The Effects of the Corporate Governance System on Innovation Activities in Croatia

DOMAGOJ RAČIĆ
Centre for Strategy and Development
e-mail: domagoj.racic@mrezaznanja.hr

VLADIMIR CVIJANOVIĆ
Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Zagreb
e-mail: vcvijanovic@efzg.hr

ZORAN ARALICA
The Institute of Economics
e-mail: zaralica@eizg.hr

UDK: 007:65.012.4(497.5)
Pregledni rad

The paper tackles the implications of the system of corporate governance on the level and prevalent modes of innovation activities and ways in which innovations are developed, financed and implemented within enterprises. The paper aims to contribute to the discussions on corporate governance and innovation by explaining the interrelationship between institutional conditions, corporate strategies related to innovation, and innovation activities, and by applying the framework to Croatia, as a (post-)transition country with a specific developmental pattern. However, the current debate about the effects of basic systems of corporate governance (Anglo-American and continental European) in relation to innovative activities cannot be adequately applied to (post-)transition countries. In Croatia, despite regulatory and capital market-related improvements in the last decade, the system of corporate governance is still relatively underdeveloped; as such, it is insufficiently conducive to innovation. The effectiveness of a national innovation system is reflected in the complexity of innovative activities within firms and their effects on competitiveness of firms and sectors. The corporate governance system currently seems inadequate for development of a knowledge-based economy, because it primarily supports non-complex innovation activities. This is reflected in the marginalization of innovation within corporate strategies, which lead to their low economic effects. The lack of cooperative stakeholder relationships precludes risk sharing that could facilitate innovation projects with higher value added. This can partly be addressed by external investments (accompanied by technological and managerial improvements) into greenfield projects and established companies – especially innovative small and medium-sized enterprises with a high growth potential.

Key words: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, INSTITUTIONS, NATIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEM, INNOVATION ACTIVITIES, CROATIA

1. INTRODUCTION

Competitiveness in markets where high added value is created is related to innovativeness. The innovation of products and processes provides a paramount contribution to the restructuring of industrial structure of particular sectors and the economy as a whole. Understanding the determinants of innovation performance requires tackling both the market and wider institutional factors that influence the level and characteristics of innovation within an economy. These determinants are often analyzed in terms of national innovative capacity, i.e. the ability of a country to produce and commercialise a long-term flow of innovative technology (cf. Stern, Porter and Furman, 2000), which involves R&D supply, absorption capacity, diffusion of knowledge and market demand (cf. Radošević, 2004). However, innovative activities occur within socio-economic systems1, and it can be expected that wider institutional factors may strongly affect it. The capacity to innovate depends

---

1 Socio-economic systems can be said to consist of three basic subsystems: institutions, technological regime and economic subsystem (cf. Dosi and Orsenigo, 1988). Although they are interlinked, a demarcation line between them can be outlined. Institutions are “durable systems of established and embedded social rules that structure social interactions” (Hodgson, 2004:3). Technology regimes can best be understood as prevailing technology systems, practices and policies. Economic subsystem comprises firms and markets for capital, labour and products/services.
upon the national innovation system, which entails actors, relationships and interactions among actors that influence creation, diffusion, utilisation and commercialization of knowledge within a country – with the emphasis on research institutions, business sector and government (cf. Kuhlmann, 2001; Lundvall, 1992, 2006). Furthermore, innovation evolves within particular institutional environments and systems of corporate governance, which regulate business activities and influence the creation and utilization of new knowledge, as well as the financing of innovation.

The main focus of the paper is the relationship between the system of corporate governance and innovation activities in Croatia. Račić and Aralica (2006) emphasized in their recent paper the relationship between the institutional environment, market efficiencies and corporate competencies and stressed the importance of interaction between the national innovation system and the corporate governance system for competitiveness and innovation within the economy. In this paper we take a step forward and further analyze the implications of the system of corporate governance on the level and prevalent modes of innovation activities and ways in which innovations are developed, financed and implemented within enterprises. Hereby the system of corporate governance and the national innovation system are viewed in terms of “institutional complementarity” (cf. Amable, 2000), i.e. they are functionally interrelated and their respective institutions are expected to co-evolve depending on environmental demands and internal structures and relationships.

