come from above and are not the consequences of discerning the "immanent aesthetics" of folkloric "items" and phenomena (Jambrešić 1993; Jambrešić Kirin 1997).

The turn in the scholarly interest of mainstream and domestic folkloristics from the aesthetic towards the ethical and cognitive has continued until today. Early mythological and folkloristic approaches are being re-examined, new avenues are opening up in research into the role of folklore in society, there is critical analysis and systematisation of old material (particularly legends and their relation to the mythological), but also new themes of study such as cultural botanics and cultural zoology and research into the connection between children's folklore with culturo-historically diverse concepts of childhood.

**Tradition as a folklore value**

I do not believe that the 1990s were spent in redefining folkloristics and its subjects. Resemantisation in folkloristics has advanced to such an extent that the folkloric in folklore has simply ceased to be a subject of interest. The differentiation of folkloric and extra-folkloric phenomena and processes in anthropological research has become almost irrelevant. On the one hand, today’s humanistic interdisciplinary research has helped in the cohesion of folkloristics (methodologically), but, on the other hand, it has also hindered it. Its borders towards ethnology/anthropology and other distinct humanistic sciences have become increasingly flexible. In the open areas of cultural anthropology and cultural studies, the specialist knowledge already attained is being more easily forgotten. Submergence of folkloristics in the interdisciplinary humanistic torrent does not mean its end – instead, it is true
liberation for folklorists from their eternally marginal position in the hierarchy of scholarship. I am wary only of the probate proceedings, mulling over the unsolved issues of folkloristics. It is true that the notion of folklore was devised in the 19th century, but it is also true that the area of application (the reach) of that concocted notion (at least in part) was not contrived, but rather exists even today. That means that the question of the folkloric in folklore is still an open one. I shall try once again.

If one looks for originality in a literary work, that is, that every work brings new, individual literary values (Solar 1976:142-143), one could say that one looks for just the opposite in folklore: congruency with tradition. One thing is certain: tradition, too, is temporally, spatially and even individually relative. Tradition is an essential determinant of the subject of research in humanistics, particularly in ethnology and fokloristics (traditional culture, oral tradition). In the second half of the 20th century, criticism of the notions of the folk and authenticity, emphasis on the synchronic orality of communication, and focusing on the performance in its context, all set aside the diachronics of tradition. Humanistics today largely responds to the challenges of globalisation and transition with the constructs of identity (sometimes even in a "fan-like" manner). Tradition (as a creative process of ascribing new meaning to old symbols) thus remains an axiom untouched by professional deliberation and used as (ostensibly self-evident) argumentation of the standard-bearers and interpreters of tradition in the processes of identification. We need to deconstruct the polysemic nature of the term, to show the interaction of tradition, myth and folklore in forming cultural identity, and the untenability of the unyielding contrarieties of tradition-innovation, tradition-progress, and (on the basis of examples) to analyse in an interdisciplinary manner the creative process of tradition and the continuity of its historical contextualisation. Perhaps that would offer a chance to folklorists in the new humanistic waters.

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ANTINOMIJE FOLKLORNIH VRIJEDNOSTI

SAZETAK


Ključne riječi: folklor, književnost, vrijednosti, tradicija