Several authors have attempted to explain industrial specialization of particular countries comparing corporate governance systems (and/or institutional frameworks in general) and innovation performance. Visintin (2001) outlined Italian industrial specialization in terms of innovation activities and noticed some possible directions for its change in view of the changing corporate governance system. Tylecote and Ramirez (2005) have explained technological innovation activities of the UK companies using a well-developed characterization of the country's corporate governance and financial system. Furthermore, Casper and Matraves (2003) analyzed how governance structures impact the innovation capabilities of leading German and UK firms in the pharmaceutical industry, showing how variations in national institutional frameworks influence the innovation process and relative performance.

This exploratory paper aims to contribute to the discussions on corporate governance and innovation by explaining the interrelationship between institutional conditions, corporate strategies related to innovation, and innovation activities. Furthermore, this framework is applied to Croatia, as a (post-)transition country with a specific developmental pattern. We have structured the paper in three main parts that follow the introduction. The second section is devoted to the literature overview, after which a case-study of Croatia is presented in the third section. The latter discusses corporate governance and innovation activities in Croatia, and is broken down into further parts, which deal with the system of corporate governance, innovation strategies and performance and corporate governance and external financing of innovation, respectively. The final summarizes the main findings and offers some concluding remarks.

2. LITERATURE OVERVIEW

By corporate governance we mean “a set of relationships between a company's management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders” (OECD, 2004). Corporate governance is influenced by the firm's external and internal conditions. External factors comprise government and stock exchange regulation, national corporate governance code (if it exists) and the structure of relevant markets for capital, labour and products/services. Relevant internal conditions include ownership structure, internal organization (especially the systems of decision-making and control and organizational culture), and power relationships among different stakeholders. Corporate governance in practice revolves around the definition of strategic objectives, means to fulfill them and instruments to measure fulfillment of these objectives, as well as around defining rights and relationships between main stakeholders concerning control, income flow, assets and liabilities, and information of the enterprise (cf. Mygind, 2001).
The emergence of knowledge-based economy complicates both value creation and risk management. Lazonick and O’Sullivan (1998) argue that, given organizational control over the strategic allocation of resources and returns, learning and innovation within enterprises is enabled by financial commitment (access to the financial resources until financial returns from innovation can be reaped) and organizational integration whereby stakeholders have the necessary incentives to jointly contribute their skills and efforts in the pursuit of common goals. At the societal level, corporate governance can be viewed as a learning process that operates through interaction among various stakeholders and results in particular social habits and institutions. Its effectiveness can be analyzed in terms of processes (e.g. levels of transparency and accountability of managers and firms to their stakeholders) and (economic, social and environmental) outcomes. Effective governance requires a balancing process between the macro-level wider institutional frameworks, meso-level opportunities for stakeholder interaction and micro-level managerial autonomy and accountability (Račić and Podrug, 2004).

Given this embeddedness of governance arrangements into institutional frameworks and societal habits, there are various national systems of corporate governance. Despite emerging initiatives towards international standards (cf. OECD, 2004) and the harmonization pressures induced by globalization of financial markets and business operations, many differences are still likely to be preserved. This includes the basic distinction between Anglo-American (USA and UK) and continental European and East Asian governance systems, i.e. between “shareholder” and “stakeholder” capitalism, or (in the language of the “varieties of capitalism” literature – cf. Hall and Soskice, 2001) between “liberal” and “coordinated” market economies.

Corporate governance systems are largely associated with corresponding financial systems; Berglöf (1997) refers to the former as arm’s length (outsider-dominated) and to the latter as control oriented (insider-dominated) financial systems. Anglo-American systems tend to have larger size and stronger role of equity markets and more dispersed ownership, which results in portfolio orientation of investors towards the control of enterprises and a stronger role of boards of directors (as opposed to control-orientation of dominant shareholders and relatively weaker boards which are more frequent in systems characterized by more concentrated ownership and stronger reliance on banks, rather than equity markets)². Corporate governance cannot be reduced to the publicly traded companies or market-based modes, because that would severely limit its scope in bank-based financial systems whereby the stock market plays an ancillary role in corporate finance, and takeover threats are rare due to concentrated ownership structures. The issues such as disclosure and transparency of corporate practices, and the treatment of minority shareholders and other stakeholders are particularly pertinent here. Inadequate regulation and/or ineffective judiciary, as it can be witnessed in many (post-)transition countries, further reinforce these problems. Therefore, reliance on arm’s length modes is inadequate in the absence of markets for corporate control and a legal system that provides efficient redress mechanisms (Račić and Podrug, 2004).

Particular aspects of the corporate governance system – including modes of financing, level and types of coordination among stakeholders, corporate organization and industrial relations – can be used as arguments in support of institutional complementarity between the corporate governance system and the national innovation system. The development of one system does not presuppose the development of the other, but they tend to be mutually reinforcing. For example, Zimmermann (2004) argued that Germany (despite a developed corporate governance system) has not sufficiently developed its national innovation system – especially in the area of science-industry relationship and utilization of intellectual property rights. The combined effects of these factors may thus significantly influence the innovative activities of companies operating under different governance regimes. The common view here is that Anglo-American systems are on average more conducive to radical innovation, due to stronger reliance on equity markets (and risk capital in particular), more

² See Tylecote and Conesa (2002) for a more detailed discussion.
flexible corporate organization and restructuring facilitated by flexible industrial relations. The basic claim is expressed by Allen and Gale (2000:406): “Markets will be especially effective at financing industries that are new or where relatively little relevant data is generated, that is, industries in which information is sparse and diversity of opinion persists.” Furthermore, Casper and Whitley (2002: 1) claim that, according to the “varieties of capitalism” framework, liberal market economies “excel in developing the necessary competencies to innovate in industries dominated by rapidly emerging technologies”. However, companies can also go public abroad, as in the case of Israeli companies doing initial public offerings in the USA. On the other hand, institutional frameworks in coordinated market economies tend to favor “long-term and incremental innovation strategies, but inhibit more radical innovation paths” (cf. Whitley, 2000; Hall and Soskice, 2001). Casper and Whitley's (2002) findings related to software and biotechnology firms in Germany, Sweden and the UK largely corroborate these claims. However, the current debate about the relative merits of corporate governance systems regarding innovation cannot be automatically related to transition economies. Although these countries usually have bank-based financial systems, their institutions are often both underdeveloped and inconsistent, and capital markets may remain relatively shallow and illiquid (see the case of Croatia below).

At corporate level, corporate governance relationships and processes tend to influence innovation and technology-related activities, such as R&D (cf. Lhuillery, 2006). The empirical literature tends to focus on the influence of ownership on R&D and the influence of governance practices on R&D. The evidence on the relationship between ownership concentration and R&D activity is inconclusive. As for the relationship between type of owners and R&D activity, Munari, Oriani and Sobroso (2005) found negative relations between the bank institutional investors and R&D activity, whereas Barrone, Surroca and Triu (2005) established a positive relationship between non-bank institutional investors and R&D activity. The influence of the composition of the board of directors on R&D is researched mainly through examination of the role of the non-executive directors, whose stronger presence on the board, according to Lhuillery (2006), is relatively more likely to promote innovation. As for the relationship between the governance practices and R&D expenditures, the results are also ambiguous. The CEO compensation scheme can stimulate corporate practice (Hall & Liebman, 1998), but no significant relation between the firm's compensation scheme for their managers and R&D expenditure could be found in the literature (Eng & Shackell, 2001). The previous results suggest that corporate governance may influence R&D intensity, but it seems that the relation between corporate governance and R&D is context-dependent (on the relevance of R&D expenditure within the corporation). When innovation is strongly embedded in corporate strategy, organizational features and resource allocations, and supported by adequate governance arrangements, positive effects on R&D expenditures and innovation activities in general are quite likely. However, the relation between the corporate governance arrangements and the innovation activities is not unidirectional: there is also feedback from innovation to corporate governance. Successful innovation requires collective learning processes that lead firms to undertake coordination of investments and further to achieve productive interactions (cf. Antonelli, 2003). Depending on the novelty of innovations, sometimes a reorganization of a company is required (cf. Tylecote and Ramirez, 2005).

Furthermore, innovative capabilities of a company can often be facilitated by cooperative stakeholder relationships, which correspond to strategic concerns and are supported by adequate incentives and governance arrangements. This includes innovation cooperation with research institutions, suppliers, customers or other enterprises, as well as employee motivation through pecuniary (e.g. stock options, profit sharing, royalties etc.) and non-pecuniary means (e.g. organizational culture, learning opportunities etc.). Proactive relationships with seemingly more distant stakeholders may also increase innovative capabilities of a company – e.g. multisectoral partnerships between companies, public sector and nongovernmental organizations (cf. Bagić, Škrabalo and Narančić, 2004).

To sum up, the corporate governance system, complemented by the national innovation system, influences innovation activities in a country. That is also likely to occur at the level of particular
companies. However, both relationships are still quite under-researched. Consequently, it is useful to provide case studies of particular countries which may assist in elaboration of more sophisticated findings on the issues. This is the aim of the following section, in which we examine the case of Croatia.

3. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND INNOVATION ACTIVITIES IN CROATIA

3.1. The system of corporate governance

The corporate governance regime in Croatia has emerged primarily through privatization and institution building: economic assets have been defined and distributed through privatization, which was complemented by as defining and enforcing legal and social frameworks that govern business transactions and firms engaged in them. However, the mismanagement of privatization and institution building (cf. Račić and Cvijanović, 2005) contributed to an underdeveloped capital market, high unemployment rate and insufficient technological and managerial upgrading of companies which results in their weak competitive position in the product/service markets. The “empty shell” (cf. Županov, 2001) model of privatization and defensive restructuring has led to widespread downsizing (sometimes through early retirement) and deindustrialization. The state still has control over a major share of the economy and provides rather sizable subsidies to companies it owns (cf. Račić and Cvijanović, 2005). Furthermore, institutional insufficiency (which was especially prevalent during the 1990s, but to some extent continues to date) meant the lack, inconsistency or merely formal nature of institution building. Underdeveloped institutions have affected both the external and the internal incapacity of corporate governance mechanisms to steer business towards economically and socially viable goals and processes. Externally, weak legislation, ineffective judiciary and occasional political influences led to the neglect of legal and social regulation, therefore increasing systemic risks and transaction costs. Within companies, the lack of independent external sources of authority that would facilitate best practices encouraged authoritarian tendencies in corporate governance and management. The lack of incentives to respect regulation and legitimize power by respecting principles considered just has made governance arrangements within companies into purely formal affairs (Račić and Cvijanović, 2005). On the other hand, only a small number of companies recognized the benefits of access to the capital market, including private equity providers.

Croatian financial system is similar to other (post-)transition economies; it is characterized by the domination of banks and a relatively shallow and illiquid capital market (Cvijanović, 2004). Banks own 77.6% of all financial assets of the financial sector (Rohatinski, 2006), although their share exceeded 90% only few years ago (Samodol, 2003). In addition, almost all investment funds, pension funds and leasing companies are also owned by banks, whose total assets have exceeded USD 49 billion. Although turnover and market capitalization of shares has constantly been rising since 1999, this was mainly because of regulatory reasons and positive impact of approaching the EU (Cvijanović, 2004; Zagreb Stock Exchange, 2004, 2005, 2006). The primary capital market has underperformed in terms of number of IPOs and bond issues; as such it has not played a strong role in the financing of companies.

When it comes to ownership structures, the analysis of basic data of public joint stock companies in 2005 has shown that their ownership structures are highly concentrated. In 57% of the public joint stock companies 10 largest shareholders have more than 80% of the shares (Račić and Cvijanović, 2006). According to Hruška (2005), the largest owner of these companies has on average an ownership stake of 46.95%. Although this is not an exception in comparison with other

---

1 Empty shell means that the firm exists as an economic subject, but there is no economically relevant function (like production, marketing, distribution) except for the existence of managerial contracts with managers responsible (see Županov, 2001, p. 21).

4 They make the bulk of share trading at Zagreb Stock Exchange.
countries of continental Europe, the problem arises in connection with independent functioning of the supervisory board. Membership of the supervisory board in Croatia is primarily connected with ownership function, rather than professional competence (Račić and Cvijanović, 2006). Besides, more concentrated ownership means fewer members of the supervisory board, i.e. stronger control by the dominant shareholders. Furthermore, an average supervisory board does not fulfill all the strategic functions that are within its area of responsibility (Hruška, 2005; Tipurić, 2006). Hence, the conclusion that “ownership and control of Croatian corporations are rarely completely separated” (Hruška, 2005:128) seems well founded. The latter is also correlated with inadequate protection of minority shareholders’ rights and the lack of transparency in companies.

Consequently, the key challenges for further development of the corporate governance regime in Croatia include definition and promotion of good practices, protection of minority shareholders’ rights, stronger role of supervisory boards, higher transparency of remuneration of management board members and alignment of their compensation with the performance of the company, strengthening internal audit systems and promoting organizational cultures that facilitate transparency and sustainable value creation (cf. Račić and Cvijanović, 2006).

3.2. Innovation strategies and performance

In this section we tackle the level and characteristics of main innovation activities and the position of innovation within corporate strategies. The pilot Community Innovation Survey (cf. Račić et al., 2005) has shown that product and process innovations are relatively frequent in manufacturing enterprises (53.8%), which even exceeds the EU-15 average (47%). The level of innovativeness of the service sector (19.3%) is less than half of the EU-15 average (40%); this is particularly worrying given that service sector is dominant in the Croatian economy. The innovation process brings along significant risks and expenditures, which can inhibit or slow down its progress. Innovation activities are often marginalized within corporate strategies or reduced to incremental modifications of existing products and/or processes. These findings have been confirmed by Aralica, Račić and Redžepagić (2007, p. 12) who researched knowledge transfer in Croatian manufacturing enterprises that have received foreign direct investments. They found that knowledge- and innovation-related activities (e.g. basic and applied research, product development and process engineering) are usually undertaken outside of the Croatian subsidiaries. It should be noted that foreign ownership is associated with above-average innovativeness (Račić et al., 2005).

Following OECD’s (2005) dual classification of innovations into incremental or radical, we observe that 12.2% of the firms have introduced radical innovations. Such innovations tend to be linked with the company’s orientation to the national market: 75% of radical innovators claim that the national market for them is more important than international markets. Therefore, very few radical innovators are internationally competitive; moreover, innovations considered radical in Croatia have often already been introduced elsewhere. Correspondingly, a high share of innovators in Croatia do not undertake research and development at all (33.8% in the manufacturing sector and 20.8% in the service sector), and enterprises that invest in research and development have generally a low level of research and development intensity. Moreover, Aralica, Račić and Radić (2005) found no statistical

---

1 The overall level of R&D expenditures in the business sector (0.52% of GDP in 2004) is also low, although Croatia performs better than several new EU member states. Low technology and medium low technology industries account for almost 3/4 of the value added (74.1%) in manufacturing (Aralica, 2007). These
interdependence between R&D activities and the innovation propensity of Croatian companies. The capability to make additional revenues from innovation is weak and the economic effects of innovations (e.g. the share of revenues from new products in total revenues) are thus limited.

Inadequate economic effects point to the lack of resources and/or capabilities for innovation. A complementary explanation may also include structures of markets where firms operate. For example, markedly low levels of innovation in service sectors may be at least partly attributed to market concentration in those sectors, which are due to non-tradable nature of services and slow liberalization. Among the obstacles to innovation, high innovation expenditures and insufficient state support and the lack of the appropriate sources of finance are emphasized most frequently. The complexity of innovative activities, which result in high risks and costs, should stimulate sharing of potential risks and rewards. However, the cooperation among the Croatian enterprises in the innovation development is rather weak. 66% of product innovations and 57% of process innovations are developed within the enterprise or within the group of enterprises. Only 2.0% of innovative enterprises are cooperating with other enterprises and institutions in the innovation development. In EU-15 19% of enterprises develop innovations in cooperation. A comparison with other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which shows considerable lags, is given in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Innovation cooperation in CEEC (in %)

![Innovation cooperation in CEEC](image)

Source: EUROSTAT/Račić et. al. (2005)

The most frequent form of innovation cooperation involves suppliers of equipment, materials, components or software (manufacturing enterprises 10%, service enterprises 3.1%). The collaboration with academic institutions occupies the second place in manufacturing (6.2%) and the third place in service sectors (2.1%). Despite occasional positive examples, science-industry collaboration is still rather underdeveloped (cf. Radas, 2004; Radas and Vehovec, 2006).

Despite marginalization of innovation within corporate strategies, their low economic effects and insufficient resources and capabilities as the main obstacles to innovation, it has been observed industries are mostly based on relatively stable technologies, unlike in the medium high technology and high technology sectors (cf. OECD, 1997), which produce products using advanced and fast changing technologies that are usually accompanied by R&D investments. Consequently, companies in these sectors build their competitive position frequently by a product and/or process innovations (cf. Lall, 2001).
that enterprises rarely engage in innovation cooperation. Consequently, the industrial structure is characterized by underdeveloped strategic alliances, clusters and industrial networks. This issue is related to both strategy and corporate governance, whereby the lack of cooperative stakeholder relationships becomes a hindrance to risk sharing that would facilitate more radical innovation projects with higher value added. A possible solution to these problems may involve external investments accompanied by technological and managerial improvements, which is the topic of the next section.

3.3. Corporate governance and external financing of innovation

Improvements in corporate governance are often prerequisites and/or consequences of receiving external finance, because of transparency and reporting requirements and control mechanisms required by the providers of financial resources. Although debt may also entail strong commitments and induce governance improvements (especially in the case of debt securities) on the part of its issuer, our main focus will be on equity, given its higher risk and stronger monitoring prerogatives it implies. The pilot Community Innovation Survey (Račić et al., 2005) has shown that innovations in Croatian enterprises are mainly financed from their own resources (79.2%), followed by bank loans (8.5%) and supplier credits (9.6%), which implicates a strong connection of present innovation processes with the equipment procurement, but also points to the economic restrictions of a more important level of innovation activities in Croatian enterprises. Government subsidies to innovation activities are rather rare and are focused on manufacturing and smaller and medium size enterprises. When discussing the effects of external finance on innovative activities in companies, it is useful to distinguish two main beneficiaries of financial inflows – both of which are related to raising corporate governance standards in companies. The first group comprises existing companies that have attracted – usually foreign – capital (often in the course of privatization) and undergone restructuring that includes product and process innovations. A wider definition of this group would also comprise greenfield FDI projects, which are expected to have adequate governance mechanisms from their establishment. The second group consists of emerging innovative SMEs that require additional capital to finance their start up and expansion. However, seed and start-up capital are rather rare in Croatia. At the end of the section, we tackle the issue of venture capital – as a mode that is particularly suitable for innovation financing of smaller firms with growth potential. Namely, due to the intangibility of their assets, “smaller firms pursuing innovation strategies may face greater difficulty in obtaining debt finance for start-up and the early stages of development than their conventional counterparts” (Brierley, 2001:66).

As for the established companies, innovation in Croatian enterprises is related to the concern affiliation (62% enterprises belonging to the concern are innovative and 42.7% not belonging to the concern), which reflects positively on the transfer of innovations through the existing business groups (cf. Račić et al., 2005). Higher innovativeness of enterprises with the foreign capital share is related to this issue. Namely 59.7% of enterprises with a share of capital of foreign origin innovate, in comparison with 33.5% innovators among enterprises that have not received any foreign investments (Račić et al., 2005). Inflow of foreign capital usually brings about more effective governance and contributes to improvement of products and processes, but it is likely that that most of these product and process innovations already exist within the international concern or a business group. Since privatization takeovers, as the most significant form of foreign direct investment, were until recently focused on conquering the domestic market, it was not possible to expect strong contribution to radical innovations and export competitiveness. A peculiarity of FDI inflows into Croatia is that almost 50 percent of the total FDI has gone into the services sectors, such as transportation and telecommunications and financial intermediation (cf. Bačić, Račić and Ahec-Šonje, 2004); given the non-tradable nature of most such services, it can be concluded that the investors have been motivated by market-seeking reasons. This is linked to seeking strategic control over the domestic companies through acquisitions of majority or controlling stakes, which enables alleviation of the aforementioned governance problems (see above), easier restructuring and reaping of the corre-
sponding returns on investment. On the other hand, corporate strategies are characterized by weak linkages with SMEs and with academic institutions; their restructuring rarely involves spin-offs that can be attractive to private equity investors, or acquisitions of SMEs that have grown on their own or have been nurtured by venture capital companies. There is only one significant corporate venturing vehicle – a private equity fund of EUR 35 million founded by nine Croatian corporate investors (Quaestus Private Equity Partners).

A comparison between the industrial structures of developed and Central and East European economies reveals that in (post-)transition economies SMEs play a comparatively smaller role in corporate production networks, and are characterized by lower levels of innovation (Iliev and Račić, 2004). In Croatia, the occurrence of innovations is related to the size of an enterprise: 35% of small firms, 50.4% of medium size firms and 60.6% of large firms innovate. Although this can be explained by more resources and very pronounced specialization of employees in larger firms, an alternative interpretation emphasizes the insufficient contribution of small and medium enterprises to innovation activities, lower level of inventiveness of new products and services and thereto related lower level of economic effects of innovation (Račić et al., 2005). The lack of inventiveness entails imitation of products of established strategies and production programs of existing companies, rather than offering novelities on the market. As for the lack of innovative SMEs, it is related to underdevelopment of the science-industry collaboration in general and of technology transfer and academic entrepreneurship in particular – in terms of incentive systems and financial (subsidies, debt and equity sources) and organizational resources that would facilitate new technology based firms to go through seed and start up stages. When it comes to existing innovative SMEs, their prosperity and growth may be limited by the entrepreneurs' strategy to preserve maximal degree of strategic control and avoid accountability obligations external finance brings (cf. McMahon, 2000). In a recently undertaken research one can see that most of high growth export-oriented SMEs are owned by a single entrepreneur (or groups of entrepreneurs) who have recognized a business opportunity. Such enterprises tend to be managed in the style of enlightened paternalism. This is understandable, given the prevailing cultural norms and entrepreneurial climate during the transition period, but it is questionable whether such ownership structures and management approach are suited for future enterprise development. If the aspiration to preserve maximal control over the enterprise prevails over optimal growth strategies, that can result in obstacles to collaboration within clusters or industrial networks, as well as to restructuring and mergers/acquisitions of companies, with reduced interest on the part of external investors (Račić, Aralica and Redžepagić, 2006).

Although enterprises list market reasons as key impediments to innovation, seen mainly through high costs and lack of adequate financing sources (cf. Račić et al., 2005), Young and Cvijanović (2006) found that supply of venture capital funds, as an inherent innovation financing source, exceeds demand, which implies lack of a qualified demand, due to the predominance of debt financing and the corresponding lack of equity financing culture among Croatian entrepreneurs. Venture capital industry in Croatia is currently valued around 100 million USD. There have not been any initial public offerings initiated by venture capital or private equity companies; few exits that have been made occurred through trade sales (sales of portfolio companies to a corporation) or buybacks. Iliev and Račić (2004) identified several constraints on the deal flow (investment proposals that are made to venture capital companies) in the Central and Eastern Europe that are also applicable here. Some impediments are related to the rare emergence of SMEs with innovative products and/or significant growth potential that could be nurtured by venture capital involvement (exhaustion of the privatization pool, weak linkages with academic institutions, limited number and quality of corporate spin-offs). Others occur due to the lack of available financial and managerial resources necessary for SME creation and growth and stimulating venture capital interest and involvement. These include the lack of business angels and referral networks and experienced senior venture capital managers, as well as the aforementioned caution towards equity investments. The innovation policy should thus incorporate measures to address these concerns.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The level and characteristics of innovation activities within an economy depend upon both market and wider institutional determinants. We have thus attempted to analyze the relationship between the system of corporate governance and innovation activities, using the example of Croatia. There is a need for further research on systems of corporate governance, corporate strategies and innovation activities in (post-)transition economies, as well as on the policies that may positively affect institutional development and economic performance.

Institutional frameworks that constitute the system of corporate governance have an impact on the level and prevalent modes of innovation activities and ways in which innovations are developed, financed and implemented within enterprises. Hereby one can observe strong complementarities between the system of corporate governance, financial system and national innovation system. Despite emerging initiatives towards international standards and the harmonization pressures induced by globalization, a variety of national systems of corporate governance many differences are likely to be preserved, including the basic division between Anglo-American and continental European and East Asian governance systems. Particular aspects of the corporate governance system – including modes of financing, level and types of coordination among stakeholders, corporate organization and industrial relations are also useful for understanding the innovation activities and the national innovation system. The current debate about the relative merits of corporate governance systems regarding innovation cannot be automatically applied to (post-)transition economies. Their bank-based financial systems are often characterized by underdeveloped and/or inconsistent institutions, whereas their capital markets may suffer from being shallow and illiquid.

This has been the case in Croatia, whereby underdeveloped institutions have affected both the external and the internal incapacity of corporate governance mechanisms. The aforementioned factors both external to companies (like weak legislation, ineffective judiciary and occasional political influences coupled with underdeveloped markets) and within companies (authoritarian management tendencies on a fertile ground of a formal nature of corporate governance arrangements) have negatively influenced the quantity and impact of innovation activities. Despite regulatory and capital market-related improvements, the system of corporate governance is still insufficiently conducive to innovation and, more generally, to corporate strategies based on investment, innovation and stakeholder engagement. In other words, there is a misalignment between the corporate governance system and innovative activities that characterize the emerging knowledge-based economy: the current conditions are conducive primarily to non-complex innovation activities. Enterprises with more ambitious business strategies based on innovation and higher governance and competitiveness standards may be burdened by higher risks and costs. This is reflected in the marginalization of innovation within corporate strategies, which lead to their low economic effects. Despite insufficient resources and capabilities as the main obstacles to innovation projects with higher value added. This can at least in part be addressed by external investments accompanied by technological and managerial improvements. This may involve domestic and foreign direct investments into greenfield projects, established companies, including the innovative SMEs with a growth potential. The latter could be particularly effectively served by venture capital, whose involvement is limited by a limited deal flow. The lack of innovative SMEs is related to underdevelopment of the science-industry collaboration in general and technology transfer and academic entrepreneurship in particular – in terms of incentive systems and financial and organizational resources that would facilitate new technology based firms to go through seed and start up stages. The prosperity and growth of existing innovative SMEs may be limited by the entrepreneurs' strategy to preserve maximal degree of strategic control and avoid accountability obligations external finance brings.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Članak obrađuje implikacije sustava korporativnog upravljanja na raznim i prevladavajućim formama inovacijskih aktivnosti te na načine razvoja, financiranja i primjene inovacija u poduzećima. Cilj članka je doprinijeti raspravi o korporativnom upravljanju i inovacijama kroz objašnjenje odnosa između institucionalnih uvjeta, poslovnih strategija vezanih uz inovacije i inovacijske aktivnosti. Pritom se koristi primjer Hrvatske, kao (post-)tranzicijske zemlje s osobitim razvojnom putanjom. Međutim, aktuelna rasprava o učincima temeljnih sustava korporativnog upravljanja (Anglo-američkog i kontinentalnog europskog) na inovacijske aktivnosti ne može se adekvatno primijeniti na (post-)tranzicijske zemlje. Učinkovitost nacionalnog inovacijskog sustava odvjet na složenosti inovacijskih aktivnosti u poduzećima, kao i u njihovim učincima na konkurentnost poduzeća i ekonomskih sektora. Sustav korporativnog upravljanja također trenutno ne pruža adekvatne poticaje razvoju ekonomije utemeljene na znanju, jer...
potiče inovacijske aktivnosti manje razine složenosti. To se odražava u mar-
ginalnoj ulozi inovacija u poslovnoj strategiji, i njihovim niskim ekonomskim
učincima. Nepostojanje suradničkih odnosa interesno-utjecajnih skupina
sprečava podjelu rizika koja bi omogućila realizaciju inovacijskih projekata s
većom dodanom vrijednošću. Ovaj problem se dijelom može riješiti vanjskim
ulaganjima (povezanim s tehnološkim i upravljačkim unapređenjima) u nove
projekte i postojeća poduzeća – napose u mala i srednja poduzeća s velikim
potencijalom rasta.

Ključne riječi: KORPORATIVNO UPRAVLJANJE, INSTITUCIJE, NA-
CIONALNI INOVACIJSKI SUSTAV, INOVACIJSKE AKTIVNOSTI, HRVAT-
SKA